leader and organization and lay down general principles for ordinary
situations, for combat tasks, and for formations, but should not, by
their rules, direct the actions of a leader from the very beginning
into definite grooves. If the regulations contain a normal procedure,
there is danger that it will be employed where inappropriate, and that
the mental alertness of the leaders will relax and fail in war at the
very moment when its presence is most vitally necessary.[207]
[207] “Leaders who have been trained only in the mechanical part of
drill and who subsequently have to act independently, fare like the
lame man deprived of his crutches, or the near-sighted man deprived
of his spectacles.” VON SEIDLITZ.
“Tactics will always vary according to the nature of the ground,
therefore it is impossible to tell beforehand what might happen in each
particular case.” (FREDERICK THE GREAT). Whether or not a particular
normal procedure is appropriate does not depend upon the terrain but
solely upon the tactical situation.[208]
[208] It is only in cases where precisely identical situations
may be presumed to exist that there can be any question of a normal
procedure. The last stages of the infantry attack in fortress
warfare present features of this nature and on that account a normal
procedure has been formulated for it in almost all of the European
armies.
While there is considerable unanimity of opinion as to the general
manner of carrying out an attack, opinions differ radically as to
details. “If all the advocates of a normal attack had to describe
it in words, there would be about as many suggestions as there are
advocates. Which of the many normal attack schemes is the most
suitable for average troops? A conference called for the purpose of
investigating this point would probably have the strange result that
each representative would concede that what the others desire is
practicable but need not be done.”[209] Anyone who thinks himself
capable of evolving a normal procedure, should bear in mind that
all such systems have invariably failed to fulfill the expectations
entertained for them because of obstacles which could not have been
foreseen during their preparation. Regulations that prescribe too many
details are very apt to lead to stereotyped forms and to that which
cannot stand the test of actual war. So far every war has had surprises
in store for the troops and this will be equally true in the future.
Troops will be able to find a way out of such situations only if they
have been taught to follow the spirit rather than the letter of their
regulations, if they have been individually trained and accustomed to
strict discipline, and if their leaders have been taught to reflect on
tactics. It is better to send troops into battle with the order, “Help
yourselves as best you can,” than to encumber them with combat rules of
doubtful value which leave them in the lurch at the first opportunity,
because the troops have not been taught to depend upon their own
initiative. The consequent indecision is increased in the same
proportion as the faith the troops and their leaders had in the lauded
universal remedy, the normal procedure. In spite of the excellence of
our regulations, we should accustom ourselves to the idea that a future
war may correct their provisions.[210]
[209] General BRONSART V. SCHELLENDORFF, _I, Betrachtungen_, etc.
p. 42
_British Drill Regulations_: “Although a normal attack is
apparently capable of being changed to suit the various situations,
the continual practice of it leads to a stereotyped formation, to
lack of skill and mobility. The disadvantages coupled with a normal
attack are not apparent in time of peace, but in war they will make
themselves felt through losses and failures.”
[210] Major VON HÜLSEN, _Schema oder Selbständigkeit?_, (Berlin,
1906).
The enunciation of certain technical combat principles as a guide in
the training of the troops is, however, far removed from laying down
a stereotyped form for attack (normal attack). Every thinking officer
will anyhow, consciously or unconsciously, formulate in his own mind
some sort of a “normal attack”, which is nothing but a firm opinion
of how he thinks an attack ought to be carried out. If such combat
regulations are called “drill attack” (_Schulangriff_), many of the
objections advanced against the normal attack are eliminated. Such
definite provisions facilitate in a great measure the intercourse
between leader and troops.
“Instructions as to what to do in battle,” says Clausewitz (_On
War_, II), “must not be taken for more than they are; they should
not be regarded as hard and fast rules or systems, but merely as
good general forms which individual judgment can utilize as is most
suitable.... By means of a uniform method, commanders attain skill,
precision, and confidence, the possession of which qualities on their
part will make the whole machine run easier....
“The drawback is that the habit of acting in a certain groove tends
to become fixed and thus antiquated while the attendant circumstances
imperceptibly change, and this should be prevented by enlightened and
thorough criticism. When, in the year 1806, the Prussian generals
(Prince Louis at =Saalfeld=; Tauenzien on the =Dornberg= at =Jena=;
Grawert in front of and Rüchel in rear of =Kapellendorf=) without
exception came to grief by employing Frederick the Great’s system
of tactics, it was due not merely to the fact that they had gotten
into a certain groove of acting which was out of date, but to the
most dire poverty of resource to which a fixed system of tactics has
ever led. Owing to this incapacity of thinking for themselves, they
involved Hohenlohe’s army in such ruin as has never before or since
overtaken any army on the battlefield.”
General von Boguslawski[211] demands that the conduct of the attack
be regulated by precise instructions both on the drill-ground and in
action. He states: “The many different methods of dealing with even
the simplest cases, unquestionably evident in the army at the present
time, are an evil calculated not only to train but also to confuse
the soldier and the subordinate leader. Precise regulations are by
no means incompatible with adaptation to the varying features of the
terrain in a given case, and will infuse unity and certainty into
offensive movements. A normal formation must be prescribed, but it
should be flexible.”
[211] _Taktische Darlegungen_, p. 51.
Elsewhere he makes the following statement in regard to a normal
attack: “I believe that the normal attack should be regarded as the
basis of troop training--a solid foundation for further development.
In carrying out the spirit of this procedure, further work should be
done on varied ground. This spirit aims at the unity of the attack.
The formations taught on the drill-ground should be retained as
long as possible. The training of officers and men must be such,
however, that they will deviate, whenever necessary, from these
normal formations. But if the formations, as well as the training
and drill, are truly practical and adapted for war, departures from
the scheme laid down in the regulations will be insignificant. This,
briefly, is my idea of the normal attack or uniform procedure, which
not only does not have a detrimental effect, but, on the contrary, is
absolutely necessary in order to facilitate the work of the higher
leader.”
General von Scherff states:[212]
“It would contribute to clearness and to proper division of
responsibility if the regulations would definitely prescribe:--
“1. That only the superior commander who makes dispositions for
battle according to his own judgment, be charged with assigning
appropriate missions;
“2. That the subordinate leader, charged with the execution of
a mission, determine, by an independent choice of any expedient
provided by the regulations, the formation in which his organization
is to carry out the task assigned; and, finally,
“3. That the subsequent conduct of such an organization be governed
by a definite normal procedure, familiar to the men from the
drill-ground, so as to ensure mutual coöperation of its component
parts.”
[212] _Einheitsangriff oder individualisierter Angriff_, Berlin,
1902.
2. CONCENTRATION, DEVELOPMENT, AND DEPLOYMENT FOR ACTION.[213]
[213] _Aufmarsch_, _Entfaltung_, _Entwicklung_.
Column tactics, which influenced us even after the Franco-German
war, required that troops be concentrated, prior to an action, from
the narrow route column into a broad combat formation. This tedious
systematic =concentration=[214] was invariably employed before
entering an action, except when, in critical situations, companies
and battalions had to be launched into the fight directly from route
column. The commander of a force could reduce the time required for
going into action only by approaching the field of battle in assembly
formation.[215]
[214] “By _concentration_ is meant the passage from route column to
a broader close order formation. It is employed for the purpose of
decreasing the depth of a column and for assembly.” (Par. 315 German
I. D. R.)
[215] Examples: The approach of the IInd Army to the battlefield of
Gravelotte, see _Taktik_, III, p. 305.
The advance of the 1st Army from its cantonments toward the
Bistrits to the battlefield of Königgrätz was a mistake. The
army first approached in route columns, then concentrated, again
formed route columns, and finally concentrated for action. V.
LETTOW-VORBECK, II, pp. 407 and 480. From what I know of the terrain
the advance should in this case have been made in assembly formations.
Valuable time was thus lost. Even when the situation was not pressing,
the leader was obliged, for example, to allow a regiment having a depth
of 1200 m. to close up to a depth of 100 paces. When this had been
done, he was forced to wait until thin skirmish lines gained a proper
distance to the front. The rear elements were able to follow only
when the skirmishers had gained a distance approximately equal to the
former depth of the entire column. Such a concentration is only proper
however, when the commander wishes to launch his troops subsequently in
several directions. Advantage should be taken of every opportunity for
decreasing the depth of the column (by forming column of sections).
The advance of large bodies of troops presents no difficulties even in
close country, if, as recommended by the author,[216] the battalions in
route column are placed abreast of each other and are permitted to go
around obstacles and take advantage of the cover available. However,
even at long ranges, troops in such formations present favorable
targets to hostile machine guns and artillery.
[216] See _Taktik_, III, p. 307.
The British were surprised in close order formations at
=Magersfontain= and =Colenso=. In subsequent engagements, in order
to avoid this, their infantry, when still a great distance away from
the enemy, took up an attack formation which permitted only movements
directly to the front (at =Poplar Grove,= for example, this was
done when 10 km. from the enemy). An advance in such a formation
was possible only because the plains of South Africa presented no
obstacles, and because the British had only to hold the enemy who
stood passively on the defensive. Each brigade formed its four
battalions into an open double column with a front of 2000 and a
depth of 800 m., the distances and intervals between battalions being
300-400 m. Each battalion deployed from this column so that its eight
companies, each in a thin line (with 2 and finally 20 pace intervals
between the men), followed each other at a distance of 100-120 paces.
The advantage of having troops in hand so that they can be used in
other directions than straight to the front, had disappeared.
[Illustration: =The Formation of a Brigade of Four Battalions of the
6th Infantry Division=
during the advance on =Poplar Grove= on March 7th, 1900. Front about
800 m., depth, 1800-2000 m.]
When an engagement is expected, the different elements, each in route
column, are directed upon their several objectives, i.e., the column
is _developed for action_. This is done because it is necessary to
gain a start over the enemy in deployment and advantageous to move
in route column. Thus a =development for action= (_Entfaltung_)[217]
is nothing but an extension of front accomplished by breaking up the
original route column into a number of separate columns. The latter
march on diverging lines and can generally remain in route column.
Deep column should not be formed unless an immediate extension is not
anticipated. During the development for action, preparations should be
made providing for the necessary depth of the combat formation.
[217] The German I. D. R. make a distinction between extension of
front, “development for action” (_Entfaltung_, pars. 315 and 466),
and “distribution in depth” (_Gliedern_, pars. 287-291 and 427). The
term “to form for attack” (_Auseinanderziehen_, par. 241), means that
troops are given a combat formation both as regards frontage and
depth.
When the necessity for engaging can be foreseen, the concentration into
an assembly formation should be avoided, since it generally entails a
loss of time and energy, and the development for action chosen instead.
(Par. 315 German I. D. R.). The latter has the additional advantage
of affording a higher degree of readiness for action without letting
the troops get out of hand. It should be practiced not only from route
column but also from assembly formation.[218]
[218] See the defeat of the Russian Reserve Brigade under Orlov
on September 2nd, 1904, at Liao Yang, in _Angriffsverfahren der
Japaner_, by von Lüttwitz.
The development for action should begin as soon as there is danger of
getting under effective artillery fire. The length of time required for
going into action may be reduced by shortening the route column (by
concentrating the troops into deep column); by forming several route
columns abreast, unless column of sections has already been formed; by
clearing the roads of troops; by marching across country; by indicating
beforehand on which side of the infantry the artillery is to be
brought up (pars. 315-323 German I. D. R.); and, finally, by directing
the heads of the various elements upon their respective objectives.
(Development for action).
In the Austrian regulations, the development for action is not
so clearly emphasized: “A concentration preceding the attack in
rencontres is permissible in only those exceptional cases when it
becomes apparent, during the preparatory stage of the action, that
the enemy has a visible start in deployment.” When time is not
pressing, the regulations prescribe a concentration for action and,
simultaneously therewith, such a grouping of the principal units (if
possible out of range of the effective fire of hostile guns, and
well concealed) that the attacking troops need move only straight to
the front. A more extended formation is taken up when the zone of
hostile artillery fire is reached. The march to the battlefield is
discussed in detail by the French regulations: In the first place,
in order to take advantage of cover and to keep the roads clear for
artillery, it will be necessary to leave the road and to advance
across country. This will, as a rule, result in widening the front
of the advancing force, even though this be only to the extent of
placing columns abreast of each other. Hourly halts are to be made,
so as to give an opportunity for replenishing ammunition and time for
reconnaissance. Small columns are preferred in woods and in close
country and larger columns on passable ground. Attention is specially
called to the danger to which troops are exposed when surprised in
defiles by hostile fire. This march to the battlefield is followed by
a concentration of the troops in concealed and protected positions.
The =deployment for action= (_Entwicklung_) consists of forming the
troops for battle and includes the extension into line of skirmishers.
As a rule, the deployment follows the development for action, but may
be made directly from route column or from an assembly formation.
It is impossible to define clearly where the development for action
ceases and where the deployment begins. The formation of a line of
skirmishers to cover a route column does not constitute a deployment.
There is no room for doubt that the regulations have in mind the
rencontre, in which the passage from route column to skirmish line
proceeds naturally and smoothly. In attacking an enemy prepared to
defend a position, the procedure is much more cautious. In this case
the force which has been developed for action is withdrawn as much
as possible from the view and the fire of the enemy (par. 367 German
I. D. R.), and led forward from cover to cover. (Par. 369 German I.
D. R.). Even in situations in which haste is required, it is a good
plan to follow the procedure laid down by the regulations, viz: “First
direct the troops upon the proper objective, then give them a suitable
formation.”
An analysis of the question as to whether an immediate launching
of troops into action is necessary (5th Infantry Division at
=Vionville=) or whether they should first be regularly concentrated
(6th Infantry Division at =Vionville=) is of special interest. The
concentration of the 1st Prussian Army Corps at =Waterloo=, and
of the 5th Bavarian Infantry Brigade at =Nehweiler= (=Wörth=),
almost in rear of the French, is justly criticised. At =Nachod=,
the Austrian brigades, owing to their time-consuming concentration,
lost an opportunity of throwing the weak Prussian advanced troops
from the heights south of Wysokow, while the latter were reinforced
by parts of the main body which arrived by half-battalions. This
reinforcement, while made in driblets, was, however, sufficient.
During its march to the battlefield of =Gravelotte=, the 3rd Infantry
Division concentrated at Buxieres for the purpose of cooking. Then
it formed again in route column, concentrated once more south of
Rezonville, and from there moved on in echelon formation. The
concentration of the 28th Infantry Brigade on August 6th, 1870
(=Spicheren=), was still less justifiable. About noon, when the head
of the brigade reached the exit of the Kollertal Wood at Raschpfuhl,
it received orders to cross the Saar. Upon receiving this order, the
five battalions present concentrated, unfurled their flags and then
marched across country to the railroad bridge of Mattstall. In order
to effect a crossing, route column had to be formed again. The delays
which occurred here led the parts of the force which had crossed
first, to throw themselves into the fight.[219]
[219] _Geschichte des Regiments Nr. 77_, p. 51.
3. THE BATTALION, THE REGIMENT, AND THE BRIGADE.
When part of a larger force, the battalion may be broken up into
companies either by directing the latter upon their respective
objectives, or by forming for attack by command.
When forming for attack by command, the front, the base company,
intervals, distances, and the relation of the companies to each other
must be indicated. The intervals should be sufficiently large to permit
the companies to move unhampered, and so maintained that irregularities
of marching will not be communicated from one to the other.
A space approximately equal to the front of a platoon will suffice
for this purpose. Thus the interval between companies at war strength
would be 150 paces, and between companies at peace strength 100 paces.
Intervals may be increased or diminished when necessary so as to enable
the troops to take the fullest advantage of cover. The same holds true
for distances. For rules in regard to the distance between the second
and first line, see p. 121, supra. When a battalion has formed line
of companies at long range from the enemy for the purpose of reducing
the effect of the hostile fire, distances should be diminished to
facilitate the transmission of orders.
When the battalion is acting alone, the intervals depend upon the
purpose of the combat. In the fights around Mukden, some of the
Japanese battalions, stationed at points where the decision was not
sought, were each assigned a front of 800 m. In these cases the four
companies of each battalion had to be deployed abreast of each other at
large intervals.
[Illustration]
It is impossible to prescribe fixed forms of deployment for particular
situations. In each case the formation of the battalion depends upon
the situation, the purpose of the combat, and the nature of the ground,
the battalion commander having the option of going into action in one,
two, or three lines.
Moreover, the formation depends upon whether--
1. The battalion is acting alone or as part of a larger force; and
whether one or both of its flanks are resting on impassable obstacles;
2. Whether it is fighting a decisive or a containing action; whether it
is to attack or to stand on the defensive;
3. Whether it is to prepare the attack by its own fire or is to take
advantage of the preparation effected by other troops; and, finally,
4. Whether or not it has to fight at night.
=A battalion acting alone=, whose flanks are not resting on natural
obstacles, will, as a rule, place entire companies successively into
action so as to retain complete organizations for other purposes. It
will seldom be proper for the battalion to form for attack in the
regular manner. When this can be done the battalion should form in
three lines in conformity with its task of initiating, carrying out,
and deciding the fight. In this case the leading company is reinforced
by the second company as soon as the situation has become sufficiently
clear. More frequently, the battalion commander will send only a single
company into action, retaining the others for the time being under
cover.
[Illustration]
The =advance guard battalion= of a regiment will, as a rule, be
compelled to develop considerable fire in a _rencontre_ (par. 357
German I. D. R.), in order to check the advance of the enemy,
and for this purpose it will frequently place two companies into
action at once. But since the battalion commander cannot count upon
reinforcements and, moreover, as he does not know on which flank the
combat is subsequently going to develop, he will provisionally retain
the other two companies in rear of the center, or echelon them in rear
of both flanks. (See “a” and “b” above figure).
[Illustration]
In a =containing action= one should endeavor to employ few rifles
but, on the other hand, expend much ammunition, and keep supports and
reserves far in rear so as to minimize the losses. If the force is to
deploy first of all only for fire action, but is later to participate
in the decisive attack, it will be advisable to place two companies in
the first line, one in the second, and one in the third. The companies
in the second and third lines will then be less exposed to hostile
fire, and the battalion commander will be able, by first launching one
and then the other company, to exercise an influence on the course of
the action during a longer period than would otherwise be possible.
(See “b”).
[Illustration]
=When a battalion is fighting as part of a larger force=, and when
both its flanks are secure, it will need only supports for feeding
the frontal attack (par. 289 German I. D. R.) and can cover a greater
front. A reserve may either be entirely dispensed with, or made very
weak.
When only one flank of the battalion is secure, the threatened flank
should be protected by echeloning the supports and the reserve in
rear of it. In this position, these echelons are not so apt to be
bullet-stops as when they are placed in rear of the center. Besides,
they can more easily execute enveloping movements and can take a
hostile flank attack in flank. When both flanks are in the air, only
the most essential precautions should be taken on the one flank, while
on the other everything available is united for the decisive attack.