owing to their numerical inferiority, but because they fear the losses
which they would suffer if they advanced further. The determination
to conquer has been overcome by the desire to live. The confusion of
impressions increases with the size of the force. Taken individually,
the men might behave quite sensibly, but in a crowd they are claimed
either by insanity or lethargy. The activity of the mind is completely
replaced by imagination; everything is believed; nothing is appraised;
exaggeration prevails everywhere; and precipitation produces unthought
of results. When the men come to their senses, it is as if they were
awakened from a stupor; they are unable to understand how fear could
have induced them to do the very opposite from that which would, most
surely, have saved them from destruction.”[184]
[184] KUROPATKIN-KRAHMER, _Kritische Rückblicke auf den
Russisch-Türkischen Krieg_, I, p. 150.
In the midst of the impressions of the battle of St. Privat, General
von Kessel wrote: “The men appear to be either extraordinarily excited
or stupefied. Their faces are distorted and only a few still retain
firm will power.”
General Bonnal describes his first impressions at the battle of
Wörth as follows: “Since half-past seven our battalion was lying,
facing eastward, in the neighborhood of the wood of Fröschweiler. The
shrieking of the Prussian shells, but especially the noise of the
shells bursting in the midst of the batteries of the 3rd Division
in position in our rear, made a considerable impression on our men.
Their joking ceased, and nervousness was plainly visible in their pale
faces. Men to whom tobacco was offered declined it; they had no desire
to smoke. All eyes were focused upon the officers. The latter were
congregated here and there in small groups; a few were trying hard to
joke, others were walking up and down, with a cigarette between their
lips, making convulsive efforts to appear at ease; a small number
were entirely calm as if no danger was present.... The first batch of
wounded made a strong impression. The battalion was to reinforce the
Turcos in the edge of the wood of Fröschweiler. The fire of the Turcos
drowned all other sounds. There was nothing to indicate that the enemy
was also concentrating a heavy fire upon the wood. We deployed into
line to the right. The deployment began, but scarcely ten men had
reached the edge of the wood when a terrible cracking and rattling
commenced. It was a mitrailleuse battery which fired a volley directly
under our very noses. At this moment our men lost their heads. They
blazed away like mad, crowded in three, four, and five ranks at the
foot of the downward slope. The men in front had thrown themselves to
the ground, the others fired kneeling or standing, leaning against
trees. Since all of the men fired without aiming, enveloped moreover
by a dense, impenetrable cloud of smoke, the advanced lines were in
greater danger of being hit by French bullets than by those of the
enemy. We had to throw ourselves to the ground to avoid being shot down
by the lines in rear. On the hill opposite to us, at a range of 300 to
400 m., there rested a white smoke cloud, and we could indistinctly
discern the enemy, who was keeping up a lively fire. The powder smoke
enveloping us was so dense that we literally could not breathe.” This
excitement gradually subsided and the leaders were able to get the
troops again under control.
The numerous surrenders of British troops in the engagements of
the Boer War were due to the peculiar conditions existing in the
theater of war. Besides, Boer and Briton spoke the same language.
During the first few days of the campaign, surrenders of detachments
of considerable strength took place. These were not punished with
sufficient severity. One almost gains the impression that the men
considered the surrenders justifiable in order to escape from a
difficult situation.
On the South African battlefields, devoid of cover and swept for
great distances by the hostile fire, it was indeed very difficult
to penetrate the hostile position, and retrograde movements were
undoubtedly attended with heavy losses. To this may be added the fact
that it was easy for the Boers, who were mounted, to bar the way to
isolated British forces. It must be remembered, moreover, that the
operations took place during the hottest season and in a country where
water is scarce; and that the men felt they had arrived at the limit
of their powers of physical endurance at an earlier moment than would
have been the case under different conditions. Thus, the surrender at
Stromberg of troops exhausted from a night march, is perhaps excusable;
not so, however, the surrender of Colonel Carleton’s detachment,
which laid down its arms at Nicholson’s Neck after offering a feeble
resistance. In the last-mentioned case, it is true, several Englishmen,
who had already laid down their arms, stood among the Boers so that the
commander of the British force did not really know just what action to
take in this situation. His hesitation decided his fate. The demand
must unquestionably be made in future also,[185] that troops surrounded
in the field make a serious attempt to cut their way out before
permitting thoughts of surrender to enter their minds.
[185] In contrast to this view the British court of inquiry found
all but three of the 226 surrenders, which occurred up to June 1st,
1900, justified. In the three cases in which the verdict was adverse
only a few men had surrendered. Within a period of eight months
the British lost a total of 1680 officers and 2124 men killed and
wounded, while their loss in prisoners amounted to 182 officers and
4984 men.
It is impossible to determine theoretically what losses troops are
able to endure. After the Franco-German War it was believed that
troops had reached the limit of endurance after losing one-third to
one-fourth of their strength. Nowadays this limit would appear to be
reached much sooner. It may be pointed out, however, that the neglect
of continuing the attack at Colenso (loss 5.8%), and at Spionskop (loss
7.2%), may, in part, be charged to lack of energy in the commander;
and that the Brigade of Highlanders, consisting of 2000 rifles and
deployed on a front of about 4000 m., in the engagement at Paardeberg
(loss 13.4%), lacked the necessary depth to continue the attack.
The greater the degree of efficiency and freshness of troops, and
the less the degree of suddenness with which they enter a difficult
situation, the greater the losses which they will be capable of
enduring. Furthermore, we should not forget that our modern personnel
has become much more susceptible to the impressions of battle. The
steadily improving standards of living tend to increase the instinct
of self-preservation and to diminish the spirit of self-sacrifice.
The spirit of the times looks upon war as an avoidable evil, and this
militates directly against that courage which has a contempt for death.
The fast manner of living at the present day undermines the nervous
system,[186] the fanaticism and the religious and national enthusiasm
of a bygone age are lacking, and, finally, the physical powers of the
human species are also partly diminishing. The influence exerted by
officers on the firing line is nowadays, however, considerably smaller
than in the past, so much so that they can actually control only the
nearest skirmishers. In addition, the nerve-racking impressions on the
battlefield are much greater at present than in the past. The “_void
of the battlefield_”[187] has become especially pronounced since the
introduction of smokeless powder. “_The invisibility of the enemy
directly affects the morale of the soldier, the sources of his energy
and his courage. The soldier who cannot see his enemy, is inclined
to see him everywhere. It is but a step from this impression to
hesitancy and then to fear._ The inertia of the troops for whole days
at Magersfontain, Colenso, and Paardeberg, frequently more than 800
m. from the enemy, was not produced by their losses, but by the moral
depression which is caused within the effective zone of rifle fire.”
(General NÉGRIER.)[188]
[186] See SPAITS, _Mit Kasaken durch die Mandschurei_. After the
author had turned away in disgust from a Chinese execution, he wrote:
“And we Europeans will feel just like this in war. We will get to a
certain point where the strength of our will and our physical powers
will succumb to the weakness of our nerves, and this state we will
reach more quickly than did the Russians, who were better off in
regard to nerves than members of those armies in which nervousness is
carefully fostered.” See also this author’s remarks about _Courage_,
_ibid._, p. 206.
[187] This complaint of the “void of the battlefield” is not
new. A Saxon officer complains of it in his _Vertrauten Briefen_
(Cologne, 1807), and the French officers report on the “void of the
battlefield” in the fights around Metz. BONNAL, _L’art nouveau en
Tactique_, p. 90.
[188] _Revue des deux mondes_, for June, 1902.
The effect of danger on the battlefield is indicated by--
1. Derangement of tactical units;
2. The mixing of men of the different units during the action; and
3. The dissolution of units into disorderly masses.
According to the _History of the Kaiser Franz Regiment_ (p. 113)
immediately after the battle of =St. Privat=, most of the companies
numbered only 30 men, and the whole regiment only 340 men, although,
allowing for losses, there should have been 1922 men. The three
companies of the 39th Füsilier Regiment which had fought in the
=Stiring Wald= at =Spicheren=, numbered only 6 officers and 150
men at the close of the fight in the evening,[189] which means
that, allowing for losses, 350 men were missing. After the battle
of =Colombey=, when the Füsilier Battalion of the 55th Regiment
was assembled, three companies numbered only 120, 60 and 40 men,
respectively. This battalion had lost about 300 men.[190]
[189] _Gen. St. W._, I, p. 366.
[190] _Geschichte des Regiments_, p. 347.
The plan of the battle of Colombey given in the General Staff Account
(_Gt. St. W._) shows at 7 P. M. 17 companies belonging to 5 different
infantry regiments, and to two different infantry brigades, occupying
a front of 1200 paces, in the following order:
7. 1. 4. 8. 4. 6. 12. 7. }
-------, ----, ----, ----, ----, ----, ----, ----, }
Jägers. 55. 15. 15. 53. 15. 15. 15. }
{ 10. 11. 12. 1. 1. 9.10. 4.3. Cos.
{ ------------, ----, ----, -----, -----,
{ 13. 13. 73. 15. 73. Inf.
At =Wörth= 17 different regiments were represented on a front of 5700
paces.
“The assault on =Elsaszhausen= (=Wörth=), after preliminary forest
fighting, mixed up the troops of the different brigades and in some
cases caused the dissolution of battalions.... The 44th Brigade was
the only one that remained in fairly good order. Abreast and in rear
of it were portions of all the other regiments (of the XIth Army
Corps) which, at the moment, however, represented no actual reserves.
Even the battalions in the first line hardly appeared to be tactical
entities.”[191]
[191] _Gen. St. W._, I, p. 268.
At several points it was possible to assemble the stragglers into
formed bodies; but the men in these, commanded by strange officers,
easily succumbed to the influences of the combat, and the units
disintegrated rather quickly as soon as they came under fire.[192]
[192] For details see KUNZ, _Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele_, XVI,
pp. 122, 124, 177, 231-234.
In the =Giefert Wald= (=Spicheren=) out of 32 companies (4
brigades) only four companies fought together as a battalion. In
the little =Wenzelberg Wood= (at =Nachod=) there were engaged 7¹⁄₂
Austrian battalions (belonging to four different regiments) and 2
Jäger-Battalions, all of these troops belonging to three different
brigades.[193] No attempt was made to lead these troops as one body.
[193] _Austrian Gen. St. W._, 1866, III, p. 81.
In the oak wood at =Dubno= (=Skalitz=), there were engaged 12¹⁄₂
and 8¹⁄₂ battalions belonging to four different regiments and to
two different army corps. “The Prussian orders led to a breaking up
of the order of battle and to a considerable mixing of brigades,
regiments and battalions. In consequence of this, control was lost to
a certain extent by the commander-in-chief, and the result achieved
was mainly due to the skill and intelligence of the subordinate
leaders--especially that of the commanders of battalions and half
battalions.”[194]
[194] KÜHNE, _Kritische Wanderungen_, II, p. 48.
“The wooded region in rear of =St. Hubert= was thickly infested with
stragglers of all arms. White, red, and blue shoulder straps were to
be seen in profusion; men with and without rifles; some with helmets,
some with caps, some bareheaded. There were no officers present
except those stretched wounded upon the ground. The superior officers
riding through the valley assembled the men they found, but it proved
only a small force that they gathered, for the greater portion of
the men were safely ensconced to one side of the bottom of the
valley.”[195] “At 5 P. M., the garrison of =St. Hubert= had increased
to 43 companies, belonging to seven different regiments, and the
result was utterly hopeless confusion.”[196]
[195] HÖNIG, _Vierundzwanzig Stunden Moltkescher Strategie_, p. 139.
[196] _Ibid._, p. 167.
“At 10 P. M., 48 battalions of the VIIth, VIIIth and IInd Corps
occupied a space of barely 1500 m. front and a depth of 1000 m., east
of the Mance ravine opposite the French position. Fortunately the
enemy was so exhausted that we were able to commit the most serious
mistakes with impunity under the very muzzles of his rifles.”[197]
[197] _Ibid._, p. 224.
“At =Sedan= bodies of infantry of the XIth Corps, as well as of the
46th Infantry and of the 5th Jäger-Battalion, had gotten mixed up
with the 43rd Brigade during the course of the battle. The regiments
of the 43rd Brigade had likewise been so disorganized that after the
capture of =Cazal= the brigade commander had nothing at his disposal
but the most heterogeneous mass of troops consisting of about a
battalion.”[198]
[198] _Gen. St. W._, II, p. 1249.
“In penetrating into =Lovtcha= (1877) the foremost battalions became
disorganized. The companies, and even single soldiers, stood around
in irregular groups on the streets, crowded into the houses and
sought cover in drainage ditches.”[199] “In one battalion of the
_Kasan_ Regiment, which was to move through the town from the left
flank, officers and men threw themselves down when the enemy’s fire
became effective and only with difficulty could they be induced to
rise. When the regimental commander fell, everybody fled, carrying
along those in rear. Only two company columns, composed of stragglers
of different organizations, resisted, deployed into a dense skirmish
line and, encouraged by their officers, rushed forward cheering.”[200]
[199] KUROPATKIN-KRAHMER, _Kritische Rückblicke auf den
Russich-Türkischen Krieg_, I, pp. 68 and 72.
[200] _Ibid._, I, p. 72.
This fighting power of improvised units, when there were officers
left to lead them, was displayed on several occasions at =Plevna=.
The IInd and IIIrd Battalions of the _Kaluga_ Regiment (in the third
battle of =Plevna=) after taking the second crest, thoughtlessly
continued the advance in complete disorder.
“Skobeleff foresaw the coming reverse and attempted to form a
reserve, but only by dint of the greatest exertions on the part of
the officers was it possible to collect about 100 men belonging
to various companies. The men of the IInd and IIIrd Battalions of
the Kaluga Regiment were scattered all over the battlefield, the
companies had become completely mixed up, and it was a matter of the
greatest difficulty to re-form them.”[201]
[201] _Ibid._, I, p. 154.
“Dense firing lines, composed of men of all the regiments,
attempted to climb the opposite slope but they got only half way;
400 paces from the Turkish works they halted. The survivors of the
organizations participating in the action gradually assembled in
Work No. 1, which had been taken. While only a couple of hundred men
had taken the work, thousands were now assembled there. Not a single
company or battalion was intact, every vestige of organization had
disappeared; the commanders, and officers generally, had become
separated from their units.”[202]
[202] _Ibid._, I, pp. 236 and 238.
“Prince IMERETINSKI succeeded in forming stragglers into the
following improvised units:
3 provisional companies of the _Libau_ Regiment.
2 „ „ „ „ _Susdal_ „
2¹⁄₂ „ „ „ „ _Vladimir_ „
1 detachment of 100 men of the _Reval_ Regiment.
“These re-formed stragglers were despatched to Skobeleff’s assistance
and made a successful assault on Work No. 2 from Work No. 1.”[203]
[203] _Ibid._, I, p. 243.
“These stragglers subsequently formed the nucleus of the garrison of
Work No. 2. During the night of the 11/12 September, the Russians
succeeded in gathering 1000 more men, which were assembled in
companies irrespective of the regiments to which they originally
belonged. This gathering of stragglers lasted, by the way, up to the
afternoon of the 12th of September. The continuance of the fight was
made possible only by constantly re-forming the remnants into new
organizations and then sending these forward into the fight.”[204]
[204] _Ibid._, I, p. 258.
The remedies provided by the regulations against these evils are,
above all else: Restriction of the front of the several units, the
deployment of tactical units side by side in action (instead of in rear
of each other) and the use of every opportunity for re-establishing
the original organizations. Other suggestions for stemming the tide
of disorder as made by the author of _Summer Nights Dream_ (1888)
(platoons formed in single rank, volley firing, and constant closing
toward the center) are impracticable in a serious action. The
disintegrating effect of a battle is stronger than tactical cohesion.
It is better to recognize this fact than to face the enemy with
illusory ideas.
It is necessary to train the men in peace time to follow willingly any
officer, whether he belong to their own or to another organization;
and, for that reason, exercises in provisional organizations are
requisite for tactical training--a large number of officers being told
to fall out at these exercises to assimilate losses which would occur
in action. The control of mixed firing lines by word of command of
an officer is the foundation of order and troop leading, and thus a
prerequisite of success in the battles of the future. In a successful
engagement, the evils above mentioned are less evident than during a
reverse when troops unexpectedly suffer heavy losses or receive fire
from the flank or rear. Troops formed into well-organized units can
well stand such a test, but in an improvised organization, composed
of fractions and men of different units, especially when their own
officers are absent, such a crisis may lead to panic.
The following battle episode is very instructive: The 1st Battalion,
4th Infantry, deployed in line of company columns, advanced at
=Colombey= (14th August, 1870) under French shell and _Chassepot_
fire. The morale of the 3rd Company was visibly impaired by two
shells which burst, one after the other, in its ranks, placing 15-20
men out of action. “The men began to hesitate; their steps grew
shorter; and, as if impelled by an invisible power, the company
executed a half right turn, another half right turn, then another
and another. One would have thought the movement was being executed
at command. The column was now facing to the rear, and although
not running, not fleeing, it was moving back to the Brasserie with
suspiciously lengthening steps. The drummer, one Borchert, did
everything to bring the men to their senses; the non-commissioned
officers assisted bravely, but in vain; the column continued its
movement to the rear. Filled with shame and indignation, the
perspiration pouring out of every pore, I shouted to the men,
repeatedly commanding: ‘Company ... Forward!’ But all in vain. At
that moment the battalion commander--he was called the ‘marble
statue’ on account of his coolness--galloped up on his bay, shouting:
‘Look at the 5th Company over yonder; see how far it has advanced.’
Then another superior officer jumped in front of the men with the
words: ‘Is there no officer here at all?’ At this instant I yelled
again as if my life depended upon it: ‘You men belong to the color
company; Company ... Forward!’ and the spell was broken. As if on
the parade ground the Grenadiers faced to the front; obediently they
executed my command: ‘To the attack! Carry arms ... Forward!’ and
soon thereafter we again occupied our position between the 2nd and
4th Companies.”
The company lost many men as soon as it entered the fight, among them
its company commander; then the two shells burst in rapid succession
within its ranks, and this explains the temporary panic. The company
lost a total of 86 men (including officers).[205]
[205] RETZLAFF, _Aus meinem Tagebuch_.
Nothing is more contagious in the zone of danger than the example
of fear or cowardice.[206] Appeals, threats, and intimidation are
of little avail. The most effective remedy lies in developing the
individual soldier’s initiative, in training him to act with common
sense even when his officers are absent. We should send our soldiers
into battle with a reserve of moral courage great enough to prevent the
premature moral and mental depreciation of the individual.
[206] Some interesting proofs in support of this statement are:
The attack made by Captain Bechtoldsheim at Custozza against
Italian infantry. _Oesterreichs Kämpfe_, II, p. 74.
The combats at the Mance ravine on Aug. 18th, 1870.
HÖNIG, _Vierundzwanzig Stunden Moltkescher Strategie_, pp. 170,
184, 193 and 215.
_Sedan_, _Gen. St. W._, II, p. 1243.
_Wald- und Ortsgefecht_, p. 179. (Aymard’s Division after the
capture of Servigny).
LEHAUCOURT, _Campagne de la Loire_, II, p. 272. (The French Gardes
Mobiles after the taking of Le Tuilerie at Le Mans).
V. DEPLOYMENTS FOR ACTION.
1. NORMAL PROCEDURE.
The characteristic tendency of modern times is the liberation of the
individual from antiquated ideas and from the restraint exercised
by ostensibly reactionary governmental power. The key-note of this
tendency, which places individualism above collectivism, is absolute
independence of the individual in municipal and national affairs, in
science and art. Even tactics has been influenced to a certain extent
by this tendency. Success in battle, however, will not be assured by
the sum-total of a number of negative or positive individual efforts,
but only by the simultaneous launching of masses controlled by a
single will. Within these limits the independence of the individual is
permissible, for a commander does not exact apathetic obedience, but,
on the contrary, intelligent coöperation on the part of everyone, and
this cannot be regulated by hard and fast rules.
Instead of laying down rules to cover all cases, the German Drill
Regulations leave the leader free to dispose of his troops according to
the purpose of the combat and the nature of the ground. In this he is
assisted by the initiative and independent action of his subordinate
leaders. Normal formations for attack and defense are requisite
however, in armies in which the tactical training of commanders and
subordinate leaders is deficient and where it is feared that the latter
will abuse the latitude allowed them. Where such normal formations
are prescribed, it is assumed that hard and fast rules are requisite
for training; that the average officer cannot be expected to estimate
a situation correctly and arrive at proper decisions; and that the
majority of them must be given definite rules for combat if they are
to render any service at all.