the French infantry that sight is lost of tactical requirements. For
example, they employ formulae to ascertain the point from which a
height can be covered with grazing fire, or propose to defend the
ascent to a plateau by evacuating the military crest and occupying
the reverse slope, keeping the slope facing the enemy under a grazing
fire with the tail ends of the trajectories.
Let A B B¹, in the accompanying figure, represent a horizontal plane
pierced by trajectories C B and C¹ B¹, at an angle α, forming the
beaten zone B B¹. If now the ground falls from B in the direction B D,
it is obvious from the figure, that the angle of fall β decreases and
the beaten zone B D increases. The limit of this increase is reached
when the angle of slope is greater than the angle of fall of the
projectile. In this case there is a dead angle beyond B and toward D.
If, on the other hand, the ground be rising, the angle of fall will be
C¹ D¹ B and the beaten zone[170] decreases to B D¹. The smaller the
angle of fall of the projectile the greater the influence of the ground.
[Illustration]
[170] The computation of beaten zones is based upon the formula
deduced by Lieutenant-General ROHNE in his work _Schieszlehre für
Infanterie_, p. 127:
Let α = angle of fall;
γ = angle of slope (rising or falling);
β = beaten zone on level ground;
then
α
----- β = beaten zone on falling ground;
α - γ
α
----- β = beaten zone on rising ground.
α + γ
From this it follows that when fire direction is in competent hands the
appearance of the enemy on the terrain as at B D will be fully taken
advantage of, while firing on slope like B D¹ should be avoided. Troops
will, however, rarely be in a position from which they can see a target
on the slope B D. The efficacy of the fire will in such a case be more
or less a matter of accident. A body of troops in broad formation will
in this case receive a greater number of hits than a column, since
each meter of front of the crest line receives a certain number of
projectiles. It is otherwise, however, where the slope rises in respect
to the line of sight. A line is more easily missed than a column of
considerable depth on the march.
The following data in regard to the increase (diminution)
of the depth of the beaten zones is taken from the work of
Lieutenant-General ROHNE on _Das gefechtsmäszige Abteilungsschieszen
der Infanterie_, p. 44:
======+===============+================
Range.| Rising Slope. | Falling Slope.
m. | 1° | 2° | 1° | 2°
------+-------+-------+-------+--------
800 | ¹⁄₂ | ¹⁄₃ | ∞ | ∞
1000 | ²⁄₃ | ³⁄₄ | 2 | ∞
1200 | ³⁄₄ | ³⁄₅ | ³⁄₂ | 3
1400 | ⁴⁄₅ | ⁴⁄₆ | ⁴⁄₃ | 2
------+-------+-------+-------+--------
[Illustration]
The above figure, taken from Lieutenant-General ROHNE’S work,
_Schieszlehre für die Infanterie_, p. 128, shows the influence of
the ground on the efficacy of fire when “poor” shots are firing at a
target, 100, 200 m. etc., in rear of which are other targets of the
same dimensions but situated either on level ground, on a 2-degree
rising slope, or a 1-degree falling slope. On a rising slope of 2
degrees the depth of the beaten zone is decreased by half, and on a
downward slope of 1 degree increased by half.
“The knowledge of this influence of the ground is of great
importance to the tactician. For this reason I have selected ‘poor’
shots for the above example because the efficacy of infantry fire in
battle will approximate theirs more nearly than any other. From this
we may deduce that where the ground slopes upward in rear of a firing
line, less distance will suffice to withdraw supports from the fire
directed at the firing line than on level ground; and that, if the
ground in rear of the firing line slopes downward, the distances must
be increased unless the slope is so great or the hostile trajectories
so flat that bullets pass over the crest, forming a ‘defiladed
space,’ into which no projectiles strike.”
On ground rising in respect to the line of sight (_i.e._, on the
slope of heights facing the enemy, or opposite to commanding ground,
the slope facing the plain) columns suffer the greatest losses; on
ground falling in respect to the line of sight (on the reverse slope
of hills and on plateaus) line targets suffer the greatest losses.
Where the ground falls at a greater angle than the angle of fall of
the projectiles (about 5 degrees at 1500 m., and 1 degree at 800
m.) a defiladed space is formed, which makes it possible to bring
supports nearer to the firing line than would be practicable on level
ground. If we assume that each graduation of the rear sight over 600
m. commands a space 100 m. deep with the normal core of hits, we
obtain the following depths of the beaten zones at a range of 1500
m., with rifle model ’98 (angle of fall 5 degrees and 22 minutes):
Ground rising 1 in 10 = 6° = 50 m.
„ „ 1 in 20 = 3° = 64 m.
„ „ 1 in 50 = 1° = 81 m.
Ground falling 1 in 10 = 6° = 360 m.
„ „ 1 in 20 = 3° = 180 m.
„ „ 1 in 50 = 1° = 113 m.
[Illustration]
[Illustration]
The figures on pages 181 and 182 show to what extent the ground is
capable of increasing or diminishing the efficacy of fire. The French
assert that the Würtembergers deliberately applied these principles
in the defense of the park wall at =Villiers=. It was, at any rate,
only an accident that the masses of troops on the west side of the
gently sloping Mamelon de Villiers suffered heavy losses on November
30th, 1870.
General PAQUIÉ of the French Army[171] lays down the following rule:
“When the angle of slope of falling ground corresponds to the angle
of fall of the lowest trajectory of a cone of dispersion, the depth
of the beaten zone will be 2¹⁄₄ times greater than on level ground.
When the angle of slope of falling ground is equal to the angle of
fall of the mean trajectory of a cone of dispersion, the depth of the
beaten zone will be 2¹⁄₂ times greater than on level ground. When the
lowest trajectory of a cone of dispersion passes over the crest of a
hill at the height of a man, and when the reverse slope of that hill
is equal to ¹⁄₁₀₀ of the range, the depth of the beaten zone will be
five times as great as on level ground.”
[171] See also _Le tir de guerre et les expériences pratiques
du camp de Châlons_. _Journal des sciences militaires_, Sept.,
Oct., Nov., 1808--_Le Joindre Général. Petit Guide pour les tirs
collectifs_, 1904.
These data are of no practical value in war. They serve only to
increase the appreciation of fire effect when examining the terrain,
and train the eye in judging such situations.
The character of the ground may exert great influence when firing
on intrenchments. Fire delivered from low ground against an enemy
in shelter-trenches is absolutely ineffective--as shown in the
action against the French IInd Corps at =Point du Jour= and by the
experiences of the Russians at =Plevna= and =Gorni Dubniac=. This
condition becomes aggravated the smaller the angles of fall of the
projectiles, and the higher the target is situated relative to the
firing position of the attacking party.
Attacks on hill positions show that there is a range at which the
greatest efficacy may be obtained from fire directed against the top
of the height itself. This maximum efficacy gradually dwindles as
the position is approached. This fact has led the Swiss to retain a
_Main Firing Position_. (See Figure, p. 182. Fire effect from A and
from B). For the purpose of determining the favorable range, “D,”
corresponding to a certain height (of the enemy’s position) “H,”
Lieutenant-General ROHNE has deduced the following formula for rifle
model ’88:[172]
D = 15.H + 500.
[172] Capitaine CUGNAC, D = 14 (H + 50). See also the work
of Captain KNOBLOCH, _Zur Technik des Feuerangriffs gegen
Höhenstellungen_, _Swiss Monthly Journal_, 1907.
The well-known plateau of the “Galgenhügel” at Wörth, which is at
present crowned by the monument of the 50th Infantry (elevation 35
m.) could be effectively swept by the fire of our present-day weapons
at 1025 m.; a further advance would reduce the fire effect. For rifle
model ’98 the formula might be stated: 20. H + 600.
It is only in fortress warfare that it might occasionally be possible
to apply this formula. To determine at what distance the defender
must take position in rear of a crest, in order to sweep the slope
facing the enemy with his fire (aiming points being resorted to)
without being himself exposed to view, is of still less value for
use in the field. According to General Warnet of the French Army, if
“p” is the degree of slope expressed in centimeters, the defender
should choose between two points which lie between (p + 5) 1000
and (p + 3) 1000. When the degree of slope is 1 cm. in 10 cm., the
defender should take up his position either 600 or 300 m. in rear of
the main crest. In such a position the defender will, it is true, be
protected to a certain extent from the enemy’s fire, but can only
very inadequately defend the slope facing the enemy. A concentration
of fire on certain targets is impossible and the attacker is given an
opportunity to reach the crest, here and there, without coming under
fire. Thus ballistic advantages must be given up in the face of the
numerous tactical disadvantages. We have mentioned this subject here,
to show the strange excrescenses which an undeniably sound basic
principle may develop in the hands of theorists, who have entirely
forgotten that in war only that which is simple succeeds.
“Indirect Rifle Fire” is to be used in firing on a target not visible
from the firing position. In this connection, the following is
taken from the report of Captain KNOBLOCH, Austrian Army,[173] on
_Schieszaufgaben unter feldmäszigen Verhältnissen_:
[173] _Verstecktes Gewehrfeuer. Vorschläge zur Erhöhung des
Gefechtswertes unserer Infanterie_, Vienna, 1904. _Feldmäsziges
Schieszen der Infanterie aus versteckten Stellungen._ _Organ der
militär-wissenschaftlichen Vereine_, Nos. 1 and 2 of 1906. _Resultate
der Schieszversuche mit verstecktem Gewehrfeuer._ _Mitteilungen
über Gegenst. des Artillerie- und Geniewesens_, No. 12 of 1905.
_Militär-Wochenblatt_, 1907, No. 28, pp. 144 and 155.
“Indirect rifle fire is infantry fire in which aiming points are
used. These should lie above and beyond the target and in line with
it. It goes without saying that an aiming point fulfilling all these
conditions will rarely be found. Moreover, the aiming point must not
be selected at random at some particular elevation, because the angle
between target and aiming point, expressed by graduations on the rear
sight leaf, might possibly lead to a negative sight setting.
“In the practical tests made on varied ground against targets of
appropriate height, splendid results were obtained as regards effect;
but the aiming point had to be indicated by means of a flag. Despite
the fact that the terrain was covered with numerous objects, such as
trees, woods, factory chimneys, etc., no suitable aiming point could
be found on the terrain itself. This largely determines the value of
indirect rifle fire in the field.”
This class of fire is, however, worth a trial at any rate. Moreover,
its tactical, combined with its moral, advantages are so great that
we could afford to accept calmly a fire effect poorer by comparison.
Indirect rifle fire will, at times, give troops an opportunity to do
damage to the enemy without being themselves seen or fired upon.
It remains to mention briefly the effect of =ricochets= which, as
a rule, tumble[174] after striking. Their range upon rebounding is
short. Bullets ricochet most frequently on water, on rocky and hard
ground, more rarely on wet meadows, and on tilled soil, but they do not
ricochet at all on sandy soil. Ploughed fields, in which the furrows
run obliquely to the line of fire, eliminate the effect of ricochets
almost entirely. When jacketed bullets (but not the massive French “D”
projectiles) strike upon rocky ground, they have a tendency to alter
their form materially, or to tear the jacket, thereby considerably
increasing the severity of the wound which is produced. The range
of ricochets upon rebounding depends mainly upon the angle at which
they are deflected. When the lateral deflection is 30 degrees their
range may amount to about 1300 m. The nearer a bullet strikes to the
skirmisher firing it, and the smaller the angle of deflection of the
consequent ricochet, the greater its range; under favorable conditions
this may amount to 2500 m. According to French experiments, in firing
at a range of 800 m., 4% ricochet hits struck a target, the height of a
man, at 1400 m., and 1% ricochet hits a similar target at 1850 m. from
the skirmisher who did the firing.
[174] According to tests, our small-caliber bullets tend to tumble
even when only grazing small twigs.
13. LOSSES IN ACTION.[175]
[175] See _Taktik_, V, p. 76 _et seq._
An attempt to move troops in close order formations within the zone
of uninterrupted infantry fire at ranges under 1500 m. when the enemy
is still in condition to direct his fire on them, is bound to lead
to losses which make the further tactical employment of these troops
impossible.
Bodies of troops following the firing lines will also have to deploy
when the hostile fire reaches them, unless they can find cover. It is
a disadvantage for them to deploy, and every opportunity to return to
close order formation must be utilized.
Troops in rear, not directly fired upon and exposed only to accidental
shots, should employ narrow rather than broad formations. It might
therefore seem advisable to remain in route column so long as no
flanking fire is received. The Italian Firing Regulations contain the
following figure showing the effect of fire directed on troops in the
formations indicated.
[Illustration:
Vertical axis: Percentage of hits to be expected.
Horizontal axis: Range in meters.
Dash-dot curve: Company Column.[176]
Dotted curve: Line of platoons.[177]
Solid curve: Line of skirmishers.
Dashed curve: Line of platoons in columns of fours, at 15-pace
intervals.]
[176] In Germany called “Column of Platoons.”
[177] In columns of fours, at 6-pace intervals.
According to the figure, the Italian Company Column (German Column of
Platoons) suffers the greatest losses; the least losses are sustained
by the company formed in line of platoons, each in route column, at
intervals of 15 paces. According to French experiments, this formation
is said to be no longer suitable when subjected to infantry fire at
ranges under 1300 m.
According to French firing tests made in Châlons,[178] the following
percentages of hits may be expected when using the Lebel rifle firing
old model steel jacketed bullets:
==========================================+===================
| At a range of
+----+----+----+----
|1200|1400|1600|1800
| m. | m. | m. | m.
------------------------------------------+----+----+----+----
Platoon (one rank) | 4.4| 3.4| 2.2| 1.4
Skirmish line, men at 3-pace intervals | 1.2|----|----|----
Platoon in column of fours | 6.6| 3.8| 2.2| 1.3
Platoon in column of twos | 5.6| 3.2| 1.9| 1.1
Company column (German column of platoons)|22.0|18.0|14.0|10.0
------------------------------------------+----+----+----+----
[178] _Le Joindre, Petit Guide pour les tirs collectifs_, p. 15.
Lieutenant-General ROHNE, in his work, _Schieszlehre für die
Infanterie_, p. 117, computes values for the relative vulnerability
of the several formations. At a range of 1200 m., purely frontal fire
only being considered, we obtain with every 1000 rounds fired with the
appropriate elevation, the following number of hits against--
========+=====+=========+=============
|Line.|Column of|Infantry in
| |platoons.|route column.
--------+-----+---------+-------------
Standing| 116 | 160 | 98
Prone | 20 | 65 | 72
--------+-----+---------+-------------
And against a company deployed in line of platoons:
=========+================+==================+===================
|3 platoons, each| 3 platoons, each |6 sections, each in
|in route column.|in column of twos.| column of twos.
---------+----------------+------------------+-------------------
Standing | 57 | 39 | 29
Prone | 28 | 25 | 14
---------+----------------+------------------+-------------------
The company deployed in line of sections in columns of twos would thus
seem to be the most favorable formation for movements, and the line
lying prone is especially well suited for halts. For movements under
purely frontal, concentrated fire, the line is the least favorable
formation, while the route column offers the narrowest target. In
this, the character of the terrain plays a decisive role. In firing
on targets consisting of columns, it has been assumed that a single
projectile will place only one man out of action. Under shrapnel fire
the formations are similarly arranged as regards their vulnerability,
the line formation being less favorable than the column of platoons,
since the former receives all bullets deflected laterally.
The total losses in battles and more serious engagements amount to from
10 to 20% of the participating troops. In some organizations the losses
in killed and wounded may amount to as much as 50-60%. The loss that an
organization will endure is directly proportional to its efficiency.
Good troops, which unexpectedly get into a difficult situation (as,
for example, the British Brigade of Highlanders at Magersfontain), and
which have been trained to look upon heavy losses as unavoidable, will
be capable of enduring a loss of 25% in the course of a battle without
going to pieces and without discontinuing the attack.[179]
[179] It is notorious that colonial wars with their moderate losses
spoil troops and their leaders in this respect.
At the battle of =Gravelotte=, in which 166,400 rifles, 21,200
sabres, and 732 guns, extending over a front of 19 km., participated
on the German side, only 109,200 rifles and 628 guns fought the
decisive action. The losses amounted to 9.51%, distributed as
follows: 899 officers and 19,260 men; according to arms: infantry,
10.96%; cavalry, 0.66%, and artillery, 5.74%. On the decisive flank,
the infantry of the Guard suffered a loss of almost 30%. On this
flank, the Rifles of the Guard (_Gardeschützen_) lost 44%, the 1st
Battalion of the 2nd Regiment of the Guard, 55.5% of their enlisted
strength, the 6th Company of the latter regiment losing even 141 men.
Although losses are, generally speaking, smaller than during the
18th Century, and at the opening of the 19th Century, nevertheless
they may amount to a considerable figure in a brief space of time in
single bodies of troops which suddenly encounter a heavy fire.
At =Magersfontain=, (December 11th, 1899) the British lost 13% of
their total strength; the Brigade of Highlanders, 23% (39% of the
officers; i.e., 1 officer for every 14.9 men); the IInd Battalion
of the Black Watch, 42%, and the IInd Battalion of the Seaforth
Highlanders, 23.9%. At =Colenso= (Dec. 15th, 1899) the British lost
6.4% of their total strength; the IInd Battalion of the Royal Dublin
Fusiliers, 23.9%.
=Spionskop= (Jan. 24th, 1900):
Attacking troops 2,694 men in 18¹⁄₂ hrs. 40 officers, 721 men = 28.2%
Supports 1,600 „ „ 10¹⁄₂ „ 8 „ 95 „ = 6.4%
Reserves 1,500 „ „ 4¹⁄₂ „ 15 „ 170 „ = 12.3%
Staffs ---- ---- 5 „ --- ----
----------------------------------------------------
5,794 men 68 officers, 986 men = 17.5%
This action illustrates strikingly how rapidly the officers directing
the fire were shot down.
Attacking troops 1 officer for every 18 men
Supports 1 „ „ „ 12 „
Reserves 1 „ „ „ 11 „
--------------------------
1 officer for every 14 men
For the purpose of comparison, we should like to mention that the
Prussian Grenadier Battalion “_von Wedel_,” consisting of 12 officers
and 390 men, lost 10 officers and 301 men (77%) in about one hour
during the battle of =Soor= (Sept. 30th, 1745). The losses suffered
by the Grenadier Battalion “_von Münchow_” at =Kesselsdorf= are
possibly not much lower. The effective strength of the last named
battalion is not given; it lost 5 officers and 371 men.[180]
[180] _Kriege Friedrichs des Groszen_, II, Appendix 3, pp. 11 and
47.
At =Kolin=, the Grenadier Battalion “_Nymschöfsky_” lost 652 men,
and six infantry regiments lost between 900 and 1188 men, _i.e._,
considerably more than 50% of their strength. Two days after the
battle, the Grenadier Battalion “_Nymschöfsky_” numbered only 24
men and the enlisted strength of six infantry regiments was 233,
296, 602, 651 and 711 men respectively. The number of stragglers was
undoubtedly very great.[181] At =Kolin=, the infantry lost in all
12,307 men out of 19,000, _i.e._, 65%.
[181] _Ibid._, III. Appendix, pp. 11 and 20.
The losses among officers are especially heavy. This is by no means
due to the attempt of the hostile skirmishers to pick off the leaders
in the combat at short range, but to the fact that, in order to lead
their men, officers must expose themselves. This becomes more and more
necessary the greater the moral effect of the combat on the nervous
systems of the men, and the poorer the troops. According to past
experience, the casualties among officers are especially heavy in the
early stages of a war.[182]
[182] See _Taktik_, V, pp. 81, 88 and 358.
The relative losses of officers and men in the battles named are
given, in round figures, in the following table:
At =Weiszenburg (Vth Army Corps)= 1 officer for every 14 men;
„ =Wörth (Vth Army Corps)= 1 „ „ „ 20 „ ;
„ =Wörth (XIth Army Corps)= 1 „ „ „ 15 „ ;
„ =Vionville (IIIrd Army Corps)= 1 „ „ „ 21 „ ;
„ =Vionville (Xth Army Corps)= 1 „ „ „ 24 „ ;
„ =Gravelotte (Guard Corps)= 1 „ „ „ 22.5 „ ;
„ =Gravelotte (XIIth Army Corps)= 1 „ „ „ 20 „ ;
„ =Colenso= 1 „ „ „ 15 „ ;
„ =Magersfontain= 1 „ „ „ 11.8 „ ;
Colonel HESSERT[183] writes the following in regard to the losses
among the officers of the 25th Division on August 18th, 1870: “Eight
of the 16 field officers and 6 of the 14 adjutants present with
the regiments and battalions were either wounded or killed. Almost
all of these officers were mounted. Seventeen of the 40 company
commanders--almost all of them dismounted--and 43 of the 151 company
officers were placed out of action. This would be a loss of 50% in
field officers, 42% in adjutants, 37% in company commanders, and 29%
in company officers.”
[183] _Betrachtungen über die Leistungen der französischen Gewehre
M/74 und M/66_, Darmstadt, 1879, p. 115.
On this day the Rifle Battalion of the Guard lost 100% of its
officers and 44% of its men--19 officers and 431 men, in about
three-quarters of an hour.
On Sept. 11th, 1877, at =Plevna=, the _Ugla_ Regiment lost 20 of its
officers, _i.e._, 40%; the _Jaroslaw_ Regiment, 25 officers, _i.e._,
64%; the total loss of the first named regiment amounted to 42%,
that of the last named to 49%. Of the 15 company commanders of the
_Vladimir_ Regiment, 14 were placed out of action.
After the assault on the =Tuminling Pass= on Oct. 12th, 1905, the
East Siberian Rifle Regiment had only 2 officers with its firing
line, and after the battle of =Sandepu= only 5. These examples are
not isolated ones. After the battle on the =Yalu=, the 11th Rifle
Regiment had present for duty only one field officer, and the 12th
only 3 captains. On March 7th, 1905, the _Yoshihoka_ Regiment (3rd
Japanese Division) had present for duty only 3 lieutenants; one
battalion was commanded by a first sergeant and one company by a
private.
14. THE MORAL EFFECT OF FIRE.
The moral effect may make itself felt in a two-fold way: as the sum of
the impressions influencing the soldier at all times in action, and
as the momentary general impression produced by a sudden considerable
increase in the losses. The great material effect of fire creates such
a consciousness of danger in men’s minds that in a defeated force more
than half of its numbers succumb to this moral effect of the fire.