the location of the sheaf of fire directed against him; the observed
strike of bullets is seldom so good an indication. It is especially
difficult to judge of the distribution of projectiles from their strike
in front and in rear of the target. Suggestions from the subordinate
leaders, whose view of the target is generally restricted, are often
more confusing than valuable.
12. THE EFFECT OF FIRE.
COMPARISON BETWEEN LOSSES PRODUCED BY INFANTRY AND ARTILLERY FIRE.
In 1866 the Austrian artillery inflicted 16% of our losses. In 1870-71
the French artillery inflicted 8% of our losses. Up to the battle of
Liao Yang the 1st Japanese Army suffered the following losses:
===========+===========================+========================
| PERCENTAGES. | WOUNDS.
+----------+-------+--------+--------+-------+-------
| Small | Art’y |Cutting |Serious.|Slight.| Very
|arms fire.| fire. |weapons.| | |slight.
-----------+----------+-------+--------+--------+-------+-------
Guard Div. | 88.42 | 11.50 | 0.08 | 32.17 | 62.49 | 5.34
2d Div. | 89.43 | 7.91 | 2.30 | 44.05 | 54.89 | 1.06
12th Div. | 80.52 | 14.48 | 2.09 | 39.12 | 46.36 | 14.52
-----------+----------+-------+--------+--------+-------+-------
Average | 86.12 | 11.30 | 2.09 | 38.45 | 54.58 | 6.97
-----------+----------+-------+--------+--------+-------+-------
The figures given above under the captions “serious” (including
killed), “slight,” and “very slight” wounds have, of course, only a
relative value. The following figures express the average losses of
Russians and Japanese:
Losses through rifle fire 85.9%
Losses through artillery fire 11.4%
Losses through cutting weapons 3.2%
Modern fire tactics count upon a prolonged fire for the purpose
of gradually exhausting the enemy, and upon rapid fire, suddenly
delivered, for annihilating him.
While a statement of the percentage of hits[162] throws some light upon
the effect of the fire of an organization, under normal conditions, the
number of figures placed out of action affords a standard of comparison
by means of which tactical success may be measured, and aids in
deciding how to distribute the fire. Differences in fire effect on like
targets are best determined by comparing the number of figures hit per
minute by 100 marksmen, as a great number of hits is presupposed, which
is not the case when the percentage of hits is taken.
[162] In this connection the following works have been consulted:
_Das Gefechtsmäszige Abteilungsschieszen der Infanterie_, 4th
Edition (1905), by Lieutenant-General ROHNE, and _Schieszlehre
für die Infanterie_, 2nd Edition (1906), by the same author;
also _Militär-Wochenblatt_ No. 46 of 1900. To be sure, absolute
trustworthiness cannot be claimed for the figures given, for the
conditions of firing in action are variable; but, as obtained by
Lieutenant-General Rohne, they serve as an excellent standard of
comparison, and, when their relative value is considered, as a basis
for tactical deductions.
(a) Influence of Training.
Individual skill in marksmanship is of decisive importance when firing
at targets of appropriate size at the short ranges. A good marksman,
firing at will, may (not _must_) expect a hit from each round fired,
at any target within 250 m., at a single kneeling opponent within 350
m., at a kneeling file within 500 m., and at a standing file within
600 m. At ranges beyond this, influences, due to the imperfections of
the rifle, make themselves felt; and these influences grow to such
an extent that the best marksmanship training is unable to eliminate
them. A considerable number of rifles must fire in order to produce
an effect; for, as some of the pieces fire short and others over,
the hits are thus distributed over a greater area. But even here
skill in marksmanship is apparent in that the cone of dispersion of
the excellent shots produces a shot group of small diameter, that of
the poorer shots one of very large diameter. Lieutenant-General Rohne
computed (_Schieszlehre für die Infanterie_, p. 84) that when firing
rifle model ’98 with the appropriate elevation at a target 1 m. high,
the marksmen named in the following table would obtain the number of
hits given at the ranges indicated:
=======+========================================
| NUMBER OF HITS OBTAINED BY
+---------------+------------+-----------
Range.|Excellent shots| Fair shots | Poor shots
| Out of 100 rounds fired.
-------+---------------+------------+-----------
1000 m.| 27. | 17.6 | 8.9
1500 m.| 14.2 | 9.7 | 4.8
-------+---------------+------------+-----------
This ratio changes, however, very seriously to the disadvantage of the
excellent marksmen when the appropriate elevation is not used. The
figure given below, in which the curves of hits are traced, shows that
even poor shots may obtain better results in this case.
From this may be deduced the great importance of quickly and accurately
ascertaining the range. The excellent ballistic qualities of our rifle
and our thorough marksmanship training can assert themselves fully only
when the range has been accurately determined. At ranges over 800 m.
too great an accuracy in collective fire may be actually detrimental.
In this case individual accuracy matters little; the important thing is
to direct the densest portion of the sheaf of fire, with some degree
of accuracy, on a target the range to which is known only in a general
way. The importance of training soldiers in precise marksmanship
is ethical rather than practical, for a good target shot need not
necessarily be a battle marksman. For the latter a cool head is of more
value than all the marksmanship skill of the target range.
(b) Influence of the Error in Estimating the Range.
At short ranges an error of estimation is offset by the flatness of
the trajectory. Lieutenant-General Rohne used a probable error in
estimation of ¹⁄₈ (12.5%) of the range in his computations. The Swiss
Firing Regulations of 1905 count on an error of 100 m. at 500 m., 200
m. at 500 to 1,000 m., 300 m. at ranges over 1,000 m., and the average
is taken to be ¹⁄₅ of the range, or 20%. For measurements with range
finding instruments see p. 146, supra.
[Illustration]
[Illustration]
In the following table, the number of hits per 100 rounds fired, at a
target 1 m. high, by the marksmen named, is shown under--
“a” When the fire is controlled and the appropriate elevation is used;
“b” When each skirmisher has selected the elevation corresponding to
his estimate of the range. In this case it is presumed, however, that
the ranges are generally estimated correctly. (ROHNE, _Schieszlehre für
die Infanterie_, 2nd Edition, p. 102).
======+================+===============+===============
Range.|Excellent shots.| Fair shots. | Poor shots.
+-------+--------+-------+-------+-------+-------
m. | a | b | a | b | a | b
------+-------+--------+-------+-------+-------+-------
400 | 65.1 | 58.5 | 50.4 | 47.8 | 26.6 | 26.4
600 | 46.6 | 32.9 | 32.9 | 26.6 | 16.9 | 15.8
800 | 35.2 | 15.5 | 23.3 | 13.9 | 11.8 | 9.7
1000 | 27. | 7.5 | 17.6 | 7. | 8.9 | 5.9
1200 | 20.5 | 4. | 13.6 | 3.9 | 6.8 | 3.5
1400 | 16.1 | 2.4 | 10.8 | 2.4 | 5.4 | 2.2
1600 | 12.5 | 1.5 | 8.7 | 1.5 | 4.4 | 1.4
------+-------+--------+-------+-------+-------+-------
The above table shows that when the elevation selected is in error,
the number of hits decreases more rapidly the greater the skill of the
marksman; and that an error in estimation is of less importance than
marksmanship only at ranges under 800 m.
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN “a” AND “b.”
======+================+===============+===============
Range.|Excellent shots.| Fair shots. | Poor shots.
m. | | |
------+----------------+---------------+---------------
400 | 6.6 | 2.6 | 0.4
600 | 13.7 | 6.3 | 1.1
800 | 19.8 | 9.4 | 2.1
1000 | 19.5 | 10.6 | 3.0
1200 | 16.4 | 9.7 | 3.3
1400 | 13.3 | 8.4 | 3.2
1600 | 11. | 7.2 | 2.
------+----------------+---------------+---------------
(c) Fire Effect as Regards Time. Number of Rounds to be Expended.
The greater the losses inflicted within a short period of time in a
limited space, the greater the moral effect of the fire. It should
therefore be the aim of the officer charged with fire direction to
bring about a decisive effect within the shortest possible time. The
leaders must bear in mind from the beginning of the fire fight that the
ammunition carried is limited and that the expenditure of a certain
amount is equivalent to a loss of power, and this is permissible only
where commensurate results would be achieved. When once a decision has
been formed to fire on a target, the ammunition necessary to accomplish
the object of the fight must be expended without stinting, since
ineffective fire impairs the morale of one’s own troops and raises that
of the enemy.
When the enemy is approximately equal to us in numbers, and is deployed
in line at one man per meter of front, presenting breast targets only,
the number of rounds per rifle, given in round figures in the following
table, will be required to place about one-third of the enemy’s force
out of action:[163]
At a range of 300 m. 3 rounds,
„ „ „ „ 400 „ 5 „
„ „ „ „ 500 „ 6 „
„ „ „ „ 600 „ 7.5 „
„ „ „ „ 700 „ 10 „
„ „ „ „ 800 „ 13 „
„ „ „ „ 900 „ 16 „
„ „ „ „ 1000 „ 25 „
„ „ „ „ 1100 „ 45 „
„ „ „ „ 1200 „ 50 „
„ „ „ „ 1300 „ 57 „
„ „ „ „ 1400 „ 63 „
„ „ „ „ 1500 „ 72 „
„ „ „ „ 1600 „ 80 „
[163] According to ROHNE, _Schieszlehre für die Infanterie_, 2nd
Edition, p. 214.
In the above table it is assumed that an error of estimation of
7.5% was made and that at ranges over 1000 m. two elevations were
used. Against head targets, approximately twice the number of rounds
indicated above must be expended; and against exposed skirmishers,
visible at full height, about half of the number of rounds given. The
efficacy is increased when the fire comes from a flank. The following
data are taken from an extended firing test: At 600-700 m., 200
skirmishers, firing 5000 rounds against 200 body targets, obtained 4.3%
hits and placed 43% of the figures out of action; under the enfilading
fire delivered by one platoon, the percentage of hits rose to 10.5%,
and the number of incapacitated figures to 80%.
(d) Additional Influences Affecting Accuracy of Fire.
Errors in setting the sight, in pointing, aiming, and pulling the
trigger, increase the area of the beaten zone at the expense of fire
effect on the actual target selected. When we consider the excitement
of men in action, and the numerous sources of error in setting the
sights, in pointing and firing, it is clear that we have to reckon
with the =effect of misses= on the field of battle more than with the
really well aimed and well delivered collective fire of a considerable
number of marksmen. Lieutenant Colonel Wolozkoi, late of the Russian
Army,[164] attempted to obtain an approximate standard of measurement
for the errors in firing made by marksmen. He bases his deductions upon
the opinion that the efficacy of rifle fire in action depends entirely
upon the mental and physical condition of the individual soldier at
the moment; that in serious engagements this condition is such that
accurate aiming cannot be expected; and finally that every skirmisher,
according to the degree of his excitement or fatigue, will fire his
piece at varying angles of elevation. He argues that this produces a
rigid cone of dispersion, whose limits correspond to certain extreme
angles of error, and whose axis (center trajectory) corresponds to a
mean angle of error; that, for each class of rifles, the depth of the
resulting beaten zone is constant; and that the depth of this zone
increases with the range corresponding to the angles of error. It
follows that the depth of this beaten zone is greater in modern rifles
than in those of older pattern.
[164] _Das Gewehrfeuer im Gefecht_, 1883.
He believes that peace training will have fulfilled its mission if the
skirmisher, while firing, holds his piece in the position to which he
has become habituated through years of practice. This position can be
none other than that in which the piece is horizontal.
Although the theory of the =Rigid, Constant Cone of Misses=, is not
tenable in this form, because there will always be a reasonably compact
core of hits (the dimensions of which depend upon the conditions
indicated in the firing regulations) at the center of the cone of
fire, the views of Colonel Wolozkoi have, nevertheless, a certain
value for us, and find application in large, hotly contested battles,
especially when the firing line has been exposed to the material and
moral influences of hostile fire for a considerable length of time. At
the commencement of every combat we can, at any rate, count on “aimed
fire”; but instead of reckoning at all times with a 75% core of hits,
100 m. in diameter, we must become used to reckoning with a 30 and 40%
core of hits, of the same diameter, produced by greater dispersion of
the bullets.
According to experiments made by Colonel Wolozkoi, a good shot makes
a mean angular error of ±8 minutes, when using the horizontal aiming
position; a poor shot, one of ±40 minutes; the average error being ±25
minutes. In this, however, the sources of error, due to excitement
on the part of the marksmen, are not considered. “The principal
angular errors can be traced to the nervousness of the marksmen; and
this is directly proportional to the magnitude of the danger and
the suddenness of its appearance. The soldier judges the magnitude
of danger by the number of hostile projectiles and by their effect.
Therefore, the livelier the hostile fire, and the longer it continues,
the greater the danger appears to him; while the less the effect of
that fire, and the better he is sheltered from it, the less he will
think himself endangered. On this account, the nervous tension of the
individual soldier will reach different degrees of intensity according
to the magnitude of the danger.
“Now there are combat situations where the danger is insignificant,
and entire engagements in which the impression produced by danger may
be called moderate; moreover, even in lively actions phases may occur
in which this is equally true. The circumstances of each particular
case will, therefore, determine how long it is possible to fire as
prescribed in the firing regulations, and from what moment a reduction
of efficacy, according to Colonel Wolozkoi’s theory, is unavoidable.
“The arrival of this moment will be postponed more or less by better
discipline and training; and, in addition, at the commencement of an
action, we may count on the men putting into practice, to a certain
extent, what they have been taught in time of peace. However, the
efficacy of rifle fire will deteriorate gradually, as the danger and
the intensity of the fight increase, until it reaches the stage which
Wolozkoi considers peculiar to all of the more serious actions.
“When discipline is still further reduced, the efforts of the men to
keep under cover may lead them to duck even their heads and to fire
their rifles at high angles. In this case the decisive short ranges
would not be swept by fire, making it possible for the more determined
of the two opponents to advance to the assault.
“This reduction of the efficacy of fire (_i.e._, the delivery of fire
at high angles) may also take place when troops are surprised and, in
consequence thereof, fire hurriedly. This explains why the enemy’s
fire passes entirely over a body of troops which has gotten quite close
to his position--by no means an unusual phenomenon in surprises.”[165]
[165] F. C. v. II. _Zum Studium der Taktik_, p. 97.
Wolozkoi assumes that the core of hits of his constant cone is formed
by projectiles fired at a mean angle of departure of less than 4
degrees, while the lower trajectories of the whole cone of fire
correspond to an angle of 1 degree and 30 minutes, and the upper
trajectories to one of 14 degrees and 30 minutes. If we apply these
figures to a particular rifle we obtain a beaten zone containing 50%
of the hits (central zone) at 560-1500 m. for the _Chassepot_ rifle;
at 1000-2000 m. for the 8 mm. rifle, and at 1200-3000 m. for the 6.5
mm. rifle. It should once more be emphasized that these figures are
applicable in combat phases in which the men themselves are under fire,
while firing, or deliver their fire hurriedly or with bad aim.
During the =Franco-German war= the German troops learned by
experience that the defender’s fire inflicted serious losses on
the attacker at long ranges, but that the efficacy of his fire did
not increase as the skirmishers came closer to his position; that,
on the contrary, the intensity of the hostile fire effect fell off
noticeably at ranges below 600 m.
During the attack made by the Prussian Guard against =St. Privat=,
the greatest number of dead and wounded were counted at ranges
from 1200-1500 m., and the fewest losses were sustained at ranges
from 500-600 m. from the enemy’s position, where it had to remain
stationary on the slope for about an hour awaiting the effect of the
enveloping movement made by the Saxon Army Corps. A range of 1500
m. corresponds approximately to an angle of departure of 5 degrees
for the _Chassepot_ rifle. The 20th Infantry Division was molested
by rifle fire from =St. Privat=, during its march from =St. Ail= to
=St. Privat= (the range in this case was 2200 m., which corresponds
to an angle of departure of 15 degrees 30 minutes for the _Chassepot_
rifle) although the skirmishers of the Guard, against whom this fire
was directed, were only from 400 to 500 m. from the French position.
In the =Russo-Turkish war= of 1877-78, the same thing occurred.
Infantry projectiles reached the Russian reserves while they were
still 2500 m. from the enemy (this range corresponds to an angle of
departure of 14 degrees 30 minutes).
Kuropatkin corroborates the statement that at 1500 m. and beyond
(5 degrees 50 minutes), the losses produced by the Turkish rifle
fire were very serious; that at 400 m. (1 degree 8 minutes) from
the hostile position, on the other hand, the losses were remarkably
small, sometimes even ceasing entirely. The Turks finally kept their
heads under cover altogether.
A correspondent writes the following in regard to the engagement
at =Slivnica= on November 17th to 19th, 1885: “When at 400 m. from
the enemy, the firing lines suffered scarcely any losses, while the
reserves, stationed far to the rear, suffered severely from stray
shots.”
It must be the endeavor of peace training to prevent the occurrence
of unaimed firing in battle. This necessitates careful supervision
by squad and platoon leaders over the individual soldier in the
firing line, and the severe punishment of every act of carelessness
in pointing, aiming, and setting of the sight, in peace time. In war
one must constantly endeavor to avoid opening fire prematurely, as it
tires the eye and the arm of the soldier, to check any unjustifiable
rapidity of fire, and to hold the men down to a steady and slow fire.
This includes, in addition, the avoidance, by the leader, of haste in
giving directions for firing. In defense, one will have to make every
effort to withdraw one’s men from the moral effect of the attacker’s
fire preparation, and to keep them in proper condition to repulse
the assault. This requires the construction of splinter proofs, head
cover, and, in case the hostile fire becomes too deadly, a cessation
of fire, which is again resumed when the enemy attempts to advance.
To carry this out properly, covered observation stations should be
built, and the men instructed to line the parapet and to open fire at
a signal previously agreed upon, sights having been set and ammunition
replenished before they leave cover. A body of troops is not unfit to
resist an assault simply because it has suffered a certain percentage
of losses, but because each individual soldier is so mastered by the
feeling that he is in danger of losing his life that he fires his piece
without raising his head above the parapet. A body of troops in such a
state will fire its projectiles in Wolozkoi’s “constant cone.”
A mobilized organization, thoroughly trained in time of peace, will
still fire a by no means inconsiderable fraction of its projectiles
with good aim and with the proper rear sight elevation, provided its
officers are equal to their task.
(e) The Influence of Rifle-Rests in Firing.
Freehand firing increases the rate of fire. Whether the skirmisher
fires freehand or from a rest is of influence on the accuracy of
the single shot at short ranges. The Belgian, Dutch, and Italian
regulations authorize the bayonet, in the absence of other expedients,
to be stuck into the ground as a rifle-rest, while this is forbidden
in Germany. Collective fire of short duration delivered at mid ranges
has not been found superior because of the use of rifle-rests. Fire
delivered from a rest is undoubtedly superior, however, when the barrel
of the piece is heated by continued firing (position of the left hand
supporting the piece when firing standing, prone, or kneeling) and
when the arm of the skirmisher gets tired. When firing from a rest,
high shots result from vibrations of the barrel;[166] and there is
also danger, when under fire, that the men will not raise their heads
over the parapet, but will fire their pieces into the air. This, as
corroborated by the more recent campaigns, is why a fire fight at
short range is by no means decided in so short a time as the peace
performances of modern rifles lead one to suppose, for great losses
do not take place until skirmishers, who have heretofore hugged the
ground, rise. At Spionskop, the two opposing firing lines remained
stationary for hours at 250 m. from each other.[167] The Japanese
found in their attacks that at ranges from 150 to 75 paces the hostile
fire had no effect.
[166] According to the _Swiss Firing Regulations_ the change in
height in the point of the target struck amounts to ¹⁄₁₀₀₀ of the
range.
[167] The British Infantry (consisting of 2694 men, exclusive of
subsequent reinforcements), which was engaged at short range on
Spionskop from 3 A. M. until 9:30 P. M., lost 40 officers and 721 men
in 18¹⁄₂ hours (one officer to every 18.5 men), _i.e._, 28.2%. See p.
189 infra.
(f) Influence of the Ground.[168]
[168] MONDEIL, _De la résolution des problèmes de tir sur le champ
de bataille_, Paris, 1900.
So far we have considered only the effect of infantry fire on level
ground. The efficacy of fire is, however, greatly influenced by the
inclination of the ground upon which the cone of dispersion falls.
Where the ground rises in respect to the line of sight, the depth of
the beaten zone is decreased; where it falls in respect to the line of
sight, the depth of the beaten zone is increased.[169]
[169] Lieutenant-General ROHNE’S definitions are given below in
explanation of certain technical terms:
“_Danger Space_” is the distance measured along the line of sight
within which the trajectory neither rises above the height of the
target nor falls below the target.
“_Beaten Zone_” is the distance measured along the surface of the
ground within which the trajectory does not rise above the height of
the target.
Whether a target will be struck by a bullet when the range has not
been correctly estimated depends entirely upon the danger space.
In pointing at the bottom line of the target, the aiming position
(_i.e._, the height at which the piece is held) does not affect
the danger space. When pointing at the center of the target the
danger space changes, increasing for low rear sight elevations and
tall targets, and decreasing for high rear sight elevations and low
targets, as compared with aim taken at the bottom line of a target.
“The evil effects of errors in estimating the range decrease as the
‘danger space’ increases, which, by the way, is wholly dependent upon
the ballistic properties of the rifle, upon the range, and the height
of the target. The danger on the ground in rear of the target fired
upon, and the difficulty of bringing up reinforcements and ammunition
over it, increases directly as the beaten zone, which in addition
depends upon the inclination of the ground to the line of sight.”