reference to the target, and its volume. In the past, pauses in the
fire were necessary to allow the powder smoke to clear away; at
present they are of advantage because they give the men a breathing
spell; rest eyes and nerves; enable ammunition to be distributed, and
allow preparations to be made for concerted action. In making use of
such pauses good cover, good observation of the enemy and instant
readiness for resuming the fire are essential. In a serious engagement
the men either maintain a vigorous, animated fire or they rest. If
the advancing enemy takes to cover, the fire must cease, only to be
resumed with full vigor when favorable targets appear. The attacker
(like the British in South Africa advancing against the Boers) will
in many cases--especially at the beginning of a campaign--be deceived
into believing that the defender has withdrawn; should the attacker now
advance, the defender, by suddenly resuming his fire, will surprise
him to such an extent that he may be repulsed.[152] Pauses in the fire
are a practical expedient for maintaining fire discipline and enable
the leader to keep his troops in hand. An organization is capable
of performing its duty well, so long as it obeys the command “cease
firing.” It might be well at this point to determine when the defender
should _change his rear sight elevations_ if the attacker advances by
rushes. At mid ranges it might be advisable to stop firing, so as to
present no target to the enemy when his line throws itself down after
a rush, and to utilize this interruption for changing the rear sight
elevation. When this is done during a forward rush of the enemy, the
rapidity of fire will suffer at the most favorable moment for bringing
an effective fire to bear upon the enemy.
[152] Compare HÖNIG, _Vierundzwanzig Stunden Moltkescher
Strategie_, p. 145, relative to the various opinions entertained in
the staffs of Generals v. Göben and Steinmetz in regard to the pause
in the fire of the French at Point du Jour. _Der 18. August_, pp.
269, 271 and 352.
8. KINDS OF FIRE.
In the days of slow loading rifles of limited range, the importance of
the _volley_ was due to the fact that it enabled the leader to develop
the greatest volume of fire in tactically favorable moments, or, in
other words, when large targets were visible for a short time. Modern
combat is conducted under different conditions. When black powder was
used the volley had the advantage of permitting the powder smoke to
clear away during the pauses. This advantage has now also disappeared.
In the Russo-Japanese war, the Japanese used “fire at will” almost
exclusively. Volleys were used by them only at long ranges; by troops
held in rear and, after an assault, to get the men in hand. These views
are not changed in the new regulations, but immediately after firing a
volley the men are to re-load without command. Rapid fire is retained.
The Russians placed their faith principally in volley fire,[153] but
were soon forced to resort to fire at will. The Russian regulations
recommended volley fire up to the decisive firing position, not so much
because of a belief in the superior efficacy of this kind of fire, but
out of distrust of the individual training of their men; certainly an
admission of the deficiency of that kind of training in their army. It
was feared that fire at will would impair fire discipline and cause
waste of ammunition, and it was believed that the immediate influence
of superiors could not be dispensed with. Even the new provisional
regulations have not discarded volley fire, which may be employed by
section or by platoon. Fire at will may be divided into slow fire (one
shot from each squad) and lively fire with counted cartridges.
[153] At Nicholson’s Neck (24th Oct., 1899) the British leaders
ordered their men, who were firing at will on the Boers advancing
from cover to cover (“_Boer Attack_”) to discontinue that fire, and
to use volleys only. But the enemy consistently avoided presenting
large targets to the British volley fire.
_Germany._ _Volleys_ (pars. 106-108 German I. F. R.) are to be employed
by platoons or companies when in close order; in skirmish line
(par. 193 German I. F. R.) only when the enemy is surprised or the
organization is to be kept firmly in hand. Volleys, however, can be
used only when the troops themselves are not exposed to an effective
fire. An organization will be able to ascertain the range by means of
trial volleys only in exceptional cases.
“_The highest attainable rate of fire_--the word rapid fire has
been elided--is to be used in attack during the preparation for the
assault; in defense to repulse a hostile assault; in warding off a
cavalry charge; in all combat situations in which a sudden or immediate
collision with the enemy occurs; and, finally, in pursuit.” (Par. 208
German I. F. R.).
_Fire at will_ is used both in extended and close order.
=Volley Fire and Fire at Will. Bursts of Fire (Rafales).= “_Il
n’y a de feu practicable devant l’ennemi que celui à volonté._”
NAPOLEON.[154]
[154] “Fire at will is the only kind of fire practicable when
engaged with the enemy.” NAPOLEON.
“It may be objected that one frequently reads in military history
of effective volleys. The explanation of this is that many of the
so-called volleys mentioned in accounts were volleys only in name. In
a few instances the defender endeavored to fire volleys, but usually
their effect was insignificant.” V. BOGUSLAWSKI.
“Fire at will was forbidden. Volley fire was used only by direction
of the commanders of the battalion sections of the line. The order
to fire volleys quickly ran along the trenches. For a few minutes
a certain amount of unrest was noticeable among the men, which, if
allowed to continue, might have degenerated into confusion and later
perhaps into disorderly flight.
“The first volley was not quite successful. It was ragged--some
men even firing a second time without waiting for the command, an
example likely to be followed by the others. The force was on the
point of getting out of hand. Volleys fired by neighboring sections
drowned the voice of the commander. In such situations only personal
experience and resourcefulness can tell a company commander what
to do. We recommend a course which has always been attended with
success in practice. Let the officer commanding a section jump upon
the parapet and from there give the order ‘cease firing.’ Then, if
the enemy’s fire permits, and his own heart is stout enough, let him
order the next volley from his position on the parapet. When once the
force is again under control, the volleys will be as good as if the
enemy were not so close.” KUROPATKIN-KRAHMER _Kritische Rückblicke
auf den Russisch-Türkischen Krieg_, II, pp. 304 and 310.
In his _Comments on Drill Regulations_ (16th Nov., 1840) Prince
WILLIAM, subsequently Emperor WILLIAM I. of Germany, says:
“I am personally opposed to volleys by battalion. I am of the opinion
that in war volleys and file fire will seldom be used. Should this
fire be used, however, no one will be able to stop file firing after
volley firing, even though not ordered, _because in my opinion it
is impossible to combat human nature_, which finds more security in
rapid loading and firing than in awaiting the commands....”
_Russian experiences in Manchuria._ “At first _volleys_ by formed
bodies of troops were attempted, but later fire at will was used.
In the latter, the men were forbidden to hurry, were instructed to
bring their pieces down to the ‘ready,’ and, whenever it was possible
to see the enemy--who was advancing by rushes--to change their rear
sight elevations at the whistle signal of their commander.... When at
a distance from the enemy the men remained cool and fired faultless
volleys. When the enemy came closer the volleys deteriorated. The
Russians used only fire at will at ranges under 800 paces. This
enabled the men to fire on individual hostile skirmishers and to
place the boldest out of action.” SOLOVIEV.
=Austria.= _Volleys_ are employed, as a rule, only by bodies in close
order, for the purpose of finding the range, and for firing upon
targets which appear suddenly at long range and which will probably
be visible for only a short time. Fire at will is the principal kind
of fire used, the rate of fire being increased or decreased by the
men according to the existing situation. When necessary, the leaders
should regulate the fire; but this should only be done in exceptional
cases as the men are apt to increase rather than diminish the rate of
fire (“Rapid fire”).
The _maximum rate of fire_ is to be employed: “In _attack_, for
the purpose of gaining a superiority of fire at short range; in
_defense_, for the purpose of warding off an impending assault. It
is moreover to be used to inflict the greatest possible losses on a
defeated enemy as long as he is within effective range; and, finally,
in fire surprises, repulse of cavalry attacks, and in rencontres with
the enemy.”
=France.= The French _Lebel_ rifle has a cylindrical magazine
situated under the stock and has a capacity of eight cartridges
which have to be loaded singly. As a rule, _fire with counted
cartridges_ is employed (_feu à cartouches comptées_) for the purpose
of obtaining a “burst of fire” (_rafale_). The _rafale_ consists of
firmly controlled, concentrated, collective fire. Fire at will (_feu
à volonté_) is also used, eight rounds per minute being fired at the
short ranges. The rapidity of this fire at will may be increased up
to 12 rounds per minute by employing the cartridges in the magazine
(_feu à répétition_). One minute is required to fill the magazine.
Volleys are to be employed in night combats and when it becomes
necessary to control the men. In exceptional cases individual men are
directed to fire.
=England and Switzerland.= The only fire employed is fire at will.
The rapidity of this fire varies according to the nature of the
target and the range.
=Italy.= Fire at will (in close order in two or four ranks).
=Japan and Russia.= (See p. 157, supra).
The Rate of Fire.
As regards its rate, fire may be divided into three classes, viz.,
_slow fire_, _accelerated fire_, and _rapid fire_. The command “fire
more slowly” (or more rapidly) serves only the purpose of diminishing
(or increasing) the rate of fire.
The rate of fire depends upon the purpose of action, the character of
the target, and the available ammunition. Unfavorable illumination and
the difficulty of clearly distinguishing the target at long ranges will
reduce the rate of fire. The aiming position (_i.e._, whether the rifle
is fired from a prone position or from a rest) also affects the rate of
fire. A well trained company at peace strength will, moreover, be able
to fire more rapidly than one on a war footing.
Hurried firing should unquestionably be condemned. The rapidity with
which our rifles can be loaded enables us to produce the maximum fire
effect in the minimum time against narrow targets. _The desire of
the soldier to make every shot a hit, carefully inculcated in time
of peace, will of itself regulate the rate of fire._ As the rate of
fire depends upon the distinctness with which the target can be seen,
it will naturally increase as the range decreases, thus generally
corresponding to the requirements of the tactical situation. Moreover,
as it is easier to aim at tall targets than at head targets, this also
exercises either an accelerating or a retarding effect, as the case
may be. Lieutenant-General Rohne has done a great deal to bring about
a correct appreciation of the rate of fire. He states: “The opposition
to an increased rate of fire is perhaps due to the belief that it is
invariably coupled with a reduction in accuracy. This is not the case,
however, and even if it were true to a certain extent, it need not
necessarily be harmful. To be sure, when a high rate of fire is solely
due to the excitement of the skirmishers, it is unquestionably to be
condemned because no attempt is made at aiming; but when it is the
product of systematic peace training, it need not necessarily preclude
good aiming. It is entirely consistent with a high rate of fire to load
and point quickly, to keep the target constantly in view, and, at the
same time, to aim accurately and to pull the trigger without flinching.
“The leader who reduces the rapidity of fire in battle in order to save
ammunition, wastes lives and time, both more valuable than ammunition.
Disabled soldiers are more difficult to replace than ammunition, and
lost time cannot be replaced at all.”[155]
[155] _Schieszlehre für die Infanterie_, 2nd Edition.
A high rate of fire need by no means be synonymous with waste of
ammunition. Ammunition would unquestionably be wasted if fire were
delivered for hours at the same high rate. It is very probable,
however, that in the battles of the future the fire will be moderate
for some time, or, better still, cease entirely, only to break
forth like a thunderstorm over the enemy when opportunity offers or
necessity demands. The slower the troops fire the longer they will
present a target to the enemy. The coolness shown in firing individual
shots at the commencement of an action will disappear owing to the
impression produced by losses. This is apparent even in field firing.
Lieutenant-General Rohne arrives at the following average results:
Ranges up to 400 m. 5 rounds per minute;
„ from 400- 700 „ 4-5 „ „ „
„ „ 700-1000 „ 3-4 „ „ „
„ „ 1000-1300 „ 2-3 „ „ „
„ „ 1300-1500 „ 1-4 „ „ „
„ over 1500 „ 1 „ „ „
Troops going into action for the first time are inclined to fire
entirely too fast, due to their desire to overcome their nervousness.
Veteran troops seek to attain the same result, not through rapidity
of fire, but through accuracy. Only the determination to make hits is
calculated to overcome nervousness. Wherever this determination is
lacking, wild firing (fire panic), which is in any case difficult to
prevent, will surely result. Fire delivered hurriedly during unexpected
rencontres is almost invariably ineffective.[156] For this reason most
of the firing regulations have eliminated the command “Rapid Fire,”
which is only calculated to produce confusion.
[156] At Beaumont the 9th Company of the 27th Infantry, after a
long advance at double time, encountered the flank of a hostile
battalion. The men became excited, raised the leaves of their rear
sights, and opened rapid fire, which had no effect whatever, as the
range was only 200 paces. _Geschichte des Regiments, Nr. 27_, p. 95.
The Italian Firing Regulations contain the following statement in
regard to the effect of accelerated fire (see p. 140 supra).[157]
[157] Consult also _Schieszversuche der k. u. k. Armeeschieszschule
seit dem Jahre 1900_, Vienna, 1905. ROHNE, _Schieszlehre für die
Infanterie_, 2nd Edition, p. 132.
1. _When the appropriate elevation is used_, two-thirds of the
percentage of hits obtained by firing 5-6 rounds from each rifle per
minute, may be expected when firing at the rate of 12-14 rounds per
minute.
2. _When the elevation selected is too great or too small by 100 m._,
rapid fire produces almost the _same percentage_ of hits as ordinary
fire at will.
3. _When the elevation selected is in error by 200 m._, rapid fire
produces almost _twice as great a percentage_ of hits as fire at will.
From the above it follows that, when the appropriate elevation is not
used, accelerated fire will inflict greater losses upon the enemy than
ordinary fire at will in the same length of time. Within equal periods
of time the actual number of hits will be greater in animated fire at
will than in slow fire; but in the latter the percentage of hits will
be higher.
Of all the different kinds of fire, the _volley_ is best adapted to
meet the requirement of keeping the troops in hand, of concentrating
the fire, and thereby producing great moral effect. Volleys are of
value to troops in ambush, in repulsing cavalry attacks, and in
preventing premature firing against the wishes of the commander. They
should be used against staffs which would be able to seek cover or
spread out when exposed to fire at will.
As the men are, however, not equally skilled in loading their pieces,
the rate of fire is very little increased by the use of volleys.
The command “Fire” can only be given when the pieces of the entire
unit are directed upon the target. The length of the pause between
preliminary command and command of execution varies, depending upon
the distinctness with which the target can be seen, the range, and
the aiming position. When the fire is delivered from a prone position
it will be difficult to determine when the command of execution
should properly be given. Moreover, as fire from a standing or
kneeling position will be the exception, this has contributed to
eliminate volley firing on the battlefield, because the troops lack
coolness--mental as well as physical--which is indispensable in every
volley.
The material and moral effect of a volley is doubtless very
considerable, but who could possibly make his voice heard when a
deployed platoon of sixty men is firing? How about the efficacy of
the fire when the men revert of their own accord from volleys to fire
at will, which they will do when their officers are either killed or
wounded and they themselves are exposed to fire?[158]
[158] During the advance on Flavigny (Vionville), the support of
the 10th Company, 12th Infantry, was to move into the firing line for
the purpose of firing volleys. “The volley was by no means a good
one, however, and the men at once took up rapid fire. Lieutenant
C---- jumped in front of the men to stop the firing, but was shot in
the leg and crawled back. The rapid fire continued along the entire
line.” _Geschichte des Regiments, Nr. 12_, p. 454.
During the war between Servia and Bulgaria the Servians always
opened the infantry combat with volleys, but after casualties had
occurred among the officers under the heavy fire of the enemy, the
steady volley fire soon degenerated into wild, hurried fire at will,
which produced no effect whatever.
If we use squad volleys (Russia), we approximate fire at will without
any of its advantages, besides which, commands, given by so many
leaders, tend to confuse the men. Moreover, it is very difficult to
handle the platoon, to stop firing, to change target, and to initiate
movements. Volley firing is therefore confined to the preparatory
stage of combat and to rare moments in which the troops firing are not
themselves under effective fire. In the defense of fortified positions
many opportunities will be found for the employment of volley fire.
The use of trial volleys for the purpose of testing the rear sight
elevation will be confined to a few favorable cases, and it may be
remarked that animated fire at will concentrated on some definite point
produces the same results.
The French, who retained volleys longer than the other powers (to keep
the men in hand, to regulate the expenditure of ammunition, and to
direct a concentrated collective fire upon the most important target
according to the will of the leader), found a substitute in the fire
with counted cartridges,[159] the “burst of fire” (rafale).[160] This
was also adopted by their artillery. In Germany, the importance of the
sudden effect produced by these “bursts of fire” is recognized, but
the same object is sought to be attained by training alone; while in
Russia, fire with counted cartridges has been adopted, not for the
purpose of obtaining rafale fire effect, but for keeping the men in
hand. Rafale fire has the disadvantage that pauses in the fire are
regulated formally, and that these pauses occur frequently at the very
moment when a favorable target is still visible. Will the individual
soldier remain cool in the excitement of battle and carefully count the
three or five cartridges which he is to fire? In defense, rafale fire
is proper, because the skirmisher in the defensive line is completely
hidden during the pauses, while the attacker presents favorable
targets only temporarily, thus justifying an increased expenditure
of ammunition. In attack, suitable targets are rarely available for
rafale fire, and a substitute for this fire must be sought in well
directed, steadily delivered fire at will, interrupted by rushes to
the front. During an attack, rafale fire might degenerate into wild,
uncontrolled fire at will, the rapidity of which decreases only when
the ammunition runs short. The employment of this class of fire might
sometimes be advisable in action when it becomes necessary to hold the
enemy, that is, in defensive situations. In this connection, one who is
thoroughly familiar with the French army aptly says: “Rafale fire may
be likened to the wild passes made by a man, backed up against a wall,
for the purpose of warding off an adversary who is able to decide the
controversy with one well-aimed blow.”
[159] Temporarily adopted in Germany also.
[160] Par. 194.1 of the _French Infantry Drill Regulations_ of
Dec. 3rd, 1904, states: “The moral effect produced upon an opponent
by the fire is much more considerable when the fire is concentrated
and delivered suddenly and unexpectedly.” Par. 194.4 states: “The
efficacy of the fire, due to its intensity, is augmented when the
enemy is taken by surprise,” etc. Par. 195.1 states: “The fire is, as
a rule, delivered by ‘rafales,’ which are short, sudden and violent;
and, in exceptional cases, by volleys.”
9. REAR SIGHT ELEVATIONS AND POINTS OF AIM.
In Switzerland and Italy the employment of a single rear sight
elevation, less than the actual range, is preferred, even when the
range is not accurately known. The French regulations are silent on
this subject. In Germany one rear sight elevation is used, as a general
rule, up to 1,000 m.; beyond that range combined sights may be used in
which the two rear sight elevations differ from each other by 100 or 50
m.[161]
[161] See ROHNE, _Schieszlehre für die Infanterie_, p. 93, et seq.
In view of the greater dispersion of fire in action, the author
recommends the selection of either one elevation only, or, at the
longer ranges, the employment of combined sights, in which the
elevations differ from each other by 200 m. In peace time the use
of combined sights, by well-trained marksmen, in which rear sight
elevations differ by only 50 m. would, indeed, be sufficient to
increase the number of hits, but on the battlefield the favorable
conditions found on the target range are lacking.
“Rapidly approaching or receding targets are followed by making proper
sight corrections, rear sight elevations being less than the range when
the fire is delivered against advancing targets and greater than the
range when the fire is delivered against receding targets. At short
ranges the same result may be obtained by aiming lower or higher. It
should be noted that, when firing on cavalry making a mounted attack,
the danger space is continuous when the sights are raised to 700 m.”
(Par. 192 German I. F. R.). As a general rule, the proper aiming point
is the lowest line of the target. When it becomes necessary to aim at
the center, to one side of or below a target, its dimensions will serve
as a guide. A change in the rear sight elevation is necessary at medium
and long ranges to raise or lower the sheaf of fire; at short ranges
it is practicable to point higher only when the target is tall. When
the velocity of a side wind cannot be estimated, it is advisable to
distribute the fire over a broader front. At short ranges the selection
of an aiming point may, under favorable circumstances, be left to the
discretion of the individual skirmishers.
10. COMMANDS.
In recounting the several commands to be given for firing, the
regulations take into consideration the logical sequence of the tasks
devolving upon the skirmisher. Thus the first command draws the
skirmisher’s attention to the target; the second indicates the range;
the third directs him to open fire.
11. THE OBSERVATION OF THE FIRE.