by platoons, with the same sight, at some one point of the target.
For the first volley a rear sight elevation sufficiently below
the proper one should be selected, so that hits on or in front of
the target can be expected with certainty. This procedure is then
repeated, as often as necessary, with correspondingly raised or
lowered rear sight leaves, until the correct elevation is obtained.
This “ranging” by trial volleys promises no result, however, if any one
of the above-mentioned preliminary conditions is not fulfilled. It is
advantageous to establish a bracket by firing volleys, as is done by
artillery, but even with a good glass it is very difficult to observe
the strike of small caliber bullets. Whether it would be advisable to
adopt for this ranging a specially designed weapon, firing thin-walled
shell weighing about 400 g., is a question.[141]
[141] The 32 mm. _Nordenfeld_ machine gun fires a shell weighing
400 g.
The older range finding instruments depend upon angle measurements at
both ends of a line (up to 25 m. long). The large range finder (_Hahn_)
has been adopted in the German army. (Pars. 88-98 German I. F. R.).
This apparatus permits a range to be measured from one point, up to
1200 m. on low targets, and on taller targets, such as skirmishers
standing, up to 1600 m. Measurements are considered sufficiently
accurate when the error amounts to
2-3% up to a range of 1000 m.
3¹⁄₂-5% „ „ „ „ 2000 „
3-3¹⁄₂% „ „ „ „ 1500 „
On the defensive the large range finders will find employment before
and during the action. The men charged with the measurement of the
range should be careful not to betray the position by their activity,
before fire is opened. The utility of these instruments is much more
restricted in an attack. However, it will often be possible, before the
fire fight begins, to ascertain the range from the point selected for
the first firing position, to the position to be attacked. According to
Soloviev range finders failed completely in action in Manchuria. (See
p. 137 supra).
6. SELECTION OF A TARGET AND TIME FOR OPENING FIRE.
In selecting a target and opening fire it must be remembered that the
fire cannot have a decisive effect unless the target is well within
effective range. The leader should ask himself whether the result to
be expected is properly commensurate with the probable expenditure of
ammunition entailed, and whether this expenditure is warranted in view
of the total amount available. But the decision to fire upon a target
once made, the ammunition necessary for the attainment of the object
of the fight must be expended without stinting, since all experience
teaches us that an ineffective fire impairs the morale of one’s own
troops, while it raises that of the enemy.
In the selection of a target, its tactical importance is the principal
determining factor. The fire is first directed upon the most dangerous,
generally the nearest target, or the one which is soon to become the
most dangerous. Subsequently the fire should be directed upon targets
which, owing to their height, width, depth, and density, promise the
greatest number of effective hits.
Infantry will, as a rule, offer the most important and promising
target, and the fire should be directed against the firing line, since
the troops following it in close order will in any event come within
range during their advance. In Italy, when two targets are available,
the fire is to be directed on the one promising the best results.
Ballistic and tactical considerations determine whether fire should be
opened at long or at short ranges.
Adequate results may be expected when the fire is directed against
low targets at ranges of 800-1200 m., but at ranges over 1200 m. a
decisive effect is only attainable by the expenditure of a large amount
of ammunition. Skirmishers standing may be fired on with good effect
even at ranges over 1200 m. (long ranges).
When the fire is properly controlled and directed, it will be effective
against tall and deep targets within ranges corresponding to the
highest graduations of the rear sight leaves. However, when the targets
are narrow, a side wind is very apt to throw the cone of dispersion off
the target.
The idea of using our accurate, long range rifle at long ranges in
defense, thus bringing it into effective play, at a time when the
danger to our own troops is still very small, is, at first glance,
very tempting. Military history shows that such fire was successful
here and there, especially where one of the contending parties was
armed with a much superior weapon, or where the enemy failed to apply
the proper remedy. But even in these cases it was successful only
up to a certain point. There is this to be said against employing
long range fire: Its effect is insignificant when compared with the
expenditure of ammunition entailed; it is difficult to replenish
ammunition and it tires the eye and the arm of the skirmisher. Poorly
trained troops finally do not raise their rifles at all, but blaze away
without aiming. To be sure, fire opened at an early moment annoys the
advance of the enemy, but it cannot seriously retard it. Once the fire
is opened, we want it to be effective; we don’t want to injure the
enemy--we want to annihilate him.
Although we fully appreciate the good results obtained at long ranges
on the target range, we prefer to utilize the entire staggering fire
effect of our weapons at short and mid ranges, wholly for the purpose
of annihilating the enemy.
Since only small targets, often scarcely discernible by the naked eye,
present themselves to the attacker, the fire of the defender should
not be returned at once. The forward movement should be continued by
utilizing every expedient (rushes with breathing spells, and cover)
until serious losses are sustained and the leader has reason to fear
that his men will lose their morale and throw themselves down without
orders. Frequently several groups will open fire while the others
continue to advance. The endeavor should be to open fire only when the
attacking force has gotten as close as possible to the lower limit of
mid combat range (800-1200 m.).[142]
[142] At Paardeberg (18th March, 1900), the left wing of the
Highland Brigade advanced, without firing a shot, to within 450 m. of
the hostile position. This advance, to be sure, was made under cover
of the fire of the right wing of the 9th Brigade, which had made a
lodgment within 750 m. of the enemy’s position.
Errors in estimating the range are offset by the flat trajectory of the
rifle only at short ranges, and only at these ranges can there be any
question of an effective preparation of the attack by fire. These views
are expressed in the German regulations.
Recent wars demonstrate that, whenever the attacker opened fire at long
ranges, the attack finally came to a standstill, that the troops in
many cases fired away all their ammunition, and that the whole attack
failed.
“Whenever the attacking regiment opened fire this was unfortunately
a sign that the attack had been repulsed.” This remark made by
Kuropatkin in regard to the fight of the Russian infantry (center
group) on Sept. 11th, 1877, at =Plevna=, is characteristic of the
Russian ideas. On the occasion referred to, the Russians advanced on
the Turkish works without fire preparation; the firing lines halted
400 to 600 m. from the Turkish position and commenced firing. They
succumbed because it never occurred to the leaders to reinforce
them and attempt to gain a superiority of fire. Even in Skobeleff’s
attack there was no sign of actual fire preparation, but, as soon
as the line halted, strong reinforcements were pushed in to carry
it forward. The attack, made on a front of about 800 m., suffered
heavy losses, but succeeded, although all organizations were in
complete disorder. After advancing 1000 m., the decimated first line
(8 battalions) halted; fifteen fresh companies carried it forward
some 150 m.; then Skobeleff threw in twenty companies in one body,
which carried the line forward to within approximately 100 to 150 m.
of the work. At this moment Skobeleff threw himself into the fight
and succeeded in taking the Turkish position with his badly cut up
troops. Doubtless an act of undeniable gallantry, but not one worthy
of imitation.
The war between Servia and Bulgaria (1885) is very instructive in
this connection. As in 1859, 1870 and 1877, that force was defeated,
which, trusting to the superiority of its rifles, opened fire at
long ranges. The Servian skirmishers often did not even get within
decisive range of the position of their opponents.
The British infantry, armed with a long range rifle equipped with an
excellent rear sight arrangement, allowed itself to be enticed, by the
long range fire of the Boers, into opening fire at 1200 and 1300 m.
(Guard at Modder River) and even at 1600 and 1700 m. (6th Division at
Paardeberg) against an enemy whose position was not discernible even
through the most powerful glasses. The losses were small and not to be
compared with those which our Guard suffered without firing, during
their advance on St. Privat. The advance of the Gordon Highlanders
at Doornkop (29th May, 1900) to within short range of the hostile
position, without firing a shot, although they themselves were under
fire from 2000 m. on, was splendid.[143]
[143] _The Times History of the War in South Africa_, IV, p. 141.
Since the assailant presents larger targets than the defender, and the
latter can make preparations for firing, ascertain ranges, construct
rifle-rests, and replenish ammunition without difficulty, it is proper
in defense to open fire at long ranges, especially in delaying actions,
for then fighting at short ranges is to be avoided in any case. It is
absolutely correct for the defender to make the most of the advantages
above mentioned. While everything is orderly and in readiness in the
defender’s firing line, the attacker’s line is still in the process of
forming. Should the defender wait until the hostile firing line has
systematically deployed and has made a lodgment within short range of
his position, or should he produce losses and create confusion in its
ranks by suddenly opening fire?
The employment of long range fire on the defensive is justified when
sufficient ammunition is available, when artillery is not present, and
when the hostile infantry pursues the tactics of advancing to short
range without firing. “Infantry should never attempt to take the
place of artillery at long ranges or compete with the fire of that
arm.” If it is important for the attacker to reach the extreme limit
of mid ranges with as little firing as possible, the defender should
in the first place fire on him with artillery, and, when this does not
suffice or is not available, with infantry, so as to prevent him from
accomplishing his object.
At mid ranges the efficacy of the defender’s fire is so great, when
directed upon an infantry line advancing without fire support, that
it becomes an important factor. At ranges from 1000 to 600 m., 8 to
25% hits can be counted on when the fire is directed against advancing
skirmishers; and even assuming an error of ¹⁄₈ in the estimated range,
3 to 12% hits may still be expected. (Par. 623, p. 196, German I. F.
R.).
If the attacker is unable to hide from the defender’s fire by using
cover, his losses will increase until they become unbearable; his
attack will hesitate, and he will commence firing. Fresh troops are
necessary to carry the attacking line forward anew. The success of the
defense is assured, if the defender is able to prevent the attacking
force from getting within short range of the position. The defender’s
chance of making a successful counter-attack disappears, however, as
soon as the attacking force makes a lodgment within short range of the
position; for the closer the defender is pressed, the closer will he
be tied to his position. While the superiority of fire enjoyed by the
defender at mid ranges allows him perfect freedom of action, at short
ranges the attacker’s fire imposes conditions upon the defense which
make the growing power of the attack sensibly felt. The moment the
defender begins firing, however, he becomes at once a favorable target
for the artillery of the attacking force. The defender frequently
betrays his position prematurely by opening fire.
The _moral effect_ of withholding the fire (_fire surprise_) is very
great.[144] A strong fire will be actually annihilating if suddenly
directed upon the enemy at short ranges, especially if he is still
in unsuitable formations, owing to his ignorance of the defender’s
position. (Example: The British brigade under Hart at Colenso, 15th
Dec., 1899, and the Highland Brigade at Magersfontain, 11th Dec., 1899)
or if the morale of his troops is questionable.[145] What good troops
should do in such a situation (employ rapid fire and then advance to
the assault) is shown by the conduct of the IInd Battalion of the 20th
Infantry at Coulomiers.[146] Steady nerves and iron discipline are,
however, prerequisites for the execution of a fire surprise by the
defender.
[144] Marshal BUGEAUD gives a very graphic description of the moral
effect of fire in his _Aperçus sur quelques détails de guerre_,
based upon his experiences in the fights with the British in the
Peninsula: “The men began to get excited when still 1,000 m. from
the enemy; they talked to each other; the march became more and more
hurried; and disorder appeared here and there in the columns. The
British remained quietly at order arms; their calm demeanor was not
without effect upon our young soldiers. We approached closer, the
men shouting: ‘_Vive l’empéreur! En avant, à la baionette!_’ Shakos
were raised upon the points of bayonets; the march became a double
time; the ranks became mixed; the excitement caused confusion here
and there; and a few shots were fired from the column. The British
continued to stand immovable, and seemed to pay no attention to us
even when only 300 paces separated the two forces.
“The contrast was apparent. Everyone felt that he would have to
deal with an opponent tried in battle; that the fire so long withheld
by the enemy would surely be annihilating. Our fighting ardor cooled;
the moral power which calmness, even when only apparent, exercises
over confusion, which seeks to drown itself in noise, made itself
felt in our ranks. At this moment, when the highest tension had been
reached, the British line raised its rifles--an indescribable feeling
rooted many of our men to the spot--and began to fire. The volleys,
coolly delivered against a narrow front, plowed through our ranks; we
wavered, decimated though we were, in order to recover; then three
overpowering cheers from the opponents’ line, which rushed forward to
the bayonet attack, and everybody turned to seek safety in disorderly
flight.”
[145] The defense of the cemetery at Beaune la Rolande. HÖNIG,
_Volkskrieg_, pp. 157 to 212.
[146] Dec. 15th, 1870. _Geschichte des Regiments Nr. 20_, p. 246.
KORTZFLEISCH, _Feldzug gegen den Loir_, p. 81.
Long range fire was employed with success on the defensive by the
French at St. Privat (the Germans suffered the most serious losses at
ranges from 1200 to 1000 m.) and by the Turks at Plevna. At 1500 m. the
Russian losses were such that they were obliged to begin advancing by
rushes. The losses decreased as the enemy’s position was approached.
The long range fire had produced a retarding but by no means an
annihilating effect. On the other hand, the fire of the defender, at
extremely short ranges, had a telling effect at Beaune la Rolande; in
the defense of Chagey on the Lisaine;[147] in the defense of Shipka
Pass (200 to 300 paces) by the Russians, and in the engagement at Gorni
Bugarov (1st Jan., 1878). Whenever the attacker enters the short range
zone while still in unsuitable formations, his losses increase until
they become annihilating. (Example: The bayonet attacks made by the
Austrians at Nachod and Trautenau).[148]
[147] KUNZ, _Entscheidungskämpfe des Korps Werder_, II, pp. 53, 93
and 143. The village was situated in a valley and had only a limited
field of fire.
[148] KÜHNE, _Kritische Wanderungen_, I, pp. 73 and 139; III, pp.
86 and 113. As regards flatness of trajectory and accuracy, the power
of the needle gun (_Zündnadelgewehr_) at point blank range (280 m.)
corresponds to the effect of rifle model ’98 at approximately 800 to
900 m. At Nachod the regiments named below suffered in two hours the
losses given:
Loss, men;
Strength; prisoners
Regiment. men. included. Prisoners. Percentage.
20th Infantry 2,500 722 165 28.8%
60th Infantry 2,500 685 185 27.4%
Provisions of Various Regulations.
=Austria.= “_In attack, everything must be done to get as close as
possible to the enemy before fire is opened._” In each fire position
the fire should be delivered with steadiness and without haste.
In _defense_, fire is to be opened as soon as appropriate targets
appear within effective range. Sometimes--especially in minor
operations--it may be advantageous to let the enemy come up close and
then open fire on him suddenly.
A decisive fire effect can only be counted on when the targets are
situated within effective range. Ineffective fire is a waste of
ammunition which impairs the morale of one’s own troops and raises
that of the enemy. For firing at long ranges it is necessary to
consider whether a sufficient amount of ammunition is available. Long
range fire should, in any case, be used only when the size of the
target makes an adequate fire effect probable, and when the range is
known, or can be ascertained with accuracy. In long range fire the
use of small units, each expending a large amount of ammunition, is
as a rule to be recommended. The _distribution_ and _concentration_
of fire should be regulated by the officer charged with fire
direction.
“_Effective fire, delivered suddenly, especially when taking an
enemy in flank or in reverse, even when delivered only by relatively
small forces, shakes the morale of the enemy in the most effective
manner._” (Fire surprise). “Under certain circumstances, but
especially when the enemy has used up all, or nearly all, of his
reserves, comparatively small detachments, skillfully led, can
contribute materially to success, or even bring about the decision,
if they are able to get on the enemy’s flank or rear and open
fire on him suddenly at short range.” Such fire surprises should
be attempted when the conditions essential for their success are
present.[149]
[149] In minor operations this would be a proper place for the
employment of large scouting detachments, the importance of which
decreases with the size of the contending forces. Such tasks can,
however, be just as well performed by a well-trained body of infantry.
=France.= In _attack_, fire is opened as late as possible, at any
rate not until the losses make it necessary to discontinue the
forward movement. Fire is the only means which makes a further
advance possible.
In _defense_, long range fire may be used under certain
circumstances. “Sudden and violent rafales delivered at short range
take the attacker by surprise if, all at once, he loses a great many
men.”
=England= (1905). _Attack._ Infantry is to advance as close as
possible to the enemy before opening fire; small losses must be
endured. Fire is decisive under 540 m. (600 yds.). Artillery and
infantry should support each other. Attention is called to the
support afforded advancing skirmishers by the fire of infantry units
and machine guns held in rear. The British are thus the first to
prescribe “fire of position.” Their Firing Regulations require that
“fire of position” be practiced by company at a range of 900 m. The
company forms line of skirmishers (2-pace intervals) while movable
disappearing targets are placed opposite it. The fire is to increase
in intensity when the attacking infantry advances over level ground
or finds obstacles; it is discontinued when cover is reached. “Fire
of position” is not without danger, but seems to be practicable
occasionally. Aside from its employment in “fire of position,”
long range fire is to be used in attack in the following cases: In
enveloping movements for the purpose of enfilading the enemy’s line;
when favorable targets present themselves; in containing actions or
in feints; in concentrated collective fire; and finally in pursuit.
_Defense_: Fire is to be opened at 1000 m. on skirmishers, but it
may be advantageous to withhold it until the hostile line comes
within short range. This will give good results when the enemy is in
ignorance of the defender’s position, or when the attack is made by
poorly disciplined troops. Continued long range fire tires the eye
and the hand.
=Italy.= In _attack_, the firing line is to reach the extreme limit
of short range (500 m.) with as little firing as possible; to
open fire before this with a part of the advancing force is only
permissible when necessary to carry the line forward. _Defense._ As
soon as the defender has a chance of obtaining some fire effect,
he should open fire to prevent the attacking infantry from getting
within short range. Fire at long (up to 1800 m.) and at mid ranges
(up to 1000 m.) may also be used for this purpose. The battalion
commander determines when fire is to be opened.
From what has been said in the preceding pages as to the time when
infantry should open fire, we may deduce the following =General
Rules=:--
It is permissible to open fire at an early moment only in exceptional
cases when the situation requires it; good preparation, which assures
the efficacy of fire and a high moral effect from the very beginning,
is of greater importance.
(a) IN ATTACK.
The attacker should advance without firing to ranges at which an
adequate fire effect against the low targets presented by the defender
may be expected. To open fire at an earlier moment is permissible only
when the defender’s fire is so strong that effective ranges cannot be
reached without firing. Long range fire is only a means to an end. In a
pursuit long range fire will, however, be employed for the purpose of
annoying the enemy.
(b) IN DEFENSE.[150]
[150] In Manchuria the Russians, when on the defensive, opened fire
on favorable targets at 1,500 m.; on skirmish lines at 1,000 m.
Fire may be opened at long ranges when sufficient ammunition is
available, only when the object is to gain time, and in decisive
actions, when the enemy presents favorable targets and we have no
artillery. Unless other reasons prevent, fire is opened as soon as
targets are clearly discernible and easily brought into line with the
sights. It is advisable to withhold the fire when the hostile artillery
is superior, when the opponent’s troops are of poor quality, and when
it is impossible to surprise the enemy with our fire while he is in
unsuitable formations. In defense, as in attack, the decision must be
sought by the employment of rapid fire at short range.
7. PAUSES IN THE FIRE.[151]
[151] A Russian company commander contributes the following in
_Mitteilungen der Infanterie Schieszschulen_: “On Sept. 3rd, 1904,
the fire in one of the trenches at Liao Yang lasted throughout
the entire day. The men were finally completely exhausted; their
shoulders, hands and fingers stiff. They had to be given some rest,
and something to eat and drink. Then the fire was resumed, only to
die down again. The fire of the skirmishers was not very effective,
as they were completely exhausted and used up.”
=Swiss.= Firing Regulations p. 44: “It may be advantageous in defense
to fire on the attacker only until he himself opens fire, and then
to remain under cover until he resumes his forward movement. A
prompt resumption of the fire by the defender must, however, be
assured.”
=France.= “The fire should cease when the hostile infantry halts and
takes to cover; its volume is increased as soon as the assailant
resumes his forward movement, or when he shows himself in dense
formations on open ground.”