definitely fixed as in Germany; neither is it prescribed that squad
leaders participate in the firing. In skirmish line fire control
and fire direction are to remain as long as possible in the hands
of the company commander. The battalion commander is charged with
concentrating and distributing the fire; with reinforcing, at the
proper time, the companies in the firing line; and with replenishing
the ammunition. At long ranges he designates the companies that are
to fire, and also the position from which fire is to be opened.
The squad leaders are charged with _constantly supervising_ the setting
of sights; the distribution, the careful delivery, and the rate of
fire; and the expenditure of ammunition.
_The squad leaders participate in the firing only_ when their duties
as leaders permit; and this will frequently be the case in a prolonged
engagement in the same position, especially at short ranges. These
remarks apply also to the range finders.
In Italy and Switzerland the squad leaders participate in the firing
when the whole platoon is engaged in a fire fight. The advantage of
thus gaining a few better shots for the firing line is more than offset
by the more careful supervision of the skirmishers as is required
in Germany, France and Austria. The platoon leader unaided is in no
position to supervise the proper use of the rifle and the expenditure
of ammunition; his subordinates must assist him. It is also desirable
to relieve the company commander from the actual duty of fire direction
and fire control. The company commander is responsible for leading
the company on the battlefield; this does not preclude his thoroughly
supervising his platoons and observing the effect of their fire.
“Whenever the company commander is in the firing line, he selects and
designates the target and gives orders for opening fire. He announces
the range found by the range finders and observes the effect of the
fire. Aside from this, he leaves fire control and fire direction to his
platoon commanders, and interferes only when he desires to concentrate
the fire of several platoons, or of the whole company, on a certain
target, or when he observes something that has escaped the notice of
the platoon commanders.” (Par. 216 German I. D. R.).
In the course of an action, fire control and fire direction will
frequently be imperfect, whether this be due to the loss of the
leaders, or to the difficulty of hearing commands in the noise of the
combat. To provide for such contingencies, the skirmishers must be
taught that, in the absence of fire control and fire direction, they
may fire (_not that they must fire_) at all targets within 600 m.; that
between 600 and 1200 m., they should fire at tall and wide targets
only; and that, at ranges over 1000 m., as a rule, they should not fire
at all.
In the pamphlet entitled, _Actual Experiences in the Russo-Japanese
War_, p. 11, et seq., Captain SOLOVIEV, 34th East Siberian Rifle
Regiment, 1st Siberian Corps, states: “* * * There was an almost
ungovernable tendency among the men, as soon as they had thrown
themselves down, to open fire without orders; paying attention
neither to the target designated, nor to setting their sights.
“This haste is, first of all, brought about by the desire of drowning
the consciousness of danger by means of increased activity. * * *
It is simply impossible to control and direct the fire when the men
have not been carefully trained. The din of battle, the explosion of
hostile projectiles, and the thunder of our own artillery make such a
deafening roar that one can scarcely hear one’s own voice. The long
firing lines make it extraordinarily difficult to transmit orders;
even squad commanders can not make themselves understood. Volley
firing must therefore be dispensed with.
“Only whistle signals, if repeated by all non-commissioned officers,
can be heard; but the men must be trained to obey the whistle signal.
With strictness and application much can be accomplished in this
direction; it may even be possible to stop the firing along the whole
length of the deployed company in the hottest phases of the fight.
“The difficulties of fire control and fire direction increase in
proportion to the intensity of the hostile fire and the proximity of
the enemy, especially on the defensive. The men get more and more
restless, their nervous tension increases, the danger seems nearer
and greater. In such a moment the leader must make every effort to
keep his men in hand, and prevent the firing from degenerating into a
wild blazing away at nothing. This is always a sign that the leader
has lost control of his troops.
“The greatest obstacle to good fire control and fire direction is the
nervousness that usually pervades troops which are not accustomed
to active service. Only thorough peace training and strict fire
discipline ensure the maintenance of order in battle and give the
fire the necessary efficacy. * * * The more laborious the struggle,
the more embittered the fight, the greater the losses, the more
fatigue and nervous strain gain the upper hand, the greater and
more important the role which the officer has to play. The success
of the 200 men under his command depends entirely upon the company
commander. The war in the Far East might well be called the war
of company commanders. The soldiers watch their leader constantly
and attentively. Two hundred lives depend upon his bearing, his
determination, firmness, and personal bravery. The men judge the
situation, the imminence of danger, success and failure, by the
conduct of their leader. The authority of an officer may rise to
great heights, but it may also sink very low. To show depression or
faint-heartedness is fatal; the feeling of despondency is at once
communicated to the men, the leader loses control of his command, and
the mischief is done.
“In battle, more than anywhere else, the officer must be a commander
and rule with an iron hand. Nowhere does discipline play as great a
role as in action. Woe to the troops who have not in time of peace
become thoroughly disciplined, to whom discipline has not become
second nature! They will pay dearly for this deficiency in war.
“I have observed that in the most critical situations a resolute
shout, in a correspondingly imperious tone, had a marvelously
quieting effect upon the men. It is likewise advisable to make, here
and there, a remark concerning routine duty. For example: ‘Why have
the sights not been set in that platoon? Platoon commander, see at
once that it is done.’ Because the commander is angry, and notices
neglect, everything goes well, so the men reason, and no danger need
be apprehended. The men quiet down, forget the whistling of the
bullets, set their sights carefully, point their pieces properly, and
aim again.”
3. SELECTION OF THE LINE TO BE OCCUPIED.
While a good field of fire is indispensable for reaping the maximum
benefit from the power of our rifles, the tactical situation is the
determining factor in the choice of a position. The requirements as to
a field of fire and the use to be made of it will vary, depending upon
whether it is desired to avoid an engagement at short range (delaying
action) or whether a decision is to be sought (decisive action). In the
first case a free field of fire at short ranges may be dispensed with.
Cover may be used only to the extent that it does not interfere with
constant observation of the enemy. It is not permissible to hide
entirely behind cover, unless expressly ordered in each case. To
rise from behind cover, for the purpose of firing, and to disappear
subsequently behind that cover for loading, is out of the question in
the firing line. This is physically impossible and much less attainable
for psychological reasons; in addition, the skirmisher will present a
much larger target than when lying down. When portions of the firing
line cannot see the target during an attack, the platoon commander
should consider this a hint, either to gain a better position farther
to the front, or to suspend his fire temporarily. (Par. 190 German I.
D. R.). In defense, in a similar case, cross fire would frequently be
the proper expedient. The attacker will often see nothing except the
heads of the skirmishers who must fire kneeling in order to sweep the
foreground, while these men will present targets of half a man’s height
to his bullets. Since smokeless powder is employed, it is important to
select positions that cannot easily be found by the enemy. Positions in
which the skirmishers are silhouetted against the sky line should be
avoided whenever possible. Faintly illuminated targets, or those lying
in the shade, are not fired on at all, according to all experience,
while the fire is above all else directed against sharply outlined
targets. The leaders must take to cover also, for in many cases single
officers standing upright draw attention to the position. The extent
of the position must be commensurate with the strength of the force;
too dense a line reduces the efficacy of fire and increases the
losses, while, on the other hand, too dispersed a force increases the
difficulties of fire control and fire direction.
4. THE STRENGTH OF THE FIRING LINE.
This depends upon the purpose of the action. Although a thin firing
line may be employed when the situation is still in doubt (protection
against surprise), it must be strong when the superiority of fire is
to be attained. If the firing line is made too weak, we are condemned
to fight a superior force continuously with an inferior one because we
have voluntarily sacrificed the advantage of our numerical superiority.
On the defensive, as soon as the direction of the hostile attack
develops, the firing line is made as strong as seems necessary for
holding the position. In a delaying action, however, we should endeavor
to place as few men in action as possible; and to compensate for the
lack of rifles by an increased expenditure of ammunition. All firing
is done from the prone position, in so far as the ground permits. The
French attempt to regulate the volume of fire by prescribing the
number of rifles to be employed instead of designating the kind of fire
to be used.
In Switzerland and England,[134] it is recommended that supports use
“Fire of position” where the terrain is suitable (hilly country).
The German Infantry Drill Regulations (par. 340) contain a similar
provision. When the supports cannot see the firing line on account of
the conformation of the ground, this fire is not likely to endanger the
latter.
[134] _Infantry Training_, 1905, p. 132, par. 2; p. 134, pars. 1,
2; p. 136, par. 6; p. 155, par. 1. See p. 154, infra.
5. ASCERTAINING RANGES.
(Pars. 78-98, 190 and 191 German I. F. R.).
Efficacy of fire depends upon a knowledge of the range. An imperfect
knowledge of the range may be compensated for by the flatness of the
trajectory of the individual rifle and by the favorable conformation of
the ground in respect to the cone of dispersion. In collective fire,
at mid and long ranges, each rear sight graduation commands a beaten
zone approximately 100 m. deep--good aim, proper elevation, and careful
firing being presupposed. The nearer the target is to the densest
portion of the cone of dispersion, the greater the efficacy of the fire.
The following results were obtained in Italian firing tests in which
100 skirmishers fired at a plate 1 m. high and 30 m. wide with the 6.5
mm. rifle:
=====================+======================+=======================
| MEASURED RANGE. | ESTIMATED RANGE.
+----------+-----------+----------+------------
| Slow fire| Rapid fire| Slow fire|Rapid fire
| [135] | [135] | [135] | [135]
|Percentage|Percentage |Percentage|Percentage
| of hits. | of hits. | of hits. | of hits.
---------------------+----------+-----------+----------+------------
At 500 m. | 21.5 | 15.8 | 14.8 | 11.3
At 1000 m. | 11.1 | 8.1 | 6.5 | 5.3
At 1500 m. | 5. | 3.4 | 2.6 | 2.2
Average results at-- | | | |
Ranges under 1000 m. | 18.2 | 13.6 | 12.1 | 9.3
Ranges over 1000 m. | 7.1 | 5.1 | 3.2 | 3.2
---------------------+----------+-----------+----------+------------
[135] Slow fire four shots, rapid fire fourteen shots, per minute.
Beyond 600 m., an error in the range exerts a greater influence
upon the efficacy of fire than does the marksmanship of the
skirmishers.[136] When an improper elevation has been selected,
the efficacy of the fire decreases as the compactness of the “cone
of dispersion” increases; in other words, the efficacy of the fire
decreases as the excellence of the marksmanship of the men and their
coolness in the face of the enemy increase. (See pp. 170 and 171,
infra).
[136] ROHNE, _Das Gefechtsmäszige Abteilungsschieszen der
Infanterie_, p. 13.
The following expedients for ascertaining ranges may be mentioned:
(_a_) Pacing and galloping;
(_b_) Estimating distances on the ground by eye (by comparison with
known distances; by estimating part of the distance);
(_c_) Firing trial volleys (ranging);
(_d_) Taking the range from a map of large scale or obtaining it
directly from infantry or artillery already engaged;
(_e_) Measuring the range directly on the ground.
Pacing (employed in Russia, France, and Austria) gives inaccurate
results. There is a difference between the number of paces a man
takes per 100 m., on a chaussee and in a ploughed field. Length of
pace depends upon the character and slope of the ground.[137] In
pacing over varied ground, a man follows the slope line while the
projectile follows an airline. Therefore it would seem that pacing is
only practicable at short ranges when the enemy is not near. The same
is true of galloping over the distance. (The length of a horse’s jump
at a gallop is on an average 3 m.).
[137] Professor RZIHA ascertained the following diminution of the
length of a pace at different degrees of slope:
_Descending_ slope, degrees. 0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Length of pace in cm. 77 70 62 56 50 45 30
Number of paces per 100 m. 129 143 161 179 200 222 333
_Ascending_ slope, degrees. 0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Length of pace in cm. 77 74 72 70 67 60 50
Number of paces per 100 m. 120 135 138 143 148 166 200
According to Major CZERNY, Austrian Army (_Treffwahrscheinlichkeit_,
in _Streffleur_, 1906, II), the error may be as much as 16 per cent
of the range.
In estimates made by individual men, the error amounts approximately
to one-eighth (12.5%) of the range;[138] this may be corrected by
taking the mean of a considerable number of estimates, or by employing
combined sights at ranges over 1000 m. (the difference between rear
sight elevations being 100 to 200 m.), thus increasing the depth of
the beaten zone. The accuracy of the resulting fire is influenced
by local and atmospheric conditions. (Par. 80 German I. F. R.).
Estimates usually fall short of the correct distance when made in
bright sunlight; in clear atmosphere; when the sun is in rear of the
man estimating; when made over uniform surfaces; over water; when
the target is set off by a bright background; when made over rolling
ground, especially when the several depressions cannot be seen. On the
other hand, estimates frequently exceed the correct range when made in
a flickering light; against a dark background; against the sun; when
the sky is overcast; during foggy weather; in the dusk; in woods; and
against an enemy who is only partially visible. According to the Swiss
Firing Regulations (1906) estimates made from a height downward are
usually too short, and those made from low ground up, too great.
[138] Lieutenant-General ROHNE, _Das Gefechtsmäszige
Abteilungsschieszen der Infanterie_, 4th Edition, p. 12.
The following statement is taken from a report made at the British
Musketry School at Hythe (5th Nov., 1905). In a great number of
estimates under 700 yards (630 m.) the results given below were
obtained:
--------Error-------- Greater
Correct ±50 yards ±100 yards errors
Officers of the Regular Army 15 49 20 14%
Officers of Militia and
Volunteers 20 44 22 20%
France: Officers made errors of 20% at the beginning of the period of
instruction, 12% at its close; rank and file of the Regular Army and
non-commissioned officers of the Reserve made errors of 30%.
In action, under the influence of danger, estimates are usually
short.[139] Peace training proves that the skill of the majority of
soldiers in estimating distances can be improved only up to a certain
point.
[139] The advance of the IInd Battalion of the 2nd Hessian Regiment
on August 18th, 1870, from the Bols de la Cusse against the height
northwest of Amanweiler: “The companies, who supposed the enemy to
be much nearer” (the actual range was 1,100 to 1,200 m.), “advanced,
cheering, and were received with mitrailleuse, shell, and rifle fire
(from hill 1,030) which swept the railroad line.” HESSERT.
Battle of Plevna, September 11th, 1877. Debouchment from corn
fields: “The distance still to be crossed before the Turkish
works were reached was underestimated. One company cheered when
at a distance of 900 to 1,000 paces from the hostile works:
the other troops took up the cry and rushed forward at a run.”
KUROPATKIN-KRAHMER, _Kritische Rückblicke auf den Russisch-Türkischen
Krieg_.
=Germany.= All the men are practiced in estimating distances up to
800 m. Officers, non-commissioned officers and suitable men (range
finders) are to be trained in quickly and accurately estimating mid
ranges, and practiced in ascertaining long ranges. (Par. 78 German I.
F. R.).
“Even a skillful range finder, if he is conscientious, can do no more
than give a minimum and a maximum estimate of what he considers the
range to be. The ranges must be communicated to the men accordingly.
The differences between maximum and minimum estimates should be as
follows: At ranges up to and including 500 m., 100 m. (for example:
350-450, or 500-600 m.); between 500 and including 1000 m., 200 m.;
over 1000 m., 300 m.”
=Italy.= Subalterns are, as a general rule, charged with estimating
the ranges. Non-commissioned officers must be able to estimate ranges
up to 1000 m. All non-commissioned officers as well as suitable
privates participate in estimating distance drill, which is conducted
by an officer in each battalion. The results are recorded in a book.
The following is the classification:
Excellent range finders: Those whose error rarely exceeds 50 and
never 100 m.
Good range finders: Those whose error does not exceed 100 m., and in
exceptional cases 150 m.
Fair range finders: Those whose normal error does not exceed 150 and
never 200 m.
Poor range finders: Those whose error exceeds 200 m.
The =Russians= estimate only short ranges, as a rule; the longer
ranges are determined by means of range finding instruments. In the
first year of their service all the men are drilled in estimating
ranges from 400 to 800 paces; officers and twenty specially selected
men from each company up to 3000 paces. The latter (both officers
and men) are to make at least 36 estimates in nine days. (Par. 190
Russian I. F. R.). The result is considered good when the error in
the estimate does not exceed the figure given below at the ranges
named:
Range in paces. Error in paces. Percentage of error.
400 to 1000 paces 50 or 12.5 to 5 %
1000 „ 2000 „ 100 „ 10 „ 5 „
2000 „ 3000 „ 200 „ 10 „ 6.6„
The Russian range finding instrument (_Souchier_) is used by
officers and specially trained non-commissioned officers; errors in
determining ranges are not to exceed a maximum of 2-3 per cent.
In =Switzerland= recruits are trained to estimate distances up to
600 m. and specially skilled men up to 1500 m.; all non-commissioned
officers estimate ranges up to 1000 m. and officers up to 1500
m. Three weeks after the recruits join, those of the most skilled
in estimating distances--about an eighth of the total number--are
selected to undergo further instruction. For this purpose they are
placed under the orders of an officer charged with this instruction,
who trains them for at least three hours, every other day, in
estimating distances on varied ground. The better half of these men,
regardless of the company to which they may belong, receive further
instruction. Exercises on wholly unknown terrain are to be had with
these men and not only extended marches but even railway journeys not
exceeding 30 km. are authorized for this purpose.
In =Austria= the men are required to estimate distances up to 800
paces (600 m.),_i.e._, up to the range within which they might
frequently have to choose their target independently. Only officers,
non-commissioned officers, and specially skilled men are required to
estimate ranges up to 2000 paces (1500 m.). The mean error of twenty
determinations at short, mid, and long ranges, of a “reliable range
finder,” is not to exceed 12 per cent. The _Roksandic_ range finding
apparatus is said to give errors not exceeding 2-3 per cent when
skillfully used.
To memorize distinguishing marks on the enemy as an aid in arriving at
a correct estimate of the range, is not considered as simulating actual
service conditions, since the power of vision of the men differs.
Furthermore, one sees the enemy mostly in a prone position in action,
and it is not to be expected that the men will remember the various
rules for determining the range by the appearance of the enemy’s
skirmishers. The same is true of the regulation which prescribes that
the soldier estimating the range is to judge the effect which the
target makes upon him. (England and Austria).
It will rarely be practicable for infantry to scale the range directly
from a map. Infantry ranges are usually so short, in comparison to the
scale of most of the maps, especially those available in the field,
that it is difficult to take them between the points of a pair of
dividers. Moreover, in an infantry action conspicuous objects are not
likely to be located often enough near the position of the skirmishers
to make it practicable to find them quickly even on the most accurate
maps. The artillery is much better off in this direction; its ranges
are longer and therefore more easily scaled from a map. Moreover,
artillery is generally posted on or near prominent points, which may
be found on almost any map. It should be remembered that a map is a
horizontal projection, that any range scaled from a map is the base of
a right triangle, and that the line of sight of a rifle, when firing
uphill, follows the hypotenuse of that triangle.
An accurate knowledge of the range to within a meter is not necessary,
as meteorological conditions,[140] especially temperature and
illumination (degree of humidity of the atmosphere) affect the range
of the projectile. Meteorological conditions may necessitate sight
corrections amounting to 100 m. at mid ranges and to 150 m. at long
ranges. According to the French Firing Regulations a difference of
temperature of ±10 degrees C., changes the range of the Lebel rifle by
18 m. at 1000 m. The altitude of the terrain increases the range on
account of reduced barometric pressure; this becomes a factor in the
selection of a rear sight elevation at an altitude of approximately
1000 m. According to the French Firing Regulations, the range of their
rifle at 1000 m. is increased as follows: At an altitude of 500 m. by
18; at 1000 m. by 42; at 1500 m. by 63; and at 2100 m. by 89 m.
[140] Lieutenant-General ROHNE, _Schieszlehre für die Infanterie_,
p. 51, and also par. 70 Austrian I. F. R. The effect of temperature
and of the altitude of the battlefield was strikingly illustrated in
the Boer war.
These meteorological influences can be eliminated by obtaining the
range from troops already engaged (artillery) or by determining the
proper rear sight elevation (not the range) by trial volleys (pars. 190
and 191 German I. F. R.) or by an animated fire at will (Switzerland:
fire at will, one round).
To ascertain the range by firing trial volleys is, however, practicable
only when the terrain near the target is visible; when the target
itself is stationary; when the ground is such that the strike of the
bullets can be observed; when the firing party is not under fire; and,
finally, when the necessary time is available. Since all of these
preliminary conditions will rarely be fulfilled, it will only in
exceptional cases be possible to determine the proper elevation by this
method.