| DENSITY.
TARGETS. +-----+-----+-----+-----
| 4 | 8 | 16 | 32
----------------------------------------------+-----+-----+-----+-----
| % | % | % | %
Infantry skirmishers standing in the open, or | | | |
a single rank line | 25 | 40 | 65 |----
| | | |
Skirmishers lying down; gun crews under fire | | | |
but protected by shields of the French type. | | | |
Space between shields and ground not closed | 7.5| 15 | 25 | 40
| | | |
Infantry lying down behind knapsacks; gun | | | |
crews protected by shields. Space between | | | |
shields and ground not closed | ----| 7.5 | 15 | 25
| | | |
Infantry lying down behind their knapsacks, | | | |
but not firing; gun crews protected by | | | |
shields. Space between shields and ground | | | |
closed so that bullets cannot pass through | ----| 0-2 | ----|----
----------------------------------------------+-----+-----+-----+-----
A skirmish line 100 m. long, and lying down, would suffer a loss of 15%
irrespective of its strength, from progressive fire (_tir progressif_;
32 rounds, density 8). If the interval between skirmishers in the
open amounts to 1¹⁄₂ paces, for instance, the front would contain 62
skirmishers, and the resulting loss would amount to 9 men. If the men
have placed their knapsacks in front of them, the loss would be reduced
by half. A line of skirmishers of the same length and strength as the
one considered above, would suffer a loss of 40%, or 25 men, when
standing up or advancing. About 1¹⁄₂ minutes are required to fire one
_tir progressif_, after adjustment has been secured. The same effect
could be obtained in about 20 seconds by firing a _rafale_ of eight
rounds, provided the battery has accurately adjusted its fire.
6. THE EFFECT OF SHRAPNEL BULLETS ON ANIMATE TARGETS.[122]
[122] BIRCHER, Colonel and Corps Surgeon of the Swiss IInd Army
Corps, _Die Wirkung der Artillerie Geschosse_, Aarau, 1899. KÜTTNER,
_Kriegschirurgische Erfahrungen aus dem südafrikanischen Kriege
1900_. Tübingen, 1900. HILDEBRAND, _Die Verwundungen durch die
modernen Kriegsfeuerwaffen_. I (1905). BOHNE, _Über die Wirkung des
Schrapnelschusses_, in _Militär-Wochenblatt_, No. 74, 1902.
The wounds produced by shrapnel bullets are similar to those caused
by the lead bullets of the infantry weapons of the past. When the
bullet strikes normally to the surface, it produces a wound circular
at the point of impact and considerably enlarged at the point of exit;
bones are frequently shattered; and the most serious effect is the
introduction of foreign substances, such as pieces of cloth, particles
of earth or sand, or of the material in which the bullet is embedded.
The effect of shrapnel bullets on animate targets depends upon the
striking energy of the bullets (expressed by kgm.) and on their
density, those of smaller cross-section having the greater penetration.
The closer the point of burst is to the target, the greater the
velocity, and, naturally, the effect.
Opinions differ as to the amount of “striking energy” necessary to put
animate targets out of action. In France, an energy of at least 4.8
kgm. is considered necessary to disable human beings, and for horses an
average of 19 kgm., while in Germany, an average energy of 8 kgm. is
deemed sufficient. The 10 g. hardened lead bullet, having a diameter of
12.3 mm., retains this energy until its remaining velocity is only 120
m. At ranges up to 1500 m., over 80% of the men struck by fragments and
bullets from shrapnel, bursting within 300 m. (and beyond this range
from shrapnel bursting within 150 m.) are put out of action. (Par. 30
German F. A. F. R.). In comparison, artillery projectiles produce a
greater number of fatal wounds than infantry projectiles.
It is worthy of note that the packed knapsack affords protection
against all shrapnel bullets having a velocity of 100 m. and against
half of those having a velocity of 200 m. The overcoat roll stops
shrapnel bullets having a velocity of less than 250 m. The penetration
of these bullets is so great, at ranges under 2000 m., that when they
strike bones or vital organs of horses, they produce instant incapacity
for action. This is especially true when the interval of burst is less
than 100 m.
B. INFANTRY FIRE.[123]
[123] Lieutenant-General ROHNE, _Schieszlehre für die Infanterie_.
Colonel MINARELLI-FITZGERALD, Austrian Army, _Modernes Schieszwesen_,
1901.
The modern infantry rifle, cal. 6.5 to 8. mm., is a magazine arm
employing steel jacketed, pointed bullets, arranged in clips. The
adoption of automatic rifles is contemplated. In these rifles the
recoil energy is utilized for throwing out empty shells and for placing
a fresh cartridge into the chamber at the same time. The objections
made to the adoption of such a rifle (complexity of the mechanism,
danger of wasting ammunition) are similar to the reasons advanced
against the adoption of breech-loading and magazine rifles. In addition
to the increased rate of fire, the advantage of eliminating the effect
of the recoil on the skirmisher must not be underestimated. Moreover,
the elimination of the recoil makes a further increase in the initial
velocity of the projectile possible.
The effect of infantry fire may be considered from two points of view,
viz.: the effect on the enemy of a single projectile, and the effective
hit in itself.
1. THE EFFECT OF A SINGLE PROJECTILE ON ANIMATE TARGETS.[124]
[124] See _Löbells Militärische Jahresberichte_, 1905, p. 475,
and 1906, p. 412, which contain complete references to military
literature. _Militär-Wochenblatt_, No. 1, 1906.
During the Russo-Japanese war the contending parties used the following
small arms and projectiles:
======+=========+=======+=====+=====================+=========
| Rifle. | Model | Cal.| PROJECTILE. |Initial
| |(year).| |Description. |Weight.|Velocity.
| | | mm. | | g. | m.
------+---------+-------+-----+-------------+-------+---------
Japan |{Arisaka | ’97 | 6.5 |Hardened lead| 10.5 | 715
|{Murata | ’94 | 8.0 |core with | 15.42 | 564
| | | |copper-nickel| |
Russia| ---- | ’91 | 7.62|jacket. | 13.7 | 615
------+---------+-------+-----+-------------+-------+---------
The ballistic qualities of the _Arisaka_ rifle were superior to those
of the Russian arm, but the maiming effect of the two rifles was about
equal. The striking energy of the projectiles was not sufficient in
every case, however, to put a man out of action. The explosive effect
produced by bullets striking interior organs and bones at short ranges
(within 500 m.) was more evident in wounds made by the 8. mm. than by
the _Arisaka_ rifle.[125]
[125] “The projectile that penetrates animal organisms displaces
and consequently destroys the tissue fibers lying in its path. The
projectile communicates a portion of its energy to the molecules
struck, and these in turn transfer that energy to adjoining ones.
The greater the velocity of the projectile at the moment of impact,
the more rapid is this transfer of motion. Especially in organs
filled with fluid are the molecules, like firm bodies, thrown with
the greatest rapidity. This has a destructive effect which in the
past has never been observed to be so extensive, and which gives the
impression that the projectile has exploded in the body. In order to
produce this effect a velocity of about 350 to 400 m. is required,
which was, of course, not obtainable in rifles of older pattern,
and was only possible in the immediate vicinity of the muzzle.
Whenever the projectile strikes a marrow bone with great velocity it
shatters it completely at the point of impact, and splinters it to
a considerable extent, all because the bone is filled with a liquid
substance.” ROHNE, _Schieszlehre für die Infanterie_, p. 69.
At mid ranges the wounds were generally of a mild character, unless
produced by tumbling bullets.[126]
[126] See also _Ricochets_, p. 185 infra.
Experiments prove that a projectile will tumble if it encounters
varying resistance (for example, if the projectile strikes an obstacle,
even if that be only a twig) or if it penetrates materials of different
density (for instance, if, in penetrating a body, it strikes first upon
a fleshy part, then upon bones). In the last mentioned case the bullet
will frequently tumble in the body. If a projectile be fired through a
series of boards, placed at intervals, it will tumble in the second
board, or if not there, then certainly in the third board. Projectiles
which ricochet on the ground before penetrating a human body change
their form more or less, according to the character of the ground on
which they ricochet. As the jacket is frequently torn, thus exposing
the leaden kernel, wounds may be produced which will equal those made
by explosive bullets.
The striking energy of the projectile is sufficient to perforate two
men at 1200 m. From experiments made with the _Lebel_ rifle on corpses,
it appeared that the projectile passed clear through 5 bodies at 100
m., through 4 bodies at 400 m. (even when large bones were struck) and
through 2 bodies at 1200 m.
In the Russo-Japanese war wounds were distributed as follows, on a
basis of 100 hits: lower limbs, 39.5; upper limbs, 25.4; abdominal
region, 16.5; chest, 15.5; spinal column, 15, and head, 11. Flesh
wounds are generally slight. This is due to the fact that the hole
made by the bullet is small, that the exterior flow of blood is
insignificant, and that the wound rarely becomes infected. Projectiles
remain in the body now much more rarely than in the past.
The central portion of marrow bones is frequently splintered by
projectiles, while thicker flat bones (shoulder blades) are cleanly
perforated.
Unless a tumbling bullet or a splinter of a bone penetrates the lungs,
chest wounds appear in much more favorable forms than in past wars.[127]
[127] “A soldier of the 3rd East Siberian Regiment, who had been
shot in the chest, for instance, subsequently walked to the nearest
railway station, a distance of over 20 km., and felt fairly well
except for a slight difficulty in breathing. A lance corporal of
the 36th East Siberian Rifle Regiment, having received a similar
wound, began his journey to the nearest railway station on a
two-wheeled cart. The motion of the cart nauseated him to such an
extent, however, that he preferred to complete the journey on foot, a
distance of 30 km.” Dr. SELDOWITSCHI in _Wratsch_.
According to observations made in the Russo-Japanese war, wounds in
joints healed without suppuration, the joint and its mobility being
saved. Amputations were extremely rare, and the surgeon’s skill was,
as a rule, seldom necessary in the treatment of shot wounds. Chest
wounds were slight, and often many men walked a few _versts_ to the
dressing station, some of them complaining of difficulty in breathing.
As a rule, such wounds healed in fourteen days. Chest wounds were more
serious when the heart or the large blood vessels were injured; but
even in these cases cures were effected. Abdominal wounds were not so
serious as in the past. Contrary to past experience, skull wounds,
in which the projectile had passed entirely through the brain, were
treated with fair success.
The campaigns in South Africa and Manchuria have amply demonstrated
that wounds produced by jacketed bullets of small caliber are not so
serious as those caused by 11 mm. projectiles. In addition, these
campaigns have shown that a further decrease in caliber is undesirable
from the tactician’s point of view, for a hit by no means affords the
certainty, in every case, of putting a man, much less a horse, out of
action.
Moreover, the wounded man is cured so quickly that in a short time
he can again participate in action. The British report of losses for
the battle of Paardeberg, on February 18th, 1900, contains the names
of a great many men who were wounded at Magersfontain on December
11th, 1899. According to British statements, 40 men out of every 100,
seriously wounded by steel jacketed bullets, could be returned to duty
after 36 days of surgical treatment. Dr. Küttner estimates that of
154 men hit in the chest, 73 were able to return to duty with their
organizations; while, out of 92 men wounded in the knee, only 28 could
be sent back to duty. Wounds produced by the small caliber _Arisaka_
rifle during the Russo-Japanese war healed more rapidly than those
caused by the Russian weapon. Flesh wounds of Japanese soldiers, for
example, healed in ten days, those of Russian soldiers in four. The
following observations were made on wounds produced by the Russian
rifle: Within a week slight wounds were covered by a scab; after
three weeks they were covered by fresh skin and a part of the wounded
were then able to return to the front. The remainder, irrespective of
the number of wounds received by any one individual, were ready for
duty in seven months. Wounds in which bones were perforated without
splintering, healed in four to six weeks, so that the men could return
to duty within four or five months after receiving the wound. When
bones were splintered the cure was, of course, considerably retarded.
The ballistic advantages of a small-caliber projectile (undesirable
from the military surgeon’s point of view) have been obtained by the
adoption of a pointed-nose bullet (called the “S” bullet in Germany and
the “D” bullet in France).[128]
[128]
Rifle Rifle
mod. ’88. mod. ’98; Lebel rifle;
“S” bullet. “D” bullet.
Caliber 7.9 mm. 7.9 mm. 8. mm.
Weight of bullet 14.7 g. 10. g. 13.2 g.
Initial velocity 640. m. 860. m. 730. m.
Remaining velocity at 800 m. 270. m. 362. m. 377. m.
Maximum ordinate of trajectory
at 700 m. 3.80 m. 1.85 m. 2.10 m.
_Militär-Wochenblatt_, 1906, No. 53; _Vierteljahrshefte_, 1907. II,
p. 281.
A further advantage of these bullets is that they produce serious
wounds on account of their tendency to tumble. These wounds, while not
inhuman, instantly disable the man struck, or, at any rate, postpone
his recovery indefinitely.
=The Effect of “S” Bullets on Corpses.=
======================+====================================
| THERE WOULD HAVE BEEN
Of the Total Number +--------+---------+--------------
of Men Hit | Fatally|Instantly|Incapacitated
in Each Case. |injured.|disabled.|for some time.
| % | % | %
----------------------+--------+---------+--------------
Flesh wounds 800 m | ---- | 36.4 | 27.3
----------+ | |
produced at 1350 m | ---- | 43.8 | 37.3
----------------------+--------+---------+--------------
Bones struck 800 m | 20.3 | 79.2 | 75.0
----------+ | |
at 1350 m | 11.1 | 88.9 | 88.9
----------------------|--------+---------+--------------
Average | 7.97 | 62.07 | 57.12
----------------------+--------+---------+--------------
2. THE EFFECT OF “S” BULLETS ON MATERIALS.
The following thicknesses of dry pine are pierced by the “S” bullet
(rifle model ’98) at the ranges given:
60 cm at 100 m.
80 cm at 400 m.
35 cm at 800 m.
10 cm at 1800 m.
In sand and earth the penetration of the “S” bullet amounts to 90 cm.
According to experiments, 3 mm. steel plates were pierced at 350 m.,
while hay stacks afforded protection when 4 m. thick; when of less
thickness, the latter caused bullets to tumble. Embankments of frozen
snow 1 m. thick, of packed snow 2 m. thick, and of loose snow 3 m.
thick, were not pierced even at 250 m.
IV. THE EMPLOYMENT OF INFANTRY FIRE.
Infantry fire may produce either a stunning and paralyzing effect on
the hostile forces, or it may gradually exhaust, wear out, and consume
them. The fire will have a stunning and paralyzing effect when it is
suddenly concentrated upon a narrow front, thereby producing fear and
terror, provided actual losses are added to this moral effect.
On the other hand, the fire will gradually exhaust, wear out, and
destroy the hostile forces when it is distributed for a prolonged
period over an extended front. In this case the material losses
suffered and the exhaustion of his physical energies may force the
conviction on the enemy that he has no longer a chance to gain the
victory. This conviction will cause a suspension of all his energies
and consequently of his determination to fight.
At =Modder River= (28th November, 1899) the Boers opened fire on the
British at 1000 m., although they had intended to hold their fire
until the British arrived within 300 m. of the position.[129]
[129] General MINARELLI-FITZGERALD, _Die Gefechte in Natal und der
Kap-Kolonie_, 1899.
The miscarriage of the contemplated sudden burst of fire resulted
in a fire fight, which tended to destroy gradually the physical and
moral powers of the British. The Boers, however, gave this gradually
destroying fire a paralyzing effect by concentrating it suddenly and
continuously on tactically important targets that were comparatively
easy to hit. Minarelli makes the following comments on the attack
made by the British 9th Brigade and Brigade of Guards at =Modder
River=: “All further attempts to induce the Guards to advance had to
be abandoned. For hours they lay on the dearly bought ground under a
blistering African sun, utilizing as cover every ant hill, every tuft
of grass, on the apparently deserted battlefield, and being morally
certain that to get up would draw a deadly hail of shot.” In regard
to the fight of the 9th Brigade, the same author states: “Meantime
the 9th Brigade fared no better. It had in part been able to get a
little closer to the enemy (550 to 900 m.), but was then unable to
advance farther. The actual losses were very small in the ten-hour
fight, amounting only to seven per cent. The Highland Brigade,
surprised at =Magersfontain=, fared still worse. The fight growing
out of the surprise lasted almost ten hours. At the short range at
which this action was fought, the Boer method of fire (_i.e._, to
fire only when an enemy raised himself to get better aim, and then to
employ only an effective concentrated fire) necessarily produced a
depressing effect.”
In order that such a fire effect may be obtained, it is necessary that
the individual soldier combine coolness and presence of mind with good
marksmanship, and that company, platoon and squad leaders maintain fire
control and fire direction.
1. FIRE DISCIPLINE.
Fire discipline is indispensable to fire control and fire direction.
It embraces the conscientious execution of all orders and signals, as
well as the scrupulous observation of all regulations bearing on the
handling of the rifle and on combat in general. Fire discipline must be
maintained even though the fire control and fire direction exercised by
the leaders is imperfect or ceases entirely in the course of the action.
=Fire discipline= requires:
Perseverance under hostile fire, even when that fire cannot be
returned; constant attention to the orders of the leaders, and careful
observation of the enemy. It requires further, taking advantage of the
ground; care in setting the sight and in delivery of fire; an increase
of fire by individuals whenever the targets become more favorable, and
a cessation of fire when the enemy disappears; finally, economy of
ammunition.
The decision is prepared by the fire of infantry, supported by
machine guns, field, and heavy artillery. The fire of troops pushed
to within short range of the hostile position will in many cases
suffice to induce the enemy to give way, so that the assault encounters
nothing but evacuated or feebly defended works. The Boer war and the
Russo-Japanese war demonstrate that determined troops will hold a
position until the attacker has massed sufficient troops to charge,
or at least until he threatens to attack with the bayonet. Examples:
Terrayama, on October 11th, 1904. Assault made by the 2nd Division on
March 1st, 1905, at Mukden, on Redouts 17 and 18.
Training in bayonet fencing has by no means lost importance,
irrespective of the fact as to whether or not bayonets will ever be
crossed in future. “Bayonet fencing is one of the most important
means of strengthening the moral force of the individual soldier; of
developing in him energy, initiative, and courage for making a dashing
advance.”[130]
[130] _Introduction to German Bayonet Fencing Regulations._
Since the armament of the different armies is almost the same, good
individual marksmanship, coolness, fire control and fire direction, and
firmly rooted fire discipline, are the deciding factors in an action in
which two equal skirmish lines contend for the superiority of fire.
2. FIRE CONTROL AND FIRE DIRECTION.
The principal object of fire control and fire direction is to bring
about a superiority of fire at the decisive point by suddenly
concentrating the fire of a large number of rifles upon it. This is the
only way in which a moral effect may be produced on the troops against
whom the fire is directed, while, at the same time, their losses attain
such proportions as to become unbearable. At mid and long ranges,
the efficacy of fire depends more on fire control and fire direction
than upon good individual marksmanship.[131] Whenever the appropriate
rear sight elevation is not used, the densest portion of the cone of
dispersion will not strike the target, and the chances of its hitting
the target diminish as the error in estimating the range and the
standard of excellence of the marksmanship increase.
[131] See ROHNE, _Schieszlehre für die Infanterie_, 3rd Edition,
p. 85. “The importance of the line shot (_i.e._, a hit on the
vertical stripe through the center of the German bull’s-eye target)
in the marksmanship training of the soldier should by no means be
underestimated, but rather appreciated at its true value. The line
shot forms the basis of known distance firing, just as the latter
forms the basis of field firing. Instruction in line shooting
(_i.e._, hitting the vertical stripe of the German bull’s-eye target)
becomes a moral factor of the highest value in field firing. It
cannot be denied, however, that the importance of the line shot, as
such, decreases with the range. Likewise all attempts to transfer
the zone of the line shot from short to long ranges have completely
failed.” Captain KRAUSE, _Die Gestaltung der Geschoszgarbe der
Infanterie_, Berlin, 1904, p. 1.
Fire control and fire direction lie in the hands of platoon
commanders,[132] who regulate the fire as their judgment dictates. Fire
control and direction embrace: the opening and cessation of fire; the
designation of a target and of the elevation to be used; the kind of
fire and its distribution; the number of rounds to be fired, and the
observation of the effect of the fire. As a rule, the fire will be
distributed over the whole front, but portions of the hostile line that
are not clearly visible should by no means be neglected (distribution
of fire). Regulations prescribing the scope of authority of individual
leaders are not considered desirable. The platoon commander possesses
in his squad leaders a medium for communicating with his platoon.
(Pars. 162-165 German I. D. R.). The movements of the skirmishers, the
correct _comprehension of the target_, the _distribution of fire_,
the _rate of fire_, and the _employment of the terrain to the best
advantage_, are regulated through the squad leaders. The lack of
thoroughly drilled coöperation on the part of squad leaders inevitably
results, as might be expected, in a so-called “skirmish mob.” The
platoon commander cannot communicate directly with every individual man
of his platoon, but he can control his platoon through his eight squad
leaders, who, by reason of their position in the line, can exert the
proper influence on their skirmishers.[133]
[132] The _Belgian Firing Regulations_ require that the officer
directing and controlling the fire fight be able to determine: 1. The
time necessary to produce a certain effect with a given number of
rifles; 2. The number of rounds necessary to produce a certain effect
in a given period of time; 3. Whether a given target justifies the
expenditure of ammunition in view of the situation or the efficacy of
the fire. The requirements of the _Italian Firing Regulations_ are
similar.