of the action. When this is the case, the leaders of all grades should
be animated by but one desire, that of being in front in order to
participate in gaining the victory. The duration of the crisis of an
action is usually brief, and in a very few rapidly passing moments the
leader must decide what to do with the troops remaining available.
When an immediate decision is not sought, it is advisable to increase
distances in order to keep the echelons held back in rear from coming
under fire. In any case, the distance between supports and firing line
should be less than the distance between firing line and enemy. In an
attack, supports should be close enough to the firing line to prevent,
by timely interference, a retrograde movement of the latter. On the
defensive, on account of the difficulty of bringing up supports for the
purpose of repulsing an assault, they will usually be placed a short
distance immediately in rear of or within the firing line (intrenched)
at the points where they are to be employed.
During an attack, whenever the lines in rear cannot be kept out of
hostile fire, care must nevertheless be taken that two echelons be not
simultaneously struck by a cone of infantry fire or by one and the same
shrapnel. The distance between echelons is therefore increased to more
than 300 m., and should not be reduced until the decisive stage of the
combat approaches.
In open country, supports held too close to the firing line will soon
cease to exist as such. When kept in close order, their losses would
be so great that the boldest men would join the firing line and the
less courageous would hunt cover. Everything depends upon the manner
in which supports are led forward, especially during that part of the
advance immediately preceding their junction with the firing line. In
this lies the whole art of fighting in deep formations. Covered terrain
permits distances to be reduced. The commander should be particularly
careful not to let this advantage escape him, since on such terrain it
is more frequently necessary promptly to reinforce the firing line.
The commander of the support must constantly observe the movements and
successes of the firing line in order that he may be able to reinforce
it in the most advantageous manner. Whenever he is obliged to split
up his command during a movement to the front, he should endeavor to
reunite it at the first opportunity.
The support should closely adapt its movements to those of the firing
line. When a part of the firing line makes a rush, the support halts
for the moment, and then runs forward to the next cover, simultaneously
with the next advancing unit of the firing line, and covered by the
fire of the skirmishers in front. “To make a rush at the same time as
the firing line was impossible, because, as soon as the latter rose,
the Turks opened a murderous fire. Whenever the firing line threw
itself down and returned the fire, that of the enemy became noticeably
weaker.”[101]
[101] _Report of Lieutenant Borsov_, in KUROPATKIN-KRAHMER,
_Kritische Rückblicke auf den Russisch-Türkischen Krieg_, III, p. 183.
The supports follow the firing line in single or double rank, in column
of twos or squads, in skirmish line or in line of squads, in quick time
or by rushes; it may also be advisable to deviate temporarily from the
direction of advance. Columns having a narrow front, so long as they
are not open to attack from a flank, are able to withstand long range
infantry fire. (Par. 224 German I. D. R.). On coming to a halt, it is
advisable to return to close order formation; at any rate, the leader
must get his command again entirely under control.
Supports in Rear of the Firing Line or Not?
Up to a few years ago (1894), the French battalion was divided into
firing line and companies of the second line. The Japanese, also, often
placed entire companies in the firing line, which could not be quickly
enough reinforced by the companies of the second line, because these
were held too far in rear. At any rate, supports are of advantage
during the first deployment before the situation is clear.
The following arguments are advanced against the employment of supports:
1. _The supports following the firing line suffer losses, without, as
a rule, being able to participate in the action._ This argument is not
well founded, since the criticism made with reference to supports is
equally applicable to companies in the second line. That supports threw
themselves into the firing line in the Franco-German war, in the belief
that they were needlessly suffering losses, was due to the fact that
they followed the firing line too closely.
Supports following the firing line closely (250-300 m.) can reach the
firing line quickly and can easily find cover on account of the small
angle of fall of modern bullets. Besides, the knowledge that supports
are immediately in rear, the moral factor, should not be underestimated.
2. _The supports may be commanded by inexperienced leaders, who will
not always act with the good judgment the situation demands and will
fail to seize the right moment for advancing._ (This can perhaps never
be avoided).
3. _Pushing the supports into the firing line tends to mix units,
makes control more difficult, and impairs the efficacy of fire._ These
criticisms are not applicable to a company, for it is in any case
impossible for the company commander to control the fire; this is the
business of platoon commanders.
The advantages of supports are, that they increase the number of
targets offered the hostile artillery; that, by reason of their small
size, they can utilize every accident of the ground; that they can
be kept close enough to the firing line to reinforce it in case of
sudden emergency; and that they allow companies in the second line to
be kept farther to the rear. A battalion, when part of a larger force,
need not keep formed bodies as supports; but a few platoons, following
the firing line in close order on the flanks, are an advantage. The
drawbacks of the _petits paquets_ would appear only if every company
were to preserve a support up to the decisive stage of the action.
11. COMPARISON BETWEEN CLOSE AND EXTENDED ORDER.
In =close order= the men are placed so close together that they can be
led by word of command and directly influenced by their officers. The
position of the individual soldier is fixed; the men on either side of
him interfere with his utilizing cover or his weapon. On terrain devoid
of cover, close order formations present such large targets to infantry
fire, that their employment, when exposed to the unsubdued fire of the
enemy, is impossible and must lead to annihilation. Thus the hostile
fire compels the most extended deployment.[102]
[102] Even during the Franco-German war it was impossible to employ
close order formations in the first line, when opposed by an unshaken
enemy, although this was still prescribed by the regulations.
Whenever this was attempted tremendous losses resulted. In the battle
of Vionville the 5th and 8th Companies of the 35th Füsilier-Regiment,
formed into a half-battalion, and following the other companies of
the battalion, which were pushed forward as the first line, suffered
in five minutes a loss of 9 officers and 150 men (out of a total of
about 400 men) from infantry fire at 1000 to 1200 m. “The impression
produced was so overpowering that the commands for extending and
deploying could not be executed at all and that the half-battalion
had to be withdrawn in rear of the cemetery where it was assembled by
the three officers still remaining.” _Geschichte des Regiments Nr.
35_, p. 23.
In cases where troops appeared in close order each losses were not
at all exceptional.
On August 18th, 1870, the Füsilier-Battalion of the 85th Infantry,
advancing from Vernéville, at first in double column, then in
half-battalion column, to within 400 paces of the enemy, lost 12
officers, 32 non-commissioned officers, and 437 men killed and
wounded (52%) in 20 minutes by the cross-fire of hostile artillery
and mitrailleuse batteries. At 800 paces from the enemy the fragments
of the battalion were assembled in three platoons. _Gen. St. W._, II,
p. 724. _Der 18. August_, p. 152.
The success of the bayonet attack made by the 9th Company of the
29th Infantry at St. Quentin may be explained by the inferiority of
the opponent. _Geschichte des Regiments Nr. 29_, p. 499.
In =extended order= the soldier’s position is not definitely fixed; he
is not required to keep his body in a prescribed position, nor is he
expected to handle his rifle by the numbers as in the manual. Instead,
judgment, agility, courage, confidence in himself, skill in handling
his weapon and in taking full advantage of the accidents of the ground,
as well as unremitting attention to his leader, are demanded of the
skirmisher.
The difficulties of troop leading are, moreover, increased by the
noise and other disorganizing influences of the fight, especially
in broken or wooded country. Whether an organization is thoroughly
trained and disciplined is best shown in extended order fighting, for,
as the direct control of the leader on his command decreases, the
demands made on the initiative of the individual soldier increase out
of all proportion. It is at any rate more practical to develop this
initiative than to try to prevent the disorganizing effect of combat by
restricting the personal freedom of the individual soldier.
In order to keep troops well in hand and to deploy them quickly in any
direction, it is requisite that close order formations be retained as
long as the terrain and the hostile fire permit. After an action, in
order to make a renewed employment of the troops possible, they must
be assembled in close order without regard to the previously existing
organization.
In night combats, in actions against cavalry not supported by other
arms, in putting down rebellions, and frequently in colonial wars[103]
as well, the importance of close order formations increases when the
troops show a disposition to get out of hand.
[103] The British _Infantry Training_ contains special regulations
governing “savage warfare,” in which close order battalion formations
are explicitly given the preference (order in echelon, square).
In extended order, infantry can most easily surmount obstacles, cross
difficult terrain, and take the fullest advantage of the accidents
of the ground, as cover against hostile fire and as rifle rests. In
extended order, infantry is, moreover, able to develop its fire power
most effectively, while at the same time offering the smallest possible
targets to the hostile projectiles. Thus the _skirmish line_ is the
principal combat formation of infantry; by means of it a combat is
initiated and carried through to the end.
Close order is best adapted for establishing discipline in the
simplest and most rapid manner by means of drill. At Jena the Prussian
battalions were not defeated because of their drill, but because they
were poorly led. What function drill had fulfilled at that time is
pretty well illustrated by the heavy losses sustained by the Prussian
infantry and by the fact that, although placed in a situation to which
they were entirely unaccustomed, the troops retained their steadiness.
No properly led army has been able to dispense with drill in developing
its discipline. In the days of linear and column tactics the ultimate
object of training was the leading of battalions in close order, in
magnificent array, against the enemy. By means of drill a passive
discipline was to be created in which intelligence played no part
whatever. We know with what energy the army of the First Napoleon was
drilled according to the wholly superannuated regulations of linear
tactics in the camp at Boulogne and during the brief pauses between
campaigns. A well drilled organization has ever, when well led, proved
equal to the occasion.[104] The electrifying word of command is an
important factor in assisting an organization accustomed to it to
overcome difficult situations. No leader will voluntarily dispense with
this aid. When Austrian shells struck the company of Count Finkenstein
during the advance against the Shipwald, that officer halted his
command, brought it to shoulder arms and did not continue the movement
until order had been completely restored.
[104] Compare herewith _Der 18. August_, p. 463, in regard to the
importance of discipline in the execution of the attack on St. Privat.
General v. Blume considers drill and skirmish training two distinct
methods by means of which efficient soldiers may be created. To
quote: “In this connection the most perfect results would undoubtedly
be attained by efficient drill and thorough skirmish training.”
Where both these methods cannot be coördinated, training in extended
order fighting should take precedence. General v. d. Goltz raises
the objection that this might perhaps produce skirmishers, but not
soldiers, _i.e._, _men whose devotion to duty surpasses their fear of
death_. General v. d. Goltz is right in demanding combat drill. In this
term he includes the painstaking execution of all those accomplishments
which the skirmisher needs in action and which he should be able to use
correctly and quickly without lengthy deliberation. To this category
belong rapid loading and setting of the sight, good pointing in any
position, accurate aiming, cool firing, quick locking of the piece,
prompt jumping up for the advance, taking advantage of accidents of the
ground in lying down for the purpose of heightening the fire effect,
crawling forward with or without firing, etc., etc. Since all these
things must be practiced individually, and since many of them do not
permit of simultaneous execution by an entire unit, we usually speak of
combat training instead of combat drill, without, however, intending
any other meaning.
“Drill is always mechanical. The instructor can make the skirmisher
load quickly and carefully, can cause him to take the position of
aim, just as he drills the correct execution of present arms and the
rise preparatory to advancing by rushes. Training is directed at the
mentality of the man, it makes him independent and allows him to
exercise initiative, even when he is no longer directly under his
superior officers’ influence, and when, in a critical hour, he is no
longer able to follow their example.
“Drill and training are both justified, each in its appropriate sphere;
the scope of both is closely defined and neither one could be dispensed
with. ‘Drill’ assists in creating the ‘soldier,’ because it develops
the characteristics which must be required of a ‘soldier’: Endurance
in surmounting hardships and dangers, unquestioning subordination of
his will to that of the leader, tenacity and trustworthiness, skill
in handling his weapon and in utilizing the ground. The addition of
training will, of course, increase the value of this ‘soldier’ very
considerably.
“Training alone will never attain this object. To arouse and develop
the man’s intellect may make him a good skirmisher, a skillful member
of a patrol, but for battle he remains incomplete, since his awakened
mental powers have not been made available by the disciplining drill.
His energies are not governed by a higher will. Nothing can give us the
assurance that he may not fail at the most decisive moment. He is no
soldier.”[105]
[105] V. D. GOLTZ, _Zur Gefechtsausbildung_, p. 26.
The French, for reasons inherent in their character, discard this
drill and seek to replace it by developing the moral factors: “Moral
powers are the mightiest pillars of success. Honor and patriotism fill
troops with the noblest devotion. The spirit of self-sacrifice and
the determination to win ensure success; discipline and steadiness
guarantee the influence of the leaders and the coöperation of all the
elements.”[106]
[106] _Introduction to the French Infantry Drill Regulations_.
“However, when necessity demands the creation of new
organizations--whether militia, volunteers, or _gardes mobiles_,--it
is a great mistake to expect everything from moral factors; even
though hatred of the enemy, enthusiasm for the fatherland, the
republic or for glory, rise to the highest pitch. ‘Victory or
death’ is the watchword when marching out--but neither is quickly
attainable; weeks and months of the severest hardships, exhausting
marches, wet and hungry bivouacs must first be endured. Very soon the
intoxication of enthusiasm is gone and reality weighs heavily on the
sobered men. Finally the enemy is confronted. But he is not to be
annihilated at once by a rapid assault--not at all; the advance is
made very slowly and the highest enthusiasm is given ample time to
evaporate during the many hours in which death is constantly faced.”
LAYMAN.
For enthusiasm, we would substitute faithful, unselfish performance of
duty, and unquestioning subordination of the will of the individual
to that of the leader. To be sure, on days of success enthusiasm will
suffice, but not when everything around us begins to waver and to
yield. The importance of drill, which cannot be replaced by anything
else, does not become apparent until all enthusiasm disappears, until
the leader becomes conscious of the specter of panic which stalks by
the side of enthusiasm.
“Discipline,” says Archduke John in his well-known work _Drill or
Training_, “must not be confounded with the snappy drill of troops,
and can, moreover, not be attained by means of it. The straightjacket
has never yet cured one insane person; the soul cannot be disciplined
through the body. One must work from the inside and not from the
outside. It is of little value if the outer annular rings of a tree are
beautiful and regular; it will rot and die in spite of its deceptive
appearance; if its heart is not healthy, the first storm may bring it
down. The inner man must look beautiful; firmness and steadiness are
needed within; the marching tread of feet on the drill ground plain
are of no moment; the beat of the heart filled with the spirit of
self-sacrifice is the important factor.”
It is well known that Emperor William I. changed the title of the
brochure _Drill or Training_, written by Archduke John, to _Drill
and Training_. Training necessitates a good corps of instructors and
a great deal of time, whereas drill will accomplish in a shorter
time results which are not so enduring. It is again presupposed that
the recruits are willing to be trained, otherwise all efforts are
unavailing. The question whether the individual man can be influenced
sufficiently in a two years’ service period to overcome even sentiments
inimical to the state, instilled in him by friends or relatives, can
only be answered by the next war. To answer this question at the
present time would be premature; but one thing is certain: the sharp
word of command, the whole influence of a well-organized body of
troops, will sweep along even the reluctant in the hour of danger.
The importance of the tactical formations which at one time constituted
minor tactics has doubtlessly decreased; unfavorable formations, in
so far as they increase or reduce losses, increase or restrict one’s
fire effect, can be offset by the fighting efficiency of the soldier
and by proper leading. The unfortunate termination of the battle of
Jena for the Prussian arms, as already mentioned, bears no relation
to drill as such. The formations in themselves were not at fault, for
linear tactics scored the greatest successes in the Peninsular war
and at Waterloo; and at the Katzbach, Prussian battalions of Borke’s
Brigade in line overran the French columns. Within certain limits,
numerical inferiority and lack of fighting efficiency can be offset by
leadership. But numbers and fighting efficiency will always remain the
decisive factors for success.
The victory of Spicheren was due primarily to the troops and not to
leadership. This is likewise true of Wörth. The lion’s share in the
victory of Vionville is certainly due to the fighting efficiency of the
gallant Brandenburgers. Finally, at St. Privat, the crisis produced
by the commanders was successfully overcome only by the tenacity of
the troops, who maintained their positions for hours under the most
destructive hostile fire.
Increased demands must at present be made upon the combat training
of the soldier. The combat requires enterprising, self-sacrificing,
cold-blooded men who are imbued with the spirit of the reckless
offensive. “The combat requires thinking leaders, _trained to rely upon
themselves_, and _skirmishers having initiative_.” (Par. 2 German I.
D. R.). “Judgment, self-confidence and boldness must be aroused and
continually developed in the young soldier.” (Par. 144 German I. D.
R.). “The aim of all exercises should be to develop the soldier into
a self-thinking and conscientiously working skirmisher.” (Par. 158
German I. D. R.). “All training should be directed toward producing
self-reliance in leaders and in the individual skirmisher.” (Par. 251
German I. D. R.). “The infantry must nourish the desire for taking the
offensive; its actions must be guided by the one thought, _forward,
at the enemy, no matter what the cost_.” (Par. 265 German I. D. R.).
“The continuous desire to press forward and the endeavor to surpass
all other units must animate all parts of the attacking force.” (Par.
327 German I. D. R.). “It should be a point of honor with skirmishers
not to allow the supports to overtake them earlier than the moment of
penetrating the enemy’s position.” (Par. 348 German I. D. R.). “Those
who fall must be left behind. These sacrifices should not lead to an
abatement of the pursuit any more than the losses sustained in the
previous fight caused the renunciation of the purpose of the combat.”
(Par. 424 German I. D. R.). “A commander who is ever willing to
shoulder responsibility will not shrink from throwing troops into the
fight _regardless of consequences_ even when the outcome of the battle
is doubtful.” (Par. 304 German I. D. R.).
If love of life and fear of death are overcome in a soldier by
discipline, in an officer this must be brought about by a higher sense
of duty and honor. On the battlefield the desire to live does not
appear in a cultured person, as a rule, in its ordinary, undisguised
form; it makes itself felt rather in the shape of tactical scruples,
whether the leader would be justified in leading his subordinates
to certain death, whether it would not be his duty to preserve the
force entrusted to him for more important duty in the service of the
fatherland, instead of sacrificing it uselessly. If, in addition, an
officer has been allowed, in time of peace, to criticise, from the
start, an order of his superior with reference to its feasibility, it
may easily happen in the stern reality of actual war that a subordinate
leader, neither especially courageous nor ambitious, succumbs to the
seductive whisperings of his senses on the approach of danger and sees
in caution the better part of valor. It is always suspicious if troops
have become accustomed to consider insignificant losses, common to
colonial wars, accompanied by great physical exertions, as indications
of good leadership.[107] Great victories are, as a rule, invariably
accompanied by great losses.
[107] In this connection and in regard to the British losses in
South Africa, see my lecture: _Die Lehren des Burenkrieges_ (1904),
p. 8, et seq. The behavior of Sir Redvers Buller at Colenso and
Spionskop is interesting. See _The Times History of the War in South
Africa_, III, pp. 234, 236, 297, 318.
III. THE POWER OF FIREARMS AND EXPEDIENTS FOR MINIMIZING LOSSES.
A. THE POWER OF FIELD ARTILLERY.
1. THE FIELD GUN.