crept up, in this manner, constantly firing and crawling, to within
about 300 m. of the enemy, we saw many white handkerchiefs waving
over in his lines, as a signal of surrender. As we placed little
credence in these signs of surrender, however, on account of many a
bad experience, we continued the advance by crawling. But, as soon as
we saw that most of the men in the enemy’s ranks were throwing away
their weapons, we rose to make the British prisoners. When we came up
with them, I noticed that a great many of the men were weeping like
children. Later, when I voiced my astonishment over the morale of
their troops to some English officers, they stated that it was due to
the uncanny manner of our advance.
“These officers stated, moreover, that the sight of danger
approaching ever closer without their being able to ward it off
effectively, caused great depression and alarm among their troops;
for the Boers, utilizing every available rock in crawling over the
plain, presented such an unfavorable target that the British fire had
had very little effect, while they themselves had been constantly
exposed to the Boer fire. All this, they claimed, had contributed to
unnerve their troops.”[91]
[91] _Supplement No. 8 to Militär-Wochenblatt_, 1900. _Spionskop_,
in _Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften_, 34/35, p. 59.
=Lessons of the Boer War=: “The rushes * * * were of variable length,
according to the intensity of the hostile fire; they varied from 30
to 80 m. According to the opinion of many British officers it was
exceedingly difficult to induce skirmishers to rise and rush forward
under hostile fire; but that once upon their feet, it became necessary
to push the attack forward as far as possible regardless of the
increased losses entailed by the longer rushes.”[92]
[92] _Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften_, 33, p. 69.
One who fought on the Boer side reports as follows in regard to the
British advance by rushes: “The men rose gradually and hesitatingly.
This gave the attentively watching enemy time to pour a well directed
fire upon the last men who arose. Thus even short rushes made by long
lines became generally too costly to be executed. Smaller groups,
on the other hand, were able to move with startling rapidity. * * *
Every sudden interruption of the firing that might attract the enemy’s
attention should therefore be carefully avoided, but, as a rule, this
is possible only when the advancing units are small.”
The British Regulations of 1896 prescribe rushes of 30-40 m., and those
published immediately after the war (1902) prescribe rushes of 70-90
m., but the rush is to continue only while the surprise of the enemy
lasts.
Russo-Japanese War.
In the Japanese army, the 5th Infantry Division employed short, and
very short, rushes by preference, while other divisions of the 1st Army
as a rule preferred long rushes. From an English work we obtain the
following data in regard to the length of rushes and the expenditure
of ammunition per rifle during halts between consecutive rushes in the
engagement on the Shiliho on October 12th, 1904, at ranges beginning
with 1,000 m.
From the table it appears that after gaining the superiority of fire,
beginning with the fifth rush, at about 625 m. from the enemy, the
length of the rushes increased; the last 400 m. were covered in one
rush as the enemy withdrew from his position.
1st rush 132 m., about 30 rounds of ammunition per rifle
2nd „ 58 „ „ 15 „ „ „ „ „
3rd „ 63 „ „ 15 „ „ „ „ „
4th „ 61 „ „ 15 „ „ „ „ „
5th „ 75 „ „ 15 „ „ „ „ „
6th „ 151 „ „ 5 „ „ „ „ „
7th „ 400 „
-----------------------------------------------
940 m., about 95 rounds of ammunition per rifle
If we assume that three shots per minute were fired from each rifle, it
follows that the attack consumed approximately 40-45 minutes.
Provisions of the Various Regulations Relative to the Advance by Rushes.
=Germany.= (Pars. 188, 189 and 337 I. D. R.). To advance by rushes,
the following commands are given: (Such) =Platoon (section, squad)
Rush!... Rise!... March! March!= At the command =Rush!= the
skirmishers finish loading, lock pieces, close cartridge boxes, and
prepare to rise. Skirmishers lying prone take the piece in the left
hand, lean on the right, and draw the right knee as close to the body
as possible without thereby raising the body from the ground. After
a brief pause, during which these preparations are made, the platoon
commander jumps up and at the same time commands: =Rise!... March!
March!= At this command the skirmishers jump up and rush forward. The
length of the rush will rarely exceed 80 m. (Par. 337 German I. D.
R.). While rushes should, as a rule, be as long as possible, short
rushes, which are designed to leave the enemy no time for firing,
should also be practiced. The principal thing is that skirmishers
rise promptly and simultaneously and that they rush forward rapidly.
The rush is terminated by the command “_Position_”; the sight
setting is changed when necessary and fire opened without further
preliminaries. Frequently the new firing position may be indicated
before the rush is made.
=Austria.= Rushes are as a rule made by platoons. “The length of the
rushes depends upon the character of the ground and the tactical
situation, as well as upon the physical condition of the men. They
serve as an expedient for reaching the next firing position.”
=France.= Rushes are made, without fixed rules, from cover to cover
(_par bonds successifs_).
=England.= (Regulations dated 1896): Originally the regulations
prescribed rushes 30-40 m. long, but, as a matter of fact, their
length was actually increased to 60 and 100 m. during the first
engagements of the South African war, in cases where the fire of the
enemy was not especially heavy. The regulations of 1905, recently
published, state: “Rushes over open ground should not exceed 80-100
yards (_i.e._, 70-90 m.) and will, in fact, rarely reach this length.
At decisive ranges, _i.e._, under 540 m., they should be short enough
to afford the enemy no opportunity to pour a well-directed fire on
the skirmishers. When cover is available the advance is made from
cover to cover.” At another place the regulations state: “On open
ground and within effective range, long lines of skirmishers, rising
simultaneously, will suffer heavy losses even when making short
rushes; the sudden movement of smaller units may take the enemy
unawares, so that for a time at least well aimed fire is avoided. The
rush is continued only while the surprise of the enemy lasts. The
shorter the range, the smaller the advancing units will have to be,
and the shorter the length of the rushes.”
All preparations for a rush must be made as unostentatiously as
possible. The units following in rear should, whenever possible,
advance beyond the leading unit which is lying down and firing. When
an advance by rushes in units is impossible, individuals may run or
crawl forward.
=Italy.= Long rushes, at least with platoons, otherwise with
companies, are used as a rule, so long as the hostile fire permits.
When the intensity of the hostile fire increases, or after the
organizations have become mixed, rushes can no longer be made by
entire units but only by squads or like fractions. These leave the
main line and endeavor to reach the next cover at a rapid run, or if
cover be lacking, throw themselves down in order to open fire again
at the shorter range thus gained. As a rule, the leading echelons
open fire at once from their new positions so as to facilitate the
advance of the others, unless special circumstances make it advisable
to delay the firing until all the other units have reached a good
position and are able to direct an effective fire upon the enemy.
=Japan.= Rushes are made according to German pattern, their maximum
length being 100, their minimum 30-40 m. Rushes are not made by units
smaller than a platoon.
=Russia.= Rushes are made by individual men, by groups, by sections,
and by platoons. The length of the rushes is not indicated. When
sections advance by rushes the platoon commander indicates the
section which is to advance first, and also the order in which the
others are to follow. The Russian regulations are the only ones which
prescribe a “movement to the rear by rushes,” at a run.
Frequently, when the men are very much fatigued, when advancing over
plowed ground and through extensive grain fields, an advance by rushes
will be impossible. Whether =fire while in motion= ought to be
employed in this case should be determined. A preliminary condition
for its employment is, however, that the enemy’s fire has been subdued
or that he has been forced under cover. To advance against an unshaken
enemy with fire while in motion must lead to the annihilation of the
attacking force. While the defender scores only 12.8% hits against
advancing skirmishers at 700 m., the attacker scores only 1.6% to 3.5%
hits against head and breast targets. With such a discrepancy in fire
effect, the attack, if employing fire while in motion, is bound to
collapse, unless it has already gained a superiority of fire prior to
the advance. It is unfortunate that fire while in motion is frequently
employed when inappropriate during drills. The danger of men wounding
each other and of the advance hesitating because the officers are not
in front of the line is not to be underestimated. On the other hand,
the advantages of eliminating the difficulties of inducing the men to
rise, of the troops leaving their losses behind, of stragglers being
more easily detected, and of keeping the entire hostile line under
fire, cannot be denied. In war this method of advance will frequently
result without orders while advancing to the charge after the defender
has been driven under cover. (In Russia this mode of advance is
prescribed).
During experiments in field firing, held in Austria by a force
advancing from 1,400 to 600 paces, with an expenditure of an equal
number of rounds of ammunition in each experiment, the following
results were obtained:
Regulation attack: Fire while in motion:
Time 26 min. 28 seconds 18 min. 40 seconds
Fire pauses 12 „ 18 „ 7 „ 40 „
Attacker against the defender:
Percentage of hits 7 16.7
Defender against the attacker:
Percentage of hits 9.2 33.
Percentage of hits obtained during the execution of the attack from
1,400 to 100 paces:
Attacker 22.7 20.
Defender 32.2 51.2
There is no model advance within the zone of effective infantry fire.
All expedients, whether they be sneaking or crawling, long or short
rushes, or fire while in motion, are of equal value, if the force, kept
well in hand by the leader, is thereby brought closer to the enemy.
Every opportunity to gain a foot of ground to the front, offered by
flanking fire or fire directed at the enemy over the heads of the
advancing force, must be utilized. The effect of our own artillery
fire should also be attentively followed with a view to advancing when
the hostile skirmishers have sought refuge under cover to escape our
shrapnel.
Examples of the Employment of Fire While in Motion.
The successful attack made by the 1st Turco Regiment at =Wörth=.[93]
[93] V. BOGUSLAWSKI, _Geschichte des Regiments Nr. 50_, p. 212.
This attack was made against disordered and exhausted troops which
lacked officers and reserves. The attack was finally repulsed by
Prussian artillery and the IInd Battalion of the 58th Infantry.
The attempted sortie of the Turks on December 10th, 1877.[94]
[94] Springer, VI, p. 204.
The attack, made in superior force and supported by artillery, was
successful in that the Russian intrenchments and rifle pits were
taken. With the arrival of Russian reinforcements, which advanced
against front and flank of the Turks, the situation was reversed.
The attack made by Vinoy’s Corps on September 30th, 1870, against the
VIth Army Corps in =l’Hay= and =Chevilly=: “The defender’s coolness
and confidence in victory grew with this ineffective fire of the
attack, and finally the dead were piled up in heaps by the steady
volleys delivered by him at short ranges (300-400 paces).”[95]
[95] V. SCHLICHTING, _Taktische und strategische Grundsätze_, 1, p.
71.
Examples of the Employment of Rushes.
1. Attack on =Le Bourget=, on October 30th, 1870.[96]
[96] HOHENLOHE, _Briefe über Infanterie_, p. 80.
KUNZ, _Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele_, 10, p. 43.
Two battalions of the _Kaiser Franz_ Guard Grenadier Regiment had
to advance from Dugny against the enemy in the northwest edge of Le
Bourget over 1,500 m. of very open terrain, covered only with high
potato crops. The battalions were formed in two lines with two
companies entirely deployed in the first line, and the battalion
reserves in rear of the center of the line with files at extended
intervals. The second line was formed similarly. The two companies
in the firing line advanced at first without firing, by rushes of
about 300 m. each, made by alternate companies, each moving forward
beyond the point where the other had halted. When effective range
was reached one company opened rapid fire while the other moved
forward by long rushes. The companies in rear followed in a similar
manner. The tall potato bushes partly concealed the lines while lying
down. In this manner the two battalions reached the outskirts of the
village almost without being checked, the defender having withdrawn
to the interior of the village.
The losses of the two battalions, while advancing by rushes, were
insignificant.
The regimental commander, bearing in mind the lessons gained at St.
Privat, had drilled the regiment beforehand in this mode of attack.
2. Attack on Redout No. 2, at =Scheinovo=, on January 9th, 1878.
The attack by Skobeleff’s Division, consisting of four battalions
(_Drushines_) of Bulgarians, and the _Ugla_, _Vladimir_, and _Kasan_
Regiments, was to be made under cover of the fire of two rifle
battalions armed with Berdan rifles, and of a provisional battalion
of the _Ugla_ Regiment armed with captured Turkish rifles. The only
artillery available consisted of a mountain battery, while the Turks
were able to bring twenty guns into action.
The Turkish rifle fire began at about 1,000-1,200 m., but the Russian
firing lines continued the advance with shouldered arms. Only when
the losses increased noticeably did they advance by rushes, _without
firing_, from 750 to about 500 m. where they opened fire. The rushes
were made by the entire firing line; the supports, with files at
extended intervals, did not follow until the firing line had thrown
itself down.
After the firing had lasted for some time, the Ugla Regiment, from
the reserve, was formed in three lines, each consisting of one
battalion, each battalion again into two lines with 350 m. distance
between lines (total depth of the column about 1,800 m.). From 900
m. on, the advance was made by rushes, the entire force inclining
to the right front. While covered by the fire of the skirmishers of
the firing line in front, the length of the rushes was 100-150 m.
At 250 m. from the enemy, the leading line, extending the line of
the Bulgarian and Rifle Battalions, was able to open fire and, after
about thirty minutes, when it was clearly apparent that the Turks
were evacuating the work, the regiment began the assault, which was
successful.
Of the troops in the first line, the 11th Rifle Battalion lost 11
officers and 422 men; the 9th Rifle Battalion, 5 officers and 269
men; the original strength of each being about 800 men. Expenditure
of ammunition: 11th Rifle Battalion, 120 rounds per rifle.
The Ugla Regiment, which advanced in close order after the defender’s
fire had been silenced, lost only nine officers and 391 men. The
Kasan Regiment, which followed the Ugla Regiment, participated in the
assault on the second Turkish position. The Turkish fire had abated
to such an extent that the battalions were able to advance in rear of
one another, each in two lines with distances of only 35 m. between
lines; the intervals between companies were 15 m., and those between
files were extended. Losses: four officers and 76 men. Expenditure of
ammunition: 12 rounds per rifle.[97]
[97] KUROPATKIN-KRAHMER, _Kritische Rückblicke auf den
Russich-Türkischen Krieg_, III, pp. 168-186.
In contrast with these examples of long rushes, almost every obstinate
engagement with an unshaken enemy showed that “every step forward”
had to be literally gained by the impulse imparted by the arrival of
small, fresh detachments, that the rushes often faltered after only
20-30 paces, and that frequently nothing remained but to work forward
individually. (See pp. 76 and 87 _supra_.)
The frontal attacks made at =Wörth=, at the Roten Berg at
=Spicheren=, opposite =Flavigny=, on August 16th, 1870, and opposite
the gravel pits of =Point du Jour=, on August 18th, 1870, etc.
In the Russo-Turkish war, the engagement at the mills north of
=Lovtcha=, the fight for the possession of the Green Hill ridges
south of =Plevna=, and the fight during the advance from the west
and southwest against the large work of =Gorni Dubniac=, show how
rushes, repeatedly attempted at short ranges, faltered after only a
few paces. “On a signal given by Ljapunov, which was to be repeated
by all the officers, the men were to rush forward immediately. Just
before the movement began, the Turks opened the usual incessant
fire, and the simultaneous advance of so many squads was of course
absolutely impossible. The rushes were, therefore, always made by
groups of 2-3 men. These groups would rise, one in this company, one
in that, run forward a few steps, and then throw themselves down
again.”[98]
[98] PUSYREWSKI, _Die russische Garde im Kriege, 1877-78_, p. 127.
The attacks on =Railway Hill= and on =Hart’s Hill= (February 1900),
on the =Tugela=, show an endeavor to advance at first by long rushes,
then by rushes gradually diminishing in length, the infantry finally
working itself forward by twos and threes for the purpose of reaching
the last firing position from which the final assault could be
made.[99]
[99] _Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften_, 34/35, pp. 129, 139.
_The Times History of the War in South Africa_, III, p. 539.
(c) Reinforcing the Firing Line.
If the fire power of the firing line is to be maintained after heavy
losses, or the intensity of its fire is to be augmented, or when it
finally is to receive the impulse for making a further advance, it
must be reinforced. (Pars. 226, 227 and 341 German I. D. R.). This
may be done by prolonging the line (platoons abreast at well defined
intervals), or, when space is lacking and after losses have occurred,
by putting men in the intervals (_i.e._, increasing the density of the
line and filling it up). When the firing line is prolonged, tactical
units are not broken up, and this facilitates fire control. Whenever
practicable, the firing line should be reinforced by prolonging it,
although the other method, that of placing men in the intervals and
gaps of the firing line, is more frequently used and more practical
because the arrival of fresh men and the replacement of incapacitated
officers occasioned thereby renews the strength of the firing line
(replenishment of ammunition). The breaking up of platoons is
unavoidable, and on that account platoon and squad leaders should be
trained in time of peace to form new units at once so that control is
not lost. In order to prevent the mixing of units, so far as this is
possible, and to keep the firing line filled up with skirmishers, even
during an engagement entailing heavy losses, it is indispensable that
the fighting front should be limited, that of a company in attack to
150, in defense to about 200 m. The unit designated to reinforce the
firing line endeavors to approach that line under cover, forms skirmish
line at any rate before leaving the last cover and advances by rushes,
or, if directly in rear of the firing line and under a heavy fire, even
by crawling.
=Austria.= Both modes of reinforcing the firing line, that of
prolonging it, and that of filling the intervals and gaps, are used.
When prolonging the line the reinforcement may remain abreast of the
firing line. During an attack efforts should, however, be made to
advance beyond the firing line--“to overreach it.” The other method,
that of filling up the line, is in attack, as a rule, to be used for
the purpose of carrying the line forward, the rush to be made as soon
as the reinforcement reaches the firing line. Signals are prescribed
for prolonging the line without advancing beyond it, for reinforcing
that line and advancing beyond it, and for filling it up and carrying
it forward in a rush.
(d) Closing Up. Assembling. Re-Forming.
(Pars. 211-214 and 230-232 German I. D. R.).
The most effective method of preventing a mixing of organizations in
action is for all units constantly to endeavor to close in toward their
leaders, filling gaps as soon as casualties have occurred. Squads which
have sustained heavy losses unite with adjoining ones under a common
leader. This closing in can, as a rule, be executed only while in
motion. It must be effected gradually and the intervals ordered should
be maintained. Crowding of every description increases losses and
causes dangerous gaps along the entire front.
If in the course of an engagement, the purpose of the action and the
situation make it no longer desirable to retain an extended order
formation, each leader, from the squad leader upward, must assemble his
unit at once and place himself and it at the disposal of the commander
of the next higher unit. Formed bodies must be created quickly and held
well in hand by their leaders, without awaiting specific orders to that
effect.
The troops must be assembled very quietly and always facing the enemy.
The original organizations are not re-formed until the command “Fall
in” is given. (Pars. 214 and 232 German I. D. R.).
10. SUPPORTS.
(Pars. 222-228 and 341 German I. D. R.).
The limited front assigned to an organization necessitates, in the
first place, a division into firing line and retained fractions. At the
decisive stage of a fight every available man must, without question,
be in the first line.
Italy. Supports are not to be used when they cannot be maintained at a
less distance from the firing line than that separating the latter from
the enemy.
It is the duty of supports to reinforce and extend the firing line, to
cover the flanks (par. 222 German I. D. R.), to act as a reserve, and,
in case of necessity, as a rallying force upon which the firing line
can fall back. The presence of supports increases confidence in attack,
and the power of resistance in defense. Supports enable a leader to
influence the action, to give a firing line that has been checked the
impetus necessary to carry it forward, and to affect the action by
sending reinforcements to points where he wishes to gain an advantage.
The support follows that part of the firing line which, in all
probability, will need its assistance; if part of the same organization
as the firing line, it follows in rear of the center, otherwise in
rear of a wing. In a company advancing alone over covered terrain, it
will sometimes be necessary to place small supports in rear of both
flanks. Firing lines can perhaps advance for some time under hostile
fire, whether they move by twos, by squads, or by platoons, but the
power necessary for pushing home the attack must be imparted to them
from the rear; otherwise the energy of the attack will spend itself.
The necessity of having supports in rear of the firing line is clearly
illustrated in the very instructive engagement at Wagon Hill in front
of Ladysmith (6th January 1900). In this fight all attempts to push the
firing line forward failed, and the necessary impetus for the decisive
advance was not given until fresh supports were fed into the firing
line.[100]
[100] _The Times History of the War in South Africa_, III, p. 200.
In hilly country the supports can fire over the heads of the
skirmishers in front of them without neglecting their proper functions.
(Switzerland and England). Such opportunities should not be overlooked,
as they increase the volume of fire.
Distances depend upon the object to be attained by the action and upon
the terrain.