Japaner_, pp. 44 and 66. BRONSART VON SCHELLENDORFF, _Sechs Monate
beim japanischen Feldheer_, p. 217.
[87] In regard to the advance of the 6th Reserve Regiment
against Husanta-Kantsy at Mukden, on March 5th, 1905, BRONSART VON
SCHELLENDORFF (_Angriffsverfahren der Japaner_, p. 225), says: “Some
500-600 m. from the Russian position, individual men sprang out of
the shelter trench at intervals of 10-25 paces, rushed forward for
about 30 m., or perhaps farther, where they threw themselves down and
fired. This procedure was repeated until a new skirmish line, with
the men approximately 3 paces apart, had been formed about 100-150
m. in front of the trench mentioned. The rest of the men, who until
this moment had remained in the trench, now rushed forward in groups
of 5-10 men for distances of 30 m., for the purpose of reaching the
advanced line.”
It might be well to mention here that thin and dense skirmish lines,
when under fire, lose an equal number of men in proportion to their
strength, provided the front occupied by them is the same.
RESULTS OF A FIRING TEST AGAINST THIN AND DENSE SKIRMISH LINES.
FIRE AT WILL, FREEHAND FROM A PRONE POSITION.
============+===========+=======+======+====+=======+========+=======
| | | | | Hits. | Figures|
| Range & | | | +---+---+ hit. |
Target. | Elevation:|No. of |No. of|Time| | +---+----+Figures
| m. |rifles.|shots.|min.| | % | | % |missed.
------------+-----------+-------+------+----+---+---+---+----+-------
180 head | 680 | 166 | 1268 | 5 | 54| 4 | 49| 27 | 131
targets |Elevation | | | | | | | |
placed at |used: first| | | | | | | |
intervals of|600 then | | | | | | | |
1-2 paces. |700 m. | | | | | | | |
------------+-----------+-------+------+----+---+---+---+----+-------
90 head | 680 | 166 | 850 | 5 | 35| 4 | 27| 30 | 63
targets |Elevation | | | | | | | |
placed at |used: first| | | | | | | |
intervals of|600 then | | | | | | | |
3-4 paces. |700 m. | | | | | | | |
------------+-----------+-------+------+----+---+---+---+----+-------
The superior effect of fire on the dense skirmish line, as expressed
by the greater number of hits, and in consequence thereof, by the
gradually growing number of figures hit, is apparent. It is worthy
of note and at first glance strange that, presupposing the two lines
considered occupy an equal front, the percentage of figures hit is
the same. The explanation of this lies in the fact that in correctly
distributed fire any specified front space is equally covered with
hits so that it is immaterial for the relative proportion of figures
hit whether an equal number of figures is removed or added. While,
however, the dense skirmish line still has 131 effectives, the
weaker line has only 63 left. The casualties are therefore far more
perceptible in the smaller force.
(a) The Formation of the Skirmish Line.
Skirmish line with intervals of two paces between the men is formed at
the command, “As Skirmishers.” (Pars. 142 and 174-180 German I. D. R.).
The skirmish line may be deployed from any formation, in any direction,
either with or without first changing front. (Par. 177 German I. D.
R.). A greater interval than two paces must be specifically ordered.
Squad leaders hasten in front of their squads and form the framework
of the skirmish line. The men follow their squad leaders absolutely.
When the terrain requires it, squad leaders may increase or diminish
intervals without command. In other armies (for instance, in those
of Italy, France, and England) the desire to keep the skirmishers
under control as long as possible, has led to advancing the platoons
designated for the firing line at first in close order, the deployment
being made only when the state of the action requires it. In France,
the intervals between files may be increased, or a single rank line
may be formed before the force is deployed as skirmishers. During an
advance it will often happen that intervals are increased or diminished
in accordance with the peculiarities of the terrain. The advance is
continued until the command or signal “Halt” is given. If line of
skirmishers is to be formed when marching to the rear, the command is
first faced to the front and then deployed on the line then occupied.
(Rallying position, par. 180 German I. D. R.). On varied ground,
deployments will be made under cover whenever possible in order to
allow of an immediate advance in skirmish line from that point. The
number of platoons to be deployed depends upon the tactical situation.
When three deployed platoons are formed abreast, it is difficult
for the company commander to control them; but this formation is an
appropriate one if a company is surprised or enters immediately into
decisive action, or in cases where the battalion acting alone requires
complete units in reserve for additional tasks. (Pars. 462, 463 and 469
German I. D. R.). When the battalion is engaged as part of a larger
force, it is a good plan to occupy all the available front space at
once with skirmishers and to maintain the intensity of fire of the
firing line by constantly reinforcing it. The losses are less in this
case than when the men crowd together in groups. (Italy).
Platoon and squad leaders are posted on the side of their commands
facing the enemy while advancing; in moving to the rear, squad leaders
are posted on the side away from the enemy, their duty being to
maintain the march direction, and the platoon commanders remain in rear
of their platoons (_i.e._, on the side toward the enemy). Russia is the
only country where the leaders of a firing line are posted in the rear.
In Austria one non-commissioned officer in each platoon is designated
to march in rear of the advancing firing line for the purpose of
supervising the skirmishers. As this non-commissioned officer is to
prevent straggling, he should be selected with great care.
The platoon commander indicates the march direction to the leader
of the base squad, and, accompanied by the range finders and the
musicians, moves to a point at least ten paces in front of the line
of his squad leaders, as a rule, opposite the center of his platoon;
but he is not restricted to this position. He must possess mobility
if he desires to lead his platoon skillfully on varied ground, if he
expects to avoid interfering with neighboring platoons, and if he
wishes to observe the enemy at the same time. The musician keeps the
company commander constantly in view. (Par. 221 German I. D. R.).
The range finders observe the battlefield, estimate the range to any
targets appearing in view, without being specifically told to do so,
communicate the range found to the platoon commander (this should not
be done by shouting, as misunderstandings might result therefrom), and
observe the effect of the fire. (Par. 173 German I. D. R.).
Whenever the flanks of a skirmish line are not protected by other
troops or by natural obstacles, a few men under a prudent leader should
always be sent out as combat patrols to the flank, or better still, to
the right or left front. The patrol should under no circumstances lose
connection with the command which it is to protect, but, on the other
hand, should not stick so close to it that the file on the exposed
flank is in a position to see as much as the combat patrol itself. As a
report from a combat patrol frequently arrives too late, or cannot be
made at all on account of hostile fire, signals should be agreed upon
and the leader of the squad on the exposed flank of the line should
keep the combat patrol constantly in view. Signal flags may also be
employed advantageously in such cases.
The =Austrian= deployment is similar to the German, the intervals
between skirmishers being about two paces. In =Italy= the skirmishers
are posted at intervals of 1.5 m. (_catena ordinaria_), but this
interval may be increased by order up to three paces (_catena rada_).
The interval between squads in extended order is 4-5 paces to
facilitate volley fire by squad. The =French= deployment is similar
to the German. An intermediate extended order formation is that in
which an advance is made in line, the files at extended intervals. In
=England= skirmishers are placed at intervals of 5-15 paces during
the initial deployment. At short ranges where the decision is sought,
one rifle per 2-3 yards of front (1.8-2.7 m.) is the rule, one rifle
per yard of front (0.90 m.) being the maximum. In =Russia= and
=Japan= the intervals are as ordered. In =Switzerland= skirmishers
are posted at intervals of 1-2 paces; when a greater front is to be
covered the intervals between squads are increased. The length of the
rushes depends on the ground, the effect of fire, and the endurance
of the men. In exceptional cases an advance by rushes, by squads or
single men, is authorized.
(b) Movements in Skirmish Line.
Fire action requires steady breathing, and, on this account, all
movements to the position at which the fire fight is to be taken up,
should be made, as long as possible, in a free swinging stride. A
careful observation of alignment or of intervals cannot be insisted
upon. Cover found within the allotted front should be utilized
by ploying, but this must neither interfere with the harmonious
advance of the entire force nor cause a loss of the march direction.
Considerations of cover for individual men should not interfere with
the spontaneous progress of the movement. Orderly movements in long
skirmish lines are best made by designating a certain element as the
_base_, whose leader is far in advance of it; all neighboring leaders
maintain their intervals from, and endeavor to remain approximately on
line with him. This has the advantage of relieving the commander of
the whole line from looking after these details and leaves him free
to concentrate all his attention on the enemy. Minor changes of the
march direction are executed by inclining to the right or left or by
designating a new objective. More extended movements by the flank,
within range of hostile fire, are possible only under cover. Changes
of direction are executed like a gradual front into line, in which a
temporary echeloning of the elements, or one which can be adjusted by
degrees, is unavoidable. (Par. 185 German I. D. R.).
In the absence of cover, an advance in quick time will be possible
only at long ranges unless the hostile fire can be kept down by fire
from enfilading or commanding positions. Skirmish lines advancing
without fire support over ground devoid of cover, begin to suffer
appreciable losses at 1000 m. The more effective the hostile fire, the
more pressing the necessity of diminishing, as far as this is possible,
the periods of time during which the skirmishers present their whole
bodies as targets to the enemy. This leads in itself[88] to an =advance
by rushes=, since the whole distance separating the advancing line
from the enemy cannot be covered in one rush. Double time may be
employed by a skirmish line when it becomes necessary to reinforce an
advancing firing line quickly, to forestall the enemy in reaching a
certain point, or in moving under fire, from the covered fire position
occupied, to another position. It is impossible to prescribe definitely
and for all cases at what ranges the advance by rushes should be taken
up and when fire should be opened in advancing by rushes, since it
depends upon the intensity of the hostile fire.
[88] KUNZ, _Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele_, 14, pp. 40, 48 and 77.
The assailant will, in the first place, endeavor to advance without
firing, in order to reach those ranges quickly at which his fire
will begin to be effective against the well-covered targets of the
defender. The skirmishers advance in strong detachments, by rushes
of the greatest possible length, taking short breathing spells at
each halt. Very soon, however, the hostile fire makes this advance
impossible. A fire fight of variable duration must first make a further
advance possible by silencing the fire of the defender. In a serious
infantry engagement every step forward must be purchased by the fire
of the attacking infantry. The attacker will, in exceptional cases
only, continue his advance in long lines, although this must appear
desirable to him, for almost invariably only a part of his force will
still be able to gain ground to the front when supported by the fire
of neighboring detachments. Favorable local conditions, insignificant
losses, and, above all, the personality of the commander will embue a
force with the determination to advance.
Time Required for Making a Rush. Strength of the Force Making the Rush.
The squad requires 5-6, the platoon at war strength about 10-15 seconds
preparation for making a rush.
To cover 80 m., requires 26-30 seconds;
„ „ 40 „ „ 17-20 „
„ „ 25 „ „ 10-15 „
While the attacker covers a distance of 80 m., the defender, if in
readiness, can fire 4-5 shots. This proves very clearly that, in order
to be able to make such a rush, a certain superiority of fire is
absolutely essential. These figures change radically as soon as the
troops are seriously engaged with the enemy and come under his fire
at short ranges. At short ranges, aside from the size of the target
offered, attempts to advance by rushes with entire companies must very
soon cease of their own accord.
The character of the terrain and the fire of the enemy play a decisive
role here.
The strength of the force making the rush is intimately connected with
the length of the rushes. A small, isolated force would run the risk of
being fired on by its own neighboring detachments. Besides, confidence
and moral courage are difficult to find in a small force. It is
difficult to carry forward long lines as units. The use of long lines
necessitates, as a rule, an almost complete cessation of fire, and, in
addition, mutual fire support suffers. Long lines should therefore be
employed only when the attacker possesses a very marked superiority of
fire. In practice it has been found advantageous to make the rush with
the smallest fraction led by an officer, _i.e._, with a platoon.
The following appropriate statement appears in _Taktische Rückblicke
auf 1866_: “In the danger zone which suddenly surrounds and startles
him in war, the soldier feels, in the first place, a desire to have
someone assure him that the seemingly critical situation in which
he finds himself, is as it should be. His eye is naturally directed
upon his officers. If the officer’s quiet glance reminds him that
here, as in peace time, the first duty is obedience, and if he sees
the officer subsequently advance fearlessly and vigorously, he will,
as a rule, not worry about the why and wherefor. It is this faithful
attachment to the person of his officer, rather than ambition and
patriotism, which inspires the soldier to highest efforts. Those
who suppose that all our soldiers are heroes simply because they
are products of a courageous race, are very much mistaken. This
would indeed be an invincible army, requiring no tactical advice,
if its soldiers would do nothing in action but their simple duty
voluntarily.”
The severest test of discipline is for a skirmish line to rise and
rush forward under an effective hostile fire. This movement had best
be executed with precision and energy even during peace exercises. The
formation and manner of execution must become second nature to the
soldier, like a movement of the manual of arms, which he retains during
his entire military service, and a knowledge of which he brings with
him when called to the colors during mobilization. The example set by
advancing leaders and the arrival of reinforcements, which move forward
through the firing line, have been found to be the most effective means
of carrying a skirmish line forward.
The critical moment occurs when the men rise and prepare to rush
forward, for an unsubdued enemy will be desirous to prevent, by
increasing his fire, any attempt to advance. The fire support afforded
by neighboring detachments would seem to have a conditional value only;
for, being themselves under fire, the skirmishers of these detachments
cannot be expected to divert their fire from the opponent previously
fired upon, to an enemy by whom they themselves are not threatened. In
oblique fire, the rifles, on account of their short barrel, interfere
with neighboring ones, and, in addition, expose the men advancing on
the flanks to the danger of being hit by the fire of their comrades.
The fire support is, therefore, restricted to hindering the hostile
skirmishers directly opposite from firing on the advancing unit. When
the terrain is favorable, infantry and machine guns should not hesitate
to fire over the heads of their own skirmishers. The coöperation of
artillery will, in any case, be of great value, and infantry will have
to select those moments for advancing when the defender is driven under
cover by the hail of shot.
The advance by rushes, consuming time and energy, is an expedient to
which the enemy compels us to resort as the only means of gaining
ground to the front. The firm determination to close with the enemy
and the ever-increasing difficulty of inducing the men to advance from
cover, require that long rushes be made. Short rushes are neither
consonant with the nature of the attack, nor with the desire to
close with the enemy. “Many halts during an advance are fatal to the
offensive.” (HÖNIG). The powers of endurance of the men, the character
of the ground, and the hostile fire, as well as the support afforded
by infantry and artillery fire, influence the length of the rush. If
the leader has already caused the skirmishers to rise, it is best to
let them run forward so long as the physical powers of the men and
the hostile fire permit. The only danger is that the men will throw
themselves down prematurely, and without orders. It is rather an
advantage that during the rapid advance, increasing both muscular and
nervous activity, the men do not think of danger and have no time to
pay attention to their fallen comrades. One fact is, however, worthy of
special attention: If we train a soldier to make long rushes in time of
peace, he will be able to make them in time of war, and it is easier
for a leader to decrease than to increase the length of rushes in the
field.
The short rushes are considered advantageous because they take the
enemy by surprise, in consequence of which he is not in a condition
to direct his fire on the advancing unit. Rushes should be made with
startling suddenness. They should not be made in step at double time,
but, on the contrary, as rapidly as possible (by rushing); by the time
the enemy directs his fire on them, the skirmishers should already
have thrown themselves down. Stragglers should also throw themselves
down, when the men in the lead drop down behind cover, and should then
endeavor to reach the firing line by crawling.
The enemy will concentrate his fire on the unit which advanced first.
The fire of this unit will at the start be rather weak, getting
stronger gradually. If this unit is left in its advanced position for
some time there is danger of its being thrown back; all neighboring
units must therefore endeavor to rejoin it as soon as possible.
The greater the superiority of our fire, _i.e._, the marksmanship which
compels the enemy to keep under cover, the greater the length of the
rushes and the rapidity with which they follow upon each other.
Short rushes with small units occur quite naturally, because the
platoon leader no longer succeeds in inducing his whole platoon to
rise, since his influence extends only to the men nearest him, and
because the flank squads at first remain behind and only gradually try
to rejoin the leading skirmishers. If only a part of the skirmishers
have jumped up, it is quite natural for them not to make a long rush,
but to throw themselves down before reaching the new position, because
of the feeling that they have been abandoned by their comrades and the
fear of running into their field of fire. Thus, in spite of the best
intentions of the leader, the short rush by small units occurs. In time
of peace, however, we should retain the long rush by platoons and not
endeavor to give human weaknesses the force of regulations.
When once compelled to employ short rushes the following question
presents itself: Is the advantage of such a small gain of ground worth
the trouble of inducing the soldier to rise for making an advance
by rushes? Would it, therefore, not be more profitable to =crawl
forward=? A man crawling on his belly presents a vulnerable surface
of approximately the size of a breast plate 50 cm. high. In an advance
made by a large unit, or over covered terrain (fields of standing
grain) crawling would be difficult (difficulty of maintaining the
direction of march and reduction of the rate of advance); it would
also be difficult to get men to advance to the charge after they have
crawled along in this fashion for some time. The supervision of a unit
crawling forward would also be exceedingly difficult. The following
results were obtained in experiments made under favorable conditions:
A distance of 500 m. was covered by crawling in about 10 minutes;
crawling tired the men, increased the activity of the lungs to such an
extent that deliberate aiming and firing was out of the question and
the motion produced a noticeable swelling of arms, hands and knees.[89]
The Boers occasionally used the following method: One man crept forward
once or twice his own length, raising his body slightly, while the
man next to him fired; then they exchanged roles and this procedure
was repeated uninterruptedly. In any case, troops ought to be able to
execute both the advance by rushes and the advance by crawling with
or without firing. On terrain devoid of cover a skirmish line will
frequently be able to advance only by crawling.
[89] During the engagement at Paardeberg (18th February, 1900), the
fighting line of the British 9th Infantry Division was reinforced
by troops crawling up into the line, and carried forward to within
450 m. of the enemy’s position. An isolated assault was subsequently
repulsed by the Boers.
Procedure: The man throws himself on the ground at full length, head
resting upon the bent left arm, right hand grasping the small of
the rifle-stock. The man moves forward by alternately bending and
straightening the right leg. When the right leg is straightened the
body slides forward without rising in the least from the ground, and
the head also remains in position resting on the left arm. The head
is raised only when the man fires his piece, the butt of which is
placed against the shoulder. Crawling on all fours is very tiring,
the man offers a larger target, and, in addition, is not immediately
ready for firing.
In this manner the Boers succeeded in shooting the enemy out of
his position. The firing line, while keeping up an incessant fire,
slowly but steadily advanced. The advance of this uncanny crawling
line is said to have produced an especially disquieting and
paralyzing impression on the immovable defender, who was tied to his
position, because of his inability to inflict perceptible losses
on these small, prone targets, and because, moreover, he himself
was continually under a galling fire. As no assault was made, no
opportunity was offered the defender for using his rifles against
targets the height of a man. The British infantrymen were, however,
insufficiently trained in handling their weapons independently. As
to rise and to retreat meant annihilation, the determination to
resist weakened gradually during the long fire fight, and, in order
to escape from this seemingly unendurable situation, which grew
more and more acute with every minute, and which paralyzed every
energetic decision, one avenue of escape only seemed open, that of
surrender.[90]
[90] Engagement at Nicholson’s Neck, October 29th, 1900.
_Vierteljahrshefte_, 1905, pp. 145 and 149.