which enables it to adapt itself easily to any combat situation. The
battalion organization is the outgrowth of practical necessity; the
regimental commander cannot handle 12-16 companies without difficulty,
and an intermediate unit, the battalion, is necessary. The battalion
is the practical, and the regiment, consisting of 3 or 4 battalions,
the ideal unit. Regiments consisting of two battalions do not possess
the same advantages, as the regimental staff becomes superfluous during
each necessary division of the regiment. Two battalion regiments do
indeed facilitate command; they are, however, more expensive in time
of peace and are of advantage in action only when formed into brigades
of six battalions each, in which case the commander has a compactly
organized reserve available.
“The regiment, by reason of its history, the uniformity of its
training, the _esprit de corps_ of its officers, and its division into
three battalions--thereby facilitating subdivision--is pre-eminently
fitted for carrying out definite combat tasks.” (Par. 470 German I. D.
R.). A glance at the map of the battle of Vionville (5B of the German
General Staff work on the Franco-German war) shows that regiments,
whenever they entered the field intact, fought as unbroken units
throughout the battle, whereas brigade organizations were frequently
broken up.
This breaking up of brigades is practically induced by the two regiment
brigade organization. (Par. 471 German I. D. R.). When once the brigade
commander has assigned sections or points of attack to his regiments,
there remains very little for him to do. He can form a reserve only
by taking two battalions from one regiment, or one battalion from
each. The brigade is, however, not like the regiment, an entity of
bodies of troops, but a unit assembled for tactical purposes, which
may, without regard to the whole, be increased or diminished by one or
more battalions in case of necessity. On the march and in action the
brigade organization as a subdivision of the division cannot always be
maintained; groups are frequently formed in which the normal units
must be broken up. In large battles the brigade is the largest force
which may yet be employed as an intact unit, although the employment of
infantry by regiments will continue to be the rule. Brigade commanders
are necessary for decreasing units of command and desirable for
relieving the division commanders of a part of their work. In time of
peace brigade commanders are useful for directing recruitment and,
moreover, as connecting links between regiments and the division.
The unmistakable advantages of the three-battalion organization have
induced the United States to form its brigades of three regiments, each
of three battalions (of 400 men each). An English division consists of
three brigades of four battalions each.
4. INTRENCHING TOOL EQUIPMENT.[45]
[45] In the Russo-Japanese war the Russian companies were equipped
with 80 small spades and 20 hand axes; the Japanese companies with 68
small spades, 17 mattocks, 8 hatchets, and 30 wire cutters.
Earth as a covering material and, incidental thereto, the adoption
of the small spade after the Russo-Turkish war, have increased in
importance owing to the greater penetrating power of the modern
infantry bullets. The disadvantages of the spade lie in the danger of
its being misused and in the consequent impairment of offensive spirit.
There is, moreover, danger that the fire effect will be impaired and
subordinated to considerations of cover. The spade should therefore not
be employed on every occasion, but only when the tactical purpose in
view requires it.
What the weight of the portable intrenching equipment of the Japanese,
Russian, and British infantry will be, is still undecided, but
experiments are being made with a uniform tool. When we consider, that
for the purpose of intrenching, one man requires a space of 1.20 m.,
and for handling his rifle a space of 0.8 m., and that when intrenching
under fire all the men cannot work, it is obvious that it would be
impracticable to equip each man with an intrenching tool. According
to all experience, it is sufficient to furnish every other man with
spade or pick. In addition to this, however, a company requires a large
number of wire cutters. Only the French infantry is equipped with
explosives, every regiment having 108 cartridges.
The following table shows the intrenching tool equipment available in
each battalion:
+=========+================================+=================+=======
| FOR EARTH WORK. | FOR TIMBER WORK.|
----------+-----------------+--------------+---------+-------+-------
| Small | Large | Small | Large |
| Intrenching | Intrenching | Intrenching |
| Tools. | Tools. | Tools. |
----------+-------+---------+-------+------+---------+-------+------
|Spades.|Mattocks.|Spades.|Picks.|Hatchets.| Axes. |Total.
----------+-------+---------+-------+------+---------+-------+------
Germany | 400 | 40 | 20 | 10 | 35 | 8 | 513
Austria | 400 | 64 | 8 | 16 | ... | 8[46]| ...
Italy[47] | 32 | 8 | 36 | 18 | ... | 62 | ...
France[48]| 448 | 128 | ... | ... | ... |... | ...
----------+-------+---------+-------+------+---------+-------+-------
[46] Each company has 4 pioneers, which carry intrenching and
carpenter tools in addition to their rifles. These men are formed
into a pioneer platoon of 64 men in each regiment.
[47] The adoption of portable intrenching tools, 50 spades and
12-15 mattocks per company, is contemplated.
[48] The following demolition tools are available in each
battalion: 64 picks, 64 fascine knives, and 16 wire cutters. Sappeur
sections carry in addition a mattock or a pick apiece, and each
ammunition carrier also carries a pick, a fascine knife, or a saw.
The large intrenching tools are apparently being changed at the
present moment.
5. THE LOAD OF THE INFANTRYMAN.
The load carried by the infantryman should not exceed one-third of
the man’s weight (84 kg.), or not more than 28 kg. According to the
“Regulations for the Employment of Infantry Equipment, M/95,” the load
of a soldier whose height is 1.67 m. (the equipment consisting of new
experimental pieces) is about 27 kg., distributed as follows:
Clothing 5.397 kg.
Equipment[49] 3,964 „
Baggage[50] 5.600 „
Arms and ammunition 8.507 „
Rations (including breakfast). 3.238 „
----------
Total 26.706 kg.
To this must be added intrenching tools:
Small spade and scabbard 0.89 kg.
Hatchet 1.08 „
Mattock 1.48 „
Load with spade 27.596 „
[49] Tent equipment 1.620 kg.
[50] Iron ration, 2.388 kg. The British soldier carries only a 269
g. ration on his person, sufficient for 26 hours. It consists of two
parts, one containing cocoa paste, the other concentrated extract of
beef (Pemmican).
COMPARISON.[51]
===========+==========+=======+========+=======+=======+===========
| | | |Weight| | Weight
| | | | of | Weight| of
| Without | With |Clothing.|knap- | of | ammu-
| spades. |spades.| |sacks.|rifles.|nition.[52]
-----------+----------+-------+---------+------+-------+-----------
Germany |26.706 | 27.596| 5.397 |20.919| 4.707 | 4.714 kg.
Austria[53]|26.615 | 26.443| 4.428 |22.187| 4.200 | 4.080 „
Russia |28.216 | 29.206| 4.000 |22.622| 4.576 | 3.426 „
France |26.125 | | 6.222 |19.903| 5.049 | 3.675 „
Italy |29.135[54]| | 5.993 |23.143| 4.505 | 4.320 „
Japan |26.365 | | 3.475 |22.890| 4.435 | 3.600 „
-----------+----------+-------+---------+------+-------+-----------
[51] According to _Journal of Military Scientific Societies_, 1906.
[52] Italy 162, Japan and Germany 150, the other states 120 rounds
per man.
[53] Depending on whether the man carries intrenching tools (front
rank only) cooking utensils (rear rank and a few men of the front
rank).
[54] Alpini carry 32.096 kg.
II. THE FORMATIONS.
1. THE ISSUE OF ORDERS.
Troops are set in motion by words of command, and, when these do not
suffice, by orders. (Orders give information of the situation and the
intentions of the commander, and assign tasks, but leave the recipient
free to choose the method of carrying them out). When commands are
given from a distance, time and energy may be saved by employing the
telephone and visual signals. To these may be added shouts, signs, and
the following signals: _To advance_, the leader raises the arm; to
indicate that the command is _to follow him_, he extends his raised arm
in the direction of march; _to halt_, he lowers the arm; _to deploy_,
both arms are raised laterally to the height of the shoulders, and if
necessary the direction the skirmish line is to take is subsequently
indicated with one extended arm; _to assemble_ his men, the leader
describes a circle above his head with one arm. These signals may also
be made with the sabre or rifle. Additional signals should be agreed
upon beforehand in each separate case. If a signal is made to a body of
troops in close order, it is meant, in the first place, for its leader.
(Par. 11 German I. D. R.). Other signals, such as those indicating a
change of direction of march, or a change in the battle formation, must
be specially agreed upon beforehand. Trumpet signals are only used by
troops in garrison at drills, and in barracks or billets as service
calls. To prevent troops from misunderstanding signals or from obeying
those not intended for them, all trumpet calls in battle, except
“charge,” “fix bayonet,” and “attention,” are forbidden.
During the engagement of =Trautenau= (27th June, 1866), the trumpet
signal “assemble,” given at another point, caused four Prussian
battalions to withdraw.[55] See also the effect of the signal
“assemble” after the taking of =Problus=.[56] Notice the effect of
the signal “form square” during the assault on the =Forest of Bor=
(=Königgrätz=).[57]
[55] KÜHNE, _Kritische Wanderungen_, 3, 2nd Edition, pp. 55 and 85.
[56] _Geschichte des Infanterie-Regiments Nr. 16_, p. 230.
[57] _Geschichte des Infanterie-Regiments Nr. 57_, p. 47. HÖNIG,
_Untersuchungen über die Taktik der Zukunft_, 4th Edition, p. 61.
On the morning of June 26th, 1866 (day of rest), reveille sounded
by a trumpeter was mistaken for an alarm signal. The 7th Infantry
Division assembled and the signal was repeated in two other army
corps. Two days previous another useless alarm had occurred because a
trumpeter, surprised by a number of Radetzky Hussars, had blown the
alarm signal.[58]
[58] _Geschichte des Regiments Nr. 66_, pp. 48/49.
The village of =Diletz= (action at =Gitschin=, 1866) was to be
evacuated at the sounding of the signal (Saxon) “First Brigade
withdraw.” The signal was, however, understood and carried out
by only three battalions; two battalions, which were at the time
engaged, did not hear it at all and maintained their position until
they were taken in reverse by hostile fire and forced to withdraw.[59]
[59] _Anteil des Königlich-Sächsischen Armeekorps_, p. 130.
In the crisis of the fight of the Füsilier Battalion of the 48th
Infantry and the 1st Battalion of the 52nd at =Vionville=, the signal
“assemble” was sounded and repeated by other trumpeters, further
mischief being averted by the energetic efforts of the officers who
prevented trumpeters from blowing the call and ordered them to blow
“commence firing” instead.[60]
[60] _Geschichte des Regiments Nr. 52_, p. 59.
2. THE PURPOSE OF FORMATIONS. COMPARISON BETWEEN LINE AND COLUMN.
The object of assembly formations is to unite troops, usually prior
to a movement, in a restricted space permitting an easy survey of the
entire body. Assembly formations serve also the purpose of placing
troops in readiness before starting on a march, before beginning an
action, and for moving them on the battlefield when out of reach of
hostile fire (columns). Route formations should permit an orderly,
comfortable march of the troops, as much of the available width of road
being used as possible, a space being left for orderlies and mounted
messengers, and for troops which are drawn forward. In order to permit
a prompt deployment of troops for action, it is necessary to reduce
their depth. Columns only are suitable for moving troops. The situation
existing at the moment will determine to what extent allowances may
be made for the comfort of the troops, or how far considerations of
comfort should be ignored in view of readiness for action, and to what
extent the depth of the columns should be decreased.
The formations for moving troops (to be employed in marching across
country and to be used on the battlefield) should be such as to
cause the least discomfort to the troops, should make it possible to
avoid obstacles, to utilize cover, facilitate changes of front and
direction of march, and permit a prompt deployment in any direction.
These formations are columns unless the hostile fire effect makes a
deployment into line necessary.
Battle formations should be such as to permit the employment of all
weapons (rifles, lances, sabres, and guns). This requirement is not
satisfied by columns, but only by the line. Modern fire effect excludes
every employment of close order formations under effective hostile fire
and compels the most extensive deployment.
Whether line or column is the preferable battle formation is a question
belonging to a bygone age. The battles of the British in Spain and at
Waterloo, the engagement at Groszbeeren, and the attack of the six
battalions of Borke’s Brigade (the 8th) at the Katzbach,[61] amply
demonstrate that the defeat of the Prussians at Jena was not due to
the employment of linear battle formations alone. In a fight with an
equal opponent, formed in columns, well trained and disciplined troops,
formed in line that allows of the use of all the rifles and is suitable
for shock action as well, have always carried off the victory.[62]
On the other hand, in the battles of the Empire we find columns
formed, which of necessity excluded a large part of the men from
participation in the action, but which were designed to break through
the hostile battle line by sheer momentum. At Wagram, Macdonald’s Corps
was formed with eight deployed battalions in rear of each other in a
single column, supported on the flanks by seven and eight battalions
respectively, also in column. At Austerlitz and Waterloo we find attack
formations in which from eight to twelve battalions of a division were
deployed one in rear of the other at distances of twenty paces. Column
and line must be examined with reference to their mobility, their
vulnerability and their fire and shock power.
[61] FRIEDERICH, _Herbstfeldzug, 1813_, I, p. 305.
[62] RENARD, _Considérations sur la tactique de l’infanterie en
Europe_, Paris, 1857.
RÜSTOW, _Geschichte der Infanterie_, II, p. 316.
The column possesses greater mobility and is better adapted than
the line for executing changes of front and for taking advantage of
the cover afforded by the ground. In a column steadiness and shock
power (produced by the crowding forward of the ranks in rear) and the
influence exerted by the officers, is greater than in a line.
The line is more dependent on the terrain in its movements. The
characteristics of the line are great frontal fire power, weakness of
the flanks, difficulty of quickly changing front, and the ever present
danger of being pierced. The line has been called the formation of the
bold, the column that of the weak.
The column[63] was proposed as a battle formation in France as early
as 1774 by Mesnil Durand, but did not find practical application
until the wars of the Revolution. In those wars columns were used
because the raw levies lacked the training necessary for making
movements in line. Whenever a line formation was used, battalions,
owing to the scarcity of efficient officers, resolved themselves
into disorderly skirmish lines which were exceedingly difficult to
control. The adoption of the column was, therefore, the result of
practical experience, but as a formation it could be justified on
the battlefield only so long as it remained capable of development
for the purpose of firing. The endeavor to combine the advantages
of column and line by a combination of both formations led to the
placing of columns in rear of the wings of the battalions deployed in
line. This formation was employed for the first time in the attack
made by a demi-brigade during the battle on the =Tagliamento= (1797),
and subsequently it was used at =Marengo= (attack made by Desaix’s
Division).
[63] The development of the French column tactics is splendidly
portrayed by KUHL in his work _Bonapartes erster Feldzug, 1796_, p.
46, et seq.
[Illustration]
During the first decade of the 19th Century the French leaders had
a marked _penchant_ for this formation, until it sank more and more
into insignificance in face of the deep column. (Ney at =Waterloo=,
and Macdonald at =Wagram=). Formations suggesting the above are found
even in the Prussian regulations of 1876. (Posting of sharpshooter
platoons of the companies at first in rear of the wings of the
deployed battalion, and later in rear of the outer flank platoons of
the companies).
[Illustration]
On account of the increased penetrating power of infantry projectiles,
especially at short ranges, a column will suffer greater losses than a
line; at longer ranges the curvature of the trajectory causes bullets
which pass over the first echelon to strike the second or third. On
ground falling with respect to the line of sight, lines, and on ground
rising with respect to the line of sight, columns are exposed to
greater losses when they come within the beaten zone.[64]
[64] At 1000 m., the projectile of rifle model ’98 falls 5 cm. for
each meter of the range, and at 1200 m. it falls 6 cm. per meter of
the range, so that the second and third platoons of a company in
column of platoons (7.2 m. distance between platoons) would offer a
target having a vulnerable surface 35 cm. high (¹⁄₅ the height of a
man), at 1000 m., 42 cm. high (¹⁄₄ the height of a man) at 1200 m.
3. THE COMPANY.
(a) Formation of the Company.
(Par. 83 German I. D. R.).
In the company the files are placed in two ranks according to height
from right to left. Each four files form a squad or group, and the
entire company is divided into three platoons (_Züge_). When a platoon
consists of more than three squads it is divided into two sections
(_Halbzüge_).
In the normal formation of the company, the three platoons, each in
two ranks,[65] are posted on a line in numerical order from right
to left. This formation facilitates firing and in garrison meets
the requirements of barrack life, each two squads forming a section
(_Korporalschaft_) under a non-commissioned officer. During the
campaign of 1866 Prince Frederick Charles gave permission to arrange
companies so that friends and relatives could serve together in the
same squad or section. A company formed in this fashion would, of
course, not look so well on parade as one formed regularly, the men
according to height from right to left flank, but it would without
doubt give a better account of itself in action. For details of the
formation of a company and division into fractions see pars. 82-85,
German I. D. R. The squad leaders and the two range finders in each
platoon are posted as file closers at facing distance in rear of the
rear rank of the company.
[65] The number of ranks is intimately related to the rate of
fire of the infantry weapon. During the days of slow loading, the
necessity of keeping at least a part of the rifles at all times ready
for firing led the Imperialists in the Thirty Years’ war (loading
was executed by 90 motions) to form their musketeers into sixteen
ranks, while Gustavus Adolphus was able to form his infantry into
six ranks owing to the greater loading facility of their rifles.
In the Seven Years’ war the Prussian infantry was formed in three,
that of the Austrians in four ranks, the fourth rank serving as a
reserve. The first rank fired kneeling. The British infantry was the
first to adopt the two rank formation for fire action, forming into
four ranks for shock action and frequently for warding off cavalry
attacks. Emperor Napoleon considered a third rank useless for fire
and shock action and initiated the double rank formation on the eve
of the battle of Leipzig. In 1888 the Prussian infantry--the last to
do so--gave up the three rank formation which had long since lost its
importance in battle and which was retained side by side with the
double rank formation for purposes of parade only.
[Illustration: Germany.]
The _non-commissioned officers_ are posted in the front rank, on the
flanks and in the center of the platoons in Russia, Austria, and
Switzerland. In Germany and Italy they are all posted in rear of the
line as file closers, and it is their duty to supervise the men. In
France a part of the non-commissioned officers are posted in the front
rank, the remainder as file closers. A German company of 200 men has
a front of 100 paces, or 80 m. The infantryman with field equipment
occupies a space about 75 cm. square.
The German Infantry Drill Regulations define interval (_intervalle_)
as the space between two elements on the same line, and distance as
the space between two elements in the direction of depth. An interval
is measured from the left flank of the element on the right to the
right flank of the element on the left (or vice versa); and distance
in the company and in the battalion is measured from the rear of the
element in front to the head of the element in rear (or vice versa).
If the distance between two elements is equal to their front, the
column is called an “open column”, otherwise it is called a “close
column.”
FRONT AND FACING DISTANCE.
===========+=========================+================================
| FRONT. | FACING DISTANCE.
| (Per man.) | (Distance between ranks.)
-----------+-------------------------+--------------------------------
Germany |About 0.80 m. Loose elbow|0.80 m. from back of front rank
|contact. |man to breast of rear rank man.
-----------+-------------------------+--------------------------------
Austria |About 0.75 m. Files are |120 cm. from heels of front rank
|separated by an interval |man to those of rear rank man
|of the width of a hand. |(according to German method of
| |measuring, about 0.88 m.).
-----------+-------------------------+--------------------------------
Italy |0.70 m. |0.75 m. from breast of front
| |rank man to breast of rear rank
| |man(according to German method
| |of measuring, 0.45 m.) on the
| |march, 1.20 m. (according to
| |German method of measuring,
| |0.90).
-----------+-------------------------+--------------------------------
France |0.70 m. including 0.15 m.|1 m. from back or knapsack of
|interval between files. |front rank man to breast of rear
| |rank man.
-----------+-------------------------+--------------------------------
Russia |0.70 m. Files are |Rear rank man is an arm’s length
|separated by an interval |from back of knapsack of front
|of the width of a hand. |rank man = 60-70 cm.
-----------+-------------------------+--------------------------------
England |About 0.80 m. |1.50 m. from heel of front rank
| |man to heel of rear rank man
| |(according to German method of
| |measuring, about 1.20 m.).
-----------+-------------------------+--------------------------------
Switzerland|About 0.75 m. |0.80 m. from back of front rank
| |man to breast of rear rank man.
-----------+-------------------------+--------------------------------
Belgium |About 0.80 m. |1 m. from heel of front rank man
| |to heel of rear rank man
| |(according to German method of
| |measuring, about 0.70 m.).
-----------+-------------------------+--------------------------------
Japan |About 0.85 m. |0.75 m. from back (or knapsack)
| |of front rank man to breast of
| |rear rank man.
-----------+-------------------------+--------------------------------
(b) Division of the Company Into Three or Four Platoons.