conditions make long marches by European troops impossible, or in
cases where the arrival of a few soldiers at distant points will exert
a potent influence on the actions of an opponent. As shown by our
experience in Southwest Africa, the proper field for mounted infantry
is colonial (guerrilla) warfare, especially when it is important to
prevent the outbreak of threatened disorders and to let the country
return quickly to a state of peace upon completion of the principal
actions. On European theaters of war, space is lacking for the
employment of mounted infantry, and, moreover, there are not enough
horses. In organizing mounted infantry, an auxiliary arm, which can be
of use only occasionally, has been created at the expense of infantry
and cavalry. The infantry itself should endeavor to meet all demands
for local reconnaissance and communication, without weakening the
cavalry for its principal duties, and without, in so doing, crippling
its own fighting efficiency.
For the purpose of reconnaissance, patrols or scouting detachments are
used. Their usefulness in difficult country and in enterprises against
the enemy’s flank or rear cannot be denied. In minor operations, by
advancing on side roads, they can hamper the enemy’s reconnaissance,
secure the flanks of their own force, ascertain the probable extent
of the prospective battlefield, and, finally, having gained a firm
foothold, they can become very annoying to the hostile artillery. In a
large battle the necessary elbow room for such employment is lacking.
To form special organizations of picked men, as is done in Russia, is
always of doubtful value. An organization cannot dispense with its
best men in action; it needs them as group leaders and as substitutes
for disabled non-commissioned officers. While everything goes without
a hitch, the withdrawal of good men from an organization is of little
importance; the drawbacks to this procedure become apparent, however,
when heavy losses deplete the ranks, when the line begins to waver,
when, in the absence of officers, only the example of courageous men
prevents the weak-kneed from running away. Our regulations properly
appreciate the importance of psychological impressions during
critical combat situations; they state: “The man who feels his
courage and coolness going, in the excitement of battle, should look
toward his officers. Should they have fallen, he will find plenty of
non-commissioned officers and brave privates whose example will revive
his courage.” (Par. 268 German I. D. R.). If it becomes necessary to
despatch a stronger infantry force on a mission of minor importance, it
will usually be better to detail an entire company than to improvise
a detachment whose leader would know his men only imperfectly. From
the standpoint of training, scouting detachments have an entirely
different value. They give young infantry officers, who are tied to
a command, an opportunity to develop self-confidence, decision, and
tactical judgment; to cope with hardships and difficulties on their
own responsibility. In this manner characteristics may be developed in
the young officers which will be of benefit to them in a large battle.
It is obvious that scouts should be assigned bicycles to give them the
mobility which infantry lacks.
If the roads are good, cyclists[28] will frequently be able to take
the place of cavalry in messenger service. In this case they remain
with their organizations and perform the same duties as the other
soldiers. The employment of cyclists is in accord with the principle
that in war every resource the country offers for warfare should be
utilized. The advantage of the use of cyclists for messenger service
and their value to the command generally is obvious; they are, in
addition, adapted for reconnaissance work and for reinforcing the
divisional cavalry. Cyclists, however, do not lend themselves to the
formation of separate organizations for battle purposes (each division
has 110 cyclists), for a large number of picked men would thereby be
withdrawn from the ranks of the troops engaged. An improvised cyclist
detachment would, in addition, accomplish very little, as it would
lack the thorough peace training requisite for cohesive action as an
organization. If the opinion is entertained that cyclist detachments
could furnish substantial aid to the cavalry[29] in advance of the
army, that they could be employed profitably in the supply districts
and in minor operations, and, finally, if the available material in
the country is to be utilized, nothing remains but to proceed to
the creation of cyclist companies in time of peace. The material
necessary for repairs and for ammunition supply can only be entrusted
to permanent organizations. The advantages of cyclists are their great
mobility,[30] their prompt readiness for firing, and, above all else,
the noiselessness of their movements. Their weakness lies in their
dependence upon a complicated machine, in the comparatively large road
space taken up by them on the march (100 cyclists in column of twos
take up about 250 to 300 m. road space), and in their dependence on the
terrain. The last mentioned drawback can be remedied apparently only
by the adoption of a folding wheel, but, since the cyclist’s equipment
cannot be secured on the machine, it is better in difficult country to
push the wheels or to leave them behind under guard when necessary.
[28] Pars. 78, 82, 86, 99, 101, 132, 151, 152, 194 and 200, GERMAN
F. S. R.
[29] By occupying positions so as to give the cavalry freedom of
action; by advancing ahead of the reconnoitering cavalry for the
purpose of re-establishing contact with the enemy, of forestalling
him in occupying important points, or of outflanking him: finally, by
coöperating with cavalry in cavalry combats, in covering a retreat,
in outpost duty, and during the execution of technical work.
[30] According to the _Italian Regulations of 1904_, the rate of
march of cyclists is as follows: slow rate 8 km., maneuvering rate,
10-12 km., road speed, 12-17 km., accelerated rate of march, up to 20
km. per hour. Cyclists can ride up to 80 km., without long rests. For
riding 90-100 km., from 5 to 6 hours are required.
In Italy, France, and England more has been done towards the
formation of cyclist detachments than elsewhere. In Italy each
_Bersaglieri_ Regiment has one company of cyclists, which is to be
employed in supporting a cavalry brigade. Cyclists have accomplished
a good deal in surmounting difficulties of the terrain. In England
the development of cyclist bodies is left mostly to the volunteers
and their exercises have demonstrated that such units are capable of
expanding in a brief space of time.
In France the cyclist movement is led by Major Gerard, who rendered
valuable service during a short maneuver of the cavalry division
(1905). Opinions are as yet divided as to the advisability of forming
cyclist battalions. Both Major Gerard and General Langlois are
advocates of their employment. General Langlois desires to oppose the
brutal German battle tactics with rapid maneuvers of mobile reserves
which he would form of cyclist battalions, artillery, and cavalry.
According to the Cyclist Regulations dated September 10th, 1904, the
cyclist company is to be looked upon as infantry, which is capable of
moving at great speed, but is tied to the network of roads. The cyclist
companies are principally intended for defensive action, holding
an important point until the arrival of infantry. They are also to
serve as support for cavalry and artillery, but are not adapted for
reconnaissance work. Since it is difficult for them to secure their
flanks on the march, they are to be used mainly in combination with
other arms.
In winter campaigns, when wheel and horse cannot be used, recourse is
had to the Canadian snowshoe (a web shoe) or to the Norwegian snowshoe
or ski (skee). In France, Italy, Austria,[31] Norway, Sweden, and
Switzerland marching on snowshoes is assiduously practiced, while in
Germany the troops have so far done little in this line. The ski is,
however, coming more and more into vogue among the rural population of
the German mountains.
[31] One of the most remarkable snowshoe marches ever recorded is
without doubt that made by the ski detachment of the 4th Regiment
of Tirolese Kaiser-Jägers (Austria) stationed in Salzburg. In
June, 1905, this detachment, consisting of 4 officers, 15 men and
4 guides, all with field equipment, marched around the base of the
“Grosz Glockner,” via Mittersil, Felber-Tauern (elev. 2,500 m.),
Windisch-Matrey, Lienz, Dolsack, Hochtor (elev. 2,570 m.), into the
Fuscher valley, despite violent cyclonic snow storms, a journey
which, even in mid-summer, can only be undertaken by experienced
tourists. In several of these detachments experiments were made with
white covers for uniform and equipment, which enabled individual men
and patrols to approach unseen to within 200 to 300 m. of an opponent.
Deep snow is an effective obstacle for troops not equipped with
snowshoes. This is not entirely due to the fact that the march is
retarded, but to the unusual difficulties attending the service of
security. Covering bodies are stalled. Besides, the difficulties of
maintaining communication with neighboring detachments are increased
when valleys or abrupt declivities intervene between the forces. The
only remedy in such cases is to employ the snowshoe, upon which one
can move rapidly without regard to roads, and up or down hill without
difficulty. Patrols can be despatched to adequate distances from the
marching body on skis alone. Ski-runners can perform the same duty
which cavalry performs on the plain; for instance, they can occupy
points in advance which are of importance to us, dispute crossings
with the enemy, and hold him at bay. Ski detachments alone are able
to reconnoiter the condition of roads and test the carrying power of
snow in advance of a command, and they alone can furnish the connecting
links in an extended outpost position, because they alone are able to
move off the roads. During halts they furnish guards; in action they
easily turn the enemy’s flanks, reconnoiter his weak points as well as
the position of his reserves; and after the fight they maintain contact
with him as patrols. They can hasten forward in advance of a command
and prepare cantonments and bivouacs, and attend to the cooking.
The great depth of a detachment of ski-runners is a disadvantage. Each
ski-runner takes up 2.20 m., and in addition a distance of 1 m. must
be left between men. Besides, as the men are not all equally skilled
in using skis, the road space taken up by a detachment of runners is
increased considerably. This necessitates the employment of small
detachments not exceeding 100 men. The proper sphere of ski-runners is
patrol duty. In winter campaigns ski-runners are a necessary substitute
for cavalry. In Scandinavia reconnaissance detachments are composed
of ski-runners and cavalry, the horses pulling the runners. This
permits a very rapid movement over snow-covered ground and may also be
employed where the use of the much slower sled is impracticable owing
to the nature of the terrain. Much practice is undoubtedly necessary
to acquire proficiency in this sport[32], for it surely cannot be
easy to preserve an upright position on skis behind a galloping horse,
while at the same time overcoming all the difficulties of the ground.
When troopers cannot continue to perform reconnaissance work, they
are replaced by snowshoe or ski-runners. The snowshoe performances in
France, since the establishment by War Department order of a training
school in Briançon, are worthy of note. According to the experiences
gained at that institution, a period of four weeks is ample for
training men for extended mountain marches. On January 18th, 1904, a
body of men on snowshoes covered a distance of 80 km., including a
climb of 1,700 m., in 20 hours (4 hours’ rest included).
[32] During the Norse winter sports of 1905, the winner covered a
distance of 67 km. in 2³⁄₄ hours.
2. THE TACTICAL UNIT.
By the term tactical unit is meant the smallest element of a body of
troops capable of sustaining an action independently, of performing
a simple combat task, and the elements of which (man and horse) are
personally known to the leader. Moreover, the tactical unit should be
small enough to allow of its being controlled by the voice of a single
leader. This requirement limits the battle front of the tactical unit
to about 100 m., which corresponds approximately to the front of a
troop[33] (_Eskadron_) in line, or to that of a battery of six pieces.
The frontage of the tactical unit of cavalry might with advantage be
decreased, while that of artillery, on account of its stability in
action, might be extended, were it not for the fact that the increase
in the quantity of matériel and in the number of horses involved in
such extension would make the supervision of the unit too difficult
for a single person. In nearly all large armies the strength of a
troop (_Eskadron_) of cavalry and of a field battery is approximately
150 horses.[34] This corresponds approximately to what the farmer
of northern Germany considers suitable to keep together in one
establishment. If the estate is larger, requiring more than 150 men and
horses, subsidiary farms[35] are established.
[33] _Eskadron_ has been rendered by “troop” in this work. The
German _Eskadron_ consists of 4-5 officers, 138-144 men, and 135-139
horses. It is the smallest administrative unit of the German cavalry
and is divided into four Züge (platoons). _Translator._
[34] GENERAL MARMONT, in his _Esprit des Institutions Militaires_,
p. 41, states that experience has shown that the most suitable
strength for a troop is 48 files, divided into four platoons; but, he
recommends that platoons should consist of 16-18 files in order to
maintain this strength throughout a campaign.
[35] _Vorwerke._
While column tactics were in vogue, the above mentioned requirements of
a tactical unit were completely fulfilled by the battalion, but this is
no longer the case. It is quite impossible for one voice to control the
movements of a battalion in action; this is scarcely possible in case
of a company. On the other hand, a company is too weak to carry out an
independent mission in action. Nothing less than a battalion possesses
the requisite fighting power, strength, and capacity for subdivision,
to sustain an action independently, to solve minor problems of combat,
and to remain a body full of fighting efficiency even after sustaining
serious losses such as are unavoidable in every modern infantry action.
To attempt a further definition of the term “tactical unit” would be of
little value. General von Scherff in a logical manner[36] constructs
a “troop unit”[37] from “fighting groups”[38] (squad of infantry or
cavalry, or one gun), several of which form a “fighting unit”[39]
(company, troop or battery), “possessing the requisite power to carry
out a specific task,” and placed under the command of a responsible
leader. “The definition of a fighting unit includes, on principle,
its indivisibility in action. Dispersion is a crime, division at
least an evil.” The “combat unit”[40] consists of a number of fighting
units. “The commander of the combat unit (infantry battalion, cavalry
regiment, or artillery battalion) should be able to lead it as a
compact entity, and should have the power of employing its component
parts independently for combined action against some point.” General
von Scherff has found imitators in Austria, where the term body of
troops (_Truppenkörper_) is applied to an organization having the
necessary means for feeding, clothing, and equipping the men, and which
is composed of a number of “basic units.”[41] Such “basic units” as
can be supervised, handled, and controlled directly by one leader, who
knows the individual men thereof and their characteristics, are the
troop (_Eskadron_), battery, and company. Von Boguslawski[42] applies
the term “fighting unit” to organizations from the company (troop) to
the brigade, which act in accordance with the tactics of their arm,
supported by the other arms, in the sphere assigned to them by orders
or by circumstances. Divisions, which, by the coöperation of the three
arms, are capable of independent employment on the march and in action,
he calls “combat units.” According to Boguslawski, army corps are
“battle units,”[43] with which the commander reckons in battle, and
which are strong enough to meet an energetic attack or to execute one
themselves.
[36] _Von der Kriegführung_, p. 49.
[37] _Truppeneinheit._
[38] _Kampfgruppen._
[39] _Kampfeinheit._
[40] _Gefechtseinheit._
[41] _Schlachteneinheiten._
[42] _Entwickelung der Taktik_, III, p. 125.
[43] _Grundeinheiten._
3. ORGANIZATION.
The basic unit of infantry is the company, from 200 to 250 men strong
in the larger armies. It seems hardly practicable to exceed a strength
of 150 men, as this is about the greatest number in which a relation
based upon personal influence of the leader on his subordinates can
still be obtained. In armies in which companies are composed of more
than 200 men, the numbers in excess of this figure may be regarded as a
margin of safety, intended to maintain the company at a strength of 200
rifles after the first casualties of a campaign, produced by marching,
detached service and battle losses. In view of the losses, which
frequently increase with extraordinary rapidity in modern battles, it
appears undesirable to fix a lower figure than that above mentioned,
as the companies would otherwise lose their independence and could no
longer be considered basic units.
===========+=========+===================================++
| | ||
| | ||
| | ||
| | ||
| | (a) PEACE STRENGTH. ||
|Company. +-----+--+------+------+------+-----++
| | | | | |Offi- | ||
| | |N.| | |cers’ |Hosp.||
| |Offi-|C.|Musi- |Pri- |Ser- |Corps||
| |cers.|O.|cians.|vates.|vants.|Men. ||
-----------+---------+-----+--+-------+-----+------+-----++
~=GERMANY=~|Minimum | 4 |15| 4 | 128 | ... | ... ||
|Maximum | 5 |17| 4 | 142 | ... | ... ||
-----------+---------+-----+--+-------+-----+------+-----++
~=AUSTRIA=~|Minimum | 4 |11| 2 | 76 | 4 | ... ||
|Maximum | 4 |14| 2 | 109 | 4 | ... ||
-----------+---------+-----+--+-------+-----+------+-----++
~=ITALY=~ |Infantry,| | | | | | ||
|Bersa- | | | | | | ||
|glieri | 3 |13| ... | 87 | ... | ... ||
| | | | |Musicians (trum- ||
| | | | |peters only) and ||
| | | | |sappers armed with||
| | | | |rifle. ||
|Alpini | 4 |19| ... | 121| ... | ... ||
-----------+---------+-----+--+-------+-----+------+-----++
~=FRANCE=~ |Ordinary | 3 |15| 2 | 108| ... | ... ||
|Maximum | 3 |15| 2 | 158| ... | ... ||
|Chasseurs| 3 |21| 2 | 125| ... | ... ||
| | | | | and| | ||
| | ...|..| ...| 150| ... | ... ||
-----------+---------+-----+--+-------+-----+------+-----++
~=RUSSIA=~ |Approxi- | | | | | | ||
|mately | 3 | 7| ...| 96 | 4 | ... ||
| | | | | | [44] | ||
-----------+---------+-----+--+-------+-----+------+-----++
===========+=========++=========================================++
| || ||
| || ||
| || ||
| || ||
| || (b) WAR STRENGTH. ||
|Company. ++-----+--+------+------+------+-----+-----++
| || | | | | |Lit- | ||
| || |N.| | |Train |ter |Hosp.||
| ||Offi-|C.|Musi- |Pri- |Sol- |Bear-|Corps||
| ||cers.|O.|cians.|vates.|diers.|ers. |Men. ||
-----------+---------++-----+--+------+------+------+-----+-----++
~=GERMANY=~|Minimum || 5 |20| 4 | 226 | 4 | 4 | 1 ||
|Maximum || ... |..| ... | ... | ... | ... | ... ||
-----------+---------++-----+--+------+------+------+-----+-----++
~=AUSTRIA=~|Minimum || 4 |19| 4 | 195 | ... | 4 | ... ||
|Maximum || ... |..| ... | 4 Pio- |4 Officers’||
| || | | | neers. | servants. ||
-----------+---------++-----+--+------+------+------+-----+-----++
~=ITALY=~ |Infantry,|| | | | | | | ||
|Bersa- || | | | | | | ||
|glieri || 5 |16| ... | 180 | ... | ... | ... ||
| ||Musicians (trumpeters only) and sappers ||
| || armed with rifle. ||
|Alpini || ... |..| ... | ... | ... | ... | ... ||
-----------+---------++-----+--+------+-------+-----+-----+-----++
~=FRANCE=~ |Ordinary || 4 |28| 4 | 218 | ... | 2 | 1 ||
|Maximum || ... |..| ... | ... | ... | ... | ... ||
|Chasseurs|| ... |..| ... | ... | ... | ... | ... ||
| || | | | | | | ||
| || ... |..| ... | ... | ... | ... | ... ||
-----------+---------++-----+--+------+-------+-----+-----+-----++
~=RUSSIA=~ |Approxi- || | | | | non-combatants. ||
|mately || 4 |22| ... | 200 | ... | 20 |... ||
| || | | | | | | ||
-----------+---------++-----+--+------+-------+-----+-----+-----++
===========+=========++===============
| ||Difference
| ||between
| ||minimum peace
| ||strength and
| ||war strength.
|Company. ++-----+--+------
| || | |
| || |N.|
| ||Offi-|C.|Pri-
| ||cers.|O.|vates.
-----------+---------++-----+--+------
~=GERMANY=~|Minimum || 1 | 5| 103
|Maximum || ... | | ...
-----------+---------++-----+--+------
~=AUSTRIA=~|Minimum || ... | 5| 132
|Maximum || 4 Officers’
| || servants.
-----------+---------++-----+--+------
~=ITALY=~ |Infantry,|| | |
|Bersa- || | |
|glieri || 2 | 3| 93
| ||Musicians (trum-
| ||peters only) and
| ||sappers armed
| ||with rifle.
|Alpini || ... |..| ...
-----------+---------++-----+--+------
~=FRANCE=~ |Ordinary || 1 |18| 110
|Maximum || ... | | ...
|Chasseurs|| ... | | ...
| || | |
| || ... | | ...
-----------+---------++-----+--+------
~=RUSSIA=~ |Approxi- || | |
|mately || 1 |15| 104
| || | |
-----------+---------++-----+--+------
[44] In addition, five non-combatants.
After the heavy losses at =St. Privat=, two companies were combined
into one for tactical purposes in some regiments of the Guard
Corps. The administration of the consolidated companies had to
remain distinct on account of the preparation of casualty lists,
recommendations for promotion and decorations. On the day of the
battle of =Orleans=, the strength of the German battalions varied
from 459 men in the 1st Bavarian Army Corps to 747 men in the 40th
Infantry Brigade. During the pursuit after the battle of =Le Mans=,
the strength of the 56th Füsilier-Battalion was even reduced to 280
men.
The actual training of troops must be completed in the company. Combat
by an independent company is the exception; combat by battalion the
rule. By the consolidation of four companies into one unit, the
battalion, consisting of 800-1,000 rifles, is formed. The French
Chasseur battalions are the only ones that consist of six companies,
because their proposed independent employment, for instance, in
mountain warfare, makes it more often necessary to detach small units
than is the case in operations on more favorable terrain.
As, in the course of time, the independence of companies in action
developed, and as the combat of the battalion as an entity was
transformed into combined action of the four companies, the strength
of the company increased from 120 to 250 rifles while the number of
companies in a battalion diminished. The battalion of Frederick the
Great was divided for administrative purposes into five companies
and for tactical purposes into eight _pelotons_. The battalion of
the first empire consisted of six _Füsilier_ and two _Voltigeur_
companies, and the Austrian battalion, until the reorganization after
1866, consisted of six companies of which each two formed a division.
Until 1866 the six company battalion predominated in the infantry of
all European armies (France, Italy, Austria, and the minor German
states), but early in the seventies most of the states adopted the
four company battalion, Russia being the last to do this (four line
and one sharpshooter company). In the regulations of 1812, Prussia
had adopted the four company battalion. The independent employment
of the four united sharpshooter platoons of a battalion was the
exception even during the campaign of 1866. At present only the
British battalion consists of eight companies, which cannot, however,
be said to possess a capacity for independent action on account of
their small size.