lessons of a certain period. They illustrate the tactical condition
which becomes perceptible at the moment of a certain development of
the fighting tools as represented by man and weapons. Man, in his
peculiarities, in his weaknesses, is the constant. He constitutes the
psychological element, inseparable from the science of combat, and
as such is the definitely given magnitude; the effect of weapons,
however, appears always as the variable factor. New weapons, therefore,
necessitate new tactics.
It will be observed also “that changes of tactics have not only taken
place _after_ changes in weapons, which necessarily is the case, but
that the interval between such changes has been unduly long. This
doubtless arises from the fact that an improvement of weapons is due to
the energy of one or two men, while changes in tactics have to overcome
the inertia of a conservative class; but it is a great evil. It can be
remedied only by a candid recognition of each change.”[22] The history
of the tactics of the 19th Century furnishes more than one instructive
example of the magnitude of such “obstinate conservatism.”
[22] MAHAN, _The Influence of Sea Power upon History_, pp. 9 and 10.
It is a marked peculiarity of manuals of instruction, that, no
matter with what far-sightedness such regulations may have been
originally compiled, they become antiquated in a comparatively short
time. Napoleon estimated this period at ten years. Frequent changes
are certainly not desirable, if tactical development is not to be
interfered with and if inconveniences are to be avoided in organizing
our mobile army from our peace organizations, Reservists, and Landwehr.
On the other hand, the regulations must keep abreast of requirements
if the conditions to which they owe their existence have changed. In
his “Military Fantasies” the Prince de Ligne wrote in 1783: “An article
which should be added to all drill regulations, and which, I know not
why, is omitted, is: ‘Act sometimes contrary to the regulations.’
It is just as necessary to teach that one must act contrary to the
regulations, as to teach the disorder of troops as it will occur in
action.”
It is always dangerous to be behind the times, as troops thereby
relinquish a superiority previously possessed over others, which
knowledge they must later purchase, with streams of blood, in the face
of hostile bullets. Of what avail, to the Austrians in 1866, to the
Russians in 1877, were all their valiant assaults, made with tactical
formations that had outlived their usefulness in the face of newer
weapons, although made with the firm determination to conquer?
The self-sacrificing spirit and firmly rooted discipline of the
troops found an insurmountable obstacle in the rapid fire of unshaken
infantry. The war experiences of our regiments show that bullets
quickly write a new tactics, demolish superannuated formations and
create new ones. But at what a sacrifice![23] In the Franco-German
war, superior leadership and a better artillery permitted us to pay
this price for the lesson. But how an army fares when it lacks these
auxiliaries is shown by the British experiences in South Africa. The
initial failure of accustomed tactical formations causes a dread of the
frontal attack and finally leads some tacticians to deny entirely even
the feasibility of such an attack. In peace training, therefore, set
forms are of less importance; stress should be laid on developing the
faculty of adaptation to changing conditions of combat and terrain.
[23] It is frequently customary on the outbreak of a war to issue
“Instructions for campaign,” in order to prepare troops, trained
according to superannuated regulations, for action on a strange
theater of war. It is desirable to disseminate the first experiences
gained in action to all parts of the army. We failed to do this in
1870, and all organizations were therefore compelled to gain this
experience for themselves. Even as late as the 18th of August, 1870,
the Füsilier Battalion of the 85th Infantry advanced in double
column formed on the center, although the campaign in Bohemia had
already demonstrated that this formation was out of date. See MOLTKE,
_Feldzug von 1859_, p. 65.
Further development and justification of the principles of the drill
regulations, and the modification of those principles under certain
assumptions, are reserved to the science of tactics. Drill regulations
should not be textbooks of tactics, but, on the other hand, a textbook
of tactics should deal with formations only in so far as that is
necessary to ensure a clear comprehension of the fundamental principles.
“Regulations and the science of combat are in a certain sense very
different subjects. The regulations are law, authority--no doubt can
be entertained on this point; but that also invests them with the
character of something fixed, at least for a certain space of time.
They cannot be kept up to date so as to meet quickly enough the rapidly
changing and ever growing demands of modern combat: that would indeed
be an unfair requirement, impossible of realization. Here must enter
the science of combat, which should be independent in every direction,
which should know no fixed rules, and which should point to no other
authority than that of truth and reality. It is not the province of
the science of combat, like that of regulations, to retain that which
is in keeping with prevailing views and forms; it must take into
consideration the fleeting theory and practice, ever developing and
changing anew.”[24]
[24] KEIM, _Gegenwärtiger Stand der Gefechtslehre_, p. 1.
A positive system of tactics will therefore be based upon one’s own
drill regulations, from the standpoint of which it will investigate
and compare the principles of the service manuals of the different
powers, and finally develop the science still further by the aid of
experience gained from military history and the knowledge of the
effect of weapons. While these are the ever changing but nevertheless
measurable factors of tactical reflection, a third, perhaps the most
important factor, must be added, viz., that the leader must reckon
with the action of men frequently exposed to the influence of great
exertions and great mental agitation. _A doctrine of tactics which does
not properly appreciate the psychological element stagnates in lifeless
pedantry._
THE FORMAL TACTICS OF INFANTRY.
I. ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT.
1. THE IMPORTANCE AND EMPLOYMENT OF INFANTRY.
In all modern armies infantry is, in virtue of its numbers and
importance, the principal arm. Since the introduction of firearms,
infantry has gradually increased in importance and numbers as compared
with the other arms.
In the Thirty Years’ war, the proportion of cavalry to infantry was
as 1:1, or 1:2, and frequently the cavalry even predominated. In
the Swedish army one gun per 1,000 men was considered sufficient.
During the era of linear tactics in the 18th Century the proportion
between the two principal arms had become as 1:2 and 1:3; in the
Napoleonic wars as 1:6 and 1:8. The number of guns was increased to 4
per 1,000 men. In the course of a campaign the ratio changes to the
disadvantage of infantry. At the outbreak of the war of 1870-71, the
relative proportions of the three arms in the German IInd Army were
as follows: cavalry to infantry as 1:8; and 3.4 guns per 1,000 men.
The proportion between the two principal arms in the IIIrd Army Corps
of the German army, at the outbreak of the Franco-German war, was as
1:18.8; on the first day of the battle of Le Mans it was as 1:16.6;
at the opening of the campaign there were 4.6 guns per 1,000 men, at
the close of the campaign 5.8 guns per 1,000 men. This was still more
marked in the Ist Bavarian Army Corps, which, on October 31st, had
5.8 guns and on December 9th even 11.1 guns per 1,000 men. At present
Germany has approximately 6, and France 3.63 guns per 1,000 infantry.
The manner in which infantry fights imprints its distinguishing mark
on the tactics of an entire period; thus, according to the combat
formations of infantry, we may speak of a period of “linear,” “column,”
and “extended order” tactics. Infantry can be equipped more cheaply and
trained more quickly than the other arms. In July, 1870, the French
army consisted of 116 infantry regiments and 21 rifle battalions,
but 38 rifle battalions were raised in addition to a large number of
regiments of _gardes mobiles_ and volunteers.
Infantry is as well adapted for combat with firearms as for combat
with the bayonet, for attack as for defense, for action in close as in
extended order. It can fight on any terrain which is at all passable,
and is more independent of weather and seasons than the other arms; it
surpasses the other arms in endurance, a man, on account of his will
power, bearing privations and exertions better than a horse. On the
other hand, the losses suffered by foot troops in action and through
exertions on the march are greater than those of the mounted arms.[25]
[25] Percentages of cases of sickness in the campaign 1870/71:
Infantry: 69.8; Field Officers: 13.26; Captains: 10.19;
Lieutenants: 3.85%
Artillery: 57.7; „ „ 4.04; „ 4.84;
Lieutenants: 4.52„
Cavalry: 37.5; „ „ 5.61; „ 2.29;
Lieutenants: 3.24„
The rate of march of infantry is so slow that in reconnaissance it
can only by great exertions attain results which a small force of
cavalry would obtain without appreciable effort. Infantry acting alone
therefore unquestionably requires the assignment of mounted men for
reconnaissance and messenger duty. As regards reconnaissance, infantry
is like a man walking in the dark, who can guard against collisions
only by stretching out his hand and feeling his way.
The lack of artillery support will also make itself felt when infantry
encounters fire at ranges at which it is defenseless, owing to the
limited range of its rifle. Infantry cannot dispense with artillery
when it has to attack localities or fortified points in villages.
The infantry of the 19th Century fell heir to the distinction made
in the 18th Century between heavy infantry (infantry of the line)
and light infantry, the latter being employed only in skirmish duty
and in the service of security. In the 18th Century the expensive
method of recruiting by means of bounties made it necessary to avoid
using troops in indecisive, costly fire actions, and to preserve the
expensive personnel for decisive shock action _en masse_. Skirmishing
was left to volunteer battalions, to Jägers, and to Füsiliers. In
Prussia the number of Füsilier battalions was increased to 24 at the
close of the 18th Century. Napoleon I. was, on principle, opposed
to the theory of light infantry. He demanded but one species of
infantry, “a good infantry.” In spite of this, however, he became the
originator of an _élite_ infantry, when, for reasons of discipline, he
created one _voltigeur_ and one _grenadier_ company in each battalion.
While battalion tactics predominated, _i.e._, until the close of the
campaign of 1866, this arrangement was imitated in most states. At
the time of the Russo-Turkish war, Russia still had in each battalion
a fifth company, one of sharpshooters, which, though not recruited
at the expense of the other companies, was formed of better material
and received special training in extended order fighting. Following
the example set by Austria, Prussia, in 1812, designated the third
rank principally for extended order fighting, by forming it into a
third platoon in each company when in action. This was called the
sharpshooters’ platoon and was composed of the best shots and the
most skillful men of the company. As late as the campaign of 1866
there were instances of the employment of the combined sharpshooter
platoons of a battalion. Here we have an actual _élite_ force assembled
in provisional organizations, not at the expense of the rest of the
troops, however.
The system of column tactics, which required that every company should
be equally skilled in extended order fighting, led to the abolishment
of _élite_ companies. The Prussian _élite_, consisting of the platoons
formed from the third rank, although not always compatible with the
employment of company columns, was not abolished until 1876. The
experience of the Franco-German war had shown that, in view of the
extensive use of extended order formations, an independent employment
of single platoons was out of the question, as in the course of an
action the firing line absorbs not only entire companies, but regiments
and brigades; and, moreover, that every platoon, as a unit for fire
action, must possess those elements which will carry it forward even
after its leader has fallen.
Napoleon formed his Guards by selecting men and officers from the
entire army for use as a battle reserve. By granting them privileges
and by loading them with distinctions, he attached them to his person,
and they assumed the character of household troops of a dynasty.
The Prussian and Russian Guards are differently constituted. They are
not, strictly speaking, _corps d’élite_, for they are not selected
from the ranks of the army. While it is true that the Prussian Guard
receives a better class of recruits and the composition of its corps
of officers and the selection of its commanders guarantee conspicuous
results, its principal superiority lies in the fact that it serves
constantly under the eye of the emperor.
Since the introduction of accurate breechloading weapons, and their
use by all infantry, Jägers and riflemen have no tactical excuse for
existing, except where they are specially trained in mountain warfare
(_Chasseurs alpins_, _Alpini_)[26], or where they are intended to serve
as a support for cavalry divisions. (France). While Jäger-battalions
are at present employed like the rest of the infantry, they are
retained by us as such because of tradition and for reasons of
organization (they are recruited from forestry personnel), and an
attempt is made in their tactical employment to turn their excellent
marksmanship and skill in the use of ground to good account whenever
possible. Jägers will be employed in defense, preferably for holding
important points, and for combat and service of security on difficult
terrain. Military experience has shown, however, that in actual war it
was seldom possible to take advantage of these special characteristics;
that in most cases the Jägers were used as other infantry, and that
infantry units fighting shoulder to shoulder with Jägers accomplished
as good results as the latter. Since the war of 1866 the demand for
special employment of Jägers has ceased. The brief course of the
campaign of 1866, in which our infantry acted mostly on the offensive,
gave the Jägers an opportunity for profitable employment only where,
contrary to accepted notions, they fought side by side with the rest of
the infantry.[27]
[26] See _Über Gebirgstruppen_, VI, p. 273, and also
_Schweizerische Monatsschrift für Offiziere aller Waffen_, 1907, May
to July.
V. GRAEVENITZ, _Beiheft zum Militär-Wochenblatt_, 1903.
[27] The 6th Jäger-Battalion on July 3rd at Sendrasitz; the 4th
Jäger-Battalion at Podol; the 5th at Skalitz; the Jägers of the
Guard at Lipa; or where during an action a reverse threw us on the
defensive (1st Jäger-Battalion at Trautenau, and also at Rosberitz).
The superior commanders, in attempting to assign them a special role,
frequently employed them unprofitably in taking up rallying positions
(3rd, 7th, and 8th Jäger-Battalions on July 3rd), sometimes even to
escort baggage (3rd and 4th Companies of the Jägers of the Guard at
Soor; and the 1st and 4th Companies of the 5th Jäger-Battalion at
Schweinschädel); or they distributed them along the whole front for
the purpose of conducting extended order fighting. When they were
thus distributed among infantry organizations their efforts merged
with those of the infantry.
For example, at Königgrätz half companies of Jägers were posted
on both flanks of the Guard Infantry Division, and the 2nd
Jäger-Battalion was on this day distributed by companies along the
front of the entire division.
V. MOLTKE, _Kritische Aufsätze zur Geschichte des Feldzuges von
1866_.
KUNZ, _Die Tätigkeit der deutschen Jäger-Bataillone im Kriege
1870/71_. On page 169, et seq., a number of excellent examples are
recorded (for instance: 5th Prussian Jäger-Battalion in the actions
on November 29th and 30th, 1870, and on January 19th, 1871, in siege
positions in front of Paris).
Mountain warfare presents such difficult problems to troops,
requires a sum total of endurance, energy and intelligence, physical
qualifications and special familiarity, that neither every recruit nor
every unit of the army will quite fulfill all its demands, although
the experience of Suworov, during his campaign in the Alps, apparently
contradicts this statement. Many disadvantages can be neutralized by
peace training and discipline, of course, but training alone will not
suffice. For overcoming the difficulties peculiar to mountain warfare,
a suitable equipment permitting free movement, and at the same time
ensuring the comfort of the men while at rest, is necessary. The
lack of such mountain equipment is keenly felt even during short
exercises lasting only a few days. Even Switzerland plans at present
the formation of three mountain brigades. Austria already has special
mountain brigades assembled for mountain warfare in its Kaiser-Jäger,
Rural Riflemen, and also in the troops of Bosnia and Dalmatia. The
Italian _Alpini_ (consisting of 22 battalions in time of peace, to
which militia companies are attached on mobilization, and which have
in addition a reserve of 22 territorial companies) form a selected
corps which is doubtless capable of accomplishing excellent results.
The Italians propose to attach machine guns to these units. It is
worthy of note that these troops carry explosives. In France the troops
garrisoned in the Alpine districts are divided into thirteen groups,
each consisting of one battalion, one mountain battery, one engineer
company, and machine guns.
As modern fire effect makes it impossible for mounted officers to
direct the firing line, it was natural to use the more improved means
of communication, the telephone and telegraph, in addition to the
visual signals employed by the navy.
The improvements made in weapons have had a further influence on the
transformation of the infantry. Even a small force of infantry can with
its magazine fire inflict annihilating losses in a very short time on
closed bodies offering favorable targets, especially when this fire is
delivered from a flanking position. This requires, on the one hand,
that greater attention be paid during combat to local reconnaissance,
which can be but imperfectly made by mounted officers with the troops,
and, on the other hand, it necessitates the employment of smaller
independent detachments for our own security and for harassing the
enemy. Intimately connected herewith is the introduction of machine
guns, possessing great mobility, which enables them to take advantage
of rapidly passing moments for pouring a heavy fire on the enemy and
also for reinforcing the independent cavalry in advance of the army.
In England it was decided to form mounted infantry charged with the
additional duty of augmenting the fire of a cavalry division, and
of furnishing the commander-in-chief with a reserve possessing the
requisite mobility to permit its being thrown to any threatened point
of the long battle lines of today. But of what importance is the fire
of a single battalion in the large armies of the present day? The
principal drawback to the employment of mounted infantry is, however,
that, when mounted, it is defenseless against cavalry, and that, while
in motion, it really needs a supporting force. In the Boer war the
mounted infantry grew finally to a strength of 50,000 men. As it was
not confronted by cavalry, it made good during the execution of wide
turning movements, which Lord Roberts employed with success for the
purpose of striking the flank of the Boers, who always rapidly extended
their lines. In spite of these good services, it could not be denied
that mounted infantry had many faults. The men knew nothing of the care
of their mounts, as is evidenced by the large percentage of horses
which became unserviceable. As mounted infantry units were improvised
bodies, they lacked the requisite training in marching and tactical
employment. After the war had lasted for some time, the mounted
infantrymen, however, had completely forgotten their infantry character
and deported themselves like cavalrymen, even if only as poor ones.
Thus, we find toward the close of the campaign numerous attacks made by
mounted infantry on the British side, as, strange to relate, also on
that of the Boers.
In this experiment of creating mounted infantry, all those drawbacks
which had been learned for centuries were exemplified. As an
improvisation, mounted infantry disturbs the cohesion of organizations;
if permanently organized, it must become cavalry, just as the dragoons
became cavalry: for mounted infantry is neither flesh, fish, nor fowl
and cannot endure.
The British Drill Regulations (1904) for mounted infantry lay down the
following principles for its employment:
In the practical employment of mounted infantry, sight must not be
lost of the fact that this arm is drilled and trained as infantry. On
account of its greater mobility, it should be able to cover greater
distances, and, in addition, be capable of executing wider turning
movements than infantry. As a rule, mounted infantry is to be used in
the following cases:
(a) It is to perform the service of security in the immediate front
of infantry divisions in conjunction with cavalry and the horse
batteries assigned to the latter, in addition to augmenting the
fire of the cavalry. It is further to occupy, as expeditiously as
possible, tactically important positions. It is to find positions
from which it can bring fire, preferably flanking fire, to bear on
the flanks of hostile cavalry before the actual combat begins. It
is to improve every success gained and constitute a formed nucleus
in case of a retreat. Moreover, mounted infantry should enable the
cavalry divisions, far in advance of the army, to devote themselves
exclusively to the strategical reconnaissance with which they are
charged.
(b) In addition, the mounted infantry is to constitute a light
mobile reserve which the commander-in-chief can despatch at a
moment’s notice from one wing to the other for the purpose of lending
assistance, or for influencing the action at particular points
and for which other troops are not available on account of the
extraordinary extension of modern lines of battle.
(c) Finally, mounted infantry is to fill the role of a mobile
column in minor warfare or in expeditions in colonial wars, and in
performing this duty assume the functions of the absent cavalry in
the service of reconnaissance and patrolling.
The following is the organization and strength of mounted infantry
organizations:
In war every infantry battalion is to furnish one company of mounted
infantry, consisting of 5 officers, 138 men, and 144 horses; and
every brigade (4 battalions) one battalion of four companies. To each
battalion of mounted infantry is assigned: one machine gun platoon,
consisting of two guns and two ammunition carts (2 officers, 40
men, and 54 horses). Hence the aggregate strength of a battalion of
mounted infantry is: 28 officers, 630 men, and 676 horses.