ASTORGA TAKEN BY THE FRENCH. SIEGE AND FALL OF CIUDAD RODRIGO.
♦1810.♦
♦INACTIVITY BEFORE CADIZ.♦
Hostilities were carried on before Cadiz with equal languor on both
sides, the French making no attempt on the Isle of Leon, and the
Spaniards none for breaking up the land-blockade. On the enemy’s part
this inaction was occasioned by their knowledge of the strength of the
works; on that of the Spaniards by want of energy in the government,
and want of spirit ♦THE REGENCY SEND FOR CUESTA.♦ in the people of
Cadiz. The Regency, immediately upon their appointment, had sent for
Cuesta to reside either in the city or the isle, that they might profit
by his advice, regarding him, they said, as the main pillar of the
country: they expressed their deep sorrow for some outrages which had
been committed against his venerable age, and their determination to
inflict exemplary punishment upon the offenders: they ordered that part
of his appointments should forthwith be paid, and promised the whole
arrears as soon as it should be possible to discharge them. The time,
however, for Cuesta’s services, either in the field or the council,
was past; and the old General employed his latter days in composing a
vindictive attack upon the fallen Junta, which called forth on their
part a complete justification of their conduct towards him. On that
score they had nothing wherewith to reproach themselves; but they must
have felt some self-condemnation in reflecting that the two generals,
who in the hour of extreme danger had acted with promptitude and
success, were the men in whom they had least confided. Alburquerque
they had regarded with jealousy, and Romana they had deprived of his
command in deference to the deputies of Asturias.
♦BADAJOZ SECURED BY ROMANA.♦
The service which Romana had rendered at that crisis was only of less
importance than the preservation of the Isle of Leon. He had secured
Badajoz when a corps of 12,000 men from Seville thought to have
obtained possession of it by a coup-de-main: some Portugueze had come
to his assistance, and their artillerymen distinguished themselves when
the enemy ventured to approach the walls. Baffled in this attempt, the
French retired to Merida, Zafra, and S. Marta, where they were annoyed
by the division of his army under D. Carlos O’Donnell, brother to the
commander in Catalonia.
♦THE BRITISH TAKE A POSITION ON THE FRONTIERS OF BEIRA.♦
Lord Wellington had nearly 9000 sick when his head-quarters were
removed from Badajoz; but when, in clear anticipation of the enemy’s
intentions, he took a position on the frontiers of Beira, they rapidly
recovered strength in that salubrious country. On the side of Alentejo
he knew that the invasion would not be attempted; attempts in that
quarter had always proved unsuccessful: if Badajoz and Elvas had been
reduced, Lisbon was secured by the Tagus, and there is no other part
of Portugal in which an army would suffer so much from disease, and
from want of water; this indeed Loison ♦SEE VOL. II. P. 181.♦ had
experienced. On the side of Gallicia the French had so lately felt
how difficult it was to retreat, that it was altogether unlikely they
would risk the same danger again, even if it had not been necessary
again to obtain possession of that province as a preliminary measure.
It appeared certain, therefore, that the attempt would be made by way
of Beira, the only remaining and most practicable route for an invading
army. Their first step must be to besiege Ciudad Rodrigo. This, he
knew, had been recommended by a council of war held in September at
Salamanca; and its success, he then observed, would do more evil than
the French could effect in any other way; for it would cut off the only
communication of the Spanish government with the northern provinces,
give the enemy the command of Castille, and probably draw after it the
loss of Almeida. Looking, therefore, to Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida as
the points of which the enemy must obtain possession before they could
march either upon Lisbon or Porto, he chose a position in the segment
of a circle, of which the convex part was opposed to the quarter from
whence the invasion was expected. Guarda, Celorico, Pinhel, and the
west bank of the Coa, were its four main points; the Coa, with its
tributary streams, flowing in front of his line along the greater part
of its extent. That river rises in the Sierra de Xalma, which is a
part of the Serra da Gata, and enters Portugal by Folgosinho; another
stream, which is also regarded as its source, rises near Sabugal; it
receives many smaller rivers, and falls into the Douro near Villa Nova
de Foscoa. Its waters are supposed to be excellent for dying wool and
tempering steel, but unwholesome.
♦ASTORGA SUMMONED BY THE FRENCH.♦
Before the French entered upon their operations in this quarter, they
thought it necessary to obtain complete possession of Leon, that their
communication might be open with Valladolid. They had been repulsed in
an attempt upon Astorga, in the preceding September, by Santocildes,
who remained as governor there. That city was surrounded with walls,
which gave it an appearance of antiquity, not of strength. They had
been erected many centuries ago, and were so massive, and at the same
time considered as of so little consequence for purposes of defence,
that the poor were permitted to dig holes in them which served for
habitations. The garrison consisted of about 3000 men, of whom from
500 to 600 were on the hospital list. Some attempts had been made to
render the city defensible, according to the system of modern warfare,
by the enemy, after Buonaparte entered it in pursuit of Sir J. Moore;
and when the Spaniards recovered it, they added to these works. Still
the fortifications were such, that though the French might deem them
sufficient against an armed peasantry, or a guerilla party, it was
never expected that any resistance would be made there against a
regular force. After the French had overrun Andalusia, and when they
were proclaiming, that the brigands had been put to the sword, and the
Napoleonic throne established in Cadiz, ... for this falsehood was
in such phrase asserted in their Spanish gazettes, ... Loison, whose
head-quarters were at Bañeza, the nearest town, wrote to the governor,
telling him, that King Joseph had entered Seville amid the acclamations
of the inhabitants; that Andalusia had submitted; the ♦FEB. 16.♦ Junta
was dissolved; and almost all the people of Spain, awakened now to a
sense of their true interest, had had recourse to the clemency of their
sovereign, who received them like a father. He urged Santocildes to
imitate so good an example, and appoint a place where they might meet
and confer upon such terms as must needs persuade him to this wise and
honourable course. Santocildes replied to this overture, that he knew
his duty, and would do it.
♦SIEGE OF ASTORGA.♦
On the 21st of March, Junot invested Astorga with 12,000 men, of whom
about a tenth part were cavalry, by means of which he became master
of the open country. The vigorous measures of Santocildes obstructed
his operations so much, that a month elapsed before he opened his
batteries. They began on three sides ♦1810. MARCH.♦ at once, at
daybreak on the 20th of April, and soon effected a breach on the
north, by the Puerta de Hierro; but immediately behind the breach the
Spaniards pulled down a house, the foundations of which served as a
formidable trench; they kept up their fire during the night, and at
eleven the following morning Junot once more summoned the governor to
surrender, declaring that, if he held out two hours longer, the city
should be stormed, and the garrison put to the sword. The governor
having returned a becoming answer, the batteries renewed their fire;
the bombardment was recommenced; the cathedral was set on fire, with
many other houses, and a whole street in the suburbs; and the French,
thinking to profit by the confusion, assaulted the breach: 2000 men
were appointed for this service: great part perished before they could
reach the wall; the remainder mounted the breach; the works within
impeded them, a destructive fire was poured upon them, and after an
hour and a half they were repulsed. At the same time the suburb was
assaulted, and with the same success; the enemy being three times
baffled in their attempts. Their loss this day amounted to 1500 men.
♦ITS SURRENDER.♦
Had the city been well stored, it would have cost the besiegers still
dearer; but after this signal success, Santocildes found himself with
only thirty round of cartridges remaining for the men, and eight only
for the artillery. Junot passed the night in making a covered way from
the trenches to the foot of the breach, where he lodged a large body
of picked men. Meantime a council of war was held; the impossibility
of resisting with advantage for want of ammunition was admitted; some
officers proposed that they should cut their way through the besiegers;
... the strength of the enemy’s cavalry was one impediment to this,
but it was rejected on account of the inhabitants; for Astorga was not
like Hostalrich, where the garrison had only themselves to provide
for; and unless terms were made for the town’s-people, what they might
expect from such conquerors as Junot and Loison was but too well
known. Fresh works of defence were thrown up within the breach while
this deliberation was going on, that nothing might be omitted, and
at daybreak a capitulation was proposed. They demanded and obtained
the honours of war for themselves; security for the inhabitants, both
in person and property; that the men should keep their knapsacks,
and the officers their horses, swords, and baggage. This part of the
capitulation was broken, and the officers were plundered as they left
the town. Even Junot, however, returned Santocildes his sword, saying,
that so brave a man ought not to be without one. In the course of
the siege the enemy lost 2500 in killed alone; so dearly was Astorga
purchased. But the more gallant its resistance, the more was that
misconduct to be regretted which had infected the provincial Juntas as
strongly as the Central Government. Since July last Gallicia had been
entirely delivered from the enemy; the population of that province,
when the census of 1797 was taken, amounted to nearly a million and
a half; the people had shown their spirit, and if due exertions had
been made on the part of the civil and military authorities, an army
might have been formed there, capable not only of preserving Astorga,
but of essentially co-operating with the British and Portugueze in the
subsequent operations.
♦AFFAIR AT BARBA DEL PUERCO.♦
After this conquest, Junot, leaving a small garrison in Astorga,
marched into Old Castille, where Ney had previously been joined by the
corps of Loison, Regnier, and Kellermann. The campaign had already
begun here. In the beginning of March the French army were upon the
Tormes, with their advanced posts upon the Agueda. Lord Wellington was
at Viseu, and his advanced posts, under General Craufurd, were upon
the Agueda also, and between ♦MARCH 19.♦ that river and the Coa. The
first time that the British and French troops met after the battle
of Talavera was in an affair of outposts, at Barba del Puerco: four
companies of the 95th, under Lieutenant-Colonel Beckwith, were posted
at that place; the French had a strong party immediately opposite, on
the other side the Agueda, in the village of St. Felices. The only
bridge below Ciudad Rodrigo is between these villages, and as the
river at this season was swollen with rain, this was the only passage.
The country is rocky and mountainous, and though the advanced sentries
of both parties were within a few yards of the bridge, it was not
expected that either would attempt to annoy the other; so great were
the obstacles which the nature of the ground presented. The French,
however, collected a brigade in St. Felices, and after night had
closed marched 600 men toward the bridge. About midnight they were all
assembled there, and made the advanced sentries prisoners; a picquet of
eighty men, posted behind the rocks, immediately fired upon them and
retreated in excellent order; they pushed on up the mountain, hoping
to surprise the remainder of the men, but were presently repulsed. The
loss was trifling on either side. Marshal Ney, however, ventured to
assert, that the English had been routed at the point of the bayonet,
and that their transports were ready at Porto and Lisbon.
♦MASSENA APPOINTED TO THE ARMY OF PORTUGAL.♦
The French had learnt at Vimeiro, and Coruña, and Talavera, to respect
British valour, but they had not yet been taught to respect English
policy; and they fully expected that if they brought a superior force
against him, Lord Wellington would fly through Portugal, and seek
shelter in his ships. Preparations, therefore, were made for this third
invasion, with an army far exceeding in number those which Junot and
Soult had commanded, even if they had been united, and under Massena,
a general ♦1810. APRIL.♦ of higher rank than either. No general in
the French service had enjoyed so high a reputation since Hoche,
and Pichegru, and Moreau had disappeared. Buonaparte, in his first
campaigns, called him, in his own inflated style, the favourite Child
of Victory; and after the late Austrian war, created him Prince of
Essling, because his skill and exertions had contributed mainly to the
escape of the French from utter destruction at the battle of Aspern.
He was appointed commander-in-chief of the provinces of the north of
Spain, including the kingdoms of Old Castille, Leon, and Asturias; the
provinces of St. Andero, Soria, Valladolid and Palencia, Toro, Zamora,
Salamanca and Avila; the army under him was named the army of Portugal;
and, as Soult had done before him, it is believed that he went to make
the conquest of Portugal, expecting to be rewarded with its crown for
his success.
♦CIUDAD RODRIGO.♦
In the later wars between Spain and Portugal, the three cities where
the Spaniards used to collect their armies before they invaded the
enemy’s country were Tuy, Ciudad Rodrigo, and Badajoz. Of these
fortresses, Tuy, like Valença on the opposite frontier, is now of
little strength or importance, Badajoz a strong place, Ciudad Rodrigo
hardly to be ranked in the third order of fortresses. It was built
some centuries ago, when the site was sufficiently convenient for a
fortified town; but the situation is bad; the works were old and
imperfect, and it had other local disadvantages. It is commanded from
many points; and one height, within 500 toises of the city, exceeds
by about fifty yards the highest of its buildings. There were no
bomb-proofs; and the suburbs, in which there were four convents, and
the number of gardens without the walls, materially assisted the
operations of a besieging army. The population of the city had been
estimated at about 10,000; but it appears not much to have exceeded
half that number. The garrison amounted to 4950, including 600
townsmen; the greater part of the others being volunteers, or men newly
raised. Camp Marshal D. Andres Perez de Herrasti was governor, an old
man, who had been the friend and comrade of Mariano Alvarez.
♦THE FRENCH BESIEGE IT.♦
On the 25th of April 6000 French appeared before the place, and
encamped in the _Termino_ of Pedro Toro, a league to the eastward.
On the 30th, the second division, consisting of from 4000 to 5000,
arrived and encamped in the _Termino_ of Valde Carros, a league to the
north. Five days afterwards another encampment was formed between the
two. On May 15th, another division, of about 7000 men, encamped to
the westward, upon Monte de Ibanrey. So large a force was necessary,
because the English were near at hand. By the 4th of June the city
was completely invested. This was not effected without repeated
skirmishes, in which the enemy suffered considerable loss. In these
♦1810. MAY.♦ affairs, D. Antonio Camargo, commandant of the volunteers
of Avila, greatly distinguished himself; but the individual who, above
all others, annoyed the enemy by his incessant enterprise, ♦D. JULIAN
SANCHEZ.♦ was D. Julian Sanchez, the son of a farmer, near the banks
of the Guebra. Till the invasion of his country, he had cultivated
his father’s lands; but when his father, mother, and sister had been
murdered by the French, he made a vow of vengeance, and, at the head
of one of those bands which the Spaniards call _guerrillas_, well
performed it. On one occasion he surprised, in his father’s house, a
French colonel, infamous for his atrocities, and put him to death,
first telling him who it was that inflicted his merited punishment in
this world, and sent him to render account for his crimes in the next.
♦MARSHAL NEY SUMMONS THE TOWN.♦
This enterprising leader made repeated assaults upon the enemy,
not hesitating, at the head of sixty, eighty, or an hundred of his
lancers, to attack three or four times his own number. Camargo, and
D. Jose Puente, commandant of the cavalry regiment of Ciudad Rodrigo,
co-operated ably with him, and the French suffered daily and hourly
losses from their indefatigable activity. They suffered also greatly
from the artillery of the town, which was excellently served. Ney
carried on his operations in a manner which the Spaniards thought
prodigal of the lives of his men, beginning his approaches where, in
their judgement, a general more sparing of his army would ♦1810. JUNE.♦
have terminated them. To protect these works, he ordered a great number
of holes to be dug, where he posted sharpshooters, by whom the garrison
were greatly annoyed. On the 24th of June, Massena arrived and took the
command, and at three on the following morning the batteries opened,
and a constant fire from six-and-forty pieces of heavy artillery was
kept up day and night till the evening of the 28th, when, having made
a breach of about five-and-twenty yards in length, Ney required the
governor to surrender, “sending him,” he said, “this last summons by
order of the Prince of Essling, commander-in-chief of the army of
Portugal, then present, whose honour and humanity were well known, but
who, if the defence were uselessly prolonged, would be compelled to
treat him with all the rigour authorized by the laws of war. If he had
any hope of being succoured by the English, he was doubtless by that
time undeceived; for if such had been their intention, they would not
have waited till the city was reduced to its present deplorable state.
He had, therefore, to choose between an honourable capitulation, and
the terrible vengeance of a victorious army; and a positive answer was
requested.” Herrasti replied, “that after forty-nine years’ service,
he could not but know the laws of war and his military duties; the
fortress was not in a state to capitulate; and whenever circumstances
made it his duty, he would then apply for terms, after securing his
honour, which was dearer to him than life.”
♦SITUATION OF LORD WELLINGTON.♦
How galling it must have been for Lord Wellington to witness the
progress of the siege, knowing his inability to relieve the town, may
well be conceived. His outposts were near enough to hear even the
musketry; but with so large a proportion of his troops half-disciplined
and untried, he could not act upon the offensive against an enemy
greatly superior in numbers, without incurring the most imminent
danger. The only possible plan by which Portugal could be saved he had
laid down for himself, and from that plan no circumstances, however
painful to his own feelings, or however derogatory in appearance to his
reputation, could induce him to swerve. He was in communication with
Romana at Badajoz; but in the state of the Spanish armies, any plan
of co-operation for the relief of Ciudad Rodrigo was impossible. It
was, however, of great importance that the place should be resolutely
defended to the last extremity, and in this hope Romana and the English
general were not disappointed. ♦SPIRIT OF THE INHABITANTS.♦ The minds
of the people had been prepared for this extremity; they had their
patriotic writers and their poets; the exploits of Julian Sanchez
excited the emulation of the youth, and the conduct of the old governor
gave confidence to all. The examples of Zaragoza, and Gerona, and
Hostalrich, and Astorga, animated the women and children, as well as
those who bore arms; for in a cause like theirs they had seen their
countrymen acquire a glory when unsuccessful, which could not have been
greater had they been victorious. The women and children, when they saw
their houses burning, gave way neither to fear nor lamentation, but
exerted themselves to quench the flames, and carried refreshment and
ammunition to the troops amid the hottest fire. There were two blind
beggars in the city: no one supposed that these unfortunate men could
render any service during the siege, but zeal taught them how to be
serviceable; they carried water to the walls by day, and ammunition by
night, with such unwearied activity, that it was the intention of the
governor and the Junta, if the town had been saved, to have rewarded
them with pensions for life.
♦THE NUNNERY OF S. CRUZ ATTACKED.♦
It was of great consequence to the Spaniards to keep possession of
those buildings without the walls, which would otherwise afford
protection to the besiegers, but which also afforded such means for
annoying them while they could be defended, that it had not been
thought advisable to demolish them before the siege. The nunnery
of Santa Cruz was the most important of these buildings. D. Ramon
Castellanos was posted there with a company of sixty men, when three
hundred of the enemy’s grenadiers, with a party of sappers, assailed
it in the night, half the party attacking it in the rear, the other
in ♦1810. JULY.♦ the front. They blew up the first and second gates;
hand grenades were thrown on both sides; the Spaniards, having the
advantage of the building, kept up a most destructive discharge of
musketry; the commander of the one party was killed, the captain of
engineers, who commanded the other, wounded, but he did not retire till
he had set fire to the convent. Seeing the flames, the governor made
signal for Castellanos to abandon the post, who accordingly let down
his men from a window into one of the inner courts of the convent, and
descending himself the last, they forced their way with the bayonet. It
was a little after midnight when they reached the gate of La Colada:
but seeing, while they took food and rested after the action, that the
enemy had extinguished the flames, Castellanos went to the governor,
and represented to him that his honour was concerned in recovering the
post. He led his men at three in the morning, after only two hours’
respite, to the assault, and surprising the French, drove them from
their dearly purchased conquest, where they left 158 dead, and 45
wounded behind them, the remainder of the wounded having been removed
during the short time that they retained possession.
♦CONVENT OF ST. DOMINGO RECOVERED. JULY 2.♦
They were driven from the convent of St. Domingo in a manner not less
worthy of remembrance. After they had won the building, Herrasti was
very desirous of recovering it, and yet hesitated at giving orders for
the attempt, knowing the exhausted state of the garrison, and how ill
any loss of men could be afforded. A serjeant, by name Manuel Martin,
happened to hear what was the state of the governor’s feelings upon
this subject. This man, who was a native of Zamora, had made himself
well known to the French: they called him _agua y vino_, water and
wine, the words which he always used when engaged in action with them;
wine being his signal for attack, and water that for retreat. He had
distinguished himself greatly during the siege, and had at this time a
wound in his arm, which however did not prevent him from going to the
governor, and soliciting permission to make an attack upon the enemy
in this convent, saying, that if he could not drive them out, at least
he could annoy them there. Accordingly, choosing out five-and-twenty
comrades, he attacked the convent with such well-directed vigour, that
the enemy, though greatly superior in numbers, were terrified and took
to flight, many of them leaving their knapsacks and muskets behind
them. This was so signal an exploit, that Manuel Martin was deservedly
promoted for it, and a badge of distinction was given to each of the
soldiers.
♦JULIAN SANCHEZ EFFECTS HIS ESCAPE FROM THE CITY.♦
But against such a force as surrounded them, all that the Spaniards
could do was to hold out to the uttermost, and sell the fortress as
dearly as possible. Massena boasted of having 100,000 men in the field;
he had 66,000 infantry and 6000 horse, of whom as many as could be
advantageously employed carried on the siege, while the others kept
the British army in check, Lord Wellington having only 51,000 under
his command, including 3000 cavalry, and half this force composed of
Portugueze, who were as yet untried, and consequently in whom little
reliance could then be placed. They were, however, brigaded with the
British in the proportion of one battalion to two, and were every
day acquiring confidence and character. The siege was less murderous
than that of Zaragoza, because the city was much smaller and less
populous, and, having the advantage of regular works, did not require
the same kind of defence. When Herrasti and the Junta saw that it was
not possible to hold out much longer, they ordered Julian Sanchez
and his lancers to make their escape while it was yet practicable,
reminding Sanchez how important it was that his services should still
be continued, and telling him he would be of more assistance to Ciudad
Rodrigo in the field than he could now be within the walls. A little
before midnight Sanchez collected his troops in the plaza; the two of
his company who were married men took their wives behind them; they
sallied out, and their leader, in the spirit of Scanderbeg, instead
of contenting himself with merely effecting his own retreat, charged
a post of cavalry, routed them, and carried away eight prisoners with
their horses. The two women were armed with pistols, and one of them,
by name Marta Fraile, saved her husband, by shooting a dragoon who was
about to attack him on one side.
♦STATE OF THE BRITISH ARMY.♦
The British army meantime, though it could render no assistance, was
far from being idly or ill employed. There had been a prevailing
feeling of despondency before the siege began, and an expectation
that the town would surrender as soon as the enemy should have opened
their fire. The progress of the siege produced more respect for
the Spaniards, and the active service in which the men soon found
themselves engaged produced cheerfulness and hope. The picquets
occupied the line of the Azava from Carpio on the right to its junction
with the Agueda; the enemy had 8000 men on the left bank of the Agueda,
behind that river and the Azava, which was fordable in many places. The
head-quarters of the light division, under Major-General Craufurd, were
at Gallegos, a short league distant, in an open country; the greatest
alertness, therefore, was necessary, and the men slept at their horses’
heads, the horses bridled and the reins in hand. The Germans were
selected for the outpost duty, being at that time the only troops in
the army who were acquainted with it: the 16th light dragoons requested
to be intermixed with them on duty, men and officers; a compliment
which gratified the brave men to whom it was paid, and the greatest
harmony was always preserved. The picquets were brought to the greatest
perfection, and the division soon attained that alertness which could
only be learnt in such service. The Portugueze behaved well on the
first opportunity which was afforded, and obtained the good opinion of
their allies; so that every thing went on satisfactorily in the allied
army, except that in a trifling and ill-executed affair Colonel Talbot
fell, a gallant officer, who had distinguished himself at Talavera, and
was deservedly and greatly lamented.
♦A PRACTICABLE BREACH MADE.♦
The French general, to whom time was of more consequence than any cost
of lives, pressed the siege with the utmost vigour, but with heavy
loss, owing to the repeated sallies of the garrison, and the excellent
manner in which the artillery of the Spaniards was served. In hope of
forcing the governor to surrender by the cries of the inhabitants,
he bombarded the town, and almost destroyed it; but the people were
not to be shaken in their purpose, the names of Numantia and Zaragoza
were in every mouth, and they were resolved in their turn to transmit
a memorable example to posterity. Meantime the regular advances of
the besiegers were carried on without intermission, and by the 2d of
July a practicable breach had been opened in the Baluarte del Rey.
The Spaniards made every exertion to defend it with sacks of earth,
estacades, and whatever other obstacles they could oppose to the enemy;
but the French did not yet venture an assault; they had so severely
experienced the valour of their opponents, that they had determined
not to storm the town till the works should be reduced to such a
state, that they might avail themselves of the whole advantage of their
numbers. They made three mines, one under the counterscarp, the other
two under the curtain of the wall and part of the Calle del Seminario,
or College-street, near the Cathedral. The besieged were aware of their
progress, but all efforts at impeding it were useless, and at three in
the morning of the 10th, the counterscarp was blown up, forming not
only an open breach, but such a way to it that carts might ascend from
the glacis.
Immediately afterwards the French renewed the fire from all their
batteries, and kept it up without intermission for twelve hours. During
this time the cry of the soldiers and the inhabitants, women and boys,
as well as their husbands and fathers, was, that they would beat off
the enemy or die; but the officers and the Junta were well aware, that
any farther resistance would only afford the French a pretext for
carrying their threats into execution, and putting all to the sword.
Thirty thousand men were ready to storm the city that evening. It was
not without much difficulty that the people could be induced to hear
of a council of war, nor would they have suffered one to be held, had
they not seen such undoubted proofs of the patriotism and courage
of those who now told them that a surrender was become inevitable.
There were some in the council who proposed to follow the example of
Julian Estrada at Hostalrich, and force their way with the bayonet
through their enemies; but here, as at Astorga, it was urged that they
were in different circumstances, and had therefore different duties;
their business now was to preserve 5000 inhabitants, who would else
be exposed to the unrestrained vengeance and brutality of the enemy.
Finally, it was resolved to capitulate, but not till the latest moment,
when there was no longer the slightest hope or possibility of relief.
♦THE TOWN CAPITULATES. JULY 10.♦
Massena’s orders to Ney were to assault the town that evening; the
French advanced for this purpose, and were at the foot of the breach,
in the act of mounting, when the white flag was hoisted: the officer
who planted it in the breach descended with the terms of capitulation,
and presented them to Ney, who sternly told him it was now too late
for any thing. The Spaniard, however, had recourse to Massena, who was
at that time supposed to be more humane than Ney. The first article
was, that the garrison should march out with the honours of war; the
rest were in like manner such as are usual in the like circumstances.
Massena having cast his eye over them, said, “Tell your governor, this
is no time to ratify the terms in writing; but I grant all which he
requires, and am going to give orders accordingly.” He then sent his
adjutant-general to bid Ney suspend the assault. Loison immediately
marched through the breach, and took possession of the town; and
General Simon, notwithstanding Massena’s pledged word, made the
garrison deposit their arms in the arsenal.
♦CONDUCT OF THE FRENCH.♦
The other terms were at the moment fulfilled; and when Herrasti, the
next day, requested that the capitulation might be signed, in order
that he might transmit it to his own government, Massena replied,
that as he saw the articles observed, he neither could nor ought to
require more. The people had escaped the horrors of an assault; but in
other respects they soon found they were at the mercy of a conqueror
who acknowledged no other law than his own pleasure. Herrasti had
stipulated for the liberty of the civil officers; they, however, were
declared prisoners of war. The members of the Junta were thrown into
the vilest dungeon of the public gaol, from whence, after having
endured for eight-and-forty hours every kind of insult and ill
treatment, they were marched on foot to Salamanca, in company with the
governor, who alone was permitted to retain his horse. The clergy were
arrested and shut up for two days in the church of St. Juan; the old
and infirm were then suffered to go to their houses, but forbidden the
exercise of their functions; the lay brethren were ordered to serve in
the hospitals, and all the others sent prisoners to Salamanca. The next
measures were, to impose a contribution of 1,800,000 reales, and to set
from six to eight hundred men at work to destroy the batteries, fill
up the trenches, and repair the works, compelling them to labour like
slaves, giving them no provisions, and allowing them little rest.
The account which the French published of their conquest was, according
to their system, full of falsehoods. They asserted that the garrison
had surrendered at discretion, which could only be contradicted, not
disproved, because Massena had broken his word. This falsehood is
worthy of remark, because it shows so strikingly the characteristic
baseness of Buonaparte’s generals. Ciudad Rodrigo was evidently at
their mercy; a generous enemy would have rejoiced to show his sense of
the merits of those who had opposed him, and would have known that in
refusing them the honours of war, he deprived them only of a barren
form; for the merit of their gallant and heroic defence it was not
in his power to efface. Massena, not satisfied with thus injuring
Herrasti’s honour, cast upon him a fouler aspersion, making him say,
that he and the garrison would have surrendered sooner, if they had
not been intimidated by the inhabitants. In reality, such had been
the noble spirit of the soldiers, that it was only by the entreaties,
as well as the arguments of the superior Junta of Castille, whose
residence was in that city, that they were prevailed upon to give up
their intention of attempting to cut their way through the besiegers.
The French general did not forget to insult the English, and endeavour
by his falsehoods to exasperate the Spaniards against them. “Ciudad
Rodrigo,” he said, “fell in their presence; they promised to succour
it; made the inhabitants prolong their defence by this deceitful hope;
and suffered the place to fall without making the slightest effort
for its relief. Thus they had excited against them the universal
indignation of the garrison and the people, who united in exclaiming
against their perfidy.”
This justice, however, Massena did to Ciudad Rodrigo, that he admitted
the defence had been most obstinate. It was impossible, he said,
to form an idea of the state to which it was reduced. Every thing
had been battered down; not a single house remained uninjured. The
killed he estimated at more than 2000. The Spaniards stated it at
only sixty-three of the inhabitants, and 237 of the garrison. Seven
thousand soldiers, he said, laid down their arms: ... the number at the
commencement of the siege was 4950. Six hundred made their escape on
the night of the capitulation, and more than 1500 before they reached
Salamanca. Above two-and-forty thousand shells were thrown into the
city, and nearly five-and-twenty thousand from it. The quantity of
powder consumed by the garrison during the last sixteen days was 893
quintales, ... the quintal being 132 lbs. The French gave no statement
of their own loss; it was probably very considerable; ♦SPECULATIONS
UPON THE CAMPAIGN.♦ the Spaniards estimated it at 3400. The capture,
however, occasioned the greatest exultation in Paris, and the Moniteur
mingled with its own insults the echoes of our factious journalists.
“The good sense of the English people,” it said, “enabling them to
foresee the dishonour and destruction of their army in Portugal, they
are convinced that the most fortunate event which could befal it would
be a catastrophe like that of Moore’s. They are too much accustomed to
calculate chances and events not to know, that alone against France
they can, in such a contest, meet nothing but disaster, and obtain
nothing but disgrace.” “Men of sound judgement, like Grenville or
Grey, are numerous in England,” said the Moniteur, “but they are at
present without any influence there.” Then, returning to its natural
tone of insult, it ridiculed the strength of Lord Wellington’s army,
amounting to the dreadful number of 24,000 English. “The cries of the
inhabitants of Ciudad Rodrigo,” it said, “were heard in his camp, which
was only six leagues distant: but all ears were shut against them;
the English made no attempt to succour that city: ... they were the
laughing-stock of Europe; every coffee-house waiter knew their weakness
on land, as well as their influence at sea. Ciudad Rodrigo was one of
the last bulwarks of the insurrection; its capture made the catastrophe
more imminent for England, who would now find it necessary to call to
the helm more prudent men, better acquainted with the nature of the
resources and of the strength of their country, and therefore more
moderate.”
In England, too, we were told, that if Ciudad Rodrigo were taken, the
efforts of the English might be considered to be at an end; the French
would then be able to advance without fear of a check; the harvest
also being now begun, whatever grain there was in the country they
would be able to secure for themselves, and so form magazines, the
want of which had hitherto chiefly retarded their advance. At one time
these politicians cried out, “that Lord Wellington could not permit
the enemy quietly to prosecute the siege of so important a fortress.”
At another, “they would not suppose him capable of fighting a useless
battle: for they trusted he was not so prodigal of the blood of his
followers. They trusted that his operations would be justified by
the event.” Then again “they were not competent to speak from their
own knowledge, yet certainly it did appear a doubtful policy to be
patiently waiting till Massena had time to concentrate his troops,
and make all his arrangements for an attack on the British position.”
“The plan of overwhelming Lord Wellington, by bringing an immense
superiority to bear upon him, was one which obviously presented itself;
there seemed no insurmountable difficulty in the execution; obstacles
there might be, from want of provisions and other circumstances, but
the skill and perseverance of the French in combating them forbade
us to place much reliance upon such grounds.” In this manner, always
presaging evil, and consistent in nothing but despondency, sometimes
borrowing the tone of the Moniteur, and sometimes setting it, did these
journalists of a disappointed party labour to deaden the hearts and
hopes of their countrymen; while their more daring, but hardly more
mischievous coadjutors addressed their weekly invectives to the readers
and auditors in pot-houses and tap-rooms, abusing their ignorance,
appealing to, and inflaming their worst passions, and crying out
against the measures of their own government, while upon the crimes
of Buonaparte they observed a silence which sufficiently indicated
their sympathy with his system, their wishes for the extension of his
tyranny, and their hopes of his eventual success.
♦LA PUEBLA DE SANABRIA OCCUPIED BY THE FRENCH.♦
The fall of Ciudad Rodrigo enabled Massena to detach a force for the
relief of Astorga, where General Mahy, who commanded in Galicia, was
blockading the French garrison. This object was easily effected.
General Taboada at this time occupied Puebla de Sanabria, where he
was exerting himself to organize a body of troops for the field:
General Echavarria was engaged in like manner at Alcañizas. In such
feeble, uncombined efforts the spirit of the country was spent, and
its resources frittered away; for as soon as men enough were brought
together to attract the enemy’s attention, they were either dispersed
or destroyed. This was the fate of Echavarria’s corps; it was surprised
by a French detachment under General La Croix, and nearly annihilated.
The alarm spread to Silveira’s head-quarters at Braganza, and Colonel
Wilson (his second in command) hastened with the advanced guard to
Echavarria’s support; but he arrived only to find the ground covered
with dead and wounded Spaniards, the enemy having retired to Carvales,
after completely accomplishing the purpose of their expedition. Massena
boasted soon afterwards of a like success at Sanabria; but the results
were very different. The French magnified the importance of this post,
saying that it commanded the entrance into Portugal, and shut up the
communication with Galicia. They said also, that Lord Wellington had
enjoined the Spanish governor to make an obstinate defence; but that
the governor reproached him in reply for having deceived the commandant
of Ciudad Rodrigo, and broken his word with him; told him it was
evident he intended to do nothing for Spain, but only, for the sake
of fomenting divisions, held out hopes of assistance which were never
realized; yet nevertheless offered to shut himself up in the fortress,
and bury himself in its ruins, if the English general would send him
one Englishman for two Spaniards, to assist in its defence. The answer
of Lord Wellington, the French papers said, might easily be conceived;
and the Spanish general therefore abandoned the town, where General
Serras found twenty pieces of artillery, and provisions for 3000 men
for six months. After this the French made no farther mention of the
Puebla de Sanabria.
♦THE PORTUGUEZE RETAKE IT.♦
D. Francisco Taboada Gil, the officer who was thus falsely represented
as insulting the English general, had communicated not with him but
with the Portugueze commander, Silveira, at Braganza, with whom it
was agreed that he should evacuate the place if it were attacked by
a superior force. Taboada accordingly ♦JULY 29.♦ fell back upon the
Portillas de Galicia; Silveira, having ascertained that Serras had
returned with the greater part of his troops to Mombuey, concerted
measures with the Spanish general for surprising the garrison which
the French had left in Sanabria, and on the fourth day after they had
taken possession of their boasted conquest, the enemy found themselves
♦AUG. 3.♦ invested in the fort. They were summoned; but the commander
replied, that he had men and ammunition to defend himself with, and
that he expected speedily to be succoured by Marshal Massena. On the
following morning a detachment of about seventy French cavalry came on
to attack the advanced guard of the Portugueze, under Captain Francisco
Texeira Lobo, whose force was about equal; but while he charged them in
front, another small party of Portugueze, by his instructions, wheeled
round and attacked them in the rear: they were instantly broken, and
twenty-eight were left upon the field, thirty prisoners, and ♦1810.
AUGUST.♦ forty horses taken. The remainder of that day was spent in
vain endeavours to force an entrance into the fort: the assailants
burnt the gates, but the enemy blocked them up effectually with stones;
the Portugueze and Spaniards then got possession of a house adjoining,
from whence they attempted to make a way through, but the enemy soon
battered it down. On the morrow, one mortar and one three-pounder were
planted against them; the first became useless after a few discharges,
and Silveira, the next morning, sent for a six-pounder from Braganza.
He was now apprized that Serras was advancing in force to relieve the
garrison. Silveira left the Spaniards to maintain the blockade, and
drew up in order of battle upon the river Tera; but Serras, having
reconnoitred his force, thought proper to retire upon Mombuey. The
six-pounder, from Braganza, was an iron gun, in such a state, that when
it arrived it was of no avail; and a twelve-pounder, which on the 8th
was brought from the same place, proved in the same condition: this was
a serious disappointment, for Silveira was now apprized that Serras
was collecting reinforcements. Six hundred horse had entered Zamora,
on their way to him, and two battalions of Italian troops were joining
him from Benevente, ♦AUG. 9.♦ Leon, and Astorga. Unable to batter the
place, because of the wretched state of his artillery, which had been
long left to rust in a dilapidated fortress, he tried the effect of
mining; here experience and skill were wanting, and only the face of
the curtain was thrown down. The garrison, however, who were Swiss,
dreaded that a second attempt might prove more successful; and their
commandant, pleading that he and his men were not French, proposed
and obtained good terms, delivering up the place on condition that
they should be allowed to embark from Coruña, and return to their own
country, on their parole, not to bear arms against the allied powers.
The artillery of the place, and the stores, were restored to the
Spaniards; but Silveira retained for the Portugueze an eagle, the first
which they had taken from their enemy. Sixty of the Swiss entered into
the service of the allies.
Serras was in sight of Silveira’s advanced posts when this capitulation
was concluded; he had with him from 4000 to 5000 foot, and about 800
cavalry. The allied Portugueze and Spaniards were inferior in number,
and still more in discipline, and with this unequal force pressing hard
upon them they broke up from Sanabria, at a time when the prisoners
were come three hours march on the way to Coruña. Colonel Wilson,
who had been ordered on an important duty to head-quarters, returned
in time to assume the command of the rear-guard, and with it cover
their retrograde movement. He checked the French in a sharp affair
of cavalry, after which he took the open road to Braganza, Silveira
retreating with the foot upon the heights of Calabor, where the enemy,
if they should continue the pursuit, could derive no advantage from
their horse. But having arrived too late for saving the garrison,
they advanced no farther than Pedralva, and from thence returned to
Sanabria, then to Mombuey. This was the termination of General Serras’s
success at the Puebla de Sanabria; the whole of the garrison which he
left there were taken prisoners, and the eagle which was taken with
them was deposited with proper triumph in the cathedral at Lisbon, as
the first trophy of the regenerated Portugueze.