CAPTURE OF ALMEIDA. CONDUCT OF THE PORTUGUEZE GOVERNMENT. BATTLE OF
BUSACO. RETREAT OF THE BRITISH AND PORTUGUEZE TO THE LINES OF
TORRES VEDRAS. THE KING’S ILLNESS.
♦1810. JULY.♦
♦MASSENA’S PROCLAMATION TO THE PORTUGUEZE.♦
From Ciudad Rodrigo Massena addressed a proclamation to the Portugueze.
“Inhabitants of Portugal,” he said, “the Emperor of the French has put
under my orders an army of 110,000 men, to take possession of this
kingdom, and to expel the English, your pretended friends. Against you
he has no enmity: on the contrary, it is his highest wish to promote
your happiness, and the first step for securing it is to dismiss
from the country those locusts who consume your property, blast your
harvests, and palsy your efforts. In opposing the Emperor, you oppose
your true friend; a friend who has it in his power to render you the
happiest people in the world. Were it not for the insidious counsels of
England, you might now have enjoyed peace and tranquillity, and have
been put in possession of that happiness. You have blindly rejected
offers calculated only to promote your benefit, and have accepted
proposals which will long be the curse of Portugal. His majesty has
commissioned me to conjure you that you would awake to your true
interests; that you would awake to those prospects which, with your
consent, may be quickly realized; awake so as to distinguish between
friends and enemies. The King of England is actuated by selfish and
narrow purposes; the Emperor of the French is governed by principles
of universal philanthropy. The English have put arms into your hands,
arms which you know not how to use: I will instruct you. They are to be
the instruments of annihilation to your foes: ... and who those foes
are I have already shown. Use them as you ought, and they will become
your salvation! Use them as you ought not, and they will prove your
destruction! Resistance is vain. Can the feeble army of the British
general expect to oppose the victorious legions of the Emperor? Already
a force is collected, sufficient to overwhelm your country. Snatch the
moment that mercy and generosity offer! As friends you may respect
us, and be respected in return; as foes you must dread us, and in the
conflict must be subdued. The choice is your own, either to meet the
horrors of a bloody war, and see your country desolated, your villages
in flames, your cities plundered; or to accept an honourable and happy
peace, which will obtain for you every blessing that by resistance you
would resign for ever.”
On the same day that Ciudad Rodrigo surrendered, the enemy’s cavalry
appeared on the ♦THE FRENCH INVEST ALMEIDA.♦ plains of Almeida. Lord
Wellington’s head-quarters at this time were at Alverca: his position
was a defensive line, about thirty miles in extent, along the frontier
mountains of Beira; but as the line formed a segment of a circle, the
points were not distant from each other in proportion to its length.
The infantry extended from Celorico to Guarda on the one side, and to
Fort Conception, one of the outworks of Almeida, on the other. The
cavalry were in advance near Fort Conception, and at Sabugal, and on
the Coa. The enemy’s superiority in horse was very great, but the
nature of the ground deprived them of the advantage which this must
otherwise have given them. They now proceeded to invest Almeida. The
operations of the siege were conducted by the second corps, under
Marshal Ney. Junot, with the 8th, had his head-quarters at S. Felices,
and his cavalry at Villar de Porco, Fuente Guinaldo, and Fuentes
d’Onoro, ground which had not then been rendered memorable in military
history. While this portion of the army covered the siege, Serras with
a division of 7000 men at Benevente threatened Tras os Montes, and
Bonnet with 8000 at Astorga was ready to enter Galicia and the province
of Entre Douro e Minho.
♦ALMEIDA.♦
Dumouriez, forgetting Elvas at the time, has called Almeida the
strongest place in Portugal. It is perhaps more important from its
situation, but very far inferior to it in strength. This town was
founded by the Moors, and is said to have been one of those which
Ferrando the Great won from them while the Cid served under him, in
his first wars. When the tide of success was for a while turned by
the entrance of the Almoravides into Spain, Talmayda, as it was then
called, fell again into the hands of the misbelievers, from whom it
was finally reconquered, in 1190, by King Sancho I. of Portugal.
Payo Guterres distinguishing himself in the conquest, obtained from
it the appellative of _O Almeydam_, the Almeydan, and transmitted to
his descendants the surname of Almeyda, conspicuous in Portugueze and
Indian history, but disgraced at this time by the representative of
the family, who was then engaged in Massena’s army as a traitor. King
Diniz, the ruins of whose magnificent works are to be seen in every
part of Portugal, rebuilt the city, and is supposed to have removed it
from a valley, a little way north of its present site. The castle was
built by him, and repaired by King Emanuel. In the later wars between
Spain and Portugal, Almeida has always been considered a place of
great importance, being the bulwark of the latter country on its most
accessible side; but, like other things of more essential consequence
to the strength of a kingdom, it had long been neglected. In 1809 there
were not a dozen gun-carriages fit for service, nor any wood in store
for the construction of others; the embrazures were falling to decay,
and the palisades of the covert-way had been mostly broken, or carried
away for fire-wood. The works were originally ill constructed, and the
place had the great disadvantage of being commanded on one side by a
hill. Its population in 1747 was 2463; and Almeida is not one of the
few places in Portugal which have been progressive since that time.
♦FORT CONCEPTION ABANDONED.♦
The same causes which rendered it impossible for Lord Wellington to
relieve Ciudad Rodrigo, made it necessary for him to leave Almeida to
its own means of defence; but the works had been repaired, the garrison
was strong, and Brigadier Cox, an English officer in the Portugueze
service, was appointed to the command. With the example of Ciudad
Rodrigo before it, there was no reason to doubt that Almeida would make
a vigorous resistance, and probably hold out so long as materially
to derange the plans of the enemy. Fort Conception was abandoned
and blown up at the enemy’s approach. General Craufurd, however,
continued to occupy a position near Almeida with 3200 British and 1100
Portugueze troops, eight squadrons of cavalry included. The chain of
his cavalry outposts formed a semicircle in front of the town, their
right flank resting on the Coa, near As Naves, about three miles above
this fortress, and their left, in like manner, resting upon the same
river, about three miles below it, near Cinco Villas. The centre was
covered by a small stream, and on the right and centre, where it was
expected that the enemy would advance, the cavalry posts were supported
by piquets of infantry. There was but one road by which the artillery
and cavalry could retreat, that leading from Almeida to the bridge,
which is about a mile west of the town. The nature of the ground made
it difficult for the enemy to approach this road on the left of the
allies, and on the south the infantry were placed to cover it, having
their right flank resting on the Coa above the bridge, their front
covered by a deep rocky ravine, and their left in some enclosures near
a windmill[14], on the plain, about 800 yards south of the town.
♦AFFAIR ON THE COA.♦
On the morning of July 24th, the centre of the British line of piquets
was attacked; they were supported by the 14th light dragoons and two
guns, but were withdrawn when a considerable column of the enemy
appeared with artillery, and began to form on the other side of the
rivulet. The force which Marshal Ney, who directed these movements,
brought into the field, consisted of 20,000 foot and between 3000 and
4000 horse, being in fact his whole corps. Fifteen squadrons of cavalry
crossed the rivulet as soon as the piquets retired, and formed with
artillery in front, and about 7000 infantry on their right; other
troops meantime were advancing upon the right of the British position,
the side on which they might best expect to cut off the retreat of
the allies to the bridge. General Craufurd now perceived that it was
impossible for him to prevent the investment of Almeida, and that
he was on the wrong side of the Coa. The artillery and cavalry were
therefore ordered to retreat along the only road which was practicable
for them; the infantry from the left to move off in _echelon_; the
right it was necessary to hold till the last, to prevent the enemy from
approaching the bridge by a road coming from Junca, which runs in the
bottom of the valley by the river side.
On the left, the men had to retreat through thick vineyards,
intersected with deep trenches, and with walls six or seven feet high;
they could not take advantage of this ground, for the enemy were in
such force, that there was imminent danger of being overpowered, and
cut off before they could reach the bridge. One of these walls General
Craufurd had considered as a complete defence against cavalry; it
enclosed a vineyard, in which some companies had been stationed, but
there had been a heavy rain during the whole of the preceding night,
and the troops had pulled down this wall in many places to make use of
the stones for forming a shelter; through these openings the enemy’s
horse entered, and here they made most of the prisoners who were taken
in the action. To retire in order over such ground was impossible,
but the retreat was made with characteristic coolness. On the other
side the bridge, the ground was equally unfavourable for re-forming;
the 43d and part of the 95th regiments were ordered to form in front
of the bridge, and defend it as long as they could, while the rest of
the troops should pass over and take a new position. They obeyed these
orders so literally, that they defended it all day; three times the
enemy attempted to force the passage, and each time they were repulsed
at the point of the bayonet; at length, when night closed, and every
thing had passed over, and the enemy had ceased to assail them, these
brave men retreated from the post where so many of their comrades
had fallen: the heaviest loss necessarily fell upon these gallant
regiments; the total, in killed, wounded, and prisoners, amounted to
330[15]. Colonel Hall of the 43d, who was among the slain, had only
joined from England the preceding day. The loss was to be regretted
because there was no object to be gained by engaging the French at
such disadvantage; but never did men behave more gallantly than those
who were engaged that day, British and Portugueze alike. They effected
their retreat under the most unfavourable circumstances, without
losing a gun, a trophy, or a single article of field equipment; and
they inflicted upon the enemy a loss, which, by his own account, was
nearly equal to the sum of ours, and which in reality doubled its
amount. After this the infantry were withdrawn to the neighbourhood of
Celorico, leaving the outpost duty to be performed by cavalry alone.
♦DESPONDING LETTERS FROM THE ARMY.♦
Massena asserted that one of our couriers had been taken with
dispatches, which represented that the English had never been engaged
in so brisk an affair; that they were in full rout; and that it was
impossible to form an idea of their deplorable condition. Of the
condition of that army, and the full rout to which he had driven
them, it was not long before Massena obtained some correct personal
knowledge; but it is probable that some desponding letters had fallen
into his hands, and it is likely also that he expected to drive the
British army before him full speed to Lisbon. Letters had been written
from that army to Porto, in which the writers had delivered it as
their opinion that our forces must inevitably retreat, Massena having
such an overpowering superiority, that Portugal could not possibly
be defended against him. These letters excited such alarm among the
British merchants in that city, that the vice-consul applied to our
admiral at Lisbon, requesting he would take into consideration the
necessity of having a sufficient force off the Douro to protect the
British subjects, who might be compelled to embark without the least
delay. They were in the utmost consternation, he said. Admiral Berkeley
thought it proper to send this requisition to Lord Wellington, who in
consequence issued general orders upon the subject. “He would not make
any inquiry,” he said, “to ascertain the authors of these letters,
which had excited so much consternation in a place where it was most
to be wished that none should exist. He had frequently lamented the
ignorance displayed in letters from the army, and the indiscretion
with which those letters were published. It was impossible that many
officers could possess a sufficient knowledge of facts to be able to
form a correct opinion of the probable events of the campaign, yet when
their erroneous opinions were published, they could not but produce
mischievous effects. He requested, therefore, that the officers, on
account of their own reputation, would refrain from giving opinions
upon matters, with regard to which they could not possibly possess
the necessary knowledge for giving it with correctness; and if they
communicated to their correspondents facts relating to the position of
the army, its strength, the formation of its magazines, preparations
for cutting down or blowing up bridges, &c., they would at least tell
their correspondents not to publish these letters in newspapers, unless
it was certain that the publication could not prove injurious to the
army and to the public service.”
♦APPREHENSIONS EXPRESSED IN ENGLAND.♦
There was cause for this reproof. The effect of such agueish
predictions in Portugal could only be to make the Portugueze believe
we should forsake them, and thus dispose them for submission to the
enemy; while, in England, they assisted the party of the despondents,
whose journalists were labouring to strike their country with a dead
palsy. “We had been lulled,” they said, “into the most dangerous
confidence. Massena was only waiting for the advance of his flanks,
that he might, with his whole combined army, either force our handful
of men to a battle, or surround them: all that could be expected was,
that the survivors might be enabled to retire to their ships with
eclat.” By the next dispatches it appeared, that it was more easy
for a journalist to imagine such a manœuvre, than for Massena to
execute it; but this had no other effect than to make them change the
note of alarm. “If Massena,” they then said, “did not destroy Lord
Wellington’s army by fighting, it could only be because he meant
to destroy it by not fighting; for Massena was the most consummate
captain of all Buonaparte’s generals. And did ministers anticipate with
complacency the continuance of our army in Portugal through the winter?
The rainy season was approaching; might it not be the deep policy of
this arch-statesman and conqueror to keep our army there? He would be
content to devote Massena and his troops to destruction, if it would
facilitate some ulterior plan; he might mean to ruin us by the expense
of our forces there; and what should we say, if it were really a part
of his policy to keep them there, while he, having possession of the
Dutch, the Danish, and the Swedish fleets and ports, made a descent
upon England or Ireland? They trusted ministers were upon their guard,
and that they destined their troops at home for a service more imminent
than the reinforcement of Lord Wellington.”
♦NEY SUMMONS THE GOVERNOR OF ALMEIDA.♦
While these writers, in the pure spirit of faction, were thus advising
a diversion in favour of the enemy, Ney, who conducted the siege of
Almeida, directed Loison to summon the governor. This general, who
was peculiarly odious in that country for his cruelty and rapacity,
addressed ♦JULY 24.♦ the governor as a Portugueze, admonishing him
not to hazard the interests of his nation for a vain point of honour.
“None,” said he, “knows better than you do, that the French come to
deliver you from the yoke of the English. There is not a Portugueze
who is ignorant of the little consideration which his country enjoys
among that people. Have they not given abundant proofs of the little
attention which they pay to a nation worthy of esteem, and for a
long time the ally of France? Their occupation of all the civil and
military posts proves to demonstration, that the intention of the
English government is to consider Portugal as one of her colonies.
The conduct which the English have held with regard to the Spaniards,
whom they promised to defend, but abandoned, should open your eyes,
and convince you that they will do the same with regard to Portugal.
Sir Governor, his excellency has charged me to offer you the most
honourable capitulation, by which you may retain the government of
your fortress, and your garrison be admitted into the number of those
Portugueze troops that have remained faithful to the interests of their
country. In your hands therefore, is placed the fate of Almeida, and of
your companions in arms. If you refuse to accede to this proposal, you
will become responsible for all the blood shed unavailingly, in a cause
which is foreign to the Portugueze nation.” Brigadier Cox happened to
be in the covered-way, close to the barrier gate, when the flag of
truce arrived with this summons. Without permitting the French officer
to enter, he returned a verbal answer, that the fortress would be
defended to the last extremity.
♦PORTUGUEZE IN MASSENA’S ARMY.♦
The Portugueze troops, of whom Loison spake as being engaged in the
service of France, were the remainder of those whom Junot had hurried
away from their own country. The men, Buonaparte was too wary to send
back; but Massena brought with him a few nobles, who, having long
preyed upon the country which they disgraced, completed their infamy by
betraying it. To these traitors Loison appealed in his summons, saying,
they could assure the governor of the honourable manner in which
they had been treated. The Marquis of Alorna, D. Pedro de Almeida,
was the most conspicuous among them; he and his accomplices used all
their influence to persuade their countrymen to submission; but the
Portugueze had already experienced the effects of non-resistance, and
the inhabitants of Castello Mendo, and a few other villages on the
borders of Beira, were the only persons who were unfortunate enough to
be deceived. These poor people, instead of abandoning their habitations
on the approach of the enemy, in obedience to the orders which had been
issued, remained in them, fearing to encounter the evils of wandering
in search of shelter, and hoping, that, as they submitted to the enemy
without resistance, their property would be safe, their women preserved
from violation, and their lives secured. But the French, conscious of
the wickedness of the cause in which they were engaged, seemed, like
the pirates of the last century, to have considered themselves in a
state of reprobation, and to have committed crimes which make humanity
shudder, as if for the purpose of manifesting their desperate defiance
of God and man. “The inhabitants of these submissive villages suffered
all the evils which a cruel enemy could inflict; their property was
plundered; their houses burnt; their women atrociously violated; and
those, whose age and sex did not provoke the brutal violence of the
soldiers, fell victims to the confidence which they placed in promises
made only to be broken.” In these words the enormities which the French
committed were proclaimed by the Portugueze government, and by the
British general.
♦THE PORTUGUEZE ORDERED TO RETIRE BEFORE THE ENEMY. AUG. 4.♦
That general addressed a proclamation to the Portugueze upon the
occasion, telling them they now saw what they had to expect from the
French. They now saw that no means remained for avoiding the evils with
which they were threatened, but a determined and vigorous resistance,
and a firm resolution to obstruct as much as possible the advance
of the enemy, by removing out of his reach all such things as might
contribute to his subsistence, or facilitate his progress. “The army
under my command,” said he, “will protect as large a portion of the
country as is possible; but it is obvious that the people alone can
deliver themselves by a vigorous resistance, and preserve their goods
by removing them out of the reach of the enemy. The duties, therefore,
that bind me to his Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal, and
to the Portugueze nation, oblige me to make use of the power and
authority with which I am furnished, for compelling the careless and
indolent to make the necessary efforts to preserve themselves from the
dangers which threaten them, and to save their country. In conformity
with this, I make known and declare, that all magistrates and persons
in authority who shall remain in the villages or towns, after
having received orders from the military officer to remove, and all
persons, of whatever class they may be, who shall maintain the least
communication with, or aid and assist in any manner the enemy, shall be
considered as traitors to the state, and tried, and punished as such an
enormous crime requires.” The manner in which Lord Wellington assumed
this power, in the name of the Prince Regent of Portugal, and of the
Portugueze nation, was as wise as the assumption itself was necessary
in such circumstances. The Portugueze people also were fully sensible
that their duty and their interest were the same, and never did any
people act with more determined zeal in defence of their country.
♦SIEGE OF ALMEIDA.♦
Massena opened his trenches on the night of August 15. While a false
attack was made against the north of the town, 2000 men dug the first
parallel to a depth of three feet; and on Sunday the 26th, at five
in the morning, eleven batteries, mounted with sixty-five pieces of
cannon, opened their fire. The garrison consisted of 5000 men, of whose
spirit no doubt was entertained; the fortress was well provided,
and its works had been placed in so respectable a state, that Lord
Wellington had reason to think it might delay the enemy till late in
the season, even if he should be unable to find an opportunity of
relieving it. These well-founded expectations were frustrated by one
of those chances which sometimes disconcert the wisest plans, and
disappoint the surest hopes of man. On the night after the batteries
opened, the large powder magazine in the citadel, with two smaller ones
contiguous to it, blew up. More than half the artillerymen, a great
number of the garrison, and many of the inhabitants, perished in this
dreadful explosion; many of the guns were dismounted, and the works
were rendered no longer defensible, even if means of defence had been
left; but, except a few cartridges for immediate use, and thirty-nine
barrels of powder in the laboratory, the whole of the ammunition was
destroyed.
♦SURRENDER OF THE PLACE.♦
Great as the calamity was, the evil would have been far more alarming
had it proceeded, as was at first supposed, from treason; but,
according to the best information which could be collected, it was
altogether accidental: the magazine was bomb-proof; and they were
taking ammunition from it, when a shell fell upon one of the carts. The
lieutenant-governor had behaved well till the batteries opened; he was
then so terrified, that he shut himself up in the bomb-proofs. Having
thus proved himself a coward, mere shame made him a traitor: and after
the explosion he took advantage of the confusion to counteract the
governor’s attempt at holding out longer. Another traitor was found
in the major of artillery. He had behaved well during the siege; but
when he was sent out to propose terms of capitulation, for the purpose
of gaining favour with the enemy he communicated to him the whole
extent of the disaster; so that Massena, knowing the place was at his
mercy, was enabled to dictate what terms he pleased. The garrison
were made prisoners of war, with this exception, that the militia,
having deposited their arms, should return to their homes, and not
serve during the war. It was ten at night when the capitulation was
concluded; in the course of half an hour the French recommenced their
fire upon the town, and kept it up till morning, when the Portugueze
were assured in reply to their remonstrances, that it had been owing
to a mistake on the part of the artillery officers: undoubtedly it
had been so; but the commander is chargeable with something worse
♦COMPILAÇAM DAS ORDENS DO DIA, 1810, P. 168.♦ than error, for having
suffered it to continue through the night without thinking it worth
while to send an order which would instantly have stopped it.
♦THE PORTUGUEZE PRISONERS ENLIST AND DESERT.♦
The terms were broken by the French with their wonted perfidy. They
tried persuasions first, and employed Alorna and the other traitors
who were with him to seduce their countrymen. Accordingly, when the
Portugueze laid down their arms upon the esplanade, they were invited
to volunteer into the French service; but not a man was found base
enough to come forward and accept the invitation. On the following
day, when the troops of the line and the militia had been separated,
they were tried separately. The troops were told, that unless they
accepted the alternative which was offered them, they must immediately
be marched into France; the hardships which they would suffer on their
march, and the treatment to which they would be exposed afterwards,
were represented to them in strong terms; and officers and men, with an
unanimity which might well have been suspected, agreed then to enlist
in the enemy’s service. They found means of informing Marshal Beresford
that they did this only for the sake of remaining within reach of their
own country, and making their escape as soon as possible; and the truth
of this declaration was proved by the numbers who soon rejoined the
allied army. Upon this occasion Marshal Beresford acted in a manner
becoming the British ♦CONDEMNATION OF THEIR CONDUCT.♦ character. He
expressed in general orders his strong disapprobation of such conduct;
for the soldiers, he said, some allowance was to be made; they were
excusable on the score of their want of education, their undoubted good
intention, and their feeling that the enemy with whom they had to deal
scrupled at no means, however unworthy, for the attainment of his ends.
Yet even in them it was to be discommended, and he doubted not that
henceforth those whom the fortune of war might throw into the enemy’s
♦1810. SEPTEMBER.♦ hands would take their lot patiently, and suffer any
thing rather than bring a stain upon the national honour. Nothing could
excuse the officers for conduct so base, so abominable, and so unworthy
of the Portugueze name. They had sinned against knowledge, and thereby
rendered themselves false and infamous; they had contracted a voluntary
engagement with the determination of not keeping it, placing themselves
in a miserable predicament, which rendered it only less infamous to
break their faith than to observe it. He should therefore report them
to their prince, that they might be dismissed with ignominy from the
service, and answer for their conduct according to the laws. At the
same time he published the names of five officers who, under a proper
sense of duty, had withstood the contagion of ill example.
♦MILITIA FORCED INTO THE FRENCH SERVICE.♦
There were three militia regiments in Almeida, those of Trancoso,
Guarda, and Arganil. Neither man nor officer of these could be induced
to serve against his country, nor self-seduced to tamper with his own
conscience. But instead of dismissing them according to the terms,
Massena said, that if they would not serve by fair means, they should
by force; and gave orders for forming a corps of pioneers, by detaining
200 men and seven officers from each regiment. Marshal Beresford
observed upon this, after honourably contrasting the conduct of the
militia with that of the regular troops, that the Portugueze, to
their misfortune, were too well acquainted with French morality for
this iniquity to surprise them: it was but one injury the more which
that outraged nation had to revenge, ... and his army would revenge
it. “Never,” said he, “even though Almeida is lost, never since the
beginning of the war has this kingdom been in so good a state for
resisting the enemy. Soldiers of the Portugueze army, if you remember
that we have the English army to co-operate with us, which has beaten
the enemy whenever it encountered them, ... if you call to mind who is
the commander of that army, and that he is yours also, ... if you have
confidence in him and in yourselves, the invaders never can conquer
Portugal. Your general has full confidence in the result, because he
confides in the inherent loyalty and valour of the nation, and in its
determination of sacrificing every thing to its fidelity, its liberty,
and its independence!”
♦THEY ESCAPE AND REJOIN THE ALLIES.♦
Massena asserted that the Porto regiment hated the English, and
therefore he should retain it in his service; but he belied his own
assertion by adding that he should keep a watchful eye on the men,
and not place them in important posts. If he judged in any degree of
the Portugueze people by the few traitorous nobles and fidalgos with
whom he was conversant, he was speedily undeceived. A night had not
elapsed before great part both of the officers and men were missing,
and in less than a fortnight nearly the whole escaped. The men, instead
of taking the opportunity of deserting, rejoined their countrymen in
arms; and the officers, unconscious of having done any thing unworthy,
presented themselves to the commander of the first detachment they
could reach, in a condition which pleaded for them, exhausted with
fatigue and hunger. They protested, when they found it necessary to
excuse themselves, that they had taken no oath of fidelity to the
French, and that to avoid it when it was to be tendered, they had fled
at all hazards, not waiting for safer opportunities. A representation
in their favour was made by Silveira; and Marshal Beresford in
consequence mitigated his former censure. It would, he said, be the
greatest satisfaction to him if he should find it confirmed that these
officers had not pledged themselves to the enemy; but what he wished to
enforce upon them was, that an officer ought to consider not merely the
end at which he aims, but the means also by which to bring it about,
that both may be alike honourable. He referred their conduct therefore
to a council of inquiry, under Silveira.
♦CHANGES IN THE PORTUGUEZE REGENCY.♦
The Portugueze regency now declared Alorna a traitor, and offered
a reward of a thousand moidores for bringing him in alive or dead.
The Marquis of Ponte de Lima, the Marquis of Loule, the Count of St.
Miguel, the Count of Ega, Gomes Friere de Andrade, and D. José Carcome
Lobo, were also declared traitors, and their property declared to be
confiscated: but they had powerful friends in the state; and it is said
that, notwithstanding the decree, their property remained untouched, in
the hands of persons in whom they could confide. A change had lately
taken place in the Portugueze regency. The Marquez das Minas resigned,
in consequence of an illness which soon proved fatal. The other two
members were, the Bishop of Porto, who was Patriarch elect, and the
Marquis Monteiro Mor. Four new members were now added; the Principal
Sousa, brother to the Conde de Linhares, who was minister in Brazil,
and to the Portugueze ambassador in England; the Conde de Redondo;
Ricardo Raymundo Nogueira, who had been law professor at Coimbra; and
the English ambassador, Mr. Stuart. Admiral Berkeley was at the same
time appointed by the Prince of Brazil commander-in-chief of the naval,
as Lord Wellington had been of the military force of Portugal. There
are few things in the annals of Great Britain more honourable to the
national character than the perfect confidence reposed in the English
nation by its old ally, and the manner in which that confidence was
requited. While the enemies of both countries were endeavouring to
incense the Portugueze against the English, by telling them that the
British government designed to usurp Portugal; and while the enemies
of administration were traducing and insulting the Portugueze people,
crying out that they would not defend themselves and could not be
defended by us, and therefore that we ought not to attempt to defend
them, the English army and the Portugueze people were acting with the
most perfect unanimity, for the common interests and common safety of
Great Britain and Portugal.
♦CONDUCT OF THE PORTUGUEZE GOVERNMENT.♦
The spirit of the people, without which all other means of defence must
have been ineffectual, was what England could neither give nor take
away; but for the measures by which that spirit was so directed as to
secure its end, Portugal was indebted to British councils. Military
and financial resources, of which the nation had not supposed itself
capable, were called forth; and the Portugueze were addressed by their
rulers in language to which they had long been unaccustomed, ... the
language of hope and confidence, and of conscious rectitude as well
as conscious strength. Like the Supreme Junta, the regents reminded
the Portugueze of their heroic ancestors; they spake of the wickedness
of the enemy, the inexpressible miseries which would accompany their
yoke, and the certainty of glorious success, if those exertions and
sacrifices were made which the emergency required; but the Portugueze
regency did not, like the Spaniards, speak to the people of the causes
which had rendered this invasion possible, and produced the decay of
Portugal; nor did they hold out the promise of the restoration of their
rights, the redress of their grievances, and the due execution of
their laws. Such promises were not necessary as excitement; a people
who were literally defending their hearths and altars, and fighting
to save their wives and daughters from violation and butchery, or to
revenge them, needed no additional feeling to goad them on: ... as
pledges they were not held out; because the government had not the
prudence to think of reforming itself. In providing for the defence
of the country, it acted providently and bravely, with wisdom and
with vigour; but in other things, the old leaven discovered itself,
and made it apparent that the pleasure of the minister was still the
law of Portugal. A decree was published, assigning to the widows,
children, or dependent brethren of those who had fallen at Almeida,
the full pay of the deceased, and half pay to the families of those
who were made prisoners. “The Prince,” it said, “would not believe
that any of his faithful vassals could have entered the service of the
enemy; and if any had been compelled to do so, he trusted they had only
yielded to compulsion, with the purpose of effecting their escape. He
suspended, therefore, his justice; but if a month elapsed before such
persons acquitted themselves by appearing, they would be considered as
traitors.” Now, the treason of the lieutenant-governor and the major
of artillery was open and undoubted: Lord Wellington had stated it in
his dispatches to the minister at war; their names were given in those
dispatches here in England, but suppressed in Portugal, out of favour
to their connexions.
♦ARBITRARY ARRESTS AT LISBON.♦
In another respect the conduct of the Portugueze regency was more
inexcusable. Eight-and-forty persons, of all ranks and professions, and
many of them unacquainted with each other, were seized in the night;
ten of them were sent to the tower of St. Julian, and the rest to the
Limoeiro, the common prison of the city. The most alarming rumours
were scattered abroad. A formidable and extensive conspiracy, it was
said, had been discovered, which had nothing less for its object than
a general massacre of the British, for the purpose of delivering up
the country to the French. These reports reached England, and received
their first contradiction from the Portugueze government themselves,
who found it expedient to declare, that neither Lord Wellington nor
Mr. Stuart had any part in their proceedings upon this occasion;
that the stories of the conspiracy, and of the arms which had been
discovered, were false; and that the individuals who had been arrested
had been sent out of the kingdom, only because it was the opinion of
the police that their residence in it might be prejudicial to the
public tranquillity. Some of these individuals were permitted to come
to England, others were sent to the Azores, after they had suffered
every kind of inconvenience, privation, and indignity, to the alarm and
distress of the families of all, and the ruin of some; ... there was
neither proof nor accusation against them; the whole, as a public act,
was one of those acts which mark the unheeding and unfeeling folly of
an ignorant and obstinate despotism, but of which the secret springs
are to be found in private malice or cupidity.
The manner in which the Portugueze government declared, that neither
Marshal General Lord Wellington, nor the minister plenipotentiary
of his Britannic Majesty, nor any individual of the British nation,
had any part in these proceedings, nor any previous knowledge of
them, make it apparent that the British general and the British
minister disapproved of an act of tyranny which was thus in reality
disclaimed on their part. They could not prevent that of which they
were not apprised before it was done, nor after it was done could
they express their disapprobation better than by requiring to have it
thus distinctly stated, that the regency had neither acted upon their
advice, nor received their sanction. It was the more to be regretted,
because the other measures of the government entitled them to respect
and gratitude. They had restored order in the country, and brought
its resources into action, and their public acts and declarations
corresponded to the spirit of the people. The ringleaders of the
mutiny, which, in its consequences, had given Soult possession of
Porto, were brought to trial and condign punishment; and after the most
impartial examination of his conduct, General Bernardim Freire de
Andrada, who had been murdered at Braga, was declared to have served
his country faithfully and well, and the memory of those unfortunate
men who perished in the same tumult was cleared of all imputation. An
army more numerous than Portugal had ever before possessed was formed,
equipped, and disciplined; and the government, when it reminded the
people of their strength, did not fear to tell them of their danger.
It announced the loss of Almeida, ... “a loss,” said the regents,
“greatly to be lamented for the death of part of its defenders, and
the unhappiness of others, who have thus fallen into captivity, but of
little importance to the great cause of the salvation of the country.
Wellington at the head of the allied armies; Beresford directing our
troops, who are indebted to him for their organization and their
discipline; brave soldiers, and a faithful people, who have sworn to
defend their prince and their native land to the last extremity; these
are the bulwarks which defend us; and these an army of slaves, who are
continually wasting away by want and desertion, will never be able to
beat down.”
♦APPREHENSIONS OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT.♦
The Portugueze, and those especially who were intrusted with the
government of their country, cannot be extolled above their merits, for
the spirit which they displayed at this crisis, the most momentous, and
to ordinary minds the most appalling of the whole war. Their merit is
the greater because there was not that vigour in the British cabinet
which the emergency required; and because with all their confidence in
British fidelity, they could not have been without some apprehension
of seeing the defence of Portugal abandoned by Great Britain. The
enemy had exultingly proclaimed that the English would fly to their
ships, and some colour for the boast was afforded by the fact that a
fleet large enough to receive the troops was lying in the Tagus, and
evidently detained there for such a service. The heavy baggage of the
army was actually kept on board; and Lord Wellington was at that time
acting under instructions of a character to excite in him any thing
rather than confidence or hope. They were to this effect, that his
majesty would be better pleased if the army were withdrawn too soon,
than that its embarkation should be endangered by the least delay.
Such instructions must inevitably have drawn on the disgrace and
ruin which they anticipated, if they had been addressed to a man of
inferior capacity, or meaner mind. A want of courage and of generosity
was implied in them which is but too characteristic of British
ministries. Instead of assuring the commander of support, whatever
might be the issue, if nothing on his part were left undone, he was
made to understand that any risk which he incurred must be upon his own
responsibility, and that any disaster which he might sustain would be
imputed to his decision. But Providence was with us, and directed the
course of events to a glorious and happy issue, notwithstanding our
repeated errors.
Lord Wellington had the farther mortification of knowing that the
army, satisfied as he was with its conduct in all respects, partook
that despondency which the pestilent activity of a faction at home was
continually labouring to produce, and which the events of the campaign
had hitherto tended to confirm. His plans had been long meditated and
wisely formed; but the reasonable expectations which he founded upon
them were disappointed by the accident that drew after it the fall
of Almeida. That place might easily have held out till the autumnal
rains should have rendered it impossible for the French to advance,
and scarcely practicable for them to have subsisted their army upon
that frontier. To gain time at this juncture was for him to gain every
thing: here he thought to have wintered in the sure expectation that
every day would render the Portugueze troops more efficient, and with
the reasonable hope that, through Marquis Wellesley’s influence in
the cabinet, he should receive such reinforcements as would enable
him to act upon the offensive. Accident had frustrated this intent;
the enemy were enabled to advance, elated with their fortune, and
relying upon it as the only divinity in which they were encouraged
to trust; and Massena, whose plans had hitherto succeeded beyond his
calculations, and even to the extent of his hopes, had the advantage of
relying upon the disposition as well as the efficiency of his army,
and the full support of a government which placed ample means at his
command, crippled him with no restrictions, and threatened him with no
responsibility.
♦MOVEMENTS OF REGNIER’S CORPS, AND OF GENERAL HILL.♦
Upon the fall of Almeida Lord Wellington’s head-quarters were removed
to Gouvea, and the whole of his infantry retired to the rear of
Celorico, the outposts continuing in advance of that town. Massena
waited till he had been joined by Regnier’s corps, consisting of
17,000 men, which, having acted with little success against Romana
in Extremadura, had crossed the Tagus at Barca de Alconete, early in
July. According to the plan which Buonaparte had laid down for the
conquest of Portugal, this corps was to have moved by the right bank
of the Tagus upon Abrantes; but this design having been altered when
the allied army was found more numerous and efficient than the French
cabinet had supposed, Regnier had moved upon Zarzamayor, Penamacor, and
Monsanto, in the hope of striking a blow against Lieutenant-General
Hill, who had advanced with 13,000 men from Abrantes to Portalegre,
for the purpose of supporting Romana. The French hoped either that
he would expose himself to an attack, or that Lord Wellington might
be tempted to make a movement against Regnier, of which Massena was
prepared to take advantage; but the British generals were not thus to
be circumvented: and Massena as well as Lord Wellington, directing his
attention to a single object, Regnier joined the invading force, while
Hill was stationed at Sarzedas, to cover the road upon Abrantes to
Lisbon, or move to Ponte de Murcella, and unite with the main body on
the line of its retreat: in either case Major-General Leith’s division,
which was kept at Thomar in reserve to support him, was to take the
same direction.
♦MASSENA ADVANCES INTO PORTUGAL.♦
Had Massena despised the allied army in truth as he affected to
do, he would now have marched by Castello Branco, Abrantes, and
Santarem, direct upon Lisbon, leaving Lord Wellington behind him; but
he remembered the fate of Junot, and had too much respect for the
enemy with whom he had to contend. Relying, however, upon numbers and
fortune, and taking into account the indecision and timidity which
seemed to characterize the British counsels, he expected that Lord
Wellington, being too weak to risk a battle, would retreat, if not fly
before him, with no other hope than that of reaching the ships and
securing his embarkation. Under this imagination he ordered the French
army to provide itself for seventeen days, by which time he expected
to finish the campaign triumphantly. The only impediment which he
apprehended on the way was from the difficulty of transport. For this
reason very few women were allowed to accompany the army; they were
left at Ciudad Rodrigo, where so many had assembled to share in the
spoils and pleasures of Lisbon with their friends and husbands, that
the place, because of the round of gaieties which was there kept up,
was called Little Paris. From thence they were to follow when the easy
conquest should be completed; and this was thought so certain, that
engagements were made for parties to be given in the capital. With this
confidence, and this levity of mind, the French entered upon their
third invasion of Portugal. They began their march in three bodies,
Junot’s corps with the artillery and cavalry proceeding by Pinhel
and Trancoso, Ney’s by Alverca, and Regnier’s by Guarda. At the same
time, Lord Wellington, aware of the enemy’s intent, began to retreat
towards Coimbra deliberately, and with such evident forethought and
determination, that this retrograde movement did not in the slightest
degree abate the spirits of the army. No stores were abandoned, no men
and horses foundered; the operations were all performed with regularity
and ease; the soldiers suffered no privations, and underwent no
unnecessary fatigue; the inhabitants retired under their protection,
and assisted them in breaking up the bridges, destroying the mills,
and laying waste the country; so that Massena found a desert as he
advanced. In the town of Celorico there were only two inhabitants,
and nothing but bare walls. At that ♦NEY AND REGNIER’S CORPS JOIN
HIM AT CELORICO.♦ place the corps of Regnier and Ney effected their
junction. The appearance of the former made it evident that there was
no intention of acting upon the Tagus; and it appeared also, upon
their taking the road by Fornos, that it was Massena’s intention to
proceed upon the right side of the Mondego, not upon the left by way of
Penalva and Ponte de Murcella, where he thought Lord Wellington would
be prepared to resist him in a strong position: he calculated upon
turning this position, and so making himself master of Coimbra and the
resources which the fertile country about that city would supply. But
he did not calculate upon the foresight and decision of the British
General, nor upon the spirit of the Portugueze people: he hoped to
delude them by promises, and to find them as he advanced remaining
patiently in their towns and villages, in expectation of the conquest
which awaited them. With ♦SEPT. 20.♦ this intent he gave orders that
the troops should halt before they entered Viseu, till the inhabitants
might be assured of protection for themselves and their property. No
persons were found abroad there; the soldiers were still forbidden to
enter any house forcibly on pain of severe punishment, and Massena
himself remained a while in the streets, expecting the effect of his
condescending patience. Night was setting in, and the word was at
length given that the soldiers might quarter themselves. The doors were
presently broken open, ... but neither inhabitants nor provisions were
there; every thing had been carried away, all had fled; even no lights
were to be found, except those which were burning in the churches. The
only living souls remaining there were a few poor wretches in the
hospital, who were in too pitiable a state for removal: one medical
attendant had been left with them; he also had fled upon the entrance
of the French, but upon the information of his patients he was pursued
and overtaken, and ordered to continue at his post, and assure the
town’s-people when they ventured back that no ill treatment was to be
apprehended from the French conquerors.
♦THE FRENCH ARMY COLLECTED AT VISEU.♦
Here Junot, with the artillery and cavalry, joined the army; but this
junction, which completed the concentration of the French force, was
impeded by Colonel Trant with some Portugueze militia and dragoons,
who attacked the convoy near Tojal. Had this enterprise been executed
as well as it was planned and timed, a blow might have been inflicted
which the enemy would have felt severely; but the French, by their
prompt discipline and judicious boldness, deterred the militia from
pursuing their success, ♦JONES’S ACCOUNT OF THE WAR, I. 297.♦ and
the park fell back on Trancoso. This delay, however, was no light
advantage for the allies: it compelled Massena to remain two days at
Viseu waiting for his artillery, and the time thus gained enabled Lord
Wellington to collect his force upon the ground whereon, now that
Massena’s movements were foreseen, he had determined to withstand him.
♦LORD WELLINGTON CROSSES TO THE SERRA DE BUSACO. SEPT. 21.♦
On the day after the French commander arrived at Viseu, General
Hill joined the British army at Ponte de Murcella; the bridge was
destroyed, and he was left there with his division, while the rest of
the army crossed the Mondego, and Lord Wellington himself proceeded
to the Serra de Busaco, a mountainous ridge eight miles in length,
and terminating precipitously on the Mondego; the Serra de Murcella,
in like manner, terminating on the opposite bank. By daylight on the
following morning the light division and the cavalry, with General
Pack’s Portugueze brigade, assembled in the plain of Mortagoa, having
their picquets upon the Criz; the bridge over that little river was
destroyed. That day the enemy appeared in sight, and on the morrow,
about three in the afternoon, drove in the picquets; some skirmishing
ensued, the allies retreated to the rear of the plain, and at night
began their march over the Serra. The place appointed for their bivouac
was on the other side, two leagues distant, but the acclivity was so
steep, that owing to this cause, and to the impediment occasioned by
the breaking down of some artillery waggons, they did not reach it
till it was daylight. It was generally supposed in the army at this
time that no stand would be made, but Lord Wellington’s determination
soon became apparent. Had his army indeed been numerous enough to have
occupied the whole ridge, no enemy could have ventured to attack him
there, the ascent being too steep for cavalry, and the height of the
position above the ground in its front such as to render the use of
artillery on the part of the assailants almost unavailing: occupied
as it was, it was impregnable. The general elevation of the ridge is
from nine to twelve hundred feet, and it is crossed by two roads, both
leading from the north to Coimbra, the one passing near the convent,
the other about a league to the southward.
♦BUSACO.♦
Busaco, which was now to become famous in British and Portugueze
history, had long been a venerable name in Portugal. It is the only
place in that kingdom where the barefooted Carmelites possessed what in
monastic language is called a desert; by which term an establishment is
designated where those brethren whose piety flies the highest pitch may
at once enjoy the advantages of the eremite and the discipline of the
cœnobite life, and thus indulge the ♦GENERAL MACKINNON’S JOURNAL, P.
74.♦ heroism of ascetic devotion in security. The convent, surrounded
by an extensive and almost impervious wood, stands in what may be
called the crater of the loftiest part of the ridge: its precincts,
which included a circumference of about four miles, were walled in.
Within that circuit were various chapels and religious stations; and
on the summit of the mountain, which is within the inclosure, a stone
cross was erected of enormous size, upon so huge a foundation, that
three thousand cart-loads of stone were employed in constructing its
base. The cells of the brethren were round the church[16], not in a
regular building, but accommodated to the irregularities of the ground,
and lined with cork, which was every where used instead of wood because
of the dampness of the situation. Every cell had its garden and its
water-course for irrigating it, the cultivation of these little spots
being the only recreation which the inhabitants allowed themselves
as lawful. In one of these gardens the first cedars which grew in
Portugal were raised. It was indeed one of those places where man has
converted an earthly Paradise into a Purgatory for himself, but where
superstition almost seems sanctified by every thing around it. Lord
Wellington’s head-quarters were in the convent; and the solitude and
silence of Busaco were now broken by events, in which its hermits,
dead as they were to the world, might be permitted to partake all the
agitations of earthly hope and fear.
On the 26th Generals Hill and Leith joined the army. This corps had
made so rapid and arduous a march, that Massena regarded its junction
as impossible, and reckoned therefore that the force which he wished
to attack must necessarily be weak in front, if indeed Lord Wellington
should venture to give him battle. That general arrived on the same
day at Mortagoa, and the bridge over the Criz was re-established for
his artillery, the army having crossed at a ford a little way above.
Some skirmishing took place, and at S. Antonio do Cantaro the French
were resisted in a manner which made them first apprehend that a
determined stand was to be made against them. Massena himself upon this
reconnoitred the position, after which he asked one of the unworthy
Portugueze who accompanied him, if he thought the allies would give him
battle? He ♦RELAÇAM DA CAMPANHA DE MASSENA. INVESTIGADOR PORTUGUEZ,
VOL. VI. 59.♦ was answered, that undoubtedly they would, seeing they
showed themselves in such strength. The French Marshal replied, I
cannot persuade myself that Lord Wellington will risk the loss of his
reputation; but if he does, ... I have him! To-morrow we shall effect
the conquest of Portugal; and in a few days I shall drown the leopard!
♦BATTLE OF BUSACO. SEPT. 27.♦
About two on the following morning the French army was in motion.
Ney’s corps formed in close column on the right, at the foot of the
hill, and on the road which leads to the convent; Regnier’s on the
left, upon the southern road which passes by S. Antonio do Cantaro;
Junot’s was in the centre, and in reserve; the cavalry was in the
rear, the ground not permitting it to act. The allied British and
Portugueze army was posted along the ridge of the Serra, forming the
segment of a circle, the extreme points of which embraced every part
of the enemy’s position, and from whence every movement on their part
could be immediately observed. The troops had bivouacked that night in
position, as they stood: Lord Wellington in the wood near the centre,
the general officers at the heads of their divisions and brigades. The
orders were that all should stand to their arms before daylight; and
the whole army were in high spirits, deeming themselves sure of an
action, and of success. Before daybreak the rattling of the enemy’s
carriages was heard, and a few of their guns were brought to fire upon
a smaller number of British ones which had been placed to command the
road. At dawn the action began on the right, and after some firing
by the light troops in advance of the position, the enemy attacked a
village which was in front of the light division, and which, though
its possession was of advantage to the French, Lord Wellington chose
rather to let them occupy, than suffer an action to be brought on upon
less favourable ground than that which he had chosen, and where he was
sure of success. The nature of the ground, upon which this assurance
was founded, facilitated the enemy’s movements to a certain degree,
but no farther; its steepness and its inequalities covered their
ascent, and they gained the summit with little loss. Regnier’s corps
was the first that was seriously engaged: it ascended at a part where
there were only a few light troops; and being thus enabled to deploy
without opposition, the French possessed themselves for a moment,
in considerable strength, of a point within the line. Their first
column was received by the 88th regiment alone, part of Major-General
Mackinnon’s brigade, which was presently reinforced by half the 45th,
and soon afterwards by the 8th Portugueze: their second found the 74th,
with the 9th and 21st Portugueze, ready to receive them on the right.
Being repulsed there, they tried the centre with no better fortune;
the remainder of Major-General Picton’s division coming up, he charged
them with the bayonet, and dislodged them, greatly superior in numbers
as they were, from the strong ground which they had gained; at the
same time, Major-General Leith arriving with a brigade on their flank,
joined in the charge, and they were driven down the hill with great
slaughter, leaving 700 dead upon the ground. Few prisoners were taken.
Marshal Ney meantime was not more fortunate with his division. Part
of it he formed in column of mass, and ordered it to ascend upon
the right of the village which he had occupied. They came up in the
best possible order, though not without suffering considerably from
the light infantry; the ground, however, covered them in part by
its steepness. Major-General Craufurd, who commanded on that side,
judiciously made his troops withdraw just behind the crest of the ridge
whereon they were formed: he himself remained in front, on horseback,
observing the enemy. No sooner had they reached the summit than the
guns of his division opened a destructive fire upon them; and the men
appearing suddenly at a distance only of some twenty paces, advanced
and charged. Instantly the French were broken: the foremost regiments
of the column were almost destroyed, and those who escaped fled down
the steep declivity, running, sliding, or rolling, as they could.
General Simon, who commanded the column, was wounded and taken. Massena
was now convinced that the attack could not succeed, and therefore
halted the support at the foot of the hill. He endeavoured to decoy
Lord Wellington out of a position which had been proved impregnable;
but the British commander persisted in the sure system on which he had
resolved, and the remainder of the day was employed in skirmishing
between the light troops. They were directed to retire when pressed,
and give the enemy an opportunity of repeating the attack. But the
enemy had received too severe a lesson to venture upon a repetition,
and as night approached they were drawn off to some distance, near the
ground where Junot and the reserve were stationed. The village which
they had been allowed to occupy in the morning still remained in their
possession. Major-General Craufurd sent to the officer who commanded
there, saying it was necessary for his corps, and requiring him to
abandon it. The reply was, that he would die in defence of the post
with which he was intrusted. This tone ♦MEMOIRS OF THE EARLY CAMPAIGNS,
171.♦ was neither called for by the occasion nor justified by the
event. Six guns were immediately opened upon him; some companies of the
43d and of the Rifle Corps were ordered to charge the village; the
French were instantly driven out, and the advanced post of the light
division resumed possession.
♦BEHAVIOUR OF THE PORTUGUEZE TROOPS.♦
Victories of greater result at the time have been gained in Portugal,
but never was a battle fought there of more eventual importance to the
Portugueze nation; for the Portugueze troops, whom the French despised,
whom the enemies of the ministry in England reviled, and whom perhaps
many of the British army till then mistrusted, established that day
their character both for courage[17] and for discipline, and proved,
that however the government and the institutions of that kingdom had
been perverted and debased, the people had not degenerated. Lord
Wellington bore testimony to their deserts: he declared that he had
never seen a more gallant attack than that which they made upon the
enemy who had reached the ridge of the Serra; they were worthy, he
said, of contending in the same ranks with the British troops in that
good cause, which they afforded the best hopes of saving. Marshal
Beresford bestowed high and deserved praise upon them in general
orders; and the opportunity was taken of granting a free pardon to all
who were under arrest for military offences, that they might rejoin
their regiments, and emulate their comrades, to whose good conduct
they were indebted for this forgiveness; but persons who had been
apprehended for robbery or murder were excepted from the amnesty, for
these, it was properly observed, were not to be considered merely as
military crimes. After this battle, the knighthood of the Bath was
conferred on Marshal Beresford, in consideration of those exertions by
which the Portugueze troops had been qualified to bear their part in it
so honourably[18].
The loss of the British in this memorable action amounted to 107
killed, 493 wounded, and thirty-one taken; that of the Portugueze to
90 killed, 512 wounded, and twenty taken. One French general, three
colonels, thirty-three officers, and 250 men were made prisoners;
2000 were left dead on the field; the number was ascertained, because
Massena sent a flag of truce requesting permission to bury them; it was
not thought proper to comply with the request, and they were buried by
the conquerors. Most of their wounded, who were very numerous[19], were
left to the mercy of the peasants; General Craufurd, whose division was
the last that withdrew from the Serra, saved as many as he could from
their hands, and lodged them in the convent. Unground maize was found
in the knapsacks of the French.
♦MASSENA MARCHES INTO THE PORTO ROAD.♦
Massena having in person directed the operations of the day, had
purchased at some cost the conviction that his boast was not here to
be realized. He consulted with Ney, Regnier, Junot, and Freirion; and
they called in the Portugueze traitors to inquire of them by what
course a position might be turned, which they found themselves unable
to force. None of these unworthy men happened to be acquainted with
that part of the country; the French commander turned from them in
evident displeasure, as if they ought to have possessed the information
of which he stood in need, and he ordered General Montbrun out with a
strong detachment to explore the ways, telling him to send Generals
St. Croix and Lamotte in different directions on the same service. On
the following day two peasants were brought in; promises could draw
nothing from them, but they yielded to threats of torture and death,
and informed the enemy that there was a pass[20] over the Serra de
Caramula, communicating with the great road between Porto and Coimbra,
and coming into it near Sardam. By this course Massena immediately
determined to proceed. There had been skirmishing throughout the
morning between the light troops; the better to conceal their
movements, the French set fire to the woods; but the summit of Busaco
commands a most extensive prospect over the whole country[21]: early
in the afternoon a large body of their horse and foot was observed in
motion from the left of their centre to the rear, and from thence their
cavalry were seen in march along the road leading from Mortagoa, over
the mountain, toward Porto. Lord Wellington at once apprehended their
purpose, and perceived that it was now too late to prevent or to impede
it.
♦COLONEL TRANT’S MOVEMENTS.♦
Orders had been dispatched from the Ponte de Murcella on the 19th to
Colonel Trant, who was then acting as Brigadier with some Portugueze
militia, that he should occupy the villages of Sardam and Aguada. The
division which he commanded formed part of the force under General
Bacellar, who was then at Moimenta da Beira, and whose instructions
were to consider the defence of the Douro, and more especially of
Porto as his principal object. The orders were that Trant should march
by S. Pedro do Sul, which was the nearest line, but the worst road,
and through a country exhausted of provisions, in consequence of the
passage of the enemy by Viseu, and the abandonment of the intermediate
district by its inhabitants. Partly for these considerations General
Bacellar directed him to make a circuit by Porto, but chiefly because
he had ascertained that a French detachment of 1500 men had entered S.
Pedro; and because he considered it his main business to provide for
the protection of Porto, which he also supposed to be Lord Wellington’s
object in ordering this movement. Trant proposed to attack the enemy
at S. Pedro, and force his way, if possible; Bacellar would not permit
him to make the attempt, because he thought it too hazardous for
troops like his; and Trant in consequence took the circuitous route.
He left his men near the points which he had been instructed ♦SEPT.
28.♦ to occupy, early on the morning after the battle, and proceeded
to the head-quarters at Busaco, where he arrived before eleven in
the forenoon, and was then first apprized that it had been intended
he should occupy the village of Boyalva, and defend the pass over
the Serra de Caramula. He offered instantly to return and occupy the
intended ground; and there was time for doing it, but the offer was
declined. Lord Wellington had not detached any part of his own army to
these passes, because in case of failure, the troops must have been cut
off from the main body; whereas the Portugueze, if compelled to retire,
might fall back upon Porto, according to their destination. Had the
ground been stronger than it was, it was not to be supposed that 1500
militia could maintain it against Massena’s army; for to that number
Trant’s force was reduced, the men having marched 190 miles in nine
successive days, and many, while traversing the district in which they
were raised, had absented themselves, without leave, to revisit their
families. They might possibly have held it long enough to bring on a
general action, if Lord Wellington had thought it advisable again to
venture one; but the same motives which withheld him from giving battle
for the relief of Ciudad Rodrigo, or Almeida, influenced him still:
he had indeed more confidence in the Portugueze troops, but the other
reasons existed in their full strength: adhering to his long concerted
plans, which were laid for sure though slow success, he determined upon
committing nothing to the mere fortune of war; Trant therefore returned
to Sardam, to act as ♦THE ALLIES WITHDRAW FROM BUSACO.♦ opportunity
might offer, and Lord Wellington during the night withdrew his army
from Busaco. General Hill recrossed the Mondego, retiring toward
Santarem by way of Thomar, and Lord Wellington marched on Coimbra,
leaving Craufurd with a few piquets on the Serra, where he performed
the humane office of providing for the wounded French, who had been
abandoned by their countrymen, for want of means to remove them.
♦TRANT RETREATS TO THE VOUGA.♦
On the evening of the 28th the enemy’s cavalry entered Boyalva,
driving in a piquet of the Light Dragoons. It is an open village, on
the western slope of the hill, where there is no defile, and where
the ground is not broken. Trant was then at Sardam, where, during the
following day and night, he occupied one half the united villages,
the enemy’s cavalry occupying the other. As he could no longer be of
service here, and was aware that he should be attacked in the course of
the day if he remained longer, early on the 30th he resolved to retire
behind the Vouga. La Croix, who, with a column of horse, was scouring
the country upon the right flank of the invading army, fell in with
his outposts, attacked them, and drove them in with the loss of one
officer and five-and-twenty men[22]. The infantry, by good fortune,
had effected their passage; they formed in defence of the bridge, and
La Croix having no infantry, did not attempt to force it. The Vouga
was at this time fordable, and therefore Trant marched in the night to
Oliveira, on the Porto road, from whence, if it should be necessary, he
could in one day reach the Douro, and cross it for the defence of that
city. There were then no other troops to defend it, and if the enemy
had pursued, Porto might have been a second time in their power. That
this was not done is not surprising, because it did not consist with
the scheme of Massena’s operations; but that the French should have
neglected so fair an opportunity of dispersing Trant’s force, which
if not dispersed might be expected presently to harass their rear,
must be accounted among those errors with which the whole course of
human events is marked, and in which the religious mind perceives the
superintendence of a higher power than man.
♦THE ALLIES CROSS THE MONDEGO.♦
The allies being on the shorter line to Coimbra, were sufficiently in
advance of the enemy for all their movements to be conducted with the
same coolness and order which had characterized the whole retreat. On
the 30th the infantry crossed from Coimbra into the great Lisbon road.
The rear-guard of cavalry bivouacked in front of Fornos, and remained
bridled up all night, in a very dangerous situation, the enemy having
pushed a strong force close to ♦OCT. 1.♦ them. In the morning they were
driven in some confusion through Fornos by a large body of horse and
foot: they formed on the great plain of Coimbra, and the French seeing
the three brigades of cavalry with six guns of the horse artillery
ready to receive them, did not venture to leave the inclosures. Before
noon the rear-guard received orders to retire, and crossed the Mondego
accordingly at the fords near S. Martinho do Bispo. The enemy pushed
on their horse, came up just as the passage had been effected, and
attempted to cross, as if in pursuit: they were charged, and driven
back by a squadron of the 16th, after which they dismounted, and fired
with their carbines ineffectually across the river. The passage might
have been defended with good prospect of success, but this was not
consistent with Lord Wellington’s plans, which were to draw the French
to a point where they should be at the greatest distance from their
resources, and where his own would be at hand.
♦1810. OCTOBER.
FLIGHT OF THE INHABITANTS FROM COIMBRA.♦
When it was known in Coimbra that the enemy were approaching, and the
retreat of the British made it evident that the city would be at their
mercy, a cry soon arose that the French had actually entered, and the
whole of the inhabitants who had not yet provided for their safety ran
shrieking toward the bridge. On all other sides they were cut off from
flight. The bridge, which is long and narrow, was presently choked
by the crowd of fugitives; and multitudes in the hurry of their fear
rushed into the Mondego, and made their way through the water, which
was in many parts three or four feet deep. The gateway, which was the
city prison, is near the bridge, and the screams of the prisoners, who
beheld this scene of terror from their grates, and expected something
far more dreadful from the cruelty of the French than they had reason
to apprehend from the laws of their own country, were heard amid all
the uproar and confusion. Lord Wellington heard them, and in compassion
sent his aide-de-camp, Lord March, to set them at liberty.
♦THE FRENCH ENTER COIMBRA.♦
Massena expected to find great resources in Coimbra, a large and
flourishing city situated in the finest part of a beautiful and
fertile country. He found it utterly deserted, like every place which
the French had hitherto entered on their march. With the intent of
securing the stores, he forbade all pillage, and gave orders that
only the brigade which was to be left in garrison there should enter.
In defiance of these orders Junot commanded his men to make their
way in, and break open the houses, as the owners had thought proper
to abandon them. Such directions were eagerly obeyed; the men forced
the guard, which, in pursuance of Massena’s instructions, had been
stationed at the gate of S. Sophia; the other troops immediately joined
them in their occupation, and Massena neither attempted to enforce his
own orders, nor manifested any displeasure during the scene of wanton
waste and havoc which ensued. The magazines of the allied army had been
removed, and Montbrun, who was dispatched to Figueira for the chance
of overtaking them there, arrived too late: but provision enough, it
is said, was found in Coimbra to have served the enemy for a month’s
consumption, if proper measures had been adopted for its preservation.
The people who so unanimously forsook their homes had had neither time
nor means for removing their property. So long as it was uncertain
in which direction the invaders would move, and while a possibility
remained that they might be successfully resisted upon the way, the
people of Coimbra had lived in hope that this dire necessity might be
averted; and when it came upon them, so many cars were required for the
sick and wounded, and other services of the enemy, that few or none
were left for them.
♦THE PORTUGUEZE PEOPLE FLY BEFORE THE ENEMY.♦
It is the custom throughout the south of India, that when a hostile
army approaches, the natives bury their treasure, forsake their
houses, take with them as much food as they can carry, and seek the
protection of some strong place, or conceal themselves among the woods
and mountains. People in these deplorable circumstances are called the
Wulsa of the district. The Wulsa has never been known to depart on
the approach of a British force, if unaccompanied by Indian allies.
This, however, is no peculiar honour of the British name; it belongs
rather to the European character, for no such spectacle had ever been
exhibited in European warfare till the present campaign. The orders of
the Regency and of the commander-in-chief might have been issued in
vain, if the Portugueze people had not from cruel experience felt the
necessity of this measure for their individual safety. The alternative
was dreadful, and yet better than that of remaining at the mercy of
such invaders. It was a miserable sight to see them accompanying the
columns of the retreating army, well-ordered as the movements of
that army were, and resolutely, as on the few occasions which were
offered, it met and checked the pursuers. All ranks and conditions were
confounded in the general calamity: families accustomed to the comforts
of a delightful climate and fruitful country followed the troops on
foot; there was no security for age, or sex, or childhood, but in
flight[23]. Every thing was left behind them except what the women
could carry; for even in this extremity the men very generally observed
the national prejudice, which deems it disgraceful for man to bear a
burthen.
♦HOPES AND EXPECTATIONS OF THE FRENCH.♦
Boastful as the French commander was, and confident in his own fortune,
and in the hitherto unchecked prosperity of the Emperor Napoleon, the
battle of Busaco made him apprehend that the enterprise in which he had
engaged was not so easy as he had imagined, nor so free from all risk
of disasters. There were not fewer than 5000 sick and wounded whom it
was necessary to leave at Coimbra; as many more had been left at Busaco
dead on the field, or abandoned there because their condition was
hopeless, or for want of means to remove them. But a loss of 10,000 men
upon his march, without any commensurate diminution of the allies, had
not been allowed for in his calculations; and he found himself unable
to leave a guard of sufficient strength at Coimbra, without weakening
his army too much. He thought therefore that the surest course by which
he could secure his sick and wounded was to pursue the English with all
his force, and drive them out of the country, for he still persuaded
himself that they were flying to their ships. This opinion he expressed
in dispatches which were intercepted. The other generals partook the
same delusion; they no longer despised the British troops, but they had
not yet been taught to respect the councils of the British government,
and the nature of its policy they could neither believe nor comprehend;
for it appeared to them incredible that any government should act upon
principles of integrity and honour. They supposed that Lord Wellington
would embark as soon as he reached Lisbon, and that it was his
intention to carry off as many of the Portugueze youth as he could get
on board, by way of securing some compensation for the expenses of the
war!
♦CONFUSION AT CONDEIXA.♦
With these expectations they followed the retreating army, not with the
ardour of pursuit, but ready to avail themselves of any opportunity
that might present itself, and cautious how they offered any to an
enemy whom they no longer affected to despise. The single occasion
which occurred in their favour they were not near enough to seize. It
was at Condeixa (the Conimbrica of the Romans); the town is built on
the ridge of the hill, and the road passes through it along a narrow
street; the people of the vicinity crowded in simultaneously with
the troops, and the inhabitants at the same time hurried to join in
a retreat which they had delayed till the last minute. They were in
great alarm, the way was blocked up by some of the country carts, and
had it not been for the good discipline which the troops observed in
this scene of confusion, and the exertions of the officers, the enemy
might have obtained no inconsiderable advantage. But they were not near
enough to profit by the favourable opportunity: order was restored
in time; and this was the only moment of serious danger during the
whole retreat. Massena pushed forward to this town, without halting at
Coimbra; but he found it necessary to remain here three days, for the
purpose of resting his troops and collecting such provisions as the
inhabitants had not been able to remove, and the retreating army had
left untouched. As the enemy advanced, the allies retired a march or
two before them; the infantry proceeded with as little molestation as
if they had been marching through a country which was in peace; the
cavalry covered the retreat, and no stragglers were to be seen.
♦LEIRIA FORSAKEN.♦
Some skirmishing took place near Pombal, with trifling loss on the
part of the allies, and more on that of the enemy. Ney and Junot
took this line of march, while Regnier advanced ♦OCT. 5.♦ upon the
road to Thomar. Leiria was forsaken by its whole population: a city
thus deserted offered such temptation, that discipline could not be
maintained in the retreating army without some examples of severity,
and one British and one native soldier were punished with death for
breaking into a chapel and plundering it. Here the allied army divided,
one part taking the road to Alcobaça, the other to Rio Mayor. ♦ALCOBAÇA
FORSAKEN BY THE MONKS.♦ The monks of Alcobaça performed on this
occasion toward the British officers their last act of hospitality.
Most of them had already departed from the magnificent and ancient
abode, where the greater part of their lives had been spent peacefully
and inoffensively, to seek an asylum where they could; the few who
remained prepared dinner for their guests in the great hall and in
the apartments reserved for strangers, after which they brought them
the keys, and desired them to take whatever they liked, ... for they
expected that every thing would be destroyed by the French. Means were
afforded them, through General Mackinnon’s kindness, for saving some
things which they could not otherwise have removed; and then the most
venerable edifice in Portugal for its antiquity, its history, its
literary treasures, and the tombs which it contained, was abandoned to
an invader who delighted in defiling whatever was held sacred, and in
destroying whatever a generous enemy, from the impulse of feeling and
the sense of honour, would carefully have preserved.
♦SURPRISE AT ALCOENTRE.♦
The rains now commenced, and set in with their accustomed severity in
that country. By this time the infantry had reached their positions;
but the cavalry who covered the rear were exposed to the whole severity
of the weather, bivouacking every night, because the enemy were so
close that it would have been imprudent for them to occupy a village.
Sir Stapleton Cotton, however, having reached the little town of
Alcoentre, took up his quarters there; the French, expecting that in
this heavy and incessant rain the English would apprehend no enterprise
on their part, took advantage of the weather, and endeavoured to
surprise him there; his piquets were driven in; and almost as soon as
the alarm could be given, they were in the town, and in possession of
six guns. A squadron from the 16th came down in time, charged them
in the street, recovered the guns, and drove them to the other end
of the town. Some severe skirmishing occurred on the following day,
in which the 3d regiment of French hussars behaved most gallantly.
At daybreak on the 10th the enemy had lost sight of the allies, and
when they reached Moinho do Cubo, where the roads to Alenquer and
Lisbon divide, they knew not which course to take. Two peasants were
brought in by their detachments, and were asked which way the English
had retreated, and where their lines were, ... for by this time
Massena had found cause to doubt whether a general who retreated so
deliberately had no other intention than to embark and fly as soon as
he reached Lisbon. The men answered that they could give no information
on either point, because they knew nothing; military punishment was
immediately inflicted upon them, to extort what they were determined
not to disclose, and they both endured it till they fainted, thus
giving the French another proof of national resolution, and of the
feeling of the Portugueze towards them. Being thus disappointed of the
intelligence which they expected, the French vanguard, which consisted
of 10,000 men, divided. The division which took the Alenquer road came
in sight of a column of the allies on ♦THE FRENCH DISCOVER THE LINES OF
THE ALLIES.♦ the heights beyond that town; on the following day this
column retreated in good order to Sobral, and was driven out of it: the
French were pursuing their advantage when a peasant fell into their
hands, who, unlike his countrymen, answered without hesitation all the
interrogatories which were put to him; he told the commander that they
were close upon the British lines, and pointed out to him where the
batteries were, in constructing which he had himself laboured. Had it
not been for his warning, this ♦INVESTIGADOR PORTUGUEZ, T. VI. 64.♦
body of the enemy would presently have been in a situation from which
it could hardly have escaped. They halted instantly, and fell back;
Massena was informed of the discovery which had been made; and three
days elapsed before the invaders again approached the works of the
allies so nearly.
♦FEELINGS OF THE ARMY.♦
The army had commenced their retrograde movement from the frontiers
with an impression that the cause wherein they were engaged had become
hopeless, and that when they reached Lisbon they should be embarked,
and abandon Portugal. This opinion had been altered by the course of
events during the retreat, and by the manner in which that retreat had
been conducted. There had been no alarm, no confusion, no precipitance
upon the march. Nothing could have been conducted with greater ease to
the troops; not a straggler had been taken, not a gun abandoned, not
an article of baggage lost; the infantry had never even been seen by
the enemy, except at Busaco, where they gave them battle, and signally
defeated them: and the cavalry had taken on the way more prisoners from
the enemy than the allies lost, a circumstance which probably never
occurred in any former retreat. The troops, therefore, became confident
that their commander had no thought of abandoning the contest; and that
an embarkation was not his object, but that he was acting upon some
settled plan, which he was well able to carry to the end. But when they
entered the lines which they were to occupy, their surprise was hardly
less than that of Massena and his army, at the foresight which they
there saw displayed, and the skill with which a strong position had
been rendered impregnable.
♦THE LINES OF TORRES VEDRAS.♦
At the close of the last century Sir Charles Stuart had perceived
that, if the French should ever seriously attempt the conquest of
Portugal, here was the vantage ground of defence; and Lord Wellington,
in his campaign against Junot, had observed this part of the country
at leisure, and came to the same conclusion. Portugal, he said in
the House of Commons, could be defended, but not on the frontier;
the defence must be on the strong ground about Lisbon; and that
consideration, he added, was in his mind when the Convention of Cintra
was made. As soon, therefore, as the impossibility of co-operating with
the Spaniards to any good effect had been fully proved, and it became
apparent that the decisive struggle must be made in Portugal, upon this
ground he resolved to make it. Early in the year it was stated in the
English newspapers that men were employed in fortifying this position,
but no mention of it had subsequently appeared, and it is truly
remarkable that works of such magnitude and importance should have
been commenced and perfected without exciting the slightest attention
during their progress. They extended from Alhandra on the Tagus to the
mouth of the little river Sizandro: the direct line across the country
between these points is about six-and-twenty miles; the line of defence
was about forty. All roads which could have afforded any advantage to
the enemy were destroyed, and others opened by which the allies might
effect their communications with most facility. In some places, streams
were dammed and inundations formed; in others the sides of the ravines
and hills were scarped perpendicularly; intrenchments were thrown up
wherever they could be serviceable; every approach was commanded by
cannon, placed in posts which had been rendered inaccessible; and
at all the most important points redoubts were erected capable of
resisting even if the enemy should establish themselves in their rear,
and well provided with stores and ammunition for defence.