SIEGE OF HOSTALRICH. ATTEMPT UPON VALENCIA. CAPTURE OF LERIDA.
OPERATIONS BEFORE CADIZ.
♦1810.♦
If proof had been wanting that men of any country may be made good
soldiers under good discipline, it might have been seen at this time in
Buonaparte’s armies, where the Italians, who in their own country ran
like sheep before the French, were now embodied with them, and approved
themselves in every respect equal to their former conquerors. These
men, who were taken by the conscription to bear part in a war wherein
they had no concern, who had no national character to support, nothing
but the spirit of their profession to animate them, were nevertheless
equal to any service required from them, and needed no other excitement
than that they were fighting for pay, and plunder, and life. Was it
then to be doubted, that if the same care were bestowed in training,
the same results would be seen in the Spaniards and Portugueze,
who were under the influence of every passion and every principle
which can strengthen and elevate the heart of man, ... both people
too being alike remarkable for national feeling, and for patience
under difficulties and privations, docility to their superiors, and
faithful attachment to those in whom they trust? It was not indeed to
be expected that the Spaniards would so far acknowledge their military
degradation as to put themselves under the tuition of an ally; Spain
had not abated sufficiently of its old pretensions, thus to humiliate
itself. Neither indeed was that degradation so complete as it had been
in Portugal. The Spanish artillery was most respectable; and there
were officers in the army who had studied their profession, and whose
talents might have raised them to distinction in the proudest age of
Spanish history. But the Portugueze were conscious of their weakness,
and in this knowledge they found their strength: for when that brave
and generous people, in the extremity of their fortune, submitted
implicitly to the direction of their old hereditary ally, ... when they
offered hands and hearts for the common cause, and asked for assistance
and instruction, the ultimate success of that cause became as certain
as any thing can possibly be deemed by human foresight. With Portugal
for the scene of action, and her population ready for every sacrifice
that duty might require, it remained only for Great Britain to feel and
understand its own strength, and employ its inexhaustible resources in
exertions adequate to the occasion.
But Great Britain as yet hardly understood its strength. The cold
poison which was continually instilled by party writers into the public
ear had produced some effect even upon the sound part of the nation.
From the commencement of the war it had been proclaimed as a truth too
certain to be disputed, that England could no longer as a military
power compete with France, consequently that we must rely upon our
insular situation, and husband our resources. These opinions had been
so long repeated, that they had acquired something like the authority
of prescription; the government itself seemed to distrust the national
power, and in the fear of hazarding too much, apportioned always for
every service the smallest possible force that could be supposed
adequate to the object, instead of placing at the general’s disposal
such ample means as might ensure success. The first departure from this
over-cautious system was in the expedition to Walcheren, where a great
armament was worse than wasted. That miserable enterprise weakened the
government, and in some degree disheartened it; and Lord Wellington,
in addition to the other difficulties of his situation, had long to
struggle with insufficient means. But the exertions and the experience
of the last year had not been lost: the British army had acquired a
reputation which, however successfully Buonaparte concealed it from
the French people, was felt by his soldiers and his generals: time had
been gained for training the Portugueze troops, and preparing for the
defence of Portugal; and the British Commander having proved both his
enemies and his allies, had clearly foreseen the course which the war
would take, and determined upon his own measures with the calmness of
a mind that knew how to make the best advantage of the events it could
not control.
♦O’DONNELL APPOINTED TO THE COMMAND IN CATALONIA.♦
While both parties were preparing for a campaign in Portugal, in which
the enemy expected to complete the conquest of the Peninsula, and
Lord Wellington felt assured that the tide of their fortune would be
turned; while the war before Cadiz was pursued with little exertion
or enterprise on either side, and the cities of Andalusia were
occupied without a struggle by the invaders; in Catalonia the contest
was carried on with renewed vigour. The fall of Gerona enabled the
besieging army to undertake farther operations; but the Catalans, as
well as the French, had changed their commander. Upon Blake’s recall
to the south, D. Juan de Henestrosa had succeeded to the command;
the provincial Junta however, in accord with the general wish of the
people and of the troops, appointed O’Donnell in his stead, and this
nomination was ♦GARCIA CONDE MADE GOVERNOR OF LERIDA.♦ confirmed by the
Regency. It gave offence to Garcia Conde, who was an older officer, and
had also distinguished himself during the siege of ♦VON STAFF, 246.♦
Gerona. He resigned the command of the first division in disgust: this
act of intemperance, however, was overlooked, and he was made governor
of Lerida, a post of great importance at that time, but to which his
services and his character seemed fairly to entitle him. The Duque del
Parque had more reason for displeasure at O’Donnell’s promotion; in
the belief that he was to have the command in Catalonia by the express
desire of the Catalan people, he had taken leave of his own army, and
Romana had been appointed to succeed him.
♦RAPID PROMOTION IN THE SPANISH ARMIES.♦
If heroes who carry victory with their single presence were to be
produced as if by miracle, according to Lord Holland’s supposition,
by democratic institutions, during such struggles as that in which
the Spaniards were engaged, fairer opportunities for their appearance
could not have been afforded under the most democratic forms than
were given both by the Central Junta and by the Regency. There had
been a flagrant exception in the case of Alburquerque; the union of
high rank, deserved popularity, and great military talents in his
person, had excited unworthy jealousies in some, and worse passions in
others: but in every other instance, promotion had rapidly followed
upon desert; a rash and even ruinous confidence had been shown where
any promise of ability appeared; and men were raised so rapidly, that
they became giddy with their sudden elevation. But Henrique O’Donnell
justified the expectations which had been formed of him. While the
French proclaimed in their official accounts, that now Gerona had
been taken, little more was required for the complete subjugation of
Catalonia; that the Ampurdam was already reduced; that the peasants,
as they were taken in arms, were hung up in great numbers upon the
trees along the road side, and that the French communications had at
length been rendered secure, the fall of Gerona, like that of Zaragoza,
had animated the Spaniards, not discouraged them: they looked to the
spirit which the garrison and the inhabitants had displayed, not to the
surrender which famine had rendered inevitable, and in the religious
and heroic endurance which had there been manifested, found cause for
more ennobling pride and surer hope than a victory in the field would
have given them. Eroles was charged by the superior Junta to enforce
the decree for embodying every fifth man. He called upon the Catalans
in language suited to the times, reminding them of their forefathers
who spread terror through the Greek empire; and referring to those
regiments of the Gerona garrison, which but a little while before the
siege had been filled up with men thus levied, as having exemplified
not less illustriously the powerful effects of discipline. By this
means the army was recruited, and the men hoping for change of fortune
with every change of commander, entered cheerfully upon the service
under O’Donnell, who had hitherto only been known by his adventurous
exploits and his success.
♦CONDUCT OF THE PEOPLE OF VILLADRAU.♦
In the other parts of Spain, grievously as all had suffered, the
scene of action had frequently been shifted; but in Catalonia there
had been no intermission. From the commencement till the termination
of the war, the struggle was carried on there without an interval
of rest. A memorable instance of the provincial spirit was given at
this time by the people of Villadrau, an open town, in the plain of
Vich; on the approach of an enemy’s detachment, which they had no
means of resisting, the whole of its inhabitants, in the middle of
February, retired to the mountains. The French Commandant, finding
the place utterly deserted, wrote to the Regidor, telling him that if
the inhabitants were not brought back by the following day, he should
be obliged to report their conduct to Marshal Augereau, and take the
necessary measures for reducing them to obedience: at the same time he
assured him that the most effectual means should be used for preserving
order. This answer was returned by the Regidor: “All these people,
that the French nation may know the love they bear to their religion,
their King, and their country, are contented to remain buried among the
snows of Montsen, rather than submit to the hateful dominion of the
French troops.” So many families, in the same spirit, forsook their
homes, rather than remain subject to the invaders, that the superior
Junta, at O’Donnell’s suggestion, issued an order for providing them
with quarters in the same manner as the soldiers. The exceptions to
this spirit were found, where they were to be expected, in the rich
commercial towns, as at Reus. If the people of Barcelona, like those of
Villadrau, and of so many smaller places, had abandoned their houses,
that city could not long have been held by the enemy; in that case the
blockade might have been as rigorous, and almost as effectual by land
as by sea: but provisions for the use of the inhabitants were allowed
by the Spanish generals to enter; and therefore, though the French
might be sometimes inconvenienced, it was certain that they would never
be exposed to any serious danger of famine.
♦HOSTALRICH.♦
The communication between Gerona and that city was impeded by
Hostalrich, a modern fortress, overlooking a small and decayed town,
which had once been fortified. It is situated on high and broken
ground, seven leagues from Gerona. The intermediate country is of the
wildest character, consisting of mountains covered with pines; the
road winds through sundry defiles, so narrow, that in most places the
river nearly fills up the way; the pass is so difficult, that in one
part it has obtained the name of El Purgatorio; and the outlet is
commanded by this fortress. Part of the town had been burnt during the
siege of Gerona, when the magazines which had been collected there were
taken by the enemy. An enemy’s division, under the Italian General
Mazzuchelli, occupied it now, preparatory to the siege of the castle;
the inhabitants, upon their approach, took refuge in the church, and
there defended themselves till a detachment of the garrison sallied,
and relieved them; and before the blockade of the fortress was
pressed, they had time to remove and seek shelter where they could. The
garrison meantime prepared for a Spanish defence. This fortress, said
the governor Julian de Estrada, is the daughter of Gerona, and ought to
imitate the example of its mother!
♦COMMENCEMENT OF THE SIEGE.♦
The siege began on the 13th of January: a week afterwards one of the
outworks, called the Friars’ Tower, was attacked; the officer in
command, D. Francisco Oliver, was killed by a hand-grenade, which
exploded as he was in the act of throwing it; and the man who succeeded
him, immediately, either through cowardice, or from a worse motive,
surrendered his post. Augereau, who was at this time come to inspect
the siege and accelerate the operations, thought it a good opportunity
to intimidate the governor. He therefore summoned him to surrender,
saying, that the garrison should in that case be allowed the honours
of war, and marched as prisoners into France; giving them two hours
to reply, and warning them that if they refused to submit upon this
summons, they must not expect to be treated like soldiers, but should
suffer capital punishment, as men taken in rebellion against their
lawful king. Estrada replied, that the Spaniards had no other king
than Ferdinand VII. The siege was carried on with little vigour till
the 20th of February, when the French began to bombard the fort; but
the men who defended it showed themselves worthy of the cause in which
they were engaged, and of their commander; and here, as at Gerona, the
French, with all their skill, and all their numbers, found that the
strength of a fortress depends less upon its walls and bulwarks, than
upon the virtue of those who defend it.
♦FIRST SUCCESS OF O’DONNELL.♦
The force under Augereau’s command was sufficiently large for carrying
on the siege of Hostalrich, commencing operations against Lerida,
and acting at the same time against O’Donnell, whose troops the
French Marshal despised, as consisting merely of raw levies. He was
soon taught to respect them and their General; for when he himself
went to Barcelona with a considerable convoy of stores, and 1500 of
the garrison were sent to occupy O’Donnell’s attention, not a fifth
part of the number effected their retreat into the city. More than
500 of the French were slain, and nearly as many taken ♦DESERTION
FROM THE FRENCH ARMY.♦ prisoners. They suffered a greater loss from
desertion. Buonaparte had pursued the wicked policy of forcing into
his own service the Austrian prisoners taken in the late war; 800 of
these men went over to the Spaniards in a body, stipulating only that
they might keep their arms, and remain together, till they should
be distributed among the regiments of the line. General Doyle had
addressed proclamations to the soldiers in the French service, not only
in the French and Spanish languages, but in Italian, Dutch, German, and
Polish also, setting before them the real cause of a war, the nature of
which they saw and felt. The Catalans too had learnt the good policy
of distinguishing between the French and the foreigners in the French
army, treating the latter, when they were taken, with kindness, as men
who had been brought against them by compulsion. The effect of this
system, and of the proclamations, was such as greatly to alarm the
enemy. They lost in this manner more than 6000 men, wretched as the
service was to which the men went over. It was not possible for them
to take any effectual means for checking this evil, when such constant
opportunities were offered in the desultory warfare which they were
compelled to carry on.
♦WANT OF CONCERT BETWEEN THE PROVINCES.♦
Had the Spanish army been even in a tolerable condition, this
cause must have produced the ruin of the French in Catalonia; but
the deserters found that they were exchanging a bad service for a
worse. The French troops, though by a policy not less ruinous than
detestable, left to supply themselves as they could, were, even at the
worst, better provided than the Spaniards in their best state. They
had always the benefit of system, regularity, and order; while the
Spaniards suffered as much from the confusion which insubordination
and the total want of method occasioned, as from neglect on the part
of the local authorities and the provincial government. Owing to these
combined causes their armies were often in a state of destitution.
Unanimous as Spain was in its feeling of indignant abhorrence at the
insolent usurpation which Buonaparte had attempted, it was divided
against itself whenever provincial interests appeared to clash. Neither
Catalonia nor Valencia would at this time make common cause with
Arragon, although they were engaged with the same passionate feeling,
for the same object, against the same enemy, and although their own
safety was immediately involved in the fate of that kingdom. The
Arragonese army consisted of about 13,000 men in three divisions, one
of which was near Teruel, another near Tortosa, and the third on the
line of the Cinca; the men were without pay, without arms, without
clothing; the officers on a fourth part of their appointments. Twenty
thousand men would eagerly have joined that army, if they could have
been armed and fed; the people had given abundant proof of their zeal,
and spirit, and devotion, and the army had done its duty: yet Valencia
would spare them none of its own ample resources, and the Catalan
government even stopped the supplies which were intended for Arragon.
The Arragonese felt this the more indignantly, because, while Lazan
was at their head, his rank and influence ensured some attention to
his representations on their behalf; but Lazan, whether or not justly,
had been arrested, as being implicated in the intrigues of Montijo and
D. Francisco Palafox, and was kept a close prisoner in Peñiscola. The
judge who officially inquired into his conduct declared that there was
not the slightest proof ♦1810. FEBRUARY.♦ against him; and upon the
overthrow of the Central Junta, Saavedra dispatched an order for his
liberation; but the Junta of Valencia, with that order in their hands,
detained him in strict confinement.
♦NEGLECT OF THE VALENCIAN GOVERNMENT.♦
No province had as yet suffered so little as Valencia; the people were
proud of the spirit and signal success with which they had repelled
Marshal Moncey from the walls of their capital; their country was the
most fertile and most populous part of Spain; men were in abundance,
wealth was not wanting, and there were more appearances of activity
and preparation than were any where else to be seen. In every town and
village militia and guerilla bands were formed; about 50,000 were thus
embodied, the greater part armed with fire-arms; and besides these
there were 11,000 troops of the line; but with this force nothing
was undertaken. Good service might have been rendered on one side by
harassing the enemy’s communications in La Mancha; and scenes of more
important action were open both in Arragon and Catalonia, ... even on
their own borders; but the will, courage, and means were inefficient,
for want of capacity in their leaders. They waited for the enemy upon
their own ground, in hope and in confidence, but without foresight
or system. General Doyle endeavoured to convince the provincial
government that no time should be lost in fortifying the important
points of Morella, Oropesa, and Murviedro. He inferred from some of
Suchet’s movements an intention to establish himself in the latter
place, which would have cut off the communication between Catalonia
and the rest of Spain, and have given him command of the Huerta de
Valencia, and of the whole country to the very gates of Tortosa. But
in the confidence and confusion which prevailed alike in the people
and in the officers and the rulers, nothing was done; and so far were
they from storing Tarragona, and forming a depôt at Peñiscola, as the
importance of the crisis required, that Tortosa itself had not at this
time provisions for a week’s consumption. They relied upon the defence
of their frontier, upon their own numbers and resources, upon fortune
and Providence; for themselves, they were ready to meet the danger
manfully whenever it should come, ... but as for any system of defence,
to fortune and Providence that seemed to be left.
♦THE FORCE ON THE VALENCIAN FRONTIER DISPERSED.♦
The Valencians were in this state when the half-armed, half-clothed,
half-hungered Arragonese, with whom their abundant means ought to have
been shared, were dispersed, and the frontier in consequence was left
open. General Caro determined to march upon Teruel, which the French
had entered, but the movements of an active enemy soon compelled him
to change this determination. One division of Suchet’s army advanced
from Alcañiz upon Morella; no means had been taken for strengthening
that important point, the Valencians therefore fell back from thence,
and from San Mateo also, and the enemy, without experiencing any
opposition, proceeded by Burriol with all speed toward Murviedro.
Meantime Suchet with the other division advanced upon the same point
by way of Alventosa; there he encountered a brave resistance from the
vanguard of Caro’s army, and after a contest, which lasted nearly the
whole day, was repulsed. The Spanish commander, expecting a renewal of
the attack, requested a reinforcement from Segorbe; he was informed in
reply, that General Caro had ordered the troops to fall back upon the
capital. This disheartened men who were too prone to interpret an order
for retreating as a signal for flight; they dispersed upon the next
attack, leaving the artillery upon the ground; Segorbe was entered in
pursuit, and Suchet, having sacked that place, effected a junction with
the other division of his army at Murviedro.
His corps consisted of about 12,000 men, with thirty field-pieces; a
force manifestly insufficient for its object, if he had not counted
upon the success of his machinations in the capital. ♦SUCHET ADVANCES
AGAINST VALENCIA.♦ From thence he advanced to the Puig, and having
fixed his head-quarters on the spot ♦MARCH 6.♦ where King Jayme el
Conquistador had encamped when he undertook the conquest of Valencia,
he addressed a letter to the Captain General Caro, saying, that he
came not to make war upon the happy capital of the finest kingdom
in Spain, nor to lay waste the delicious country which surrounded
it, but to offer protection and peace, such as Jaen, and Granada,
♦1810. MARCH.♦ and Cordoba, and Seville were enjoying. Andalusia had
submitted; the army, having discharged its duty, had entered into the
service of King Joseph Napoleon; and the militia, consisting of men
enlisted by force, and under the penalty of death if they refused,
had been dismissed. Religion was respected, justice observed, private
property untouched; and General Caro was now invited to open the gates
of Valencia, that the French might enter, and he might deserve the
blessings of his country. Wherefore should he prolong a contest, the
issue of which the Spaniards themselves could now no longer consider
doubtful? They had done enough to prove their courage, and it was time
that their sufferings should have an end. The Captain General’s answer
contained some stinging truths, and some remarkable falsehoods. It
contrasted the professions of General Suchet with his actual conduct;
and it assured him that the French had been completely defeated between
Puerto Real and the Isle of Leon, that they had evacuated Seville
in consequence, and were in full retreat toward the Sierra Morena.
Authentic intelligence was so irregularly communicated, and the most
extravagant reports so eagerly propagated and so readily believed,
that it is very possible the Captain General of Valencia believed the
incredible statement which he advanced. Suchet addressed a summons
also to the inhabitants of Valencia, calling upon them as proprietors
and parents to consult their own interest and their duty, by preserving
their beautiful and flourishing city from the calamities of war. They
returned for answer, that they were prepared to sacrifice every thing
in the defence of their just cause; that having defeated Moncey in a
similar attempt, they had good reason now to hope for the same success;
and that it was for his Excellency, who so humanely deprecated the
effusion of blood, to consider whether the best method of avoiding that
evil was not to abstain from an attack?
♦HE RETREATS FROM VALENCIA.♦
Suchet, in fact, had no intention of making one. It was, however,
expected by the Valencians; and in that expectation the superior Junta,
by Caro’s advice, had removed to St. Felipe, a city to which it seems
strange that its old name of Xativa should not have been at this time
restored. There they were to exert themselves for supplying the capital
and annoying the invaders, a military Junta being appointed meantime
within the city, to dispose of the peasantry who had flocked thither,
and to direct the labours of a willing people. A former Junta had been
assembled after the dispersion at Alventosa, and in the course of the
ensuing night every member had been arrested upon a charge of treason.
An edict also was passed, confiscating the property of all who had fled
from the city at this time, their absence being interpreted as proof
either of cowardice or of treachery. Such severity was not without
cause. Relying upon their intelligence in the city, the van of the
French army entered the suburb of Murviedro, and occupied the College
of Pius V. the Royal Palace, and the Zaidia, all which are without the
walls on the farther bank of the Turia. From the palace they fired upon
the bridge; and they exasperated, if it were possible to exasperate,
the hatred of the Spaniards, by exposing the images which they had
taken from the churches on their march and in the suburbs to the fire
of the city, having stript some of their taudry attire, and dressed up
others in regimentals. But finding their hopes fail, and not being in
sufficient force to venture upon an attack, they decamped during the
night of the 11th, retreating with such celerity, that they abandoned
great part of their plunder.
♦A CONSPIRACY DISCOVERED IN THAT CITY.♦
The Valencians imputed their deliverance on this occasion to their
Patroness and Generalissima, the Virgin, under her invocation of Maria
Santissima de los Desamparados, and to the Saints who were natives of
Valencia. A deliverance it was; for a plan had actually been formed to
assassinate the Captain General, and proclamations in favour of King
Joseph and his French allies were found upon the chief mover of this
treason, Colonel Baron de Pozoblanco. This person, who appears to have
been a revolutionary fanatic, suffered under the hangman; his head
was exposed upon a stake in the market-place, with an inscription
under it, announcing his crime, and charging him also with belonging
to the sect of the illuminated Egyptian freemasons, which was said to
be extending itself from Madrid into La Mancha, Murcia, and Valencia,
and to have converted the different appellations of the Virgin into
distinctive names for its own organization.
♦THE FRENCH BOAST OF SUCCESS.♦
Suchet’s expedition was not made without loss; some of his garrisons
and smaller parties were cut off by the Arragonese troops in his rear,
under D. Pedro Villacampa. The Castle of Benasque had been taken before
he marched against Valencia, and that capture completed his military
possession of the north of Arragon; but the people, when deprived of
their fortresses, found fastnesses in their mountains, and waged from
thence a wearying and wasting war against their oppressors; and Mina’s
prisoners were escorted from the frontier of Navarre to Lerida, through
a country of which the French called and fancied themselves masters.
This desultory warfare was carried on in Catalonia also with no less
skill than success. Augereau had supposed, that after the reduction
of Gerona little more was necessary for the complete subjugation of
the province; he boasted of a victory in the plain of Vich, the most
glorious, it was said, which the French had yet obtained, wherein
O’Donnell had lost 7000 men, with the whole of his baggage, and after
which he could find no place of safety till he had taken refuge under
the walls of Tarragona. Souham in like manner proclaimed that the
famous Rovira had fled before him, notwithstanding his vaunts of the
incursions, robberies, and assassinations upon which he prided himself.
It was presently seen with what little foundation the invaders boasted
of these triumphs.
♦O’DONNELL’S SUCCESSFUL OPERATIONS.♦
O’Donnell’s movements were not in consequence of a defeat. Having
experienced the superiority which the enemy’s discipline gave them
in the management of large bodies, he had immediate recourse to that
system of warfare, in which enterprise, celerity, and the ardour of
the soldiers, are of more avail than tactics. Therefore he retreated
rapidly from Moya to Terrasa, leaving Manresa uncovered: the
inhabitants of that city forsook it on the approach of the French; and
O’Donnell continuing ♦MARCH 16.♦ to lead the invaders on, fell back,
first to Villa-franca del Panades, then to Torre-dembarra, finally
under the walls of Tarragona, executing these movements in good order,
and without loss. The enemy, in pursuit, as they believed, of a flying
army, occupied Manresa with 1500 men, left 900 in Villa-franca, and
proceeded till they also came in sight of Tarragona. One division
occupied Vendrell, and extended to Arco de Barra, upon the high road
to Barcelona; but in a few days this division joined the main body,
which was at Coll de Santa Cristina, and they immediately advanced
♦MARCH 28.♦ towards Valls. O’Donnell, profiting by this movement,
sent Camp Marshal D. Juan Caro against Villa-franca; Caro proceeded by
forced marches, and surprised the enemy on the following ♦MARCH 30.♦
morning; between 200 and 300 were killed, and 640 made prisoners, not a
man escaping. Caro himself was wounded; the command of his detachment
devolved upon Brigadier D. Gervasio Gasca, and they proceeded toward
Manresa, to attack the enemy, who occupied that town.
A body of 500 or 600 had already been sent to reinforce the French
in Manresa, and had effected their junction, though not without the
loss of two carts of ammunition, and forty killed, in an action with a
party of somatenes and of expatriates, as those Spaniards were called
whose homes were occupied by the enemy. Augereau no sooner heard of
the loss in Villa-franca, than, apprehending a similar attack upon
Manresa, he ordered a further reinforcement of 1200 men from Barcelona,
to proceed thither with the utmost celerity. Gasca, receiving timely
intelligence of their movement, instead ♦APRIL 3.♦ of proceeding
upon Manresa, marched to intercept this column, and fell in with it
between Esparraguera and Abrera; 400 were left upon the field, 500 made
prisoners, and the remainder fled toward Barcelona, not more than 200
reaching that city. The Spaniards, after this second success, prepared
to execute their projected attack upon the enemy in Manresa, and the
Marquis de Campoverde took the command for this purpose: but the men
had exerted themselves too much in forced marches and in action to
perform a third enterprise with the same celerity as the two former;
and on the night before the attack should have been made, Schwartz,
who headed the French detachment, evacuated the town, and took the
road to Barcelona by Santa Clara, Barata, and Marieta. He began his
retreat at eleven on the night of the 4th. Brigadier D. Francisco
Milans, who was stationed at St. Fructuos, passing the night under
arms, to be ready for the attack at seven on the following morning, was
apprised of the enemy’s retreat between four and five, and dispatched
the corps of expatriates, under Rovira, in pursuit, while the rest of
the division followed as fast as possible. Rovira, whom the French had
lately reviled as a wretch who was flying before them, passing in two
hours over a distance which was the ordinary journey of four, in their
pursuit, overtook them at Hostalet, and attacked them with his usual
intrepidity. Schwartz, whose force consisted of 1500 men, formed them
into a column, and continued to retreat, fighting as he went. Rovira,
however, so impeded his movements, that he gave time for Milans to come
up with him near Sabadell; the Spaniards then charged with the bayonet;
500 of the French fell, 300 were made prisoners; Schwartz himself was
wounded, and owed his life to the swiftness of his horse. Some of the
French, after having surrendered, were said to have fired upon the
Spaniards, and this was assigned as the cause why the number of the
slain exceeded that of the prisoners.
The amount of the killed and taken in these actions falls far short of
the sum of the French loss; for the desertion was very great, every
defeat giving the Germans, who were forced into their wicked service,
an opportunity of escaping from it. The whole loss which they sustained
from these well-planned enterprises was not less than 5000. O’Donnell
hoped that he should now be enabled to relieve Hostalrich; but the
main body of the French returning toward Barcelona from Reus, which
they had taken possession of a few days before, compelled Campoverde’s
division to fall back, and thus prevented the attempt. In Catalonia,
indeed, though more military talent and far more energy were displayed
than in the other provinces, it was less a war of armies than of the
people against a great military force. Wherever the French moved in
large bodies, the Catalans could not resist them, or resisted in vain;
in general actions and in sieges, the enemy were sure to be successful;
the French, therefore, and they in this country who would have had
us abandon the Peninsula to their mercy, concluded that the party
which won battles, and captured fortresses, must necessarily soon
become masters of the country; and they reasoned thus, because they
never took into their calculation the national character, the natural
strength of Spain, and the moral strength of man.
♦1810. FEBRUARY.
SIEGE OF HOSTALRICH.♦
The effect of that moral power was shown not less admirably at
Hostalrich than it had been at Zaragoza and Gerona, though the three
sieges differed from each other in all their circumstances. The little
town of Hostalrich was not included within the works, and the fortress
contained no other inhabitants than its garrison. The bombardment
began on the 20th of February. The adjutant, D. Jose Antonio Roca, was
writing a dispatch for the governor to the commander-in-chief, when a
shell burst so near them, that one of the fragments entered the room
and swept away every thing from off the table: Roca picked up his
paper, and, remarking that the sand which it carried with it might save
him the trouble of telling the general they were bombarded, continued
his dispatch. A private soldier, who went out of the works for water,
received a musket-ball in his groin as he was returning; he laid one
hand upon the wound, and carrying in the pitcher steadily with the
other, met his serjeant, to whom he delivered it; then groping in the
wound for the ball, which probably had not gone deep, he pulled it out
with his fingers, and gave it to the serjeant, saying, “I deposit this
ball in your hands; keep it for me, and as soon as I am cured, this
very bullet shall revenge me upon the first Frenchman at whom I can
get a shot.” And as he went to the hospital he charged his comrades,
in case he should not live to take vengeance for himself, that they
would take it for him. Such was the spirit with which Hostalrich was
defended. “Let every circumstance of the siege be made known!” said
this brave garrison; “if we are successful, the detail will give hope,
and confidence, and joy to every true patriot; if we are unfortunate,
it will excite a different feeling, but it will never produce shame or
dismay.”
♦1810. MARCH.♦
Verdier, who now commanded the besieging force, addressed a new summons
to the governor at the time of O’Donnell’s retreat to Tarragona,
representing that movement as the consequence of a total defeat. “The
wreck of the Spanish army,” he said, “was seeking a moment’s shelter
in Tarragona and Tortosa, vigorously pursued by Augereau in person,
who would immediately commence the siege of both places. The siege of
Lerida was already far advanced, and its fall inevitable. Hostalrich
was a fort of no other use than as it interrupted the communication
between Gerona and Barcelona; and this purpose it no longer effected,
the French having made a new road, and communicating freely between
those cities. The object, therefore, for defending it, no longer
existed; and longer resistance, instead of adding to the governor’s
glory, would be called a vain obstinacy, draw upon him the reproaches
of posterity, and make him responsible for the blood which should be
shed.” Considering these circumstances, the French general summoned
him to surrender, and offered him the honours of war. The Marshal Duke
of Castiglione, Augereau, he added, revoking his former declaration,
had authorized him to propose these terms. “You will do well, sir,”
he continued, “to accept them with glory; if you delay, they will
without doubt be refused to you; and you will then be obliged to suffer
conditions, which, however rigorous they may appear, are dictated by
justice, seeing that a protracted resistance is neither justified by
honour nor by reason.” Estrada replied, by simply referring him to his
former determination, and to the conduct of the garrison.
The situation of the fortress, upon a craggy height, secured it against
an assault, while there were any resolute men to defend it. The
bombardment continued till every building within the walls had been
destroyed, except a casemate, which served as an hospital, and was only
large enough to hold one-and-twenty beds; the remainder of the sick
and wounded were secured in a mine, and the garrison also had their
quarters under ground. Supplies had been introduced about the middle of
the siege; all other attempts had been defeated, and would have been
of no avail at length had they succeeded, because the cisterns were
destroyed. Estrada had the example of O’Donnell’s retreat from Gerona
before him, and determined to make his way through the enemy’s lines,
rather than capitulate. This he concerted with O’Donnell, ♦1810. MAY.♦
who, for the purpose of deceiving the besiegers, ordered some vessels
to approach Arenys de Mar, the nearest part of the coast, sent one
detachment to call off their attention on the side of Orsaviña and
Monnegre, and another on the southern skirts of Monseny, toward Breda.
Augereau, who had come to witness the capture of a fortress which had
resisted him for four months, sent in a last summons on the evening
of the 11th of May, offering the same terms which had been granted
to Gerona; he allowed the governor two hours for consideration, and
declared, that if the fort was not then delivered up, the whole of
the garrison should be put to the sword. Estrada laid this before his
officers, and with one consent they returned for answer, that they
thanked the Marshal for thinking them worthy of being thus named with
Gerona, but that they were not yet in a condition which should make
them yield. On the following morning, the men, to their great joy, were
informed of the resolution which had been taken.
♦RETREAT OF THE GARRISON.♦
The French expected such an attempt, and judged, from the stir which
they beheld in the fort, that it would be made in the ensuing night.
That evening, therefore, they strengthened their post at Tordera on the
right, thinking, as the men themselves did, that the governor would
make for Arenys de Mar, where the ships were awaiting him. At ten,
the garrison descended the glacis on the side of the high road of St.
Celoni, and crossed the road and the space between the fort and the
heights of Masanas. It was broad moonlight. Two advanced parties, to
the right and left, fell upon the enemy’s picquets with the bayonet;
those, however, who escaped gave the alarm; but the garrison had gained
the start, ascended to St. Jacinto, and hastened toward St. Feliu
de Buxaleu. A league from Hostalrich they fell in with an enemy’s
encampment, and routed them; this gave the alarm to another body of
2000 French, whose station was near, on the road to Arbucias; but they
were received so resolutely, that they soon gave over the pursuit.
Thus all was effected which could be done by skill and courage; one
division lost its way, and many of the men dropt on the road, their
strength failing them on this great exertion, from the want of rest and
food, which they had long endured. Among them was the noble Julian de
Estrada, who thus fell into the hands of the enemy: this was a heavier
loss to his country than that of the fortress which he had defended so
well; for in the course of the war, Catalonia had but too much cause
bitterly to regret the loss of such men as Estrada and Alvarez. Five
hundred men reached Vich in safety on the following day, 132 joined
them on the next, being part of the battalion of Gerona, who had lost
their way and fallen in with the enemy; stragglers continually came in,
and on the evening of that day, the number who had accomplished their
retreat amounted to 800, though the French asserted, that every man
was either killed or taken.
In such an enterprise, it was impossible to bring off the sick and
wounded; the comptroller of the hospital, D. Manuel Miguel Mellado,
remained with them to go through the form of delivering up the ruins,
and provide for their safety. Such of the invalids as were best able
mounted guard, the gates were closed, and the drawbridges raised; and
in this state Mellado anxiously waited for what might happen. Half an
hour before midnight, a brisk fire of musketry was poured in upon the
flanks of the ravelin, and of St. Francisco. Mellado called out to
the enemy to cease firing, for the fort was theirs; and he requested
them to wait till the morning, that he might deliver a letter from
the governor to the French general. They replied, they would suffer
no delay, the gates must instantly be opened; otherwise, they had
ladders, and would enter and put every man to the sword. He, however,
told them he would not open the gates till he had seen their general;
upon this they renewed their fire, setting up a loud shout like men
who were about to obtain possession of their prey. Mellado hastened
to the bulwark of St. Barbara, where he apprehended the escalade
would be made, and there he perceived that the enemy, who had found
a rope-ladder in the covered way, were endeavouring to grapple the
drawbridge with it; but, either from the weight of the rope, which
rendered it difficult to be thrown, or because the irons were not
sufficiently sharp to lay hold, their attempts were frustrated. This
Mellado could not foresee; and knowing that no time was to be lost, he
hastened out through a covered way to the nearest work of the enemy,
and called out to the commandant, requesting him to stop the assault,
and send him to the general, that he might deliver the governor’s
letter; the party who were flanking the ravelin, no sooner heard his
voice than they fired a volley towards it; upon which, without waiting
for an answer, he hastened to the nearest centinel of the French, and
the captain of the guard conducted him to the French commandant in the
town; whom he entreated to have compassion upon the wounded in the
fort, and call off the assailants. This officer was a man of humanity,
and instantly sent off to suspend the assault, while Mellado, who was
now delivered from his fears for his poor defenceless countrymen,
was escorted to the general. In the morning the gates were opened
to the enemy. The French soldiers gave sufficient proof how little
mercy the wounded would have found at their hands, had they been
under no control, for they stript the clothes and blankets from the
beds of these helpless men. Mazzachelli gave orders that they should
be conveyed to Gerona; and Mellado, having seen this performed, and
perceiving that it was intended to detain him and his assistants as
prisoners, took the first opportunity of making his escape.
♦LAS MEDAS AND LERIDA SURRENDERED.♦
At the very time when the garrison of Hostalrich, after a four months’
defence, and a bombardment, during which between three and four
thousand shells were thrown into the place, ♦MAY 13.♦ thus gallantly
effected their retreat, the Catalans suffered another loss. The islands
and fortress of Las Medas, which were of material importance from
their position on the coast, were surprised by a party of Neapolitan
infantry, and given up in a manner which the French imputed to
cowardice, though, by their own account, treason, on the part of the
commander, was the only intelligible cause of the surrender. Lerida
also was rather betrayed than yielded by Garcia Conde. The town was
entered by assault: and the castle, where the works were uninjured,
and which, under Alvarez or Estrada, might have rivalled Gerona, was
surrendered the next day. For this there was no excuse; O’Donnell’s
last orders to the governor had been, that if the city should be
taken, he was to defend the fortresses; and if no such orders had
been given, his duty required him to hold out to the last extremity.
The commander-in-chief, who rewarded the defenders of Hostalrich with
a medal, stigmatized this conduct as it deserved; but he reminded
the Catalans, that Tarragona, Tortosa, Cardona, Berga, Seu de Urgel,
Coll de Ballaguer, and Mequinenza, still remained as bulwarks of the
principality; that if all these were lost, there would be their
inaccessible mountains; and that when they began the war, they had
neither army nor fortresses, for all their fortified places had been
dismantled. A wound which he had received during the siege of Gerona,
and which had never been healed, because he never allowed himself rest
enough from the incessant and anxious activity of his situation, became
now so threatening, that he was constrained for a while to withdraw
from ♦AUGEREAU SUPERSEDED BY MARSHAL MACDONALD.♦ the command. Augereau
also, about the same time, was recalled. His success in sieges did not
expiate, in Buonaparte’s eyes, for the loss in men and reputation which
he had sustained from an enemy who were now become as wary as they were
active and enterprising. Marshal Macdonald, Duke of Tarento, succeeded
him. The plunder of Barcelona was sent into France under Augereau’s
escort; and a number of commercial adventurers from that country, who,
being deceived by the French official accounts, had supposed that Spain
was actually subdued, and gone thither with the intent of forming
establishments, gladly seized the first opportunity of returning in
safety.
If the war was carried on by the Catalans with an unwearied and
unremitting energy which was not displayed in other parts of Spain,
it was not wholly owing to that enterprising and unconquerable spirit
by which they have always been characterized, but in some degree to
the natural strength of the province, and still more to the advantage
which they derived from having many places in their possession which
could not be reduced without a regular siege. Throughout Spain there
existed the same feeling of indignation against the invaders, ...
but where the country, the villages, and the towns were alike open,
there was not the same possibility of resistance; plains could not be
defended by peasantry; nor could the contest be maintained by large
bodies against a superior enemy, when there were neither fortified
towns nor natural fastnesses on which they could retire. In such
parts the war was carried on by guerilla parties, who made incursions
from the mountainous districts into the plains, and whenever it was
necessary to disperse, found friends every where. Wherever the French
were nominally masters of the country, the guerillas harassed their
communication, cut off their small parties, and diminished their
numbers by a mode of warfare as disheartening to the enemy as it was
consuming and inglorious; while in the stronger parts of the kingdom,
such as Asturias, and the province of Cuenca, and the mountains of
Ronda, the inhabitants perseveringly defended their native soil.
♦FORT MATAGORDA TAKEN BY THE FRENCH.♦
Cadiz, however, was the point whereon all eyes were at this time
turned, in expectation of great events. Victor had been left to command
the siege, if siege it may be called. The French occupied the shore of
the bay, fortified their own position, and endeavoured to annoy the
shipping and the town; a regular attack upon the isle was too perilous
for them to attempt. Fort Matagorda was the only point from which it
was thought possible that they could injure the town: it had been built
for the defence of the arsenal, opposite to the broadest part of that
tongue of land which connects Cadiz with the Isle of Leon. From thence
it was apprehended they might with the largest land mortars throw
shells to the gates of the city; Ormond indeed had planted his cannon
there, in the fruitless attempt upon Cadiz in Queen Anne’s reign.
The fort, like the other land-works, had been dismantled upon their
approach; but when it was seen that they were beginning to reconstruct
it, it was deemed advisable that they should be dispossessed, and
that the post should be maintained as long as possible against them.
Accordingly they were compelled to abandon it, and the hasty works
which could be re-erected were garrisoned by a party of British
soldiers and seamen under Captain Maclean. They defended it for nearly
two months, till it was reduced to a heap of ruins; and having lost
in the last two days sixteen killed and fifty-seven wounded, were
brought off by the boats of the British squadron, under the fire of
the enemy’s batteries, with little loss. The manner in which this weak
fort was defended taught the French what they might expect if they
should attempt the Isle of Leon, for the defence of which a formidable
line of works behind the Santi Pietri had now been executed under the
direction of General Sir Thomas Graham, who had arrived from England to
command the auxiliary forces there. These works extended to the ocean
on the right, and on the left occupied the Caraccas as an advanced
post. The French also were more intent upon securing themselves in
their cantonments than upon annoying the Spaniards. They fortified
Puerto Real, Puerto Santa Maria, and Chiclana, formed entrenched camps
between these places, and strengthened the Trocadero, where they
established batteries from whence to bombard the town. Having presently
found the inefficiency of the field artillery, which was all that
they had brought with them, they fished up the guns from the French
and Spanish ships which had been wrecked upon that coast after the
battle of Trafalgar. Most of the heavy pieces with which two-and-twenty
batteries were now mounted were recovered in this manner from the sea.
♦STORM AT CADIZ.♦
The French, though disappointed in their main object here by
Alburquerque’s sagacity, and the prompt assistance of the British
forces, were in high spirits. They were in a fine country; their
quarters were at once commodious and secure; and a few weeks after
their arrival the winds and waves threw into their possession no
inconsiderable booty. For during a tremendous gale, which continued
four days with unabated violence, three line of battle ships, one
frigate, and about forty merchantmen were driven[12] to the side
of the bay which they occupied, and went on shore at the height of
the spring side. The men were taken out by the boats of the British
squadron, and the ships were set on fire by the enemy’s red-hot shot;
but no small part of the lading fell into their ♦CRUEL USAGE OF THE
FRENCH PRISONERS IN THE BAY.♦ hands. During the tempest the French on
board the prison ships could not receive their supplies of provisions
and water from the shore; their signals of distress were disregarded
by the Spaniards; and if the British Admiral had not sent his boats
to their relief as soon as the gale abated, very many more of these
miserable men than actually perished must have fallen victims, the
Spaniards being in no haste to encounter the swell for the sake of
enemies whom they seem to have considered as out of the pale of
humanity. In the case of these prisoners, indeed, they had cast off
all compassion, and the obduracy of the national character was fully
manifested towards them, the negligence of the government being in
this instance hardly less criminal than the avarice ♦1810. MAY.♦
and brutality of those whom it employed. Admiral Pickmore perceiving
with how little care the pontoons were secured, proposed to the
Spanish Admiral that chains should be used as bridles to their cables;
application was made to the Admiral in command at the Caraccas; they
were promised from time to time, but never sent; and, as the British
Commander had foreseen, ♦MAY 15.♦ the prisoners in the Castilla, nearly
700 in number, and mostly officers, cut the cable one night, when
wind and tide were in their favour, ♦ESCAPE OF TWO PRISON SHIPS.♦ and
hoisting a sail which they had made from their hammocks, ran for the
opposite coast. English boats were presently sent after them, while
it was doubted whether the vessel had not by accident parted from her
anchor; but when they reached her it was impossible to board, the
pontoon being light, her ports all down, no steps on the side, nor
ropes over it, and the French prepared, not only with musketry, but
with cannon-ball of twenty-four and thirty-six pounders, which had
been used for ballast in the vessel: two hundred men were stationed to
throw these by hand, and the boats were presently disabled when such
missiles were showered upon them. Fort Puntales and the gun and mortar
boats opened their fire upon the pontoon, the vessel was burnt, but the
fugitives, with little loss, effected their escape[13].
A week later the French had nearly obtained possession of a rich
prize. The S. Elmo, line of battle ship, with 250,000_l._ on board,
in attempting to work out of the bay, got under their battery of S.
Catalina. She was saved by the exertions of the officers and men in
all the boats of the British squadron. Having turned her head round,
the greater part of them went on board, and fought her guns with good
effect till out of the enemy’s reach. The French had better fortune
with the Argonauta pontoon; the prisoners on board that vessel, about
six hundred in number, followed the example of their comrades in the
Castilla; a third of these were killed by the fire which was kept up
upon them; the remainder escaped from the burning hulk. But though
the Spaniards had taken no precautions for rendering such attempts
impracticable, they felt how dangerous it was to keep so large a body
of prisoners in the bay while a French army was in possession of
the shores. Two ships of the line were at this time under orders to
carry part of them to the Canaries; and more would have been sent to
Majorca and Minorca, whither 5000 had been transported in the preceding
year, if the inhabitants had not at this crisis been in a state of
excitement, which would have rendered a farther importation dangerous
both to the prisoners themselves and to the government. Serious
disturbances had broken out in both islands, not from any spirit of
disaffection, but from distress, and indignation that so many of
these unhappy persons should be cast among them, and no adequate means
provided for their subsistence. The Minorcans were less likely to be
patient under such misgovernment than any other Spaniards, remembering
the prosperity and good order which they had enjoyed while their island
was in possession of the English: with them, however, the ebullition of
♦INSURRECTION AGAINST THE PRISONERS AT MAJORCA.♦ popular feeling past
harmlessly off, while Majorca became the scene of a disgraceful and
dreadful tragedy. Some fugitives landed at Palma from those parts of
the south which had lately fallen under the French yoke; they brought
horrible tales concerning the invasion of Andalusia and the conduct
of the invaders; and the people, excited by these horrors, cried out
for vengeance upon the prisoners. Troops were called out to protect
these unfortunate men, but the soldiers would not act against their
countrymen; and when the commander, General Reding, as the only means
of saving the prisoners, consented that they should be sent to the
desert island of Cabrera, many were butchered in his presence, in spite
of his entreaties and exertions, and many thrown into the sea, before
the embarkation could be effected; nor could it have been effected, if
the soldiers had not at length been provoked to fire upon the mob.
♦PRISONERS SENT TO CABRERA.♦
Five thousand at first, and afterwards half as many more, were landed
upon Cabrera, a rocky island about fifteen miles in circumference,
with no other inhabitants than a handful of soldiers, who were
stationed there to prevent the Barbary corsairs from making it a place
of rendezvous. A few tents were provided for the superior officers,
the remainder were left to shelter themselves as they could. There
was but one spring on the island, and in summer this was dry: they
discovered some old wells, which had been filled up, and which, when
cleared, yielded bad water, and very little of it. The supplies from
Palma were sent so irregularly, sometimes owing to the weather, but
far more frequently to inhuman negligence, that scores and hundreds
of these miserable creatures ♦THEIR INHUMAN TREATMENT THERE.♦ died of
hunger and thirst; many were in a state of complete nakedness, when
in mere humanity clothing was sent them by the British commander in
the Mediterranean: and at other times they were kept alive by barrels
of biscuit and of meat which the English ships threw overboard for
them, to be cast on shore. But in the third year of their abode, the
captain of a Spanish frigate, whose name ought to have been recorded,
remonstrated so effectually upon the manner of their treatment,
that from that time they were regularly supplied with food. He gave
them potatoes and cabbage and tobacco seed, from which they raised
sufficient for their consumption; and having by persevering labour,
♦MÉMOIRES D’UN OFFICIER FRANÇAIS, PRISONNIER EN ESPAGNE, 255, 287.♦
without any other tools than a single knife, broken six feet into a
rock, on the surface of which there was appearance enough of moisture
to excite their hopes, they obtained a supply of water. Some of
them used the skulls of their own dead, for want of other vessels,
to contain it; ... and others, with no such excuse of necessity,
manufactured buttons from their bones! About 1500 entered the Spanish
service rather than endure a banishment to which no end could be
foreseen; and some 500, chiefly officers, were in compassion removed to
England. At the end of the war not more than 2000 remained in Cabrera,
nearly half of those who had been landed there having sunk under their
sufferings. The Spaniards departed from the straight path of probity
when they broke the terms of capitulation which had been granted ♦SEE
VOL. I. P. 501.♦ at Baylen. They committed that breach of faith in
deference to popular outcry, and to the sophistry of one who soon
proved himself a traitor, ... the most odious of all those men whom
the Revolution either found wicked or made so: and in the subsequent
treatment of the prisoners humanity was as little regarded, as honour
had been in detaining them. Many and grievous were the errors which the
Spaniards committed in the course of the war; but this is the only part
of its history which will be remembered for them as a national reproach.
♦M. SOULT’S EDICT.♦
On the other hand, the French had as yet abated nothing of that
insolent cruelty with which they began the contest, supposing that
they could intimidate the Spanish nation. Soult, ♦MAY 9.♦ who had
recommended that all the commanding ♦SEE VOL. III. P. 446.♦ officers
employed in Spain should be _impassible_, ... incapable of any feeling
by which they might even possibly be moved to compunction, ... issued
at this time an edict not less extraordinary than Kellermann’s. After
various enactments, some of which were as impracticable as they were
rigorous, imposing penalties upon the inhabitants of those districts
in which the patriotic parties should commit any crimes, as this
Frenchman was pleased to denominate their hostilities against the
invaders of their country; he pronounced, “that there was no Spanish
army, except that of his Catholic Majesty, King Joseph Napoleon; all
parties, therefore, which existed in the provinces, whatever might be
their number, and whoever might be their commander, should be treated
as banditti, who had no other object than robbery and murder; and all
the individuals of such parties who might be taken in arms should be
immediately condemned and shot, and their bodies exposed along ♦COUNTER
EDICT OF THE REGENCY.♦ the highways.” When the Regency found that this
decree was actually carried into effect, they ♦AUG. 15.♦ reprinted it,
with a counter decree by its side, in French and Spanish, declaring
anew, “that every Spaniard capable of bearing arms was in these times
a soldier; that for every one who should be murdered by the French, in
consequence of the edict of the ferocious Soult, who called himself
Duke of Dalmatia, the three first Frenchmen taken in arms should
infallibly be hanged; three for every house which the enemy burnt in
their devastating system, and three for every person who should perish
in the fire.” Soult himself they declared unworthy of the protection
of the law of nations, while his decree remained unrepealed. They gave
orders, that if he were taken, he should be punished as a robber; and
they took measures for circulating both decrees throughout Europe, to
the end that all persons might be informed of the atrocious conduct
of these enemies of the human race; and that those inhabitants of the
countries which were in alliance with France, or, more truly, which
were enslaved by her, who were unhappy enough to have children, or
kinsmen, or friends serving in the French armies in Spain, might see
the fate prepared for them by the barbarity of a monster, who thought
by such means to subdue a free and noble nation.