ATTEMPTS TO DELIVER FERDINAND. OVERTURES FOR A NEGOTIATION MADE
THROUGH HOLLAND. PROCEEDINGS IN PARLIAMENT CONCERNING PORTUGAL.
REFORM OF THE PORTUGUEZE ARMY.
♦1810.♦
♦THE REGENCY.♦
The regency was acknowledged without hesitation in those provinces
which were not yet overrun by the enemy, and every where by those
Spaniards who resisted the usurpation; yet with the authority which
they derived from the Supreme Junta a portion of its unpopularity had
descended upon them. The necessity of their appointment was perceived,
and the selection of the members was not disapproved: in fact, public
opinion had in a great degree directed the choice; nevertheless, when
they were chosen, a feeling seemed to prevail that the men upon whom
that unfortunate body had devolved their power could not be worthy of
the national confidence. Like their predecessors, they were in fact
surrounded by the same system of sycophancy and intrigue which had
subsisted under the monarchy. The same swarm was about them: it was
a state plague with which Spain had been afflicted from the age of
the Philips. Hence it came to pass that the national force, instead
of being invigorated by the concentration of legitimate power, was
sometimes paralysed by it. For if a fairer prospect appeared to open
in the provinces where the people had been left to themselves and to
chiefs of their own choosing, too often when a communication was opened
with the seat of government, this unwholesome influence was felt in the
appointment of some inefficient general, who was perhaps a stranger to
the province which he was sent to command.
A central government was, however, indispensable, as a means of
communication first with England, and eventually with other states,
but more especially as keeping together the whole body of the monarchy
both in Europe and in America. The Spanish nation was not more sensible
of this than the British ministry. The French, and they who, like the
French, reasoning upon the principles of a philosophy as false as it
is degrading, believe that neither states nor individuals are ever
directed in their conduct by the disinterested sense of honour and of
duty, supposed that the continuance of these temporary administrations
must be conformable to the wishes of the British cabinet, whose
influence would be in proportion to the weakness and precarious tenure
of those who held the government in Spain. But that cabinet had no
covert designs; they acted upon the principle of a plain, upright,
open policy, which deserves, and will obtain, the approbation of just
posterity; and so far were they from pursuing any system of selfish
and low-minded cunning, that at this time, when the regency was formed,
they were taking measures for effecting the deliverance of Ferdinand
from captivity.
♦SCHEMES FOR DELIVERING FERDINAND.♦
Montijo, before his hostility to the Junta was openly declared, had
proposed a scheme to them for this purpose; but he was too well known
to be trusted, and when he required as a preliminary measure that
50,000 dollars should be given him, Calvo, who was the member appointed
to hear what he might propose, plainly told him that his object was
to employ that sum in raising a sedition against the government; upon
which Montijo told him that he had a good scent, and thus the matter
ended. A similar proposal was made by some adventurer in Catalonia; the
provincial government was disposed to listen to it, but they referred
it to General Doyle, and he soon ascertained that the projector only
wanted to get money and ♦BARON DE KOLLI’S ATTEMPT.♦ decamp with it.
Meantime the British ministers had formed a well-concerted plan,
but dependent upon some fearful contingencies, ... the fidelity of
every one to whom in its course of performance it must necessarily be
communicated, and the disposition of Ferdinand to put his life upon the
hazard in the hope of recovering his liberty and his throne. The Baron
de Kolli, who was the person chosen for this perilous service, was one
who in other secret missions had proved himself worthy of confidence.
He took with him for credentials the letter in which Ferdinand’s
marriage in the year 1802 had been announced by Charles IV. to the King
of England, and also letters in Latin and in French from the King,
communicating to the prisoner the state of affairs in Spain, and saying
how important it was that he should escape from captivity, and show
himself in the midst of his faithful people. A squadron, commanded by
Sir George Cockburn, landed Kolli in Quiberon Bay, and to that part of
the coast Ferdinand was to have directed his flight, for which every
needful and possible provision had been made, measures having also been
devised for sending the pursuers upon a wrong scent. The scheme had
been well laid, and with such apparent probability of success, that it
is said the Duke of Kent requested permission to take ♦KOLLI’S MEMOIRS,
39.♦ upon himself the danger of the attempt. The squadron was provided
with every thing which could conduce to the convenience and comfort of
Ferdinand and his brother; with this view a Roman Catholic priest had
been embarked, with a regular set of ornaments and consecrated plate
for the Romish service.
Kolli made his way to Paris, completed his arrangements, and was
arrested at Vincennes within a fortnight from the day whereon he
landed. He had been betrayed by a pretended royalist in the pay of
the British government, and by the Sieur Richard, whom he had trusted
because he had served bravely under the unfortunate ♦1810. MARCH.♦
Prince de Talmont in La Vendée. His credentials and his other papers
were seized; and when he was examined by Fouché, who was then minister
of police, he had the mortification of being told that the character
of the person for whose service he had thus exposed himself had been
entirely mistaken, for that no credentials would induce Ferdinand to
hazard such an attempt. It was afterwards proposed to him, that as his
life and the fortune of his children were at stake, he should proceed
to Valençay, and execute his commission, to the end that he might hear
from Ferdinand’s own lips his disavowal of any connexion with England,
... or that if that prince really entertained a wish to escape, an
opportunity might be given him of which the French government might
make such use as it deemed best. Kolli rejected this with becoming
spirit; and the purpose of the police was just as well answered by
sending Richard to personate him. But Ferdinand no sooner understood
the ostensible object of his visitor, than he informed the governor of
Valençay that an English emissary was in the castle.
It is very possible that Ferdinand may have perceived something
in Richard’s manner more likely to excite suspicion than to win
confidence; for the man was not a proficient in villany, and not
having engaged in it voluntarily, may have felt some compunction
concerning the business whereon he was sent. His instructions were, if
he should succeed in entrapping Ferdinand, to bring him straight to
Vincennes, there probably to have been placed in close confinement: the
supposition that a tragedy like that of the Duc D’Enghein was intended
cannot be admitted without supposing in Buonaparte far greater respect
for the personal character of his victim than he could possibly have
entertained. An official report was published, containing a letter
in Ferdinand’s name, wherein the project for his escape was called
scandalous and infernal, and a hope expressed that the authors and
accomplices of it might be punished as they deserved. Other papers were
published at the same time, with the same obvious design of exposing
Ferdinand to the indignation or contempt of his countrymen and of his
allies. There was a letter of congratulation to the Emperor Napoleon
upon his victories in Austria; an expression of gratitude for his
protection, and of implicit obedience to his wishes and commands;
details of a fête which he had given just before this occurrence in
honour of the Emperor’s marriage with the Archduchess Maria Louisa; and
a letter requesting an interview with the governor of Valençay upon a
subject of the greatest moment to himself, being his wish to become
the adopted son of the Emperor, an adoption which, the writer said,
would constitute the happiness of his life, and of which he conceived
himself worthy by his perfect love and attachment to the sacred person
of his majesty, and entire submission to his intentions ♦1810. APRIL.♦
and desires. But it was so notoriously the system of Buonaparte’s
government to publish any falsehoods which might serve a present
purpose, that these letters, whether genuine or fabricated, obtained no
credit[9].
As soon as the official report appeared in the English newspapers, Mr.
Whitbread asked in the House of Commons whether the letter purporting
to be written by his Majesty to Ferdinand VII. was to be looked upon as
a document which had any pretensions to the character of authenticity?
a question which Mr. Perceval declined answering. Of course this
afforded a topic for exultation and insult to the opponents of the
government. The Spaniards felt very differently upon the occasion.
Whether those who were desirous of forming a new constitution for
Spain, or even of correcting the inveterate abuses of the old system,
thought it desirable to see Ferdinand in possession of the throne,
before their object was effected, may well be doubted; but whatever
their opinions might be upon that point, the attempt at delivering
him excited no other feelings than those of gratitude and admiration
towards Great Britain. ♦ESPAÑOL, T. I. 120.♦ “With what pleasure,” said
the best and wisest of their writers, “does the good man who observes
the mazes of political events, behold one transaction of which humanity
alone was the end and aim! With what interest does he contemplate an
expedition intended, not for speculations of commerce, nor for objects
of ambition, but for the deliverance of a captive King, in the hope of
restoring him to his throne and to his people!”
♦OVERTURES FOR PEACE.♦
The British cabinet was sounded to see whether it would offer such
compensations and exchange of prisoners as might extricate Kolli from
his perilous situation. This curious proposal was connected with some
insidious overtures for peace made then, partly for the purpose of
deceiving the French people into a belief that the continuance of the
war was owing alone to the inveterate feeling of hostility in England;
but more with the design of preparing the Dutch for the annexation of
their country to the French empire, an intention which was first avowed
in these overtures. Louis Buonaparte was drawn into this transaction
by a solemn assurance that no such intention was really entertained;
but that it was held forth merely as a feint, in the hope of alarming
the British government, and inducing it to make peace, for the sake
of averting a political union, which of all measures must be most
dangerous to England. The overture was properly rejected upon the
ground, that it would be useless, or worse than useless, to open a
negotiation when it was certain that insurmountable difficulties must
occur in its first stage. A few weeks only elapsed before the purpose
which had been solemnly disavowed by Buonaparte’s ministers to Louis
was carried into effect, by a compulsory treaty, in which that poor
king ceded to France the provinces of Zealand and Dutch Brabant, the
territory between the Maas and the Waal, including Nimeguen, together
with the Bommelwaard and the territory of Altena, inasmuch as it
had been adopted for a constitutional principle in France that the
_thalweg_ or stream of the Rhine formed the boundary of the French
empire. About two months after this act of insolent and wanton power an
army was ordered into Holland to complete the usurpation, and Louis,
giving the only proof of integrity and courage which was possible in
his unhappy circumstances, abdicated the throne, and retired into
the Austrian dominions, leaving behind him a letter to the Dutch
legislature, which contained a full vindication of his own conduct,
and an exposure of Napoleon’s traitorous policy, which, given as it was
in the most cautious language, and with a remainder of respect and even
brotherly affection, might alone suffice to stamp the character[10] of
that brother with lasting infamy. During his short and miserable reign
Louis had done what, considering in what manner he had been placed
upon the throne, it might have seemed almost impossible that he should
do, he had gained the affections of the Dutch people; not by any good
which he did, for his tyrannical brother neither allowed him time nor
means for effecting the benevolent measures which he designed, but
by the interest which he took in their sufferings, and by his honest
endeavours to prevent or mitigate those acts of tyranny which were
intended to increase the distress of a ruined country, and prepare it
for this catastrophe.
♦BUONAPARTE’S INTENTION OF ESTABLISHING A WESTERN EMPIRE.♦
The conquest of Holland had been an old object of French ambition;
but wider views than Louis XIV. entertained during the springtide of
his prosperity were at this time disclosed ♦FEB. 17.♦ by Buonaparte.
A _senatus consultum_ appeared early in the year, decreeing that the
Papal States should be united to, and form an integral part of the
French empire. The city of Rome was declared to be the second in the
empire (Amsterdam was named the third); the Prince Imperial was to take
the title of King of Rome, and the Emperors, after having been crowned
in the church of Notre Dame at Paris, were before the tenth year of
their reign to be crowned in St. Peter’s also. The measures that were
designed to follow upon this decree were unequivocally intimated, in
that semi-official manner by which Buonaparte’s schemes of ambition
were always first announced. “The Roman and German imperial dignity,”
it was said, “which, with regard to Rome, had long been an empty name,
had ceased to exist upon the abdication of the Emperor Francis; from
that time, therefore, the great Emperor of the French had a right to
assume the title. Napoleon, who revoked the gifts which Charlemagne
made to the bishops of Rome, might now, as legitimate lord paramount
of Rome, like his illustrious predecessor, style himself Roman and
French Emperor. He restores to the Romans the eagle which Charlemagne
brought from them, and placed upon his palace at Aix la Chapelle; he
makes them sharers in his empire and his glory; and a thousand years
after the reign of Charlemagne, a new medal will be struck with the
inscription _Renovatio Imperii_. After ages of oblivion, the Empire
of the West reappears with renovated vigour; for Napoleon the Great
must be looked on as the founder of a revived Western Empire, and in
this character he will prove a blessing to civilized Europe. The peace
of Europe will thus be completely re-established. The great number of
well-meaning people, to whom Napoleon’s power seemed oppressive, while
they considered themselves as exempt from any engagement towards him,
will fulfil their new duties with inviolable fidelity. Considered in
this point of view, the re-establishment of the Western Empire is a
duty which Napoleon owes not less to the law of self-preservation, than
to the repose of Europe.”
No opposition to this project could have been offered by the
continental princes; the yoke was upon their necks: it only remained
for him to complete the subjugation of the Peninsula, and this appeared
to him and his admirers an easy task, to be accomplished in one short
campaign. There was no longer any Spanish force in the field capable
of even momentarily diverting the French from their great object of
destroying the English army, and obtaining possession of Portugal, and
to that object Buonaparte might now direct his whole attention and his
whole power.
Lord Wellington had foreseen this, and clearly perceiving also what
would be the business of the ensuing campaign, had prepared for the
defence of Portugal in time. It was necessary that we should carry on
the war in that country as principals rather than as allies, and for
this full power had been given by the Prince of Brazil. As yet little
had been done toward the improvement of the Portugueze army; like the
government, it was in the worst possible condition; both were in the
lowest state of degradation to which ignorance, and imbecility, and
inveterate abuses ♦MONEY VOTED FOR THE PORTUGUEZE ARMY.♦ could reduce
them. Early in the session, parliament was informed that the King had
authorized pecuniary advances to be made to Portugal, in support of its
military exertions, and had made an arrangement for the maintenance of
a body of troops not exceeding 30,000 men. Twenty thousand we already
had in our pay, the sum for whom was estimated at 600,000_l._; for
the additional ten, it was stated at 250,000_l._ to which was to be
added 130,000_l._ for the maintenance of officers to be employed in
training these levies, and preparing them to act with the British
troops. This led to a very interesting ♦MARQUIS WELLESLEY;♦ debate in
the House of Lords. Marquis Wellesley affirmed, “that Portugal was
the most material military position that could be occupied for the
purpose of assisting Spain: great disasters, he admitted, had befallen
the Spanish cause, still they were far from sinking his mind into
despair, and still he would contend, it was neither politic nor just
to manifest any intention ♦1810. FEBRUARY.♦ of abandoning Portugal.
What advantage could be derived from casting over our own councils,
and over the hopes of Portugal and Spain, the hue and complexion of
despair? To tell them that the hour of their fate was arrived, ...
that all attempts to assist, or even to inspirit their exertions in
their own defence, were of no avail, ... that they must bow the neck
and submit to the yoke of a merciless invader, ... this indeed would
be to strew the conqueror’s path with flowers, to prepare the way for
his triumphal march to the throne of the two kingdoms! Was it then
for this that so much treasure had been expended, ... that so much of
the blood had been shed of those gallant and loyal nations? Whatever
disasters had befallen them, they were not imputable to the people of
Spain. The spirit of the people was excellent, and he still ventured to
hope that it would prove unconquerable. All their defeats and disasters
were solely to be ascribed to the vices of their government. It was the
imbecility, or treachery, of that vile and wretched government which
first opened the breach through which the enemy entered into the heart
of Spain; that delivered into hostile hands the fortresses of that
country; and betrayed her people defenceless and unarmed into the power
of a perfidious foe. Let us not contribute to accomplish what they have
so inauspiciously begun! Let not their lordships come to any resolution
that can justify Portugal in relaxing her exertions, or Spain in
considering her cause as hopeless. Yet what other consequence would
result from prematurely withdrawing the British troops from Portugal,
or retracting the grounds upon which we had hitherto assisted her?”
♦LORD GRENVILLE;♦
Lord Grenville replied. “He felt it,” he said, “an ungrateful task, ...
a painful duty, ... to recal the attention of their lordships to his
former predictions, which they had despised and rejected, but which
were now, all of them, too fatally fulfilled. His object, however,
was not a mere barren censure of past errors, but rather, from a
consideration of those errors, to conjure them to rescue the country
from a continuance of the same disasters, and to pay some regard to the
lives of their fellow-citizens. Were they disposed to sit in that house
day after day, and year after year, spectators of wasteful expenditure,
and the useless effusion of so much of the best blood of the country,
in hopeless, calamitous, and disgraceful efforts? It was a sacred duty
imposed upon them to see that not one more life was wasted, not one
more drop of blood shed unprofitably, where no thinking man could say
that, by any human possibility, such dreadful sacrifices could be made
with any prospect of advantage. Was there any man that heard him, who
in his conscience believed that even the sacrifice of the whole of that
brave British army would secure the kingdom of Portugal? If,” said
he, “I receive from any person an answer in the affirmative, I shall
be able to judge by that answer of the capacity of such a person for
the government of this country, or even for the transaction of public
business in a deliberative assembly. By whatever circumstances, ...
by whatever kind of fate it was, I must say, that I always thought
the object of the enterprise impossible; but now I believe it is
known to all the people of this country, that it has become certainly
impossible. Was it then too much to ask of their lordships that another
million should not be wasted, when nothing short of a divine miracle
could render it effectual to its proposed object?” In these strong and
explicit terms did Lord Grenville declare his opinion, that it was
impossible for a British army to secure Portugal; and thus distinctly
did he affirm, that the opinion of a statesman upon this single point
was a sufficient test of his capacity for government.
After touching upon the convention of Cintra and Sir John Moore’s
retreat, he spoke of the impolicy of our conduct in Portugal. “If
those,” he said, “who had the management of public affairs had
possessed any wisdom, any capacity for enlightened policy in the
regulation of a nation’s interests and constitution, any right or
sound feelings with regard to the happiness of their fellow-creatures,
here had been a wide field opening to them. They had got possession of
the kingdom of our ally, with its government dissolved, and no means
existing within it for the establishment of any regular authority
or civil administration, but such as the British government alone
should suggest. Here had been a glorious opportunity for raising the
Portugueze nation from that wretched and degraded condition to which
a lengthened succession of mental ignorance, civil oppression, and
political tyranny and prostitution had reduced it. Was not that an
opportunity, which any men capable of enlarged and liberal views of
policy, and influenced by any just feelings for the interests of their
fellow-creatures, would have eagerly availed themselves of? Would not
such men have seized with avidity the favourable occasion to rescue the
country from that ignorance and political debasement, which rendered
the inhabitants incapable of any public spirit or national feeling?
Here was a task worthy of the greatest statesmen; here was an object,
in the accomplishment of which there were no talents so transcendant,
no capacity so enlarged, no ability so comprehensive, that might
not have been well, and beneficially, and gloriously employed. It
was a work well suited to a wise and liberal policy, to an enlarged
and generous spirit, to every just feeling and sound principle of
national interest, ... to impart the blessings of a free government to
the inhabitants of a country so long oppressed and disgraced by the
greatest tyranny that had ever existed in any nation of Europe.”
Then after arguing that time had been lost in arming and disciplining
the Portugueze, he relapsed into his strain of unhappy prophecy. “He
did not,” he said, “mean to undervalue the services or the character
of the Portugueze soldiery, whom he considered as possessing qualities
capable of being made useful, but he would never admit that they
could form a force competent to the defence of the kingdom; they
might be useful in desultory warfare, but must be wholly unfit for
co-operation with a regular army. He was not afraid, therefore, of
any responsibility that might be incurred by his stating, that if the
safety of the British army was to be committed on the expectation of
such co-operation, it would be exposed to most imminent and perhaps
inevitable hazard. But if these 30,000 men were not composed of
undisciplined peasants and raw recruits, but consisted of British
troops, in addition to the British army already in Portugal, he should
consider it nothing but infatuation to think of defending Portugal,
even with such a force. Against a power possessing the whole means of
Spain, as he must suppose the French to do at this moment, Portugal
was the least defensible of any country in Europe. It had the longest
line of frontier, compared with its actual extent, of any other nation;
besides, from its narrowness, its line of defence would be more likely
to be turned; and an invading enemy would derive great advantages
from its local circumstances. As to the means of practical defence
afforded by its mountains, he should only ask, whether the experience
of the last seventeen years had taught the world nothing; whether its
instructive lessons were wholly thrown away? Could it be supposed that
a country so circumstanced, with a population without spirit, and a
foreign general exercising little short of arbitrary power within it,
was capable of any effectual defence?” Lord Grenville concluded this
memorable speech, by moving, as an amendment to the usual address,
“that the house would without delay enter upon the consideration of
these most important subjects, in the present difficult and alarming
state of these realms.”
♦EARL OF LIVERPOOL;♦
“It was not the fault of ministers,” Lord Liverpool replied,
“nor of the person whom they had sent thither as his majesty’s
representative, if the exertions of the Portugueze government were not
correspondent to the dangers of the crisis. The state of the country
must be recollected, which might truly be said to have been without
a government; all the ancient and established authorities having
disappeared with the Prince Regent. But, under these unpromising
circumstances, every thing was done which could be done. There was
no time lost; there was no exertion untried; there was no measure
neglected. Never were greater exertions made to provide a sufficient
force, and never were they more successful. The noble baron had
triumphantly asked, what have we gained in the Peninsula? We have
gained the hearts and affections of the whole population of Spain and
Portugal; we have gained that of which no triumphs, no successes of
the enemy could deprive us. In Portugal, such is the affection of the
inhabitants, that there is no want of a British soldier that is not
instantly and cheerfully supplied. Look to Spain! What is the feeling
of the people, even in this awful moment of national convulsion and
existing revolution? It is that of the most complete deference to the
British minister and government; and so perfect is their confidence
in both, that they have placed their fleet under the orders of the
British admiral. Would a cold, cautious, and phlegmatic system of
policy have ever produced such proofs of confidence? Would indifference
have produced those strong and signal proofs of affection? Whatever
might be the issue of the contest, to this country would always remain
the proud satisfaction of having done its duty. He trusted we should
never abandon Spain, so long as any hope remained of the possibility
of ultimate success. We were bound by every sentiment of honour and
good faith to support a people who had given proofs of honour, of good
faith, and of bravery, which have never been exceeded by any nation.”
♦EARL MOIRA;♦
Earl Moira replied to this, by delivering opinions which, as a
soldier, he would never have conceived, if he had not been possessed
by party spirit. “Every thing which the ministers attempted,” he
said, “betrayed, as the universal opinion of the public pronounced, a
total want of judgement, foresight, and vigour; and, as the climax of
error, they now seemed resolved to defend Portugal, ... according to
a plan of defence, too, which was perfectly impracticable. For it was
utterly ridiculous to suppose, that the ideas of Count La Lippe, as to
the practicability of defending Portugal from invasion, could now be
relied upon. We should be allowed to retain Portugal, under our present
system, just so long as Buonaparte thought proper. The administration
of these men had been marked by the annihilation of every foreign
hope, and the reduction of every domestic resource; they who vaunted
of their resolution and power to protect and liberate the Continent,
had only succeeded in bringing danger close to our own shores? And
why? because they sacrificed the interests of the nation, and violated
every principle of public duty, to gratify their personal ambition and
personal cupidity. He was speaking the language of ninety men out of a
hundred of the whole population of the country, when he asserted, that
they deserved marked reprobation, and exemplary punishment.”
♦LORD SIDMOUTH;♦
Viscount Sidmouth regretted the opportunities which had been lost, but,
with his English feeling and his usual fairness, insisted that it was
incumbent upon us to stand by our allies to the uttermost. The Marquis
of Lansdown objected to the measures of ministry more temperately than
his colleagues in opposition, maintaining that it was bad policy to
become a principal ♦LORD, ERSKINE;♦ in a continental war. Lord Erskine
spoke in a strain of acrimonious contempt, mingled with irrelevant
accusations and unbecoming levity. “There really,” said he, “seems to
be a sort of predestination, which I will leave the reverend bench to
explain, that whenever the French take any country, or any prisoners,
they shall have some of our money also. I can hardly account for the
infatuation which possesses those men, who suppose they can defend
Portugal by sending a supply of British money there. It might as well
be expected to accomplish that by sending over the woolsack, with my
noble and learned friend upon it.”
The ministers must have been well pleased with the conduct of their
opponents; they could not have desired any thing more favourable to
themselves than the intemperance which had been displayed, and the
rash assertions and more rash predictions, which had been so ♦LORD
HOLLAND.♦ boldly hazarded against them. Lord Holland upon this occasion
made a remarkable speech, observing, in allusion to Lords Sidmouth
and Buckinghamshire, that “he could not understand how these lords
could give their confidence to ministers without being assured that
their confidence was deserved. We were obliged in honour,” he said,
“to do what we could for Portugal, without injury to ourselves, ... in
honour, ... for that was the only motive that ought to interest the
feelings, or excite the hearts of this or any other nation. But if we
were to embark in the cause of that sinking people, we were not to
load them with our imbecility, in addition to their own weakness. A
great plan was necessary; nothing neutral or narrow, nothing minute,
nothing temporary, could enter into it; but for this qualities were
requisite which no man could hope for in the present ministry. Where
was the address, the ability, the knowledge, the public spirit, that
were the soul of success in such a cause? He found them shifting from
object to object, and hanging their hope on every weak and bending
support, that failed them in the first moment of pressure. He thought,
that for defence no government could be too free; by that he meant
too democratic; the words might not be synonymous, but it was in such
governments that men felt of what they were capable. There was then
the full stretch of all the powers. There was a great struggle, a
great allay of the baser passions; but there rose from them a spirit
vigorous, subtilized, and pure; there was the triumph of all the
vehement principles of the nation; the rapid intelligence, the bold
decision, the daring courage, the stern love of country. It was in the
hour of struggle that men started up among the ranks of the people;
those bright shapes of valour and virtue that gave a new life to the
people; those surpassing forms of dignity and splendour that suddenly
rose up, as if by miracle, among the host, rushed to the front of the
battle, and, as in the days of old, by their sole appearance turned
the victory. But where was the symptom of a love for free government
in the conduct of the ministry? The government of Portugal had been
absolutely in their hands; had they disburdened it of its obstructions
to freedom? Had they pointed its aspect towards democracy? Then as if
the cause had been rendered desperate because the British ministry had
not introduced democratic principles into the governments of Spain and
Portugal, he supported the opinion of his party, and maintained that
it would be criminal to force a nation to a defence which might draw
down ruin on them. But if we were to withdraw from the contest, it was
possible for us to do so without degrading the country by any base
avidity for little gains, by seizing upon any of those little pieces of
plunder, which were so tempting, and apt to overpower our resistance to
the temptation. We might leave the country of our ally with the spirit
of friendship and the purity of honour. It was of great moment to us,
in even that meanest and lowest view of policy, to leave the people
of the Peninsula our friends; but we must be actuated by a higher
principle, and be regretted and revered by those whom we were forced
to abandon. He could not expect this from his majesty’s ministers, and
therefore could not think their hands fit to wield the resources, or
sustain the character of the British empire.” Lord Holland therefore
voted for the amendment, the object of which was, that the cause of the
Peninsula should be given up as hopeless.
♦MARCH 9.
MR. PERCEVAL;♦
The debate was not less interesting in the Lower House, when Mr.
Perceval moved for a sum not exceeding 980,000_l._ for the defence of
Portugal; “a vote,” he said “so consistent with the feelings which
the house had professed on former occasions, that he should not have
expected any opposition to it. He reminded the house how those who
opposed it had been always of opinion that it was impossible for Spain
to hold out so long; that if she succeeded at all, she must succeed at
once; but that she could never maintain a protracted contest against
the disciplined armies and enormous resources of France. This was
their declared and recorded opinion; but what was the fact? Spain had
continued the struggle. France might occupy the country with an army,
but her power would be confined within the limits of her military
posts, and it would require nearly as large an army to keep possession
of it as to make the conquest. There never had existed a military power
capable of subduing a population possessing the mind, and heart, and
soul of the Spaniards. The very victories of their enemies would teach
them discipline, and infuse into them a spirit which would ultimately
be the ruin of their oppressors. Under these circumstances, would it
be wise to abandon Portugal? The last Austrian war had arisen in great
measure out of the contest in the Peninsula; and during the progress of
that war, however calamitous the result had proved, it would be in the
recollection of the house, that one other day’s successful resistance
of the French by the Austrians might have overthrown the accumulated
power of the enemy. Such events might again take place, for no man
could anticipate, in the present state of the world, what might arise
in the course of a short time; but be that as it might, as long as the
contest was, or could be, maintained in the Peninsula, the best policy
of this country was to support it.”
♦SIR J. NEWPORT;♦
To this Sir John Newport replied, “if any question could provoke
opposition, it must be that which would make them continue efforts in
a cause which every one but the ministers considered hopeless. As for
the recorded opinion of parliament, parliament was pledged to support
the Spaniards while they were true to themselves; but that they had
been true to themselves he denied.” Then assuming that the French must
necessarily drive us out of Portugal, he asked what was to be done
with the 30,000 Portugueze soldiers? “Were they to be brought to this
country, and added to the already enormous foreign army in its service?
Or were they to be sent to Brazil? Or to be left fully equipped, and
ready to add to the military force of Buonaparte?” In the course of his
speech Sir John Newport endeavoured to show that the Portugueze levies
had not been ♦MR. VILLIERS;♦ expedited as they ought to have been. Mr.
Villiers, who had been our minister in Portugal, made answer, “that the
government there was administered with great vigour; large supplies of
money had been raised to meet the public exigencies; the old military
constitution of the country had been restored: the finances were ably
administered and well collected; and the war department conducted with
energy and ability. If Spain,” he said, “had done its duty equally with
Portugal, in supporting the efforts of Great Britain, its cause would
already have triumphed, and there would not now have been a Frenchman
upon the Spanish territory.”
♦MR. CURWEN;♦
Mr. Curwen said, “that as the Portugueze people had suffered a French
army to overrun their country without any resistance, he was not for
placing much reliance upon the Portugueze troops. If the enemy could
point out what he would wish that we should undertake, his first wish
would be, that we should attempt to defend Portugal. Buonaparte,” he
said, “could not receive more cheering hopes of ultimate success,
than he would derive from learning that the present ministers were to
continue in office, and that the House of Commons still persisted in
placing a blind confidence in them, and enabling them to enter upon
measures which, in their inevitable result, could not fail to answer
all his purposes. The vote of the house this night, if it should decide
against attempting the defence of Portugal, would be more important
than if we were to take half the French army prisoners.”
♦MR. LESLIE FOSTER;♦
Mr. Leslie Foster then rose, and his speech, in the spirit which it
breathed, and the knowledge which it displayed, formed a singular
contrast to the harangues of the opposition. “The present proposition
of his majesty,” said he, “is partly connected with his past conduct
towards the Peninsula; it is but a continuance and extension of the
same spirit of British resistance. It is now, however, open to the
reprehension of two classes of politicians; those who think we never
ought to have committed ourselves for the salvation of Portugal and
Spain; and those who, having approved of that committal while the
event appeared doubtful, think that the overwhelming power of France
has at length brought this tragedy so nearly to a close, that nothing
is left for us, but to escape if possible from being sharers in its
catastrophe. Hope, they contend, has vanished; there is no longer room
for prediction; history has already recorded, in letters of blood, the
fate that awaits our perseverance. To me the aspect of the Peninsula
appears an enigma, which it is no reflection on any ministers not
perfectly to have understood; a revolution bursting out at a period the
least expected, exhibiting events in its progress the most singularly
contradictory, and pregnant with results which I still think no man
living can foresee. If, on the one hand, we are referred to the apathy
of Gallicia during the retreat of Sir John Moore, ... if we are desired
to remember Ocaña and Tudela, and all the other defeats which the
Spaniards have endured, and endured without despondency, ... must we
not in candour remember that there was a battle of Baylen? Are we to
shut our eyes to the extraordinary phenomenon, that in Catalonia, the
very next province to France, the French, at this hour, appear to be
as often the besieged as the besiegers? and can we forget Zaragoza
and Gerona? But above all, shall we not do justice to that singular
obstinacy, to give it no more glorious a character, which has sustained
their spirit under two hundred defeats, and which, in every period of
the history of Spain, has formed its distinguishing characteristic? The
expulsion of the Moors was the fruit of seven centuries of fighting
uninterrupted, and of 3600 battles, in many of which the Spaniards had
been defeated. In the beaten but persevering Spaniards of these days we
may trace the descendants of those warriors, as easily as we recognize
the sons of the conquerors of Cressy and of Agincourt in the English
who fought at Talavera. We may trace the same fortitude and patience,
the same enthusiastic superstition, the same persevering insensibility
of failure, and, I will add, the same absolute indifference as to
liberty, constitution, or cortes, that distinguished the expellers of
the Moors. Because we feel that freedom is the first of blessings,
it is too much to say that other nations are to be raised in arms by
no other motives than its influence. History should have taught us,
that there is another spirit prompting men to war, and which once
poured all Europe forth in the Crusades; and however we may pronounce
on the motives of our ancestors, the fact we cannot deny, that the
greatest spectacle of embattled nations ever exhibited on the theatre
of war was under governments and systems which indeed were not worth
the defending. I believe we may consider the inhabitants of the
Peninsula, first, as a multitude of hardy and patient peasantry, buried
in ignorance and superstition, and accustomed from their cradles,
by the traditions and the songs of their ancestors, to consider the
sword as the natural companion of the cross; and almost inseparably
to connect in idea the defence of their religion with the slaughter
of their enemies; and with these predispositions goaded into madness
by ecclesiastics, as ignorant almost as their flocks; but without an
idea or a wish for freedom; with _Fernando Settimo_ in their mouths,
as a watch-word, and fighting, if you will, for the continuance of
the Inquisition. And with these qualifications it is my most firm
conviction, that they would have overwhelmed all the armies of France,
but that it was their misfortune to be cursed with a nobility in all
respects the opposite of the peasantry, differing from them, not merely
in their moral qualities, but even in their physical appearance; a
nobility of various degrees of worthlessness, but with a few brilliant
exceptions, generally proportioned to the rank of their nobility; and
further cursed by a government (I speak not of their kings but of the
Junta) both in its form and in its substance the most abominable that
ever repressed or betrayed the energies of a nation; hence desperate
from repeated treason, destitute of confidence, not in themselves but
in their commanders, unable to stand before the French in battle, but
still more unable to abstain from fighting. One rare and unquestionable
feature they presented, ... a nation that would fight with France; and
certain I am, that if we had not tried the experiment of fighting by
their side, these very men, who now most loudly condemn the course we
have pursued, would be calling for the impeachment of these ministers,
who had neglected such glorious opportunities; who, in the crisis of
the fate of France, had shrunk from the only field where there was a
prospect of contending with success; who had coldly refused our aid
to the only allies who were ever worthy of British co-operation. It
is too much a habit to call for the fruits of our battles, tacitly
assuming that nothing but the absolute and complete attainment of our
object can justify having fought them. I never can agree to measure
the justification of a battle by the mere fruits of victory! yet even
on this ground I must contend, that never were there laurels the
more opposite of barren, than those which have been reaped by our
countrymen in Spain. We, indeed, wanted not to be convinced that our
army, like our navy, equalled in science, and exceeded in courage,
that of any other nation in the world: but if we have any anxiety for
our character with other armies, if reputation is strength, and if the
reputation of a nation, as well as of an individual, consists not in
the estimation in which it holds itself, but in the estimation in which
it is held by others, it is a false vanity that causes us to shut our
eyes and ears to the opinions of other nations. Spain at least had
been convinced by the exertions of her government, misrepresenting our
failure at Buenos Ayres, and other scenes of our misfortunes, that
Great Britain, omnipotent by sea, was even ridiculous on land. So much
so, that when the army of General Spencer was landed near Cadiz, than
which a finer army never left the English shore, it was the wonder as
well as the pity of the Spaniards, that such noble-looking soldiers
should be so absolutely incapable of fighting. The ‘beautiful’ army
was even the emphatic denomination by which the British forces were
distinguished; and when Sir John Moore was known to be at length on his
march, that the beautiful army, the ‘_hermoso exercito_,’ was actually
advancing, was a subject of Spanish surprise, at least as much as of
Spanish exultation; but when that army had commenced its retreat, old
impressions were revived with tenfold force, ‘_hermoso_’ was no longer
the epithet bestowed on it, but one which it is impossible for me to
repeat. Nor let it be said that Coruña was a full vindication of its
fame! We indeed know that British heroism never shone more conspicuous
than on that day; but the ray of glory which illuminated that last
scene of our retreat, was but feebly reflected through the rest of
Spain from that distant part of the Peninsula. The French returned in
triumph to Madrid, and boasted that they had driven us into the sea;
... it was certain we were no longer on the land; ... and under such
circumstances it is not surprising that Spain should have declined
to have given to us all the credit which we really deserved. Some
gentlemen, I see, are of opinion that it is no great matter what the
Spaniards thought about us; but are we equally indifferent to the
opinions of the French? Let us not too hastily conclude that they did
full justice to our merits. We are told, indeed, that at Maida and in
Egypt we had set that point at rest. Of Maida, I shall only say, that
within the last month it has been, for the first time, mentioned in
any newspaper of France, and that I believe nine-tenths of the French
soldiers have never heard either of the battle, or of the existence
of such a place; and as to Egypt, their opinion is universally that
which General Regnier, in his most able, but untrue representation, of
those events, has laboured to impress, namely, that the treachery of
Menou, and the detestation in which the army held the service in Egypt,
and their anxiety to return to France, were the real causes of their
expulsion; and that an overwhelming force of ninety thousand men, of
English, Turks, and Indians, which he says, and which they believe, we
brought against them, furnished a decent excuse for their surrender.
Let us remember too, that it was after these proofs of British military
excellence, that Buonaparte, on the heights of Boulogne, parcelled out
in promise to his soldiers the estates of the ‘_nation boutiquiere_:’
let us remember also our own opinions in those days, how general
engagements were to be avoided; ... how a system of bush-fighting was
to be adopted in Kent; ... and our hopes that England might be saved
after London might be lost, ... or what inundations we should make to
protect it. Such language was then termed ‘caution:’ but on the proud
eminence on which we are now placed, we may afford to acknowledge
there was in it some mixture of distrust in the good old bayonet of
Britain. Where are the promises of Buonaparte now? The very ridicule
of such assertions would render it impossible for him to repeat them.
It is these guilty ministers who have taught to him, and what I think
of much more consequence, have taught to England, another style of
conversation. They have fairly tried that point, so carefully avoided
by their predecessors; they have brought our armies to a meeting with
the finest armies of France; and have added more to our strength, as
well as to our glory, by fighting in Spain, than their predecessors
by abstaining from it in Poland.... Such is the view which I take of
what is past: With respect to the second point, whether the time is
indeed come, when our further assistance can only be destruction to
ourselves, without being serviceable to our allies, a very little time
must show us that; and if there are indeed good grounds of hope, any
premature expression of our despondency will certainly extinguish them.
The Junta is at length demolished. The French are again dispersed over
every part of the Peninsula: the people are still every where in arms.
Let us not damp that spirit which may effect much, and which must
effect something, ... which must at least give long employment to the
forces of our enemy. If, indeed, it depended solely upon us, whether
our allies should continue that sacrifice of blood which they have so
profusely shed, I should not think us justifiable in purchasing our
quiet at such a price: but convinced as I am, that whether we stand
by them, or forsake them, those gallant nations will still continue
to bleed at every pore, our assistance assumes a new character;
and independent of the advantages to be derived to ourselves, ...
independent of 200,000 Frenchmen already fallen, ... independent of
not less than 300,000 more required even to preserve existence in
the Peninsula, ... independent of Brazil and South America, for ever
severed from our enemies, ... and independent of the fleets of the
Peninsula, I trust, rescued from their grasp, ... independent of these
gains to ourselves, there is another feeling binding upon a nation,
as well as upon an individual, not to forsake our friend because he
is in his greatest danger!... Still, however, I acknowledge a limit
there must be, beyond which we cannot go, and whenever we can agree in
declaring that
Funditus occidimus, neque habet Fortuna regressum,
then, indeed, the first laws of self-preservation will call on us to
discontinue the contest. But surely Great Britain will not utter such
a sentiment until her allies shall be disposed to join in it. They do
not despair, and I will never despair of them so long as they do not
despair of themselves, ... so long as I should leave it in their power
to say to us at a future day, ‘Whence these chains?... If you had stood
firm a little longer, ... if you had not so soon fainted, ... we should
not at this day be in the power of our enemies!’”
♦GENERAL FERGUSON;♦
General Ferguson was the first person who rose after Mr. Leslie Foster
had concluded this able and manly speech. “He had been in Portugal,”
he said, and “he did not think there were 30,000 soldiers in that
country; those that were there had certainly, through the exertions of
General Beresford and other British officers, attained an appearance
of discipline: but he feared that an army adequate to the task of
defending Portugal must be able to make a stand in the first instance;
and if obliged to retreat, must still, as opportunity offered, return
to the charge; and thus make resistance after resistance. Now he was
decidedly of opinion, from what he had seen and heard of them, that
on the very first defeat the little discipline of the Portugueze army
would vanish, and a dispersion be the consequence.”
♦MR. FITZGERALD;♦
Mr. Fitzgerald asked whether ministers had employed transports to bring
away our cavalry from Portugal? in this service, he said, our money
would be best employed. He had never heard of any achievement performed
by the Portugueze, except, indeed, that 2000 of them, with the Bishop
of Porto at their head, had entered Porto, and taken twenty-four
Frenchmen ♦LORD MILTON;♦ prisoners. Lord Milton repeated the erroneous
proposition of the Marquis of Lansdowne, that it was highly improper to
act as principals in a foreign country, instead of as auxiliaries. “No
reasonable man,” he affirmed, “could vote a million of the public money
for such a purpose, when the French were under the walls of Cadiz.
It had often been the practice to subsidize foreign troops, but he
believed it had never before entered the head of any English statesman
to grant subsidies to the Portugueze, ... to those, in fact, among whom
the materials for ♦MR. BANKES;♦ an army could not be found.” Mr. Bankes
talked of the money: “We had it not to spare, and if we had, even then
we ought not to spare it. Too much had already been furnished to the
Spaniards. Where were we to find more? specie we had not, and paper
would not answer. The enemy were now perhaps in possession of Cadiz,
which had escaped immediate capture only through an accident. The
Cortes had not even a town in Spain to meet in. It was quite romantic
to expect that a British army, of 20,000 or 25,000 men, even with
whatever co-operation Portugal could give, would be able to maintain
the war there as a principal against France. He must oppose the motion,
and recommend that the resources of the country should be husbanded for
our defence.”
♦MR. JACOB;♦
Upon this, Mr. Jacob, who had recently returned from Spain, denied that
France had any complete occupation of that country, either civil or
military. In Catalonia, he said, it would be difficult to say, whether
there were at that moment more Spanish towns besieged by the French,
or towns occupied by French troops besieged by the Spaniards; and the
communications were so completely cut off, that the French could not
send a letter from Barcelona to Gerona, without an escort of at least
500 cavalry to protect it. Generally speaking, throughout the whole of
Spain, those towns only were surrendered which were under the influence
of the nobility and gentry of large estates; but the mass of the people
were patriotic, and the villages were defended after the towns had
been betrayed. And not only the villages, but the mountains, were
still obstinately defended. He believed, that among the nobility and
gentry, where there were two brothers, the man of great possessions
was always for submitting to the enemy, while the other joined the
patriotic standard. We had been accustomed to consider civil wars as
the most horrible of all kinds of hostilities, but never was any civil
war so horrible as that which was now raging in Spain. The massacre,
the pillage, and the violence offered to women, were unparalleled.
He had lately been witness to some of these atrocities. The town of
Puerto Real had surrendered upon terms, and Victor, upon entering it,
published a proclamation, promising the most perfect security to all
the inhabitants. Nevertheless, he had hardly taken possession before he
ordered the men, who were mostly artificers at the docks in Cadiz, to
be imprisoned, and the females were marched down to St. Mary’s, to be
violated by his army.
It might have been thought that such a statement as this could have
produced but one effect, or at least that no man could have been
found who would attempt to weaken its effect, by ♦MR. WHITBREAD;♦
recriminating upon his own country. Mr. Whitbread, however, after
observing that he believed Mr. Jacob had gone to Spain upon a mission,
half commercial, half diplomatic, demanded of him whether he had been
an eye-witness of these atrocities; and if he were, or if he were
not, why he had detailed them, unless it was to inflame the house
upon a question where their judgement only ought to decide? “Abuses,
no doubt,” he said, “must have prevailed; but were gentlemen aware of
none committed under circumstances of less provocation, when the clergy
received the mandates of power to ascend their pulpits, and issue from
them falsehoods not more rank than they were notorious?” Such is the
language which Mr. Whitbread is reported to have uttered upon this
occasion. He proceeded to ask, “Where was the spirit of the Spaniards?
where were its effects? were they seen in suffering the French to pass
over the face of their country, like light through an unresisting
medium? We were gravely told that the post could not pass unmolested;
no doubt this was a most serious calamity, and a conclusive proof of
the energy of the popular spirit, ... only, unfortunately, we had the
same proof in Ireland! Spain,” he averred, “had not done its duty ...
no matter from what cause; the people had, however, some excuse, they
had been under the selfish sway of an aristocracy, that only wanted
to use them as an instrument for effecting their own narrow purposes;
their implicit confidence had been abused by the blind bigotry of an
intolerant priesthood, ... a priesthood that, whatever it preached,
practised not the gospel; they had had the sword in their hands as
often as the crosier, and they had had, he feared, in their hearts
any thing but the meekness, humility, charity, and peace, that their
blessed Master had inculcated by his pure precepts, enforced by the
example of his spotless life, and sealed by the last sufferings of his
all-atoning death. While,” said Mr. Whitbread, “I value those precepts
and that example, I never can take pleasure in setting man against his
fellow-man in a hopeless struggle. I think the present cause hopeless,
and as such I never will consent to its being uselessly and cruelly
protracted.”
Mr. Huskisson and Mr. Bathurst spoke like men in whom the principle
of opposition was not the pole star of their political course. The
♦MR. HUSKISSON;♦ question, Mr. Huskisson said, was, whether we were to
withhold from his majesty’s ministers the means by which the contest
might be rendered ♦MR. BATHURST.♦ more likely to be successful. Mr.
Bathurst said, it was enough for him to know that an alliance with
Portugal had been concluded, and that Portugal, in virtue of that
alliance, demanded our assistance. An amendment was moved by Mr.
Tierney, tending to refuse the grant, and 142 members voted for it,
over whom ministers had a majority of sixty-two. In the Lords, the
numbers had been 94, and 124.
To comment upon the language of the opposition in these debates would
be superfluous. The ignorance which they displayed of the national
character of the Spaniards and Portugueze, and of the nature of the
seat of war, the contemptuous superiority which they assumed, and
the tone in which they ridiculed and reviled our allies, were of
little moment; but the debate was of main importance, because the
party committed themselves completely upon the defence of Portugal,
declaring, in the most confident and positive terms, that it was
hopeless, and ought not to be attempted. Their journalists took up
the subject in the same strain, and followed the unhappy pattern of
prediction which had been set them. One of two things, they said,
must necessarily happen to these 30,000 Portugueze troops; either
they must fall into the hands of the French, or we must bring them
out of Portugal. The possibility that, with a British army, they
might be able successfully to defend their country, these men had
neither wisdom, nor knowledge, nor virtue to contemplate. Could it be
doubted for a moment, they said, that Spain would be subdued, from one
extremity to the other, before the end of six months? They copied,
too, as faithfully, the false and slanderous representations which
were made of the Portugueze. A thousand Portugueze, they said, would
fly before a single French company, just as so many gipsies would run
away from a constable. We might raise a better legion in Norwood. Was
there an English colonel who would give five shillings a dozen for
such recruits, or a serjeant who would be at the expense of a bowl of
punch for fourscore of them? The French and their partizans did not
fail to make due use of what was thus advanced in their favour; but
the Portugueze were too well acquainted with the real character and
feelings of this nation to have their faith in British friendship
shaken by the gross misrepresentations of a virulent party: and they
knew, perhaps, that statesmen who take part against the government and
against the allies of their country, and writers who pervert to the
most wicked and perilous purposes the freedom of the press, are the
concomitant evils of a free constitution like ours, under which both
public and private libellers breed like vermin in a genial climate.
♦REFORM OF THE PORTUGUESE ARMY.♦
Meantime the Portugueze army, which, under a system of complicated
abuses, had been reduced to the lowest possible state of degradation,
was reformed in all its branches by the indefatigable exertions of
Marshal Beresford. He had to contend not only with the inveterate
evils which had grown up during the long perversion of government, but
with that spirit of insubordination which, at the outbreak of these
troubles, the general anarchy had produced. The soldiers had begun
to claim and exert the power of choosing their own officers; an end
was immediately put to this ruinous license, and at the same time
means were taken for removing the cause of complaint wherever it had
originated, by recalling the officers as well as the men to a sense of
their duty, and by introducing British officers in sufficient number
to give the army consistence and effect till they might gradually be
replaced by native Portugueze. Equal justice, which in that country
had been as little known as liberty of conscience, was promised and
administered; the troops were told that the Marshal was at all times
ready to hear their complaints, through the proper channel; and that if
any officer excused himself from forwarding the complaint of a soldier,
the soldier might address it directly to the commander-in-chief. But
the Marshal said it was his duty to be impartial, and the officers had
as much right to justice as the soldiers. Severe penalties had been
denounced against desertion, but with so little effect, that nearly
seven hundred cases occurred during the month of April in this year;
the punishment of death was then inflicted on one offender, and two
others were degraded to Angola. At the same time the officers were not
allowed to absent themselves from their duty under pretext of illness;
certificates to this effect had been so greatly abused, that they were
no longer to be regarded without such actual inspection as the Marshal
might appoint; and one person of high family was dismissed the service
for a subterfuge of this kind. Courts-martial were made to understand
their proper functions by being reprimanded in general orders; and
the _Misericordia_ which had interfered to suspend the execution of
an officer who had received money from the French, and entered their
service, was informed that its privileges did not extend to these
cases, and that the sentence must be carried into effect.
It was necessary to raise the military character in the opinion
of the soldiers themselves, as well as of the nation. But before
this could be done, the sense of cleanliness and decency was to be
restored: for the troops, in that sullen state of self-neglect which
discomfort and hopelessness produce, had well-nigh lost all sense of
either. The Commander-in-chief told them that many of the evils which
the army suffered were occasioned by the want of cleanliness; that
health could not be preserved without it, that the soldiers must wash
themselves frequently, and that it grieved him to say, he must require
the officers to set them an example; that fatigue was no excuse for
neglecting this essential duty, for after a long march nothing was so
refreshing; that every officer must be responsible for the cleanliness
of the men under his command, and that he himself would never excuse
any officer whom he should see dirty. He gave orders that the men
should be provided with soap, brushes, and combs; that they should
brush their clothes and clean their shoes every day, and be punished
if they neglected this; and as the summer approached, he required the
officers, whenever an opportunity occurred, to make the men bathe by
companies. The Portugueze soldiers, it was said, like those of every
other country, desired to appear with a military air, and with that
propriety which belongs to the military character, and the men who most
affected this appearance were always the best soldiers; it was the
business of the officers, therefore, to see that they were provided
with every thing necessary for maintaining it. While this indispensable
attention to cleanliness was exacted, every possible provision was
made both for their health[11] and comfort. A dispensation was
obtained from the Pope’s Legate, allowing the troops the use of meat
while on service, every day in the year, except on Ash-Wednesday and
Good-Friday. The huge regimental kettles, which, after the Mahommedan
custom, were still used in the Portugueze army, and which, from the
inconvenience of carrying them, frequently did not come up with the
troops till long after they were wanted, were laid aside, and light tin
vessels substituted, which might be always at hand. An injurious custom
of marching in their cloaks when it rained, and even using the blanket
at such times as an additional covering, was prohibited; the men, they
were told, knew by experience, that no clothing could protect them
against the rain during a wet march, and therefore they were ordered
to keep cloak and blanket dry for their own comfort when they reached
the journey’s end. The officers and non-commissioned officers were
in the habit of kicking and striking the soldiers; wherever British
officers commanded this was immediately forbidden, and their example,
with the decided opinion of Marshal Beresford, nearly, or altogether,
put a stop to the unmanly practice. The ordinary punishment, though
less disgraceful and severe than the abominable system of flogging,
proved more frequently fatal; it consisted in striking the soldier on
the back, across the shoulders, with the broad side of a sword. The
number of strokes, or _pancadas_, never exceeded fifty; but men have
not unfrequently been known to drop down dead after receiving thirty,
from a rupture of the aorta. Marshal Beresford ordered a small cane to
be used instead of the sword; and thus, without altering the national
manner of punishment, rendered it no longer dangerous.
There were other evils which were beyond his power. When the troops of
the line were recruited, it was neither done by ballot nor by bounty:
a certain number were demanded from each district; the captain of
that district picked whom he chose, sent them to prison till he had
collected the whole number, then marched them to join their regiment.
The Marshal introduced the easy improvement of sending them to a
recruiting depôt, to be drilled before they joined; but he fixed
upon the peninsula of Peniche, a swampy and unwholesome spot, which
proved fatal to many, acting with double effect upon the depressed,
half-starved, and ill-treated peasants, who were sent thither. The
sick, the lame, and the lazy, were crowded into the same dungeon when
recruited by the Capitam Mor; contagion was thus generated, and very
often those, and those especially, who were fit for the service, were
carried off by disease. The depôt was afterwards removed to Mafra,
which is a healthy situation.
Over the method of levying troops Marshal Beresford had no control. But
the hospitals, which were infinitely more destructive to the army than
the sword of the enemy, and would have destroyed it much faster than
it could have been recruited, were greatly improved under a British
inspector, though the government would not permit his regulations to be
carried into effect to their full extent. Still a great and material
improvement was accomplished. The commissariat had been so conducted,
as to be at once inefficient for the army, and oppressive for the
people. A board of administration at Lisbon had its intendants in
every province, and its factors in every town. Government contracted
for provisions and forage, at fixed prices, with the board, and the
board directed its agents to purchase what might be required for the
troops on the spot. Payment was made by bills upon the board, which
in the best times were seldom taken up till twelve months after they
became due, and in the present state of things were considered to be
worth nothing. The farmer, therefore, naturally concealed his grain;
it was seldom that magazines were formed, or any provision made
against scarcity; and what the farmer could not or would not sell at
the disadvantageous rate which the factors offered, was usually taken,
when it could be found, by force. Marshal Beresford got commissaries
appointed to the different brigades, but he could not get money for
them, and therefore they were of little use. To reform the civil
establishments of the army was almost as difficult as it would have
been to reform the government; the utmost exertions of the Marshal,
aided as they were by Lord Wellington’s interference, availed nothing,
... being opposed by every species of low cunning and court intrigue.
For the old corruptions existed in full vigour, notwithstanding the
removal of the court to Brazil; and the body politic continued to
suffer under its inveterate disease, a _morbus pediculosus_, from
which nothing but a system of reform, wisely, temperately, firmly, and
constitutionally pursued, could purify it, and restore it to health and
strength.
Much, however, was done for Portugal, ... enough to be ever remembered
by that country with gratitude, and by Great Britain with a generous
and ennobling pride. An English commissariat, scrupulously exact in
all its dealings, relieved the farmers in great measure from the
oppression of their own government. The soldiers learnt to respect
their officers and themselves; they rapidly improved in discipline;
they acquired confidence, and became proud of their profession. The
government itself found it necessary to alter its old system of secrecy
and delusion; the dispatches of Lord Wellington and Marshal Beresford
were published in the Lisbon Gazette, and the people of Portugal were
officially informed of the real circumstances of the war, as fairly and
as fully as they had been in the War of the Acclamation.