THE FRENCH ENTER ANDALUSIA. DISSOLUTION OF THE CENTRAL JUNTA AND
APPOINTMENT OF A REGENCY. ALBURQUERQUE’S RETREAT.
♦1810.♦
♦SUPINENESS OF THE CENTRAL JUNTA.♦
The Central Junta manifested none of that energy after the rout at
Ocaña which they had so successfully exerted after the battle of
Medellin. The whole extent, not of the loss alone, but of the danger
also, had then been fairly stated, and bravely regarded. The danger was
more immediate now; so imminent indeed, that it was scarcely possible
they should have deceived themselves with any expectation of seeing
it averted; but they did not venture to proclaim the whole truth, and
call forth in the southern provinces a spirit like that which the
Catalans displayed, and which might have made their cities and strong
places emulate Zaragoza and Gerona. Instead of this, they suffered a
fallacious hope to be held out, that if the enemy should enter the
kingdoms of the south, the passes would be occupied behind them; the
Dukes of Parque and Alburquerque would hasten to the scene of action,
and another day like that of Baylen might be expected. Fuller accounts
were given in the official gazette of an affair of guerillas than of
the battle of Ocaña; and details were published of their victory at
Tamames, after the army by which it was gained had been routed at Alba
de Tormes.
♦GENERAL DISCONTENT.♦
They obtained a few addresses thanking them for having convoked the
Cortes, which, it was said, would like an elixir of life revivify the
social body to its very extremities, and congratulating them upon their
triumph over internal divisions, and over those who would hastily and
inopportunely have established a regency. But their enemies were more
active than their friends, or rather than their dependants, for other
friends they had none; and their congratulations were as premature
as their triumph was short-lived. Romana’s declaration against them
was not the only symptom that they had lost the confidence of the
army as well as of the people. The Conde de Noroña being at this time
removed from the command in Galicia, addressed a proclamation to the
Galicians, telling them the country was in danger, and that for his
part he had given up all dependence upon the existing government.
His repeated applications for money and arms had never obtained the
slightest notice, and seemed rather to have given offence. Under
such circumstances it remained for them to act for themselves, and
he advised them to form a separate Junta for their own kingdom, and
be governed by it. A similar disposition prevailed in many of the
provinces, and Spain seemed on the point of relapsing into that state
from which the formation of the Central Junta had delivered it. They
were saved from it only by the progress of the enemy.
♦ROMANA REFUSES THE COMMAND.♦
So effectually were the Junta humbled, that they requested Romana
would repair to Carolina, where the wreck of Areizaga’s army was
collecting, and offered him full powers for whatever measures he might
think necessary. But Romana was too much disgusted with the government
to serve under them, and saw the consequences too clearly to place
himself in a responsible situation where failure was certain. They
then recalled Blake from Catalonia, where ill fortune had made him
unpopular, appointing O’Donnell, in whom the soldiers and the people
had great confidence, to succeed him; but this removal could not be
effected in time; Castaños was not called upon, perhaps from a sense
of the injustice with which he had been treated; and Areizaga was
thus left in the command, neither to the satisfaction of the troops,
the people, or himself, for he had now a full consciousness of his
weakness, his danger, and his incapacity.
♦MONTIJO AND D. FR. PALAFOX IMPRISONED.♦
The government for its own safety had found it necessary to imprison
Montijo and D. Francisco Palafox, and they had removed the most
formidable person for popular talents in the Seville Junta, by sending
Padre Gil on a mission to Sicily. That Junta, however, was busily at
work, though the better members took no part in its intrigues; and the
efforts which should have been made for organizing a civic and national
resistance, the spirit and disposition for which were not wanting,
were employed in exciting resentment against the government. This
temper was not mitigated by some financial measures, which were of a
nature rather to betray its weakness than show its resources. Half the
plate and jewels of every family and individual was called for, as a
forced loan; and a heavy tax, in the form of a license, imposed upon
every one who kept a carriage of any kind, the license being granted to
those only whose profession or whose infirmities rendered it necessary.
All funds which had been bequeathed or appropriated to pious purposes
were for the present to be taken for war expenses, those of hospitals
and public schools alone excepted; vacant _encomiendas_ and vacancies
in the military orders were not to be filled up, that the revenues
might be made available for the same emergency; and a scale was formed
for reducing the pay of all persons in the public service, soldiers
who were actually employed alone excepted. These measures, which
disappointed some in their expectations, and bore heavily upon the
scanty means of others, produced more discontent than relief.
♦ATTEMPTS TO EXCITE A FALSE CONFIDENCE.♦
The Junta could at this time have had no reasonable hope of preventing
the French from entering Andalusia. They could have no reliance upon
the remains of Areizaga’s army, for the most mournful circumstances
attending such battles as that of Ocaña is, that the worst men escape,
and that the best and steadiest are those who fall. Parque’s force was
not so completely broken up; it had lost more in reputation than in
actual strength, but its strength was comparatively small, and it was
at a distance. What reliance they had was upon Alburquerque’s corps,
which consisted of only 12,000 men; ... his head-quarters were at Don
Benito, having 2000 men at Truxillo, and some advanced parties upon the
Tagus. But their immediate danger was not from the side of Extremadura,
and what was such a corps against the armies which the French would now
bring into the field! Fallacious statements were circulated to make
the Andalusians rely upon the strength of the passes, and the measures
which had been taken for defending them. It was affirmed that Areizaga
had been joined by considerable reinforcements, and abundantly supplied
with means of every kind; that his army had been re-organized; that
that general, who had gained the confidence of the nation, would soon
be at the head of its four divisions; and that the works in the passes
were such, that all the force which Napoleon might send against them
would be unable to effect their way.
♦SCHEMES OF COUNT TILLY.♦
Such statements, which could only deceive the people into a false
security, may very possibly have been designed for that effect by some
of those agents of the government, who were now looking to obtain
favour with the Intruder, The members of the Junta themselves stand
clearly acquitted of any such intention. One of them, and only one,
had at this time his own projects in view, and they were not so much
those of a traitor, as of a desperate adventurer, in the delirium of
revolutionary ambition. This was the Conde de Tilly, a man equally
destitute of principle and of character, and who, as sometimes happens
in the crooked paths of political expediency, had been promoted from
the provincial to the Central Junta, because such promotion was the
readiest means of removing him from a situation which he disgraced!
This man, being destitute of any private worth and of all national
feeling, could have no hope for his country; and finding no farther
hope there for himself, he had turned his thoughts toward the colonies.
His plan was to get four or five thousand troops at his disposal, and
when the crisis which he foresaw should arrive, seize what money there
might be in the treasury, hasten to Cadiz, take possession of the ships
there, sail for Mexico, and there establish himself at the head of an
independent government. The difficulties which he might find from the
British squadron at his outset, or the Mexicans on his arrival, were
overlooked in this frantic scheme. A few days before the battle of
Ocaña he opened it to a general officer, whom he wished to engage in
the project; that officer informed Castaños, who was then residing at
Algeziras, and to whom those persons who saw that some change in the
executive government must soon take place, were looking as one in whom
the nation might confide. The adventurer was arrested in consequence,
and died not long afterwards a prisoner in one of the castles at Cadiz.
♦THE JUNTA ANNOUNCE THEIR INTENTION TO REMOVE.♦
At the commencement of Areizaga’s unhappy operations, the Junta and the
general had encouraged each other in a delusion so unreasonable that
it might almost be called insane. But now if it had been possible for
the government, after the experience of Somosierra, to deceive itself
concerning the strength of the passes, and the reliance which might be
placed upon them, their commander would have awakened them from that
dream. Areizaga had lost his presumption at Ocaña, and was prepared for
defeat before he was attacked. He made known his utter hopelessness
to the Junta, and by sending away great part of his stores, for the
purpose of securing them, betrayed it also to the army and to the
people. In their former danger, after the battle of Medellin, the Junta
had declared that they would never change their place of residence till
some peril or public reason rendered their removal necessary; that in
such case of emergency they would make their intention known, would
remove to the situation where they could with most advantage attend
to the defence of the country, and would never abandon the continent
of Spain while there was one spot in it which they could maintain
against the invaders. It was debated now whether they should act in
conformity to this declaration. The intention of such a removal had
been indicated when the Isle of Leon was named as the place where the
Cortes were to assemble; and there were some members who objected to
an earlier removal, on the ground that it would greatly increase the
general alarm. But the majority rightly perceived that the danger was
close at hand, and therefore that no time was to be lost. They did
not, however, venture openly to state the true and obvious motives
for this resolution when they announced it to the public. The Isle
of Leon, they said, was the fittest place for the Cortes to hold its
sittings, because there were buildings there applicable to the purpose;
from thence their decrees could be communicated to every part of
the Peninsula, whatever might be the vicissitudes of war; and there
they might devote themselves to their arduous functions with perfect
tranquillity, which was hardly attainable amid the distractions of a
great city. But this having been determined, the Junta found itself in
the predicament provided for by a decree of the preceding year, wherein
it had been declared, that at whatever place the representatives of the
nation should be convoked, to that place the government must remove its
seat. They gave notice, therefore, that on the first of February they
should meet in the Isle of Leon; and they made immediate preparations
for the removal.
♦MURMURS AT SEVILLE.♦
The people of Seville could not but perceive that their city was to
be abandoned to the enemy; this was obvious. What other designs the
members of the Junta might have formed, every one guessed, according
as he suspected or despised this unfortunate administration. Some
said they were sold to the French, and the Junta were only pretending
to fly, that they might deceive other provinces with a show of
patriotism, and sell them as they had sold Andalusia. Others acquitted
them of treason, to fix upon them the charge of peculation: a few of
the members, they said, were, for their known virtue and talents,
entitled to the love of their countrymen; the rest were a sordid race,
who, having appropriated to themselves the free gifts which had been
contributed for the use of the army, while they left the soldiers to
perish for want of food and clothing, were now about to fly to England
or to the Canaries, and there enjoy in safety the riches of which they
had defrauded their brethren and their country. Those persons who
could command the means of removal hastened to secure themselves in
the sea-ports; others, whose fortunes rooted them to the spot, and who
were thus compelled to share its fate, or whose bolder spirits were
impatient of flight or of submission, joined in imprecations upon the
government by which they believed themselves to have been sacrificed;
... whether the cause had been guilt or imbecility, the effect to them
and to the country was the same.
♦1810. JANUARY.
INVASION OF ANDALUSIA.♦
The preparations of the French having now been completed, the Intruder
put himself at the head of the French army, and advanced to take
possession of the kingdoms of Andalusia. The actual command was vested
in Marshal Soult, having Victor, Mortier, and Sebastiani under him.
The Intruder was accompanied by Azanza, O’Farrell, and other of his
ministers, who, believing that Spain was now conquered, and that Great
Britain must withdraw from a contest which it was impossible she could
maintain, were confirmed in that opinion[8] by the speeches of the
opposition in the British parliament, and by the authority of certain
English newspapers. The French, to exaggerate their easy triumph,
affirmed that the Spanish general, confiding in the entrenchments which
he had thrown up at the entrance of the defile, in the cuts which had
been made in the roads, and the mines which had been dug at the brink
of the precipices, considered his position impregnable. But Areizaga
had not been more censurable at Ocaña for rashness than he was now for
the total want of that confidence with which he was thus reproached.
Had he known how to have excited in his men either the hope or the
despair of enthusiastic devotion to their country and their cause, the
strength of the position would have afforded him such advantages, that
the enemy must have sought some other entrance into Andalusia. There
was no attempt at this; the remembrance of his former defeat acted
both upon him and his soldiers, and the Sierra Morena was defended no
better than the Somosierra had been. The men gave way at every point,
with scarcely a show of resistance, because they saw, by the conduct
of their general, that it was not expected they should stand their
ground. One division took flight at Navas de Tolosa, where one of the
most celebrated victories in Spanish history had been gained over the
Moors. The operations began on the 20th of January, and the Intruder’s
head-quarters were established the next day at Baylen, a name of which
the French reminded the Spaniards now with bitter exultation.
♦FALSE HOPES HELD OUT TO THE PEOPLE BY THE CENTRAL JUNTA.♦
On the same day, the Junta informed the people of Seville that the
pass of Almaden had been forced; but the danger, they said, was not
so great as terror might perhaps represent it. The division stationed
there, having been far too weak for maintaining the post, was gone to
join Alburquerque, who threatened the flank of the enemy; the Duke
del Parque was advancing by rapid marches; their junction would form
an army superior to the French force at Almaden, which would thus be
checked in its career, or driven back; while Areizaga’s army occupied
the other passes, and was ready to hasten to the defence of Seville,
whither also the two dukes would repair in case of necessity. This,
they said, was the true state of things, which the government had
neither exaggerated nor dissembled. They had issued orders for marching
off all the men in arms who could be collected to join the armies, and
for supplying them; and they called upon the people of this capital to
lay aside all terror, to suffer no confusion or tumult, but to display
the same courage and calmness which they had so honourably manifested
in times of greater danger. For the French, they said, depended more
upon the distrust and disunion which they hoped to create than upon
their own strength.
♦INSTRUCTIONS TO ALBURQUERQUE.♦
While the Junta thus admonished the people to be calm, they themselves
were bewildered by the danger which pressed upon them. The series of
their instructions to Alburquerque, from the time when they first
clearly saw that Andalusia was seriously threatened, exhibits their
incapacity and their wavering councils in the most extraordinary
manner. A month before the attack was made, Alburquerque warned them
that the pass of Almaden was threatened, and explaining in what
manner such a movement on the part of the enemy would threaten his
own position, observed how expedient it was to call his troops from
Truxillo and the advanced posts upon the Tagus. Their answer was,
that if the enemy made the movement which he apprehended, he must
endeavour to prevent them, by taking a good position, where he might
fight them to advantage; meantime the force at Truxillo must not be
lessened, and he must not forget to leave a competent garrison in
Badajoz. By another dispatch they enjoined him to act offensively and
with energy, to destroy the plans of the French for penetrating by
the road of La Plata. Another ordered him to hold himself ready for
marching as soon as he should receive instructions; and had he been
a man of less decision, it would thus have suspended his movements
till those instructions arrived. His army was thus upon the Guadiana
when the passes were forced, and the enemy moved a column along the
road of La Plata, to occupy Guadalcanal, and thus prevent him from
entering Andalusia. This purpose Alburquerque understood, and made his
own movements so judiciously, that when they expected to take easy
possession of Guadalcanal, they found him there with the main body of
his infantry, while the horse escorted his artillery to St. Olalla
and Ronquillo; and thus the whole army was ready to move wherever
its services were required. Here he received those instructions for
which he had been too zealous and too good an officer to wait. They
directed him to approach the enemy as near as possible, to oppose them
if they attempted to enter Andalusia, and if they should retreat upon
La Mancha, to harass them as much as possible; for it appears that
the Junta even indulged this hope. Alburquerque informed them, that
an army, consisting of 8000 disposable men and 600 horse, could not
approach very near to watch the movements of a hostile force, more than
three-fold its own number; if he added to his own little division that
which was destined to garrison Badajoz, which had at this time scarcely
400 effective men, it would only increase his own troops to 11,700,
which would still be insufficient either to occupy the line of defence,
which they instructed him to take up, or to observe the enemy with any
hope of impeding them: nevertheless he would do all that was possible.
On the 21st the Junta ordered him to march immediately for Cordoba, in
consequence of the enemy’s having occupied the pass called Puerto del
Rey; the next morning they summoned him to Seville, by the shortest
route, and with the utmost expedition; before night they changed their
purpose, and sent off another express, ordering him ♦MANIFESTO DEL
DUQUE DE ALBURQUERQUE, 45–70.♦ to Cordoba. This vacillation was imputed
to treason, especially as the war-minister, D. Antonio Cornel, had long
been suspected by the people. Certain it is, that if Alburquerque had
obeyed these orders, his own army must have been cut off, and Cadiz
would inevitably have been taken by the enemy, according to their aim
and expectation: but the error of the Junta is sufficiently accounted
for by their incapacity and their alarm.
♦INSURRECTION AT SEVILLE AGAINST THE CENTRAL JUNTA.♦
The termination of their power was at hand. When this last order was
expedited to Alburquerque, every hour brought fresh tidings of the
progress of the enemy, the murmurs of the people becoming louder as
their agitation increased, and their danger appeared more imminent.
The Junta were hastening their departure for Cadiz; their equipages
were conveyed to the quays, and the papers from the public offices were
embarked on the Guadalquiver. This alone would have made the populace
apprehend the real state of things, even if it had been possible to
keep them in ignorance of the disasters which so many breathless
couriers announced. During the nights of the 22d and 23d the patroles
were doubled; no disturbance, however, took place; the agents of
Montijo and Francisco Palafox were preparing to strike an effectual
blow, and carefully prevented a premature explosion. On the morning
of the 24th the people assembled in the square of St. Francisco, and
in front of the Alcazar; some demanded that the Central Junta should
be deposed; others, more violent in their rage, cried out, that they
should be put to death; but the universal cry was, that the city should
be defended; and they took arms tumultuously, forbade all persons to
leave the city, and patrolled the streets in numerous small parties to
see that this prohibition was observed. The tumult began at eight in
the morning, and in the course of two hours became general: they who
secretly directed it, cried out that the Junta of Seville should assume
the government, went to the Carthusian convent in which Montijo and
Francisco Palafox were confined, delivered them, and by acclamation
called on Saavedra to take upon himself the direction of public affairs
in this emergency.
♦SAAVEDRA TAKES UPON HIMSELF THE TEMPORARY AUTHORITY.♦
D. Francisco Saavedra, at that time minister of finance and president
of the Junta of Seville, was a man of great ability and high character;
but he was advanced in years, and it was believed that poison had been
administered to him, at the instigation of Godoy, which had in some
degree affected his intellects. Whatever foundation there may have been
for this belief, he betrayed no want either of intellect or of exertion
on this occasion; he calmed the people by consenting to exercise the
authority with which they invested him; assembled the members of the
provincial Junta; issued a proclamation enjoining the Sevillians to
remain tranquil; and by making new appointments, and dispatching new
orders to the armies, satisfied the populace for the time. Montijo
left the city to assist in collecting the scattered troops; and Romana
was re-nominated to that army from which the Central Junta had removed
him. The people, however, called upon Romana to take upon himself the
defence of the city, and stopped his horses at the gate; but Romana
evaded the multitude, and hastened towards Badajoz to secure that
important fortress, as the best service which he could then perform.
♦THE FRENCH ENTER SEVILLE.♦
Every thing was in confusion now. The Central Junta were hastening how
they could to Cadiz. Saavedra with five other members of ♦JOVELLANOS,
P. 13. § 6.♦ the Seville Junta took the same course, separating
themselves from their unworthy colleagues, some of whom, they now
perceived, were corrupted by the enemy, and others betrayed by their
selfishness and their fears. These persons remained to receive their
reward from the intrusive government, or make their terms with it;
and Seville, in spite of the disposition of its inhabitants, received
the yoke like Madrid. This had been foreseen, and the Central Junta
had been urged to break up the cannon foundry, and destroy the stores
which they could not remove; but every thing was left to the French.
The ♦THEY OVERRUN ANDALUSIA.♦ virtue indeed which had been displayed
at Zaragoza and Gerona appeared the more remarkable when it was seen
how ignobly the Andalusian cities submitted to the invaders, who
sent off their detachments in all directions, not so much to conquer
the country, as to take possession of it. Jaen, which had boasted of
its preparations for defence, where six-and-forty pieces of cannon
had been mounted, and military stores laid in to resist a siege,
submitted as tamely as the most defenceless village. Granada, also,
where a crusade had been preached, was entered without resistance by
Sebastiani. The people of Alhama were the first who opposed the enemy;
their town, which had only the ruins of Moorish works to protect it,
was carried by storm; and Sebastiani fought his way from Antequera
to Malaga through armed citizens and peasantry, headed by priests
and monks. The French say that this insurrection, as they called it,
put on an alarming appearance; and it is evident, from the struggle
made in this quarter by a hasty and undisciplined multitude, that if
the provincial authorities had displayed common prudence in preparing
for the invasion, and common spirit in resisting it, Andalusia might
have proved the grave of the invaders. While Sebastiani thus overran
Granada, Mortier was detached on the other hand to occupy Extremadura,
which it was thought was left exposed by the retreat of the English;
but Alburquerque, disobeying the express commands of the government,
had garrisoned Badajoz, Romana had repaired in time to that fortress,
and the designs and expectations of the enemy in that important quarter
were effectually baffled.
♦THE FRENCH PUSH FOR CADIZ.♦
This was not their only disappointment. The possession of the country,
and all the open towns, was of little importance when compared with
that of Cadiz. If it were possible that the fate of Spain could depend
upon any single event, that event would have been the capture of Cadiz
at this time; and the French therefore pushed on for it with even more
than their accustomed rapidity. The city was utterly unprepared for
an attack: there were not a thousand troops in the Isle of Leon, and
not volunteers enough to man the works; the battery of St. Fernando,
one of its main bulwarks of defence, was unfinished. While the scene
of action was at a distance, the people of Cadiz thought the danger
was remote also; and but for the genius and decision of a single man,
Buonaparte might have executed his threat of taking vengeance there for
the loss of his squadron.
♦ALBURQUERQUE’S MOVEMENTS.♦
At four on the morning of the 24th Alburquerque received that dispatch
from the Central Junta, which, countermanding his march to Seville,
ordered him to make for Cordoba. A counter-order of some kind he seems
to have expected; for, in acknowledging this dispatch, he expressed
his satisfaction that he had not commenced his movements according to
the instructions received the preceding night, in which case he must
have had the inconvenience of a counter-march; at the same time he
said, that the troops which he had directed to garrison Badajoz, and
which he was now ordered to recall, could not join him without great
danger, and without leaving that place defenceless, ... a point of
such importance, that though these orders were positive, he would not
obey them unless they were repeated. At this time he was at Pedroso
de la Sierra, whither he had advanced from Guadalcanal, pursuant to
the first instructions, requiring him to move upon Cordoba. There
was the Guadalquivir to cross, and Alburquerque, not being certain
that his artillery could pass the bridge of Triana, determined to
have it ferried over at Cantillana. He was near that ferry when the
last dispatches reached him, written on the 23d, and repeating the
order to march towards Cordoba: but Alburquerque at this time knew
that the Junta were flying from Seville, though they had given him no
intimation of their design, and knew also that Cordoba must then be in
the enemy’s possession. He did not therefore hesitate for a moment to
disobey orders, which must have led to the destruction of his army,
... an army, in the fate of which, inconsiderable as it was, the fate
of Spain was more essentially involved, than in that of any which she
had yet sent into the field. Having crossed at Cantillana, he made the
main body proceed to Carmona, while he himself, with part of his little
cavalry, advanced towards Ecija, where the French had already arrived,
to ascertain their movements, and if possible alarm them by his own,
and make them suppose that his army covered Seville: but the French
general, as well as Alburquerque, was aware that Seville was a point of
far inferior importance to that upon which the invaders had fixed their
attention; and the enemy were now pushing on the chief part of their
force by El Arahal and Moron to Utrera, in order to cut off the Duke
from Cadiz. The least delay or indecision, from the moment he began his
march, would have proved fatal. Instantly perceiving their object, he
ordered his troops to make for Utrera, where his artillery and cavalry
arrived almost at the same time with the French; from thence he
marched with the infantry by Las Cabezas to Lebrija, across the marsh,
at a season when it was deemed impracticable; thus enabling it to reach
Xerez in time, while the cavalry accompanied the artillery along the
high road, skirmishing as it retreated, delaying the pursuers, and
sacrificing itself for the preservation of the rest of the army and of
Cadiz. On the night of the 30th he performed this march from Utrera to
Lebrija; and on the same night the people of Cadiz were relieved by an
express from him, saying, that he was between them and the French, and
should reach ♦CADIZ SAVED BY ALBURQUERQUE.♦ the city in time to save
it. The following morning he arrived at Xerez, having gained a day’s
march upon the enemy: they found themselves outstript in rapidity, and
outmanœuvred; and on the morning of the 2d of February, Alburquerque,
with his 8000 men, entered the Isle of Leon, having accomplished a
march of sixty-five leagues, 260 English miles. Thus Cadiz was saved.
♦HE IS APPOINTED GOVERNOR OF CADIZ BY THE PEOPLE.♦
Yet the means of defence had been so scandalously neglected, that the
Isle of Leon must have been lost if the French had ventured to make a
spirited attack upon it; and Cadiz would then speedily have shared the
same fate. In general, the French calculate with sufficient confidence
upon the errors of their enemies, ... a confidence which has rarely
deceived them in the field, and has almost invariably succeeded in
negotiation. Here, however, they did not think it possible that works
so essential to the salvation of the government should have been
left unfinished; and, knowing that the troops were under a man whom
they trusted and loved, they knew that, naked, and exhausted, and
half-starved as those troops were, behind walls and ramparts, they
would prove desperate opponents. Having saved this all-important place
by his presence, the Duke lost no time in securing it; he exerted
himself night and day: the people, he says, when they are guided by
their first feelings, usually see things as they are; they blessed him
as their preserver, and he was appointed governor by acclamation.
♦A JUNTA, ELECTED AT CADIZ.♦
While Alburquerque was on his march, a change in the government had
been effected. Venegas had been appointed governor of Cadiz by the
Central Junta, apparently in reward for that blind obedience to their
instructions, which, more than any other circumstance, frustrated Sir
Arthur Wellesley’s victory. Both Mr. Frere and the British general
distrusted his military talents. The people of Cadiz, with less
justice, suspected his fidelity, and he was not without fear that he
might become the victim of suspicion in some fit of popular fury. His
danger became greater as soon as it was known that the Central Junta
had been deposed at Seville, and were flying in various directions;
but Venegas, with prudent foresight, went to the Cabildo, and, saying
that the government from which he had received his appointment existed
no longer, resigned his command into their hands, and offered to
perform any duty to which they should appoint him. This well-timed
submission had all the effect which he could wish; the Cabildo were
flattered by it, the more, because such deference of the military to
the civil authority was altogether unprecedented in that country; and
they requested him to continue in his post, and act as their president,
till a Junta could be elected for the government of the town. Measures
were immediately taken for choosing this Junta, and the election was
made in the fairest manner. A balloting-box was carried from house to
house; the head of every family voted for an electoral body; and this
body, consisting of about threescore persons, then elected the Junta,
who were eighteen in number. A mode of election so perfectly free and
unobjectionable gave to the Junta of Cadiz a proportionate influence
over the people; but they themselves, proud of being, as they imagined,
the only legally-constituted body in Spain, became immediately jealous
of their power, and hostile to the establishment of any other.
♦RESIGNATION OF THE CENTRAL JUNTA.♦
It was, however, essential to the salvation of the country that some
government should be established, which would be recognized by the
whole of Spain. The members of the Central Junta, who had arrived in
the Isle of Leon, would fain have continued their functions; they found
it vain to attempt this, and then, yielding to necessity, they suffered
themselves to be guided by Jovellanos, who represented to them the
necessity of appointing a regency, not including any individual of
their own body. Mr. Frere, acting as British minister till Marquis
Wellesley’s successor should arrive, exerted that influence which he so
deservedly possessed, first to enforce the advice of Jovellanos upon
his colleagues, and afterwards to make the Junta of Cadiz assent to
the only measure which could preserve their country from anarchy; but
so little were they disposed to acknowledge any authority except their
own, that, unless the whole influence of the British minister had been
zealously exerted, their acquiescence would not have been obtained. The
Archbishop of Laodicea, who was president of the Central Junta, the
Conde de Altamira, Valdes, and Ovalle, had been seized at Xerez, and
were in imminent danger from the blind fury of the populace, if some
resolute men had not come forward and saved them, by persuading the mob
to put them under custody in the Carthusian convent, as prisoners of
state. They were indebted for their liberation to Castaños, who in this
time of danger had hastened to the Isle of Leon, and took measures for
having them safely conducted thither. Their arrival made the number of
members three-and-twenty; and on the 29th of January this government
issued its last decree. Voluntarily they cannot be said to have laid
down their power, but the same presiding mind which pervaded their
former writings made them resign it with dignity. “Having,” they said,
“reassembled in the Isle of Leon, pursuant to their decree of the
13th, the dangers of the state were greatly augmented, although less
by the progress of the enemy than by internal convulsions. The change
of government which they themselves had announced, but had reserved
for the Cortes to effect, could no longer be deferred without mortal
danger to the country. But that change must not be the act of a single
body, a single place, or a single individual; for in such case, that
which ought to be the work of prudence and of the law, would be the
work of agitation and tumult; and a faction would do that, which ought
only to be done by the whole nation, or by a body lawfully representing
it. The fatal consequences which must result from such disorder were
apparent; there was no wise citizen who did not perceive, no Frenchman
who did not wish for them. If the urgency of present calamities, and
the public opinion which was governed by them, required the immediate
establishment of a Council of Regency, the appointment of that council
belonged to none but the supreme authority, established by the national
will, obeyed by it, and acknowledged by the provinces, the armies, the
allies, and the colonies of Spain; ... the sole legitimate authority,
which represented the unity of the power of the monarchy.”
♦A REGENCY APPOINTED.♦
After this preamble they nominated as regents Don Pedro de Quevedo y
Quintana, Bishop of Orense; D. Francisco de Saavedra, late president
of the Junta of Seville; General Castaños; Don Antonio de Escaño,
minister of marine; and D. Esteban Fernandez de Leon, a member of the
council of the Indies, as representative of the colonies. To these
persons the Junta transferred its authority; providing, however, that
they should only retain it till the Cortes were assembled, who were
then to determine what form of government should be adopted; and that
the means which were thus provided for the ultimate welfare of the
nation might not be defeated, they required that the regents, when they
took their oath to the Junta, should swear also that they would verify
the meeting of the Cortes at the time which had been appointed. The
new government was to be installed on the ♦LAST ADDRESS OF THE CENTRAL
JUNTA.♦ third day after this decree. The Junta accompanied it with a
farewell address to the people, condemning the tumult at Seville, and
justifying themselves, like men who felt that they had been unjustly
accused, because they had been unfortunate. Neither their incessant
application to the public weal, they said, had been sufficient to
accomplish what they desired, nor the disinterestedness with which
they had served their country, nor their loyalty to their beloved but
unhappy king, nor their hatred to the tyrant and to every kind of
tyranny. Ambition, and intrigue, and ignorance had been too powerful.
“Ought we,” they said, “to have let the public revenues be plundered,
which base interest and selfishness were seeking to drain off by a
thousand ways? Could we satisfy the ambition of those who did not think
themselves sufficiently rewarded with three or four steps of promotion
in as many months? or, could we, notwithstanding the moderation which
has been the character of our government, forbear to correct, with the
authority of the law, the faults occasioned by that spirit of faction,
which was audaciously proceeding to destroy order, introduce anarchy,
and miserably overthrow the state?”
Then drawing a rapid sketch of the exertions which they had made
since they were driven from Aranjuez, ... “Events,” they said, “have
been unsuccessful, ... but was the fate of battles in our hands? And
when these reverses are remembered, why should it be forgotten that
we have maintained our intimate relations with the friendly powers;
that we have drawn closer the bonds of fraternity with our Americas;
and that we have resisted with dignity the perfidious overtures of
the usurper? But nothing could restrain the hatred which, from the
hour of its installation, was sworn against the Junta. Its orders
were always ill interpreted, and never well obeyed.” Then, touching
upon the insults and dangers to which they had been exposed in the
insurrection at Seville, ... “Spaniards,” they continued, “thus it is
that those men have been persecuted and defamed, whom you chose for
your representatives; they who without guards, without troops, without
punishments, confiding themselves to the public faith, exercised
tranquilly, under its protection, those august functions with which you
had invested them! And who are they, mighty God! who persecute them?
the same who, from its installation, have laboured to destroy the Junta
from its foundations; the same who have introduced disorder into the
cities, division into the armies, insubordination into the constituted
authorities. The individuals of the government are neither perfect nor
impeccable; they are men, and as such liable to human weakness and
error. But as public administrators, as your representatives, they will
reply to the imputations of these agitators, and show them where good
faith and patriotism have been found, and where ambitious passions,
which incessantly have destroyed the bowels of the country. Reduced
from henceforward by our own choice to the rank of simple citizens,
without any other reward than the remembrance of the zeal and of the
labours which we have employed in the public service, we are ready, or,
more truly, we are anxious, to reply to our calumniators before the
Cortes, or the tribunal which it shall appoint. Let them fear, not us;
let them fear, who have seduced the simple, corrupted the vile, and
agitated the furious; let them fear, who, in the moment of the greatest
danger, when the edifice of the state could scarce resist the shock
from without, have applied to it the torch of dissension, to reduce it
to ashes. Remember, Spaniards, the fate of Porto! an internal tumult,
excited by the French themselves, opened its gates to Soult, who did
not advance to occupy it till a popular tumult had rendered its defence
impossible. The Junta warned you against a similar fate after the
battle of Medellin, when symptoms appeared of that discord which has
now with such hazard declared itself. Recover yourselves, and do not
accomplish these mournful presentiments!
“Strong, however, as we are in the testimony of our own consciences,
and secure in that we have done for the good of the state as much as
circumstances placed within our power, the country and our own honour
demand from us the last proof of our zeal, and require us to lay down
an authority, the continuance of which might draw on new disturbances
and dissensions. Yes, Spaniards, your government, which, from the
hour of its installation, has omitted nothing which it believed could
accomplish the public wish; which, as a faithful steward, has given
to all the resources that have reached its hands no other destination
than the sacred wants of the country; which has frankly published its
proceedings; and which has evinced the greatest proof of its desire for
your welfare, by convoking a Cortes more numerous and free than any
which the monarchy has ever yet witnessed, resigns willingly the power
and authority which you have confided to it, and transfers them to the
Council of Regency, which it has established by the decree of this
day. May your new governors be more fortunate in their proceedings! and
the individuals of the Supreme Junta will envy them nothing but the
glory of having saved their country, and delivered their King.”
Thus terminated the unfortunate but ever-memorable administration
of the Central Junta, a body which had become as odious before its
dissolution, as it was popular when it was first installed. If in
their conduct there had been much to condemn and much to regret, it
may be admitted, upon a calm retrospect, that there was hardly less
to be applauded and admired. Spain will hereafter render justice to
their intentions, and remember with gratitude that this was the first
government which addressed the Spaniards as a free people, the first
to sanction those constitutional principles of liberty which had for
so many generations been suppressed. It was to be expected, when such
tremendous events were passing, and such momentous interests at stake,
that their errors would be judged of by their consequences without
reference to their causes. An unsuccessful administration is always
unpopular; and in perilous and suspicious times, when the affairs of
state go ill, what is the effect of misjudgement, or weakness, or
inevitable circumstances, is too commonly and too readily imputed
to deliberate treason. Such an opinion had very generally prevailed
against the Central Junta; but when this power was at an end, and
nothing would have gratified the people more than the exposure and
punishment of the guilty, not even the shadow of proof could be found
against them. They were inexperienced in business, they had been
trained up in prejudice, they partook, as was to be expected, of the
defects of the national character; but they partook, and some of
them in the highest degree, of its virtues also: and their generous
feeling, their high-mindedness, and unshaken fortitude, may command an
Englishman’s respect, if it be contrasted not merely with the conduct
of the continental courts, but with the recorded sentiments of that
party in our own state, who, during this arduous contest, represented
the struggle as hopeless, and whose language, though it failed either
to dispirit or to disgust the Spaniards, served most certainly to
encourage the enemy. England has had abundant cause to be grateful to
Providence, but never, in these latter times, has it had greater than
for escaping, more than once, the imminent danger of having this party
for its rulers. They would have deserted the last, the truest, of our
allies; they would have betrayed the last, the only hope of Europe and
of the world; they would have sacrificed our honour first, and when
they had brought home the war to our own doors, which their measures
inevitably must have done, the lasting infamy which they had entailed
upon the nation would have been a worse evil than the dreadful and
perilous trial through which it would have had to pass.
♦1810. FEBRUARY.
THE REGENTS.♦
In their choice of the regents the Junta seem to have looked for the
fittest persons, without regard to any other considerations. Three
of them were well known. The Bishop of Orense was venerable for his
public conduct, as well as for his age and exemplary virtues; no man
had contributed more signally to rouse and maintain the spirit of
the country. Castaños had received from the Junta a species of ill
treatment which was in the spirit of the old government, but for
which they made amends by this appointment. When he was ordered as a
sort of banishment to his own house at Algeziras, the people of that
place, greatly to their honour, mounted a volunteer guard before the
house, as a mark of respect; and the Junta, in the last days of their
administration, when they turned their eyes about in distress, called
upon him to take the command, and resume the rank of captain-general
of the four kingdoms of Andalusia. The call was too late, but he came
to the Isle of Leon in time to rescue some members of that body from
the populace of Xerez; and in nominating him to the regency, they
seem to have consulted the wishes of the people. Saavedra was in full
popularity, and had given good proof of disinterested zeal during
the tumult at Seville. Instead of securing his private property, he
occupied himself in calming the people, and in preserving the public
treasure and the more valuable public records; and as there was a
want of vessels, he embarked the public property on board the one
which had been hired for his own effects. Escaño had been minister of
marine at Madrid, and was known as a man of business and fidelity.
Leon’s appointment was not agreeable to the Junta of Cadiz, who felt
their power, and were determined to derive from it as much advantage as
possible; he therefore declined accepting the office on the plea of ill
health, and D. Miguel de Lardizabal y Ariba, a native of the province
of Tlaxcalla, in New Spain, and member of the council of the Indies,
was appointed in his stead.
♦THEIR INJUSTICE TOWARDS THE MEMBERS OF THE CENTRAL JUNTA.♦
A government was thus formed, which, receiving its authority from the
Supreme Junta, derived it ultimately from the same lawful source, ...
the choice of the people and the necessity of the state. In such times,
and in a nation which attaches a sort of religious reverence to forms,
it was of prime importance that the legitimacy of the new government
should be apparent, and its right of succession clear and indisputable.
For this Spain was principally indebted to Jovellanos, the last and not
the least service which that irreproachable and excellent man rendered
to his country. But it was the fate of Jovellanos, notwithstanding
the finest talents, the most diligent discharge of duty, the purest
patriotism, and the most unsullied honour, to be throughout his life
the victim of the unhappy circumstances of Spain. Seven years’
imprisonment, by the will and pleasure of the despicable Godoy, was a
light evil compared with the injustice which he now endured from that
government which he, more than any other individual, had contributed
to appoint and to legitimate. The council of Castille, which first
acknowledged the Intruder, and then acknowledged the Junta, in the
same time-serving spirit attacked the Junta now that it was fallen,
affirmed that its power had been a violent usurpation, which the
nation had rather tolerated than consented to, and that the members
had exercised this usurped power contrary to law, and with the most
open and notorious selfishness and ambition. The people, not contented
with their compulsory resignation, accused them of having peculated the
public money; and the regency, yielding to the temper of the times,
and perhaps courting popularity, acted as if it believed this charge,
registered their effects, and seized their papers. Even Jovellanos was
ordered to retire to his own province, which happened at that time to
be free from the enemy, and there place himself under the inspection
of the magistrates. This act is inexpiably disgraceful to those from
whom it proceeded; upon Jovellanos it could entail no disgrace. He had
long learnt to bear oppression, and patiently to suffer wrong; but this
injury came with the sting of ingratitude, it struck him to the heart,
and embittered his few remaining days.
This rigorous treatment of the Central Junta was the work of their
implacable enemy, the council of Castille, a body which they ought
to have dissolved and branded for its submission to the Intruder;
and of the Junta of Cadiz, a corporation equally daring and selfish,
who thought that in proportion as they could blacken the character
of the former government, they should increase their own credit
with the people. The members of that government had given the best
proof of innocence; not one of them had gone over to the enemy, nor
even attempted to conceal himself at a time when the popular hatred
against them had been violently excited. Several of them had embarked
on board a Spanish frigate for the Canaries; when their baggage was
seized, it was, at their own request, examined before the crew, and
the examination proved that they had scarcely the means of performing
the voyage with tolerable comfort. Tilly died in prison without a
trial. This was a thoroughly worthless man, and it might probably have
appeared that he had found means of enriching himself when he was sent,
in the manner of the republican commissioners in France, to superintend
the army which defeated Dupont. But Calvo, who was arrested also and
thrown into a dungeon, without a bed to lie on or a change of linen,
and whose wife also was put in confinement, was irreproachable in his
public character. He had been one of the prime movers of that spirit
which has sanctified the name of Zaragoza, and during the first siege
repeatedly led the inhabitants against the French. All his papers had
been seized; he repeatedly called upon the regency to print every one
of them, to publish his accounts, and bring him to a public trial; but
he was no more attended to than if he had been in the Seven Towers of
Constantinople. After the Cortes assembled he obtained a trial, and was
pronounced innocent.
♦PROCLAMATION OF THE INTRUDER.♦
The Intruder, following his armies, and thinking to obtain possession
of Cadiz, and destroy the legitimate government of Spain, issued a
proclamation at Cordoba, characterized by the impiety and falsehood
which marked the whole proceedings of the French in this atrocious
usurpation. “The moment was arrived,” he said, “when the Spaniards
could listen with advantage to the truths which he was about to utter.
During more than a century the force of circumstances, which masters
all events, had determined that Spain should be the friend and ally of
France. When an extraordinary revolution hurled from the throne the
house which reigned in France, it was the duty of the Spanish branch to
support it, and not lay down its arms until it was re-established. But
it required a spirit of heroism to adopt such a resolution, and the
cabinet of Madrid thought it better to wait for that from the progress
of time, which it wanted courage to obtain by arms.” This truth, for
such the Intruder might well call this part of the proclamation, marks,
as much as the falsehoods which accompanied it, the devilish spirit
by which the French councils had long been possessed; having allured
the Spanish Bourbons by oaths and treaties to their own destruction,
France now reproached them with the very conduct which she had tempted
them to pursue. The paper proceeded to affirm, that, during its whole
alliance with France, Spain had been watching an opportunity of falling
upon her. “The conqueror of Europe,” it continued, “would not allow
himself to be duped. The princes of the house of Spain, not having
the courage to fight, renounced the crown, and were content to make
stipulations for their private interests. The Spanish grandees, the
generals, the chiefs of the nation, recognized those treaties. I,”
said the Intruder, “received their oaths at Madrid, but the occurrence
at Baylen threw every thing into confusion. The timid became alarmed,
but the enlightened and conscientious remained true to me. A new
continental war, and the assistance of England, prolonged an unequal
contest, of which the nation feels all the horrors. The issue was never
doubtful, and the fate of arms has now declared so. If tranquillity
is not immediately restored, who can foresee the consequence? It is
the interest of France to preserve Spain entire and independent, if
she become again her friend and ally; but if she continue her enemy,
it is the duty of France to weaken, to dismember, and to destroy her.
God, who reads the hearts of men, knows with what view I thus address
you. Spaniards! the irrevocable destiny is not yet pronounced. Cease
to suffer yourselves to be duped by the common enemy. Employ your
understanding: it will point out to you in the French troops, friends
who are ready to defend you. It is yet time: rally around me! and may
this open to Spain a new era of glory and happiness.”
♦LANGUAGE OF THE DESPONDENTS IN ENGLAND.♦
If the Spaniards had had as little wisdom, or as little sense of
national honour, as the party who opposed the measures of government
in England, they would have believed the Intruder, and submitted to
him. This party, who, at the time of Sir John Moore’s retreat, told us
that the Spaniards had then yielded, and that their fate was decided,
now declared, with a little more prudence in their predictions, that
the show of resistance must soon be at an end. The king’s message,
declaring that Great Britain would continue its assistance to the
great cause of Spain, as the most important considerations of policy
and of good faith required, excited in them the gloomiest forebodings.
“We were then still,” they said, “to cling to the forlorn hope of
maintaining a footing in Portugal! Our resources were still farther
to be drained in supporting our ally, or rather in supporting a system
which did not arouse its own people to its defence; and for our
efforts, however strenuous, in the support of which we did not receive
either their gratitude or their co-operation. It was reported,” they
said, “that the English army had made a retrograde movement to Lisbon,
and actually embarked in the transports at the mouth of the Tagus.
Having uniformly declared their opinion, that this expedition, under
Lord Wellington, was injurious to the most important interests of the
country, as they affected both its resources and its character, they
should most sincerely and warmly congratulate the public if such were
its termination.” That is, they would have congratulated us if we had
broken our faith, deserted our allies, fled before our enemies, left
Buonaparte to obtain possession of Cadiz and Lisbon, and then waited
tremblingly for him upon our own shores, with our resources carefully
husbanded till it pleased him to come and take them!
“It has been conjectured,” said these hopeful politicians, “that Cadiz
might be abundantly supplied from the opposite coast of Barbary. But
those who hazarded this opinion were not precisely informed of the
state of things on the African coast. The Emperor of Morocco was
extremely unfriendly to his Christian neighbours. Cadiz, to be sure,
was an interesting point, which it was our interest to maintain as
long as possible; but they had no expectation that Cadiz, when really
attacked, could long hold out. It could not be supplied with fuel with
which to bake bread for the inhabitants for one week.” While this party
thus displayed their presumptuous ignorance, and vented their bitter
mortification in insults against the ministry and against our allies,
they endeavoured to direct attention toward the Spanish colonies,
saying that the great, and indeed only object, of this country, should
be to establish a mercantile connexion with the empire which was to
be erected there, and recommending that we should take immediate
measures for assisting the emigration of the Spanish patriots! Happily
the councils of Great Britain were directed by wiser heads, and the
people of Spain actuated by better principles and by a braver spirit.
“We are supported,” said Romana to his countrymen, “by the illustrious
English nation, who are united with the brave Portugueze, our brethren,
possessing a common interest with ourselves, and who never will abandon
us.” The people and the government had the same confidence in British
honour. English and Portugueze troops were dispatched from Lisbon to
assist in the defence of Cadiz, and Ceuta was delivered in trust to an
English garrison.
♦THE ISLE OF LEON.♦
The Isle of Leon forms an irregular triangle, of which the longest side
is separated from the main land by a channel, called the river of
Santi Petri, ten miles in length, and navigable for the largest ships.
This side is strongly fortified, and the situation also is peculiarly
strong. The bridge of Zuazo, built originally by the Romans, over the
channel, is flanked with batteries, and communicates with the continent
by a causeway over impassable marshes. There are two towns upon the
island; that which bears the same name, and which contains about 40,000
inhabitants, is nearly in the middle of the isle; the other, called
St. Carlos, which stands a little to the north, was newly erected, and
consisted chiefly of barracks and other public buildings. Cadiz stands
on the end of a tongue of land seven miles in length, extending from
the isle into the bay; this isthmus is from a quarter to half a mile
broad, flanked on one side by the sea, and on the other by the bay of
Cadiz. Along this isthmus, an enemy who had made himself master of
the island must pass; new batteries had been formed, new works thrown
up, and mines dug; and if these obstacles were overcome, his progress
would then be opposed by regular fortifications, upon which the utmost
care and expense had been bestowed for rendering the city impregnable.
Before this unexpected and unexampled aggression on the part of France,
the great object of the Spanish government had been to render Cadiz
secure from the sea: as soon, therefore, as the approach of the enemy
was certain, one of the first operations was to demolish all those
works on the main land from whence the shipping could be annoyed. This
was a precaution which Admiral Purvis had strongly advised after the
battle of Medellin, and again as soon as the more ruinous defeat of
Areizaga was known. Upon the first report that the enemy were hastening
toward Cadiz, in the hope of surprising it, he requested Admiral Alava
to remove the ships, and place them in the lower part of the harbour,
where they might be secure; but it was not till Mr. Frere had strongly
urged the necessity of this precaution that the Spanish Admiral, after
much reasoning on his part, reluctantly complied. The ill spirit which
at this time prevailed among the naval officers arose rather from
the pitiable situation in which they found themselves, than from any
predilection for the French, or the more natural feeling of hostility
toward the English in which they had grown up. Men being wanted for
the land service, and not for the fleet, the navy had been neglected
during this contest: the ships were ill manned and miserably stored,
the pay far in arrears; and the officers had latterly disregarded their
duty as much as they thought themselves disregarded by the government,
... hopelessness producing discontent, and discontent growing into
disaffection. This temper could produce no ill effect when the regency
and the people were so well disposed. The fleet was removed in time;
and the hulks also in which the miserable prisoners were confined were
moved lower down into the bay, and moored under the guns of the English
and Spanish ships.
The British Admiral had represented in time how important it was that
the batteries on the north side of the harbour should be kept in an
efficient state. The danger now was from the land side, not from the
sea, and by good fortune the land quarter had been strengthened some
fifty years before, at a cost and with a care which had then been
deemed superfluous. But the Spanish government had not forgotten
that it was on that side Essex had made his attack, and England was
the enemy against whom those precautions were taken. At that time
every villa and garden upon the isthmus had been destroyed. During
after-years of security the ground had again been covered, and was now
to be cleared again. The Spaniards, roused by the exertions and example
of Alburquerque, as much as by the immediate danger, laboured at the
works, and carefully removed every building on the isthmus. Night and
day these labours were carried on, and the sound of explosions was
almost perpetual. The wood from the demolished buildings was taken into
the city for fuel.
♦VICTOR SUMMONS THE JUNTA OF CADIZ.♦
Marshal Victor, before he understood how well the isle was secured,
sent a summons to the Junta of Cadiz, telling them he was ready to
receive their submission to King Joseph. Jaen, Cordova, Seville,
and Granada, he said, had received the French with joy; he expected
the same reception from the people of Cadiz; and as the fleets and
arsenals were the property of the nation, he demanded that they
should be preserved for their rightful sovereign. They returned an
answer, signed by every individual of their body, declaring that they
acknowledged no one for King of Spain but Ferdinand VII. Soult, also,
representing the English as the enemies of Spain, insinuated, in a
summons to Alburquerque, that it was their intention to seize Cadiz
for themselves. Alburquerque replied, no such design was entertained
by the British nation, who were not less generous than they were great
and brave; their only object was to assist in the defence of Cadiz with
all the means in which they abounded, an assistance which the Spaniards
solicited and gratefully received. Cadiz, he added, had nothing to
fear from a force of 100,000 men; the Spaniards knew that the French
commanded no more than the ground which they covered, and they would
never lay down their arms till they had effected the deliverance of
their country.
♦ILL-WILL OF THE JUNTA TOWARDS ALBURQUERQUE.♦
The service which Alburquerque had rendered was so signal, and its
importance so perfectly understood by all the people of Cadiz, that
he was deservedly looked upon as the saviour of the place. Having
been appointed governor in obedience to the general wish, he became
in consequence president of the Junta, as Venegas had been before
him, whose obedient policy was now rewarded by the highest station
to which a subject could be appointed, that of viceroy of Mexico.
Alburquerque had not solicited these appointments; on the contrary, he
remonstrated against them, pointing out how impossible it was, that,
having the command of the army, he could attend to other duties at the
same time; and in consequence of his representations, D. Andres Lopez
de Sagastizabel was nominated to act as his deputy in both capacities.
The Junta of Cadiz had obtained their power unexceptionably, but no
men ever made a more unworthy use of it; they had reluctantly assented
to the formation of the regency, and when it was formed, endeavoured
to restrain and overrule it, and engross as much authority as possible
to themselves, in which, unhappily for Spain, and more unhappily for
Spanish America, they were but too successful. Alburquerque became the
marked object of their dislike, because he had recognised the regency
at a moment when, if he had hesitated, they would have struggled to
get the whole power of government into their own hands. That spirit,
which had never condescended to conceal its indignant contempt for
Godoy, could not stoop to court the favour of a Junta of mercantile
monopolists. Not that he despised them as such; his mind was too full
of noble enterprises to bestow a thought upon them, otherwise than as
men who were called upon to do their duty while he did his.
♦THE TROOPS NEGLECTED.♦
His first business had been to complete the unfinished works of
defence, especially the _cortadura_, or cut across the isthmus, where
the battery of St. Fernando was erected; and lest any attempt should
be made to pass beside it at low water, the iron gratings from the
windows of the public buildings were removed, and placed on the beach
as a chevaux-de-frise. While these things were going on, the people
of Cadiz manifested a disgraceful indolence; they assembled in crowds
on the ramparts, wrapt in their long cloaks, and there stood gazing
silently for hours, while the English were employed in blowing up
the forts round the bay; appearing, says an eye-witness, indifferent
spectators of the events around them, rather than the persons for whose
security these exertions were made. Meantime the troops, whose rapid
march had placed these idlers out of fear, were neglected in a manner
not less cruel to the individuals than it was detrimental to the public
service. The points to be protected were so many, that the numbers of
this little army did not suffice to guard them, without exhausting the
men by double duty. Alburquerque requested that the regiments might be
filled from the numberless idle inhabitants of the isle and of Cadiz,
who, while they were idle, were at such a time worse than useless.
Unless this were done, he said, it was not only impossible for his men
to undertake any offensive operations, or even to improve themselves in
discipline, but they must be wasted away with fatigue and consequent
infirmities. These representations were in vain; neither was he more
successful in requiring their pay, a supply of clothing, of which they
stood evidently in need, and those common comforts in their quarters,
which were as requisite for health as for decency. The Junta of Cadiz
had seven hundred pieces of cloth in their possession, yet more than
a month elapsed, and nothing was done toward clothing the almost
naked troops. Alburquerque asserts, as a fact within his own positive
knowledge, that the reason was, because the Junta were at that time
contending with the Regency, to get the management of the public money
into their own hands, and meant, if they had failed, to sell this cloth
to the government, and make a profit upon it, as merchants, of eight
reales _per vara_!
♦ALBURQUERQUE APPLIES TO THE REGENCY IN THEIR BEHALF.♦
It is not to be supposed that the Junta were idle at this time; they
had many and urgent duties to attend to; but no duty could be more
urgent than that of supplying the wants and increasing the force of
the army. The Duke applied to them in vain for six weeks, during which
time he discovered that the Junta looked as much to their private
interest as to the public weal; for from the beginning, he says, their
aim was to get the management of the public expenditure, not merely for
the sake of the influence which accompanies it, but that they might
repay themselves the sums which they had lent, and make their own
advantage by trading with the public money. At length he applied to
the Regency. The regents, feeling how little influence they possessed
over the Junta, advised the Duke to publish the memorial which he
had presented to them, thinking that it would excite the feelings
of the people. In this they were not deceived; ... the people, now
for the first time called upon to relieve the wants of the soldiers,
exerted themselves liberally, and there was not a family in which some
contribution was not made for the defenders of the country. But the
Junta were exasperated to the last degree by this measure, which their
own culpable neglect had rendered necessary. Alburquerque’s memorial
contained no complaint against them; it only stated the wants of the
soldiers, and requested that, unless those wants were supplied, he
might be relieved from a command, the duties of which, under such
circumstances, it was not possible for him to perform. Though he was
persuaded of their selfish views, he had no design of exposing an
evil which there was no means of remedying; and when he understood
how violently they were offended, he addressed a letter to them,
disclaiming any intention of inculpating them, in terms which nothing
but his earnest desire of avoiding all dissensions that might prove
injurious to the country could ♦THE JUNTA ATTACK ALBURQUERQUE.♦ either
dictate or justify. This did not prevent the Junta from publishing an
attack upon him, in reply, of the most virulent nature. They reproached
him with having exposed the wants and weakness of the army; entered
into details as frivolous in themselves as they were false in their
application, to show that they had done every thing for the soldiers;
declared, with an impudence of ingratitude which it is not possible
to reprobate in severer terms than it deserves, that his cavalry had
retreated too precipitately, and ought to have brought in grain with
them; and concluded by a menacing intimation, that the people of Cadiz
were ready to support them against any persons who should attempt to
impeach their proceedings. If the Junta of Cadiz had no other sins
to answer for, this paper alone would be sufficient to render their
name odious in history; so unprovoked was it in its temper, so false
in its details, so detestable for its ingratitude. Had Alburquerque
been capable of consulting his own safety by a precipitate retreat,
Portugal, as he said, and the English army were at hand, ... and he
needed not to have undertaken an arduous march of 260 miles in the
face of a superior enemy, and in direct disobedience of the orders
of his government. If the cavalry which saved Cadiz, and which they
thus wantonly accused of retreating too precipitately, had been even a
quarter of an hour later, it could not have entered the Isle of Leon.
“This,” said the indignant Duke, “is the patriotism of the Junta of
Cadiz; the enemy is at the gates, and they throw out a defiance to the
general and the army who protect them!”
♦HE RESIGNS THE COMMAND.♦
But Alburquerque was too sincere a lover of his country to expose it to
the slightest danger, even for the sake of his own honour. He could
not resent this infamous attack without exciting a perilous struggle;
and without resenting it he felt it impossible to remain at the head of
the army. Having thus been publicly insulted, a reparation as public
was necessary to his honour, and that reparation, for the sake of
Spain, he delayed to demand. The Regency would have had him continue
in the command; he however persisted in resigning. No injustice which
could be done him, he said, would ever have made him cease to present
himself in the front of danger, had he not been compelled to withdraw
for fear of the fatal consequences of internal discord. Accordingly, he
who should have been leading, and who would have led, the men who loved
him to victory, came over to England as ambassador, with a wounded
spirit and a broken heart.