PROCEEDINGS IN FRANCE AND IN THE BRITISH PARLIAMENT.
♦1809.♦
♦BUONAPARTE DIVORCES THE EMPRESS JOSEPHINE.♦
The year had thus closed in Spain as triumphantly for the invaders
as it began; and yet the French felt, and could not but feel, that
the subjugation of that kingdom was more distant at this time than
they had supposed it to be when they entered upon the invasion, in
the wantonness of insolent power. Buonaparte, when he recapitulated
the exploits of the year to his senate, intimated an intention of
returning thither to complete the conquest. “When I shall show myself
beyond the Pyrenees,” said he, “the frightened leopard will fly to
the ocean to avoid shame, defeat, and death. The triumph of my arms
will be the triumph of the genius of good over that of evil; of
moderation, order, and morality, over civil war, anarchy, and the
evil passions.” He neither mentioned nor alluded to the battle of
Talavera; the circumstances of that well-fought field had been so
completely concealed from the French nation, that they were fully
persuaded the English had suffered a great defeat; but the lesson
had not been lost upon Buonaparte. That battle, and the repulse at
Esling, made him for the first time feel the insecure foundation of
his power; it taught him that his armies were not invincible. His
hatred for England, implacable as it was, had not prevented him from
regarding with admiration the military genius of Marlborough, though
he was incapable of appreciating the principles and feelings which
induced that excellent commander on every occasion to mitigate by every
means in his power the miseries of war. He despised the counsels, and
egregiously miscalculated the resources of Great Britain; but he was
compelled in his heart to render reluctant justice to the national
spirit, which Vimeiro and Coruña, and the Douro and Talavera, had shewn
him could be displayed by her armies no less than by her fleets; and
he could not but secretly and ominously apprehend, that such victories
as those of Blenheim and Ramillies might be achieved by such soldiers.
It is believed that this feeling determined him to connect himself by
marriage with one of the great continental powers. Secret arrangements
for this having been made with the house of Austria, he divorced
the Empress Josephine at the close of the year by an act of his own
government, and with her full acquiescence, reasons of state being made
the plea, as they were the motives, for this measure. In the manner of
the separation, in the provision which was made, and in the honours
which were reserved for Josephine, due regard was shown her: she was
a gentle and benevolent woman; and had Buonaparte in his moral nature
been half as worthy of the throne, the world might have loved and
revered the memory of both.
♦FARTHER REQUISITION FOR THE ARMIES IN SPAIN.♦
But triumphantly as the war with Austria had been concluded, the
prospect of peace was yet far distant. The war-minister reported,
that the French armies in Spain consisted of 300 battalions and 150
squadrons, and it would be sufficient, without sending any additional
corps, to keep them at their full establishment: 30,000 men collected
at Bayonne afforded means for accomplishing this, and for repulsing
any force which the English might send to that country. In this state
of things, no other levy was necessary than such as would supply the
contingent indispensably requisite for replacing in the battalions of
the interior the drafts which were daily made from them. There remained
from the conscription of the years 1806, 7, 8, 9, 10, more than 80,000
men, who, though ballotted, had not been called into actual service;
it was proposed to call out 36,000, and then to declare those classes
free from any future call. “By these means, sire,” said the minister,
“your armies will be maintained at their present strength, and a
considerable number of your subjects will be definitively released
from the conscription.” There were also at the Emperor’s disposal
25,000 men, afforded by the conscription for 1811; but upon these it
was not proposed to call, unless events should disappoint his pacific
intentions.
Thirty thousand men stationed at Bayonne to supply the constant
consumption of his army in Spain, 36,000 to be raised for replacing
the drafts from the interior, and 25,000 to be taken by anticipation,
before the conscription in its regular course ought to have reached
them, and to be held in readiness for farther demands of blood; this
was the prospect held out at the conclusion of the Austrian war; these
were the sacrifices which the French were called upon to make, not for
defence, not for the interests, not for the honour of France, but to
support a wanton and execrable usurpation, which had no other cause
than the individual ambition of Buonaparte.... ♦DISPLAY OF SPANISH
FLAGS.♦ He felt how needful it was to persuade the French that a war
which they knew to be so destructive was not as inglorious as it was
unjust, and for this purpose a parade was made of the victories which
had been obtained in Spain. The flags taken at Espinosa, Burgos,
Tudela, Somosierra, and Madrid, were presented to the legislative body;
a detachment of the grenadiers of the imperial guard was introduced,
and seated on the right and left of Buonaparte’s statue, that the
stage might be full. Rhetorical speeches were delivered, and the
session concluded like a stage spectacle, with a flourish of trumpets,
and cries of Long live the Emperor! In this exhibition, Buonaparte
addressed himself to the ruling passion of the people over whom he
reigned. “Without glory,” he said, “there could be no happiness for a
Frenchman;” and the moral feeling of the nation had been so debased
that they believed glory might be attained in a war thus flagrantly
and infamously unjust. ♦1810. JANUARY.♦ The prevailing weakness of his
own character also was betrayed in this display; no other successes
were brought forward than those which had been won while he was in
Spain; for though he liberally rewarded his generals in all ways, and
left them also at full liberty to enrich themselves by exaction and
plunder, he was jealous of any celebrity that they might attain, and
desired, more from personal vanity than from political considerations,
that in every success the French should look to him, and to him alone,
as the author of their victories.
While France was thus rejoicing in the triumphs of its armies, the
Central Junta saw the whole extent of their danger, and rested their
hopes upon the goodness of their cause and the character of the
Spanish nation, with a composure which nothing could shake. Never was
a nation more truly represented in its defects and in its virtues, in
its strength and in its weakness. While in their administration they
committed the same errors, deceiving themselves and others, which in
former wars had rendered the Spaniards[7] the most inefficient and
impracticable of all allies; their language was that of the loftiest
fortitude, and their public papers breathed a spirit worthy of their
station. One of the most splendid of these orations was issued during
the fearful pause after the defeat of their armies at Ocaña and at Alba
de Tormes, when the peace with Austria left Buonaparte at leisure to
♦ADDRESS OF THE CENTRAL JUNTA TO THE NATION.♦ direct his whole force
against Spain. “Our enemies,” said they, “exhort us to submit to the
clemency of the conqueror. Because in their own degraded hearts they
find nothing but baseness when they are weak, and atrocity when they
are strong, they imagine that the Spaniards must abandon all their
lofty hopes. Who has told them that our virtue is of so low a standard?
Does fortune oppose to us greater obstacles? we will redouble our
exertions! Are our dangers augmented? we shall acquire the greater
glory! Slaves of Buonaparte, waste not time in sophistries which can
deceive no one; speak frankly and say, we will be the most wicked of
men, because we believe ourselves the most powerful: ... this language
is consistent and intelligible; but do not attempt to persuade us
that the abandonment of our rights is wisdom, and that cowardice is
prudence! Submit?... Do these sophists know to what they advise the
most high-minded nation upon earth? It would be a stain without example
in our annals, if after such efforts, such incredible events, we were
to fall at the feet of the crowned slave who has been sent to us as
king. And for what? That from the midst of his banquets, his ruffian
parasites, and his prostitutes, he may point out the churches which are
to be burnt; the estates which are to be divided among his satellites;
the virgins and matrons who are to be taken to his seraglio; the youths
who are to be sent as the tribute to the Minotaur of France!
“Spaniards, think not that the Junta speak thus to excite you by the
arts of language; what need of words, when things speak for themselves?
Your houses are destroyed; your churches demolished; your fields laid
waste; your families dispersed and wandering through the country, or
hurried into the grave. Have we made so many sacrifices, have the
flames of war consumed half Spain, that we should abandon the other
half to the far more deadly peace which the enemy prepares for it?
For no one will beguile himself with the insidious parade of the
improvements which the French hold out. The Tartar who commands them
has decreed, that Spain shall have neither industry, nor commerce,
nor population, nor political representation whatever: ... to be made
a waste and solitary sheep-walk for supplying French manufactures
with our wools; to become a nursery of men who may be hurried away to
slaughter; such is the destiny which he would impose upon the most
highly favoured of all countries! Shall we then, submitting to this,
submit also to the destruction of our religion; abandon the interests
of heaven and the faith of our fathers to the sacrilegious mockery
of these banditti; and forsake the sanctuary which, during seven
centuries, and in a thousand and a thousand battles, our forefathers
maintained against the Saracens? If we should do this, the victims who
perished in that contest would cry to us from their graves, Ungrateful
and perfidious race, shall our sacrifices be in vain, and is our blood
of no estimation in your eyes? No, patriots! rest in peace, ... and let
not that bitter thought disturb the quiet of your sepulchres!
“There is no peace, there can be none in this state of things! That
Spain may be free, is the universal wish of the nation; and if that
cannot be obtained, at least it may become one immense desert, one
wide grave, where the accumulated remains of French and Spaniards may
exhibit to future ages our glory and their shame. But fortune is not so
inimical to virtue as to leave to its defenders only this melancholy
termination. It is written in heaven, and the history of all ages
attests the truth, that a people who decidedly love their liberty and
independence must ultimately establish them, in despite of all the
artifice and all the violence of tyranny. Victory, which is so often
a gift of fortune, is sooner or later the reward of constancy. What
defended the little republics of Greece from the barbarous invasion of
Xerxes? What reconstructed the Capitol when it was almost destroyed by
the Gauls? What preserved it from the mighty arms of Hannibal? What, in
times nearer our own, protected the Swiss from German tyranny, and gave
independence to Holland in spite of the power of our ancestors?
“Spaniards, the Junta announces to you frankly what has happened in
the continent, because it would not have you ignorant for a moment
of the new danger which threatens the country: they announce it in
the confidence, that, instead of being dismayed, you will collect
new strength, and show yourselves more worthy of the cause which you
defend, and of the admiration of the universe: they announce it to
you, because they know that the determination of the Spaniards is to
be free at whatever cost; and all means however violent, all resources
however extraordinary, all funds however privileged, must be called
out to repel the enemy. The ship’s treasures must be thrown overboard
to lighten her in the tempest and save her from shipwreck. Our country
is sinking; ... strength, riches, life, wisdom, council, ... whatever
we have is hers. The victory is ours, if we carry on to the end of our
enterprise the sublime enthusiasm with which it began. The mass with
which we must resist the enemy must be composed of the strength of
all, and the sacrifices of all; and then what will it import that he
pours upon us anew the legions which are now superfluous in Germany,
or the swarm of conscripts which he is about to drag from France? We
began the contest with 80,000 men less; he began it with 200,000 more.
Let him replace them if he can; let him send or bring them to this
region of death, as destructive to the oppressors as to the oppressed!
Adding to the experience of two campaigns the strength of despair and
of fury, we will give to their phalanxes of banditti the same fate
which their predecessors have experienced; and the earth, fattened with
their blood, shall return to us with usury the fruits of which they
have deprived us! Let the monarchs of the North, forgetful of what
they are, and of what they are capable, submit to be the slaves of
this new Tamerlane; let them purchase at such a price the tranquillity
of a moment, till it comes to their turn to be devoured! What is this
to us, who are a mighty people, and resolved to perish or to triumph?
Did we ask their consent when, twenty months ago, we raised our arms
against the tyrant? Did we not enter into the contest alone? Did we not
carry it on for a campaign alone?... Nothing which is necessary for our
defence is wanting. Our connexion is daily drawn closer with America,
to whose assistance, as timely as it was generous, the mother country
is deeply indebted, and on whose zeal and loyalty a great part of our
hope is founded. The alliance which we have formed with Great Britain
continues and will continue; that nation has lavished for us its blood
and its treasures, and is entitled to our gratitude and that of future
ages. Let, then, intrigue, or fear, prevail with weak governments and
misled cabinets; let them, if they will, conclude treaties, illusory
on the part of him who grants, and disgraceful on the part of those
who accept them; let them, if they will, relinquish the common cause
of civilized nations, and inhumanly abandon their allies! The Spanish
people will stand alone and erect amid the ruins of the European
continent. Here has been drawn, never to be sheathed, the sword of
hatred against the execrable tyrant; here is raised, never to be beaten
down, the standard of independence and of justice! Hasten to it, all ye
in Europe who will not live under the abominable yoke; ye who will not
enter into a league with iniquity; ye who are indignant at the fatal
and cowardly desertion of these deluded princes, come to us! Here the
valiant shall find opportunities of acquiring true honour; the wise and
the virtuous shall obtain respect; the afflicted shall have an asylum.
Our cause is the same; the same shall be our reward. Come! and, in
despite of all the arts and all the power of this inhuman despot, we
will render his star dim, and form for ourselves our own destiny!”
Two things are remarkable in this paper; the total change, or rather
restoration of public feeling, which must have been effected, before
a Spanish government would hold up the resistance of the Dutch to
Philip as a glorious example to the Spanish people; and the want of
foresight and information in the Junta, who could not only rely upon
the attachment of the colonies, but even venture to declare, that the
hopes of the country rested in great measure upon them. But though the
Spanish government deceived itself in looking for hope where none was
to be found, and in its exaggerated opinion of its military strength,
it was not mistaken in relying upon the national character, and that
spirit of endurance which constituted ♦STATE OF PUBLIC OPINION IN
ENGLAND.♦ its moral strength. Upon this it was, and upon the extent and
nature of the Peninsula, that those persons who from the commencement
looked on with unshaken confidence to the final expulsion of the
invaders, founded their judgement. The Continent, notwithstanding its
extent, fell under the yoke of France, because the spirit of the people
was not such as to supply the want of magnanimity and of wisdom in
their rulers: the Tyrolese were subdued notwithstanding their heroism,
because, in so small a territory as the Tyrol, numbers, remorselessly
employed, must necessarily overcome all resistance. But no force can be
sufficient to conquer and keep in subjection a peninsula, containing
about 170,000 square miles, and twelve millions of inhabitants, if the
people carry resistance to the uttermost. Their armies may be defeated,
their towns occupied, their fortresses taken, their villages burnt,
... but the country cannot be conquered while the spirit of the nation
remains unsubdued. In Spain the mountains form a chain of fastnesses
running through the whole Peninsula, and connecting all its provinces
with each other. In such a country, therefore, when the war ceases
to be carried on by army against army, and becomes the struggle of a
nation against its oppressors, pursued incessantly by night and day,
the soldier, no longer acting in large bodies, loses that confidence
which discipline gives him; while the peasant, on the other hand, feels
the whole advantage which the love of his country, and the desire of
vengeance, and the sense of duty, and the approbation of his own heart,
give to the individual in a contest between man and man. The character
of the Spaniards was displayed in their annals. The circumstances of
their country remained the same as when Henri IV. said of it, that
it was a land wherein a weak army must be beaten, and a strong one
starved. They who were neither ignorant of history nor of human nature
considered these things; and therefore, from the commencement of the
struggle, regarded it with unabated hope.
But never since the commencement of the French revolution had the
affairs of England, of Europe, and of the world, worn so dark an aspect
as at this time. The defeats which the Spaniards had sustained were
far more disheartening than those of the preceding winter, because
they evinced that neither had the armies improved in discipline, nor
the government profited by experience. It was but too plain, that,
notwithstanding the show of resistance made at the Sierra Morena, the
kingdoms of Andalusia were in fact open to the enemy; so supine was the
Central Junta, as to make it even probable that Cadiz itself might be
betrayed or surprised; and if, now that Buonaparte had no other object,
he should march a great force against the English in Portugal, there
were few persons who had sufficient knowledge of the country and of the
character of the people, to look onward without dismay.
♦LORD WELLINGTON’S VIEWS WITH REGARD TO PORTUGAL.♦
Lord Wellington calculated upon both. He knew that man is naturally
brave, that the men of any country therefore may, with good training,
be made good soldiers, and that if the Spanish troops were no longer
what they had been under the Prince of Parma, the fault was not in
the materials, but in the composition of their armies. The Portugueze
were as proud a people as the Spaniards, and had in their history as
much cause for pride; but they were not so impracticable. The removal
of their court removed all those intrigues and jealousies which would
otherwise have been at work; the nation felt itself at this time
dependent upon England; but there was no humiliation in this; any such
sentiment was precluded by old alliance, the confidence of hereditary
attachment, and the consciousness that it was willing and able to
do its own part in its own defence. Whatever measures the British
government advanced were cordially adopted; and Lord Wellington,
during the mortifying inaction to which he was reduced, had the
satisfaction of knowing that the Portugueze troops were every day
improving in military habits and feelings, and that he might reckon
upon them in the next campaign as an efficient force. In all his views
and opinions concerning the course to be pursued, Marquis Wellesley
entirely agreed with him; and the Marquis, when he returned to England
to take his place in administration, proposed that every effort should
be made for placing Portugal in the best state of preparation. He knew
that we might rely upon the Spaniards for perseverance through all
reverses and under every disadvantage; but it was on the Portugueze
that we must place our trust for regular and effectual co-operation.
♦THE KING’S SPEECH.♦
When parliament assembled this was referred to in the king’s speech.
“The efforts,” it was said, “of Great Britain, for the protection of
Portugal, had been powerfully aided by the confidence which the Prince
Regent had reposed in his majesty, and by the co-operation of the local
government, and of the people of that country. The expulsion of the
French from that kingdom, and the glorious victory of Talavera, had
contributed to check the progress of the enemy. The Spanish government
had now, in the name and by the authority of Ferdinand VII., determined
to assemble the general and extraordinary Cortes of the nation. This
measure, his majesty trusted, would give fresh animation and vigour
to the councils and the arms of Spain, and successfully direct the
energies and spirit of the Spanish people to the maintenance of the
legitimate monarchy, and to the ultimate deliverance of their country.
The most important considerations of policy and of good faith required,
that as long as this great cause could be maintained with a prospect
of success, it should be supported, according to the nature and
circumstances of the contest, by the strenuous and continued assistance
of the power and resources of Great Britain.”
In the debates which ensued it was a melancholy thing to see how
strongly the spirit of opposition manifested itself even in those
persons whose opinions and feelings regarding the justice and necessity
of the war were in entire ♦SPEECH OF EARL ST. VINCENT;♦ sympathy with
the government. Earl St. Vincent inveighed in the strongest terms
against the ministers, to whose ignorance and incapacity, to whose
weakness, infatuation, and stupidity, he said, all our disasters and
disgrace were owing. After panegyrizing Sir John Moore as one of
the ablest men who ever commanded an army, he spoke of the battle
of Talavera as a victory which had been purchased with the useless
expenditure of our best blood, which led to no advantage, and which
had had all the consequences of defeat. “It is high time,” said he,
“that parliament should adopt strong measures, or the voice of the
country will resound like thunder in their ears. Any body may be a
minister now: they pop in, and they pop out, like the man and woman in
a peasant’s barometer; they rise up like tadpoles; they may be compared
to wasps, to hornets, to locusts; they send forth their pestilential
breath over the whole country, and nip and destroy every fair flower
in the land. The conduct of his majesty’s government has led to the
most frightful disasters, which are no where exceeded in the annals of
history. The country is in that state which makes peace inevitable;
it will be compelled to make peace, however disadvantageous, because
it will be unable to maintain a war so shamefully misconducted and so
disastrous in its consequences.”
♦LORD GRENVILLE;♦
Lord Grenville spake in a similar temper. The day must come, he
said, when ministers would have to render an account to parliament
of the treasures which they had wasted, and the lives which they had
sacrificed. Their measures had uniformly failed, and presented nothing
but an unbroken series of disgraceful, irremediable failures. And yet
they had the confidence, the unblushing confidence, to tell us of a
victory! Gilded disasters were called splendid victories, and the
cypress that droops over the tombs of our gallant defenders, whose
lives have been uselessly sacrificed, was to be denominated blooming
laurels! He spake of what might have been done if an army had been
sent either to Trieste or to the north of Germany; condemned the
Walcheren expedition, as the plan and execution of that miserable
enterprise deserved, and pronounced a condemnation not less unqualified
upon the plans which had been pursued in Spain, where, he said, they
had persisted in expecting co-operation from an armed peasantry,
persevering in error after the absurdity of such an expectation had
been proved. Why too had the army in that country been exposed in
unhealthy situations? But the Lords had a duty to perform; having seen
what had taken place before in Spain and Portugal, they could not
exculpate themselves for having continued to repose confidence in such
ministers. They must exert themselves in this most imminent crisis of
their country. “You cannot be ignorant,” said he, “of its tremendous
situation, and where can you look? To the government! See it, my Lords,
broken, distracted, incompetent, incapable of exerting any energy,
or inspiring any confidence! It is not from the government that our
deliverance is to be expected; it must be found, if it be found at all,
in your own energy and in your own patriotism.” And he concluded with
moving as an amendment to the address, that vigorous and effectual
proceedings should be instituted, as the only atonement which could be
made to an injured people!
♦HONOURABLE MR. WARD;♦
The language of the opposition in the House of Commons was not
more temperate. “Lord Wellington’s exploits at Talavera,” said the
Honourable Mr. Ward, “left the cause of Spain as desperate as they
found it, and in their consequences resembled not victories, but
defeats. For by what more disastrous consequences could defeat have
been followed, than by a precipitate retreat, by the loss of 2000 men
left to the mercy of the enemy upon that spot where they had just
fought and conquered, but fought and conquered in vain; that spot
which, as it were in mockery to them, we had endeavoured to perpetuate
in the name of the general? By what worse could it have been followed
than by the loss of all footing in Spain, the ruin of another army,
and the virtual renunciation of all the objects of the war? William
III. used by his skilful generalship to render defeat harmless, ... our
generals made victory itself unavailing.”
♦MR. PONSONBY;♦
Mr. Ponsonby said it was a crisis which called upon the House of
Commons to put forth its penal powers; and that had he a choice between
punishment and pardon, he should prefer punishment, because the
circumstances of the country imperiously required some solemn example.
♦MR. WHITBREAD;♦ Mr. Whitbread directed the force of his invective
against Marquis Wellesley. “To Spain,” he said, “he had gone, after
delays which ought to be accounted for; and what were his services
when he got there? Why, he went through the mummery of dancing on the
French flag! He visited the Junta, went through all the routine of
etiquette and politics, made a speech about reform, took his glass
after dinner, and religiously toasted the Pope. On his return, of
course, when the places were going, he came in for his share, and
made one of the administration which the Chancellor of the Exchequer
had at length compiled; but in what manner had he compiled it? His
first application was to two noble lords, with whose principles he
had been at war all his political life: they rejected the tender in a
manner worthy of their dignity, and the rebuff which they gave would
have daunted any man of less temerity than himself. There was not a
man, from the Orkneys to the Land’s End, who did not pronounce him
and his administration weak, incapable, and insufficient. Even with
the addition of the two colleagues who had deserted them they were
feeble, but they then stood on a principle, or rather in opposition
to a principle; but now, having been rejected by all who were worthy,
the weak, and old, and infirm, were collected from the hedges and high
roads, and consorted with for want of better.
“Let our relative situation with the enemy,” he pursued, “be well
considered! Austria gone, the French force concentrated, and Spain
their only object. We are told that Portugal may be defended by 30,000
men; but would not Buonaparte know our force to a drummer? and where
we had 30,000 he would have three score. Who would struggle against
such fearful odds? We held our ground in that country just at the will
of the French Emperor, and at his option he could drive us out of it.
And what could we expect from our present ministry, ... or rather
from a single man, for the Chancellor of the Exchequer, in fact, stood
alone? Marquis Wellesley, of whom such account had been made, might
be considered as completely insignificant. Who was he? The governor
of India, ... the man who had scarcely escaped the censure of that
house for his cruel tyranny! the man who had assailed the press, that
sacred palladium of the people! the friend of despotism! the foe to
liberty! Could this man say to Buonaparte, in the noble indignation
of insulted virtue, ‘I have not done as you have!’ Alas! if such a
man had strength, he would indeed be a fearful acquisition to such a
government; but he was known, and therefore weak and harmless. Peace,”
Mr. Whitbread concluded, “should be the cry of the nation. Peace, ...
particularly because the thraldom of millions of our fellow-subjects
was the tenure by which this incapable junto held their offices.”
♦MR. PERCEVAL.♦
Mr. Perceval replied to this speech in all its parts. “As to the
situation,” he said, “which he had the honour to hold in his Majesty’s
council, he must state, in the most explicit manner, that it was not
an object of his own desire; on the contrary, if his wishes had been
realized, another person would then have held the office of first lord
of the treasury. When, by his Majesty’s directions, he had applied
to Lords Grey and Grenville, for the purpose of forming an extended
administration, the first proposition which he should have made to
them, if they had given him an opportunity of stating it, would have
been, that it should be left to themselves to determine who should be
the first lord of the treasury.” This was a confession of weakness:
twelve months before, Mr. Perceval was strong in the opinion of the
people; but now the deplorable Walcheren expedition hung about him like
a mill-stone, and, even in his own feelings, weighed him down. Having
said what he could in defence of that expedition, he rose into a higher
strain, when speaking of the Spaniards, and the unjust and unfeeling
manner in which their conduct had been represented. “Was it liberal,”
he said, “that the defenders of Zaragoza and Gerona should be said
to have displayed no generosity, no enthusiasm, no patriotism? Well,
indeed, might those persons censure what was done to aid the Spanish
cause, who could assert that the cause did not deserve success! But
neither in ancient nor in modern history could an example be found of
a country maintaining a contest like that which this degraded Spain,
and this degraded Spanish government, had so long supported. Never, in
recent times, had 250,000 Frenchmen been so long in a country without
subduing it. Spain was not subdued; but what effect upon the Spaniards
such language as had been used that night might produce, it was
impossible to predict!”
♦VOTE OF THANKS TO LORD WELLINGTON OPPOSED BY THE EARL OF SUFFOLK.♦
When a vote of thanks to Lord Wellington was moved in the House of
Lords, it was opposed by the Earl of Suffolk, who argued that the best
mode of assisting Spain was by a floating force, which might be landed
wherever it could be most useful; by such a mode of warfare, he said,
Gerona, during its long and glorious defence, ♦EARL GROSVENOR;♦ might
have been relieved. Earl Grosvenor also opposed the vote, and made some
judicious remarks upon the practice of raising men to the peerage whose
fortunes were not adequate to support the rank. The ends of military
fame, he said, would be better promoted if different orders of military
merit were established; the same spirit of valour might be excited, and
all inconveniences to the constitution ♦EARL GREY;♦ avoided. Earl Grey
denied that the battle of Talavera was a victory; it had been trumpeted
as such, he said, by ministers, but in so doing they had practised an
unworthy deception. Lord Wellington had betrayed want of capacity and
want of skill: the consequences had been most disastrous, nor did we
yet know the extent of the evil. One army had been compelled to retreat
into Portugal, where he feared it was in a very critical situation,
and where, from the unhealthiness of the position which it occupied,
disease had made such an alarming progress among the troops, that he
believed their numbers did not at that time exceed 9000 effective men.
♦MARQUIS WELLESLEY;♦
Marquis Wellesley replied, that he knew the circumstances which had
influenced his brother in all his movements during the campaign, and
the plain statement of those circumstances triumphantly vindicated
him. “Against strange mismanagement,” he said, “such unlooked for,
such unaccountable casualties as had occurred during that campaign,
and frustrated a plan so wisely contrived, no human prudence on Sir
Arthur’s part could provide. Concerning the necessity of a radical
change in the government of Spain, his opinions,” he continued, “were
not unknown. But it surely was not to be expected that Spain could
reach at once the vigour of a free government, just emerging as she
was from that dreadful oppression which had broken down the faculties
of her people, ... from those inveterate habits and ancient prejudices
which had so long contracted her views and retarded her improvement,
and from the disconnexion and disunion between her different
provinces. The change which was desired could not be the work of a
day. But were we therefore to desert the Spaniards in this crisis of
their fortunes, and abandon them to the mercy of their invaders?...
As for the circumstances which attended and followed the battle of
Talavera, nothing more perhaps, in a military sense, could be said
of the result, than that the British troops had repulsed the attack
of a French army almost double their numbers, the efforts of which
had been chiefly directed against them. But was there no skill, no
bravery, no perseverance displayed in the mode in which that repulse
was effected? Did no glory redound from it to the British arms? Had
it not been acknowledged, even by the enemy, as the severest check
they had yet sustained? That victory had saved the south of Spain from
absolute destruction, had afforded time for Portugal to organize her
army, and had enabled Lord Wellington to take a position where he might
derive supplies from Spain, at the same time that he drew nearer to his
own magazines. He should not attempt to diminish the disasters which
afterwards befel the Spanish armies; both his noble brother and himself
had earnestly advised them to keep on the defensive; but, flushed with
the victory of Talavera, and too sanguine of success, they advanced at
all points, and the result had fatally justified the propriety of the
advice which had been given them. This, however, was not the present
subject. It was enough for him to have shown that Lord Wellington had
arrested the progress of the French armies into the south of Spain, and
procured a breathing time for Portugal; that country was placed in a
greater degree of security than at any time since it had been menaced
by France, and such essential improvements had been introduced into the
Portugueze army, that it would be enabled effectually to co-operate
with the British troops. These advantages were fairly to be ascribed
to Lord Wellington; and he did not hesitate to say, that his brother
was as justly entitled to every distinction which his sovereign had
conferred, and to every honour and reward which it was in the power of
that house to bestow, as any noble lord who for his personal services
had obtained the same distinctions, or who sat there by descent from
his illustrious ancestors.”
To this temperate and able speech, which showed that means had been
taken with due foresight, and that with due perseverance there ♦LORD
GRENVILLE.♦ was a well-grounded hope of success, Lord Grenville replied
by arguing from the misconduct of the Spanish ministers against our
own. “Let the house,” he said, “consider how much dependence the
administration had placed upon such a government as that of the
Spaniards, and then ask themselves if they could be justified in
supporting them in a continuance of error. We were now told that
reliance was to be placed upon the co-operation of the Portugueze; but
they ought to judge of the future from the past, to recollect that for
want of co-operation it had been found necessary to retreat, and that
the remnant of the army was in a situation not unlike that in which it
was placed by its advance to Talavera.”
♦FEB. 1.♦
The vote of thanks was opposed in like manner ♦GENERAL TARLETON;♦ in
the House of Commons. General Tarleton said, that Lord Wellington’s
dispatches were vain-glorious, partial, and incorrect; that he had
been deficient in information concerning the amount and situation of
Soult’s army; and that he had been compelled to a precipitate retreat,
after abandoning his sick and wounded. ♦MR. WHITBREAD.♦ Mr. Whitbread
affirmed, that the battle had been more a repulse than a victory; nor
could he, he said, withhold a tear, when he thought of the British
blood which had been spilt in sacrifice to incapacity and folly. The
consequence of the battle was, that the army had no other retreat than
that through Deleitosa, and their condition during that retreat was
such, that many hundred perished on the road from famine. The Spanish
cause, he concluded, was now more hopeless than ever. But the motion
received a powerful support from Mr. Windham, who, setting all party
views aside, followed the feelings of his own generous nature. “The
unproductive consequences of this victory,” he said, ... “for a victory
it was, and a glorious victory, ... were not to be put in comparison
with the military renown which we had gained. Ten or fifteen years
ago, it was thought on the continent that we might do something at
sea, ... that an Englishman was a sort of sea-animal; but our army was
considered as nothing. Our achievements in Egypt first entitled us to
the name of a military power; the battle of Maida confirmed it; and
he would not give the battles of Vimeiro, Coruña, and Talavera, for a
whole Archipelago of sugar islands.”
♦PENSION VOTED FOR LORD WELLINGTON. FEB. 16.♦
The vote was carried in both houses without a division. But the
opposition tried their strength in the House of Commons upon the
King’s message, recommending that a pension of 2000_l._ should be
settled upon Lord Wellington, and the two next heirs to his title
in succession. “With the grant of the peerage,” ♦MR. CALCRAFT;♦ Mr.
Calcraft said, “that house had nothing to do; he was sorry it had been
conferred; but though there was no remedy for it, the house ought not
to add to it the pension. Pensions and thanks might be voted, but they
could not permanently blind the country; whatever the public opinion
might be now, it would not be with ministers upon this subject a
month hence, when the whole fruits of Lord Wellington’s victories and
campaigns would develope themselves to public view. It was mournful
and alarming to hear that Lord Wellington had said he could defend
Portugal with 50,000 men, provided 30,000 of them were British; for if
the French were in earnest in their designs upon that country, before
three months Lord Wellington and his army would be in England. Neither
Portugal nor any other country could be defended by victories like that
of Talavera.”
It was said by General Craufurd, a peerage might be an incumbrance
to Lord Wellington without a pension. General Loftus also remarked,
that he had always been one of the most liberal men in existence,
and the state of his circumstances was therefore, he imagined, far
from sufficient for the support of the dignity ♦OPPOSED BY SIR
FRANCIS BURDETT;♦ to which he was elevated. Sir Francis Burdett took
this occasion for touching a popular note. “If Lord Wellington’s
liberality,” he said, “had brought him into difficulty or debt, who
was it whom they called upon to free him from the incumbrance? ...
the people; ... who already owed debts enough, not in consequence of
any prodigality of their own, but through the impositions of their
representatives. As to the military part of the question, he could only
say, that the result was failure, ... failure as complete as failure
could be. But even if the occasion had been such as to deserve reward,
he should object to making any appeal for that purpose to the people’s
purse. What was become of the patronage of the government? Where were
the sinecures, which were always defended because they afforded a fund
for such purposes as these? Yet application was made to the people, ...
and this by a government who, while they perpetually threw the burden
upon the people, had greater means of rewarding merit at their disposal
than all the combined merit of Europe could possibly exhaust.”
♦MR. WHITBREAD;♦
The same strain of argument was pursued by Mr. Whitbread. “It was
often argued,” he said, “that the expectation of one of those great
places falling in satisfied many a claimant: if so, why should not
Lord Wellington wait for one of them? It was an important part of the
question, whether, supposing the peerage to have been merited, the
circumstances of the new peer were such as to require the pension; for
if they were not, it would be a scandalous waste of the public money.
Nor was it necessarily to follow, that whenever the king was advised to
grant a peerage to any officer, the House of Commons was bound to vote
him a pension.”
This produced from Mr. Wellesley Pole a ♦MR. WILBERFORCE;♦ statement
of his brother’s fortune. Mr. Wilberforce then appealed to the house,
whether, if Lord Wellington had devoted the great talents which
confessedly belonged to him to the bar, or to any other liberal
pursuit, he would not have rendered them infinitely more productive
than it appeared that he had done by actively employing them in the
service of his country? and he protested against the unjust and
impolitic illiberality of opposing such a grant upon such grounds.
The same opinion ♦MR. CANNING.♦ was delivered by Mr. Canning. “The
victories of Lord Wellington,” he said, “had re-established our
military character, and retrieved the honour of the country, which
was before in abeyance. If the system of bestowing the peerage was to
be entirely changed, and the House of Lords to be peopled only by the
successors to hereditary honours, Lord Wellington certainly would not
be found there. But he would not do that noble body the injustice of
supposing that it was a mere stagnant lake of collected honours: it was
to be occasionally refreshed by fresh streams. It was the prerogative
of the crown to confer the honour of the peerage; it was the duty of
that house to give it honour and independence. The question was,
whether they would enable Lord Wellington to take his seat with the
proudest peer in the other house, or whether they would send him there
with the avowed intention that it was only to the crown he was to look
for support. It was their duty to take care if the crown made a peer,
that it should not make a generation of peers wholly dependent on its
favour for their support.”
There was a great majority upon this question, 213 voting for the
grant, 106 against it. But the current of popular opinion in the
metropolis set in with the opposition at this time; for the Walcheren
expedition, like a pestilential vapour, clouded the whole political
♦THE COMMON COUNCIL PETITION AGAINST THE PENSION.♦ horizon. The
common council presented a petition against the pension: a measure so
extraordinary, they said, in the present state of the country, and
under all the afflicting circumstances attending our armies in Spain
and Portugal under that officer’s command, could not but prove highly
injurious in its consequences, and no less grievous than irritating
to the nation at large. In the military conduct of Lord Wellington,
the lord mayor and common council added, they did not recognise any
claims to national remuneration; and they conceived it to be a high
aggravation of the misconduct of his majesty’s unprincipled and
incapable advisers, that they had, in contempt and defiance of public
opinion, recommended this grant to parliament. There was neither
reason nor justice in making it, and therefore they prayed that it
might not pass into a law. When the second reading was moved, Mr.
Whitbread said he trusted that as this petition had been presented,
the minister would not press it that day. Mr. Perceval replied he saw
no necessity for any such forbearance, and the bill passed by a great
majority, 106 dividing against 36.
In these debates ministers were completely triumphant. Some of their
opponents accused them of having done too much, others of having
done too little, and some would fain have persuaded the people of
Great Britain, that our army had obtained no victory at Talavera. The
charge of having taken no measures for conciliating the Spaniards, by
obtaining for them a restoration of those political rights which had
been so long withheld, was abundantly disproved by the papers laid
before parliament. There it appeared that Mr. Stuart, Mr. Frere, and
Marquis Wellesley, had each pressed upon the existing government the
necessity of convoking the Cortes. The great error which the ministry
had committed, was in their neglect of Catalonia. In the commencement
of the struggle this fault was not imputable to them, but to the
general, who disobeyed his instructions to convey his army to that most
important scene of operations: the effects of that fatal error were to
a certain extent irremediable; but no subsequent attempt was made, and
the French were suffered to take fortress after fortress, without an
effort on our part to relieve them. Still the conduct of administration
toward Spain was far more worthy of commendation than of censure; if
not without error, if not always successful, it had uniformly been
brave and generous: we had every motive of policy for assisting the
Spaniards in their struggle, but the assistance was given in a manner
worthy of the nation which gave, and of the noble people who received
it.
The result of any discussion upon this subject was anticipated by the
public; they, in spite of the efforts of factious news-writers, and
journalists of higher pretensions, whose want of feeling was more
disgraceful even than their want of foresight, continued to feel
concerning Spain like freemen and like Englishmen. Nor was Mr. Windham
the only member of opposition who expressed this sentiment. When in
♦MARQUIS OF LANSDOWN; JUNE 8.♦ the course of the session the Marquis
of Lansdown moved for a vote of censure upon ministers for rashness
and ignorance, the strong bias of party spirit did not prevent him
from rendering justice, in some respects, both to his own countrymen
and to Spain. “Whatever he might think of the policy which led to the
battle of Talavera,” he said, “or of its consequences, he should ever
contemplate the action itself as a proud monument of glory to the
general who commanded, and to the army who won that ever-memorable
day. No success, he affirmed, could be expected in Spain under such a
government, or with armies so constituted and commanded as the Spanish
armies, or where supplies could not be procured; these things ought to
have been known; but these things were no reflection on the Spanish
national character. The Spaniards had displayed acts of the most
splendid heroism which had ever been recorded; they had converted the
walls of Zaragoza and Gerona into fortifications almost impregnable.
Their disasters were imputable, not to the people, but to those who
could suppose that a junta of persons put together in any manner
composed a government, and that a crowd of men collected in any way was
an army. Still he was ready to confide in the Spanish people, and to
believe that much might yet be done by their efforts; and he cherished
the hope, and would cherish it to the last, that if ever Europe was
saved, our own country would be an important agent in that great event.
But it was not by co-operating in rash expeditions with such armies as
that of Cuesta.”
♦LORD HOLLAND;♦
Lord Holland spoke to the same purport, while the intent of his speech
was to fix a censure on the ministers. He condemned them for having
sent out Mr. Stuart and Mr. Frere without adequate instructions,
particularly with regard to the most important point, the arrangement
of a system for redressing the grievances of the Spanish people and
restoring their rights. But on that point the British government
was fully justified. He condemned them also for neither having sent
an adequate force, nor given proper instructions, nor made adequate
provision for that force which they did send: but the event had shown,
that a larger force had been sent than could be provided, in the
inexperienced state of our own commissariat, and in the disordered
state of Spain. He said that ministers ought equally to be condemned
by those who disapproved of our interposing at all in the affairs of
Spain, and by those who were most interested in the success of the
Spaniards: if, indeed, there was any difference, the friends of Spain
must condemn them most, because they were peculiarly mortified by the
disappointment of their wishes, a disappointment which the misjudging
policy of these ministers had produced. He was one who had felt this
mortification, for no event had ever excited a livelier interest in
his mind, not even the dawn of the French revolution. But having thus
spoken to justify the vote of censure which he was about to give,
Lord Holland argued in defence of the principle which his own party
vehemently and even virulently opposed. He dwelt upon the importance of
supporting Spain to the utmost, and upon the perilous facilities which
Cadiz and Lisbon would afford for the invasion of Ireland, if those
ports were suffered to fall into the hands of the French. If, after
all efforts, he said, Spain should ultimately be subdued, his advice
was, that we should promote the establishment of such a system of
government in the Spanish colonies as good statesmen could approve, the
only system which ought to be approved in any country, a system founded
upon the opinions and wishes of the people.
♦MARQUIS WELLESLEY.♦
Marquis Wellesley replied to the general attack which was made upon
ministers, in a manner worthy of his reputation as a statesman. He
pointed out the solid advantages which had been gained during the last
campaign, by securing Portugal, and giving time for the Portugueze
to form an army, which was now in a state to co-operate with the
British troops; he showed also what advantages had been gained to the
Spaniards, had the Junta known how to profit by them, or followed the
advice which both he himself and Lord Wellington had pressed upon them
in vain. Then, in a clear and masterly manner, he enforced the duty
and necessity of supporting the cause of Spain. “Justly,” he said,
“had it been stated by the noble Marquis, that if ever Europe was to
be delivered, England must be the great agent in her deliverance; and
justly he might have added, that the fairest opportunity for effecting
that deliverance opened, when Spain magnanimously rose to resist the
most flagrant usurpation of which history records an example. Not
only were we called upon by the splendour, the glory, the majesty of
the Spanish cause, to lend our aid; a principle of self-preservation
called upon us also: these efforts on the part of Spain afforded us
the best chance of providing for our own security, by keeping out of
the hands of France the naval means of Spain, which Buonaparte was so
eager to grasp, knowing they were the most effectual weapons he could
wield against the prosperity and the power of Great Britain. The views
of Buonaparte, in his endeavours to subjugate Spain, were obvious,
even to superficial observers. The old government had placed at his
disposal the resources of that country, but the old government was
feeble and effete; and, however subservient to his will, he knew it
was an instrument which he could not pitch to the tone of his designs.
He therefore resolved to seize upon the whole Peninsula, and to
establish in it a government of his own. He may have been prompted to
this partly by his hatred to the Bourbon race, partly by the cravings
of an insatiable ambition, partly by the vain desire of spreading his
dynasty over Europe, partly by mere vanity: but his main object was,
that he might wield with new vigour the naval and colonial resources
of Spain, to the detriment of Great Britain. This alone could suit the
vastness of his designs; this alone could promise to gratify his mortal
hatred of the British name. By the entire subjugation of the Peninsula,
and the full possession of its resources, he knew that he should
be best enabled to sap the fundamental security of these kingdoms.
Therefore how highly important was it to keep alive there a spirit
of resistance to France! There were no means, however unprincipled,
which Buonaparte would scruple to employ for the attainment of his
ends. To him force and fraud were alike, ... force, that would stoop
to all the base artifices of fraud, ... fraud, that would come armed
with all the fierce violence of force. Every thing which the head of
such a man could contrive, or the arm execute, would be combined and
concentrated into one vast effort, and that effort would be strained
for the humiliation and destruction of this country. Universal dominion
is, and will continue to be, the aim of all French governments; but
it is pre-eminently the object to which such a mind as Buonaparte’s
will aspire. England alone stands in the way of the accomplishment
of that design, and England he has therefore resolved to strike down
and extirpate. How then were these daring projects to be met? How,
but by cherishing, wherever it may be found, but particularly in the
Peninsula, the spirit of resistance to the usurpations of France? If
we have saved the navy of Portugal; if we have saved the Spanish ships
at Ferrol; if we have enabled the Portugueze government to migrate to
their colonies; if we have succeeded in yet securing the naval and
colonial resources both of Portugal and Spain; how have these important
objects been achieved, but by fomenting in both these kingdoms a spirit
of resistance to the overwhelming ambition of Buonaparte? To this end
must all our efforts be now directed. This is the only engine which
now remains for us to work in opposition to Buonaparte’s gigantic
designs. Why then should we depart from that salutary line of policy?
what is there to dissuade or discourage us from adhering to it? I can
discover nothing in the aspect of Spanish affairs that wears any thing
like the hue and complexion of despair. If, indeed, it had appeared
that this spirit began to languish in the breast of the Spaniards, if
miscarriages, disasters, and defeats had been observed to damp the
ardour and break down the energies of the Spanish mind, then might it
be believed that further assistance to the Spanish cause would prove
unavailing. But, fortunately for this country, not only is there life
still in Spain, but her patriotic heart still continues to beat high:
the generous and exalted sentiment, which first prompted us to lend our
aid to the cause of Spain, should therefore be still maintained in full
force, and should still inspirit us to continue that aid to the last
moment of her resistance. The struggle in which Spain is now engaged
is not merely a Spanish struggle. In that struggle are committed the
best, the very vital interests of England. With the fate of Spain the
fate of England is now inseparably blended. Should we not therefore
stand by her to the last? For my part, my lords, as an adviser of the
crown, I shall not cease to recommend to my sovereign to continue to
assist Spain to the latest moment of her resistance. It should not
dishearten us that Spain appears to be in the very crisis of her fate;
we should, on the contrary, extend a more anxious care over her at a
moment so critical. For in nations, and above all in Spain, how often
have the apparent symptoms of dissolution been the presages of new
life, and of renovated vigour? Therefore, I would cling to Spain in
her last struggle; therefore, I would watch her last agonies, I would
wash and heal her wounds, I would receive her parting breath, I would
catch and cherish the last vital spark of her expiring patriotism. Nor
let this be deemed a mere office of pious charity; nor an exaggerated
representation of my feelings; nor an overcharged picture of the
circumstances that call them forth. In the cause of Spain, the cause of
honour and of interest is equally involved and inseparably allied. It
is a cause in favour of which the finest feelings of the heart unite
with the soundest dictates of the understanding.”
Full use was made of these debates by the French government, which was
at this time employing every artifice for making the people believe
that Great Britain was on the brink of ruin. The King’s speech, as
usual, was falsified, and sent abroad. There it was said, that whatever
temporary and partial inconveniences might have resulted from the
measures which were directed by France against our trade and revenue,
the great source of our prosperity and strength, those measures had
wholly failed of producing any general effect. The official French
paper substituted for these words a sentence, in which the King was
made to tell his parliament, they must be aware that the measures
adopted by France to dry up the great sources of our prosperity had
been to a certain degree efficient. It was said that we were not merely
on the verge of national bankruptcy, but actually suffering under all
the horrors of famine; that our crops of every kind had failed; we were
obliged to feed our cattle with sugar and molasses, and had nothing
but sugar, cocoa, and coffee, and the skin and bones of these cattle
for ourselves. To a certain degree, Buonaparte and his journalists may
have perhaps believed the falsehoods which they circulated; they read
in our factious newspapers of decaying trade, diminished resources,
and starving manufacturers; and the opposition told them, that France
was certain of success in whatever she attempted on the Continent;
that the cause of Spain was hopeless; that it was impossible for us
to carry on the war; that if we did not grant the Roman Catholics all
that they demanded, Ireland would be lost, and the loss of Ireland
would draw after it the downfal of the British empire. Speeches of this
tenour were carefully translated for the use of the Emperor’s subjects,
and circulated throughout the Continent: but when the French saw it
asserted, upon the authority of English members of parliament, that the
Spaniards and Portugueze had nothing worth fighting for; that they were
inimical in their hearts to England; that Buonaparte was reforming the
abuses of their old government, and redressing their grievances; when
they saw it affirmed in the English House of Commons, that the people
of Spain must know Marquis Wellesley would, if opportunity should
offer, take both Spain and Portugal as Buonaparte had done; when they
saw the same persons who represented Sir John Moore as a consummate
general vilify the talents of Lord Wellington, deny his merits, oppose
the rewards which were so justly conferred on him, and maintain, in
the face of their insulted country, that the British army had gained
no victory at Talavera; it appeared to them impossible that language,
at once so false, so absurd, and so co-operative with the designs of
France, could have been uttered by an English tongue; such speeches
were supposed to have been invented in France, and they attributed to
the artifices of their own government what were in reality the genuine
effusions of perverse minds, irritable tempers, and disappointed
faction.