SIEGE OF GERONA.
♦1809.♦
While the Central Junta directed its whole attention toward Madrid,
and expended all its efforts in operations, so ill concerted and ill
directed, that the disastrous termination was foreseen with equal
certainty both by their friends and foes, Catalonia was left to defend
itself; and a sacrifice of heroic duty, not less memorable than that
which Zaragoza had exhibited, was displayed at Gerona.
♦GERONA.♦
Gerona (the Gerunda of the Romans, a place of such unknown antiquity
that fabulous historians have ascribed its foundation to Geryon) is
situated upon the side and at the foot of a hill, where the little
river Onar, which divides the city from the suburbs, falls into
the Ter. Two centuries ago it was second only to Barcelona in size
and importance; other places in the principality, more favourably
situated for commerce, and less overlaid with monks and friars, had
now outgrown it, for of about 14,000 inhabitants, not less than a
fourth were clergy and religioners. In the thirteenth century it was
distinguished by the defence[1] which Ramon Folch of Cardona made
there against Philip III. of France; a memorable siege, not only for
the resolution with which Ramon held out, and for the ability with
which he obtained honourable terms at last, concealing from Philip the
extremity of famine to which the place was reduced, but also for the
singular destruction which was brought upon the besiegers by a plague
of flies[2]. Their bite is said to have been fatal to the horses, of
which such numbers died, that their carcasses produced pestilence;
two-thirds of the army perished, and the remainder found it necessary
to retreat into their own country, carrying home in their coffins the
chiefs who had led them into Spain. In the succession-war, Gerona was
signalized by the desperate resistance which it made against Philip V.
After it had fallen, the Catalans blockaded it during eight months;
M. Berwick raised the blockade, and the French minister proposed to
him to demolish the works; his plea was, that the expense of keeping
a garrison there might be spared; but his intent, that the Spaniards
might have one strong-hold the less upon their frontier. But Berwick
required an order from Louis XIV. to warrant him in a proceeding which
must necessarily offend the King of Spain; and Louis was then withheld
by a sense of decency from directly ordering what he wished to have had
done. The fortifications after that time had been so neglected, that
when Arthur Young was there in 1787, he thought they were not strong
enough to stop an army for half an hour: the old walls, however, had
now been well repaired; and the city was also protected by four forts
upon the high ground above it. But its principal defence was the
citadel, called here, as at Barcelona, Monjuic, which commanded it from
an eminence about sixty fathoms distant. This was a square fort, 240
yards in length on each side, with four bastions, and for outworks the
four towers of Saints Luis, Narcis, Daniel, and Juan.
♦FORCE OF THE GARRISON.♦
The garrison amounted only to 3400 men, but they were commanded by
Mariano Alvares, ♦VOL. I. P. 465; VOL. II. P. 322.♦ and the inhabitants
were encouraged by having twice driven the enemy from their walls.
After the battle of Valls it was certain that the French, having no
force to oppose them in the field, would make a third attempt to
obtain possession of this important place, and that they would make it
in sufficient strength and with ample means, lest they should incur
the disgrace of a third repulse. No means, therefore, were neglected
of providing for defence; but while every military preparation which
the circumstances permitted was made, Alvarez felt and understood
that his surest reliance must be placed upon that moral resistance of
which the Zaragozans had set them so illustrious an example. Like the
♦CRUSADERS ENROLLED.♦ crusaders of old, the inhabitants took the cross,
and formed eight companies of an hundred men each; the women also,
maids and matrons alike, enrolled themselves in an association which
they ♦COMPANY OF ST. BARBARA.♦ called the Company of St. Barbara, to
perform whatever duties lay within their power, as their countrywomen
had done at Zaragoza. The French scoffed at these things, as indicating
the fanaticism of a people whom they considered greatly inferior to
themselves. Light-minded, as well as light-hearted, and regardless of
any higher motive than may be found in the sense of mere military duty
(for it was the direct object of Buonaparte’s institutions to eradicate
or preclude every better principle), they were incapable of perceiving
that the state of mind which their nefarious conduct had called forth,
sanctified such measures.
♦ST. NARCIS APPOINTED GENERALISSIMO.♦
These were demonstrations of the religious feeling with which the
Geronans devoted themselves to the cause of their country, and to the
duty of self-defence. With more reason might the French deride the
part which in that city was assigned to the Patron Saint, though such
derision would come with little consistency from those among them who
professed to believe in the Romish church. St. Narcis, as the Saint is
called in the clipt language of that province, had obtained as much
credit for defeating Duhesme in his first attempt upon Gerona, as for
sending the plague of flies against the French King Philip. A meeting
had in consequence been held of the municipality, the chapter, the
heads of the religious houses, and all the chief persons of the city,
Colonel Julien Bolivar presiding as the king’s lieutenant. Resolutions
were passed, that seeing St. Narcis had always vouchsafed his especial
protection to the principality of Catalonia, as had been manifested
during the former invasions of the French, and recently by the
defeat of Duhesme, which was wholly owing to his favour; and seeing
moreover that for the purpose of resisting the tyranny and oppression
of Napoleon Buonaparte it was necessary to appoint a commander who
should be capable of directing their operations and repulsing such an
enemy, ... no one could so worthily fill that office as the invincible
patron and martyr St. Narcis; and therefore, in the name of Ferdinand
the King, they nominated him Generalissimo of all the Spanish forces
by land and sea, and confided to him the defence of Gerona, of its
district, and of the whole principality. On the following Sunday, the
Junta, with all the clergy and other persons of distinction, went in
procession to notify this appointment to the Saint in his shrine in the
church of St. Felix; the shrine was opened, and a general’s staff, a
sword, and a belt, all richly ornamented, were deposited by the relics
of the chosen commander; and the enthusiastic joy which the ceremony
excited was such, that the Spaniards said it seemed as if the glory of
the Lord had descended and filled the church, manifesting that their
devotion was approved and blessed by Heaven!
♦ALL MENTION OF CAPITULATING FORBIDDEN.♦
This display of national character and of Romish superstition had
taken place in the first fervour of their feelings after a signal
deliverance. The spirit of the Geronans did not fail when danger
was again at hand; and the governor, seeing and relying upon this
disposition of the people, thought it advisable, before the time of
trial approached, to restrain by fear the few treacherous subjects
who might be waiting, when opportunity offered, to declare themselves;
♦APRIL 1.♦ he published an edict, therefore, forbidding all persons
from speaking of capitulation on pain of immediate death, without
exception of class, rank, or condition. Both by the garrison and the
people it was received with acclamations. The military Junta of the
city proposed that the streets should be unpaved as a precaution
against bombardment; this was opposed by the board of police, upon the
ground that it would be prejudicial to health; the question, therefore,
was referred to the medical board, who found it convenient to avoid a
physical discussion, and compromised the matter by deciding that the
paving should be taken up in the squares and streets through which the
troops must necessarily pass.
♦ST. CYR WOULD HAVE REDUCED THE CITY BY BLOCKADE.♦
General Reille, who was to have commanded the besieging army, was
at this time superseded by General Verdier. This army consisted of
18,000 men; to make up that number Marshal St. Cyr was compelled to
weaken the corps of observation under his own command, which was thus
reduced to about 12,000; but from such armies as the Catalans could
bring into the field, and such counsels as directed them, he well knew
how little there was to apprehend. ♦ST. CYR, 164.♦ In this confidence
St. Cyr would have preferred blockading the city to besieging it, and
would have waited till it should be reduced by famine, whereby all
the loss which the besiegers sustained might have been spared. But
he was neither consulted nor listened to, holding the command at this
time only till Marshal Augereau ♦1809. MAY.♦ should arrive. On the
6th of May the besiegers first appeared on the heights of Casa Roca
and Costarroja on the other side the Ter, and began to form their
lines without opposition. A battery of eleven mortars was planted
upon Casa Roca, from whence it commanded the city; works were erected
against Monjuic also; the garrison being far too weak to impede these
operations, and no efforts being made for impeding them from without.
When the lines were completed, and every thing ready to commence the
bombardment, they sent a flag of truce requiring Alvarez to spare
himself and the city the evils which must inevitably attend resistance.
D. Mariano admitted the officer to his presence, and bade him tell his
general, that in future the trouble of sending flags of truce might
be spared, for he would hold no other communication with him than at
the mouth of the cannon. The French commander found means of conveying
a letter to him afterwards, with the significant observation that he
might probably repent having thus cut himself off from the only means
of communication which ♦THE BOMBARDMENT BEGINS.♦ were allowed in war.
It was on the 12th of June that the summons was sent, and on the night
of the 13th, about an hour after midnight, the bombardment began.
Then for the first time the _generale_ or alarm was beat, a sound
which afterwards became so frequent in this ♦1809. JUNE.♦ devoted
city: roused from their sleep, the aged and the children repaired to
cellars and other places of imagined security, which they who could
had provided for this emergency, and the female company of St. Barbara
hastened to their posts. An ill-judged sally was made early on the 17th
against some works which were supposed to be the base of a battery
against the Puerto de Francia: it was successful, but the success was
of little importance and dearly purchased; many brave men fell, and 110
were brought back wounded. The bombardment continued, and among other
buildings the military hospital was destroyed: the people, while it was
in flames, observed that its destruction was deserved, for, instead
of proving a place of help and healing for the sick, covetousness and
peculation had made their profit there upon human misery. The hospitals
of St. Domingo and St. Martin were also rendered uninhabitable;
one other had been made ready, another was to be prepared, and the
difficulty of providing for the sick and wounded increased at the time
when their numbers were daily increasing. About the end of the month an
epidemic affection of the bowels become prevalent, occasioned partly
by the perpetual agitation of mind which the people endured, partly by
sleeping in damp subterranean places, where the air never circulated
freely, and where many had nothing but the ground to lie on. In July,
a bilious fever is usually endemic in Gerona; it seized especially upon
the lower classes now, and upon the refugees from those places which
had been taken or burned by the enemy; and it affected the wounded also.
♦ST. CYR DRAWS NEARER GERONA.♦
During these operations St. Cyr, retaining the command till Augereau,
who was disabled by an attack of gout at Perpignan, should arrive
to supersede him, had remained in his position ♦P. 368.♦ near Vich.
The capture of the French troops near Monzon, and Blake’s success at
Alcañiz, had so alarmed the enemy at Zaragoza and at Madrid, that
orders were dispatched for him to return towards Tarragona, and combine
his movements with Suchet, who, it was deemed, would otherwise be in
danger. But King Joseph’s orders were respected almost as little by the
French commanders as by the Spanish nation. Marshal St. Cyr represented
that his army had always been left to itself, having no relation
with any other corps, and being specially destined for subjugating
Catalonia, which the Emperor Napoleon had thought quite sufficient
employment for it, and which, in fact, would long continue to require
all its efforts. On the other hand, Verdier was entreating him to
approach nearer Gerona, and this he prepared to do, being aware that
Blake’s immediate object, after collecting the runaways from Belchite,
must be to introduce supplies and reinforcements into the besieged
city. His first care was to send the sick and wounded to Barcelona,
the only place where they could be in safety. This done, no time was
lost in breaking up from quarters which he was unwilling to abandon;
for though the want of meat and wine had been severely felt there by
the troops and officers, as well as by the invalids, there had been no
lack of bread; and the country through which they had to pass not being
practicable for carriages of any kind, no more could be taken with them
than the soldiers could carry for ♦JUNE 18.♦ themselves. The movement
was so luckily timed, that they reached S. Coloma de Farnes, just as
a small detachment of Blake’s army arrived there, escorting some 1200
cattle to Gerona: the whole convoy fell into their hands, ♦ST. CYR,
167–172.♦ with an abundance of wine also, the want of which is felt by
the French soldiers more severely than any other privation.
♦PALAMOS TAKEN BY THE FRENCH.♦
St. Cyr’s head-quarters were now at Caldas de Malavella, and he
occupied a line extending from Oña in advance of Bruñola to S. Feliu de
Guixols, of which place his troops took possession at this time, after
a brave but ineffectual resistance. It was a point of considerable
importance, being the port most convenient for those Spanish vessels
which cut off the communication between France and Barcelona for all
ships which were not under a strong escort. Palamos was of still more
importance at this juncture, because from thence Gerona communicated
by sea with Tarragona. This place was attacked by Italian troops under
General Fontane; it was carried by assault, and the only persons who
were spared were the few who threw themselves into the sea, and were
received prisoners when the fury of the invaders had spent itself[3].
On the other hand, the Catalans were not always unsuccessful in
their endeavours to annoy the invaders. Rovira, formerly a canon,
and therefore called Doctor Colonel Rovira (one of the most able and
enterprising partizans who appeared during the contest), intercepted
a convoy and a train of artillery horses, to supply the loss of which
St. Cyr was obliged to part with the horses belonging to his corps.
And a battalion which Augereau had sent to fix up proclamations in
the villages beyond the frontier, was routed by Colonel Porta before
it had disposed of three of ♦ST. CYR, 173, 190.♦ its papers. Augereau
having, in the campaign of 1794, served in that province, and left a
good name there, had counted upon the effect of his proclamations, not
considering that he was now engaged in a cause in which every heart and
every understanding, every principle and every feeling, were against
him.
♦ASSAULT OF MONJUIC.♦
Verdier meantime prosecuted the siege, in full expectation of
bringing it to a speedy conclusion. ♦1809. JULY.♦ The outworks were
soon rendered untenable, and the redoubts which covered the front of
Monjuic were carried with a facility which made him undervalue his
opponents. At ♦ST. CYR, 175.♦ the beginning of July, three batteries
played upon three sides of this little fortress: that which was planted
against the north front consisted of twenty four-and-twenty pounders;
while the French were battering it, the angle upon which the flag was
hoisted fell into the ditch; D. Mariano Montorro descended for it in
the midst of the fire, brought it up in safety, and replanted it upon
the wall. The breach was soon wide enough for forty men abreast. The
fire of the garrison had ceased, for they perceived that the French
were secured by their trenches, and powder was too precious to be
used unless its effects were certain: the enemy, who had not learned
the temper of the men with whom they were contending, judged from
this silence, that their hearts or ammunition had failed, and in the
night between the fourth and fifth they assaulted the breach. But
it was for this that the garrison had reserved their fire, and they
poured it so destructively upon the columns which approached, that
the French retreated with great loss. For three days they continued
their fire upon the breach. Between two and three on the morning of
the 8th, 6000 men again assaulted it; and at the same time the town
was bombarded[4]. D. Blas de Furnas, second in command at Monjuic, was
in the thickest of the fight; he strained his voice till from exertion
it totally failed, but still his presence and his actions encouraged
all who saw him. The enemy came on, filled the fosse, and proceeded
to the breach ... “Woe to him,” says Samaniego, the historian of the
siege, and himself one of the besieged, “woe to him who sets his foot
upon the fosse of Monjuic!” A mortar, which lay masked among the
ruins of the ravelin, and discharged 500 musket-balls at every shot,
was played full upon the enemy by D. Juan Candy, and the havoc which
it made was tremendous. Three times during that day the assault was
repeated, with the utmost resolution on the part of the assailants,
who were never thrown into confusion, though all their efforts were
unavailing, and though they left 1600 of their number slain. The day,
however, was disastrous to the Geronans also, though not from any evil
which it was possible for strength or courage to have averted. The
tower of St. Juan, which stood between the west curtain of the castle,
the city, and the Calle de Pedret, was blown up. In what manner the
magazine took fire was never known. Part of its little garrison were
fortunately employed in active service elsewhere; the rest were buried
in the ruins, from whence twenty-three persons were extricated alive
amid the incessant fire which the enemy kept up upon the spot. Their
preservation was in great measure owing to the exertions of D. Carlos
Beramendi. The company of St. Barbara distinguished themselves that
day: covered with dust and blood, under the burning heat of July, and
through the incessant fire of the batteries and musketry, they carried
water and wine to the soldiers, and bore back the wounded.
The severe loss which the French sustained in this second attempt
convinced them, that while one stone remained upon another, Monjuic
was not to be taken by assault. From this time, therefore, they
continued to batter it on three sides; and, practising the surest and
most destructive mode of warfare, stationed sharpshooters in their
trenches on every side, so that for one of the garrison to be seen
was almost certain death. So perilous was the service become, that
the centinels were changed every half hour, yet nine were killed in
one day at one post, and scarcely one escaped unwounded. It became at
length impossible to observe the operations of the enemy, so thick
were their marksmen, and with such fatal certainty did they take their
aim: no other means remained than that of sending some one into the
fosse, who, lifting up his head with the most imminent hazard, took a
momentary glance. By the beginning of August the besiegers had pushed
their parallels to the edge of the fosse; their labour was impeded by
the stony soil, which rendered it necessary to bring earth from some
distance; for this, however, they had hands enough, and they had no
apprehension to hurry and disturb them, that any army powerful enough
to raise the siege could be brought against them.
♦SUCCOURS INTERCEPTED.♦
Meantime the Spaniards were preparing for an attempt to introduce
succours. For this purpose they threatened the right of the covering
army, hoping to draw their attention upon that point, while 1500 men
passed through the French line near Llagostera, where General Pino
had his head-quarters. They succeeded perfectly in this difficult
attempt, through their knowledge of the country, ... but a straggler
who lagged behind fell into the enemy’s hand, and upon information
which was obtained from him, it was understood that they would direct
their course to Castellar de la Selva, and endeavour to pass through
the besieging army in the night. There was time to take measures for
intercepting them, and being turned aside from thence at nightfall,
when they were beginning to debouche, they fell in at daybreak with
Pino, who was in pursuit, and scarcely a third escaped: the rest
were made prisoners, and sent into France. It was learnt from the
prisoners ♦JULY 11.♦ that the Spaniards did not intend to make any
serious effort for raising the siege till the besiegers should be
weakened by those diseases which the season would infallibly produce.
Reports, nevertheless, were current that such an effort would be made
on Santiago’s day, when the patron of Spain might be expected once
more to inspire or assist his faithful votaries. The French would have
deemed themselves fortunate if this report had been verified; for
according to the barbarous system of warfare which Buonaparte pursued,
they were left to provide subsistence for themselves as they could;
... the soldiers had to cut the corn, thresh it, and grind it for
themselves; and though St. Cyr had given orders that biscuit for four
days’ consumption should always be kept in readiness, in case it should
be necessary to collect the army for the purpose of giving battle, not
more than half that quantity could ever be provided. More than once
also ammunition became scarce, great part coming from Toulouse, and
even from so remote a point as Strasbourg. ♦ST. CYR, 164.♦ Unhappily
the Spaniards were in no condition to profit by the embarrassments of
the enemy; and nothing was done by England for Catalonia, where, during
the first years of the struggle, so much might have been done ♦VOL.
II. P. 328.♦ with effect. The army which in the preceding autumn had
been ordered thither from Sicily, and detained by its general for the
protection of that island, was employed at this time in an expedition
against Naples, as a diversion in favour of the Austrians; and thus the
means which might have saved Gerona were misdirected.
♦THE RAVELIN TAKEN.♦
Meantime the main attacks of the besiegers were directed against
the ravelin which was now the main defence of Monjuic. While it
was possible to maintain it, the garrison contended who should be
stationed there, as at the post of honour. It was repeatedly attacked
by night, but the defenders were always ready, and always repulsed the
assailants. It was now discovered that the enemy were mining; this was
distinctly ascertained by the sounds which were heard in the direction
of the fosse. The castle was founded upon a rock, and therefore the
officers apprehended no immediate danger from operations of this
nature. The purpose of the French was to destroy a breast-work which
protected that gate of the castle through which was the passage to the
ravelin: the breast-work was almost wholly of earth, and its explosion
did no hurt, but it left the gate exposed. A battery, already prepared,
began to play upon it, and the communication between the castle and
the ravelin was thus rendered exceedingly difficult. A sally was made
against this battery, and the guns were spiked; a priest was one of the
foremost in this adventure: he received a ball in his thigh, and fell;
the enemy pressed on to kill him; one of their officers, at the hazard
of his own life, protected him, and in this act of humane interference
was slain by the Spaniards, ... ♦1809. AUGUST.♦ a circumstance which
their journalists recorded with becoming regret. The success which had
been obtained was of little avail, for the French had artillery in
abundance: in the course of a few hours they mounted other pieces in
place of those which had been rendered useless, and continued their
fire upon the gate and the ravelin. At the same time they formed a
covered way from their own parapet to the breach of the ravelin; by
this, on the night between the 4th and 5th of August they poured a
sufficient body of troops through the breach to overpower the forty
men who were stationed there; but having won the place, they could
not maintain it, exposed as it was to musketry from the castle. It
was, therefore, left for the dead who covered it. About forty hours
afterwards, a few Spaniards determined to go and bring off the arms
which the French had not had time to carry away; they found a lad of
sixteen who had lain thus long among the carcasses; he was the only one
of his comrades who escaped death or captivity, ... they brought him
off, and he was sent to the hospital half dead with exhaustion.
♦MONJUIC ABANDONED.♦
The guns of Monjuic had now been silenced; the enemy were so near,
that sometimes the Spaniards knocked them down with stones: it was
with difficulty that the governor, D. Guillerme Nasch, could restrain
his men: impatient at remaining inactive, they earnestly solicited
permission to sally out upon the most desperate attempts. The garrison
had held out seven-and-thirty days since a practicable breach was made.
A week had elapsed since the ravelin was lost, and three sides of the
castle were now entirely in ruins; there was little water left, and
that little foul and unwholesome; the number of soldiers was every
day diminished by disease as well as by the chances of war. Under
these circumstances, the governor deemed it his duty to preserve the
men who were still left, that they might assist in the defence of the
city. On the evening of the 11th he abandoned the ruins, and retired
into Gerona, every man taking with him two hand-grenades and as many
cartridges as he could carry. Matches were left in the magazine, and
the retreat was effected with only the loss of one man, who was killed
by a shell when he had entered the gates.
♦VERDIER EXPECTS THE TOWN TO FALL.♦
Elated with this success, ... a success dearly purchased, and bringing
no glory to the conqueror, ... Verdier assured his government that
Gerona could not now hold out longer than from eight to fifteen days.
He planted one battery against the bulwark of St. Pedro, and another
upon Monjuic, which commanded all the works in the plain, and the
whole line of the city from St. Pedro to the tower of Gironella. Other
batteries, placed by St. Daniel’s Tower, commanded Fort Calvary, the
Castle of the Constable, and one of its advanced posts. While they were
forming these, and throwing up works nearer the city than they could
approach before the fall of Monjuic, a little respite was necessarily
afforded to the besieged; but, that no rest might be given them,
shells were thrown in from time to time by night and day. From the
commencement of the siege Alvarez had felt the want of men, and had
repeatedly solicited a reinforcement of 2000; even then the garrison
would hardly have amounted to half its complement. Nothing but the want
of men prevented him from making more frequent sallies, ... in all that
were made, the desperate courage and high sense of duty which inspired
the Spaniards gave them a decided advantage. “Never,” said he, in his
report to the government, “never have I seen the precious enthusiasm of
all who are within this city abated even for a moment; and a thousand
times would they have sallied out, if I had not, because of their
scanty numbers, been compelled to forbid them.” Just after the fall
of Monjuic, D. Ramon Foxa, and D. Jose Cantera, brought him 700 men,
a trifling number considering the state of Gerona, and the importance
of defending it; but they were volunteers, and went with willing and
prepared minds to make the sacrifice which was required of them.
♦A BATTERY PLANTED ON THE CATHEDRAL.♦
Alvarez now planted upon the roof of the cathedral a battery of three
cannon. The little opposition which was made to this as an act of
profanation was soon overcome, for the clergy felt that, as when
fighting in the field, they were employed in the service of the altar,
so, in such a war, the temple could not be desecrated by using it as a
fortress. Till now a watch had been kept upon the tower, to observe the
movements of the enemy, and ring the alarm whenever an attack was about
to be made. It was composed of the clergy of the cathedral, with one
of the Canons at their head: now that the battery was planted there,
this guard made their station a place of arms also, and annoyed the
besiegers with musketry. The cathedral had been hitherto the hospital
for wounded officers; it now became necessary to remove them to a safer
quarter, for the enemy directed their fire thither with a perseverance
that discovered how much they were annoyed from thence. In the frequent
removal of the hospitals which the bombardment occasioned, the company
of St. Barbara was of the most essential service; throughout the whole
siege, these heroic women shrunk from no duty, however laborious,
however perilous, or however painful. Three of the leaders are
especially mentioned, Dona Lucia Joana de Fitzgéralt, D. Mariangela
Vivern, and D. Maria Custi, commandants of the three divisions of St.
Narcis, St. Dorothy, and St. Eulalia.
At the end of August, several breaches had been made by the batteries
of Monjuic, and it was every day apprehended that they would be made
practicable. Alvarez then declared in his general orders, that if
any of the defenders flinched from the breach when it was attacked,
they should immediately be considered as enemies, and fired upon
accordingly. The besiegers continually constructed new works, they
had troops at command, artillery in abundance, and ♦DISTRESS OF THE
CITY.♦ engineers of the greatest skill. The garrison was considerably
reduced; the hospitals were no longer able to contain the numbers
who required admission: the contagion increased, and became more
virulent; the magazines were exhausted of all their provisions except
wheat and a little flour, and famine began to be severely felt. Not a
word of capitulation was permitted within the city, nor a thought of
it entertained; but Blake was well aware that it was now absolutely
necessary to make a great effort for the relief of the place, and throw
in troops and ♦ATTEMPT TO INTRODUCE SUCCOURS.♦ supplies. This was
exceedingly difficult; for, although the enemy occupied an extensive
line, it might easily be contracted, and they would certainly employ
their whole force to prevent the entrance of supplies into a place
which they had strictly blockaded for more than three months. The only
means of succeeding would be to divert their attention upon various
points, and make them suppose that the Spaniards intended to give
battle in the quarter directly opposite to that by which the convoy was
to proceed. Blake’s head-quarters were at S. Ilari when he began his
movements; he ordered Don Manuel Llanden, lieutenant of the regiment
of Ultonia, with as many troops as could be allotted for this service,
and as many of the Somatenes as he could collect on the way, to march
to the heights of Los Angeles, which are north of Gerona, dislodge the
enemy from that position, where they had only a small body of infantry,
and protect the convoy which was to be introduced on that side. Blake
then advanced two hours’ march towards the Ermida, or Chapel of Pradro,
with the reserve, that he might be ready to give assistance wherever
it was wanted; from thence he dispatched the colonel of the regiment
of Ultonia, D. Enrique O’Donnell, with 1200 foot and a few cavalry, to
attack the French at Bruñolas, his object being to make them suppose
that the convoy was proceeding in that direction.
♦SEPT. 1.♦
O’Donnell, by the error of his guides, was led more than two hours’
march out of the direct road, and thus prevented from attacking the
enemy at daybreak, according to his intention. This, however, did not
frustrate the plan. Bruñolas was a strong position, the enemy were
posted in two bodies, and they had a redoubt with entrenchments on the
top of the mountain. Stationing one part of his men at the foot of the
ascent, to defeat the purpose of the enemy, which he perceived was
to attack his principal column in flank, he ordered Sarsfield, with
the greater part of his force, to attack the French in front; it was
done with complete success; they were driven from their entrenchments,
and reinforcements came hastening towards them, this, as Blake had
designed, being supposed to be the point which it was of most
importance to ♦1809. SEPTEMBER.♦ secure. O’Donnell having succeeded in
this diversion, now descended into the plain, lest he should be turned
by superior numbers. There was some difficulty in the descent, owing
to its steepness and the proximity of the enemy, nevertheless it was
effected in perfect order, and having reached the plain, he halted,
and formed in order of battle. Another division of the Spaniards under
General Loygorri joined him, and they continued in that position to
occupy the attention of the French, and draw more of their troops from
the side of the Ter during the whole of the day.
While O’Donnell thus successfully executed his orders on one side,
D. Juan Claros acted on another in concert with the Doctor Colonel
Rovira. Rovira dislodged the enemy from the castle of Montagut, which
they had fortified. Claros at the same time attacked them on the left
bank of the Ter, dislodged them from the height which they occupied
on that part of the river, killed the Westphalian General Hadelin,
burnt their encampments at Sarria and Montrospe, and won the battery
of Casa Enroca. Llanden meantime obtained possession of the heights
of Los Angeles: this opened a way for ♦GARCIA CONDE ENTERS WITH
REINFORCEMENTS.♦ the convoy, with which Garcia Conde, at the head of
4000 foot and 500 horse, advanced from Amer, crossed the Ter, and
hastened along the right bank toward Gerona. The attention of the enemy
had been so well diverted by the attacks on other points, that the
Spaniards were enabled to break through the force which had been left
there, set fire to the tents, and effect their entrance. Six hundred
men sallied at the same time from the city to the plain of Salt, partly
to assist in confusing the enemy, but more for the purpose of restoring
water to the only two mills within the walls. In this they failed;
for, since the French had broken the water-courses, it was discovered
that the weather had completed their destruction; ... had not this
detachment thus uselessly employed their time, they might have carried
off the besiegers’ magazines from Salt.
♦INADEQUACY OF THIS RELIEF.♦
These operations, so honourable to Blake who planned, and to the
officers who executed them, were performed during a day of heavy and
incessant rain, which concealed their movements from the enemy. Of
the troops who got into Gerona, 3000 remained there. Alvarez did not
conceal from them the desperate nature of the service upon which they
had entered; he addressed both officers and men, telling them, that
if any one among them dreaded the thoughts of death, now was the time
to leave the city, for the Geronans and their defenders had sworn to
perish rather than surrender, and he asked if they were willing, to
swear the like? They readily took the oath. Conde, with the rest of the
army and the beasts of the convoy, accomplished his return as happily
as his entrance. Of all Blake’s actions this was the only one which
was completely successful. But more might have been done, and ought
to have been attempted. If he had given the French battle, a victory
would have delivered Gerona; and a defeat could only have produced
the dispersion of his own troops, in a country which they knew, where
every man was friendly to them, and where they would presently have
re-assembled. He had little to lose, and every thing to gain. Even if,
instead of retreating as soon as his object of introducing supplies
was effected, he had continued to threaten the enemy, without risking
an action, an opportunity of attacking them at advantage must have
been given him; for of the two days’ biscuit which had been reserved
for such an occasion, one had been consumed, and the French army could
not have been kept together for want of supplies. Blake was highly
and deservedly extolled for the skill with which he had conducted his
operations; but the attempt, though it had succeeded in all parts,
was miserably inadequate to the object. The stores, which after so
much preparation and with such skilful movements had been introduced,
contained only a supply for fifteen days. Hopes indeed were held out of
others which were to follow, but it was impossible not to perceive that
the enemy would be more vigilant hereafter, and that the introduction
of a second convoy would be rendered far more difficult than that of
the first. Alvarez was so well convinced of this, that he immediately
reduced the rations one half, preparing at once with invincible
resolution for the extremity which he knew was ♦ST. CYR, 231.♦ now to
be expected; and then, it is said, that for the first time there was
some desertion from the Spanish troops.
♦LOS ANGELES TAKEN, AND THE GARRISON PUT TO THE SWORD.♦
The Spaniards, after the late action, had occupied with 500 men the
convent of N. Señora de los Angeles, which was situated upon the
highest ground in the vicinity, and having been fortified, was now
an important point, as facilitating both ingress and egress for the
besieged, while it remained in their hands. Mazuchelli, therefore,
with the Italian troops, was ordered to take it. According to his
statement the Spanish commandant Llanden fired upon the officer who
summoned him; and therefore when the post was carried, after a brave
resistance, every man was put to the sword except three officers,
whom the Italian commander saved, and Llanden himself, who leapt from
one of the ♦ST. CYR, 243.♦ church-windows, and effected his escape.
The Italian soldiers had become mercilessly ferocious in the course
of this war, exasperated, it is said, by the murder of some of their
sick and wounded ♦IB. 262.♦ who had fallen into the hands of Rovira
and other guerilla chiefs. In these dreadful cases, where cruelty
excites revenge, and revenge provokes fresh cruelty, there is a fearful
accumulation of guilt on all the parties who thus aggravate the evils
of war: but that the inhumanity of the invaders was carried on upon
a wider scale, that it was systematically encouraged and sometimes
enjoined, and that it extended to women and even children, is as
certain ... as that the provocation was given by them, and the example
set, ... an example which neither the Spaniards nor Portugueze were
likely to be slow in following. The enemy were less fortunate in an
attack upon the irregular forces under Claros and Rovira, who with
incessant activity intercepted their communication with Figueras.
Verdier attacked them at S. Gregori, where they were well posted and
well commanded, for these leaders were men well fitted for the sort of
warfare in which they were engaged, and the French were compelled to
retire with the loss of one of their generals.
♦UNSUCCESSFUL SALLY.♦
The besiegers were at this time compelled for want of ammunition to
suspend their efforts till a supply could be received from France. The
time was not lost by the garrison in strengthening their works, works
however which derived their main strength from the unconquerable spirit
of the inhabitants. When the supplies arrived the enemy directed their
fire upon the three points of St. Lucia, St. Cristobal, and the Quartel
de Alemanes, or Quarter of the Germans. This latter building rested
in part of its foundation upon the wall itself, and the object of the
enemy was to beat it down, that they might enter over its ruins as by a
bridge. The fire from the cathedral, from the Sarracinas, and from the
tower of Gironella, was well kept up in return; but the French had so
greatly the advantage both in the number and size of their artillery,
that Alvarez ordered a sally, in the ♦SEPT. 15.♦ hope of spiking their
guns. That it might be the more unexpected, the gate of S. Pedro, which
had been walled up since the loss of Monjuic, was re-opened, and the
Spaniards advanced with such rapidity upon the enemy’s works, that
the attack was made almost as soon as they were seen. In many points
it was successful, in some the Spaniards failed, and when they were
thrown into confusion they were unable to rally. In some few of the
persons chosen for the sally, something worse than want of discipline
discovered itself, ... they lagged behind in the assault, and, without
sharing the danger, fell in with their braver comrades on their return.
So much was done, and so much more must have been effected, if all
had behaved equally well, that Colonel Marshal, an Englishman in the
Spanish service, exclaimed, “We have lost a great victory!”
♦THE FRENCH REPULSED IN A GENERAL ASSAULT.♦
The guns which had been rendered useless were soon replaced, and an
incessant fire was kept up upon the three great breaches; on the 18th,
the French engineers declared that all three were practicable. Monjuic
had taught the enemy not to be too confident of success; the breaches
indeed were of such magnitude that it seemed scarcely possible they
should fail in storming them, but they knew that victory must be dearly
purchased. In the evening, therefore, they sent a white flag; it was
not noticed from the town, and the officers who accompanied it made
signs to the Spaniards; there was no firing at this time, and the
men, both of the besieging army and the town, were looking silently
and intently on, to await the issue. Alvarez at length sent a verbal
order to the French officers to retire, ... they requested to be
heard, and were told from the walls to retire on peril of their lives;
they persisted in offering a letter, and then both the castle of the
Constable and the tower of Gironella fired. As soon as the officers
reached their own lines, the batteries were again opened, some upon
the breaches, others throwing shells into the town. During the night
this was kept up, and the enemy collected troops upon the heights of
Campdura and in Monjuic, for the assault. At daybreak they were seen
in motion in different parts, with the purpose, it was supposed, of
calling off attention from the real points of danger. The whole ♦SEPT.
19.♦ forenoon was employed in preparation. Between three and four, the
watch on the cathedral informed Alvarez that troops were descending
from Monjuic to St. Daniel. At the same time the like intelligence
arrived from the forts of the Constable and of the Capuchines; and
another messenger from the cathedral followed, with tidings that the
enemy were advancing in force both from Monjuic and St. Daniel against
the breaches, and that many of them carried instruments for sapping.
The alarm was now rung from the cathedral, and beaten through the
streets; there was scarcely any interval between the alarm and the
attack, so near to the walls were the points of which the enemy were
in possession: 2000 men came on straight from Monjuic, an equal number
advanced between Monjuic and St. Daniel, a third body from S. Miguel;
at the same time a movement of troops was seen in the woods of Palau;
they advanced against the three bridges, the Puerto de Francia, and
forts Calvary and Cabildo. It was not without surprise that the enemy
found the Geronans prepared to receive them at all these points. Nasch,
the defender of Monjuic, had his post at the Quartel de Alemanes,
where one of the principal breaches was made. Colonel Marshall was at
the breach of St. Lucia; a company of crusaders, composed entirely of
clergy, were stationed at the breach of St. Cristobal; the rest of the
garrison, and crusaders, and all the other townsmen manned the walls.
The company of St. Barbara were distributed among the different posts,
to perform their important functions, and proclamations were made,
inviting the other women of Gerona to assist them in this awful hour.
At the Quartel de Alemanes the enemy mounted the breach with the utmost
resolution, and they succeeded in forcing their way into the first
quadrangle of that great building; the French batteries continued to
play upon the walls and the buildings adjoining the breach, and a
huge fragment fell upon those who were foremost in the assault, just
at the moment when part of the Ultonia regiment was about to charge
them: a few of the Spaniards were buried with them in the ruins. The
Geronans then rushed on, drove back the enemy, presented themselves in
the breach, and fought hand to hand with the assailants. Frequently
such was the press of the conflict, and such the passion which inspired
them, that impatient of the time required for reloading their muskets,
the defendants caught up stones from the breach, and brained their
enemies with these readier weapons. Four times the assault was repeated
in the course of two hours, and at every point the enemy were beaten
off. Alvarez, during the whole assault, hastened from post to post,
wherever there was most need of his presence, providing every thing,
directing all and encouraging all; he had prepared cressets to light
up the walls and breaches in case the enemy should persist in their
attempt after darkness closed; but they withdrew long before night
set in, hastily and in disorder, leaving 800 of their best men slain.
Among them was that Colonel Floresti, whom this very Mariano Alvarez
had admitted into Monjuic at Barcelona, when the French took their ♦SEE
VOL. I. P. 201.♦ treacherous possession of that fortress.
Of the besieged forty-four fell in this glorious day, and 197 were
wounded. Our brave countryman, Colonel Marshall, died of his wounds,
as did D. Ricardo Maccarty, another officer of the same regiment,
who was Irish either by birth or extraction. A glorious success had
been gained, one that filled the conquerors with the highest and most
ennobling pride; this joy it brought with it, but it brought no rest,
no respite, scarcely even a prolongation of hope. There was neither
wine to distribute to the soldiers after their exertions, nor even
bread; a scanty mess of pulse or corn, with a little oil, or a morsel
of bacon in its stead, was all that could be served out, ... and this
not from the public magazines, but given by the inhabitants, who, in
the general extremity, shared their stores with the soldiers, lamenting
that they had nothing better to bestow. “What matters it?” said these
brave Spaniards, “the joy of having saved Gerona to-day will give us
strength to go on!” A party went out to bring in any of the wounded
enemies who might have been left among the dead; one had been stript by
a miquelet, but upon perceiving what was the object of their search, he
discovered himself to be living. “Having been wounded,” he said, “he
feigned death as the only chance of escaping death, for he had been
led to believe that the miquelets and the peasants gave no quarter.”
The man who had stripped him happened to be present when he spoke; he
immediately re-clothed him, ran to bring him water, and took charge
of him till he could be removed to the hospital. While the Spaniards
were employed in this humane office, a fire was opened upon them from
the enemy’s works, occasioned, no doubt, by some error of the French
centinels: it drove them in, and the remainder of the wounded were
consequently left to perish. One wretched German, by the breach of St.
Lucia, lay groaning for twenty hours before death relieved him.
♦ST. CYR RESOLVES TO REDUCE THE CITY BY FAMINE.♦
The loss which they had sustained in this assault thoroughly
discouraged the besiegers; and when St. Cyr, for the sake of proving to
the Spaniards that he was not to be outdone by them in perseverance,
would have made a second effort, the officers whom he consulted were
unanimously of opinion that it ought not again to be attempted. The
Marshal, however unwilling to make an acknowledgement so honourable to
the people against whom he was employed, was compelled then to admit
that Gerona could only be reduced by famine, and to determine upon
pursuing that course, which of all others is the most wearying to the
soldiers, and the most painful to a general who has not extinguished in
himself all sense of humanity. Every day now added to the distress of
the besieged. Their flour was exhausted; wheat they had still in store,
but men are so much the slaves of habit, that it was considered as one
great evil of the siege, that they had no means of grinding it; two
horse-mills, which had been erected, were of such clumsy construction,
that they did not perform half the needful work, and the Geronans,
rather than prepare the unground corn in any way to which they had not
been accustomed, submitted to the labour of grinding it between two
stones, or pounding it in the shell of a bomb with a cannon-ball. For
want of other animal food, mules and horses were slaughtered for the
hospital and for the shambles; a list was made of all within the city,
and they were taken by lot. Fuel was exceedingly scarce, yet the heaps
which were placed in cressets at the corners of the principal streets,
to illuminate them in case of danger, remained untouched, and not a
billet was taken from them during the whole siege. The summer fever
became more prevalent; the bodies of the sufferers were frequently
covered with a minute eruption, which was usually a fatal symptom:
fluxes also began to prevail[5].
♦O’DONNELL ENTERS THE CITY.♦
The hope of relief was the only thing talked of in Gerona, and day
and night the people, as well as the watchmen, looked eagerly on all
sides for the succours of which they were so greatly in need, and
which they knew Blake was preparing. That general, on the 21st of
September, had assembled a convoy at Hostalrich; on the morning of
the 26th a firing was heard towards Los Angeles, and a strong body
of the garrison sallied out to assist the convoy. Wimpfen had the
command of the advancing army. When they reached the heights of S.
Pelayo, before La Bisbal, O’Donnell was sent forward, with 1000 men,
to open a way through the enemy: this officer, who was generally not
less successful than enterprising in his attempts, broke through the
enemy, set fire to one of their encampments, and made way for 160 laden
beasts, which entered safely through the Puerta del Areny. The joy
of the besieged was but of short endurance; they looked to see more
troops and more supplies hastening on: 10,000 men they knew had been
sent upon this service, 1000 had effected their part, why could not
the nine follow? After gazing for hours in vain, they could no longer
deceive themselves with hope; it was but too certain that the rest of
the convoy had been intercepted. They then began to censure the general
who had attempted to introduce it on that side, where the way was
craggy, and led through such defiles, that a handful of men would be
sufficient to defeat his purpose: their disappointment vented itself in
exclamations against Blake, and they blamed him for remaining at the
head of an army after so many repeated misfortunes as he had sustained.
♦FAILURE OF THE ATTEMPT TO RELIEVE IT.♦ That general was not more
censured by the Catalans than by the enemy for his conduct during the
siege. The French condemned his want of promptitude and enterprise,
being conscious themselves that for want of resources they must have
been seriously endangered, if they had been repeatedly and vigorously
attacked, or even threatened. But Blake, after the panic at Belchite,
could have no confidence in his men: nor was this his only misfortune;
though in other respects a good officer, he wanted that presence of
mind which is the most essential requisite for a commander, and he was
therefore better qualified to plan a campaign than to execute his own
arrangements. When he succeeded in the former attempt for relieving
Gerona, if the fair occasion had been seized the enemy might have then
been compelled to raise the siege; but it was let pass for want of
alacrity and hope. This second effort was miserably unsuccessful; nine
parts of the convoy fell into the enemy’s hand, and there was a loss of
more than 3000 men, for the ♦ST. CYR, 262.♦ Italians gave no quarter.
St. Cyr thought that the men who had got into the city could not
possibly retreat from it, and must therefore accelerate its surrender;
and believing that the ♦ST. CYR GIVES UP THE COMMAND TO AUGEREAU.♦
business of the siege was done, he went to Perpignan for the purpose
of making arrangements for the better supply of the army, and getting
rid of an irksome command which his successor seemed in no haste to
assume. His situation had long been painful. The service itself was one
to which no casuistry could reconcile an honourable mind; the system
of preying upon the country gave a barbarous character to it, which,
if the cause itself had been less odious, must have been intolerable
to one bred up in those feelings and observances by which the evils
of war were mitigated: and if Marshal St. Cyr had been insensible to
these reflections, he had much personal mortification to endure. There
was reason to suspect that the army was neglected, because he was an
object of displeasure to the government which employed him; and he was
made to feel that the officers under him were, for his sake, debarred
from the honours and advancement which they were entitled to expect.
Finding therefore that Augereau was not incapacitated by ill health
♦ST. CYR, 264, 268.♦ from assuming the command, he communicated to him
his determination of holding it no longer, and was rewarded for his
services by two years of disgrace and exile.
♦O’DONNELL EFFECTS HIS RETREAT.♦
Marshal Augereau had not been many hours before Gerona when O’Donnell
with his thousand men broke through the besieging army, and
accomplished his retreat more daringly and not less successfully than
he had effected his entrance. It was O’Donnell who first formed the
Geronans into companies, and disciplined them: he had not remained
in the city during the siege, because it was rightly thought he
would be better able to assist it from without; and he had displayed
such skill and intrepidity in intercepting a convoy at Mascara, in
concert with Rovira, that the Central Junta promoted him to the rank
of brigadier. When, in the unhappy attempt at relieving the city, he
and his division only had entered, he took up his station between the
fort of the Capuchins and of La Reynana; but Gerona stood in need of
provisions, not men; a thousand troops added nothing to her useful
strength, the Geronans were strong enough without them to resist
an assault if another were made; with them they were not numerous
enough to sally and raise the siege; the continuance of O’Donnell
then could only serve to hasten the fall of the city, by increasing
the consumption of its scanty stores, and to weaken his own men by
the privations in which they shared. It was agreed, therefore, with
Alvarez that he should cut his way through the enemy; and a few
families thought it better to follow him in this perilous attempt,
than remain in a city where it now became apparent that they who
escaped death could not long escape captivity. The place was completely
surrounded, so that to elude the enemy was impossible; the only hope
was to surprise them, ♦OCT. 13.♦ and then force a way. One night,
after the moon was down, they left their position in silence: the
Geronan centinels at St. Francisco de Paula mistook them for an enemy,
and fired: but it is not unlikely that this accident, which might so
easily have frustrated the enterprise, facilitated it, by deceiving
the French, who, when they heard the alarm given from the city, could
never imagine that an attempt was about to be made upon their camp.
To make way by the mountains, O’Donnell knew would be impossible, in
the darkness, without confusion; ♦1809. OCTOBER.♦ therefore, though
the enemy’s posts were more numerous on the plain, he judged it safer
to take that course. The plan was ably carried into effect; his men
surprised the first post, fell upon them with sword and bayonet, not
firing a gun, cut them off without giving the alarm, and sparing two
prisoners, made them their guides through the encampment. They passed
five-and-twenty posts of the enemy, through many of which they forced
their way: Souham was surprised in his quarter, and fled in his shirt,
leaving behind him as much booty as the Spaniards had time to lay hands
on. The alarm spread throughout the whole of the lines, but it was too
late; by daybreak the Spaniards reached S. Colona, where Milans was
posted with part of Blake’s army, and it was not till they were thus
placed in safety that a body of 2000 foot and 200 horse, who had been
sent in pursuit of them, came up. O’Donnell was promoted to the rank of
camp-marshal for this exploit.
♦MAGAZINES AT HOSTALRICH TAKEN BY THE FRENCH.♦
But an immediate change took place in the condition of the besieging
army under the new commander. Their wants were immediately supplied
from France, they were largely reinforced, and encouragement of every
kind was given them, as if to show that the disfavour which they had
experienced had been wholly intended toward Marshal St. Cyr. Augereau
being thus in strength, sent General Pino against the town of
Hostalrich, where magazines were collected for Blake’s army, and for
the relief of Gerona. The town was occupied by 2000 troops; Blake was
too distant to act in support of this important post; the Spaniards,
after a gallant resistance, were driven into the citadel by superior
numbers; the magazines were lost, and the greater part of the town
burnt.
♦AUGEREAU OFFERS FAVOURABLE TERMS.♦
The French purchased their success dearly; but it cut off the last
possibility of relief from Gerona. The besieged now died in such
numbers, chiefly of dysentery, that the daily deaths were never less
than thirty-five, and sometimes amounted to seventy. The way to the
burial place was never vacant. Augereau straitened the blockade; and,
that the garrison might neither follow the example of O’Donnell,
nor receive any supplies, however small, he drew his lines closer,
stretched cords with bells along the interspaces, and kept watch-dogs
at all the posts. The bombardment was continued, and always with
greater violence during the night than the day, as if to exhaust the
Geronans by depriving them of sleep. He found means also of sending
letters into the city, sparing no attempts to work upon the hopes and
fears of the people; he told them of his victory at Hostalrich, ... of
the hopeless state of Blake’s army, ... of the peace which Austria had
made; ... he threatened the most signal vengeance if they persisted
in holding out, and he offered to grant an armistice for a month,
and suffer supplies immediately to enter, provided Alvarez would
capitulate at the end of that time, if the city were not relieved.
There was a humanity in this offer such as no other French general had
displayed during the course of the Spanish war; but Alvarez and the
Geronans knew their duty too well to accept even such terms as these
after the glorious resistance which they had made. With such an enemy,
and in such a cause, they knew that no compromise ought to be made:
they had devoted themselves for Spain, and it did not become them, for
the sake of shortening their own sufferings, to let loose so large a
part of the besieging army as this armistice would have left at liberty
for other operations.
♦DESTRUCTION OF A FRENCH CONVOY BY THE BRITISH SHIPS.♦
While the people of Gerona opposed this heroic spirit of endurance
to the enemy, an affair took place at sea, which, if it brought no
immediate relief to the Catalans, convinced them at least that they
were not wholly neglected by Great Britain. Lord Collingwood having
obtained intelligence that an attempt would be made from Toulon for
throwing supplies into Barcelona, sailed from Minorca about the middle
of October, and took his station a few leagues off Cape St. Sebastian,
on the coast of Catalonia. On the 23d the enemy’s fleet came in sight,
consisting of three ships of the line, two frigates, two armed store
ships, and a convoy of sixteen sail. Rear Admiral Martin was ordered
to give chase; he fell in with the ships of war off ♦OCT. 25.♦ the
entrance of the Rhone, but they escaped him that night, because the
wind blew directly on shore. The next morning he renewed the chase, and
drove two of them, one of eighty guns, the other of seventy-four, on
shore, off Frontignan, where they were set fire to by their own crews;
the other ship of the line and one frigate ran on shore at the entrance
of the port of Cette, where there was little probability that the
former could be saved, but they were under protection of the batteries.
The second frigate had hauled her wind during the night, and got into
Marseilles road.
Two brigs, two bombards, and a ketch belonging to the convoy, were
burnt by the Pomona while Admiral Martin was in chase. The other
vessels made for the bay of Rosas; a squadron pursued, and found them
moored under the protection of the castle, Fort Trinidad, and several
batteries newly erected by the French. Four of these vessels were
armed; the largest was of 600 tons, carrying sixteen nine-pounders, and
110 men; she was inclosed in boarding nettings, and perfectly prepared
for action. The English boats, however, boarded them all, though they
were bravely defended, and though a constant fire was kept up from the
forts and from the beach. Of the eleven ships, three had landed their
cargoes, but all were taken or burnt; and of the whole convoy there
only escaped the frigate, which put into Marseilles, and one of the
store-ships, which probably succeeded in reaching Barcelona.
♦INCREASED DISTRESS OF THE CITY.♦
It was no unimportant service thus to straiten the French in that
city, ... but it was a success which brought no relief to Gerona,
where the devoted inhabitants seemed now abandoned to their fate.
Hitherto the few mules and horses which remained unslaughtered had
been led out to feed near the walls of St. Francisco de Paula, and
of the burial ground: ... this was now prevented by the batteries
of Palau and Montelivi, and by the French advanced posts; and these
wretched animals, being thus deprived of their only food, gnawed the
hair from each other’s tails and manes before they were led to the
shambles. Famine at length did the enemy’s work; the stores from which
the citizens had supplied the failure of the magazines were exhausted;
it became necessary to set a guard over the ovens, and the food for
the hospitals was sometimes seized upon the way by the famishing
populace. The enemy endeavoured to tempt the garrison to desert, by
calling out to them to come and eat, and holding out provisions. A few
were tempted; they were received with embraces, and fed in sight of
the walls, ... poor wretches, envying the firmer constancy of their
comrades more than those comrades did the food, for lack of which
their own vital spirits were well-nigh spent! None of that individual
animosity was here displayed which characterized the street-fighting
♦1809. NOVEMBER.♦ at Zaragoza, ... the nature of the siege was not such
as to call it forth; and some of those humanities appeared, which in
other instances the French generals systematically outraged in Spain.
The out-sentries frequently made a truce with each other, laid down
their arms, and drew near enough to converse; the French soldier would
then give his half-starved enemy a draught from his leathern bottle,
or brandy flask, and when they had drunk and talked together, they
returned to their posts, scoffed at each other, proceeded from mockery
to insult, and sometimes closed the scene with a skirmish.
♦REPORT OF THE STATE OF HEALTH.♦
The only disgraceful circumstance which occurred during the whole
siege was the desertion of ten officers in a body, two of whom were
men of noble birth; they had been plotting to make the governor
capitulate, and finding their intentions frustrated, went over to the
enemy in open day. Except in this instance, the number of deserters
was very small. Towards the end of November many of the inhabitants,
having become utterly hopeless of relief, preferred the chance of
death to the certainty of being made prisoners, and they ventured to
pass the enemy’s lines, some failing in the attempt, others being
more fortunate. At this time Samaniego, who was first surgeon to the
garrison, delivered in to Alvarez a report upon the state of ♦NOV. 29.♦
health: as he gave it into his hands, he said something implying the
melancholy nature of its contents; Alvarez replied, “this paper then,
perhaps, will inform posterity of our sufferings, if there should be
none left to recount them!” He then bade Samaniego read it. It was a
dreadful report. There did not remain a single building in Gerona which
had not been injured by the bombardment; not a house was habitable;
the people slept in cellars, and vaults, and holes amid the ruins; and
it had not unfrequently happened that the wounded were killed in the
hospitals. The streets were broken up; so that the rain water and the
sewers stagnated there, and the pestilential vapours which arose were
rendered more noxious by the dead bodies which lay rotting amid the
ruins. The siege had now endured seven months; scarcely a woman had
become pregnant during that time; the very dogs, before hunger consumed
them, had ceased to follow after kind; they did not even fawn upon
their masters; the almost incessant thunder of artillery seemed to make
them sensible of the state of the city, and the unnatural atmosphere
affected them as well as humankind. It even affected vegetation. In
the gardens within the walls the fruits withered, and scarcely any
vegetable could be raised. Within the last three weeks above 500
of the garrison had died in the hospitals; a dysentery was raging
and spreading; the sick were lying upon the ground, without beds,
almost without food; and there was scarcely fuel to dress the little
wheat that remained, and the few horses which were yet unconsumed.
Samaniego then adverted with bitterness to the accounts which had been
circulated, that abundant supplies had been thrown into the city; and
he concluded by saying, “if by these sacrifices, deserving for ever
to be the admiration of history, and if by consummating them with the
lives of us who, by the will of Providence, have survived our comrades,
the liberty of our country can be secured, happy shall we be in the
bosom of eternity and in the memory of good men, and happy will our
children be among their fellow-countrymen!”
♦SOME OF THE OUTWORKS TAKEN BY THE FRENCH.♦
The breaches which had been assaulted ten weeks before were still
open; it was easier for the Geronans to defend than to repair them,
and the French had suffered too much in that assault to repeat it. A
fourth had now been made. The enemy, learning from the officers who
had deserted that the ammunition of the place was almost expended,
ventured upon bolder operations. They took possession by night of
the Calle del Carmen; from thence they commanded the bridge of S.
Francisco, which was the only means of communication between the old
city and that part on the opposite side of the Ter; from thence also
they battered Forts Merced and S. Francisco de Paula. During another
night they got possession of Fort Calvary, which they had reduced to
ruins, and of the Cabildo redoubt: this last success seems to have
been owing to some misconduct, for the historian of the siege inveighs
upon this occasion against the pernicious measure of intrusting boys
with command, as a reward for the services of their fathers. The city
redoubts fell next. The bodily strength as well as the ammunition of
the Geronans was almost exhausted, and these advantages over them were
gained with comparative ease. The enemy were now close to the walls,
and thus cut off the forts of the Capuchins and of the Constable, the
only two remaining outworks. The garrisons of both amounted only to 160
men; they had scarcely any powder, little water, and no food. These
posts were of the last importance; it was resolved to make a sally for
the sake of relieving them, and the garrison of the town gave up for
this purpose their own miserable rations, contributing enough for the
consumption of three days. The ration was at this time a handful of
wheat daily, or sometimes, in its stead, the quarter of a small loaf,
and five ounces of horse’s or mule’s flesh, every alternate day.
♦LAST SALLY OF THE GARRISON.♦
The few men who could be allotted for this service, or indeed who were
equal to it, sallied in broad day through the Puerto del Socorro,
within pistol-shot of the redoubts which the enemy now possessed; they
were in three bodies, two of which hastened up the hill toward the two
forts, while the third remained to protect them from being attacked
in the rear from the Calle del Carmen. The sally was so sudden, so
utterly unlooked for by the besiegers, and so resolutely executed, that
its purpose was accomplished, ♦1809. DECEMBER.♦ though not without
the loss in killed and wounded of about forty men, which was nearly a
third of those who were employed in it. This was the last effort of the
Geronans. The deaths increased in a dreadful and daily accelerating
progression; the burial-places were without the walls; it had long been
a service of danger to bury the dead, for the French, seeing the way
to the cemetery always full, kept up a fire upon it; hands could not
now be found to carry them out to the deposit-house, and from thence to
the grave; and at one time 120 bodies were lying in the deposit-house,
uncoffined, in sight of all who passed the walls.
♦ALVAREZ BECOMES DELIRIOUS.♦
The besiegers were now erecting one battery more in the Calle de la
Rulla; it was close upon one of the breaches, and commanded the whole
space between Forts Merced and S. Francisco de Paula. This was in the
beginning of December; on the 4th Alvarez was seized with a nervous
fever, occasioned undoubtedly by the hopeless state of the city. On
the 8th the disorder had greatly increased, and he became delirious.
The next day the Junta assembled, and one of their body was deputed to
examine Samaniego and his colleague Viader, whether the governor was
in a state to perform the duties of his office. They required a more
specific question; and the Canon who had been deputed then said, it
was feared that, in the access of delirium, the governor might give
orders contrary to his own judgement, if he were in perfect sanity of
mind, and contrary to the public weal, when the dreadful situation of
the city was considered. The purport of such language could not be
mistaken; and they replied, that, without exceeding the bounds of their
profession, they could pronounce his state of health to be incompatible
with the command, and his continuance in command equally incompatible
with the measures necessary for his recovery.
♦CAPITULATION.♦
Samaniego and his colleague went after this consultation to visit the
governor, whom they found in such a state that they judged it proper
for him to receive the _viaticum_, thinking it most probable that,
in the next access of fever, he would lose his senses and die, ...
for this was the manner in which the disorder under which he laboured
usually terminated. Being thus delivered over to the priests, Alvarez,
before the fit came on, resigned the command, which then devolved
upon Brigadier D. Julian de Bolivar: a council was held during the
night, composed of the two Juntas, military and civil; and the result
was, that in the morning, D. Blas de Furnas, an officer who had
greatly distinguished himself during the siege, should treat for a
capitulation. The whole of the 10th was employed in adjusting the
terms. They were in the highest degree honourable. The garrison were to
march out with the honours of war, and be sent prisoners into France,
to be exchanged as soon as possible for an equal number of French
prisoners then detained in Majorca and other places. None were to be
considered prisoners except those who were ranked as soldiers; the
commissariat, intendants, and medical staff were thus left at freedom.
The French were not to be quartered upon the inhabitants; the official
papers were neither to be destroyed nor removed; no person was to be
injured for the part which he had taken during the siege; those who
were not natives of Gerona should be at liberty to leave it, and take
with them all their property; the natives also who chose to depart
might do so, take with them their moveable property, and dispose as
they pleased of the rest.
While the capitulation was going on, many of the enemy’s soldiers came
to the walls, bringing provisions and wine, to be drawn up by strings,
... an honourable proof of the temper with which they regarded their
brave opponents. During the night the deserters who were in Gerona,
with many other soldiers and peasants, attempted to escape: some
succeeded, others were killed or taken in the attempt, and not a few
dropped with weakness upon the way. To those who remained, the very
silence of night, it is said, was a thing so unusual, that it became
a cause of agitation. At daybreak it was found that the soldiers had
broken the greater part of their arms, and thrown the fragments into
the streets or the river. When the garrison were drawn up in sight of
the French, their shrunken limbs and hollow eyes and pale and meagre
countenances sufficiently manifested by what they had been subdued.
The French observed, not without admiration, that in the city, as well
as at Monjuic, most of the guns had been fired so often that they were
rendered useless; brass itself had given way, says Samaniego, before
the constancy of the Geronans.
The first act of the French officer who was appointed governor was
to order all the inhabitants to deliver in their arms, on pain of
death, and to establish a military commission. _Te Deum_ was ordered
in the cathedral; it was performed with tears, and a voice which could
difficultly command its utterance. Augereau would fain have had a
sermon like that which had been preached before Lasnes at Zaragoza,
but not a priest could be found who would sin against his soul by
following the impious example. A guard was set upon Alvarez; he amended
slowly, and the physicians applied for leave for him to quit the city,
and go to some place upon the sea-shore; it was replied, that Marshal
Augereau’s orders only permitted him to allow the choice of any place
on the French frontier, or in the direct road to France. He chose
Figueras, and, having recovered sufficiently to bear the removal, was
hurried off at ♦DEC. 24.♦ midnight without any previous notice, and
under a strong escort. The Friars, who had been all confined in the
church of St. Francisco, with a cannon pointed against the door, and
a match lighted, were marched off at the same time, in violation of
the terms. The sick and wounded Spaniards were hastily removed to
St. Daniel; they were laid upon straw, and being left without even
such necessaries as they had possessed in the city, except that they
were better supplied with food, many died in consequence. There was
a grievous want of humanity in this; but no brutal acts of outrage
and cruelty were committed, as at Zaragoza; and, when so many of the
French generals rendered themselves infamous, Augereau, and the few who
observed any of the old humanities of war, deserve to be distinguished
from their execrable colleagues.
♦DEATH OF ALVAREZ.♦
The Central Junta decreed the same honours to Gerona and its heroic
defenders as had been conferred in the case of Zaragoza. The rewards
which Mariano Alvarez had deserved by his admirable conduct were to be
given to his family, if, as there was reason to fear, he himself should
not live to receive them. The sad apprehension which was thus expressed
was soon verified. He died at Figueras. It was said, and believed, in
Catalonia, that Buonaparte had sent orders to execute him in the Plaza
at Gerona, and that the French, fearing the consequences if they should
thus outrage the national feeling, put him out of the way by poison[6].
His death was so probable, considering what he had endured during the
siege, and the condition in which it left him, that no suspicion of
this kind would have prevailed, if the public execution of Santiago
Sass and of Hofer, and the private catastrophe of Captain Wright and of
Pichegru, had not given dreadful proof that the French government and
its agents were capable of any wickedness. In the present imputation
they were probably wronged, but it was brought on them by the opinion
which their actions had obtained and merited.
♦EROLES ESCAPES.♦
About 600 of the garrison made their escape from Rousillon. Eroles was
one; than whom no Spaniard rendered greater services to his country
during the war, nor has left to posterity a more irreproachable and
honourable name.