objections, which he stated to Garay, and which the Junta, though they
would otherwise have published the proclamation, readily admitted. That
ambassador perceived, more clearly perhaps than any other person at
that time, the danger to be apprehended from convoking a legislative
assembly in a nation altogether unprepared for it by habits, feelings,
education, or general knowledge. He considered it a delicate and
dangerous point in every respect, and said, “that if the decision of
the question were left in his hand, notwithstanding the necessity
for widening the basis of the government, the failure of all the
political experiments which had been made in these latter times, and
the impossibility which had been found (by a fatality peculiar to the
present age) of forming a permanent establishment, even in affairs
less essential than the formation of a free constitution for a great
nation, would make him waver. But taking the decision for granted, he
thought the manner in which it was proposed to announce it likely
to produce bad effects in Spain; and he could venture,” he said, “to
assure D. Martin de Garay, that it would undoubtedly create them in
England. If the Spaniards had indeed passed three centuries under
arbitrary government, they ought not to forget that it was the price
which they paid for having conquered and peopled the fairest portion of
the world, and that the integrity of that immense power rested solely
upon these two words, Religion and the King. If the old constitution
had been lost by the conquest of America, the first object should be
to recover it; but in such a manner as not to lose what had cost so
much in the acquisition: and for this reason, they ought to avoid,
as a political poison, every enunciation of general principles, the
application of which it would be impossible to limit or qualify, even
when the Negroes and Indians should quote it in favour of themselves.
And allowing that a bad exchange had been made in bartering the
ancient national liberty for the glory and extension of the Spanish
name; allowing that the error should at all hazards be done away; even
though it were so,” Mr. Frere said, “it did not appear becoming the
character of a well-educated person to pass censures upon the conduct
of his forefathers, or to complain of what he may have lost by their
negligence or prodigality, still less so if it were done in the face
of the world; and what should be said of a nation who should do this
publicly, and after mature deliberation?”
This was true foresight,--and yet the English ambassador approached
Charybdis in his fear of Scylla. He spoke to the Spaniards of Religion
and the King; in England the truest and most enlightened lovers of
liberty can have no better rallying words; in Spain those words
had for three hundred years meant the inquisition and an absolute
monarch, whose ministers, so long as they could retain his favour,
governed according to their own will and pleasure, unchecked by any
constitutional control. The government did not obtain by their decree
for ♦UNPOPULARITY OF THE JUNTA.♦ convoking the Cortes the popularity
which they had perhaps expected. The measure had been long delayed, and
therefore was supposed to have been unwillingly resolved on. So much,
indeed, had been expected from the Central Junta, that no possible
wisdom on their part, no possible success, could have answered the
unreasonable demand. The disappointment of the nation was in proportion
to its hopes, and the government became equally the object of suspicion
and contempt. Some of the members had large estates in those provinces
which were occupied by the French, and it was suspected that where
their property was, there their hearts were also. Their subsequent
conduct proved how greatly they were injured by this distrust. They
were not censured for their first disasters, which the ablest men
under like circumstances could not have averted. Had they obtained
accurate intelligence of the strength and movements of the enemy when
Buonaparte entered Spain; had they exerted themselves as much in
disciplining troops as in raising and embodying them, and had they
supplied them with regularity and promptitude; it would not have been
possible to have stopped the progress of such a force. Something was
allowed for the confidence which the battle of Baylen had inspired, and
for the enthusiasm of the people, which the government had partaken.
Neither would the nation have been disposed to condemn, even if it had
perceived, errors which arose from the national character. But when,
after the bitter experience of twelve whole months, no measures had
been adopted for improving the discipline of the armies, or supplying
them in the field, the incapacity of the Junta became glaring, and
outcries against them were heard on all sides.
♦THEIR DIFFICULTIES AND ERRORS.♦
One of the weightiest errors for which they were censured was for not
exerting themselves more effectually to bring the whole strength of the
country against the invaders. They had promised to raise 500,000 men
and 50,000 cavalry. Granada was the only province which supplied its
full proportion, and Granada even exceeded it; its contingent was about
28,000, whereas it furnished nearly forty. But this depended more upon
the provincial Juntas than upon the central government, whose decrees
were of no avail in those parts which the enemy possessed, and were ill
observed in others, where the local administrations, from disgust, or
jealousy, or indolence, or incapacity, seemed to look on as spectators
of the dreadful drama, rather than to perform their parts in it, as
men and as Spaniards. Neither is it to the want of numbers that their
defeats were to be attributed; there were at all times men enough in
the field; arms, equipments, and discipline were wanting. It is unjust
to judge of the exertions of the Spanish Junta by those of the National
Convention in France, who had the whole wealth and strength of a
populous and rich country at their absolute disposal, and who began the
revolutionary war with officers, and tacticians, and statesmen capable
of wielding the mighty means which were put into their hands. The fault
of the Junta was in relying too much upon numbers and bravery, and too
little upon their fortresses. The general under whom the great captain
Gonzalo de Cordova learnt the art of war had left them a lesson which
they might profitably have remembered. He used to say, that fortresses
ought to be opposed to the impatience and fury of the French, and that
the place for stationing raw troops was behind walls and ramparts.
The most important errors which the Junta had hitherto committed were,
the delay in convoking the Cortes, and their conduct towards Sir
Arthur Wellesley’s army; but the national character contributed in no
slight degree to both. For it was not the known aversion of Florida
Blanca to the name of a representative assembly, nor the fears of some
of the Junta, nor the love of power in others, which protracted the
convocation of the Cortes, so much as their reverential adherence to
established forms. This was evident in Jovellanos himself, who regarded
it as equally profane and dangerous to approach this political ark of
the covenant, without scrupulously observing all the ceremonies and
solemnities which the law prescribed. Precedents on points of this
kind are not to be found in Spain as they are in England. Antiquaries
were to be consulted, archives examined, old regulations adapted to
new circumstances,--and this when the enemy was at the gates. The
defect may well be pardoned, because of the virtues with which it
was connected. Had the Spaniards regarded with less veneration the
deeds and the institutions of their ancestors, they would never have
supported that struggle which will be the wonder of succeeding ages.
Their conduct toward the English army sprang from a worse fault;
from that pride which made them prone to impose upon others and upon
themselves a false opinion of their strength. It is the national
failing, for which they have ever been satirized, by their own writers
as well as by other nations. They will rather promise and disappoint,
than acknowledge their inability; of this, their history for the last
two centuries affords abundant examples; they had yet to learn, that
perfect sincerity is as much due to an ally as to a confessor. In
many cases the government was itself deceived; the same false point of
honour prevailing in every department, from the lowest to the highest,
it received and acted upon exaggerated statements and calculations; but
in others, it cannot be denied, that pride led to the last degree of
meanness, and that promises were held out to the English general, which
those who made them must have known it was impossible to perform.
Yet it must be admitted that the errors of the Junta were more
attributable to the character of the nation than of the individuals;
and those individuals were placed in circumstances of unexampled
difficulty. Four-and-thirty men, most of them strangers to each other,
and unaccustomed to public business, were brought together to govern a
nation in the most perilous crisis of its history, without any thing to
direct them except their own judgement, and almost without any other
means than what the patriotism of the people could supply. They had
troops indeed, but undisciplined, unofficered, unprovided, half armed,
and half clothed. The old system of government was broken up, the new
one was yet to be formed. They had neither commissariat nor treasury;
the first donations and imposts were exhausted; so also were the
supplies which England had liberally given, and those from America had
not yet arrived. Added to these difficulties, and worse than all, was
that dreadful state of moral and social anarchy into which the nation
had been thrown, and which was such that no man knew in whom he could
confide. To poison food or water in time of war is a practice which
all people, who are not absolute savages, have pronounced infamous by
common consent; but it is a light crime compared to the means which
Buonaparte employed for the subjugation of Spain,--means which poisoned
the well-springs of social order, and loosened the very joints and
fibres of society. Morla, when he betrayed his country, committed an
act of treason against human nature. The evil had been great before,
but when a Judas Iscariot had been found in Morla during the agony of
Spain, in whom could the people confide? “Suspicion,” says Jovellanos,
“and hatred were conceived and spread with frightful facility. How many
generals, nobles, prelates, magistrates, and lawyers, were regarded
with distrust, either because of their old relations with Godoy, or
because they were connected with some of the new partizans of the
tyranny; or for the weakness, or indecision, or ambiguity of their
conduct; or for the calumnies and insinuations which rivalship and envy
excited against them! It was considered as a crime to have gone to
Bayonne, to have remained at Madrid, or resided in other places which
were occupied by the intrusive government; to have submitted to swear
allegiance to it, to have obeyed its orders, or to have suffered even
compulsively its yoke and its contempt. What reputation was secure?
Who was not exposed to the attacks of envy, to the imputations of
calumny, and to the violence of an agitated populace?”
From this state of things it necessarily arose, that the Junta acted in
constant fear and suspicion of those whom they employed. Their sense
of weakness and their love of power increased the evil. Fearing the
high spirit of Alburquerque, and the influence which rank and talents
conjoined would give to his deserved popularity among the soldiers,
they cramped him in a subordinate command, while they trusted those
armies which were the hope of Spain to Cuesta, because they were afraid
of offending him, and to Venegas, for the opposite reason, that they
were sure of his obsequious submission. Some odium they incurred by
permitting a trade with towns which the enemy occupied. For the sake,
as was alleged, of those Spaniards who were compelled to live under
the yoke, and also for the advantage of the colonies, they had granted
licences for conveying sugar, cacao, and bark, to those parts of the
kingdom. ♦JULY 14.♦ These licences were only to be trusted to persons
of known and approved patriotism, who were likewise to be strictly
watched, and liable to be searched upon any suspicion. The weakness of
such a concession in such a war, as well as the obvious facility which
it afforded to the French and their traitorous partizans, excited just
reprehension; and at the close of the year ♦DEC. 28.♦ the Junta found
it necessary to revoke their edict, acknowledging that, in spite of all
precautions, it was found prejudicial to the public safety. Some of the
members were suspected of enhancing the price of necessaries for the
army, by their own secret monopolies; others were said to be surrounded
by venal instruments, through whom alone they were accessible. These
imputations were probably ill-founded or exaggerated; certain, however,
it is, that never had any government fewer friends. Men of the most
opposite principles were equally disaffected toward it. Its very
defenders had no confidence in its stability, and were ready to forsake
it. They who dreaded any diminution of the regal authority, could not
forgive its popular origin; they who aspired to lay the foundation
of a new and happier order of things, were discontented, because the
measures which were taken towards the reformation of the state were
slowly, and, as they deemed, reluctantly adopted. Those wretches who
were sold to France were the enemies of any government which resisted
the usurpation; and those whose timid natures, or short-sighted
selfishness, disposed them to submission, naturally regarded it with
dislike, because it delayed the subjection of the country. Among the
people, who were actuated by none of these feelings, it was sufficient
to render the Junta unpopular that it was unfortunate. The times
rendered them suspicious; their own conduct and their power made them
obnoxious to many; and their ill-fortune, more than their errors, made
them disliked by all.
♦SCHEME FOR OVERTHROWING THEM.♦
Influenced by some of these motives, and perhaps in no little degree
by jealousy, the Junta of Seville were particularly hostile to the
government, and a plan was formed in that city for overthrowing it: the
members were to be seized, and some of the most obnoxious transported
to Manilla in a ship which was prepared for the purpose. Some regiments
had been gained over, and it is said even the guards of the Junta;
but as the persons who designed this revolution had for their direct
object the good of Spain, they considered it a mark of confidence due
to Great Britain to make the English ambassador acquainted with their
purpose; for in fact, so far were the Spanish people from regarding
the interference of Great Britain with jealousy, that they were
disappointed because their ally did not interfere more frequently, and
with more effect. Marquis Wellesley, of whom it had been said by Mr.
Whitbread that he would, if opportunity should offer, take Spain and
Portugal as Buonaparte had done, had now an opportunity of showing in
what manner he thought himself bound to act by a government which he
knew to be weak, and suspected to be treacherous. At the very time when
this foul imputation was brought against him in parliament, he gave to
that government just so much information of its danger, as, without
compromising the safety of any persons concerned, enabled the Junta to
prevent the intended insurrection.
The general wish was less for the convocation of the Cortes, than for
the establishment of a regency, from which more unanimity and more
vigour was expected, than from the present divided council. The people
of Cadiz said the fate of Spain was in Marquis Wellesley’s hands, that
he ought to remove the Junta, and establish an energetic government.
Those persons who respected hereditary claims would have had the
Archbishop of Toledo appointed regent, as being the only Bourbon in
the country; but he was young; and what weighed against him more than
the want of either talents or character, was, that he was believed to
be governed by his sister, the wife of Godoy. Others looked to Romana,
knowing his dislike to the Junta, and hoping that he would assume the
government himself, or intrust it to able hands. Another project was
to appoint both these personages regents, with the Duke del Infantado,
and two other colleagues. It was thought that the army would gladly
have seen the supreme authority vested in one of their own body, either
Romana or Infantado. But both these noblemen were free from any such
ambition; and Montijo, who was always intriguing for power, was so well
known, that he was the last person whom any party would have trusted.
♦COMMISSION APPOINTED BY THE JUNTA.♦
The warning which had thus been given was not lost upon the Junta, and
they attended to the representations which accompanied it; they knew
their weakness, and perceived their danger; admitted that the existing
government was not suited to the state of affairs, and nominated a
commission for the purpose of inquiring in what manner it might best be
replaced. Romana was included in the commission, and upon this occasion
he delivered in a paper, which, if they had required additional proof
of his hostility, and their own unstable tenure, would amply have
♦ROMANA’S ADDRESS. OCT. 4.♦ afforded it. “There were three cases,”
he said, “either of which ought to produce a change in the system
of a government: When a nation, which ought only to obey, doubts
the legitimacy of the authority to which it is to submit; when such
authority begins to lose its influence; when it is not only prejudicial
to the public weal, but contrary to the principles of the constitution.
The existing government was objectionable upon all these grounds: it
was founded upon a democratic principle of representation, inconsistent
with the pure monarchical system of Spain, and with the heroic loyalty
of the Spaniards, and which, if it continued, would subvert the
monarchy. As often as he meditated upon this subject, he doubted the
lawfulness of the existing government; and this opinion was general in
the provinces through which he had passed. Among the services which he
had endeavoured to perform for his king and country, it was not the
least that he had yielded obedience to the orders of this government,
and made the constituted authorities in Leon, Asturias, and Gallicia
do the same; considering this absolutely necessary to preserve the
nation from anarchy. A government, though illegal, might secure the
happiness of the people, if it deserved their confidence, and they
respected its authority; but the existing government had lost its
authority. The people, who judge of measures by the effects which they
see produced, complain that our armies are weak for want of energy in
the government; that no care has been taken for supplying them; that
they have not seen the promised accounts of the public expenditure,
and how the sums which have arrived from America, those which our
generous allies have given, the rents of the crown, and the voluntary
contributions, have been expended: they look in vain for necessary
reforms; they see that employments are not given to men of true
merit, and true lovers of their country; that some members, instead
of manifesting their desire of the public good, by disinterestedness,
seek to preserve their authority for their own advantage; that others
confer lucrative and honourable employments on their own dependents
and countrymen; that for this sole reason ecclesiastical offices have
been filled up, the rents of which ought to have been applied to the
necessities of the state; that that unity which is necessary in the
government, is not to be found, many of the Junta caring only for the
interests of their particular provinces, as if they were members of
some body different from that of the Spanish monarchy; that they had
not only confirmed the military appointments made by the provincial
Juntas, without examining the merits of the persons appointed, but had
even assigned recompences to many who were destitute of all military
knowledge, having never seen service, nor performed any of those duties
which were confided to them; that the Junta, divided into sections,
dispatched business in matters altogether foreign to their profession,
and in which they were utterly unversed, instead of referring them to
the competent and appropriate ministers; that horses taken from their
owners, instead of being sent to the armies, were dying for hunger on
the dry sea-marshes; finally, that many of the most important branches
of administration were in the hands of men, suspicious, because of
their conduct from the commencement of the public misfortunes, and
because they were the creatures of that infamous favourite, who had
been the author of all the general misery. Such,” said Romana, “are the
complaints of the people: there is but one step to disobedience; the
enemy will profit by the first convulsion, and anarchy or servitude
will then be the alternative.”
The Marquis then stated, that the time for which some provinces had
appointed their representatives to the Junta was expired; that others
had empowered them not to exercise the sovereign authority, but to
constitute a government which might represent the monarch: in neither
case could these provinces be expected to acknowledge an authority
which they had never conferred. The commission, he proceeded to say,
had proposed that the Junta should reduce itself to five persons,
in whom the executive power should be vested; and that in rotation
each member of the existing body should enter into this supreme
executive council, which should also preside over the Cortes when it
was assembled. This project discovered the love of power in the Junta
more unequivocally than any other part of their conduct. What Romana
proposed in its stead was as prudent in itself as it was inconsistent
with his previous positions. After maintaining that the powers of the
existing government were from the first illegal, and that even such as
they were, they had, for part of the members, expired, he recommended
nevertheless that this government should, as representing legitimately
or illegitimately the Cortes, appoint a regent, or a council of
regency, consisting of three or of five persons, especially advising,
as a proof of generosity and patriotism, that they should nominate
none of their own body. A Junta should be formed, under the title of
the Permanent Deputation of the Realm, to represent the Cortes till
the Cortes should be assembled; it should consist of five members
and a procurador-general, and one of these members should always be
chosen from their American brethren, as forming an integral part of
the nation. But the Cortes should be assembled with as little delay
as circumstances would permit, and then no laws should be passed, or
contributions imposed, without its consent. “If,” said he, “I have in
some cases connected the supreme power with the nation, I have done no
more than revive the constitutional principles of the Spanish monarchy,
which have been stifled by the despotism of its kings and their
ministers.” However hostile to the principles of civil liberty the
first positions of Romana appeared, the most zealous friends of freedom
might have been contented with his conclusions.
“Ought we,” said he, “to fear that an adventurer, who usurps the
throne of Ferdinand, should appear among us, if we had a government
like this, emanating from the consent of the people, from submission
to the true God, and from the necessity of our mournful and perilous
situation? Would our armies then be defective in numbers, and in
subordination and discipline? would they be so filled with ignorant
and cowardly officers, so unprovided with food, so irregularly paid,
and so destitute of all equipments? would men be appointed generals,
because they would support the persons who appointed them, or because
they knew how to command an army and how to save the country? With
such a government, the nation would have invincible armies, the armies
would have generals, the troops would be officered, and the soldiers
would learn subordination and discipline. When Spain shall see that
auspicious day, I shall think it the first day of her hope, and the
most happy of her glorious revolution. Such,” he continued, “is my
opinion; but I ought not to forget that I have publicly controverted it
by my actions. For who sustained your sovereign authority in the army
and province which I governed? Gallicia, whom didst thou obey? Didst
thou respect in me any power but that of the Central Junta, or did I
consent that thou shouldst separate thyself from a government which I
was sanctioning by my own obedience? Asturias, didst not thou see the
powerful arm upraised which thou hadst implored so earnestly, and the
blow of its power fall upon a Junta, which, after having acknowledged
the sovereignty of the Central, and received from it succours, of
which my soldiers, naked and exhausted, were in want, domineered like
a despot, and had even disobeyed the express will of our King, D.
Ferdinand? Nevertheless,” said he, addressing the Central Junta, “you
rewarded this scandalous disobedience; and removed me covertly from
the command, in order that guilty Spaniards might be honoured with
the greater distinction. My opinions were the same then that they are
now; but circumstances imperiously required a government, and any
government is better than none. Then it was my duty to obey; now I
should not perform what is due to my character, if I did not declare
what I believe to be required for the salvation of my country. How
indeed should I be silent; how should I suffer the fire of patriotism
to be extinguished, seeing the sacrifice of so many victims in our
glorious cause; faithful wives murdered with their daughters, after the
most foul and unutterable outrages; nuns driven from their cloisters,
some wandering about, many more the prey of lustful impiety; ministers
of the altar forced from the sanctuary; temples turned into stables
and dens of uncleanness; towns reduced to servitude; opulence to
squalid beggary; armies composed of the bravest spirits of the nation,
which have disappeared in the hottest struggles of their native land,
consumed by hunger, naked, and destitute; seeing, in fine, that such
revenues and the liberal donations of Spain and America have not even
supplied the first necessities of the soldier? How could I remain a
tranquil spectator of such great and mournful objects, and not think
them superior to the nearest personal interest, to our self-love, and
to our very existence? As a Spaniard,” he concluded, “I am ready to
suffer a thousand deaths in defence of our liberty; and in my rank I
have rendered homage to the descendant of the Pelayos, the Jaymes, and
the Garcias. As a general, I will join myself to the last soldier who
shall have resolution to revenge his country in the last period of her
independence; but as a representative of the nation, I must be excused
from occupying that distinguished place, unless a legitimate government
be immediately established, which foreign powers will not hesitate to
acknowledge, which will represent our sovereign, and which will save a
people who are resolved to die for their God, for their king, and for
the happiness of their posterity.”
♦REPLY OF THE JUNTA.♦
It is proof of full political freedom in the Spanish press at this
juncture, that this paper should have appeared, being little short of
a declaration of hostility against the existing government. But though
the high monarchical principles with which Romana began his manifesto
displeased the democratic party, and the glaring inconsistency of
his proposal weakened the effect which his authority might otherwise
have produced, the government felt the necessity of doing something
to conciliate the nation; they determined to convoke the Cortes,
and announced the resolution in a paper which may be considered as
their official apology. In this paper, without directly referring to
Romana’s ♦OCT. 28.♦ charges, they replied to them. “Spaniards,” said
they, “it has seemed good to Providence that in this terrible crisis
you should not be able to advance one step towards independence,
without advancing one likewise toward liberty. An imbecile and decrepit
despotism prepared the way for French tyranny. Political impostors
then thought to deceive you by promising reforms, and announcing, in
a constitution framed at their pleasure, the empire of the laws, ...
a barbarous contradiction, worthy of their insolence. But the Spanish
people, that people which before any other enjoyed the prerogatives
and advantages of civil liberty, and opposed to arbitrary power the
barrier which justice has appointed, need borrow from no other nation
the maxims of political prudence, and told these impudent legislators,
that the artifices of intriguers and the mandates of tyrants are not
laws for them. You ran to arms; and fortune rendered homage to you, and
bestowed victory in reward for your ardour. The immediate effect was
the reunion of the state, which was at that time divided into as many
factions as provinces. Our enemies thought they had sown among us the
deadly seed of anarchy, and did not remember that Spanish judgement
and circumspection are always superior to French intrigue. A supreme
authority was established without contradiction and without violence;
and the people, after having astonished the world with the spectacle of
their sublime exaltation and their victories, filled it with admiration
and respect by their moderation and discretion.
“The Central Junta was installed, and its first care was to announce,
that if the expulsion of the enemy was the first object of its
attention in point of time, the permanent welfare of the state was
the principal in importance; for to leave it sunk in the sea of old
abuses, would be a crime as enormous as to deliver you into the hands
of Buonaparte; therefore, as soon as the whirlwind of war permitted, it
resounded in your ears the name of the Cortes, which has ever been the
bulwark of civil freedom; a name heretofore pronounced with mystery
by the learned, with distrust by politicians, and with horror by
tyrants; but which henceforth in Spain will be the indestructible basis
of the monarchy, the most secure support of the rights of Ferdinand
and his family, a right for the people, and an obligation for the
government. That moral resistance, which has reduced our enemies to
confusion and despair in the midst of their victories, must not receive
a less reward. Those battles which are lost, those armies which are
destroyed; those soldiers who, dispersed in one action, return to offer
themselves for another; that populace which, despoiled of almost all
they possessed, returned to their homes to share the wretched remains
of their property with the defenders of their country; that struggle of
barbarity on the one hand, and of invincible constancy on the other,
present a whole as terrible as magnificent, which Europe contemplates
with astonishment, and which history will one day record, for the
admiration and example of posterity. A people so generous ought only to
be governed by laws which bear the great character of public consent
and common utility, ... a character which they can only receive by
emanating from the august assembly which has been announced to you.”
The Junta now betrayed that undue desire of retaining their power,
which, though not their only error, was the only one which proceeded
from selfish considerations. “It had been recommended,” they said,
“that the existing government should be converted into a regency
of three or of five persons, and this opinion was supported by
the application of an ancient law to our present situation; but a
political position which is entirely new, occasions political forms and
principles absolutely new also. To expel the French, to restore to his
liberty and his throne our adored King, and to establish a solid and
permanent foundation of good government, are the maxims which gave the
impulse to our revolution, are those which support and direct it; and
that government will be the best which shall best promote these wishes
of the Spanish nation. Does a regency promise this security? What
inconveniences, what dangers, how many divisions, how many parties, how
many ambitious pretensions within and without the kingdom; how much,
and how just, discontent in our Americas, now called to have a share in
the present government! What would become of our Cortes, our liberty,
the cheering prospects of future welfare and glory which present
themselves? What would become of the object most valuable and dear to
the Spanish nation ... the rights of Ferdinand? The advocates for this
institution ought to shudder at the danger to which they expose them,
and to bear in mind that they afford to the tyrant a new opportunity
of buying and selling them. Let us bow with reverence to the venerable
antiquity of the law; but let us profit by the experience of ages. Let
us open our annals and trace the history of our regencies. What shall
we find? ... a picture of desolation, of civil war, of rapine, and of
human degradation, in unfortunate Castille.”
The weakness of this reasoning proved how the love of power had blinded
those from whom it proceeded. The Junta wished to evade the law of the
Partidas, because it did not specify a case which it could not possibly
have contemplated, though the law itself was perfectly and directly
relevant. They assumed it as a certain consequence of a regency,
that the colonies would be disgusted; that the Cortes would not be
convoked; that the rights of Ferdinand would be disregarded; and that
new opportunities of corruption would be afforded to France; and they
forgot to ask themselves what reason there could be for apprehending
all or any of these dangers, more from a council of regency than from
their own body. Romana’s manifesto contained nothing more flagrantly
illogical than this. Having thus endeavoured to set aside this project
by alarming the nation, they admitted that the executive power ought
to be lodged in fewer hands, and said, that with that circumspection,
which neither exposed the state to the oscillations consequent upon
every change of government, nor sensibly altered the unity of the body
which it was intrusted with, they had concentrated their own authority;
and that from this time those measures which required dispatch,
secrecy, and energy, would be directed by a section formed of six
members, holding their office for a time.
The remainder of the manifesto was in a worthier strain. “Another
opinion,” they said, “which objected to a regency, objected also to
the Cortes as an insufficient representation, if convoked according to
the ancient forms; as ill-timed, and perhaps perilous in the existing
circumstances; and in fine as useless, because the provincial Juntas,
which had been immediately erected by the people, were their true
representatives; but as the government had already publicly declared
that it would adapt the Cortes, in its numbers, forms, and classes, to
the present state of things, any objection drawn from the inadequacy
of the ancient forms was malicious, as well as inapplicable. Yes,
Spaniards,” said they, “you are about to have your Cortes, and the
national representation will be as perfect and full as it can and
ought to be, in an assembly of such importance and eminent dignity.
You are about to have your Cortes; and at what time, gracious God! can
the nation adopt this measure better than at present? When war has
exhausted all the ordinary means, when the selfishness of some, and the
ambition of others, debilitate and paralyse the efforts of government;
when they seek to destroy from its foundations the essential principle
of the monarchy, which is union; when the hydra of federalism, so
happily silenced the preceding year by the creation of the central
power, dares again to raise its heads, and endeavour to precipitate
us into anarchy; when the subtlety of our enemies is watching the
moment of our divisions to destroy the state; this is the time, then,
to collect in one point the national dignity and power, where the
Spanish people may vote and call forth the extraordinary resources
which a powerful nation ever has within it for its salvation. That
alone can put them in motion; that alone can encourage the timidity
of some, and restrain the ambition of others; that alone can suppress
importunate vanity, puerile pretensions, and infuriated passions.
Spain will, in fine, give to Europe a fresh example of its religion,
its circumspection, and its discretion, in the just and moderate use
which it is about to make of the liberty in which it is constituted.
Thus it is that the supreme Junta, which immediately recognized this
national representation as a right, and proclaimed it as a reward, now
invokes and implores it as the most necessary and efficacious remedy;
and has therefore resolved that the general Cortes shall be convoked on
the first day of January in the next year, in order to enter on their
august functions the first of March following. When that happy day has
arrived, the Junta will say to the representatives of the nation,
“‘Ye are met together, O fathers of your country! and re-established in
all the plenitude of your rights, after a lapse of three centuries.
Called to the exercise of authority by the unanimous voice of the
kingdom, the individuals of the supreme Junta have shewn themselves
worthy of the confidence reposed in them, by employing all their
exertions for the preservation of the state. When the power was placed
in our hands, our armies, half formed, were destitute; our treasury
was empty, and our resources uncertain and distant. We have maintained
in the free provinces unity, order, and justice; and in those occupied
by the enemy, we have exerted our endeavours to preserve patriotism
and loyalty. We have vindicated the national honour and independence
in the most complicated and difficult diplomatic negotiations; and we
have made head against adversity, ever trusting that we should overcome
it by constancy. We have, without doubt, committed errors, and would
willingly, were it possible, redeem them with our blood; but in the
confusion of events, among the difficulties which surrounded us, who
could be certain of always being in the right? Could we be responsible,
because one body of troops wanted valour and another confidence;
because one general had less prudence and another less good fortune?
Much Spaniards, is to be attributed to your inexperience, much to
circumstances, but nothing to our intention; that ever has been to
deliver our King, to preserve to him a throne for which the people has
made such sacrifices, and to maintain it free, independent, and happy.
We have decreed the abolition of arbitrary power from the time we
announced the re-establishment of our Cortes. Such is, O Spaniards! the
use we have made of the unlimited authority confided to us; and when
your wisdom shall have established the basis and form of government
most proper for the independence and good of the state, we will resign
it into the hands you shall point out, contented with the glory of
having given to the Spaniards the dignity of a nation legitimately
constituted.’”
♦GUERILLAS.♦
Had the nation been more alive to such hopes as were thus held out,
the pressure of events and the presence of imminent danger would have
distracted their thoughts from all speculative subjects. Frustrated as
their expectations of immediate deliverance had been, their confidence
was not shaken; the national temper led them to think lightly of every
disaster, but to exaggerate every trifling success; and the defeats
at Arzobispo and Almonacid were less felt or thought of by the body
of the people, than the successful exploits of those predatory bands,
who, under the name of Guerillas, were now in action every where.
The government partook of this disposition; and it must be ascribed
as much to this as to policy, that the official as well as the
provincial journals published every adventure of this kind more fully
and circumstantially than some of those actions wherein their armies
had disappeared. The example which Mina and the Empecinado had set
was followed with alacrity and tempting success, rich opportunities
being offered by the requisition of plate from churches and from
individuals, which the intrusive government was at this time enforcing.
The guerillas were on the watch, and intercepted no trifling share
of the spoils. One party surprised a convoy with eighty _quintals_
of silver near Segovia. The French, who found themselves sorely
annoyed by this species of warfare, though they were as yet far from
apprehending all they should suffer by it, endeavoured to raise a
counter-force of the same kind in Navarre, under the name of Miquelets.
But that appellation, which was so popular among the Spaniards, had no
attraction for them when it was pressed into the usurper’s service,
and the scheme only evinced the incapacity of those who projected it,
for the guerillas depended for information, shelter, every thing which
could contribute either to their success or their safety, upon the good
will of their countrymen; who then would engage in an opposite service,
with the certainty that every Spaniard would regard him as an enemy and
traitor, and as such endeavour secretly or openly to bring about his
destruction?
♦D. JULIAN SANCHEZ.♦
Among the persons who became most eminent for their exploits in
this desultory warfare, D. Julian Sanchez began at this time to be
distinguished. He raised a company of lancers in ♦1809. OCTOBER.♦ the
district of Ciudad Rodrigo, and acted with such effect against the
enemy in the plains of Castille, that General Marchand, who commanded
the sixth corps at Salamanca, threatened to execute the vengeance which
the guerillas at once eluded and defied, upon those whom he suspected
of favouring them. Specifying, therefore, eight of the principal
sheep-owners in that part of the country, he declared that they should
be kept under a military guard in their own houses, and the severest
measures be enforced against their persons and property, if the bands
of robbers, as he called them, did not totally disappear within eight
days after the date of his proclamation. He declared also that the
priests, _alcaldes_, lawyers, and surgeons of every village, should
be responsible with their lives for any disorders committed by the
guerillas within their respective parishes; adding, that every village
and every house which the inhabitants might abandon on the approach of
the French should be burnt. This served only to call forth an indignant
reply from Sanchez, containing some of those incontrovertible truths
which made the better part of the French themselves detest the service
in which they were employed.
Ney’s corps was at this time in Salamanca, under General Marchand,
occupying also Ledesma and Alba de Tormes. Soult’s head-quarters were
at Plasencia; he occupied Coria, Galesteo, and the banks of the Tietar
and the Tagus, as far as the Puente del Arzobispo; Mortier’s corps was
at Talavera, Oropesa, La Calzada de Oropesa, and Naval Moral; Victor’s
advanced posts were at Daymiel, his head-quarters at Toledo; Sebastiani
was at Fuenlebrada, and his corps extended from Aranjuez to Alcala. On
the side of La Mancha or Extremadura, they could not hope to open a way
to Seville, unless the government by an act of suicidal madness should
encounter the certain consequences ♦THE FRENCH REPULSED FROM ASTORGA.♦
of a general action. Remaining, therefore, on the defensive here, they
prepared for offensive operations on the side of Salamanca, with a view
to the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, and a third invasion of Portugal. Sir
Robert Wilson’s representations respecting the importance of that point
had not been neglected by the government; the force which the Duque del
Parque commanded there was now respectable in numbers, and had acquired
some experience as well as confidence in that desultory warfare
which Sir Robert had begun, and which D. Julian Sanchez had so well
continued. Preparatory to their movements on this quarter, the French
attempted to carry Astorga by a sudden attack, for which purpose, with
a force of 2600 men, they advanced from the Ezla, and endeavoured to
force the Bishop’s Gate. D. Jose Maria de Santocildes, who commanded
there, was neither wanting in principle nor in ♦OCT. 9.♦ conduct. His
measures for defence were well taken and well executed, and after a
four hours’ action, the enemy retreated with the loss of more than 200
men.
♦BATTLE OF TAMAMES. OCT. 18.♦
A movement of more importance was presently undertaken against the
Duque del Parque, who had taken a strong position on the heights near
Tamames. Marchand commanded the French corps, consisting of 10,000
foot, 1200 horse, with fourteen pieces of cannon; and nothing but
his contempt of the enemy could have induced him to attack them in
such a post. He came on in full confidence, forming his columns with
ostentatious display, as if to exhibit the perfect facility with which
their evolutions were made. As it was soon apparent that the main
attack would be upon the left, being the weakest part of the position,
the Duke ordered Count de Belveder, with half the reserve, to support
this point. Carrera, who commanded the left wing, stood the attack
well; a small party of cavalry, still further to the left, were posted
in a wood, from whence it was intended that they should issue, and
charge the flank of the enemy; but Carrera’s second brigade making
a movement for the purpose of allowing their artillery to play, the
French horse charged them at full speed before they were well formed,
broke in upon them, and cut down the Spaniards at their guns: ... for a
moment the day seemed lost. The Duke, with his staff, came up in time
to the place of danger. Mendizabal, who was second in command, sprang
from his horse, and rallied those who were falling back; the young
Principe de Anglona distinguished himself in the same manner; and
Carrera, whose horse had received two musket-balls, and one wound with
a sabre, put himself at the head of his men, charged the French with
the bayonet, routed them and recovered the guns. Meantime an attack
was made upon the right and centre; but here the Spaniards were more
strongly posted, and D. Francisco de Losada, who commanded in that
part, repulsed them. They retreated in great disorder, leaving more
than 1100 on the field; their wounded were not less than 2000.
♦THE FRENCH RETIRE FROM SALAMANCA. OCT. 21.♦
On the third day after the battle, the Duke moved forward, hoping to
surprise the enemy in Salamanca. He crossed at Ledesma on the 23d, and
marched all the night of the 24th; at daybreak he reached the heights
which command Salamanca to the northward, but the French had retreated
during the night to Toro, carrying with them the church plate and all
their other plunder. They had remained five days in hope of receiving
a reinforcement from Kellermann, who, with a weak corps, occupied the
country between Segovia and Burgos; but seeing no succour approach, the
loss which they had sustained rendered it necessary for them to retire
with all speed, upon the unexpected intelligence that the Spaniards
were within three leagues of the city.
♦MARSHAL SOULT APPOINTED MAJOR GENERAL.♦
The people of Salamanca did not long enjoy their deliverance. While
Kellermann was reinforced with one brigade, another from Dessoles’
division was directed toward that city, preparatory to more important
movements; activity having now been given to the French armies, and
union, which had long been wanted, by the appointment of Marshal Soult
to the rank of Major-General in place of Marshal Jourdan, who was
recalled to Paris. This change was highly acceptable to the troops
in general, though there prevailed a feeling of personal ill-will
toward Soult on the part of some of his fellow marshals which had
not existed toward his predecessor; but more confidence was reposed
in him, the reputation which Jourdan had obtained in the days of
the National Convention not having been supported by his subsequent
fortune. The Duque del Parque, perceiving that more serious operations
were likely to be directed against him, urged the government to act
on the offensive in La Mancha, as a means ♦THE JUNTA RESOLVE ON
RISKING A GENERAL ACTION.♦ of averting the danger from himself; and
the Junta needed little encouragement at this time for measures of the
most desperate temerity. The ablest members of that body partook so
strongly of the national temper, that they were wholly incapacitated
for understanding the real state either of their own armies, or of the
allies, or of their enemies. Their infatuation might seem incredible,
if it were not proved both by their conduct and by documents which they
themselves laid before the nation, stating upon what grounds they had
acted. They had persuaded themselves that if Sir Arthur, after Cuesta
rejoined him, had given battle to Soult, according to his original
intention, the destruction of Soult’s army would have been easy and
certain, the annihilation of Victor’s army easy ♦EXPOSICION DE LA
JUNTA CENTRAL. RAMO DIPLOMATICO, P. 27.♦ as a consequent measure, the
recovery of Madrid easy, and the expulsion of the French as far as
the Ebro, or even to the Pyrenees. By some fatality, they said, the
British General had chosen that line of conduct which was precisely the
most prejudicial to the Spanish cause. By some stranger fatality they
themselves persisted in believing that the British army had been at
all times amply supplied with means of subsistence and of transport,
that it was at any time capable of advancing, and (as if themselves
incapable of understanding that the British Commander and the British
Ambassador meant what they said in their repeated representations)
that it would advance if the Spaniards evinced the determination and
the ability to act without them. And with this persuasion they deluded
their General as well as themselves.
♦AREIZAGA APPOINTED TO THE COMMAND.♦
Rash as he was, even Cuesta would hardly have been so deluded. Upon his
resignation Eguia had only held the command while the government could
look about for a successor. Castaños was under a cloud; the inquiry
which he demanded had never been granted, and though public opinion was
beginning to regard him as his past services and real worth deserved,
there was no thought of again employing him. Alburquerque was an
object of jealousy; Romana of dislike and fear. Areizaga therefore,
who had been highly commended by Blake for his conduct in the battle
of Alcañiz, was removed from the command at Lerida to be placed at
the head of 50,000 men. Alburquerque, who had from 9000 to 10,000
in Extremadura, was ordered to join Parque, and place himself under
his orders; while Areizaga, with the greatest force that they could
collect, was instructed ♦STATE OF MADRID.♦ to advance upon Madrid.
What they knew concerning the state of that city might well excite
their feelings, and raise in them a strong desire of delivering its
inhabitants from their bondage; but there was nothing to encourage
the extravagant hopes which they entertained. The national feeling
existed nowhere in greater strength, though there was no other place
wherein so many traitors were collected; all who in other parts of the
country had made themselves conspicuous as partizans of Joseph, having
fled thither when they could not abide in safety elsewhere. To leave
the capital was an enterprise of the utmost danger for those who were
willing to sacrifice every thing, and take their chance in the field
against the invaders: any one might enter; but in the course of a few
hours it was known who the stranger was, whence he came, where he was
harboured, what was his business, and who were his connexions, ...
every thing which the most vigilant police, and the most active system
of espionage could discover. The tradesmen and those whose means
of subsistence were not destroyed by the revolution were oppressed
by heavy and frequent exactions; the Intruder’s ministers knew the
impolicy of this, but nevertheless were compelled to impose these
burdens; and after the atrocities which they had sanctioned, they
could suffer nothing more either in character or in peace of mind.
Otherwise, even in Madrid, where a strong military force kept every
thing in order, and where none of the immediate evils of war were felt,
there were sights which might have wrung the heart. Men and women, who
had been born and bred in opulence, begged in the streets, as soon as
evening had closed, ... the feelings of better times preventing them
from exposing their misery in the daylight. But what most wounded
the Spanish temper was the condition of their clergy, and monks, and
friars, who, suffering as it were as confessors under the intrusive
government, worked as daily labourers for their support, employing
in hard and coarse labour hands which, the Spaniards said, were
consecrated by the use of holy oil, and by contact with the Body of our
Lord!
Overlooking all impediments in the way of their desires, the Junta
calculated so surely upon delivering the capital, that they fixed upon
a captain-general, a governor, and a corregidor, who were to enter upon
their functions as soon ♦JOVELLANOS, § 103.♦ as it should be recovered;
and they charged Jovellanos and Riquelme to draw up provisional ♦1809.
NOVEMBER.♦ regulations for securing tranquillity there when the enemy
should withdraw. This confidence arose from a national character which
repeated disasters could neither subdue nor correct. The rashness with
which they determined to bring on a general action, at whatever risk,
appeared to them a prudent resolution. Now that the continental war was
terminated, and Buonaparte had no other employment for his armies, it
was certain that more troops than had been withdrawn from Spain would
be marched into it, for the purpose of effecting its subjugation; they
thought it therefore the best and surest policy to make a great effort
before the numbers of the enemy should be thus formidably increased.
Former failures had neither disheartened nor instructed them; and they
furthered the equipment of the army with a zeal which, if it had been
excited two months before in providing for their allies, might have
realized the hopes wherein they now indulged.
♦CONDITION OF THE BRITISH ARMY.♦
The new commander partook the blind confidence of his government.
In some degree he appears to have been deceived by them; for he was
neither informed of Lord Wellington’s determination not to advance, nor
of the condition of the British army, which was such at that time as
to render an advance impossible. From causes which physiologists have
not yet been able to ascertain, the country where they were quartered,
upon the Guadiana, is peculiarly unhealthy during the dry season, when
that river ceases to be a stream, and, like its feeders, is reduced
to a succession of detached pools in the deeper parts of its course.
The troops suffered so much more than the natives, partly because the
disease laid stronger hold on constitutions which were not accustomed
to it, and partly from the peculiar liableness of men, when congregated
in camps, to receive and communicate endemic maladies, that more than a
third of their whole number were on the sick list; and the inhabitants
of the country, aware as they were that this plague belonged to it,
ascribed its greater prevalence and malignity among the strangers to
their having eaten mushrooms, holding the whole tribe themselves in
abhorrence, and not thinking the ordinary causes of the disease could
account for the effects which they witnessed. Areizaga was ignorant of
all this, and the government allowed him to advance with an expectation
that the British army was to follow and support him.
♦DISPOSITION OF THE FRENCH TROOPS.♦
Knowing the condition of that army, it seems almost incredible that
the Junta could have deceived themselves when they thus deceived their
general. But unlikely as it was that they should have given orders for
a forward movement of such importance, without such co-operation, they
hoped perhaps to deceive the enemy, by reports that Lord Wellington
and Alburquerque would advance along the valley of the Tagus. The
French were never able to obtain good intelligence of the English
plans; they could, however, to a certain point, foresee them, as a
skilful chess-player apprehends the scheme of an opponent who is not
less expert than himself at the game; they had learnt to respect the
British army in the field, but they thought the British Commander was
more likely from caution to let pass an opportunity of success, than
to afford the enemy one by rashness. This opinion they had formed from
the events of the late campaign, being fully aware of the danger to
which they had been exposed, and unacquainted with the difficulties
which had frustrated Sir Arthur’s plans, ... difficulties indeed which
they who were accustomed always to take whatever was needful for their
armies either from friend or foe, without any other consideration
than that of supplying their own immediate wants, would have regarded
with astonishment, if not contempt. When Marshal Soult therefore
prepared at this time to act against the Spaniards, the English force
hardly entered into his calculations. He had 70,000 men available for
immediate service in one direction. One corps of these, under Laborde,
watched the Tagus, with an eye to Alburquerque’s movements. Victor
observed the roads from Andalusia to Toledo and Aranjuez, having his
cavalry in advance at Madrilejos and Consuegra; Sebastiani, with the
fourth corps, was in the rear of Victor, securing the capital, from
which neighbourhood a division had been sent to support Marchand after
his defeat at Tamames. The reserve, under Mortier, was at Talavera;
Gazan occupied Toledo with two weak regiments; and Joseph was with his
guards at Aranjuez, relying upon the fortune of Napoleon, and now, when
the Continent was effectually subdued, and reinforcements had already
begun to enter the Peninsula, believing himself in secure possession of
the crown of Spain.
♦AREIZAGA ADVANCES FROM THE SIERRA MORENA.♦
On the 3d of November, Areizaga’s army, consisting of 43,000 foot, 6600
cavalry, and sixty pieces of cannon, began their march from the foot
of the Sierra Morena into the plains, taking with them eight days’
provision. The advanced guard, of 2000 cavalry under Freire, were
one day’s march in front; the infantry followed in seven divisions,
then the rest of the cavalry in reserve, and the head-quarters last,
marching from twenty to thirty miles a day; they had no tents, and took
up their quarters at night in the towns upon the road. They advanced
forces by Daymiel on the left, others along the high road to Madrid,
by Valdepeñas and Manzanares. The French retired before them, and in
several skirmishes of cavalry the Spaniards were successful. Latour
Maubourg escaped with a considerable body of horse from Madrilejos by
the treachery of a deserter, who apprised him of his danger just in
time for him to get out of the town as the Spaniards entered it. They
continued their way through Tembleque to Dos Barrios; then, by a flank
march, reached S. Cruz de la Zarza; threw bridges across the Tagus,
and passed a division over. Here they took a position; the French
pushed their patroles of cavalry near the town, and Areizaga drew out
his army in order of battle. An action upon that ground did not suit
the enemy, and the Spanish general was frantic enough to determine upon
leaving the mountains, and giving them battle in the plain.
♦THE AUSTRIAN COMMISSIONER REMONSTRATES AGAINST HIS PURPOSE. NOV. 16.♦
Baron Crossand, who was employed in Spain on a mission from Austria,
was with the army, and, dreading the unavoidable consequences of such
a determination, presented a memorial to Areizaga, reminding him, that
only the preceding day he had admitted how dangerous it would be thus
to hazard the welfare of his country. None of the motives, he said,
which should induce a prudent general to risk a battle were applicable
in the present case; he had nothing to urge him forward, and the most
fertile provinces of Spain were in his rear: by meeting the enemy upon
their own ground, the advantage of position was voluntarily given them,
and the superiority of numbers which the Spaniards possessed was not
to be considered as an advantage, in their state of discipline; so far
indeed was it otherwise that the French founded part of their hopes
upon the disorder into which the Spaniards would fall in consequence
of their own multitude. A victory might procure the evacuation of
Madrid and of the two Castilles, but these results were light in the
balance when weighed against the consequences of defeat. The wisest
plan of operations was to entrench himself upon the strong ground which
the left bank of the Tagus afforded; from thence he might send out
detachments toward Madrid and in all directions, and act in concert
with the Dukes of Parque and Alburquerque, patience and caution
rendering certain their ultimate success.
♦BATTLE OF OCAÑA.♦
These representations were lost upon Areizaga; he marched back to Dos
Barrios, and then advanced upon Ocaña into the open country. About 800
French and Polish cavalry were in the town; they were driven out by the
Spanish horse; a skirmish ensued, in which four or five hundred men
fell on both sides. In this affair the French general Paris was borne
out of the saddle by a lancer, and laid dead on the field. He was an
old officer, whom the Spaniards represent as a humane and honourable
man, regretting that he should have perished in such a cause. Areizaga
bivouacqued that night; and the French, who had now collected the corps
of Sebastiani and Mortier, under command of the latter, crossed the
Tagus before morning. At daybreak Areizaga ascended the church tower of
Ocaña, and seeing the array and number of the enemy, it is said that
he perceived, when too late, what would be the result of his blind
temerity. He arrayed his army in two equal parts, one on each side the
town; and his second line was placed so near the first, that, if the
first were thrown into disorder, there was not room for it to rally.
Most of the cavalry were stationed in four lines upon the right flank,
a disposition neither imposing in appearance nor strong in reality. The
artillery was upon the two flanks.
About seven in the morning, Zayas, who had often distinguished himself,
attacked the French cavalry with the advanced guard, and drove them
back. Between eight and nine the cannonade began. The Spanish artillery
was well served; it dismounted two of the French guns, and blew up some
of their ammunition-carts. Mortier having reconnoitred the ground,
determined to make his chief attack upon the right, and, after having
cannonaded it for a while from a battery in his centre, he ordered
Leval, with the Polish and German troops, to advance, and turn a ravine
which extended from the town nearly to the end of this wing of the
Spanish army. Leval formed his line in compact columns; the Spaniards
met them along the whole of their right wing, and their first line
wavered. It was speedily reinforced; the right wing was broken, and a
charge of cavalry completed the confusion on this side. The left stood
firm, and cheered Areizaga as he passed; an able general might yet
have secured a retreat, but he was confounded, and quitted the field,
ordering this part of the army to follow him. Lord Macduff, who was
with the Spaniards, then requested the second in command to assume
the direction; but while he was exerting himself to the utmost, the
French cavalry broke through the centre, and the rout was complete.
The Spaniards were upon an immense plain, every where open to the
cavalry, by whom they were followed and cut down on all sides. Victor,
who crossed the Tagus at Villa Mensiger, pursued all night. All their
baggage was taken, almost all their artillery; according to the French
account, 4000 were killed, and 26,000 made prisoners: on no occasion
have the French had so little temptation to exaggerate. Their own loss
was about 1700.
This miserable defeat was the more mournful, because the troops that
day gave proof enough both of capacity and courage to show how surely,
under good discipline and good command, they might have retrieved the
military character of their country. No artillery could have been
better served. The first battalion of guards, which was 900 strong,
left upon the field fourteen officers, and half its men. Four hundred
and fifty of a Seville regiment, which had distinguished itself with
Wilson at Puerto de Baños, entered the action, and only eighty of
them were accounted for when the day was over. Miserably commanded as
the Spaniards were, there was a moment when the French, in attempting
to deploy, were thrown into disorder, by their well-supported fire,
and success was at that moment doubtful. The error of exposing the
army in such a situation must not be ascribed wholly to incapacity
in Areizaga, who had distinguished himself not less for conduct than
courage at Alcañiz; it was another manifestation of the national
character, of that obstinacy which no experience could correct, of that
spirit which no disasters could subdue.
♦TREATMENT OF THE PRISONERS.♦
There was none of that butchery in the pursuit by which the French
had disgraced themselves at Medellin. The intrusive government had at
that time acted with the cruelty which fear inspires; feeling itself
secure now, its object was to take prisoners, and force them into its
own service; and for this purpose a different sort of cruelty was
employed. While the Madrid Gazette proclaimed that the French soldiers
behaved with more than humanity to the captured Spaniards, that they
might gratify their Emperor’s brother by treating his misled subjects
with this kindness, the treatment which those prisoners received was
in reality so brutal, that if the people of Madrid had had no other
provocation, it would have sufficed for making them hate and execrate
the Intruder, and those by whom his councils were directed. They were
plundered without shame or mercy by the French troops, and any who
were recognized as having been taken before, or as having belonged to
Joseph’s levies, were hurried before a military tribunal, and shot
in presence of their fellows. Even an attempt to escape was punished
with death by these tribunals, whose sentence was without appeal!
They were imprisoned in the Retiro, and in the buildings attached to
the Museum, where they were ill fed and worse used; and they who had
friends, relations, or even parents, in Madrid, were neither allowed to
communicate with, nor to receive the slightest assistance from them. By
such usage about 8000 were forced into a service, from which they took
the first opportunity ♦RIGEL, 2. 406.♦ to desert, most of them in the
course of a few months having joined the guerillas.
The defeat of Areizaga drew after it that of the Duke del Parque. Too
confident in his troops, he remained in his advanced situation, amid
the open country of Castille, till the army which he had defeated was
reinforced by Kellermann’s division from Valladolid. The Duke knew
there were 8000 French infantry and 2000 horse in Medina del Campo,
and, thinking that this was all their force, took a position at Carpio,
upon the only rising ground in those extensive plains, and there waited
for their attack. The enemy advanced slowly, as if waiting for other
troops to come up. Seeing this, the Duke gave orders to march against
them, and the French retreated, fighting as they fell back, from about
three in the afternoon till the close of day, when they entered Medina
del Campo. The Duke then discovered that a far greater force than he
had expected was at hand, and fell back to his position at Carpio,
there to give his troops rest, for they had been thirty hours without
any. At midnight the French also retired upon their reinforcements.
During the following day the Duke obtained full intelligence; it now
became too evident that he could no longer continue in his advanced
situation, and he began his retreat from Carpio in the night. In
the evening of the next day he halted a few hours at Vittoria and
Cordovilla, and at ten that night continued his march, being pursued
by Kellermann, who did ♦BATTLE OF ALBA DE TORMES.♦ not yet come near
enough to annoy him. On the morning of the 28th he reached Alba de
Tormes, and there drew up his troops to resist the enemy, who were
now close upon him. He posted them upon the heights which command the
town on both sides of the Tormes, in order to cover his rear-guard,
the bridges, and the fords; the whole cavalry was on the left bank.
General Lorcet began the attack, and was repulsed by the infantry and
artillery: two brigades of French horse then charged the right wing of
the Spaniards; their cavalry were ordered to meet the charge; whether
from some accidental disorder, or sudden panic, they took to flight
without discharging a shot, or exchanging a single sword stroke;
part of them were rallied and brought back, but the same disgraceful
feeling recurred; they fled a second time, and left the right flank
of the army uncovered: the French then charged the exposed wing with
an overpowering force, and, in spite of a brave resistance, succeeded
in breaking through. The victorious cavalry then charged the left of
the Spaniards; but here it was three times repulsed. Mendizabal and
Carrera formed their troops into an oblong square, and every farther
attempt of the enemy was baffled: night now came on; this body, taking
advantage of the darkness, retreated along the heights on the left
bank of the town, and the Duke then gave orders to fall back in the
direction of Tamames. They marched in good order till morning, when, as
they were within eight miles of that town, and of the scene of their
former victory, a small party of the enemy’s horse came in sight, and
a rumour ran through the ranks that the French were about to charge
them in great force. The very men who had fought so nobly only twelve
hours before now threw away firelocks, knapsacks, and whatever else
encumbered them: the enemy were not near enough to avail themselves of
this panic; and the Duke, with the better part of his troops, reached
the Peña de Francia, and in that secure position halted to collect
again the fugitives and stragglers. Kellermann spoke of 3000 men killed
and 2000 prisoners: and all the artillery of the right wing was taken.
By this victory the French were enabled without farther obstacle to
direct their views against Ciudad Rodrigo, and to threaten Portugal:
and Lord Wellington removed in consequence from his position in the
vicinity of Badajos to the north of the Tagus, there to take measures
against the operations which he had long foreseen. Alburquerque’s
little army was now the only one which remained unbroken; but what
was this against the numerous armies of the French? even if it were
sufficient to cover Extremadura, what was there on the side of La
Mancha to secure Andalusia, and Seville itself? Every effort was made
to collect a new army under Areizaga at the passes of the Sierra, and
to reinforce the Duke del Parque also; ... but the danger was close at
hand.