PLANS OF THE FRENCH. SIR A. WELLESLEY RAISED TO THE PEERAGE.
MARQUIS WELLESLEY ARRIVES IN SPAIN. ALTERATIONS IN THE BRITISH
MINISTRY. STATE OF THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT. THE BRITISH ARMY
RETREATS TO THE FRONTIERS OF PORTUGAL. BATTLES OF TAMAMES,
OCANA, AND ALBA DE TORMES.
♦1809. AUGUST.♦
Never during the war had the prospect appeared so hopeful as when Sir
Arthur entered Spain. For the first time Buonaparte had been repulsed
at all points in a great battle; and for the first time also a spirit
of national resistance had broken forth in Germany, ... the only
spirit by which his tyranny could be overthrown. The Spaniards seemed
to acquire strength from their defeats, learning confidence in their
resources, if not experience from misfortunes; while the British army,
by the passage of the Douro and the discomfiture of Soult, had once
more made the enemy feel what they might apprehend from such troops and
such a commander.
♦SOULT PROPOSES IMMEDIATELY TO INVADE PORTUGAL.♦
The Peninsula was but a secondary object in the all-grasping schemes
of Buonaparte’s ambition. At first he had expected to secure it
without a struggle; nor was he yet so undeceived concerning the real
nature of the resistance to be experienced there, as to believe that
any serious effort would be required for completing its conquest. In
Germany it was, he thought, that the fate of Europe must be decided;
and this opinion was proclaimed in England by those who, on every
occasion, sought to persuade the public that resistance to such a
statesman and such a general, wherever it was attempted, could only
end in defeat, and humiliation, and ruin. Under this impression he had
ordered the intrusive government, which was in fact entirely under his
orders, to content itself with protracting the war till the campaign
in Germany should be brought to a close. That campaign was now ended.
The battle of Wagram had re-established his shaken power; an armistice
had immediately been sued for, and in the negotiations which followed,
the house of Austria surrendered more than the French king Francis I.
had lost at Pavia. The news of this great success did not, however,
induce the Intruder to deviate from his instructions. M. Soult, the
most enterprising as well as the ablest of the French officers who
were employed in Spain, proposed at this time a plan for re-entering
Portugal. The line which should have secured the communication of the
British army with Lisbon he occupied, now that that army had found
it necessary to retreat across the Tagus. He proposed, therefore, to
move from Plasencia against Beresford’s inefficient force, while Ney,
advancing from Salamanca, should act upon its left flank. That army, if
not absolutely destroyed, would be prevented from forming a junction by
way of Alcantara with Sir Arthur; and the French, by rapidly pursuing
this advantage, might occupy Abrantes, and once more take possession of
Lisbon, in which case Soult, ♦CAMPAIGN OF 1809, PP. 49–52. IB. APP.
C-K.♦ still deceiving himself with regard to the disposition of the
Portugueze, thought they would submit to an enemy whom they found it
hopeless to resist. The plan was boldly conceived, though M. Soult had
not sufficiently taken into his calculation the character of the troops
with which he would again be brought in contact: but it was rejected
by Joseph, who was at that time guided chiefly by M. Jourdan. That
General, distinguished for his signal successes in the revolutionary
war, held the high situation of Major-General of the army of Spain; and
he preferring what seemed the surer though the slower course, resolved
implicitly to follow the Emperor Napoleon’s instructions, and undertake
no offensive operation for the present. A plan, he said, had been
laid down for invading Portugal, and would be executed in the month
of February. It was their intention to subjugate the south of Spain
before this should be undertaken; and if the British Commander had
possessed as little foresight as appeared in the conduct of the Spanish
government, or if the British army had not derived better support from
the Portugueze than from the Spaniards, the French might have succeeded
in both parts of their intended operations.
♦SIR A. WELLESLEY RAISED TO THE PEERAGE.♦
The Central Junta expressed its sense of Sir Arthur Wellesley’s
services, by nominating him one of the Captain-generals of the army (a
rank nearly equivalent to that of our field-marshal), and presenting
him, in the name of Ferdinand, with some horses selected from the best
breeds of Andalusia. “This tribute,” they said, “was of small value
in comparison with the services which he had rendered to Spain, and
still less in proportion to the wishes of those who offered it: but for
hearts like his, the satisfaction resulting from great achievements
was their best recompense; not was it in the power of man to bestow
any reward which could equal the glory of being one of the principal
deliverers of a great and generous people, of listening to their
blessings, and of deserving their gratitude.” Sir Arthur accepted the
horses, and the appointment also, provided he should receive permission
from his own sovereign; but he declined the pay attached to it, not
thinking it becoming that he should burthen the finances of Spain
during such a contest. In England, also, he was recompensed with new
honours. As soon as the news of his victory arrived, he was raised to
the peerage by the titles of Baron Douro of Wellesley, and Viscount
Wellington of Talavera, and of Wellington in the county of Somerset.
♦AUG. 1. MARQUIS WELLESLEY ARRIVES IN SPAIN.♦
On the fourth morning after the battle, while the bells of Cadiz were
ringing, the cannon firing, and the people rejoicing with higher hopes
than had been felt since the surrender of Dupont, Marquis Wellesley
landed in that harbour to supersede Mr. Frere. A great concourse
assembled to see him land, and as he set foot on shore, a French flag
was spread before him, that he might tread upon it in honour of his
brother’s victory. The people drew his carriage, which in that country
is an unusual mark of respect. The Marquis gave one of them a purse of
gold to distribute among his comrades: but the man returned it, and,
in the name of the people, assured him they desired no reward, being
happy that they had this opportunity of expressing the sentiments of
the whole nation. Both at Cadiz and at Seville the Marquis was received
with every mark of public honour, and with the most enthusiastic
expressions of attachment and gratitude to the British nation. But
the first dispatches from Sir Arthur opened ♦DISTRESS OF THE ARMY FOR
PROVISIONS.♦ upon him a disheartening prospect. The combined armies,
amounting to not less than 60,000 men, and 16,000 or 18,000 horse,
were depending entirely for their daily supply upon the country,
which did not contain a population in many square miles equal to the
number of the army, and could not of course produce a sufficiency for
its sustenance. Extremadura indeed is the worst peopled and least
cultivated province of the whole Peninsula. It was necessary to
send to a great distance for supplies, which, scanty as they were,
could not be procured regularly, nor without great difficulty. The
troops were ill fed, and frequently received no rations whatever.
Effectual measures, Sir Arthur said, must be taken, and that speedily.
No army could serve to any purpose unless it were properly fed; and
it was absurd to suppose that a Spaniard, or a man or animal of any
country, could make exertions without a due supply of food; in fact
the Spaniards were more clamorous, and more exhausted, if they did not
receive it regularly, than the English. The English, however, were in
a state of great distress; from the 3d till the 7th they had had no
bread; then about 4000 pounds of biscuit were divided among 30,000
mouths, and the whole supply ♦AUG. 8.♦ was exhausted. “The army,” said
Sir Arthur, “will be entirely lost, if this treatment continues. If
efficient measures had been adopted by the government when the distress
of the British troops was first represented to them, the benefit must
ere this have been experienced. There had been no neglect on the part
of Mr. Frere: the evil was owing to the poverty and exhausted state of
the country; to the inactivity of the magistrates and people; to their
disinclination to taking any trouble, except that of packing up their
property, and removing when they heard of the approach of a French
patrole; to their habits of insubordination and disobedience, and to
the want of power in the government and their officers.”
♦DISPUTES WITH CUESTA CONCERNING SUPPLIES.♦
Cuesta’s unaccommodating temper aggravated the evil. He was applied
to after the battle for ninety mules to draw the British artillery in
place of those lost in the action; there were at that time hundreds
in his army employed in drawing empty carts, and yet he refused to
part with any. Five guns belonging to Alburquerque’s division having
been taken at Arzobispo, the Duke endeavoured to make over to the
British army the mules attached to them; but Cuesta took them for
himself. His own cavalry were plentifully supplied with barley, while
hundreds of the British horses died for want of it. In other respects,
his men suffered as many privations as the English; and vexation at
this and at the untoward issue of the campaign, combined with bodily
infirmity, seems to have bewildered him: he lent ear to every complaint
against the allies; and at a time when they were literally starving,
both men and horses, he wrote to their General, stating that his own
troops were in want of necessary food, because all that he ordered
for their use was intercepted by the British and their commissaries.
The English, he said, actually sold biscuit and meat; and he heard
continual complaints and saw continual traces that they plundered all
the places through which they passed, and even followed the peasantry
to the mountains, for the purpose of stripping them even to the shirt.
Sir Arthur positively denied that any thing going to the Spanish army
had been stopped by the British; as for the tale of his soldiers
selling provisions, he observed, that it was beneath the dignity of his
Excellency’s situation and character to notice such things, and beneath
his own to reply to them. He was concerned that General Cuesta should
conceive there was any reason for complaining of the British troops;
but, continued he, “when troops are starving, which those under my
command have been, as I have repeatedly told your Excellency since I
joined you, and particularly when they had no bread from the 3d to the
7th, it is not astonishing that they should go to the villages and even
to the mountains to look for food where they think they can get it. The
complaints of the inhabitants, however, should not have been confined
to the conduct of the British; here in Deleitosa I have seen Spanish
soldiers, who ought to have been elsewhere, take off the doors of the
houses which were locked up, in order that they might plunder the
houses; and they afterwards burnt the doors.”
To preserve discipline among starving troops is indeed impossible, and
neither Cuesta nor Sir Arthur could be responsible for their men under
such circumstances; but the letter of the former brought the question
respecting provisions to a point, and Sir Arthur called upon him to
state distinctly whether he understood that the Spanish army was to
have not only all the provisions which the country could afford, but
all those also which were sent from Seville; whether any magazines had
been formed, and from whence the troops were to draw provisions? “I
hope,” said he, “that I shall receive satisfactory answers to these
questions to-morrow morning; if not, I beg that your Excellency will be
prepared to occupy the posts opposite Almaraz, as it will be impossible
for me to remain any longer in a country in which no arrangement is
made for provisioning my troops, and in which it is understood that all
the provisions which are either found in the country, or are sent from
Seville (as I have been informed, for the use of the British army) are
to be applied solely and exclusively to the Spanish troops.” On the day
that this correspondence took place, an English commissary arriving
from Truxillo with bread and barley for the British army, was stopped
on the way, and deprived of all his barley and part of his bread by
a detachment of Spanish horse. Whatever momentary irritation might
be occasioned by circumstances like these, Sir Arthur commiserated
the sufferings of the Spanish army too sincerely to harbour any
resentment; but he perceived the absolute necessity of withdrawing.
“It is useless,” he said to the British ambassador, “to complain; but
we are not treated as friends, much less as the only prop on which the
cause of Spain can depend. But, besides this want of good-will, which
can easily be traced to the temper of the General, there is such a
want of resources in the country, and so little exertion in bringing
forward what is to be found; that if the army were to remain here much
longer, it would become totally useless. The daily and increasing loss
of horses from deficiency of food, and from the badness of what there
is, is really alarming.” Ney’s return to Old Castille strengthened
him in this resolution; it satisfied him that no serious attack upon
Andalusia was intended for the present, and he thought it not unlikely
that this corps of the enemy was about to invade Portugal, for the sake
of drawing him out of Spain.
♦MR. FRERE REQUIRES THE REMOVAL OF CUESTA.♦
The necessity of removing Cuesta from the command appeared so urgent
to Mr. Frere, that he deemed it his duty to present a memorial upon
the subject, though Marquis Wellesley was expected two days afterward
at Seville. ♦AUG. 9.♦ He dwelt upon his abandonment of the wounded
at Talavera, and upon the imminent danger to which he had exposed
Venegas by concealing from him, as well as from his government, the
true state of the combined armies, and the inability of the English to
proceed. The dismissal of Cuesta, he said, could not long be delayed,
and it was important that it should take place instantly, and another
commander appointed: either the choice being left to Sir Arthur, or the
Junta itself appointing the Duke of Alburquerque, who possessed his
confidence and that of the army, and whose abilities had been tried
and approved. This was the only satisfaction which could be given to
the British General and his army, and even this would be little: “the
wound,” said Mr. Frere, “is very deep, and the English nation could
not have received one more difficult to heal than the abandonment of
their wounded at Talavera.” This was the last act of Mr. Frere in his
public capacity; and it was consistent with the whole conduct of that
minister, who, during his mission never shrunk from any responsibility,
nor ever, from the fear of it, omitted any effort which he thought
requisite for the common welfare of his own country and of Spain. In
presenting such a memorial, while his successor was, as it were, at the
door, he was conscious that he might appear to be acting irregularly in
his public character; and in his private one, that it might alter the
feelings with which he could have wished to take leave of his friends
in Spain; but, in addition to the urgency of the case, he considered
also that it would be peculiarly unpleasant for Marquis Wellesley
to begin his mission with an altercation in which his brother was
concerned. Mr. Frere’s situation had been unfavourable to any thing
like a controlling influence; the intelligence which announced the
intended assistance of a British force had been accompanied with an
intimation of his recall, and for some months he had, as he expressed
himself, literally been a minister only from day to day, looking
for the arrival of his successor by the first fair wind. The Junta
expressed their sense of his zealous services by conferring upon
him the Castillian title of Marquez de la Union (which he received
permission from his own government to retain); and, in reply to the
momentary outcry which misrepresentation and party spirit had raised
against him in England, they represented his conduct such as they
conceived it to be, and as it truly was. This had never prevented him
from using the strongest language and taking the highest tone toward
the very persons who had been foremost in this friendly act; but he
felt how unfavourable his situation was, and, knowing that that of
Marquis Wellesley would in all respects be very different, he hoped
the Marquis might be able to remedy the existing evils as far as they
were capable of being remedied. The task, however, was no easy one.
“It might seem,” he said, “that a British minister ought before that
time to have established a regular system for securing the subsistence
of the armies; but the evil lay deep; it arose from an old despotic
government, and from eighteen years of the basest corruption, intrigue,
and public pillage. The effects of all this still continued, the system
itself was not wholly done away, and even a sovereign in ordinary times
would find it difficult to remedy it.”
♦CUESTA RESIGNS THE COMMAND.♦
Marquis Wellesley, on his arrival, did not think it expedient to
insist on Cuesta’s removal. That General, he observed, was said to be
deficient in every quality necessary for an extensive command, except
courage; his temper rendered him peculiarly unfit for acting with an
allied army, and it was scarcely possible that another officer with
equal disqualifications should be found in the Spanish service. But
the government was under some apprehension of his influence, which
was supposed to be extensive and dangerous, though it rested on no
other foundation than the precarious one of undeserved popularity. The
Marquis, therefore, limited his interference to a strong expression
of his sense of the General’s misconduct, being of opinion that his
removal might be effected more willingly and with less danger if it
appeared to be the consequence of his own actions, rather than the
result of a direct application from the British ambassador. The Junta,
however, were desirous that such a direct application should be made;
and Marquis Wellesley then addressed a note to Garay, stating that it
was impossible to hope for any degree of co-operation, or even for any
aid from the troops of Spain to the British army, if the chief command
remained in the hands of General Cuesta. Cuesta had wisely anticipated
such a measure. Two days after the date of that letter to Sir Arthur,
in which he complained so preposterously of the British troops, a
paralytic stroke deprived him of the use of one leg; feeling himself
then completely incapacitated, he delivered over the army to the second
in command, D. Francisco de Eguia, and requested permission to resign,
that he might go to the baths of Alhama. When, therefore, the Marquis
delivered in his note, he was informed that Cuesta’s resignation had
been accepted.
♦EGUIA SUCCEEDS AD INTERIM TO THE COMMAND.♦
Eguia was well acquainted with the military topography of Spain, but
had no other qualification for the command of an army: at the battle
of Medellin he did not venture to depart from his orders without
receiving fresh ones from Cuesta, at a time when it was impossible for
Cuesta to communicate with him, and by this imbecility he completed
the destruction of the army that day. Mr. Frere, knowing that the
military Junta would be most likely to confirm him in the command,
because he was one of the old school, wrote a private note to Garay,
deprecating such an appointment. Alburquerque was the proper person for
the command; but the Junta were jealous of his rank, his popularity,
his talents, and his enlightened views; and Marquis Wellesley soon
discovered that, if he were named to the command, the army under him
would certainly be reduced. Till, however, a successor to Cuesta should
be chosen, the command devolved upon Eguia; and when that General
notified this to the British Commander, he accompanied the intelligence
with the fairest professions, desiring him to depute a confidential
officer, who, with another appointed on the part of the Spaniards,
might regulate the distribution of provisions in such a manner that
the English army should be supplied in preference to the Spaniards.
Lord Wellington expressed, in reply, his perfect confidence in the
intentions of Eguia, and sent some officers to Truxillo, there to meet
any whom Eguia might appoint, and settle some practicable arrangement:
a preference like that which was spoken of he well perceived was
impossible.
♦CALVO SENT TO SEE TO THE SUPPLIES.♦
When first the Junta were informed of the distress of the British army,
nothing appeared to hurt them so much as that their own troops should
have been supplied while their allies were in want, and they ordered
Cuesta, in every instance, to supply the British troops in preference
to his own. They directed the Junta of Badajoz to send two members of
their body into the vale of Plasencia, and secure the persons of those
magistrates who, having engaged to furnish means for the British army,
had failed in their engagement; to supersede them also, and place at
the disposal of the British commissary every thing which he might
require. Before these measures could be executed, Soult entered from
Old Castille, and the whole of the fertile country on that side of the
Tagus fell into the possession of the enemy. When the complaints of
the British General became louder, the Junta, alarmed at his intended
retreat into Portugal, deputed D. Lorenzo Calvo, one of their own body,
to the armies, hoping that his exertions, aided by his authority, would
effectually remedy the evil. Calvo was considered a man of energetic
character and activity, and, having been bred up in commerce, had
acquired those habits of business which were necessary for the service
in which he was now employed. True to that system of dissimulation,
which, by the old school, was esteemed essential in all business of
state, he was charged to invest Cuesta with the order of Charles III.
lest that General should take umbrage at the distinction conferred upon
Lord Wellington, though at this very time the Junta were so offended at
Cuesta’s conduct, that nothing but their fears had prevented them from
immediately displacing him.
♦LORD WELLINGTON DECLARES HIS INTENTION OF FALLING BACK.♦
But neither Eguia’s professions, nor the measures of the government,
nor the presence of one of its members, produced any relief to the
British army. Had it been in a condition for service, and provided
with means of transport, Lord Wellington had it in view to act against
the French at Plasencia, for which purpose he ordered materials to be
collected for repairing the Puente de Cardinal; but his cavalry had
now consumed all the forage within reach; they were obliged to go from
twenty to thirty miles to procure it, and frequently when they had
gone so far, the Spaniards, being themselves in equal want, deprived
them of it on their return. The horses were at length so much reduced
that they were scarcely able to relieve the outposts. More than a
month had now elapsed since the British General informed Cuesta that,
if he were not supplied, he could not remain in Spain. In the course
of that time, if proper measures had been taken, supplies might have
been forwarded from the farthest part of Andalusia; but not a mule or
cart, or article of provision of any kind had been obtained under any
order from, or arrangement made by, the government. Lord Wellington
applied for a remount of only an hundred mares, which could not be
used in the Spanish cavalry, because they used stallions; even these
he could not procure, nor did he receive an answer to his application.
It was now become absolutely necessary to withdraw, and on the 18th of
August, he requested Marquis Wellesley to give notice to the government
that he was about so to do. “Since the 22d of last month,” said he,
“the horses have not received their regular deliveries of barley, and
the infantry not ten days’ bread. I have no doubt the government have
given orders that we should be provided as we ought to be, but orders
are not sufficient. To carry on the contest to any purpose, the labour
and service of every man and of every beast in the country should be
employed in the support of the armies; and these should be so classed
and arranged as not only to secure obedience to the orders of the
government, but regularity and efficiency in the performance of the
service. Magazines might then with ease be formed, and transported
wherever the armies should be stationed. But as we are now situated,
50,000 men are collected upon a spot which cannot afford subsistence
for 10,000, and there are no means of sending to a distance to make
good the deficiency: the Junta have issued orders, which, for want of
arrangement, there are no persons to obey; and the army would perish
here, if I were to remain, before the supplies could arrive.”
♦CORRESPONDENCE WITH EGUIA AND CALVO.♦
Prepared as both the Spanish government and general ought to have been
for such a determination, both manifested the greatest astonishment
when it was announced. Eguia wrote to Lord Wellington, repeating his
protestations, that he should have every thing which he required, and
that the Spaniards should go without any thing, rather than the British
should be in want. “An English commissary,” he said, “should reside
at Truxillo, who should have a key of the magazines, and take the
proportion for the British army, though his own should perish. If,” he
continued, “notwithstanding these conclusive protestations, the British
General persisted in marching into Portugal, it would be apparent
that other causes induced him to take that step, and not the want of
subsistence.” Upon this insulting assertion, Lord Wellington informed
Eguia that any further correspondence between them was unnecessary. He
entered, nevertheless, into a sufficient explanation of the real state
of affairs. The magazines of Truxillo, according to a return sent by
Eguia himself, did not contain a sufficiency to feed the British army
alone for one day. No doubt was entertained of the exertions of the
Spanish General, nor of his sincerity. “The deficiencies,” said Lord
Wellington, “arise not from want of orders of your Excellency, but
from the want of means in the country, from the want of arrangement in
the government, and from the neglect of timely measures to supply the
wants which were complained of long ago.” A letter from Calvo to Lord
Wellington implied the same suspicion concerning the motives of his
retreat as Eguia had done, though in more qualified terms. This member
of the Junta came forward with something more specious than vague
promises and protestations. “He bound himself,” he said, “to provide
the army, within three days, with all the rations which it might
require; and within fifteen days to have magazines formed in places
appointed by the British General, containing all the articles which
the army could consume in one or two months; and to provide also carts
and mules, both of draft and burthen, sufficient for the transport of
these magazines.” He then protested that 7000 rations of bread, 50,000
pounds of flour, 250 _fanegas_ of barley, 50 of rye, 100 of wheat, and
60 _arrobas_ of rice were ready, with means of transport for them, and
before the morrow noon would reach the British army in their present
position. “My activity,” said Calvo, “shall not rest until continual
remittances of the same articles prove that my promises deserve to
be confided in; and if there were in your Excellency’s intention any
disposition to alter your purpose of retreat, I am certain I should
obtain the satisfaction of hearing your Excellency yourself confess
that I had surpassed your hopes.” At the time when Lord Wellington
received this letter, he had in his possession an order dated only
five days back, and signed by this very member of the Supreme Junta,
ordering to the Spanish head-quarters, for the use of the Spanish army,
all the provisions which the British commissary had provided in the
town of Guadalupe and its neighbourhood. Well, therefore, might he
reply to him, that he could have no confidence in his assurances. “As
for the promise,” said he, “of giving provisions to the British army
to the exclusion of the Spanish troops, such a proposal can only have
been made as an extreme and desperate measure to induce me to remain
in Spain; and were it practicable, I could not give my consent to it.
The Spanish army must be fed as well as the British. I am fully aware,”
he continued, “of the consequences which may follow my departure,
though there is now no enemy in our front; but I am not responsible
for them, whatever they may be. They are responsible who, having been
made acquainted with the wants of this army more than a month ago, have
taken no effectual means to relieve them; who allowed a brave army,
which was rendering gratuitous services to Spain, and which was able
and willing to pay for every thing it received, to starve in the midst
of their country, and be reduced by want to a state of inefficiency;
who refused or neglected to find carriages for removing the officers
and soldiers who had been wounded in their service, and obliged me to
give up the equipment of the army for the performance of this necessary
act ♦AUG. 20.♦ of humanity.” On the following day Lord Wellington began
his retreat in the direction of Badajoz.
♦MARQUIS WELLESLEY PROPOSES A PLAN FOR SUPPLYING THE ARMIES.♦
He halted at Merida, and eight days after his departure, being then
four marches from Xaraicejo, he found none of the supplies on the
road which had so confidently been promised. Having, however, been
able to separate his troops, and being out of reach of Eguia’s army,
he now procured regular supplies. Marquis Wellesley meantime had
been indefatigable in pressing upon the government the necessity
of a regular plan for provisioning the armies; and he found, upon
investigation, that orders enough had been issued, but no means
had been employed either to enforce the execution of those orders,
or to ascertain in what respects they had failed, or what were the
causes either of their total failure or of their partial success. No
magazines or regular depots had been established, no regular means of
transport provided, nor any persons regularly appointed to conduct and
superintend convoys, under the direction of the general commanding the
army; nor had any system been adopted for drawing from the more fertile
provinces, by a connected chain of magazines, resources to supply the
deficiency of those poorer countries in which the army might be acting.
At the solicitation of the Junta, Marquis Wellesley delivered in a plan
for remedying these evils. It was less easy of execution in Spain than
it would have been in England, where the system of our stagecoaches
and waggons has disciplined a great number of persons in the detail of
such arrangements; yet, with due exertions on the part of government,
it might speedily have been established. Two days elapsed, and no
notice was taken of the proposal; he requested a reply, and after two
days more Garay put into his hand a long string of regulations for
the internal management of the magazines when they should have been
formed. Marquis Wellesley again anxiously inquired whether the Junta
were disposed to adopt the plan which he had formed at their request,
and whether any steps had been taken for carrying it into effect? At
length, after it had been nine days in their hands, he was informed
that they assented to it,--but this was all; it was a mere verbal
assent, and no measures whatever were taken for beginning arrangements
of such urgent necessity. The government at the same time expressed
its confidence that the British army would now rejoin the Spaniards,
and make a forward movement against the enemy. Marquis Wellesley
suspected some of the Junta of treason. “This proposition,” said he to
his government, “accords with the general tenor of those professions
of zeal for active war, which have particularly characterized the
declarations of the Junta since the army has been deprived of the
means of movement and supply. Far from affording any just foundation
of confidence in their intentions, such declarations of activity and
enterprise, unaccompanied by any provident or regular attention to
the means and objects of the war, serve only to create additional
suspicions of ignorance, weakness, or insincerity. No person acquainted
with the real condition of the British and Spanish forces at ♦AUG. 30.♦
this time, could reasonably advise a forward movement against the enemy
with any other view than the certain destruction of the allied armies.”
♦HIS ILL OPINION OF THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT.♦
The conduct of the Junta gave strong grounds for such a suspicion.
The real cause which had checked the progress of a victorious army,
and finally reduced it to a state unfit for service, could not be
concealed; public opinion loudly imputed this evil to the negligence of
government, and the government endeavoured, by ungenerous artifices, to
divert the general indignation. Rumours were set afloat that the real
cause of the retreat of the British army was very different from the
assigned one; they had not fallen back upon Portugal because there had
been any deficiency either in their means of supply or of transport,
but because of certain political considerations, inconsistent with the
security and honour of Spain, and with the good faith of Great Britain.
Demands, it was whispered, had been made in the King of England’s
name, for the cession of Cadiz, of the Havannah, and even of the whole
island of Cuba; changes had been required in the form of the Spanish
government, as preliminary conditions to the further operations of the
British troops in Spain, and Lord Wellington had retreated only because
these demands were refused. These reports, which, if not invented
by the government, certainly were not discountenanced by them, were
absolutely and entirely false; nothing had been asked from Spain except
subsistence for the army employed in her defence. Marquis Wellesley,
however, though he perceived the criminal misconduct of the government,
and though he affirmed that in the last campaign no rational motives
could be imagined for the conduct of some of the generals and officers,
unless it were supposed that they concerted their operations with the
French instead of the British general, did justice to the people of
Spain. “Whatever insincerity or jealousy towards England existed, was
to be found,” he said, “in the government, its officers, and adherents;
no such unworthy sentiment prevailed among the people.” They had done
their duty, and were still ready to do it; and, notwithstanding the
vexations which he experienced, and the alarm and even ill-will which
the retreat of the British excited, he remembered, as became him,
that the cause of Spain and England was the same: while, therefore,
he expressed his opinion that the Cortes ought to be assembled, and
a more efficient government formed than that of so ill-constituted
and anomalous a body as the Junta, he listened willingly to every
suggestion for employing the British troops in any practicable manner.
Might it not be possible, it was said, for them to take up a position
on the left bank of the Guadiana, occupying Merida as an advanced post,
their right at Almendralejo, and their left extending toward Badajoz?
Portugal might be covered by this position; Seville protected at the
same time, and a point of support given to the left of the Spanish
army, which should in that case be cantoned in Medellin, Don Benito,
and Villa Nueva de la Serena.
♦LORD WELLINGTON OBJECTS TO TAKING A POSITION ON THE GUADIANA.♦
This plan the Marquis proposed to his brother; but that able general
was of opinion that the Guadiana was not defensible by a weaker
against a stronger army, being fordable in very many places, and
affording no position. The Spanish army, he thought, was at that time
in the best position in that part of the country, one which they
ought to hold against any force that could be brought against them,
if they could hold any thing; while they held it they covered the
Guadiana effectually, and their retreat from it was always secure.
He, therefore, recommended that they should send away the bridge of
boats which was still opposite Almaraz, and remain where they were
as long as possible. For the British army, Lord Wellington said, he
saw no chance at present of its resuming offensive operations; and he
desired that no hopes might be held out to the Junta of any further
co-operation on his part with the Spanish troops, which in their
present state were by no means to be depended on. He saw the difficulty
to which this determination might reduce the Spanish government; their
army might be seized with a panic, run off, and leave every thing
exposed to instant loss. All he could say to this was, that he was
in no hurry to withdraw from Spain; he wanted to refresh his troops;
he should not enter Portugal till he had heard Marquis Wellesley’s
sentiments; if he did enter it he should go no farther than the
frontier, where he should be so near, that the enemy, unless in very
great force, would not venture across the Guadiana, leaving the British
army upon their flank and rear; in fact, therefore, he should be as
useful to Spain within the Portugueze frontier as upon the Guadiana,
and even more so, because the nearer he went to Portugal, the more
efficient he should become. The best way to cover the Guadiana and
Seville, was by a position on the enemy’s flank.
♦ALBURQUERQUE APPOINTED TO THE COMMAND IN EXTREMADURA.♦
As an inducement to Lord Wellington to remain, and co-operate with
the Spanish army, the Junta proposed to place the corps which they
designed to leave in Extremadura under his command. This was to consist
of 12,000 men, a number inadequate to the service for which they were
required; but the true reason was perceived by the British General;
he had by this time had ample opportunities of discovering that the
Junta, in the distribution of their force, did not consider military
defence and military operations so much as political intrigues and the
attainment of trifling political objects. The Junta of Extremadura
had insisted that Alburquerque should have the command in their
province; the government was weak enough in authority to be obliged
to yield this, and weak enough in judgement to diminish as far as
possible the army which they unwillingly entrusted to this envied
and most ill-treated nobleman. Lord Wellington, who could not have
accepted the command unconditionally without permission from his own
court, declined it altogether under present circumstances, as being
inconsistent with those operations which he foresaw would soon become
necessary for the British army. He had intelligence that a council of
war held at Salamanca had recommended an attack upon Ciudad Rodrigo:
the loss of that place would cut off the only communication which the
Spanish government had with the northern provinces, and would give the
French secure possession of Old Castille, and probably draw after it
the loss of Almeida. It would, therefore, be incumbent upon him to make
exertions for relieving Ciudad Rodrigo. The cabildo of that city, just
at this time when Lord Wellington was contemplating their approaching
danger, and how best to succour them, gave an example of the spirit
which too many of these provincial authorities displayed toward the
British army. 100,000 pounds of biscuit had been ordered there, and
paid for by a British commissary; and when Marshal Beresford sent for
it, that it might be deposited in the magazines at Almeida, the cabildo
seized 30,000 pounds of this quantity, upon the ground that debts due
to that city by Sir John Moore’s army had not been paid, ... although
part of the business of the commissary who was sent to Ciudad Rodrigo
was to settle these accounts, and discharge the debts in question.
♦LORD WELLINGTON WITHDRAWS TO BADAJOZ.♦
This was a specimen of that ill-will towards England which prevailed in
many places among persons of this rank; and Marquis Wellesley perceived
that such persons, if not favoured by the government, were certainly
not discountenanced. The same spirit was manifested but too plainly by
the persons employed about Cuesta’s army. While they were professing
that the English army should be served in preference to their own
people (even to the exclusion of them, if needful), they never offered
to supply a single cart or mule, or any means of transport from their
own abundance. Lord Wellington, for want of such means, was compelled
to leave his ammunition behind him, and then no difficulty was found
in transporting it to the Spanish stores. No difficulty was found
in transporting the bridge of boats from Almaraz to Badajoz; yet
if these means of transport, with which the Spanish army was always
abundantly provided, had been shared with the British army, many of the
difficulties under which it suffered would have been relieved, and its
separation, says Lord Wellington, certainly would not have taken place
when it did. The distress which his men suffered would not have been
felt in an equal degree by the French, or by any people who understood
how to manage their food. Meat they had always in sufficiency, and
their chief want was of bread, ... they were not ingenious enough to
make a comfortable meal without it, though flour or rice was served out
in its stead. But the want of food for the cavalry, and of means of
transport, which actually rendered the British army inefficient, could
not be remedied by any dexterity of the men, or any foresight of the
general, and is wholly imputable to the conduct of the Spanish generals
and the Spanish government. Spain was grievously injured by this
unpardonable misconduct. The English ministry were at this very time
proposing to increase Lord Wellington’s force to 30,000 men, provided
the supreme command were vested in the British general, and effectual
arrangements made for their supply. But in the present state of things,
both the Marquis and his brother perceived that any co-operation
with the Spanish armies would only draw on a repetition of the same
disasters. The intent was therefore abandoned, ♦1809. SEPTEMBER.♦ and
Lord Wellington at the beginning of September, proceeded to Badajoz,
stationing his army, part within the Portugueze frontier, and part on
the Spanish territory, in a position which would menace the flank and
rear of the French if they advanced toward Andalusia.
♦EXPEDITION TO WALCHEREN.♦
While the allied armies were thus rendered inefficient, not by the
skill or strength of the enemy, but by the inexperience and incapacity
of the Spanish authorities, the mightiest force that had ever left the
British shores was wasted in a miserable expedition to the Scheldt,
and upon objects so insulated, and unimportant at that crisis, that if
they had been completely attained, success would have been nugatory.
Had that force been landed in the north of Germany, as the Austrian
government proposed, it has since been known, that what Schill did
with his single regiment, would have been done by Blucher and the
whole Prussian army. Marquis Wellesley had always disapproved of its
destination, looking upon the plan as at once absurd and ruinous.
Destructive to the last degree it proved, from the unwholesome nature
of the country to which it was sent: a cause which of all others might
with most certainty have been foreseen, and yet by some fatality seems
to have been overlooked by all who were concerned in planning the
expedition or consulted upon it. The only consolation, if consolation
it may be deemed, for the misemployment of such a force, was in the
knowledge that, owing to the state of the Spanish counsels, and the
temper of the Spanish generals, it could not have acted in Spain.
♦INQUIRY INTO THE CONDUCT OF THE DUKE OF YORK.♦
The British government meantime had to struggle with difficulties at
home as well as abroad, and of the most unexpected kind. During the
former part of the year parliament was occupied with an inquiry into
the conduct of the Duke of York as commander-in-chief, which ended
in his resigning the office. The circumstances which were disclosed
rendered this resignation becoming and necessary; but perhaps there
never was another instance in which the reaction of public opinion was
at once so strongly and so justly manifested. For when the agitation
was subsided which had been raised, not so much by the importance
of the business itself, as by the unremitting efforts of a set of
libellers the vilest and most venomous of their kind, it was then
perceived that the accusation had originated in intrigue and malice;
that the abuses which were brought to light were far less than had been
supposed to exist, and that in proving them it had been proved also
that the greatest improvements had been introduced into that department
by his Royal Highness, and that the general administration was
excellent. From that time, therefore, the Duke acquired a popularity
which he had never before possessed; and the efforts which had been
made with persevering malignity to ruin him in the good opinion of the
nation, served only to establish him there upon the strongest and
surest grounds.
♦ALTERATIONS IN THE MINISTRY.♦
This inquiry had occupied a full third of the whole session, to the
grievous interruption of public business, and the more grievous
excitement of the people, even to the extinction in most minds of
all other public interest whatever. The ministry meantime had other
causes of disquiet, which did not transpire till the session had
closed. Mismanaged arrangements for the removal of Lord Castlereagh
from the war department, induced him to challenge Mr. Canning, with
whom the wish for his removal originated, but who in the course
of the affair had been as ill used as himself. Both parties in
consequence resigned; the Duke of Portland did the same, compelled by
the state of his health, for he died almost immediately afterwards,
and thus the administration was broken up. Lord Liverpool, the only
remaining secretary of state, performed the business of the other two
departments, while the remaining members of the cabinet looked about
in dismay, and almost in despair, for new colleagues and for a new
head. ♦SEPT. 23.♦ Their situation appeared so forlorn that official
letters were addressed to Earl Grey and Lord Grenville, informing them
that his Majesty had authorized Earl Liverpool and Mr. Perceval to
communicate with their lordships for the purpose of forming an extended
and combined administration, and requesting them to come to town, that
as little time as possible might be lost in forwarding so important
an object. Earl Grey replied, that had his Majesty been pleased to
signify he had any commands for him personally, he should not have lost
a moment in showing his duty by prompt obedience to his royal pleasure;
but when it was proposed that he should communicate with the existing
ministers, for the purpose of forming a combined administration with
them, he should be wanting in duty to the King, and in fairness to
them, if he did not at once declare that such a union was, as far as
it regarded him under the then circumstances, impossible: this being
the answer which he was under the necessity of giving, his appearance
in London could be of no advantage; and it might possibly be of
detriment to the country, if, in consequence of a less decisive answer,
any farther delay should take place in the formation of a settled
government.
Lord Grenville, who was in Cornwall, replied, he should lose no time in
repairing to town, and begged leave to defer all observations upon the
business till his arrival. The day after his arrival he sent an answer
conformable to that of Earl Grey, declining the proposed communication,
because it could not be productive of any public advantage. “I trust,”
he added, “I need not say that this opinion is neither founded in any
sentiment of personal hostility, nor in a desire of unnecessarily
prolonging political differences. To compose, not to inflame, the
divisions of the empire, has always been my anxious wish, and is now
more than ever the duty of every loyal subject; but my accession to
the existing administration could not in any respect contribute to
this object, nor could it be considered in any other light than as a
dereliction of public principle. This answer, which I must have given
to any such proposal, if made while the government was yet entire,
cannot be varied by the retreat of some of its members. My objections
are not personal, they apply to the principle of the government itself,
and to the circumstances which attended its appointment.”
Nothing but extreme necessity could have induced the remaining
ministers to make these overtures; and when their advances were thus
rejected, great hopes were entertained by the adverse party, that
they would not be able to keep their ground as an administration. It
was even affirmed and believed that some of the highest offices were
offered to different persons, and that none could be found to accept
them. The only hope of the ministry rested upon Marquis Wellesley;
hints were thrown out that he would not join any arrangement in which
Mr. Canning was not included; this opinion, however, proved erroneous,
the Marquis accepted the office which Mr. Canning vacated, the Earl
of Liverpool was transferred from the home to the war department,
and the situation which he had vacated was filled by Mr. Ryder. Lord
Palmerstone was made secretary at war in the room of Sir James
Pulteney, and Mr. Perceval took the place of the Duke of Portland,
... thus uniting in himself, as Mr. Pitt and Mr. Addington had done
before him, the offices of first lord of the treasury and chancellor
of the exchequer. The loss of the Duke was only that of a name; that
of Mr. Canning was greatly regretted, as was also the secession of Mr.
Huskisson, who resigned his seat at the treasury at the same time;
but though the ministry was weakened by their departure, it was well
understood that the opposition would derive no aid from them; and, on
the whole, government was thought to have gained by these changes more
than it had lost, in consequence of the high reputation of Marquis
Wellesley, and the almost general desire of the nation to see him in
administration. His brother, Mr. Henry Wellesley, was appointed to
succeed him as ambassador to Spain.
♦DISPOSITION OF THE FRENCH AND SPANISH ARMIES.♦
The disposable force of the enemy in Spain at this time was estimated
at 125,000 men, well provided with cavalry and artillery, exclusive
of the garrisons in Barcelona and the strong places upon the
Pyrenean frontier. Of these, about 35,000 were employed in Arragon
and Catalonia, the rest were in the two Castilles and Extremadura,
70,000 being in the field under Victor, Soult, Ney, Sebastiani, and
Mortier, ... the remainder employed in garrisons, and in keeping up the
communication between the different places in their possession. Sick
and wounded were not included, and an allowance was made for the loss
of 10,000 men at Talavera. At the lowest estimate, this was the number
of the enemy; the force of the Spaniards was miserably inferior. Blake,
after the rout at Belchite, had reassembled a small army, scarcely
exceeding 6000 men, with which he was endeavouring, from time to time,
to relieve Gerona. Noroña had 15,000 men in Galicia; but a tenth part
of these were without arms, and he had neither cavalry nor artillery.
The Duke del Parque had 9000 men at Ciudad Rodrigo, and Eguia and
Venegas had about 50,000 in their two armies. But the inefficient state
of these troops had been lamentably proved; both cavalry and infantry
were for the most part undisciplined, and the latter neither properly
clothed nor accoutred, notwithstanding large supplies of all things
needful had been sent from England.
♦NEEDINESS OF THE INTRUSIVE GOVERNMENT.♦
The Intruder meantime, now that immediate danger was averted, had
leisure to feel the wretched state to which his subserviency to a
wicked brother had reduced him. He was, indeed, in possession of
Madrid, and half the kingdom was overrun by his troops; but how were
those troops to be paid, or how was he to support the expenses of his
court and government? Whatever might be the issue of the war in the
Peninsula, the vast colonial empire of Spain could never be his, and
the resources which still continued to arrive from thence were enjoyed
by the legitimate government. Whereever his authority extended, trade
was at an end, the people were impoverished, and the sources of revenue
destroyed. The first-fruits of plunder also had now been consumed.
Andalusia, indeed, offered a harvest as yet untouched, and which would
ere long be at his disposal; but till the opportunity arrived, it was
necessary to glean whatever had been spared in the former pillage. An
edict was issued, denouncing severe punishment against those who should
secrete papers or effects belonging to the suppressed monasteries, and
offering a reward for the discovery of such property, proportionate to
its value. He had previously confiscated the property of all Spaniards
in foreign countries, who should not forthwith return in obedience to
his command; he now called upon those in whose hands property, papers,
or effects had been left by others when forsaking their place of
residence, to deliver them up for the use of the treasury. Any persons
buying or selling gold, silver, or jewels, which had belonged to a
suppressed convent, or to an insurgent, were to be severely punished;
and those who assisted the insurgents in any manner were to be put
to death. Another decree sequestered the revenues of all archbishops
and bishops, and appointed pensions from the state instead. Another
commanded all persons possessing plate to the amount of more than ten
dollars, except in plates, knives, and spoons, to give in an account
thereof within three days; the mint was immediately to pay a fourth
of its value, and the remainder was promised within four months. All
plate which should be concealed after this edict was to be forfeited,
and a fourth of its value given to the informer; and silversmiths were
forbidden to purchase any articles in silver, except such as were
permitted to be in use by the present decree.
♦MEASURES OF SEVERITY.♦
These measures proved the neediness of the intrusive government. Its
atrocious character had already been amply demonstrated; if farther
proof were needed, it was to be found in a decree by which all persons
whose sons were serving in what it called the insurgent armies were
required to furnish a man to the Intruder’s service for every son, or
a proportionate sum of money; the elder brothers, or other nearest
relations or guardians of those who had no father, were subjected
to the same law; and those who had no money either for procuring
the substitute or paying the fine were to be imprisoned, or sent
into France. But it was reserved for this government to introduce a
new species of barbarity, which had never before been heard of in
war. Kellermann, whom the English had rescued with such difficulty
from the vengeance of the Portugueze at Lisbon, was at this time
governor-general of what the French called Upper Spain, ♦OCT. 28.♦ that
is, of the provinces of Salamanca, Zamora, Toro, Leon, Valladolid,
Palencia, Burgos, Soria, Santander, Biscay, Guipuzcoa, and Alava.
♦KELLERMANN’S EDICT.♦ Throughout this whole tract of country he placed
all horses and mares above a certain height in requisition for the
French armies, ordering them to be taken to the respective country
towns, and there delivered for that purpose; and every horse or mare
below the size named, or under thirty months old, with every mare that
should be three months gone with foal, was to have the left eye put
out by the owner, and to be in other ways rendered unfit for military
service. A fine of four times the value of the beast was to be exacted
from any one who disobeyed this edict, and all French officers were
charged to see it carried into execution. Nothing can more strikingly
evince their moral degradation, than that their general should have
ordered them to enforce the execution ♦MEASURES OF JOSEPH’S MINISTERS.♦
of an edict like this. These were the measures pursued in the name of
a King who was represented as being equally philosophic and humane,
who was to remedy all the evils of long misrule, to relieve the people
from all grievances, restore Spain to its ancient prosperity, and
confer upon it a happiness which it had never before enjoyed! In an
unhappy hour had Joseph’s ministers entered his service, persuading, or
seeking to persuade, themselves that they might benefit their country
by giving their countenance to a perfidious and odious usurpation. The
ablest men who have ever endeavoured to do good by evil means, have
felt their best intentions frustrated in the attempt. These ministers,
worthy, as under other circumstances they might have been of their
station, found themselves now the mere instrument of that very military
power which they had flattered themselves that they should be allowed
to direct. Still, however, seeking some excuse to their own hearts,
and to posterity, they took advantage of the time for attempting
alterations, which would have been most salutary if the nation had been
prepared for them, ... but for which it was so little prepared, that
the premature attempt only attached the Spaniards the more to the very
evils from which it was intended to deliver them. One sweeping decree
abolished all the regular orders in Spain, whether monastic, mendicant,
or clerical; the individuals belonging to them were ordered to quit
their convents within fifteen days, resume their secular habits, and
repair to their native places, where pensions were promised them. It
was certain that the intrusive government had neither the means nor
the intention of paying these pensions; but the whole property of the
suppressed orders was seized for the use of the state. The reason
assigned for this measure in the preamble to the decree was, that these
communities had taken a hostile part against the government, which,
while it thus abolished them, wished to recompense those individuals
who had conducted themselves well. Better reasons, Urquijo and his
colleagues well knew, would only have exasperated a people whose souls
were thoroughly enslaved to the superstitions which debased them;
but the cause which was thus assigned exasperated them as much, and
this feeling was kept up and disseminated every where by the ejected
members, who, wherever they went, excited the compassion of their
countrymen and inflamed their hatred of the intrusive government. Some
prudence as well as humanity was shown, by exempting the nuns from this
decree; they were subjected to the ordinary, and forbidden to receive
pupils. The military orders were abolished also, except that of the
Golden Fleece, and the one which the intrusive government had itself
instituted. This was needlessly offending the national pride, which was
in like manner wounded by the removal of the tax raised under the name
of the _Voto de Santiago_; the relief, even had circumstances allowed
it to be felt, would not have compensated for the outrage upon Spanish
feeling. In taking away the privilege of sanctuary, and suppressing all
ecclesiastical jurisdiction in civil and criminal cases, the ministers
acted as they would have wished to do, had they held their offices by
a better tenure; and in making strangulation the mode of death for all
criminals of whatever rank, and decreeing that degradation was implied
in the sentence. But when an edict affected to abolish all dignities
and titles which had not been conferred by the Intruder, and required
the traitorous nobles in his service to receive from him a confirmation
of the peerage which they had disgraced, the futility of the decree
only provoked contempt.
♦THE CENTRAL JUNTA ANNOUNCE THAT THE CORTES WILL BE ASSEMBLED.♦
Joseph’s ministers had leisure for legislative speculations and for
dreams of reformation. The real business of government was not in
their hands; in all essential points they were mere ciphers, and
seemed to feel that they were so. The Central Junta was in a situation
as much more trying as it was more honourable. The difficulties
and embarrassments of every kind with which they were beset might
have confused heads more experienced in affairs of state; and their
exertions under the pressure of immediate danger left them little
time for those measures of effectual reform, which Spain so greatly
needed, but which were looked for more eagerly by the British nation
than by the Spaniards, for as a people the Spaniards were contented
with their old system, and attached to it even with all its evils and
abominations. The general wish in England was that the Cortes should be
convened, and this was desired as sincerely by the British government
as by Jovellanos and those other noble minded Spaniards who hoped
through regular and constitutional means to restore the liberty and the
prosperity of their country. It was long after the installation of the
Junta before the disasters of the day allowed them leisure for thinking
of the morrow. To this their delay in taking measures for assembling
the Cortes must be ascribed, more than to their love of power, which
they were ill able to wield, or of the patronage which they unworthily
bestowed. But to these motives the delay was imputed; and by not
following the advice of Jovellanos when the act would have appeared
spontaneous and graceful, they lost the opportunity of obtaining that
popularity which even the semblance of disinterestedness is sure to
acquire. It was not till eight months after their installation that a
decree came forth for re-establishing the legal representation of the
monarchy in its ancient Cortes. The time was left indefinite, but the
edict said it would be convoked in the course of the ensuing year, or
earlier, if circumstances should permit.
The language of the Supreme Junta on this, as on every other occasion,
was worthy of the position in which the national government was placed,
and of the principles on which it professed to act. “The Spanish
people,” they said, “must leave to their posterity an inheritance
worthy of the sacrifices which were made for obtaining it. The Supreme
Junta had never lost sight of this object; and the progress of the
enemy, which had hitherto occupied their whole attention, rendered
more bitter the reflection, that all their disasters were solely owing
to the disuse of those institutions which, in happier times, secured
the welfare and the strength of the state. The ambition of some, and
the indolence of others, had reduced those institutions to nothing;
and the Junta, from the moment of its installation, solemnly bound
itself to restore them. The time was now arrived for this great work.
Desirous, therefore, that the nation should appear with the dignity
due to its heroic efforts; that the rights of the people should be
placed beyond the reach of encroachments; and that the sources of
public felicity should run freely as soon as the war ceased, and repair
whatever inveterate arbitrary power had scorched, or the present
devastation had destroyed, the Junta decreed, that the Cortes should
be re-established, and would immediately proceed to consider the
method of convening it; for which end it would nominate a committee of
five of its members. It would also investigate, in order to propose
them to the nation assembled in Cortes, the means of supporting the
holy war in which they were engaged; of insuring the observance of
their fundamental laws; of meliorating the legislation and abolishing
the abuses which had crept into it; of collecting and administering
the revenue, and of reforming the system of public education. And
to combine the information necessary for such discussions, it would
consult the councils, provincial Juntas, tribunals, magistracies,
corporations, bishops, and universities, and the opinion of intelligent
and enlightened persons.”
♦DECLARATION WHICH WAS FIRST PROPOSED.♦
A declaration in stronger terms had been submitted to the Junta, and
rejected by them at the instigation of Mr. Frere. “Spaniards,” it
was there said, “it is three ages since the laws on which the nation
founded its defence against tyranny have been destroyed. Our fathers
did not know how to preserve the liberty which had been bequeathed to
them; and although all the provinces of Spain successively struggled
to defend it, evil stars rendered their efforts useless. The laws,
from that time forward, have been only an expression more or less
tyrannical, or beneficent, of a particular will. Providence, as if
to punish the loss of that prerogative of free men, has paralysed
our valour, arrested the progress of our intellect, and impeded our
civilization, till we have come to that condition, that an insolent
tyrant formed the project of subduing the greatest nation of the globe,
without reckoning upon its will, and even despising its existence.
In vain has the prince sometimes attempted to remedy some of the
evils of the state: buildings cannot be erected on sand, and without
fundamental and constituted laws, it is useless for the philosopher
in his study, or the statesman in the theatre of business, to exert
himself for the good of the people. The best projects are not put in
execution, or not carried through. Good suggestions are followed by
evil ones; economy and order, by prodigality and rapine; a prudent and
mild minister, by an avaricious and foolish favourite; and thus the
ship of the state floats without sails and helm, till, as has happened
to the Spanish monarchy, it is dashed to pieces on a rock. How, but
by the re-establishment of freedom, could that blood be recompensed
which flows in every part of the Peninsula; those sacrifices which
Spanish loyalty is offering every instant; that moral resistance, as
universal as it is sublime, which disconcerts our enemies, and renders
them hopeless even in the midst of their victories? When this dreadful
contest is concluded, the Spaniard shall say proudly to himself, ‘My
fathers left me slavery and wretchedness for my inheritance; I leave
to my descendants liberty and glory.’ Spaniards, this is the feeling
which, by reflection in some, and by instinct in all, animates you now;
and it shall not be defrauded of its expectations. Our detractors say
that we are fighting to defend old abuses, and the inveterate vices of
our corrupted government; let them know that your struggle is for the
happiness, as well as the independence of your country; that you will
not depend henceforward on the uncertain will or the variable temper
of a single man; nor continue to be the plaything of a court without
justice, under the control of an insolent favourite, or a capricious
woman; but that on the edifice of your ancient laws you will rear a
barrier between despotism and your sacred rights. This barrier consists
in a constitution to aid and support the monarch when he is just, and
to restrain him when he follows evil councils. Without a constitution
all reform is precarious, all prosperity uncertain; without it the
people are no more than flocks of slaves, put in motion at the order
of a will, frequently unjust, and always unrestrained; without it
the forces of the whole society, which should procure the greatest
advantages for all its members, are employed exclusively to satisfy the
ambition, or satiate the frenzy of a few, or perhaps of one.”
♦OBJECTIONS BY MR. FRERE.♦