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HISTORY
OF THE
PENINSULAR WAR.
G. WOODFALL, ANGEL COURT, SKINNER STREET, LONDON.
HISTORY
OF THE
PENINSULAR WAR.
“Unto thee
“Let thine own times as an old story be.”
DONNE.
BY ROBERT SOUTHEY, ESQ. LL.D.
POET LAUREATE,
HONORARY MEMBER OF THE ROYAL SPANISH ACADEMY, OF THE
ROYAL SPANISH ACADEMY OF HISTORY, OF THE ROYAL
INSTITUTE OF THE NETHERLANDS, OF THE
CYMMRODORION, OF THE MASSACHUSETTS
HISTORICAL SOCIETY, ETC.
A NEW EDITION.
_IN SIX VOLUMES._
VOL. IV.
LONDON:
JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE-STREET.
MDCCCXXVIII.
Ἱστορίας γὰρ ἐὰν ἀφέλῃ τις τὸ διὰ τί, καὶ πῶς, καὶ τίνος χάριν ἐπράχθη,
καὶ τὸ πραχθὲν πότερα εὔλογον ἔσχε τὸ τέλος, τὸ καταλειπόμενον αὐτῆς
ἀγώνισμα μὲν, μάθημα δὲ οὐ γίγνεται· καὶ παραυτίκα μὲν τέρπει, πρὸς δὲ
τὸ μέλλον οὐδὲν ὠφελεῖ τὸ παράπαν.
POLYBIUS, lib. iii. sect. 31.
CONTENTS.
CHAPTER XXIV.
PAGE
Victor retreats across the Tagus 1
Alburquerque proposed for the command in La Mancha 2
Plan of detaching a Spanish force toward Segovia 4
Jealousy entertained of Cuesta 5
Sir Arthur confers with Cuesta 6
He requires that the passages toward the north be occupied 7
Junction of the British and Spanish armies 8
Opportunity of attacking the French lost by Cuesta’s indecision 9
Distress of the British army for means of transport 10
Sir Arthur halts 12
Cuesta advances in pursuit of the French 12
Junction of Joseph and Sebastiani with Victor 13
Cuesta’s vanguard attacked by the French 14
Alburquerque saves Cuesta from defeat 15
Cuesta retreats to the Alberche 16
Sir Arthur prevails on him to cross that river 16
Position of the allies in front of Talavera 17
Sir Arthur nearly made prisoner 18
Battle of Talavera 19
Cuesta decimates some of his troops 29
State of Talavera 31
Movements of Sir Robert Wilson 32
Movements of Soult, Ney, and Mortier 33
Cuesta neglects to secure the passes 33
Intelligence of Soult’s advance 34
Soult occupies Plasencia 35
Sir Arthur marches against him 36
Cuesta determines to follow Sir Arthur 38
Cuesta joins the British 39
They retreat across the Tagus 40
Colonel Mackinnon removes part of the wounded 41
Defeat of the Spaniards at Arzobispo 43
Movements of Marshal Ney 45
Action with Sir Robert Wilson at the Puerto de Baños 46
The French enter Talavera 48
Victor behaves well to the English wounded 49
Murder of the Bishop of Coria 50
Venegas’s army kept inactive before and after the battle of
Talavera 51
His useless attempt upon Toledo 53
He complains of Cuesta 55
The Intruder’s movements after the battle 56
Venegas prepares to fight at Aranjuez 57
Aranjuez and its gardens 59
The French repulsed there 63
Deliberations concerning the army of La Mancha 63
Venegas resolves to attack the enemy 65
The French attack him 66
Battle of Almonacid 67
CHAPTER XXV.
Soult proposes to invade Portugal 71
Sir Arthur Wellesley raised to the Peerage 74
Marquis Wellesley arrives in Spain 75
Distress of the army for provisions 75
Disputes with Cuesta concerning supplies 77
Mr. Frere requires the removal of Cuesta 80
Cuesta resigns the command 82
Eguia succeeds _ad interim_ 84
Calvo sent to see to the supplies 85
Lord Wellington declares his intention of falling back 86
Correspondence with Eguia and Calvo 88
Marquis Wellesley proposes a plan for supplying the armies 91
His ill opinion of the Spanish government 93
Lord Wellington objects to taking a position on the Guadiana 95
Alburquerque appointed to the command in Extremadura 96
Lord Wellington withdraws to Badajoz 98
Expedition to Walcheren 100
Inquiry into the conduct of the Duke of York 101
Changes in the British ministry 102
Lords Grey and Grenville refuse to join it 103
Disposition of the French and Spanish armies 105
Neediness of the intrusive government 106
Measures of severity 108
Kellermann’s edict 108
Measures of Joseph’s ministers 109
The Central Junta announces that the Cortes will be assembled 112
Declaration which was first proposed 114
Objections to it by Mr. Frere 117
Unpopularity of the Central Junta 119
Their difficulties and errors 120
Scheme for overthrowing them 127
Commission appointed by the Junta 128
Romana’s address 129
Reply of the Junta 136
Guerillas 144
D. Julian Sanchez 145
The French repulsed from Astorga 147
Battle of Tamames 148
The French retire from Salamanca 149
Marshal Soult appointed Major-General 150
The Junta resolve on risking a general action 150
Areizaga appointed to the command 151
State of Madrid 152
Condition of the British army 154
Disposition of the French troops 155
Areizaga advances from the Sierra Morena 157
The Austrian commissioner remonstrates against his purpose 158
Battle of Ocaña 159
Treatment of the prisoners 162
Battle of Alba de Tormes 164
CHAPTER XXVI.
Gerona 167
Strength of the garrison 170
Crusaders enrolled 170
Company of S. Barbara 170
St. Narcis appointed Generalissimo 171
All mention of a capitulation forbidden 172
St. Cyr would have reduced the city by blockade 173
The bombardment begins 174
St. Cyr draws nearer Gerona 176
S. Feliu de Guixols and Palamos taken by the French 177
Assault of Monjuic 178
Succours intercepted 182
The ravelin taken 184
Monjuic abandoned 185
Verdier expects the town to fall 186
Battery planted on the cathedral 187
Distress of the city 189
Attempt to introduce succours 189
Garcia Conde enters with reinforcements 191
Inadequacy of this relief 192
Los Angeles taken and the garrison put to the sword 194
Unsuccessful sally 195
The French repulsed in a general assault 196
St. Cyr resolves to reduce the city by famine 201
O’Donnell enters the city 202
Failure of the attempt to relieve it 203
St. Cyr gives up the command to Augereau 204
O’Donnell effects his retreat 205
Magazines at Hostalrich taken by the French 207
Augereau offers favourable terms 208
Destruction of a French convoy by the British ships 209
Increased distress in the city 211
Report concerning the state of health 212
Some of the outworks taken by the French 214
Last sally 215
Alvarez becomes delirious 216
Capitulation 217
Death of Alvarez 220
Eroles escapes 221
CHAPTER XXVII.
Buonaparte divorces the Empress Josephine 222
Farther requisition for the armies in Spain 224
Display of Spanish flags at Paris 225
Address of the Central Junta to the nation 227
State of public opinion in England 233
Lord Wellington’s views with regard to Portugal 235
The King’s speech 236
Earl St. Vincent 237
Lord Grenville 238
Honourable Mr. Ward 239
Mr. Ponsonby 240
Mr. Whitbread 240
Mr. Perceval 242
Vote of thanks to Lord Wellington opposed by the Earl of Suffolk 244
Earl Grosvenor 244
Earl Grey 244
Marquis Wellesley 244
Lord Grenville 247
General Tarleton 247
Mr. Whitbread 248
Pension voted for Lord Wellington 248
Opposed by Sir Francis Burdett 249
Mr. Whitbread 250
Mr. Wilberforce 251
Mr. Canning 251
The Common Council petition against the pension 252
Marquis of Lansdowne 254
Lord Holland 255
Marquis Wellesley 257
CHAPTER XXVIII.
Supineness of the Central Junta 264
Romana refuses the command 266
Montijo and D. Francisco Palafox imprisoned 266
Attempts to produce a false confidence 267
Scheme of Count Tilly 268
The Junta announce their intention to remove 270
Murmurs at Seville 272
Invasion of Andalusia 273
The French pass the Sierra Morena 274
False hopes held out to the people by the Central Junta 274
Instructions to Alburquerque 275
Insurrection at Seville against the Central Junta 277
Saavedra takes upon himself the temporary authority 279
The French enter Seville 279
They overrun Andalusia 280
They push for Cadiz 281
Alburquerque’s movements 282
Cadiz saved by Alburquerque 284
He is appointed governor of Cadiz by the people 284
A Junta elected at Cadiz 285
Resignation of the Central Junta 286
A Regency appointed 288
Last address of the Central Junta 289
The Regents 295
Their injustice toward the members of the Central Junta 296
Proclamation of the Intruder 299
Language of the despondents in England 301
The Isle of Leon 303
Victor summons the Junta of Cadiz 306
Ill will of the Junta towards Alburquerque 307
The troops neglected 308
Alburquerque applies to the Regency in their behalf 310
The Junta publish an attack against Alburquerque 311
He resigns the command, and is sent ambassador to England 312
CHAPTER XXIX.
The Regency 314
Schemes for delivering Ferdinand 316
Baron de Kolli’s attempt 316
Overtures for peace 321
Buonaparte’s intention of establishing a Western Empire 323
Money voted for the Portugueze army 326
Debates upon this subject 326
Marquis Wellesley 326
Lord Grenville 328
Lord Liverpool 332
Earl Moira 333
Lord Sidmouth 334
Marquis of Lansdowne 334
Lord Erskine 335
Lord Holland 335
Mr. Perceval 338
Sir John Newport 339
Mr. Villiers 339
Mr. Curwen 340
Mr. Leslie Foster 340
General Ferguson 349
Mr. Fitzgerald 350
Lord Milton 350
Mr. Bankes 350
Mr. Jacob 351
Mr. Whitbread 352
Mr. Huskisson 354
Mr. Bathurst 354
Reform in the Portugueze army 356
CHAPTER XXX.
O’Donnell appointed to the command in Catalonia 367
Garcia Conde made governor of Lerida 367
Rapid promotion in the Spanish armies 368
Conduct of the people of Villadrau 369
Hostalrich 371
Commencement of the siege 372
First success of O’Donnell 373
Desertion from the French army 373
Want of concert between the provinces 374
Negligence of the Valencian government 376
The force on the Valencian frontier dispersed 377
Suchet advances against Valencia 378
He retreats 380
Conspiracy discovered in that city 381
The French boast of success 382
O’Donnell’s successful operations 383
Siege of Hostalrich 387
Retreat of the garrison 390
Las Medas and Lerida surrendered 394
Augereau superseded by Marshal Macdonald 395
Fort Matagorda taken by the French 396
Storm at Cadiz 398
Cruel usage of the French prisoners in the bay 399
Escape of the prison ships 400
Insurrection and massacre of the prisoners at Majorca 402
Prisoners sent to Cabrera 402
Their inhuman treatment there 403
Marshal Soult’s edict 404
Counter edict of the Regency 405
CHAPTER XXXI.
Inactivity before Cadiz 407
The Regents send for Cuesta 407
Badajoz secured by Romana 408
The British take a position on the frontiers of Beira 408
Astorga summoned by the French 410
Siege of Astorga 411
Its surrender 412
Affair at Barba del Puerco 414
Massena appointed to the army of Portugal 415
Ciudad Rodrigo 416
The French besiege it 417
D. Julian Sanchez 418
Marshal Ney summons the place 418
Situation of Lord Wellington 420
Spirit of the inhabitants 420
Nunnery of S. Cruz attacked 421
Convent of S. Domingo recovered 422
Julian Sanchez effects his escape from the city 423
State of the British army 425
A practicable breach made 426
The place capitulates 428
Conduct of the French 429
Speculations upon the campaign 431
La Puebla de Sanabria occupied by the French 434
The Portugueze retake it 436
CHAPTER XXXII.
Massena’s proclamation to the Portugueze 440
The French invest Almeida 441
Almeida 442
Fort Conception abandoned 444
Affair on the Coa 445
Desponding letters from the army 448
Apprehensions expressed in England 450
Ney summons the governor of Almeida 451
Portugueze officers in Massena’s army 452
The Portugueze ordered to retire before the enemy 454
Siege of Almeida 455
Surrender of the place 456
The Portugueze prisoners enlist and desert 457
Condemnation of their conduct 458
Militia forced into the French service 459
They escape and rejoin the allies 460
Changes in the Portugueze Regency 461
Conduct of the Portugueze government 463
Arbitrary arrests at Lisbon 465
Apprehensions of the British government 467
Movements of Regnier’s corps, and of General Hill 470
Massena advances into Portugal 471
Ney and Regnier join him at Celorico 472
The French army collected at Viseu 474
Lord Wellington crosses to the Serra de Busaco 474
Busaco 476
Battle of Busaco 478
Behaviour of the Portugueze troops 482
Massena marches into the Porto road 484
Colonel Trant’s movements 485
The allies withdraw from Busaco 487
Trant retreats to the Vouga 487
The allies cross the Mondego 489
Flight of the inhabitants from Coimbra 490
The French enter Coimbra 490
The Portugueze people fly before the enemy 491
Hopes and expectations of the French 493
Confusion at Condeixa 494
Leiria forsaken 495
Alcobaça forsaken by the monks 496
Surprise at Alcoentre 497
The French discover the lines 498
Feelings of the British army 499
Lines of Torres Vedras 500
Romana joins the allies 504
Trant surprises the French in Coimbra 504
He escorts his prisoners to Porto 507
Difficulties of Massena’s situation 509
His demonstrations in front of the lines 511
Montbrun sent against Abrantes 512
The French army subsists by plunder 513
Deserters form themselves into a corps of plunderers 515
State of Lisbon 516
Opinions of the opposition in England 517
General La Croix killed 518
Massena retreats from the lines 520
Lord Wellington advances to Santarem 521
Both armies go into cantonments 522
The King’s illness 523
Proceedings concerning a Regency 525
Mr. Perceval 527
Troops sent to Portugal 530
Issues of money required 531
Conduct of Lord Grenville as Auditor of the Exchequer 532
State of the opposition 536
Their expectations 538
Language of the anarchists 538
Mr. Perceval popular at this time 542
Schemes for a new ministry 544
The King’s opinion during an interval of amendment 545
The Prince Regent announces his intention of making no change 546
Mr. Perceval’s reply 547
HISTORY
OF THE
PENINSULAR WAR.
CHAPTER XXIV.
SIR A. WELLESLEY ENTERS SPAIN. BATTLE OF TALAVERA. RETREAT OF THE
BRITISH ARMY. DEFEAT OF THE SPANIARDS AT PUENTE DEL ARZOBISPO
AND ALMONACID.
♦1809.♦
♦VICTOR RETREATS BEYOND THE TAGUS.♦
The head-quarters of Marshal Victor, after he returned from his
movement in favour of Soult to his former position, were at Truxillo:
Cuesta was on his left flank, having his head-quarters at Fuente del
Maestro, and his advance at Calemonte on the Guadiana, a league from
Merida. The British General had formed a plan for cutting off the
enemy’s retreat by a movement through Castello Branco and Plasencia
to the bridge of Almaraz; this he relinquished, because it did not
coincide with Cuesta’s opinion, and because he found it impossible
to prevail upon that general to choose a secure position, or to
concentrate his army, which was distributed with so little judgement
in an open country, that if Victor had attacked it, an easier victory
might have been obtained than that of Medellin. The French have
seldom suffered such opportunities to pass, and Sir Arthur was very
apprehensive that the army, which had been raised with such exertions,
would be dispersed before he could effect a junction with it. But
Victor was content to forego this advantage rather than risk the
danger of being cut off from Madrid by such an operation as Sir Arthur
had meditated; he broke up, therefore, at the beginning of June,
and retreated across the Tagus at Almaraz; Cuesta followed, without
obtaining any advantage over him in his retreat, and sufficiently
fortunate that the French Marshal was in too much fear of a better
army, to profit by the want of discipline in the Spaniards and the want
of skill in their commander.
♦ALBURQUERQUE PROPOSED FOR THE COMMAND IN LA MANCHA.♦
When Sir Arthur had given up his original plan, it was concerted that
he should join Cuesta at Badajoz. Victor’s retreat rendered this
unnecessary; it was then agreed that he should advance, as he had at
first proposed, by way of Plasencia. The army of La Mancha at this
time, consisting of 16,000 foot and 1300 horse, was under Venegas,
subject to Cuesta’s orders. This was the side on which the French
were most exposed; Alburquerque, by one operation, though it had only
partially succeeded, had retarded the plans of the enemy for more than
a month, and, had he not been withheld by the positive orders of men
who were unworthy to control him, there is reason for believing that he
would have prevented many of the disasters which afterwards occurred.
His patriotism was undoubted; no man, indeed, ever more passionately
loved his country: his military talents were of the highest promise;
and when these moral advantages concurred, his rank and illustrious
family ought to have been considered as circumstances to recommend him,
giving him, as they would have done, additional claims to the respect
of the army and of the nation. With both he was exceedingly popular,
especially among the La Manchans; and having been a successful general,
almost the only one who had obtained any success, the soldiers had
an opinion of his good fortune as well as of his talents. Mr. Frere,
who estimated the Duke as he deserved, was exceedingly desirous that
he should have the command in La Mancha, and suggested it to Cuesta.
“An army,” he said, “which had been torn by factions, thrown into
confusion by the successive removal of its officers, and discouraged
by ill fortune, could have no hope of being speedily re-established
and conducted to victory, except by a general who was known to them
for his successes, and who was personally popular among them, and in
the province wherein he was to act. The Duque de Alburquerque was the
only one who united in himself these advantages; and for the situation
which he at present held, Venegas would not be less useful, having
always served under General Cuesta, and not only near his person,
but immediately under his eyes.” Unhappily Cuesta was jealous of the
Duke’s popularity; and the Supreme Junta were jealous of his rank and
influence. Mr. Frere’s advice was rejected, and this may be considered
as one cause of the failure of the campaign.
♦PLAN OF DETACHING A SPANISH FORCE TOWARD SEGOVIA.♦
It had at first been doubted whether the French would make any thing
more than a show of resistance on this side of Madrid; and a plan was
proposed for menacing their retreat and the rear of the metropolis, by
detaching a considerable Spanish corps through the Puerto de Arenas
to Avila, Arevalo, and Segovia. Such a movement, it was thought,
would compel the enemy either to retreat, or to detach a force of
correspondent magnitude; and thus a material advantage would be
afforded to the British army, which, when concentrated, amounted only
to 20,000 men. Cuesta had about 38,000, well armed but ill disciplined,
and ill clothed also, which, in their state of discipline, was an evil
of more consequence than may immediately be obvious. The Intruder, with
9000 of his guards, and the greater part of the garrison of Madrid,
had joined Sebastiani in La Mancha, and attempted to bring Venegas to
action; finding this in vain, they left 2000 men to defend Toledo, and
prepared to bring their whole disposable force, consisting of about
50,000, against the united Spanish and British armies. But the Spanish
army was in such a state, that little could be expected from its
co-operation: a smaller force would, under such circumstances, be of
greater assistance, as being more manageable and more likely to follow
the example and catch the spirit of their better disciplined allies.
If, therefore, a large detachment of these troops, by moving toward
Segovia, could draw off a body of the French to watch them, they would
render more service by such a diversion than could be expected from
them in the field. For this reason such a movement was advised both by
Sir Arthur and Mr. Frere; that minister not being deterred from the
performance of his duty by the clamour raised against him in England,
but delivering his opinion to the British general upon the same
footing, he said, as he should have done had he been holding a private
conversation with Sir Arthur, and as he should equally have ventured
to do had he been residing ♦JEALOUSY ENTERTAINED OF CUESTA.♦ casually
in Spain in a private character. There was another reason which made
the Junta wish to see Cuesta’s army diminished. A suspicion had for
some time prevailed that Cuesta had not forgiven his arrest, and that
the same temper which led him to those violent measures whereby he
had provoked that act of vigour, would tempt him to take some serious
vengeance whenever it was in his power. This, it was thought, was more
to be apprehended now than at any former time, because the army which
his rival, Blake, commanded, had just at this time been shamefully
dispersed, and thus the great obstacle to such a project was removed.
The Junta were afraid to supersede Cuesta, even if they knew whom to
appoint in his place; and they were afraid even to propose this measure
of detaching a part of his army, under a commander of sufficient
popularity to oppose his designs: but it was not doubted that if such a
measure were proposed by the British General as a military plan, they
would joyfully accede to it.
Cuesta was wronged by these suspicions; ... he was obstinate,
intractable, and unfit for command; but a right honest man, and one
who, from a sense of duty as well as from natural courage, would at any
time have laid down his ♦JULY 10. SIR ARTHUR CONFERS WITH CUESTA.♦
life for the service of Spain. Sir Arthur, whose head-quarters were now
at Plasencia, went to confer with him at Almaraz. Fourteen thousand of
the Spaniards were at this time stationed at the Puente del Arzobispo;
the remainder were about two miles from the bridge of Almaraz, encamped
under the Pass of Miravete. Victor had taken up a position upon the
Alberche, near Talavera. There, Sir Arthur stated his opinion, the
enemy ought to be attacked by the united force of the allies; but it
would be desirable to detach a corps of 10,000 towards Avila to turn
their right: Cuesta approved the proposal, but desired they might be
British troops. Sir Arthur replied, that the British ♦1809. JULY.♦
army, to act with advantage, must act in a body; and the Spaniards
could better spare such a detachment, being indeed more numerous than
was either necessary for the operations on the Alberche, or convenient,
considering their state of discipline. These representations were lost
upon Cuesta, who estimated his own importance by the numbers under
his command; he refused to make any large detachment, but offered
to send two battalions of infantry and a few cavalry to join Sir R.
Wilson’s Portugueze brigade, and march upon Arenas, and thence to
Escalona, in communication with the left of the British army. Had Sir
Arthur’s advice been followed, it was his intention to have recommended
Alburquerque to the command; but it was the fate of Spain to be almost
always deprived of the services of this brave and able general by the
jealousy of meaner minds.
♦HE REQUIRES THAT THE PASSES BE OCCUPIED.♦
Sir Arthur proposed also that the Spaniards should occupy the passes at
Perales and Baños, and thus cut off the communication between Victor
and the French forces in the north of Spain. It was neither known what
the amount of that force might be, nor where it was distributed, nor
in what condition it was: but the march of Mortier with some 15,000
men from Aragon to their assistance had been ascertained, and it was
certain therefore that a movement might be apprehended from that
quarter. The proposal was received with some ill humour on Cuesta’s
part, for he was surrounded by intriguers, some of whom perhaps sought
to serve the enemy by embroiling the allies, and others who, having as
much national pride as professional ignorance, had as much selfishness
as either; these persons had persuaded the hasty old man that Sir
Arthur sought to weaken the Spanish army by dividing it, in order to
obtain for himself the glory of expelling the French from Madrid, which
was now, they represented, within Cuesta’s reach. He was prevailed
upon however, by his Adjutant-General, O’Donoju, to promise that this
should be done; and if the performance fell far short, the detachment
being incompetent in force, and almost wholly unprovided, the failure
must be imputed to his erring judgement and the disorderly state of the
commissariat department, not to any want of faith or perverse purpose
on his part.
♦JUNCTION OF THE BRITISH AND SPANISH ARMIES.♦
In pursuance of the arrangements at this interview, the British army
broke up from Plasencia on the 17th and 18th of July, and formed a
junction with Cuesta on the 20th at Oropesa. Sir R. Wilson marched from
his position on the Tietar on the 15th, and reached Escalona on the
23d, threatening Madrid on that side, from which he was about eight
leagues distant. Venegas had been directed to break up from Madrilejos
at the same time as the British army, march by Tembleque and Ocaña,
cross the Tagus by the ford at Fuente Duenas, and advance to Arganda,
so to threaten Madrid, which would then be within a few hours’ march.
Had this plan been followed, either a considerable body of the French
must have been detached against Venegas, or he would have entered the
capital without resistance.
♦OPPORTUNITY OF ATTACKING THE FRENCH.♦
But Sir Arthur was destined throughout the campaign to have his
plans continually frustrated by the misconduct of those from whom he
looked for cordial co-operation. On the 22d the combined armies moved
from Oropesa, and the advance attacked Victor’s rear-guard, which
was drawn up in order of battle, upon a plain about a league from
Talavera. Their right wing was turned by Brigadier-General Anson,
and Alburquerque attacked them in front, and drove them back. They
retreated to a position upon the Alberche, a league beyond the town,
and the combined armies advanced, and encamped that night in the vine
and olive-yards between the town and the French. Sir Arthur had a
narrow escape that day; while he was reconnoitring, a three-pound shot
was fired at him with so good an aim, that it cut a bough from a tree
close to his head. He determined to attack the enemy the following
morning, and bring Victor to action before he should be joined by
Sebastiani and the Intruder. Nothing could be more favourable to his
views than this unskilful halt of the enemy, an opportunity being thus
presented for beating them, as he had hoped, in detail. The columns
were formed for this purpose at an early hour, and at five in the
morning they received orders to march. But when Cuesta was informed
of the determination which had been taken, no arguments could induce
him to make up his mind, and give the ♦LOST BY CUESTA’S INDECISION.♦
necessary instructions: at midnight he remained undecided, and the
orders therefore were necessarily countermanded, ... not more to the
disappointment of the army, than to the sore vexation of the General,
who knew the whole importance of the opportunity which had thus been
lost. So unaccountable was this conduct in Cuesta, that it has been
supposed he scrupled at fighting upon a Sunday. Whatever his reasons
were, they have never been explained, and could not have been more
valid than this would have been: but thus the fair occasion was let
pass; for when, on the morning of the 24th, he was ready to offer
battle, it appeared that Victor, profiting by the precious time which
had been given him, had decamped during the night, and retired to St.
Olalla, and from thence towards Torrejos, to effect that meditated
junction which Sir Arthur’s measures would have frustrated.
♦DISTRESS OF THE BRITISH ARMY FOR WANT OF TRANSPORT.♦
This retreat surprised Cuesta as much as if his own procrastination
had not deprived Spain of the victory which prompter measures would
have secured. The British General had foreseen the consequence of so
ill-timed a delay, and the disappointment was the more grievous because
he could not pursue the French. From the hour in which he entered
Spain he had never been able to procure means of transport: ... he
required none for the baggage of individuals, ... only for provisions,
ammunition, money, and military stores, things indispensable for an
army: and these were not to be obtained. The country was in a state of
total disorganization; and what was more extraordinary, the government
seemed to be totally ignorant of this, and to suppose that nothing more
was required of it than to issue edicts, which would be carried into
effect as if things were in their ordinary course. This inconvenience
had been so severely felt, that Sir Arthur, before he left Plasencia,
informed Cuesta it would be impossible for him to undertake any farther
operations after their arrangements against Victor should have been
carried into effect, unless the necessary means of transport were
supplied. Justice to his Majesty, and to the army with which he had
been intrusted, required this determination, he said, and he was
equally bound in justice to communicate it to General Cuesta without
delay. The means which he required were such as every country in which
an army was acting was bound to afford; and if the people of Spain were
either unwilling or unable to supply what the British army required,
they must do without its services. This declaration had been made as
early as the 16th; a week had now elapsed, there had not been the
slightest effort to remedy the evil, and from the same cause the troops
were now in actual want of provisions. For the Spanish commissariat was
in the most deplorable state; and that of the British army, which was
far from being in a good one, could effect nothing in a country where
they exerted no authority themselves, and the government would exert
none for them. The evil was aggravated by the junction of two large
armies, in a country which had scarcely ever been without troops to
exhaust it during the preceding twelve months. When the two combined
armies became competitors for food, the inhabitants naturally preferred
their own countrymen: ... it was afterwards discovered also, that, with
a stupid selfishness, which admits neither of justification or excuse,
they concealed the greater part of their stores from both.
♦SIR ARTHUR HALTS.♦
Thus painfully circumstanced, Sir Arthur could not proceed. He
conceived also that his engagement with Cuesta was fulfilled by the
removal of Victor from the Alberche; for if advantage were duly taken
of that movement, it gave the Spanish General possession of the course
of the Tagus, and opened the communication with La Mancha and Venegas.
He halted from absolute necessity, and he determined even to return
to Portugal, if he were not properly supplied. Cuesta appeared fully
sensible of the propriety of this determination, and trusting that good
fortune would put him in possession of Madrid, which now seemed just
within his reach, he, having means of transport in abundance, ♦CUESTA
ADVANCES IN PURSUIT OF VICTOR.♦ advanced four leagues in pursuit of
Victor, to the village of Bravo; Sir Arthur, meantime, taking up a
position at Talavera, to wait the issue of a movement which was
undertaken against his opinion, moved two divisions of infantry and a
brigade of cavalry, under General Sherbrooke, across the Alberche to
Casalegas, to keep up the communication with Cuesta and with Sir Robert
Wilson. Near that village the body of a Spanish peasant was found, whom
the French soldiers had a little before burnt, or rather scorched to
death. It lay with the arms lifted and the hands clenched, as if in the
act of prayer, the features distorted, and the whole corpse stiffened
in one dreadful expression of agony!
♦JUNCTION OF JOSEPH AND SEBASTIANI WITH VICTOR.♦
Joseph Buonaparte and Marshal Jourdan left Madrid on the 23d, and
halted that night at Navalcarnero, designing to form a junction with
Victor at Casalegas, and to order Sebastiani thither as soon as that
general, in pursuance of his instructions, should have returned from
Consuegra and Madrilejos, where he was watching Venegas, to Toledo.
Another object which Jourdan had in view was to check Sir Robert
Wilson, whose force he supposed to be considerably greater than it was,
and of whose enterprising spirit the French stood in fear. But Victor,
who was well informed of the plans of his enemies, perceived, that if
he fell back upon Navalcarnero to join the Intruder, it would be easy
to interpose between them and Sebastiani, in which case the junction
of their whole force in this quarter would be rendered exceedingly
difficult, if not impossible. Apprising Joseph, therefore, of his
movements, he retreated to the left bank of the Guadarrama, at its
confluence ♦JULY 25.♦ with the Tagus near Toledo. Sebastiani reached
that city the same day, and the Intruder, marching to the same point,
fixed his head-quarters at Vargas, two leagues distant, so that the
whole force which he could bring against the allies was now united.
It consisted of 45,000 men, after 3000 were left to defend Toledo.
They resolved immediately, now that this great object was effected, to
act upon the offensive; and on the next day they began their march to
Torrejos.
♦CUESTA’S VANGUARD ATTACKED BY THE FRENCH.♦
Cuesta had by this time advanced to St. Olalla. He there learnt that
Victor had turned off towards Toledo; and so far was he from divining
the obvious intent of such a movement, that he supposed the French were
in full retreat, and that he had nothing to do but to pursue them. From
some strange misconception, too, he supposed the English were about to
follow him; they were very short of provisions and means of conveyance,
he informed his own government, but he was doing all in his power to
persuade them of the necessity of putting themselves in motion. He
thus deceived himself and his government, instead of making efforts to
supply the wants of the English army, or assisting them with his own
means of transport. These he possessed in sufficient quantity; and it
was discovered when too late, that food in abundance might have been
procured, had proper means been used for obtaining it. In the morning
of the 25th Cuesta dispatched intelligence that he was in pursuit of
the French; in the evening he discovered that he was in some danger
of being attacked by them, and on the following day his outposts were
assailed in Torrejos, and driven in. General Zayas advanced with the
vanguard to meet the French; he was attacked by Latour Maubourg,
with the French advanced guard, and suffered considerable loss; but
Zayas was a good officer, and maintained his ground against superior
numbers while he sent to require support. ♦ALBURQUERQUE SAVES CUESTA
FROM DEFEAT.♦ Alburquerque had requested that his division might be
the first to support the vanguard, either in case of its attacking
the enemy or being attacked. While Cuesta made arrangements for the
retreat of the whole army beyond the Alberche, the Duque advanced time
enough to save Zayas from complete rout, and the army from that utter
defeat which must necessarily have resulted. The vanguard was flying
at the moment when he arrived; he charged the enemy, checked them, and
gave the van time to re-form, and fall back in good order. But for
this timely success the army would have been dispersed, for all the
artillery and baggage were in the streets of St. Olalla, carts of bread
were there also blocking up the way, the commissaries had taken flight,
and the men, catching that panic which want of order in an army never
fails to occasion on the first approach of danger, had begun to throw
away their arms, that they might neither be incumbered with them in
running away, nor supposed to be soldiers if they were overtaken.
♦CUESTA RETREATS TO THE ALBERCHE.♦
Alburquerque would have pursued his success had he not been compelled
to retreat by repeated orders from the commander-in-chief, at the
moment when he was about to attack a disheartened enemy, with troops
confident in their own courage and in the skill of their leader, and
heated by the advantage which they had gained. He had, however, done
much in saving the army, for never were the movements of an army
conducted in a more wretched and disorderly manner; like a rabble upon
a pilgrimage, such was Alburquerque’s description, they proceeded
without any regard to distance, order, or method, and with the whole
park of artillery; they had neither provisions, staff, nor settled
plan; and they stopped upon their marches to repose like flocks of
sheep, without taking up any position, so that, if the French had known
the condition they were in, defeat must have been inevitable whenever
they were unexpectedly attacked. Saved from that total dispersion which
must have ensued, had not Alburquerque thus checked the French in their
career, the Spanish army retreated twenty miles from St. Olalla to the
Alberche unmolested, thus again forming a junction with the British,
and bivouacked on the left bank. At daybreak Sir Arthur crossed, and
having with some difficulty penetrated to the old General’s tent, found
him asleep there, and the army in that state of disorder which is ♦SIR
ARTHUR PREVAILS ON HIM TO CROSS THAT RIVER.♦ usually consequent upon
a forced retreat. He pointed out the necessity of passing the river
without loss of time, and taking up his ground on the right of the
British position. Fortunately Cuesta yielded to this advice, although
he thought it unlikely that the enemy would venture to attack them:
there was a report that they had detached 15,000 men towards Madrid,
and this strengthened his opinion. In fact, had Venegas performed his
part of the concerted operations, either this must have been done by
the French, or Madrid would have fallen. But though this General was
under Cuesta’s orders, and had been instructed how to act in pursuance
of the plan arranged with the British Commander, counter orders were
sent him by the Supreme Junta; and he, in consequence, disconcerted
the whole arrangement by employing himself in a useless cannonade of
Toledo; thus permitting the French to bring their whole force against
the allies.
♦POSITION OF THE ALLIES IN FRONT OF TALAVERA.♦
Sir Arthur, as soon as the Spaniards fell back to the Alberche,
expected a general action, and immediately prepared for it, recalling
Sherbrooke from Casalegas to his station in the line. The position
extended something more than two miles. The British were on the left;
there the ground was open, and commanded by a height upon which a
division of infantry was stationed under Major-General Hill. Still
farther upon the left was a low range of mountains separated from the
height by a valley about 300 fathoms wide, and here a ravine running
from north to south covered the left and centre of the position, and
terminated at the beginning of the olive grounds on the right. The
valley was not occupied, because it was commanded by the height, and
because the mountains were thought too distant to be of any consequence
in the expected battle. The right, consisting of Spaniards, extended
immediately in front of Talavera down to the Tagus: this part of the
ground was covered with olive trees, and much intersected by banks and
ditches. The high road leading from the town to the bridge of Alberche
was defended by a heavy battery in front of the Ermida, or chapel of
Nuestra Señora del Prado, which was occupied by Spanish infantry. All
the avenues to the town were defended in like manner; the town itself
was occupied, and the remainder of the Spanish foot formed in two lines
behind the banks, on the road which led to the position of the British.
In the centre between the allied armies was a commanding spot, on
which the British had begun to construct a redoubt. Brigadier-General
Alexander Campbell was posted here with a division of infantry; and
General Cotton’s brigade of dragoons, with some Spanish cavalry, in the
open ground in his rear.
♦SIR ARTHUR NEARLY MADE PRISONER.♦
When Sherbrooke was recalled from Casalegas, General Mackenzie had
been left with a division of infantry and a brigade of horse as an
advanced post near Casa de Salinas, in a wood on the right of the
Alberche, which covered the left of the British army. About two in
the afternoon of the 27th the enemy appeared in strength on the left
bank; Victor forded the Alberche, and before Mackenzie’s division
could be withdrawn from the wood on the left, it was attacked by very
superior forces under Generals Lapisse and Chaudron Rousseau. Sir
Arthur, from a tower immediately in their rear, which he had ascended
for the purpose of observation, saw the men falter when about to be
attacked by such overpowering numbers, and descending just in time,
with difficulty mounted his horse in the midst of the affray, and
escaped being made prisoner. Had he been taken at that moment, or had
Marlborough, a century before, been recognised and detained when he
fell into the hands of a French partisan on the Meuse, how differently
would the latter days of Buonaparte and of Louis XIV. have closed, and
how different at this hour would have been the condition of England,
of Europe, and of the world! The British suffered considerably, but
they withdrew in perfect order, and took their place in the line.
Meantime the other divisions of the French crossed, and advanced
within cannon-shot of ♦BATTLE OF TALAVERA.♦ the allied army. They
cannonaded the left of the British position, and they attacked the
Spanish infantry with their horse, hoping to break through and win
the town; but they were bravely withstood and finally repulsed. The
action ceased a little before nine at night. A little before eleven the
first line of the Spanish left opened a tremendous fire; Sir Arthur,
who was near the spot, observed that the fire was admirably well kept
up, and hoped they would do as well next day; but as he suspected that
at that moment there was nothing to fire at, he wished to stop it.
While he was speaking, three battalions of Spaniards, alarmed at their
own noise, gave way, and fairly took to their heels. The vacancy was
promptly filled up; and these very men the next day bore their full
share of the battle, and behaved as steadily as the best troops could
have done. Victor had marked the height on which General Hill was
posted; he considered it to be the key of the position, and thought
that, if he could beat the English from thence, it would be impossible
for them to maintain the field afterwards. This might best be done
during the night. He therefore ordered Ruffin to attack the hill with
three regiments, Vilatte to support him, and Lapisse to make a feint
upon the centre of the allied armies, which might serve as a diversion.
The attack was made soon after night had closed; for a moment it
was successful, and they got possession of the height. General Hill
instantly attacked them with the bayonet, and recovered the post. At
midnight the attempt was repeated, and failed again. According to
the French account, one of the regiments destined for this service
lost its way, owing to the darkness, and another was impeded by the
ravine. Both sides suffered considerably at this well-contested point.
The armies lay upon the field, the cavalry with their bridles round
their arms; but there was little rest during the night; both sides
were on the alert and alarm, and in different parts of the field the
videttes of each army were sometimes fired on by their own countrymen,
being mistaken for enemies. Whole battalions of the enemy got into the
English line, some crying that they were Spaniards, some that they were
German deserters: the trick was soon discovered, and, in the reception
which they met with, it is not unlikely that many a poor German, who
really intended to desert, lost his life. These night-engagements
were carried on with the most determined fury; the men, after they
had discharged their muskets, frequently closed, and fought with the
butt-end.
The French had ascertained, in the course of the evening, that any
attack upon the town, posted as the Spaniards were, was hopeless;
that the centre also was very strong, both from the rugged ground and
the olive-yards which covered it, and the works which had been thrown
up there. The left was the most practicable point of attack, and the
difficulty of carrying that they had severely experienced. There,
however, they made a third attempt at daybreak, with three regiments
under General Ruffin advancing in close columns. They proceeded
triumphantly, as they supposed, nearly to the summit; when they were
again charged and again beaten back, but they fell back in good order.
Sir Arthur, for the better security of this post, now sent two brigades
of horse into the valley on the left. Alburquerque had at this time
been ordered by the Spanish commander to go with his cavalry to a place
near the town, where it was impossible for them to act, and there
was not even room for them, the ground being thickly wooded. On this
occasion he ventured to act from his own judgement; observing that the
English cavalry were charged by very superior numbers, he hastened to
support them, and his opportune arrival enabled them to occupy the
position. Cuesta perceived the advantage of this movement, and suffered
the Duke to choose his own ground, who accordingly took the post of
danger with the English horse. To annoy this body, the French sent
their riflemen to the heights on the left of the valley; thus occupying
the ground which Sir Arthur had supposed beyond the bounds to which the
action would extend. It proved of no advantage to them; for Cuesta,
marking the movement, dispatched Camp-marshal Bassecourt against them
with the fifth division of Spanish infantry, and dislodged them with
great loss.
About eleven, the enemy having been baffled in all their attempts,
intermitted the attack, rested their troops, and, it is said, cooked
their dinners upon the field. Wine and a little bread were served out
to the British troops. A brook which flows into the Tagus separated the
French and English in one part of the field, and during this pause men
of both armies went there to drink, as if a truce had been established.
Their muskets were laid down and their helmets put off while they
stooped to the stream, and when they had quenched their thirst, they
rested on the brink, looking at each other. The heat and exasperation
of battle were suspended; they felt that mutual respect which proofs
of mutual courage had inspired, and some of them shook hands across
the brook, in token that although they were met to shed each other’s
blood, brave men knew how to value a brave enemy. At such a moment it
was natural for Englishmen to have no other feeling; ... the atrocities
by which Buonaparte’s soldiers in the Peninsula had disgraced their
profession, their country, and their nature, were for the time
forgotten. This interval also was taken for bringing off the wounded
who lay intermingled as they had fallen. And here also a redeeming
sense of humanity was manifested; all hostility being suspended among
those who were thus employed, and each striving who should with most
alacrity assist the other in extricating the common sufferers. About
noon Victor ordered a general attack along the whole line. His own
three divisions were to attack the hill once more. Sebastiani was to
form his first division in two lines on the left of Lapisse; Leval,
with a brigade just then arriving from Aranjuez, to be stationed to
the left of this division, a little in the rear; still further left,
Milhaud, with his dragoons, was to observe Talavera; Latour Maubourg’s
infantry and Merlin’s light-horse formed in the rear of Victor to
support his corps, and advance into the open ground now occupied by
him, as soon as he should have won the hill. The reserve was placed in
a third line behind Sebastiani’s corps.
From the moment this general attack commenced, the firing of musketry
was heard on all sides like the roll of a drum, with scarcely a
moment’s interruption during the remainder of the day, the deeper sound
of a heavy cannonade rising above it like thunder. The operations
of the French were deranged by a blunder of Leval’s division, which
they attribute to the ruggedness of the ground, and the impossibility
of preserving the line among the olive-trees and vines. Instead of
forming in _echellon_ in the rear, it advanced to the front, and
before it had finished deploying it was attacked. Sebastiani sent a
brigade to its support, and it fell back to the ground which it was
designed to occupy. This occasioned some delay. When the line was
formed, Sebastiani waited till Victor had begun the attack. Lapisse
first crossed the ravine, supported by Latour Maubourg’s cavalry, and
by two batteries, each of eight pieces of cannon. Vilatte threatened
the hills and covered the valley, and Ruffin, skirting the great chain
of mountains to the left, endeavoured to turn the flank of the British
army. The attack upon the hill was exceedingly formidable, but, like
all the former, it failed. Lapisse was mortally wounded, his men were
driven back, and Victor himself rallied them, and brought them once
more to the contested point; their retrograde movement had exposed
Sebastiani’s right, and there also the French suffered considerably.
While Victor led his troops once more to the foot of that hill which
had so often been fatal to the assailants, Vilatte with the columns in
the valley advanced to his support. General Anson’s brigade, consisting
of the 1st German light dragoons and the 23d dragoons, with General
Fane’s heavy cavalry, were ordered to charge them. The French formed
in two solid squares; they were protected by a deep ravine, which
was not perceived till the horses were close to it; and they kept
up a tremendous fire of artillery and musketry. This was the most
destructive part of the whole action; numbers of men and horse fell
into the ravine, ... numbers were mown down. But the portion which
got over were collected as well as he could by the Honourable Major
Ponsonby, and led upon the bayonets of the enemy. They passed between
two columns of infantry, against which they could effect nothing, then
galloped upon the regiment of chasseurs which supported them. Here
they were charged by some regiments in reserve, surrounded, broken,
dispersed, and almost destroyed, losing two-thirds of their number. The
rest (Lord William Russell was among them) passed through the intervals
of the French columns, and retired within their own lines. Injudicious
and unfortunate as the charge was, the desperate courage with which
officers and men had advanced upon almost certain destruction
astonished the enemy; it put an end to their efforts on that side, and
no further attempt was made upon the hill, which was now covered with
dead, dying, wounded, and exhausted troops.
The attack upon the centre was made at the same time. General
Campbell was supported by Eguia and Henestrosa, and by a regiment of
Spanish horse; the allies repulsed the enemy, and while the Spaniards
turned their flank, the English took their cannon. A column, chiefly
consisting of Germans, advanced with excellent steadiness through a
heavy fire of artillery, like men who, having obtained the highest
military character, were resolved to keep it. They were received by
Lieutenant-General Sherbrooke’s men with a volley of musketry which
staggered them; the whole British division then rushed forward with
the bayonet, and by that irresistible charge the enemy were driven
back with great slaughter. But the brigade of Guards advanced too
far in pursuit; they were attacked by the French reserve, they were
cut down by a close fire of artillery from a wood; in a few minutes
all their mounted officers were killed, with more than 500 men, and
at that moment the fate of the day appeared worse than doubtful. But
Sir Arthur’s foresight secured the victory which had been so long
contested. Seeing the advance, and apprehending the consequence, he
moved a battalion of the 48th from the heights to their support; and
this timely succour, with the assistance of the second line of General
Cotton’s cavalry, saved the brigade from that total destruction which
must else have been inevitable. The broken Guards passed through the
intervals of the 48th, re-formed behind it, and then in their turn
supported the regiment which had preserved them. Upon their advance,
the enemy, whose heart now failed them, retired: the Guards renewed the
huzzas with which they had advanced, and the cry was taken up along
the whole line. It was the shout of victory on the part of the allies;
for though the light troops continued to fire, and from time to time a
heavy cannonade was renewed, the enemy made no further attempt.
A circumstance more horrid than unfrequent in war occurred toward the
close of the action; the long dry grass took fire, and many of the
wounded were scorched to death. It was night before the battle ended,
and the allies were far from certain that it would not be renewed on
the morrow. The moon rose dimly, the night was chill and damp because
of the heavy dew; the troops lay in position on the ground, without
covering, and without food; even water was scarce; but the officers
and the generals were faring alike, and neither murmuring was heard
for their privations, nor apprehension felt for what the morrow might
bring forth. The French had made large fires along the whole front of
their line. At daylight the troops were under arms, and in order of
battle, ... but the enemy had disappeared, a rear-guard only being in
sight on the left of the Alberche. The Intruder had been a spectator of
the whole action. During the night contradictory reports were brought
him, some affirming that another attack must ensure the victory, others
that Victor’s right had been turned, and he could not possibly keep his
ground. In this dilemma Joseph sent to ascertain which was the true
report, and retired to rest, in expectation of having the favourable
one confirmed, the reserve bivouacking round him. At daybreak he
was awakened by Sebastiani, who had fallen back with his corps upon
the reserve during the night, and who came with tidings that he had
been compelled to make this retrograde movement, because Victor was
retreating along the foot of the hills to Casalegas. This intelligence
left no time for deliberation. The Intruder began to retreat also,
but in perfect order; Milhaud’s division formed the rear, and Latour
Maubourg brought off many of the wounded. Twenty pieces of cannon were
taken by the conquerors; the prisoners were not many.
Our loss had been very heavy; 801 killed, 3913 wounded, 653 missing.
The Spaniards had 1250 killed and wounded. Generals Mackenzie and
Langworth fell. Two bullets passed through Sir Arthur’s clothes, and he
received a severe contusion on the shoulder from a spent musket-ball.
During the second action no attack was made upon the main body of
Cuesta’s army; the position was too strong, and the French rightly
judged, that if, by bringing their whole force to bear upon the
English, they could defeat them, Cuesta’s discomfiture must necessarily
follow. On this day, therefore, they were in the proportion of more
than two to one to the troops whom they engaged. The British entered
the field 18,300 effective men; they were opposed to not less than
48,000. The presence of the Spaniards was of vital importance, by the
security which they afforded to the right of our army; and essential
service was afforded by those who came into action on the second day,
especially by Alburquerque and Bassecourt, and by two battalions under
Brigadier-General Whittingham, in their service, who came forward
to support the Guards; but the brunt of the battle was borne by the
British, as the loss which they sustained evinces. From their loss
that of the defeated enemy might fairly be computed, if the numbers
left upon the field had not afforded surer ground. Both Spaniards and
English state it at not less than 10,000 men; the number of their dead
was so great, that Cuesta ordered out his troops by battalions to burn
them.
♦CUESTA DECIMATES SOME OF HIS TROOPS.♦
The Spaniards, where they were well commanded, behaved well; but
melancholy proofs were given of the inefficient state of their armies.
The whole of their commissariat took flight as soon as the action
began, with all the people belonging to them; so that after the battle
the allies found themselves in total want of food and resources. Three
or four corps threw down their muskets without having once discharged
them, and dispersed; some of them plundered the baggage. Cuesta was
so indignant at this, that after the action he ordered the division
to be decimated, and it was only after much entreaty from the British
Commander that he consented to re-decimate those on whom the lot had
fallen, and six officers and some thirty men were actually executed.
Sir Arthur remarked upon this occasion, with equal humanity and wisdom,
that fear of disgrace would affect the Spaniards more than fear of
death, and that for this reason, among others, exertions ought to be
made for clothing them in uniform. Marching to battle as they did,
without any thing to distinguish them for soldiers, in the first panic
they threw away their arms and accoutrements, and pretended to be
peasants. Men dressed as soldiers could not thus at once put off the
marks of their profession, and that being the case, they would feel
that their safety depended upon keeping their arms and standing their
ground; and when the whole army was uniformly clothed, it would be easy
to deprive the soldier who should misbehave of a part of his uniform,
or to fix upon him some mark of disgrace,--a mode of punishment, he
said, the most effectual as well as the most humane. Cuesta had just
experienced the good effect of such measures; the regiments whom he
deprived of one of their pistols for misconduct at the battle of
Medellin, behaved so well from that time, and exerted themselves so
strenuously on all occasions to wipe off their disgrace, that, after
the battle of Talavera, the pistol was restored to them.
♦STATE OF TALAVERA.♦
The wounded of both armies were brought in promiscuously, and many
of them laid in the streets and in the squares till shelter could be
allotted for them: even for this inevitable necessity no order having
been taken by the Spanish authorities. It is worthy of notice, that a
greater proportion recovered of those who were left a night upon the
field, than of such as were earlier housed, and this is explained by
the effect of the free air in preventing fever. Needful accommodations
for these poor creatures were not to be found in a city which the
French had visited. They had destroyed the public buildings, overturned
the altars, and opened the tombs. Furniture of every kind they had
carried off to their camp, and what they had no other use for, they had
consumed as fuel. Frenchmen like, they had a theatre in their camp. The
soldiers’ huts were so remarkable for neatness and regularity, as to be
an object of curiosity to the British officers; but it was remarked as
one proof of the wanton destruction caused by the Intruder’s armies,
that they were all thatched with unthreshed straw. It ought to be
mentioned as a contrast to this, that when the British troops halted by
day or night amid olive-groves, they were not allowed to cut the trees
either for fuel or for shelter.
♦MOVEMENTS OF SIR R. WILSON.♦
The day after the action a light brigade, 3000 strong, and a troop
of horse-artillery, under Brigadier-General Craufurd, arrived from
Lisbon to reinforce the British army, which thus found itself nearly
as strong as before the action. But a battle so well contested, and so
gloriously won, was rendered of no avail, by the complicated misconduct
of the Spanish government and of the Spanish general. The same want
of provisions and of the means of transport, which had compelled Sir
Arthur to halt at Talavera, prevented him from pursuing his victory.
The Intruder, ignorant of this, trembled for Madrid, expecting every
hour to hear that Venegas, Sir R. Wilson, and the combined forces were
marching upon that city, where the people were looking out for their
deliverers. Sir Robert had proceeded with his corps to Navalcarneiro,
notwithstanding the immediate neighbourhood of the enemy’s army. The
detachment reached the Guadarrama: he had established a communication
with Madrid, Belliard was preparing to withdraw from the city into the
Retiro, which had been fortified as a citadel, and Sir Robert had made
arrangements for entering the metropolis on the night of that very
day when he and his corps were recalled, because a general action was
expected. Some insurrectionary movements had already appeared, which
Belliard had been able to suppress; but it was certain that the moment
an army came to the assistance of the citizens, he would no longer be
able to keep them down. Joseph’s hope, therefore, was from an attack
upon the rear of the allies, to be made by the collected forces of
Soult, Ney, and Mortier, under command of the former.
♦MOVEMENTS OF SOULT, NEY, AND MORTIER.♦
Soult, after his retreat from Galicia, occupied Zamora, Salamanca,
and Leon, with the remains of his army, which he had found means
to reequip. Ney’s corps was quartered at Astorga, Benevente, and
Leon; Mortier’s at Medina del Campo, and Valladolid. Apprised of the
movements of the English, Soult gave orders on the 20th for collecting
the whole at Salamanca, and four days afterwards was instructed by
Jourdan, in the Intruder’s name, to advance as speedily as possible
upon the rear of the enemy by way of Plasencia. Sir Arthur, from the
commencement of the campaign, was aware of the existence of this
force in the north, and the manner in which it would attempt to act.
His own army was so small, that it was not possible for him to spare
detachments for securing the passes of the long mountain-ridge which
the French ♦CUESTA NEGLECTS TO SECURE THE PASSES.♦ must cross. But
Cuesta had sent the Marquess de la Reyna, with two battalions from his
own army and two from Bejar, to occupy the Puerto de Baños, and given
orders to the Duque del Parque to secure the Puerto de Perales, by
detachments from Ciudad Rodrigo. The former point Sir Arthur considered
safe; but, doubting the Duque’s power to spare a sufficient force
for the latter, he directed Beresford, with the Portugueze troops, to
defend this pass, as the greatest service which, in their then state of
discipline, they were capable of performing.
♦INTELLIGENCE OF SOULT’S ADVANCE.♦
Two days after the battle, intelligence was brought to Talavera that
12,000 rations had been ordered at Fuente Duenas for the 28th, and
24,000 at Los Santos on the same day, for a French army, which it was
supposed was on its march to the Puerto de Baños. Cuesta upon this
discovered some anxiety respecting that post, and proposed that Sir
R. Wilson with his corps should be sent thither. This could not be
assented to, for his corps was stationed in the mountains towards
Escalona, still keeping up a communication with the people of Madrid,
... an advantage too important to be foregone. Of this Cuesta appeared
sensible; yet he could not be prevailed upon to send a detachment
from his own army; and Sir Arthur, considering that they had no other
grounds for believing this was the point which was threatened than that
the rations were ordered, which might be a feint, and hoping too that
the troops already there might prove sufficient, and even that the
news of his late victory might deter the French from proceeding, did
not press the Spanish general further that day. Night brought with it
the anxious feeling that a point had now become of prime importance,
concerning which he could not be satisfied that proper means had been
♦JULY 31.♦ taken for its defence; and in the morning he again pressed
Cuesta upon the subject, urging him to detach thither a division of
infantry, with its guns, and a commanding officer on whom he could
rely. “Certainly,” he declared, “he never would have advanced so far,
if reason had not been given him to believe that pass was secure. The
division would not be missed at Talavera; if it arrived in time it
would perform a service of the greatest moment; and even if the enemy
should have crossed the mountains before its arrival, it would then be
in a situation to observe him.” But Cuesta was not to be persuaded.
That day and the following elapsed; on the third came tidings that
the French had entered Bejar; and then the Spanish general dispatched
Bassecourt with a force which might have sufficed had it been sent in
time.
♦SOULT OCCUPIES PLASENCIA.♦
Mortier began his march from Salamanca on the 27th, Soult followed
on the 30th, Ney two days afterwards, all taking the same route.
The advance fell in with the Marquess de la Reyna’s out-posts at La
Calzala, and pursued them to Bejar and Col de Baños. The two battalions
on which Cuesta had relied before the appearance of danger, consisted
of only 600 men, supplied with twenty rounds of ammunition! Even this
was more than they employed; they attempted to blow up the bridge
called Cuesper de Hombre, and failing in that, retired without firing
a shot. ♦1809. AUGUST.♦ The battalions of Bejar dispersed as soon as
they saw the enemy. Yet such was the strength of this position, that
the very sight of the Spaniards delayed Mortier’s march, in consequence
of the dispositions which he thought it necessary to make for forcing
it if it had been defended, and he did not enter Plasencia till the
first of August. The occupation of that place was of the greatest
importance; the French had now intercepted sir Arthur’s communication
with Portugal, and were enabled to manœuvre upon his rear if he
advanced toward Madrid, or remained at Talavera.
♦SIR ARTHUR MARCHES AGAINST HIM.♦
Cuesta now proposed that half the British army should march against
Soult, while the other half maintained the post at Talavera. Sir Arthur
said he was ready either to go or stay with the whole British army, but
he would not divide it; the choice was left to him, and he preferred
going, thinking his own troops were most likely to accomplish the
object of the march, perhaps even without a contest. It appears that
he was not aware of the enemy’s force: Cuesta estimated it at twelve
or fourteen thousand, and Sir Arthur did not at that time suppose it
to be larger. He preferred the alternative of going for another reason
also, feeling it of more importance to him that the communication
through Plasencia should be opened than it was to the Spaniards, though
highly important to them also. The movements of Victor in front induced
him to suppose that the enemy, despairing of any better success at
Talavera than they had already experienced, intended to fall upon Sir
R. Wilson, and force a passage by Escalona: thus to act in concert
with Soult between the Alberche and the Tietar. Sir Robert also felt
himself seriously menaced, and some letters which he intercepted gave
him sufficient information to ascertain that these were the plans of
the enemy; he therefore informed the British General that he should
remove his artillery to St. Roman, occupy the Panada with 300 men, a
strong height behind Montillo with 600 more, from whence there was a
good retreat to St. Valuela, and return with the rest to a position,
in readiness either to occupy Valuela, or obey such instructions as
he might receive. In this state of things, Sir Arthur perceived how
possible it was that Cuesta might be forced to quit Talavera before
he could return to it, and this made him uneasy for his hospital. At
all events, he thought it too far advanced. He therefore entreated
Cuesta to make a requisition for carts, and remove the wounded as
expeditiously as was consistent with their safety, by first sending
them to an intermediate station at no great distance, from whence they
might gradually be passed to the place which should ultimately be fixed
upon. He wrote to Bassecourt, requesting that he, with that division
which had been dispatched to secure the passes after they had been
lost, would halt at Centiello, and watch the vale of Plasencia; and
he again recommended to the Spanish commander, that Venegas should be
ordered to threaten Madrid by the road of Arganda, that being the only
means whereby it was possible to alarm the enemy, and make him divide
his forces.
♦AUG. 3.
CUESTA DETERMINES TO FOLLOW SIR ARTHUR.♦
Having thus taken every precaution, he marched to Oropesa, with the
intention of either compelling Soult to retreat, or giving him battle.
At five in the evening he learned that the enemy were at Naval Moral,
not more than eighteen miles distant; thus having placed themselves
between him and the bridge of Almaraz, as if they meant to cut off
his retreat across the Tagus. An hour afterwards dispatches came from
Talavera, inclosing an intercepted letter from Jourdan to Soult,
wherein the latter was told that the British army was at least 25,000
strong, and yet he was ordered to bring it to action wherever he could
find it; from this Cuesta inferred that Soult could not have less than
30,000 men, and this was the precise number at which the friar, on
whom the letter had been found, stated his army. But the most grievous
part of the intelligence was, that Victor was again advancing, and
had reached St. Olalla, and that Cuesta, seeing himself threatened
both in front and in flank, and apprehending the British would require
assistance, was determined to march and join them. Painful as it was
thus to abandon the wounded, he considered that he must have abandoned
them if he were driven from the position, and that position being now
open on the left, he did not think himself able to maintain it. Sir
Arthur immediately wrote to represent that the danger was far less
imminent than Cuesta apprehended; the enemy, he thought, were not
likely to attack Talavera, nor to occupy the British long. It would be
time to march when they knew that the French had forced their way at
Escalona, or were breaking up from St. Olalla. Victor was certainly
alone, and Sebastiani and the Intruder occupied by Venegas. At all
events he urged him to delay his march till the next day, send off his
commissariat and baggage before him, and halt in the woods till the
wounded were arrived at the bridge of Arzobispo. Soult’s force, he
said, was certainly overrated.
Sir Arthur’s mistake upon this subject arose from his being ignorant
that Mortier had formed a junction with this army. He supposed that it
consisted only of the corps of Soult and Ney, who had brought out of
Galicia 18,000 men, the remains of 36,000 with which they entered that
country. Cuesta, however, was better informed; and he himself altered
his opinion of the enemy’s force when he considered the positive orders
which the Intruder had given for attacking the British army, supposing
it to consist ♦CUESTA JOINS THE BRITISH.♦ of 25,000 men. Cuesta had
not asked Sir Arthur’s advice, and did not wait to receive it: he left
Talavera before it reached him, marched all night, and joined the
British at Oropesa soon after daylight on the 4th. His apprehension of
danger to himself was well founded: it was not without great exertions
and heavy loss that the combined armies had repulsed the French at
Talavera; well, therefore, might he despair of withstanding them alone
if they returned to the attack. But the danger which by this hasty
retreat he averted from himself, he brought upon Venegas and Sir
Arthur; and the latter, in addition to the mortification of having
his wounded fall into the hands of the enemy, saw himself exposed
to an attack in front and in rear at the same time by two armies,
each superior ♦THEY RETREAT ACROSS THE TAGUS.♦ to his own. It was
absolutely necessary to retreat, otherwise nothing but two victories
could extricate the troops from their perilous situation, and they were
little capable of extraordinary exertions, not having had their full
allowance of provisions for several days. The bridge of Almaraz had
been destroyed, and when the Marquess de la Reyna abandoned his post
at the pass, he made for this point, with the intention of removing
the bridge of boats that had been placed there; the boats indeed might
be still in the river, but it was thought impossible to reach Almaraz
without a battle. If he moved on to give the enemy battle, the French
from Talavera would break down the bridge of Arzobispo, and thus
intercept the only way by which a retreat was practicable; the same
danger would be incurred if he took a position at Oropesa. Nothing
remained, therefore, but to cross at Arzobispo, while it was yet in
his power, and take up a defensive post upon the Tagus: the sooner a
defensive line should be taken, the more likely were the troops to
be able to defend it. On the day, therefore, that Cuesta formed his
unfortunate junction, Sir Arthur retreated by this route, and crossed.
Cuesta followed on the night of the 5th.
♦COL. MACKINNON REMOVES SOME OF THE WOUNDED.♦
Sir Arthur had left Colonel Mackinnon in command at Talavera with the
charge of the sick and wounded, amounting, with those attached to the
hospital, to about 5000 persons. On the evening of one day the charge
had been given him, and on the next at noon Cuesta informed him that
Soult was at Plasencia with 30,000 men, and that Victor was in his
front, only six leagues distant; the monk who discovered their plans,
being the bearer of a letter from the Intruder to Soult, was in the
room: it was his intention to retire at dusk with the Spanish army and
join Sir Arthur, and the hospital had better be got off before that
time. Colonel Mackinnon had been instructed, in case of such necessity,
to make for Merida by way of the Puente del Arzobispo: but it was with
difficulty he could procure from Cuesta seven waggons to remove a few
of the wounded. There was no alternative but to recommend those whom
there was no possibility of removing to the honour and humanity of the
French commanders; and Colonel Mackinnon, who had lived in France,
and was in every respect one of the most accomplished officers in the
British army, did this in a manner which was believed to have had great
effect in obtaining for them the humane and honourable treatment they
received. All who were able to march were ordered to assemble at three
that afternoon, and proceed to Calera that night, ... a town which the
French had completely destroyed. The next day they were overtaken at
Arzobispo by the British army, and instead of passing the night there,
as had been intended, were ordered to proceed. Forty bullock-cars were
added to their means of transport, but in such ill repair for some
of the worst roads in the world, that only eleven of them reached
Deleitosa. A more difficult six days’ march could hardly be conceived,
and the difficulty was of a kind more trying to a brave and feeling
mind than danger. There was only a commissary’s clerk to provide for
them, and the runaway Spaniards were plundering the small magazines
in all the villages. Reports that the French had crossed the Tagus,
and were in their front, alarmed his men, who were in no condition for
the field, and many of them took to the mountains. Mackinnon mustered
his force in a convent near Deleitosa; it consisted then of 2000 men,
and these he conducted to Elvas, without magazines, with no assistance
from the magistrates, who, on the contrary, sometimes evinced a hostile
disposition; and with such want of humanity on the part of the people
(made callous by selfishness, and selfish by necessity), that he was
often obliged to use violent means, or the men must have been starved.
♦DEFEAT OF THE SPANIARDS AT ARZOBISPO.♦
The British army was now stationed at Deleitosa, whence they could
defend the point of Almaraz and the lower parts of the Tagus. Cuesta
remained at Arzobispo; but so little in concert with Sir Arthur, that
he moved his head-quarters, and suffered three days to elapse without
sending him any information of his plans or movements. On the night
of the 7th, he removed to Peraleda de Garbin, leaving two divisions
of infantry and Alburquerque’s division of cavalry to defend the
passage of the river. This was an imprudent measure, for the enemy
were in force on the left bank; they had already attempted to win the
bridge, and were now erecting batteries. The bridge was barricaded, and
defended by several batteries with embrasures connected by a covered
way, and upon these works the general relied with such confidence, that
he thought he might safely withdraw the greater part of his army to
more convenient quarters. Cuesta ought to have understood the nature
of this post; he had been blamed for abandoning it in the former part
of the year: satisfied, however, with having fortified the bridge,
he never thought of examining whether ♦AUG. 8.♦ the river might not
be fordable. Mortier, who commanded the corps of the French which
led the pursuit, erected batteries to call off the attention of the
Spaniards, while he ordered the chief of his staff, Dombrowsky, with
two good ♦OPERATIONS DE M. SOULT, 524.♦ swimmers, to sound the Tagus.
His officer of engineers had observed, that when the Spanish horse
were brought to drink they went some way into the river; trial was
made where this indication promised some hope of success, and a good
ford, passable even for infantry, was found there, not two hundred
yards above the bridge and the Spanish batteries. Soult, who had
now come up, resolved to effect the passage in the heat of the day,
when the Spaniards would be taking their mid-day sleep, and might be
surprised. He calculated upon a carelessness which he was sure to
find. The Spaniards relied upon the river for their defence, never
having deemed it needful to ascertain how far it might be relied on:
the passage was accomplished almost as soon as they were aware of the
attempt; the works of the bridge were taken in the rear, some of the
Spanish artillerymen were cut down ♦NAYLIES, 174.♦ at their guns,
and others, in a manner not to be justified by any laws of war, were
compelled to turn them upon their countrymen; the works were presently
demolished, and the way opened for Girard’s infantry. Alburquerque’s
cavalry were reposing under some trees, a short league from the scene
of action; at the first alarm they ♦NAYLIES, 175.♦ hastened to support
their countrymen; and their charge was made with such resolution and
effect, that Soult is said to have thought of firing grape upon them
through his own men, as the only means of repelling them. But succours
came to the French in time for preventing this atrocious expedient; and
the Spaniards, horse and foot alike, retreated, or rather fled through
a mountainous country, which favoured their escape, leaving their
ammunition, their baggage, and the whole of their artillery. The slain
were estimated by the French at 1600 men, most of whom were cut down
in a pursuit from which the enemy returned with every man his sabre
red with blood. Some of the French were drowned in the passage, their
other loss was trifling. The same frightful circumstance as at Talavera
occurred after the action; the herbage took fire; the wind spread the
flames far and wide, among stubble, dry shrubs, and groves of ♦NAYLIES,
177.♦ ilex and of olives; ... on all sides the cries of the wounded
were heard; and through the night muskets, which the fugitives had
thrown away, went off, cartridges took fire, and cassoons of artillery
exploded.
♦MOVEMENTS OF MARSHAL NEY.♦
The commonest precaution might have saved the Spaniards from this
defeat, in which, though the loss of men was not great, that of
artillery and ammunition was considerable, and the moral effect upon
the troops of more importance than either. It seems, indeed, that Soult
advanced to Arzobispo in the sole hope of profiting by the negligence
of the Spanish commanders to strike some such blow; for the enemy had
no intention at this time of carrying the war into Extremadura, finding
Almaraz too well defended, and the fords, which were said to exist
below the bridge, impassable. Ney had formed the design of crossing
them, and taking possession of the defiles of Deleitosa and Xaraicejo,
thus to cut off the retreat of the English toward Portugal; but those
points were secured by Sir Arthur, as well as the passage of the river,
and the French Marshal was ordered back to Salamanca to secure that
part of the country, in concert with Kellermann, against the Duque del
Parque and the Conde de Noroña, who had been prevented from occupying
the enemy on that side for want of artillery and cavalry; the former,
however, was now beginning to act on the offensive. Ney began his march
on the 9th to the Puerto de Baños, in his way towards Old Castille; and
this brought him in contact with Sir Robert Wilson.
♦ACTION WITH SIR R. WILSON AT THE PUERTO DE BAÑOS.♦
When the British commander left Talavera, Cuesta’s advanced guard was
in communication with Sir Robert, and that officer was informed of the
intended retreat of the Spaniards, that he might in like manner fall
back. But he was advanced too far for this to be practicable; after a
long march through the mountains, he found himself, on the night of the
14th, six leagues from Arzobispo; the high road between Oropesa and
Talavera was to be crossed, and Victor was in possession of Talavera;
thinking it, therefore, too late to reach Arzobispo, he determined
to move by Puerto de San Julien and Centinello, and cross the Tietar
toward the mountains. On the 11th he reached Baños, and had set out
the following morning on the road of Grenadilla, to restore by this
route his communication with the allied armies, when a cloud of dust
was perceived on the road of Plasencia, and a peasant assured him
it proceeded from a body of the enemy. Readily believing what was so
probable, he turned back, and took post in front of Baños, placing 200
Spanish infantry under Colonel Grant in advance of Aldea Nueva. The
enemy’s chasseurs and voltigeurs advanced in considerable bodies under
General Lorset; and Grant, after a resistance in which the Spaniards
demeaned themselves gallantly, was compelled to fall back. The French
then attempted to cut off Sir Robert’s own legion, which was posted
between Aldea Nueva and Baños: he had strengthened his position by
every means which the time allowed, so that they could only advance
gradually, and with severe loss from the fire of musketry which was
kept up upon them. At length part of the Merida battalion on the right
gave way, and a road was thus left open by which the position might
have been turned. Then Sir Robert ordered a retreat upon the heights
above Baños, and from thence sent to secure the road of Monte Mayor,
which turned the Puerto de Baños, a league in the rear, and by which
the French were directing a column. Don Carlos d’Espagna came up at
this time with his battalion of light infantry, took post along the
heights commanding the road to Baños, and enabled Sir Robert to detach
a party to the mountain on the left, commanding the main road. On the
Extremadura side this Puerto is not a pass of such strength as on the
side of Castille. Sir Robert had no artillery, and the French were not
less than treble the number of his troops; nevertheless he maintained
his ground for nine hours. At six in the evening, three columns of the
enemy succeeded in gaining the height on the left; his post was then no
longer tenable, and he retired along the mountains, leaving open the
main road, along which a considerable column of cavalry immediately
hastened. It came in sight of the battalion of Seville, which had
been left at Bejar with orders to follow on the morrow; but when Sir
Robert was obliged to retire, and the action commenced, he ordered it
to the pass to watch the Monte Mayor road and the heights on the rear
of his left. As soon as the French cavalry came nigh, an officer with
some dragoons rode on, and called out to the Spanish commanders to
surrender. They were answered by a volley that killed the whole party;
the Spaniards then began to mount the heights; they were attacked and
surrounded by two bodies, one of horse, the other of foot; but they
succeeded in cutting their way through, and Ney, having forced the
pass, hastened on to Salamanca. Sir Robert’s loss was not considerable,
and after halting two days at Miranda de Castañas, to rest his men, and
collect those who were dispersed, he proceeded on his way.
♦THE FRENCH ENTER TALAVERA.♦
The retreat of Cuesta from Talavera, however much both the former and
subsequent conduct of that general may deserve censure, was, under his
circumstances, at least an excusable measure. About 1500 of the wounded
were left, whom there was no time to remove; most of whom, indeed,
were not in a state to bear removal. Cuesta had hardly begun his march
before the French were in sight. When Victor entered the town, he found
some of the wounded, French and English alike, lying on the ground in
the Plaza. After complimenting the English, and observing that they
understood the laws and courtesies of war, he told them there was one
thing which they did not understand, and that ♦VICTOR BEHAVES WELL TO
THE ENGLISH WOUNDED.♦ was how to deal with the Spaniards. He then sent
soldiers to every house, with orders to the inhabitants immediately to
receive and accommodate the wounded of the two nations, who were lodged
together, one English and one Frenchman; and he expressly directed that
the Englishman should always be served first. Many had already died
in the square, and the stones were covered with blood; Victor ordered
the townsmen to come with spades and besoms, remove and bury the dead,
and cleanse the Plaza; he was speedily obeyed, and then the French
said the place was fit for them to walk in. This was done a few hours
after they entered the town. The next day the troops were assembled
at noon, and liberty of pillaging for three hours was allowed them.
Every man was provided with a hammer and a small saw for this purpose
in his knapsack, and they filed off by beat of drum in regular parties
to the different quarters of the town upon this work, as a business
with which they were well acquainted. Nothing escaped their search:
they discovered corn enough to supply the French army for three months;
these magazines had been concealed both from the Spanish and English
generals, and the owners were now punished for their treachery to their
countrymen and their allies, by the loss of the whole. Dollars enough
to load eight mules were also found hidden beneath some broken wheels
and rubbish in a yard belonging to one of the convents.
♦MURDER OF THE BISHOP OF CORIA.♦
The behaviour of Victor to the wounded English deserves more especially
to be mentioned, because Soult was carrying on the war with unrelenting
barbarity. From Plasencia he laid waste the fertile vale in which that
city stands with fire and sword. Serradilla, Pasanon, Arroyo-Molinos,
El Barrado, Garganta la Olla, Texada, Riolobos, Malpartida, and La
Oliva, were burnt by his troops, who, when they were not otherwise
employed, went out upon the highways, robbed every person whose ill
fortune compelled them to travel in this miserable country, and usually
killed those whom they robbed. D. Juan Alvarez de Castro, the Bishop of
Coria, in his eighty-sixth year, was murdered by these wretches. When
Lapisse, in the month of June, marched from Salamanca to Alcantara, the
Bishop with great difficulty and fatigue escaped; but the hardships
which he then underwent were too much for one in such extreme old age,
and when Soult quartered himself in this part of the country, he was
confined to his bed in the village of Los Hoyos. Had he been removed
he must have died upon the road; it was, therefore, not a matter of
choice but of necessity that he should remain and take his chance.
Three of his clergy and some of his domestics remained with him; and
a few old men took refuge under the same roof, thinking the presence
of their venerable pastor would render it a safe asylum. The French
entered the village, and took possession of the house where the old
prelate lay in bed. His chaplains met them, and intreated protection
for their spiritual father, and his domestics waited upon them, hoping
to obtain favour, or at least to escape injury. But after these
ruffians had eaten and drunk what was set before them, they plundered
the house of every thing which could be converted to their own use, and
destroyed whatever they could not carry away. Then they fell upon the
unhappy people of the house, one of whom they killed, and wounded six
others; lastly, they dragged the Bishop from his bed, and discharged
two muskets into his body.
♦VENEGAS’S ARMY KEPT IN INACTION BEFORE AND AFTER THE BATTLE OF
TALAVERA.♦
The plans of the enemy on the side of Extremadura were effected;
they who had so lately trembled for Madrid had seen the allied
armies recross the Tagus, and they gave themselves credit for the
fortunate issue of a campaign, in which, if it had not been for the
misconduct of the Spanish General and of the Central Junta, they must
have been driven to the Ebro. On the side of La Mancha they were
not less successful. Venegas, on the 14th of July, had received
orders to occupy the attention of the enemy, and divert them from
the allied armies as much as possible, without endangering himself
In consequence he advanced his army from El Moral, Ynfanles, Puerto
Elano, and Valdepeñas, to Damiel, La Solana, El Corral de Caraquel,
and Manzanares, keeping his head-quarters still at Santa Cruz de
Mudela, and expecting intelligence which would justify him in advancing
to Consuegra and Madrilejos. At this time he supposed it was the
intention of the combined armies to march upon Madrid; and when the
want both of provisions and means of transport rendered it impossible
for the British army to proceed, Cuesta gave him no intelligence of
this, thereby exposing him to be destroyed, if the French, instead
of marching upon Talavera, had directed their attack against him.
Cuesta’s whole conduct respecting the British army was so utterly
unreasonable, that it can only be accounted for by ascribing it to
obstinacy and incapacity. The wants of the British army were palpable;
he had them before his eyes, and could at any moment have satisfied
himself of the truth of every complaint which he received; yet he
concealed the real state of things both from his own government and
from Venegas, to both of whom it was of such essential importance that
they should be accurately informed. The Spanish government received
true intelligence from Mr. Frere, and in consequence they dispatched
a courier to Venegas, directing him to suspend his operations, and
take up a defensive position. Cuesta’s neglect rendered it prudent
to dispatch these orders; but one evil produced another. Two hours
after the arrival of the courier, Venegas received intelligence of
the victory of Talavera, which was the more unexpected, because the
Intruder, true to the French system, had published an Extraordinary
Gazette, stating that he had defeated the allied armies on the 26th.
Venegas ordered Te Deum to be sung in the neighbouring churches, and
celebrated the victory by a general discharge: but he failed to improve
it; and, instead of considering that the circumstances under which
the Junta had dictated his instructions were now entirely changed, he
adhered strictly to them, and lost the opportunity of advancing to
Madrid; thus consummating the series of blunders by which a campaign so
well planned, and a victory so bravely won, were rendered fruitless.
Had he pushed for that city immediately, he might have entered it; Sir
Robert Wilson would have joined him there, the resources of the city
would have been secured for the allies, and the recovery of the capital
would have raised the whole country far and near against the French. If
Alburquerque had commanded this army, the momentous opportunity would
not have been lost.
♦HIS USELESS ATTEMPT UPON TOLEDO.♦
Venegas therefore remained with his vanguard at Aranjuez, and his
head-quarters at Ocaña, while another division of his army under
Lacy was employed in an idle attempt upon Toledo, which, as he did
not choose to destroy the houses from whence the enemy fired at
him, because it was a Spanish town, could not possibly succeed, and
therefore ought not to have been made. On the third day after the
battle Cuesta wrote to Venegas, directing him to advance upon Madrid.
“This operation,” he said, “must oblige Victor to detach a large part
of his force toward the capital, in which case the allies would pursue
him to that city, and if any unforeseen accident should compel Venegas
to retire, he might retreat by Arganda and along the skirts of the
mountains.” This letter was written at eleven at night. Twelve hours
afterwards Cuesta forwarded a second dispatch, stating that Victor’s
army had marched in the direction of Torrijos and Toledo. Venegas, upon
receiving the first, ordered his whole force to unite at Aranjuez,
meaning to lose no time in reaching the capital. The contents of the
second staggered him; if the enemy marched for Toledo, they would
fall on his rear-guard; if they went through Torrijos direct upon
Madrid, they had the start, and would get between him and that city. He
determined, therefore, still to collect his force in the neighbourhood
of Aranjuez, and there wait for fresh orders; and he reminded Cuesta
how indispensably necessary it was that their movements should be
combined.
♦VENEGAS COMPLAINS OF CUESTA.♦
His army was collected on the night of the 3d, leaving only 600 foot
and 200 horse in the neighbourhood of Toledo. The next day he received
another dispatch from Cuesta, telling him of his march from Talavera
to reinforce Sir Arthur. This letter was written with preposterous
confidence; he was going, he said, to secure the victory against Soult,
after which they should return to attack Victor. Meantime he advised
Venegas to bear in mind, that general actions with better disciplined
troops than their own did not suit them. Venegas felt the danger of
his own situation, but his prevailing feelings were indignation and
resentment at the multiplied proofs of incapacity which Cuesta had
given. He wrote to his government, stating “that he was thus left to
himself with an army inferior in number to the enemy, and, by the
acknowledgement of the captain-general, inferior in discipline also:
how much more deeply should he have been committed, if, in obedience
to that general’s orders, he had marched upon Madrid, relying on the
promised support of the allied armies!” The reflection was just as well
as natural; but Venegas ought to have reflected also, that if he had
marched upon Madrid in time, that support would not have failed him.
He added that no choice was left, save of commencing a retreat, which
would dispirit the troops and destroy the national enthusiasm in all
the places which they had occupied and must now abandon. Consequences
like these, which were immediately before his eyes, made him determine
to remain where he was, and fight if he were attacked, preferring to be
cut to pieces rather than submit to a shameful flight.
♦THE INTRUDER’S MOVEMENTS AFTER THE BATTLE.♦
The enemy were well aware of the danger to which they had been
exposed from the army of La Mancha. The Intruder, after his defeat
at Talavera, retreated to Santa Olalla, leaving Victor to take up
a position behind the Alberche, and watch the combined armies. The
next day he moved to Bargas and Olias, near Toledo. On the night of
the 31st, he received advices from Victor, who, being alarmed by Sir
Robert Wilson’s movements, was about to fall back to Maqueda; at the
same time he learnt that Venegas was collecting his force at Aranjuez
and threatening Madrid. Alarmed at this, he ordered Sebastiani and the
corps of reserve to take up a position at Illescas, from whence they
might either advance rapidly to support Victor, or to attack Venegas.
Victor’s next advices expressed further fears from the troops at
Escalona, whose force he supposed to be far greater than it was: “If
the enemy advanced in that direction,” he said, “as seemed probable, he
should retire to Mostoles.” Joseph, trembling for the capital, moved
to that place himself in the night between the 3d and 4th: Mostoles is
only twelve miles from Madrid, ... so near had the scene of action been
brought. From thence, having learnt that Victor’s apprehensions had
subsided, he turned back on the following night to Valdemoro, summoned
Sebastiani thither, and ordered an attack to be made upon Venegas.
♦VENEGAS PREPARES FOR BATTLE AT ARANJUEZ.♦
That general expected such an attack from the moment when he was
apprised of Cuesta’s retreat. At daybreak on the 5th, he went from his
head-quarters at Tembleque to reconnoitre the position at Aranjuez. The
Queen’s Bridge was the only one which had not been broken down; his
first measure was to recall Lacy with the advanced guard from Puente
Largo on the Xarama, that he might secure his retreat over this bridge
in time; then he resolved to occupy the range of heights adjacent to
Ontigola, beginning from Mount Parnaso, and to defend the passage of
the river. Having directed these measures, he returned to his quarters,
leaving Giron in command of the three divisions upon the Tagus. Three
hours had hardly elapsed before Giron sent word that large columns of
horse and foot and artillery were marching upon Puente Largo, and that
some had already crossed the Xarama; this was followed by tidings that
a great dust was seen in the direction of the ford of Añover. It could
not now be doubted that a serious attack was about to be made; the ford
would certainly be attempted, and Venegas was apprehensive that he
should be assailed in the rear at the same time by troops from Toledo.
He therefore ordered Lacy to cross the Queen’s Bridge, and break it
down; and marched his reserve from Ocaña to the height on the left of
the road between that town and Aranjuez, where they might be ready to
resist an attack on the side of Toledo or the ford, and to support the
retreat of the other divisions, who, if they found themselves unable to
guard the river, were instructed to retreat to Ocaña; but their orders
were to defend the passage to the utmost, and maintain every position
inch by inch.
Lacy could not commence his retreat soon enough to avoid an attack;
a strong body of cavalry from the Cuesta de la Reyna fell upon his
rear, but they resisted the enemy, and, retiring in good order over
the Queen’s Bridge, broke it down, and took post upon some heights
which protected it: the bridge itself was defended by Don Luis Riquelme
with three battalions and four pieces of cannon; another battalion
was stationed in the Plaza de S. Antonio. D. Miguel Antonio Panes, a
captain of artillery, only son of the Marquis of Villa Panes, defended
the broken Puente de Barcas with two eight-pounders and two companies.
Other troops were stationed at the ford of the Infante Don Antonio’s
garden, at the Puente Verde, at the Vado Largo, or broad ford, and in
the Calle de la Reyna. A reserve was placed on each side the road to
Ocaña, and in the walks immediately adjoining the palace, on the left
of which the whole of the cavalry stood ready to charge the enemy in
case they should win the passage of the river, or attack the Spaniards
in the rear by a party which might have crossed at some remoter point.
♦ARANJUEZ AND ITS GARDENS.♦
The ground whereon a battle has been fought is never passed over by
an intelligent traveller without producing a meditative train of
thought, however transient, even if the scene has no other interest;
but when the local circumstances are remarkable, the impressions become
deeper and more durable, especially if the war were one in which,
after any lapse of time, the heart still feels a lively concern.
Aranjuez had been for nearly two centuries the spring residence of
the Spanish court. It stands in a rich and lovely country, where the
Xarama falls into the Tagus, in what was once a peninsula. Charles
V. had built a hunting-seat there, which Philip III. enlarged into a
palace, yet such a palace as was designed for comfort and comparative
retirement, rather than for splendour. In his time a canal was made
between the two rivers, partly with the intent of giving the place
a character of safety, that the King might be secure there with no
larger body of guards than his dignity required. Succeeding monarchs
each added something to the embellishment of the grounds, and Charles
IV., when Prince of Asturias, made a garden which was called by his
name. Aranjuez itself was a poor village till the time of Grimaldi’s
administration, when a town was built there under his directions, and
partly on the Dutch plan; the streets being long, spacious, straight,
and uniform, with rows of trees, for beauty and for shade, ... only
the canals were wanting. The population had increased to some 10,000
persons, who depended in great measure for their prosperity upon the
annual residence of the court.
The pride of Aranjuez was in its gardens; they were in the French
style, but with a charm which that style derived from a Spanish
climate. Long and wide avenues were overbowered with elms, which loved
the soil, and which, by the stateliness of their growth, and the deep
umbrage of their ample branches, repaid the care with which water from
the Tagus was regularly conducted to their roots. That river also
supplied numerous fountains, each in the centre of some area, square or
circular, hex- or oct-angular, where, in peaceful times, at all hours
of the day, some idlers or ruminators were seen on the marble benches,
enjoying the shade, and the sight and the sound of the water, which
was thrown up by statues of all kinds, appropriate or preposterous,
beasts, harpies, sea-horses, Tritons, and heathen gods and goddesses,
in jets or curvilinear shoots, intersecting each other, falling in
regular forms, sparkling as they played, cooling the air around, and
diffusing a sense of freshness even in the hottest noon. In some
places the loftiest trees were made to bear a part in these devices of
wanton power, the pipes being conveyed to their summit; in others the
fountains set music in motion when they played. There was one fountain
which served as a monument of one of the proudest victories that had
ever been achieved by Spain, the central part being formed from a block
of marble which had been taken in one of the Turkish ships at Lepanto.
But this was a place where the strength of vegetation made art
appear subordinate, and the magnificence which all these elaborate
embellishments produced was subservient to delight and comfort. The
elms, which were the largest of their kind, had attained a growth which
nothing but artificial irrigation in a genial soil and hot climate
could have given them. The poplar and the tamarisk flourished in like
manner; the latter grew along the banks of the Tagus with peculiar
luxuriance. Every approach to Aranjuez was shaded with trees, from
which avenues branched off in all directions, opening into glades,
and diversified with bowers. Nor was this royal expenditure directed
only to the purposes of splendid enjoyment. The Spanish Kings, with an
intention better than the success which attended it, endeavoured to
improve the agriculture of the country, by setting their subjects an
example upon the royal domains. The best fruits in the Peninsula were
cultivated for sale in the royal gardens; the finest oil in Spain was
produced there, and wine from vineyards of the choicest grapes was
collected in cellars of unequalled extent. They had attempted also to
naturalize the camel there, and at one time from two to three hundred
of these animals fed in the royal pastures, and were occasionally
employed for burthen. But though they bred, and appeared to thrive
there, the experiment was given up; the native animals, which are
reared with so much less cost and care, being better suited to the
soil, and surface, and climate of Spain.
The banks of the Tagus at Aranjuez, and the gardens which it had so
long been the pride and pleasure of the Spanish Kings to embellish,
were now to be made the scene of war. About two in the afternoon the
French appeared upon the right bank, and began the attack along the
whole line. They opened a heavy fire on all points, but more especially
upon the ford of Don Antonio’s garden, and the reserve from the walks
were sent to strengthen that post. Panes at the Puente de Barcas was
struck by a ball, which carried away his leg; a glance convinced him
that the wound was mortal: “Comrades,” said he, “stand by these guns
till death ... I am going to heaven:” and, as they bore him from the
field, the only anxiety he expressed was, that another officer should
take his place without delay. Don Gaspar Hermosa succeeded him, after
planting a mortar at the Puente ford in the midst of the enemy’s fire.
The Spanish artillery was excellently served this day, and frequently
silenced that of the French. One mortar placed in the thicket opposite
the islet, made great havoc among the enemy. Lacy, perceiving his own
post secure, and that the main attack was made upon the left, at the
Puente Verde, the gardens of the Prince and of Don Antonio, removed his
division thither without waiting for orders. The firing continued till
the approach of night, when the French, baffled in all their attempts,
retired. The loss of the Spaniards was between two and three hundred;
they computed that of the French at three hundred killed, and about a
thousand wounded. The French force consisted of fourteen or fifteen
thousand, being the whole of Sebastiani’s corps. They themselves
carefully avoided all mention of the action, saying only that they
worsted the advanced guard of Venegas, and drove it beyond the Tagus.
Giron, who commanded, was rewarded with the rank of camp-martial; and
the Junta testified its sense of the heroism of Panes, who died a few
hours after he was wounded, by exempting the title in his family from
the duties called _lanzas_ and _medias anatas_ for ever, appointing
his father a gentleman of the bed-chamber, and ordering a letter to be
written to him, as a document to be preserved in the archives of his
house, expressing, in the most honourable terms, the sense which the
country entertained of the services rendered to it both by father and
son.
♦DELIBERATIONS CONCERNING THE ARMY OF LA MANCHA.♦
The French after this repulse recrossed the Xarama, and, as Venegas
had foreseen, prepared to attack him from the other side. According
to their official statement, they thought it would be a long and
difficult work to rebuild the bridges at Aranjuez, and that it would
be less dangerous to force the passage of the Tagus at Toledo, where
the Spaniards remained masters of the bridge. The Spanish General,
therefore, disposed his troops at Aranjuez, Ocaña, La Guardia, and
Tembleque, ready to march, as circumstances might require, to some
point where he could only be attacked in front, and might be freed
from the apprehension that the enemy would cut off his retreat by way
of Toledo, and, having disabled him, penetrate to the Sierra Morena,
the armies of Cuesta and Sir Arthur being too far off to prevent them.
The necessity of retreating was indeed obvious; and the Junta were of
opinion that he had no other course left than that of abandoning La
Mancha, and taking post at the pass of Despeñaperros. Mr. Frere thought
it would be better, if La Mancha were untenable, to occupy the passes
with a part of his army only (for it was not to be supposed that at
this time the French could make any serious attempt upon Andalusia),
and march with or detach the rest upon the left of the enemy, through
a country which they had never been able to occupy, Cuenca, Molina,
and as far as Arragon; a movement upon the two former points would
threaten the capital, upon the latter it would give the Spaniards a
decided superiority in that quarter, and interrupt the communication
of the French with France. In the present state of things, Mr. Frere
perceived how desirable it was that the Spaniards should have as many
small armies as possible; their system of military subsistence and
discipline being so imperfect, defeats became dangerous, and even
destructive, in proportion to the size of the army; in small bodies
they were comparatively of little importance: in small bodies the
Spaniards had almost uniformly been successful; and such diversions
would harass and distract the French, and waste their force.
♦VENEGAS RESOLVES TO ATTACK THE ENEMY.♦
Mr. Frere spoke upon this plan to one of the leading members of the
war department, and would have delivered in his advice in writing, if
Marquis Wellesley had not at that time been daily expected to arrive
at Seville and supersede him. This circumstance, and the confidence
which Venegas expressed in the spirit of his troops (for he seemed
disposed to risk a battle rather than abandon La Mancha,) induced him
to wait for the Marquis’s arrival; and then it was too late. For on the
same day that Mr. Frere recommended this proposed diversion, Venegas
received advices from the fifth division, under General Zerain, by
Toledo, that the French had received a reinforcement of 8000 ♦AUG. 8.♦
men, and were about to attack him. Upon this the general ordered the
fourth division from Tembleque to advance to his support. While they
were on their way, Sebastiani, having collected ♦AUG. 9.♦ his whole
corps at Toledo, attacked Zerain, who retreated in good order to
Sonseca, and from thence turned to Almonacid to join the troops which
had been sent to his assistance. At Almonacid Venegas assembled his
whole army on the 10th, and believing that the number of the enemy did
not exceed 14,000, the same reasons which had made him stand his ground
at Aranjuez, after the retreat of the combined armies, induced him once
more to give the French battle. He could not bear to abandon the people
of La Mancha, who had welcomed him with enthusiasm on his advance: he
knew how injurious it was, not merely to the general character of an
army, but to the individual feelings of the soldiery, to be perpetually
giving way before the enemy, losing ground, and losing reputation
and hope also; and his success at Aranjuez made him confident in the
courage and conduct of his troops. Before he delivered his own opinion,
he summoned the different chiefs of division to council, and they
perfectly accorded with his pre-determination. This was on the 10th; he
resolved to let the troops rest the next day, that they might recover
from their march, and it was agreed to attack the enemy at daybreak on
the 12th. Meantime it was supposed more accurate information of their
number might be obtained.
♦HE IS ATTACKED BY THEM.♦
Delay has ever been the bane of the Spanish councils, and Venegas
should have remembered, that in offensive war every thing depends
upon celerity. Victor had now opened a communication with Soult, and
the Intruder being thus delivered from all fear of the allied armies,
joined Sebastiani, with the reserve, on the 9th. While Venegas was
deliberating, his position was reconnoitred; and on the morning of the
day which he had allowed for rest he was attacked by an army of little
less than double the force at which he had computed it. The Spaniards,
however, were not taken by surprise. The right wing, under Vigodet,
extended to some rising ground beyond the village of Almonacid: the
centre, consisting of two divisions, under Camp-marshal Castejon,
were in the plain before the village. Lacy commanded the left, which
was supported by a height, detached from the range of hills that run
north and south, beginning at Toledo. Giron was stationed, with three
battalions, as a reserve, behind the centre; the rest of his division
were posted, part on the heights to the left, part at an advanced
battery, and the remainder upon the Castle hill, behind the village.
The cavalry, under Camp-marshals the Marquis of Gelo, D. Tomas Zerain,
and the Viscount de Zolina, were placed in two bodies, one on each wing.
♦BATTLE OF ALMONACID.♦
The Intruder was in the field; but Sebastiani was the real commander.
That general perceived that the event of the day depended upon the
possession of the hill on the Spaniards’ left, and he ordered Laval
to attack it with his two divisions. Laval formed in close columns,
by divisions and brigades, and attacked the hill both in front and on
the right at once. The French suffered considerably in this attack.
Count Sobolesky and another chief of battalion were killed, several
of equal rank wounded; but they had the advantage of numbers as well
as discipline. The colonel who commanded on the hill was wounded, and
before Giron could reach the spot with the reserve, the battalions
which were posted there gave way. These battalions, instead of rallying
when they found themselves supported, confused the troops who came to
support them. The height, upon which the fate of the day depended, was
lost; and the enemy, having won it, attacked the Spaniards in flank.
Lacy upon this wheeled to face the enemy, and for a while withstood
them; 200 cavalry, led by Don Nicholas Chacon, charged one of their
columns, which, forming itself into a square, withstood the attack; and
Chacon, having his horse shot under him, and some of his best officers
and soldiers killed, was compelled to withdraw. In the centre the enemy
were equally successful, and at length the Spaniards fell back along
the whole of their line. Nevertheless the ground was well contested,
and Venegas took up a second position behind Almonacid, supported by
the Castle hill. Here he was presently attacked at all points; his
cavalry made another charge, which failed for lack of numbers, not
of spirit, and the general then perceived that there was no hope of
recovering the day. He therefore commenced his retreat, and ordered
Vigodet, whose division was at this time the least exposed, to bring up
and cover the rear. Vigodet performed this service with great coolness,
recovered and spiked one of the cannon which had been taken, and
began at length to fall back himself in good order. At this time some
ammunition carts, which were blown up on his right, that they might
not fall into the enemy’s hands, frightened the horses of the little
cavalry which covered his own retreat, and the French, taking advantage
of their confusion, charged him vigorously. The second in command
of the division, D. Francisco de Reyna, checked the pursuers, while
Vigodet rallied the scattered horse, and collected about 1000 men,
under whose protection he left the field. They retreated by different
routes to Herencia, meaning to fall back to Manzanares, Membrilla, and
Solana. As far as Herencia the movement was effected in good order,
only a few soldiers, straggling from their ranks to drink at the few
wells in that arid country; but when the van reached Manzanares, a cry
arose that the French had got before them on the road of Valdepeñas,
to cut off their retreat. This false report, either originating in
treason or in cowardice, spread through the troops: from that moment
subordination was at an end, and they forfeited the credit which had
been gained in the action, by dispersing.
Sebastiani stated the loss of the Spaniards at 4000 killed, 4000
prisoners, an immense number wounded, 100 ammunition waggons,
and thirty-five pieces of cannon. The whole of the artillery and
baggage was certainly lost; but the number of prisoners was grossly
exaggerated, because the Spaniards did not disperse till they had
accomplished their retreat; and the French, with that inconsistency
which so often betrayed the falsehood of their official accounts,
admitted that none of their corps could be overtaken. He gave no
account of his own loss; Venegas estimated it at 8000, ... an
exaggeration as great as that of the French general; but that the
French suffered severely was evident, because they were long crippled
for any further operations. Venegas retired to La Carolina, his men
assembled at the passes of the Sierra, and in a few days he was again
at the head of a respectable army. The enemy had now effected every
thing which they proposed; they had driven Cuesta and the British
beyond the Tagus on one side, and on the other had recovered possession
of La Mancha; and the Intruder, rejoicing in the issue of a campaign,
which opened under such inauspicious aspects, returned triumphantly to
Madrid. The disgrace of Talavera sate easy upon the French; ... with
their usual contempt of truth, they affirmed that they had won the
victory; and the situation of the contending armies a few weeks after
the battle gave credit to the impudent assertion.