Besides, I have already done so, in part at least, elsewhere. But I
wish to recall the curious coincidence that the mathematical
achievements of the Elberfeld horses were much more brilliant and
much more prodigious than those of the dogs which have up to now
been experimented on. And horses in the phylo-genetic line are more
ancient than dogs: they are lower in the zoologic scale. Much lower
still, i.e. among the Arthropoda, occur many other mathematical
wonders. I only mention in a cursory way the logarithmic spiral of
the spider's web, the precise curves realized without instruments
of any kind by the Coleoptera and Hymenoptera in cutting leaves,
the stereometry of the aphides. Then, as it were, at the bottom of
the scale (if one may still speak of a descent and a bottom) the
marvellous plancton filters of the Appendiculata; the geometrical
spots of the Amoebae; the cases of perfect forms of so many other
Protozoa; and, finally, think of the constructive technic of the
static organs, or of those of movement either in man or animals or
plants; think of the complex mathematics of the mitosi, or of any
cell proceeding to its own indirect division.
It seems to me clear that the mathematical faculty--assuming
always, let it be understood, that it may give rise to more or less
conscious phenomena in the biological subject--may be amongst the
most natural of imaginable causes, and that even the smallest
amount of consciousness may help this existing capacity in the
animal to express itself. That we are concerned with an expression
by raps or not, does not seem to me as important as a proper
estimation of the importance of the central fact constituted by
this mathematical capacity.
From this central fact, proved over and over again without any possible
doubt to be true of the "thinking" animals, there have been developed
two distinct groups of consequences: (1) the prodigious mathematical
performances occurring as by magic among the Elberfeld horses at a
certain point of their "education": (2) the apparent manifestations of
thought through the typtology or rapping out of words, culminating in
the "philosophic" achievements of Rolf and Lola.
For the reasons just mentioned the first group of consequences seems to
me to admit largely of biological (i.e. biopsychical) explanation;
however, anything which eventually does not fit into the biological
explanation may be made to enter without any effort into the second
method of explanation which, in view of the facts, it seems to me that
we must adopt for the second of the two groups of consequences above
referred to.
That mathematics can be "lived" rather than "known"--or, if any one
prefers the term, "realized"--by an organism which is without any
psychical accompaniment whatever of the human type, is a fact which I
find credible. But when Rolf speaks to me of the origin of the soul, or
makes up poetry; when Lola complains to me of honour lost, etc., the
thing is not credible to me in any way except by paying attention to
nothing except the feeling, which is so difficult to avoid, that what
is here speaking to me, versifying and complaining, is a psychical
"quid," absolutely human and only human; a "quid" which therefore is
(after all) not the animal's, although manifested in some way through
it. The difficulty naturally consists in deciding precisely how this
happens. But it does not seem to me altogether impossible to arrive at
a proper hypothesis.
I have already said that we must discard, because of its inability to
explain a great part of the facts, the most easy and simple
hypothesis--that of some mechanical signal (e.g. by means of a supposed
pressure of the hand under the cardboard, or by the hand itself which
is held out to the animal, in the case of the dogs which have so far
been experimented with). Here we also have to remember the proposition
laid down by Miss Kindermann herself that "She did not wish to let
herself be carried away by sentiment," and that she would seek all
possible proofs which were good logically. Having excluded the
hypothesis of deceit, it is a further proof of the sheer impotency of
the theory of signals, when regard is had to the available amount of
the material observed and recorded in the authoress, if we ask how is
it possible to imagine that she (knowing very well, as she says, the
suspicion resting on the method) in a year or more of work with Lola
should not herself have perceived that she herself had been producing
by mechanical means the rapped answers of her pupil?
In my opinion the answer is that the authoress was not only not aware
of, but _could not_ in the least have been aware of, the action that
may have passed from herself to the dog so as to bring about the
rapping of the answers; and that on the other hand it is not a question
at all of thinking of a simple mechanical operation of the kind
mentioned above, because in the presumed action of the authoress on the
dog there is no need to have recourse to such a crude hypothesis (as
surely there was no similar action of Krall's on his horses, especially
when they were separated from him). I maintain, in fact, that in
principle, even without any contact by hand, we may still presume that
all the "wonders" obtained by Miss Kindermann are obtainable, taking,
of course, into account the peculiar endowments of the animal we are
dealing with. For if there be any automatism (and there is surely a
good dose of it), it is certainly not a question of a mechanical
automatism (of the type of Neumann's), but quite certainly of a true
and proper _psychic automatism_; a very different thing, and without
doubt much more complex.
In all probability the first condition for the occurrence of genuine
phenomena similar to those attributed to "thinking" animals must be a
very particular psychic relationship between the animal and his master.
And such a relation, although with reluctance, I am compelled to call
of the mediumistic type.
My reluctance is due in part to the very unhappy etymology of the term,
derived from the famous word "medium," so unscientific both in its
origin and in the meaning which some even now wish to associate with
it. But even after having freed it from any "spiritistic" meaning, the
term still leaves me reluctant; for I cannot hide from myself the
weakness of a hypothesis which, in order to explain (only in part) one
enigmatical fact (in this case, that of "thinking animals"), must have
recourse to another unsolved enigma (in this case that of the
"mediumistic phenomena").
However, it will already be something if the two problems are
eventually merged together and so become a single problem; but it is
not my object to explain any psychical facts themselves, whatever they
may be, under which the phenomena of Lola and others of a similar
nature may be eventually classified. It will be sufficient for me at
present to group the performances of the animals, if possible, with
something better known. And "mediumistic" facts, extrinsically at
least, are certainly better known. I refer therefore to them as I find
them described in the psychology called supernormal; because, from
force of circumstances I am compelled to recognize that it is within
this psychology that I must now continue the discussion.
IV. MEDIUMISTIC "RAPPORT" AND TELEPATHY
The hypothesis of a psychic automatism of a mediumistic type, as a
concomitant phenomenon, at least, in experiments of the "new
zoopsychology," offers us a point of support for a possible
interpretation of the strange uncertainty and irregularity of the
successes and failures of different observers and different animals.
With Krall two of his horses gave magnificent results; two others
negative results. In the same way, with the same dogs some
experimenters obtain wonders, others obtain nothing.... We may
therefore assume that in order to obtain favourable results there
must be a proper accord or reciprocal psychic concordance between
the animal and the person making the experiment, precisely as
happens with mediumistic phenomena.
Moreover, this hypothesis in the same way helps us to an
interpretation of the fact that the same animal, with the same
investigator, gives good results in some matters, poor or no result
in others. Taking, however, due account of the central mathematical
phenomena, on which, as it seems to me, the whole edifice is
superposed, there remains a great variety of marked psychical
idiosyncrasies in the various cases. One of the animals is
decidedly a calculator; another likes to read or to explain
figures; another detests reading but willingly taps out
"spontaneous communications."
Without possessing much intrinsic probative value of its own, it is
certain that all this fits in very badly with the supposition of a
purely mechanical automatism operated by the person making the
experiments. And on the other hand it bears a close analogy to the
mediumistic "specialities"; that is, to the well-known fact that
one "medium," for instance, is good for "physical effects" (i.e.
gives rise around it to dynamic phenomena), but is not good for
"psychography"; or produces "incarnations" but not "apports," etc.
In the same way, typtology or rapping, more or less systematic,
seems a fundamental gift, common to all the various kinds of
"mediums." And the fact is perhaps of a certain value that
precisely the same thing is true of "thinking" animals; although we
must always remember that an analogous relation may only be
apparent or extrinsic. Besides, the tone also of the
"communications" in the two fields seems to me very much akin. I
allude to the curious, angular, enigmatic, spasmodic, often playful
and bantering communications, with frequent "unexpected replies"
and philosophic platitudes. I find all these in Lola, and I
remember similar stories of Rolf and of the horses, giving me an
impression very like that which I get from the accounts of
mediumistic seances "with intellectual effects."
Premising all this, we may suppose that a peculiar psychic concordance,
which failing a better term might be called mediumistic, exists between
Lola and her mistress. The mistress then in some way will have
"communicated" through the dog the substance of her psychic self
(perhaps with eventual autonomous additions from the canine or other
psychic entity); all this happening, we must suppose, in a subliminal
way, with partial psychical disassociation on the part of the
authoress, if not also probably on the part of Lola, about which I am
quite certain (and in this I agree with Neumann) that it absolutely
does not understand anything or know anything of almost all the
manifestations of thought which it exhibits.
There remain the questions (if the possibility of such duplicate
mediumistic phenomena is admitted _a priori_ to be possible) as to the
point at which the normal relationship between a human person and an
animal passes over into this supernormal one; and, finally, as to what
particular known facts in the case of Lola, besides the rather too
general analogies already mentioned, speak in favour of this
hypothesis.
Into the mediumistic endowment of the investigator it seems to me
useless to inquire since _a priori_ many persons, so it seems, are more
or less strikingly endowed, and the conditions which determine results
are not sufficiently known. At the most there exist some indications--e.g.
in Morselli's masterly work (2)--of the existence of some concordances
between the phenomenology of mediumism and hysterical, hysteroid, or at
least "sensitive" temperaments. And I believe that--with the help of
their own publications, properly analysed--it would not be too
difficult to attribute one or the other of such physio-psychic
varieties to those persons who have up to the present obtained the best
results with "thinking animals."
More interesting appears to me the investigation of the question
whether animals themselves have already given any clear proof of being
able to be "sensitive" in the mediumistic sense. And I must say that
such a proof seems to have almost been reached.
I may refer on this subject to the exhaustive monograph published
in 1905 by Bozzano (1) and written with the special competency and
clearness that distinguish the well-known Genoese psychist.
Bozzano at that time was necessarily ignorant of the "thinking"
animals, for it was only afterwards that they came to notice. But
there were other authors who introduced the possibility (or the
necessity) of a supernormal relationship in order to explain the
Elberfeld facts, as soon as they were known. Perhaps the first in
chronological order was De Vesme, who published in 1912 an
interesting article in that sense (3), showing the many analogies
between the phenomena of Elberfeld and mediumistic phenomena
generally, e.g. the typtological particularities; the wrong
orthography ("Firaz" tapped by the horse to express its own name
"Zariff," "Dref" instead of "Ferd," etc.); solutions of difficult
problems and invincible resistance to simple inquiries; immediate
promptitude of correct replies to complicated mathematical
problems, etc.
A similar work was Maeterlinck's, written in 1909 for a German
review, and then transformed into a long and interesting chapter of
the well-known volume, "L'hote Inconnu" (10).
Then in 1914 was published a book by E. G. Sanford (5) containing
some useful comparisons between "thinking" animals and mediumistic
psychology.
In Italy there were indications in the same sense, in the work of
Stefani (1913), Professor Siciliani (1914), and others. But the
subject was but little followed up.
Even psychologists by profession seemed for a time to be willing to
accept the hypothesis of some "telepathic" transmission of thought from
the investigators to the Elberfeld horses.
Already Claparede (1912) had been forced to refer to this, although
he refused, so to speak, to discuss the matter; then G. C. Ferrari,
and F. Pulle, in an interesting account (4) relate how the horse
taken by them for instruction sometimes guessed the numbers that
they were proposing to them, and rapped out the answers before
being asked to do so.
Whatever may be the fate of the telepathic hypothesis, it may not be
amiss to remind the reader that it undoubtedly is very closely
connected with the mediumistic. The distinction between them is not
always easy; besides, both may exist together side by side.
"Telepathy," so called, (a term not less unfortunate than that of
"medium" and its derivatives), or, better, the transmission of thought,
is (shortly put) the hypothesis that at a certain moment an agent
transmits, and a receiver perceives, some definite mental image or
state of mind. The transmission may be more or less willed (i.e.
conscious) on the part of the agent; on the part of the receiver,
however, the fact of the transmission always remains unconscious, but
the psychical elements perceived bring about a reaction in
consciousness and the receiver knows what he is doing, or at any rate
may do so, at the moment of the occurrence. Shortly stated, it may be
regarded as a kind of suggestion, "à distance," with sometimes
immediate and sometimes delayed effect; a kind of posthypnotic
performances of a suggestion without the intervention of hypnotism (or,
perhaps, with a partial subhypnotic state?), the receiver of the
suggestion not receiving it in the form of acoustic vibrations or in
any way by means of one of the ordinary senses.
Mediumistic phenomena on the other hand require for their explanation
the possibility of a much more direct, more profound and more immediate
relationship between the several minds taking part in them. One of
these minds--more or less disassociated--might become the instrument of
another--even of several others--although still itself in a state of
more or less complete disassociation, and always remaining altogether
unconscious of its relationship to the other. One of the minds might
therefore be an agent, another a recipient, or even several of them
simultaneously might join together to produce the phenomena, the
subliminal nature of the relationship remaining fixed. The actors would
in this way, for ever, all of them without exception, be absolutely
unaware that they were the actors. It might also be the case that the
recipient through whom the phenomena are produced (i.e. the "medium,"
or in our case the animal experimented on) would not be conscious at
all of the resulting action. With human "mediums" we should find in
such cases a more or less advanced state of trance or ecstasy. And with
regard to animals, I remember the opinions of Ochorowicz and
others--which were preceded, however, long ago by a similar opinion of
Cuvier--according to which the consciousness of animals in an awakened
state would correspond fairly closely to the consciousness of man in a
hypnotic state.
If what has been said above is at all correct, it would seem as if the
walls separating various minds one from another all of a sudden are
opened wide, and by a partial interpenetration of one mind by the other
the several minds join together to produce by mutual determination
automatic action. And it is in these special psychical states that
"supernormal" phenomena, viz., psychography, clairvoyance,
clairaudience, etc., occur.
Now, although all this is to move in a very uncertain ambit, harassed
by a multitude of diverse and vain dilettantisms and mysticisms, and
only too frequently by fraud, it is not any longer possible nowadays to
deny that facts, objectively known, compel the positive scientist to
have recourse to some such suppositions. Also without making the
"subliminal," with Myers, a kind of "deus ex machina" in the world, it
is certain that mediumistic phenomena of the kind mentioned are
henceforth to be considered as a subject of study for an open-minded
psychology. I may refer in support of this view, among others, to the
powerful work of Morselli. And to return to the "thinking" animals, we
find that the mediumistic hypothesis, however shifty it may seem, is a
better explanation than the telepathic hypothesis--which has already
itself become rather more systematized in modern psychology.
After his visits to Elberfeld, Claparede, as I said, had found it
difficult to treat as valid the telepathic hypothesis when applied
to Krall's horses. What, indeed, had been "transmitted" to them?
Numbers? Words? Single letters? (or orders to stop the foot at the
right time?) It must be remembered that the horses were tapping
their answers by using a sort of stenography, that usually left out
the vowels: that besides, although the words could be recognized in
the most certain manner, the spelling was most irregular, and, as I
have already pointed out, sometimes reversed. Further, as to the
words themselves, most infantile phrases were used, certainly such
as no adult would have suggested. Was it suggestion then from one
unconscious to another? But this is to fall back upon a supposition
of the "mediumistic" type, and takes no count of the cases of
replies to questions which were unknown to everybody present, and
brings us to the single dilemma: either there is intelligence in
the human sense in the animal, or a relationship of the mediumistic
type above described between the several minds concerned.
As to the interesting observations reported by Ferrari and Pulle,
it seems to me opportune to quote here some extracts from the first
of these distinguished authors.
"This séance was particularly interesting, because I find it
recorded in my notes that a fact was verified three times
consecutively, which had occurred sporadically more than once
before, and had been observed and noted by us and various other
witnesses.
"It consisted in this: While I was putting in the box the number of
balls which I had intended the horse to read, the horse, which
often could not even have seen the number of balls, because I
covered them partly with my head and hands, tapped out the correct
number.
"The same thing happened when I took in one hand a card, the signs
on which it could only have read with difficulty, the light being
rather bad. The most curious thing about it was that the taps were
then made upon the whole more rapidly and less strongly than usual;
and that several times later on the horse gave the same number
itself with some little difficulty.
"It is also curious that it should have repeated the performance,
seeing that it was only once rewarded for it, and that, because it
was agreed that it had done its reading well. I must add that the
person who assisted me told me that generally, even when it was
giving correctly the number decided on, it hardly looked to see how
I was placing the balls in the box....
"Once when I was arranging three balls, because some one standing
behind the horse had made me the sign 3, the horse tapped its three
beats behind my shoulders while stretching out its neck by my side
in order to try to take a salad leaf, thus showing that it was
taking very little interest in the sign which I held out to it and
in the taps which it was making.
"Certainly, this time at least, the animal seemed to perform an
automatic action, and it seemed to me that we had guessed
subconsciously what the horse intended to do. This may appear a
crooked hypothesis, but it is less difficult for me than to think
that the horse had read in my mind the number which I had there. It
certainly did nothing on most occasions to upset the fairly clear
and precise impression that it was obeying some more or less
complex determinism."
It seems to me difficult to avoid the impression that what has just
been stated does not reveal a simple telepathic relationship but
something rather more deep. The want of interest by the animal in its
behaviour is for me symptomatic, and agrees perfectly well with the
sensation of the observer that he also had to obey some obscure
determinism. I see here another case of a combined psychical (partial)
operation of a "mediumistic" kind; and this hypothesis makes very
plausible the other no less impressive hypothesis of the observer that
his mind was reading (in a subconscious way) the mind of the horse. I
call this hypothesis of Ferrari impressive, because in this case it was
due to a person who is certainly not to be suspected of dilettantism,
and still less of any pseudo-scientific mysticism.
For the rest I repeat that "telepathy" also may co-exist along with
"mediumistic" action. In a general way, telepathy would seem to assume
in the animal a greater amount of "human" psychic affinity, whilst in
mediumistic action I look upon the animal as reacting to the
intervention of the other mind in a much more "automatic" way: almost
like a "speaking table," but a table provided with live feet rather
than inert legs, and above all provided with a nervous system forming
part of it, so that very little action on the part of the medium is
required, but the subliminal action of the investigator is enough by
itself to work it. (Of course, this does not exclude altogether action
by others or by the horse itself).
Krall admits the possibility of telepathy (but in a very limited
measure): and then, if I remember right, he was looking finally for
an explanation which to-day I should perhaps call of the
mediumistic type, if I had been better acquainted with it; but in
fact I had of him, in his lifetime, only some vague hint on the
point.
As to Miss Kindermann, she recognises the possibility of
transmission of thought in certain cases (e.g. when Lola is tired
or is unwilling to "work" any more). According to her it would be a
question of a line of least resistance, along which the "work" of
the animal becomes more easy. Hence arises the necessity, as she
maintains, for the investigator to be very careful of the danger of
falsified results and to _abstain with this object from any
intentional thought_. But these are the very conditions which
"mediums" impose on investigators, and if these conditions are not
observed, mediumistic séances seem only to be successful with
difficulty. Therefore, in trying to resist the danger of telepathic
falsification, and without indeed being aware of the resulting
consequences, Lola's mistress may have contributed to create the
very conditions most favourable to the development of mediumistic
action.