I pass to a real difficulty, where I do not feel at all sure that our
policy was wise, though on the whole the balance of well-informed
opinion seems to approve of it. I mean the so-called total "blockade" of
Germany, including the shutting out of foodstuffs. The history of this
policy is as follows.
On February 4, 1915, the Germans announced that all the seas round Great
Britain were a "war-area" in which they would sink without warning all
ships whatsoever. (Neutrals might be spared on occasion, but could not
complain if they were sunk.) This was a proposed blockade by submarine,
which has hitherto proved to be impracticable. If Germany had commanded
the seas she would, of course, have proclaimed a real blockade and
prevented any ship from reaching Great Britain.
Now we made no objection to the enemy's wishing to blockade us. We
objected to the submarine blockade on its own special demerits, because
it could not be, or at any rate was not, carried out with any respect
for humanity. A regular blockade may be compared with putting a line of
policemen across a street to turn back intruders. A submarine blockade
was as though a man, having no police at his disposal, were to make
occasional dashes into the street with a revolver and shoot passers-by.
But this point need not be laboured, since American opinion was quite in
agreement with ours. The point to consider is the retort that we made.
Up to February we had allowed, not only foodstuffs but important
articles for munition-making, like cotton, to proceed freely to Germany.
On February 4 Germany announced that no ship would be allowed to sail to
or from Great Britain and that all our shipping, including even fishing
boats, would be sunk at sea by submarines. We replied on March 11 that,
if they chose to put the war on that footing, we took up the challenge.
After a certain date we would allow no ship to carry goods to or from
Germany, and, as for their murderous submarines, our fishermen should
have arms and fight them. The submarine war has been at times extremely
dangerous to us, and may be so again: but, as far as we can at present
judge, we have won it. By unheard-of efforts of daring and invention our
sea-faring men have baffled and destroyed the submarines, and we have
turned the tables of the blockade completely against the enemy.
Our action, however, has been criticized on several grounds. (1) On
grounds of international law. Here I must stand aside and allow the
lawyers to speak. It is no part of my case to argue that in all the
innumerable controversies produced by the war England has always been
technically in the right. But it seems pretty clear that in this matter
a condition has arisen which has no precedent in previous wars and is
not covered by any of the existing rules. If our action is to be
described as a "blockade," there has certainly never been any blockade
like it before, either in vastness of scale or, I think, in efficiency,
or in the leniency with which it is exercised. Neither has any
government of a belligerent nation before commandeered all foodstuffs
for its own use, as Germany has, and thus brought them under the
category of contraband. Nor again, so far as I know, has there been a
parallel to the curious position in the Baltic, where our command of
the sea suddenly ceases, not from any lack of strength or vigilance on
our part, but because the neutral powers who own the narrow entrances to
the Baltic have closed them to our warships. We seem here again to be
creating a precedent, but not, I think, a precedent that is repugnant to
the "essence of international law properly applicable to questions at
issue under present-day conditions." Mr. Asquith seems to have accepted
some such view when he explained that our policy was to exclude supplies
from Germany, and at the same time refused to use the term "blockade" in
order "not to be entangled in legal subtleties." The gravest objection
to the whole policy is, no doubt, the hardship which it inflicts on
neutrals. All blockading, all stopping of contraband, all interference
with shipping, inflicts hardship on neutrals; and the immense scale of
the Allied operations in this world-war makes the total hardship
inflicted very large.
I sometimes doubt whether the Allies would have taken this drastic step
had they not felt that, on the main issue of the war, neutral feeling
was so overwhelmingly on our side that it would probably accept a good
deal of inconvenience in order to have the war finished more rapidly and
successfully. And I do think that the general attitude of most neutral
nations, and most especially of America, has shown a high standard of
generosity and of what I may call world-patriotism.
(2) Secondly, on ground of humanity. We are said to be "starving the
women and children of Germany." The answer is, first, that such a
blockade is a normal measure of war in all sieges and was practised,
e.g. by the Germans in the siege of Paris. It has always been understood
that the siege process would be applied to Great Britain by any enemy
who should command the sea. It was attempted by Napoleon, and it has
been applied already by Germany, though with complete lack of success.
We are doing to Germany what they are trying to do to us. Secondly,
while we are a nation vitally dependent on sea-borne imports for our
food, Germany is almost completely self-supporting. She can live for an
indefinite time on her own produce; and the most that our "blockade" can
do is to make life less comfortable, and the supplying of the army
vastly more difficult. No human being in Germany need starve because of
our "blockade."
There is a further development of this argument which causes many
people, myself included, grave searchings of heart. It is connected with
the treatment of conquered territories, such as Poland, Serbia, and to a
lesser degree, Belgium. By every canon of law and humanity, as well as
by the express stipulations of the Hague Convention, a nation which
holds conquered territory assumes serious responsibilities towards the
inhabitants. All these the German Government has repudiated. It appears
certain that the German Government has not only destroyed during its
military operations practically all the food-supplies of Serbia, and
much of the food-supplies of Poland: it has further, during its
occupation of those territories, carried off into Germany, with or
without pretext, almost all the food that remained in them. It has
produced famine of a ghastly description, and excused itself by
attributing all to the British blockade.
This is bad enough, but worse remains. Appeals were made to us to do for
Poland and Serbia what we did for Belgium: to admit food for the
starving natives and of course also contribute to the food-fund
ourselves. This we were willing and anxious to do if we had the same
guarantee as in Belgium, that the Germans would not take the food,
native or imported, for their own use. They were not to take the
imported food themselves; nor were they to sweep the country bare of all
the native-grown crops and cattle, and leave us to support entirely the
whole population of their conquered provinces. To the surprise of most
people concerned they refused to give this guarantee. By starving these
territories, it appeared, they gained two advantages. First, they forced
large numbers of Poles, and perhaps a few Serbs, to seek work in Germany
and set free so many Germans for the fighting line. Secondly, they
could use the famine to stir up hatred against the British. Mr. Bullard
assures us that even in America the starvation of Poland is generally
attributed to our blockade, and if writers of his tone have much
influence, I have no doubt that what he says is true. As for the
unfortunate Poles themselves in their misery and isolation, who can tell
what they believe?
This is a hideous state of things, and if our blockade is at all an
effective element in causing it, I would be in favour of dropping the
blockade forthwith. But it does not seem to be so. If Germany did not
wish to starve these people she need not do it. We are willing, both to
admit food and to send food, so long as she will promise not to steal
it. If it be argued that Germany cannot be expected to look on at a
crowd of conquered Poles and Serbs enjoying themselves while good sound
Germans are short of pork and butter and bread, the answer is that, even
at the best, we should hardly be able to bring the food-supply of two
utterly ravaged and devitalized countries, like Poland and Serbia, to a
level approaching that of Germany. Germany is living on her own
resources and those of her allies, true; but the territories in question
are both vast and fertile, and scarcely the extreme fringe of them has
been touched by the war. On the whole, it does not look as if Poland or
Serbia would appreciably benefit by our admission of food to Germany.