arguments, just mentioned, may be applicable; for we perceive around us
an innumerable multitude of beauties and features of harmony, which were
not necessary to the preservation of our world, and which, according to
every rule of probability, would never have existed, unless we supposed,
that the earth has been formed, dissolved, and reproduced, an infinity
of times, before having been composed such as we see it; but then I
would ask, why there are no vestiges of those alterations, and why that
motion has stopped?
It would be possible, however, by the assistance of a new supposition,
to resolve the difficulty I have just mentioned; some may say, that the
union, and the successive dispersion of the universal atoms, are
executed in a space of time, so slow and insensible, that our
observations, and all those which we have from tradition, cannot inform
us whether there will not be a separation of all the parts of the
universe, by the same causes which have occasioned their adhesion.
It is obvious, that transporting us into infinity and admitting such a
series of arbitrary suppositions, they are not indeed exposed to any
rational attacks; but, making equally free with infinity, in order to
oppose nonsense to nonsense, why may I not be allowed to suppose, that
in the infinite combinations arising from perpetual motion, men have
been created, destroyed, and again called into being, with the same
faculties, remembrances, thoughts, relations, and circumstances; and why
each of us separated from our former existence, only by a sleep, whose
duration is imperceptible, should not be in our own eyes immortal
beings? Infinity permits the supposition of this absurd hypothesis, as
it authorises every flight of the imagination in which time is reckoned
for nothing. We see, however, how we risk running into error, when with
our limited faculties we wish to subject the incomprehensible idea of
infinity, and boldly adjust it to the combinations of finite beings.
Let us produce, however, another objection. It may be said, that our
planet is the result of chance; but is not this chance improbable, if we
suppose that there existed in the infinity of space, an infinite number
of other assembled atoms, equally produced by the first throw of the
dice, which represent all the possible forms, and imaginable
proportions? And I would also ask, by what laws, all these irregular
bodies, necessarily subject, by reason of their number and masses, to an
infinity of movements, have not disconcerted the planetary system
formed, at the same time as they were, by chance?
I ought to observe, above all, that the order which we are acquainted
with, is a proof of universal order; for, in immensity, where one part
is nothing compared with the whole, no part, without exception, could be
preserved, unless it was in equilibrium with every other.
Thus, whether _an infinite succession of chances_ be supposed, to which
the entire mass of atoms has been uniformly subject, or whether the
first general throw is thought sufficient, but divided _into an infinity
of different sections_, our reason opposes invincible difficulties to
the result which some want to draw from these various systems.
In short, we must observe, that in order to understand the accidental
formation of a world, such as we are at liberty to suppose, the eternal
existence of every kind of organized and intelligent atoms, must have
preceded the formation of that world. I must again observe, that when
they are obliged to such wonderful first principles, and to admit, in
the beginning, a nature so astonishing, we can scarcely conceive how
they can make it act suddenly a foolish part, in order to finish the
work of the universe: a more exalted supposition, would have prevented
their drawing a conclusion, so absurd.
It seems to me, that notwithstanding the immensity which has given rise
to so many ridiculous notions about the formation of the world, they
have such a resemblance to each other, that we can scarcely discern any
difference; and considering the little circle which the imagination runs
over, when it applies its force to deep conceptions, we think we
discover something supernatural in its singular weakness: the authors of
these systems seem to have a slavish turn of thinking, and the marks of
their chains are very visible; it is always atoms, and atoms that they
make play together, either at different times, or all at once, in
infinite space; but when some want to form ideas of liberty and will, as
they do not know in what manner to analyze these properties, they
suppose them pre-existing in the elementary parts, which they made use
of to create their universe; and they prudently take care not to grant
any action to liberty and will, in order to prevent any resistance to
those notions on which they build their universe.
They would not render either more simple or credible, the blind
production of worlds, by supposing not only innumerable multitude of
organized atoms, but, even an infinite diversity of molds to hold the
atoms, and of which force chemical analogy gives us an idea. Such a
system, which might serve to explain a few secondary causes of our known
nature, is not applicable to the first formation of beings; for with
such an assemblage of molds and atoms, all the great difficulties would
still subsist. In fact, how should the different molds have classed
themselves properly, in order to form the most simple whole, but which
beside required a fixed measure and gradation of ranks? The mold
destined for the organized atoms, of which the crystalline is to be
composed, how is it possible it should have placed itself in the centre
of that mold which is to form the pupil of the eye, and this last on
that one which is to form the whole, and so on, by an exact gradation,
whose divisions and subdivisions are innumerable?
Were they to suppose an infinite succession of molds, of which the
largest attracted the smallest, in the same manner as the molds
attracted the atoms; this supposition, less ridiculous than any other,
is not sufficient to model, even in imagination, the most unimportant
phœnomena of nature; it is necessary, besides, that by the direction of
a wise and powerful force, the molds, and the atoms which belong to
them, set themselves in motion, without confusion; it is necessary that
those destined to compose the exterior fibres should not obstruct the
passage of those molds calculated to form the interior organs; in short,
that every one of those in its course and expansion, should artfully
observe those delicate shades which blend or separate all the parts of
the simplest of nature’s works.
We are already acquainted with a force which acts in all directions,
which disposes every thing in due order, tends towards an end, stops,
begins again, and finishes, every moment, a complicated work; and this
is the intelligent will, and certainly we have reason to be astonished,
that the only faculty we have an intimate consciousness of, is the one
philosopher’s turn from, when they investigate the admirable order of
the universe.
I allow, that they may, at the same time they reject the idea of a God,
admit, as a principle, the eternal existence of a mechanical force,
which, by an incomprehensible necessity, directed, towards a wise end,
every thing that was at first confusedly scattered in the immensity of
space; but this new supposition would form an hypothesis similar to the
system of the eternal existence of the universe; in fact, the eternal
existence of all the elements, of all substances, forces, and properties
which were necessary to produce a certain order of things, would be a
phœnomenon as incomprehensible as the existence of that order itself.
We must add, that these two phœnomena would be separated in our thoughts
only by an indivisible instant, an instant that we can neither describe
nor imagine in the extent of the time represented by eternity; for any
chosen period would be still too late by an infinity of ages. The
necessary effect of an eternal cause has not, like that cause, any
period to which we can fix its commencement.
We thus perceive, under another point of view, how vain and ridiculous
are the fantastic operations, they imagine, before the existence of the
world, and which are attributed sometimes to the disordered movements of
chance, and sometimes to the regular laws of blind necessity.
There is then but one hypothesis to be opposed to the idea of a God: it
is the system of the eternal existence of the universe. Such an
atheistical system will always be more easily defended than any other,
because that being founded on a supposition without bounds, it does not
require to be embraced by reasoning, like all the hypothetical ideas, by
which men make nature act according to an order of their own invention.
We will, in the next chapter, consider this system, and discuss it by
every means in our power.
CHAP. XIV.
_The same Subject continued._
Those who maintain that the world subsists of itself, and that there is
not a God, say, in favour of their opinion, that if the eternal
existence of the universe overwhelms our understanding, the eternal
existence of a God is a still more inconceivable idea; and that such a
supposition is only another difficulty, since, according to a common
mode of judging, a work the most wonderful appears a phœnomenon less
astonishing than the knowledge of which it is the result.
Let us first fix our attention on this argument. It is useless to ask,
what is meant by another difficulty in infinity; those ideas which are
represented by familiar expressions, necessarily derived from
comparison, are only admissable in the narrow circle of our knowledge;
out of it, those ideas have not any application, and we cannot fix any
degrees in the immensity which exceeds the bounds of our views, and in
those unfathomable depths which are out of the reach of our intellectual
powers.
Undoubtedly, our mind is equally lost, both in trying to form a distinct
idea of a God, and in endeavouring to describe the eternal existence of
the world, without any cause out of itself: however, when we try to
glance our thoughts towards the first traces of time; when we try to
rise almost to the beginning of beginnings, we feel distinctly that, far
from considering the eternal existence of an intelligent cause as
increasing the difficulty, we only find repose in that opinion; and
instead of forcing our mind to adopt such an opinion, and thinking we
wander in an imaginary space, we find it, on the contrary, more
congenial with our nature; whilst order unites itself to the idea of a
design, and a multiplicity of combinations to the idea of an
intelligence. Thus we rise from little to great things, and reasoning by
analogy, we shall more easily conceive the existence of a Being endowed
with various unlimitted properties, which we in part partake; we shall,
I say, more easily conceive such an existence, than that of a universe,
where all would be intelligent, except the first mover. The workman,
undoubtedly, is superior to the work: but according to our manner of
feeling and judging, an intelligent combination, formed without
intelligence, will always be the most extraordinary, as well as the most
incomprehensible phœnomenon.
It is not indifferent to observe, that according to the system I combat,
the more the world would appear to us the admirable result of wisdom,
the less power should we have to draw any deduction favourable to the
existence of a God, since the author of a perfect work is not so easily
traced as the feeble re-iterated labours of mediocrity. Thus, all those
who particularized the beauties of nature, would stupidly injure the
cause of religion, and weaken our belief in the existence of a Supreme
Being. It seems to me, that it is easy to perceive what an ill-founded
argument that must be which leads us to a conclusion so absurd.
The attentive view of the universe should make us mistrust the judgment,
which we form, of that which is the most simple in the order of things;
for all the general operations of nature arise from a movement more
noble and complicated than we can easily form an idea of. We should
surely find, contrary to a perfect simplicity of means, that a circuit
of two hundred millions of leagues, which our globe makes every year, is
necessary, in order to produce the successive changes of seasons, and to
assure the reproduction of the necessary fruits; we should find, that
the distance of thirty-four millions of leagues, between the sun and the
earth, was necessary to proportion the rays of light to the delicacy of
our organs. However, if even in the narrow circle we traverse, we do not
discover any constant application of that simple order, of which we form
an idea, how could such a principle serve to guide our opinions, at the
moment when we elevate our meditations to the first link of the vast
chain of beings; when we undertake to examine, whether, throughout the
immensity of the universe, there exists, or not, an intelligent cause?
What would become, in that immensity, of the insignificant phrase, _it
is one difficulty more_? The buzzing fly would be less ridiculous, if
capable of perceiving the order and magnificence of a palace, it
asserted, that the architect never existed.
Every thing indicates, that, according to our different degrees of sense
and knowledge, what is simple, and what is easy, have a very different
application; we may continually observe, that these expressions are not
interpreted in the same manner, by a man of moderate abilities and a man
of genius; however, the distance which separates the various degrees of
intelligence with which we are acquainted, is probably very trifling in
the universal scale of beings. All our reflections would lead us then to
presume, that beyond the limits of the human mind, the simple is
compounded, the easy our wonderful, and the evident our inconceivable.
After having examined the principal arguments of the partisans of
athiestical systems, which we now attack; let us change the scene, and
in the midst of the labyrinth, in which we are placed, try to find a
clue for our meditations.
We are witnesses of the existence of the world, and intimately
acquainted with our own; thus, either God or matter must have been
eternal; and by a natural consequence, an eternal existence, which is an
idea the most incomprehensible, is, however, the most incontestible
truth. Obliged now, in order, to fix our opinion, to chuse between two
eternal existences, the one intelligent and free, the other blind, and
void of all consciousness, why not prefer the first? An eternal
existence is an idea so astonishing, so much above our comprehension,
that we decorate it with every thing sublime and beautiful, and nothing
deserves more those decorations than thought.
Would it not be strange, that in our sysmatic divisions, it was only to
thought, and consequently to all that was most admirable in our nature,
that we refuse eternity, whilst we grant it to matter and its blind
combinations? What a subversion of all proportion! that we should
believe in the eternal existence of matter, because it is present to our
eyes, and yet not admit the eternal existence of an intelligence; whilst
that which we are endowed with becomes the source of our judgment, and
even the guide of our senses!
And by what other singularity we should grant the faculty and the
consciousness of intelligence, only to that small part of the world
which is represented by animated beings? Thus, the whole of nature would
be below a part; and if no spirit animated the universe, man would
appear to have reached his ultimate perfection; though we see in him but
a faint sketch, a weak shadow of something more complete and admirable;
we perceive that he is, to speak thus, at the commencement of thinking;
and all his cares, all his efforts, to extend the empire of that
faculty, only inform him, that he tends continually towards an end, from
which he is always distant; in short, in his greatest exertions he feels
his weakness; he studies, but he cannot know himself; he makes a few
petty discoveries, sees some trifling wheels, whilst the main spring
escapes his search: he is fallen into the world, like a grain of sand
thrown by the winds; he has neither a consciousness of his origin, nor a
foresight of his end; we perceive in him all the timidity and mistrust
of a dependent being; he is constrained, by instinct, to raise to heaven
his wishes and contemplations; and, when he is not led astray by an
intoxicating reason, he fears, seeks to adore a god, and rejects with
disdain the rank which audacious philosophers assign him in the order of
nature.
I must also add, that the sentiment of admiration, which I cannot
stifle, when I turn my attention on the spiritual qualities we are
endowed with, would be insensibly weakened, if I was reduced to consider
man himself as a simple growth of blind matter; for the most astonishing
production would only inspire me with a transitory emotion, unless I can
refer it to an intelligent cause: I must discover a design, a
combination, before I admire; as I have need to perceive feeling and
affection, before I love.
But as soon as I see in the human mind the stamp of Omnipotence; and it
appears to me one of the results of a grand thought; it reasumes its
dignity, and all the faculties of my soul are prostrate before such a
wonderful conception.
It is then united with the idea of a God, that the spiritual faculties
of man attract my homage and captivate my imagination; in reflecting on
these sublime faculties, studying their admirable essence, I am
confirmed in the opinion that there exists a sovereign intelligence,
soul of nature, and that nature itself is subject to its laws: yes, we
find in the mind of man the first evidence, a faint shadow of the
perfection which we must attribute to the Creator of the Universe. What
a wonder indeed is our thinking faculty, capable of so many things yet
ignorant of its own nature! I am equally astonished, by the extent and
limits of thinking; an immense space is open to its researches, and at
the same time it cannot comprehend the secrets which appear most
proximate with it; as the grand motive of action, the principle of
intellectual force, ever remains concealed. Man is then informed, every
instant, of his grandeur and dependence; and these thoughts must
naturally lead to the idea of Omnipotence. There are, in those limits of
our knowledge and ignorance, in that confused and conditional light, all
the evidence of design; and it seems to me, sometimes, that I hear this
command given to the human soul by the God of the universe: go to admire
a portion of my universe, to search for happiness and to learn to love
me; but do not try to raise the veil, with which I have covered the
secret of thy existence; I have composed thy nature of some of the
attributes which constitute my own essence, thou wouldst be too near me,
if I should permit thee to penetrate the mysteries of it; wait for the
moment destined by my wisdom; till then, thou canst only reach me by
reverence and gratitude.
Not only the wonderful faculty of thinking connects us with the
universal intelligence; but all those inconceivable properties, known by
the name of liberty, judgment, will, memory, and foresight; it is, in
short, the august and sublime assemblage of all our intellectual
faculties. Are we, in fact, after the contemplation of such a grand
phœnomenon, far from conceiving a God? No, undoubtedly, we have within
us a feeble image of that infinite power we seek to discover; man is
himself a universe, governed by a sovereign; and we are much nearer the
Supreme Intelligence, by our nature, than by any notion of the primitive
properties of matter; properties, from which some wish to make the
system of the world and its admirable harmony flow.
It seems to me, that our thinking faculty is too slightly treated in the
greater number of philosophic systems; and some have been so afraid of
honouring it, that they will not admit it to be a simple and particular
principle, when the subject of the question is the immortality of the
soul; nor will they consider it as a universal principle, when they
discuss the opinion of the existence of a God.
It is equally singular, that they wish to compose of matter a soul
endowed with the most sublime qualities; and they pretend, at the same
time, that the world, in which we see intelligent beings, had not for a
contriver and principal any being of the same nature: this supposition,
however, would be as reasonable as the other is weak; but it seems to
me, that they like better to attribute order to confusion, than to order
itself.
We seek to penetrate the secret of the existence of the universe; and
when we reflect on the causes of that vast and magnificent disposition,
we can only attribute it to what seems the most marvellous and analogous
to such a composition, thought, intention, and will. Why then should we
retrench from the formation of the world all those sublime properties?
Are we to act sparingly in an hypothesis in which all the wonders of
nature are concentred? It is by the spiritual faculties with which man
is endowed, that he remains master of the earth, that he has subdued the
ferocious animals, conquered the elements, and found a shelter from
their impetuosity: it is by these faculties that man has constructed
society, given laws to his own passions, and that he has improved all
his means of happiness; in short, nothing has ever been done, but by the
aid of his mind; and in his speculations on the formation of the world,
and on the admirable relations of all the parts of the universe, that
which he wishes not to admit, and will dare to reject is the intelligent
powers and action of thinking. It seems like men disputing about the
means which has been made use of to erect a pyramid, who name all the
instruments, except those that they found at the foot of the edifice.
Habit only turns our attention from the union of wonders which compose
the soul; and it is thus, unfortunately, that admiration, lively light
of the mind and feelings, does not afford us any more instruction. We
should be very differently affected, if, for the first time, we
contemplated the meanest part of this admirable whole! But even then, in
a little time, the strong conviction of the existence of a God would be
worn away, and become what it is at present. But, let me be permitted,
in order to render this truth more striking, to have recourse, for a
moment, to fiction. Let us imagine men, as immoveable as plants, but
endowed with some one of our senses, enjoying the faculty of reflection,
and enabled to communicate their thoughts. I hear these animated trees
discourse about the origin of the world, and the first cause of all
things; they advance, like us, different hypothesis on the fortuitous
movement of atoms, the laws of fate and blind necessity; and among the
different arguments, employed by some, to contest the existence of a
God, creator of the universe, that which makes the greatest impression
is, that it is impossible to conceive how an idea should become a
reality; of how the design of disposing the parts should influence the
execution, since the will being a simple wish, a thought without force
has not any means to metamorphose itself into action: but in vain would
these immoveable spectators of the universe wish to change their
situation, to raise a shelter against the impetuosity of the winds, or
the scorching heat of the sun; yet then it would be evidently absurd to
imagine the existence of a faculty essentially contrary to the immutable
nature of things. Let however, in the midst of this conversation, a
supernatural power appear, and say to them, what would you think then,
if this wonder, whose existence you regard as impossible, should be
executed before your eyes; and if the faculty of acting, according to
your own will, was to be suddenly given you? Seized with astonishment,
they would prostrate themselves with fear and respect; and from that
instant, without the slightest doubt, would believe they had discovered
the secret of the system of the world; and they would adore the infinite
power of intelligence, and it is to a like cause we should attribute the
disposition of the universe. However, the same phœnomenon which would
appear above belief, and out of the limits of possibility, to those who
have never been a witness of it, that wonder exists in our world; we see
it, we experience it every instant; though the force of habit weakens
the impression and eradicates our admiration.