you. And, by Jupiter, I have this to say further. While they are still
children they should attend schools, and when they come out of childhood
into youth they should turn their minds to horses and arms and have paid
public teachers in each of these two departments. In this way from very
boyhood they will both learn and practice all that they must themselves
do on becoming men, and so they will prove far more serviceable to you
for every work. The best ruler, who is of any value, must not only
himself perform all his required tasks, but also look forward to see how
the rest shall become also as excellent as possible. And this name can be
yours, not if you allow them to do whatever they please and then censure
those who err, but if before any mistakes occur you teach them everything
which, when practiced, will render them more useful both to themselves
and to you. And afford nobody any excuse whatever, either wealth or
birth, or anything else that accompanies excellence, for affecting
indolence or effeminacy or any other behavior that is not genuine. Many
persons, fearing that on account of some such possession they may incur
jealousy or danger, do much that is unworthy of themselves, expecting
by such behavior to live in greater security. As a consequence they
commiserate themselves, believing themselves wronged in this very
particular, that they are not allowed to appear to live aright. Their
ruler also suffers a loss because he is deprived of the services of good
men, and suffers ill repute for the censure imposed upon them. Therefore
never permit this to be done, and have no fears that any one brought up
and educated as I propose will ever adopt a rebellious policy. Quite the
reverse; it is only the ignorant and licentious that you need suspect.
Such persons are easily influenced to behave most disgracefully and
abominably in absolutely every way first toward their own selves and next
toward other people. Those, however, who have been well brought up and
educated are purposed not to wrong any one and least of all him who cared
for their rearing and education. If any one, accordingly, shows himself
wicked and ungrateful, do not entrust him with any such position as will
enable him to effect any harm: if even so he rebels, let him be tried and
punished. Do not be afraid that any one will blame you for this, if you
carry out all my injunctions. For in taking vengeance on the wrongdoer
you will be guilty of no sin any more than the physician who burns and
cuts. All will pronounce the man justly treated, because after partaking
of the same rearing and education as the rest he plotted against
you.--This is the course of action I advise in the case of the senators
and knights.
[-27-] "A standing army should be supported, drawn from the citizens,
the subject nations, and the allies, in one case more, in another less,
province by province, as the necessities of the case demand; and they
ought to be always under arms and make a practice of warfare continually.
They must have secured winter-quarters at the most opportune points, and
serve for a definite time, so that a certain period of active life may
remain for them before old age. For, separated so far as we are from the
frontiers of the empire, with enemies living near us on every side, we
should otherwise no longer be able to count on auxiliaries in the case of
emergencies. Again, if we allow all those of military age to have arms
and to practice warlike pursuits, quarrels and civil wars will always be
arising among them. However, if we prevent them from doing this and then
need their assistance at all in battle, we shall always have to face
danger with inexperienced and untrained soldiers at our back. For this
reason I submit the proposition that most of them live without arms
and away from forts; but that the hardiest and those most in need of a
livelihood be registered and kept in practice. They themselves will fight
better by devoting their leisure to this single business; and the rest
will the more easily farm, manage ships, and attend to the other pursuits
of peace, if they are not forced to be called out for service, but have
others to stand as their guardians. The most active and vigorous element,
that is, which is oftenest obliged to live by robbery, will be supported
without harming others, and all the rest of the population will lead a
life free from danger.
[-28-] "From what source, then, will the money come for these warriors
and for the other expenses that will be found necessary? I shall make
this point clear, with only the short preliminary statement that even
were we under a democracy, we should in any case need money. We can not
survive without soldiers, and without pay none of them will serve. Hence
let us not feel downhearted in the belief that the compulsory collection
of money appertains only to monarchy, and let us not turn away from
the system for that reason, but conduct our deliberations with a full
knowledge of the fact that in any case it is necessary for us to obtain
funds, whatsoever form of government we may adopt. Consequently, I
maintain that you should first of all sell the goods which are in the
public treasury,--and I notice that these have become numerous on account
of the wars,--except a few which are exceedingly useful and necessary
to you: and you should loan all this money at some moderate rate of
interest. In this way the land will be worked, being delivered to men who
will cultivate it themselves, and the latter will obtain a starting-point
and so grow more prosperous, while the treasury will have a sufficient
and perpetual revenue. This amount should be computed together with all
the rest of the revenue that can be derived from the mines and with
certainty from any other source; and after that we ought to reckon on not
only the military service but everything else which contributes to the
successful life of a city, and further how much it will be necessary to
lay out in campaigns at short notice and other critical occurrences which
are wont to take place. Then, to make up the deficiency in income, we
ought to levy upon absolutely all instruments which produce any profit
for the men who possess them, and we should exact taxes from all whom we
rule. It is both just and proper that no one of them should be exempt
from taxation,--individual or people,--because they are destined to enjoy
the benefit of the taxes in common with the rest. We should set over them
tax-collectors in every case to manage the business, so that they may
levy from all sources of revenue everything that falls due during their
term of management. The following plan will render it easier for the
officers to gather the taxes and will be of no little service to those
who contribute them. I mean that they will bring in whatever they owe
in an appointed order and little by little, instead of remaining idle
a short time and then having the entire sum demanded of them in one
payment.
[-29-] "I am not unaware that some of the incomes and taxes established
will be disliked. But I know this, too,--that if the peoples secure
immunity from any further abuse and believe in reality that they will be
contributing all of this for their own safety and for reaping subsidiary
benefits in abundance and that most of it will be obtained by no others
than men of their own district, some by governing, others by managing,
others by army service, they will be very grateful to you, giving as they
do a small portion of large possessions, the profits of which they enjoy
without oppression. Especially will this be true if they see that you
live temperately and spend nothing foolishly. Who, if he saw you very
economical of your own means and very lavish of the public funds,
would not willingly contribute, and deem your possession of wealth to
constitute his safety and prosperity? By these means a very large amount
of money would be on hand.
[-30-] "The rest I urge you to arrange in the following way. Adorn this
city in the most expensive manner possible and add brilliance by every
form of festival. It is fitting that we who rule many people should
surpass all in everything, and such spectacles tend in a way to promote
respect on the part of our allies and alarm on the part of enemies. The
affairs of other nations you should order in this fashion. First, let the
various tribes have no power in any matter nor meet in assemblies at all.
They would decide nothing good and would always be creating more or less
turmoil. Hence I say that even our own populace ought not to gather at
court or for elections or for any other such meeting where any business
is to be transacted. Next, they should not indulge in numbers of houses
of great size and beyond what is necessary, and they should not expend
money upon many and all kinds of contests: so they will neither be worn
out by vain zeal nor become hostile through unreasonable rivalries. They
ought, however, to have certain festivals and spectacles, (apart from the
horse-race held among us), but not to such an extent that the treasury or
private estates will be injured, or any stranger be compelled to spend
anything whatever in their midst, or food for a lifetime be furnished
to all who have merely won in some contest. It is unreasonable that the
well-to-do should submit to compulsory expenditures outside their own
countries; and for the athletes the prizes for each event are sufficient.
This ruling does not apply to any one of them who might come out victor
in the Olympian or Pythian games, or some contest here at Rome.[12] Such
are the only persons who ought to be fed, and then the cities will not
exhaust themselves without avail nor anybody practice save those who have
a chance of winning, since one can follow some other pursuit that is
more advantageous both to one's self and to one's country. "This is my
decision about these matters.--Now to the horse-races which are held
without gymnastic contests, I think that no other city but ours should be
allowed to hold them, so that vast sums of money may not be dissipated
recklessly nor men go miserably frantic,--and most of all that the
soldiers may have a plentiful supply of the best horses. This, therefore,
I would forbid altogether, that those races should take place anywhere
else than here. The other amusements I have determined to moderate so
that all organizations should make the enjoyment of entertainments for
eye and ear inexpensive, and men thereby live more temperately and free
from discontent.
"Let none of the foreigners employ their own coinage or weights or
measures, but let them all use ours. And they should send no embassy to
you, unless it involve a point for decision. Let them instead present to
their governor whatever they please and through him forward to you all
such requests of theirs as he may approve. In this way they will neither
spend anything nor effect their object by crooked practices, but receive
their answers at first hand without any expenditure or intrigue.
[-31-] "Moreover, in respect to other matters, you would seem to be
ordering things in the best way if you should, in the first place,
introduce before the senate the embassies which come from the enemy and
from those under truce, both kings and peoples. For it is awe-inspiring
and impressive to let the senate appear to be master of all situations
and to exhibit many adversaries prepared for petitioners who are guilty
of double dealing. Next, have all the laws enacted by the senators, and
do not impose a single one upon all the people alike, except the decrees
of that body. In this way the dignity of the empire would be the more
confirmed and the decisions made in accordance with the laws would prove
indisputable and evident to all alike. Thirdly, it would be well in case
the senators who are serving in the city, their children or their wives,
are ever charged with any serious crime, so that a person convicted would
receive a penalty of disenfranchisement or exile or even death, that
you should set the situation before the senate, without any previous
condemnation, and commit to that body the entire decision at first hand
regarding it. Thus those guilty of any crime would be tried before all
their peers and punished without any ill-feeling against you. The rest,
seeing this, would improve in character for fear of being themselves
publicly apprehended. I am speaking here about those offences regarding
which laws are established, and judgments are rendered according to the
laws.
"As for talk that some one has abused you or spoken in an unfitting way
about you, do not listen to any one who brings such an accusation nor
investigate it. It is disgraceful to believe that any one has wantonly
insulted you who are doing no wrong and benefiting all. Only those who
rule badly will credit these reports. Because of their own conscience
they surmise that the matter has been stated truthfully. It is a shame to
be angry at complaints for which, if true, one had better not have been
responsible, and about which, if false, one ought not to pretend to care.
Many in times past by angry behavior have caused more things and worse to
be said against them. This is my opinion about those accused of uttering
some insult. Your personality should be too strong and too lofty to be
assailed by any insolence, and you should never allow yourself to think
nor lead others into thinking that any person can be indecent toward you.
Thus they will think of you as of the gods, that you are sacrosanct. If
any one should be accused of plotting against you (such a thing might
happen), do not yourself sit as judge on a single detail of the case nor
reach any decision in advance,--for it is absurd that the same man should
be made both accuser and judge,--but take him to the senate and make him
plead his defence. If he be convicted, punish him, though moderating the
sentence so far as is feasible, in order that belief in his guilt may be
fostered. It is very difficult to make most men believe that any unarmed
person will plot against him who is armed. And the only way you could
gain credence would be by punishing him not in anger nor overwhelmingly,
if it be possible.--This is aside from the case of one who had an army
and should revolt directly against you. It is not fitting that such an
one be tried, but that he be chastised as an enemy.
"In this way refer to the senate these matters and [-32-] most of the
highly important affairs that concern the commonwealth. Public interests
you must administer publicly. It is also an inbred trait of human nature
for individuals to delight in marks of esteem from a superior, which seem
to raise one to equality with him, and to approve everything which the
superior has determined after consulting them, as if it were their own
proposal, and to cherish it, as if it were their own choice. Consequently
I affirm that such business ought to be brought before the senate.--In
regard to most cases all those senators present ought equally to state
their opinions: but when one of their number is accused, not all of them
should do so, unless it be some one who is not yet a senator or is not
yet in the ranks of the ex-quæstors that is being tried. And, indeed, it
is absurd that one who has not yet been a tribune or an ædile should cast
a vote against such as have already filled these offices, or, by Jupiter,
that any one of the latter should vote against the ex-prætors or they
against the ex-consuls. Let the last named have authority to render a
decision in all cases, but the rest only in the cases of their peers and
their subordinates.
[-33-] "You yourself must try in person the referred and the appealed
cases which come to you from the higher officials, from the procurators,
from the præfectus urbi, from the sub-censor, and the prefects, both the
commissioner of grain[13] and the night-watch.[14] No single one of them
should have such absolute powers of decision and such independence that a
case can not be appealed from him. You should be the judge, therefore
in these instances, and also when knights are concerned and properly
enrolled centurions and the foremost private citizens, if the trial
involves death or disenfranchisement. Let these be your business alone,
and for the reasons mentioned let no one else on his own responsibility
render a decision in them. You should always have associated with you
for discussion the most honored of the senators and of the knights, and
further certain others from the ranks of the ex-consuls and ex-prætors,
some at one time and some at another. In this association you will become
more accurately acquainted with their characters beforehand, and so be
able to put them to the right kind of employment, and they by coming in
contact with your habits and wishes will have them in mind on going out
to govern the provinces. Do not, however, openly ask their opinions when
a rather careful consideration is required, for fear that they, being
outside their accustomed sphere, may hesitate to speak freely; but let
them record their views on tablets. To these you alone should have
access, that they may become known to no one else, and then order the
writing to be immediately erased. In this way you may best get at each
man's exact opinion, when they believe that it can not be identified
among all the rest.
"Moreover for the lawsuits, letters, and decrees of the cities, for the
consideration of the demands of individuals and everything else which
belongs to the administration of the empire you must have supporters and
assistants from among the knights. Everything will move along more easily
in this way, and you will neither err through want of fairness nor become
exhausted by doing everything yourself. Grant every one who wishes to
make any suggestion whatever to you the right of speaking freely and
fearlessly. If you approve what he says, it will be of great service:
and if you are not persuaded, it will do no harm. Those who obtain your
favorable judgment you should both praise and honor, since by their
devices you will receive glory: and those who fail of it you should never
dishonor or censure. It is proper to look at their intentions, and not to
find fault because their plans were unavailable. Guard against this same
mistake when war is concerned. Be not enraged at any one for involuntary
misfortune nor jealous of his good fortune, to the end that all may
zealously and gladly run risks for you, confident that if they make a
slip they will not be punished nor if successful become the objects of
intrigue. There are many who through fear of jealousy on the part of
those in power have chosen to meet reverses rather than to effect
anything. As a result they retained their safety, but the loss fell upon
their own heads. You, who are sure to reap the principal benefit from
both classes alike,--the inferior and the superior,--ought never to
choose to become nominally jealous of others, but really of yourself.
[-34-] "Whatever you wish your subjects to think and do _you_ must
say and do. You can better educate them in this way than if you
should desire to terrify them by the severities of the laws. The former
course inspires emulation, the latter fear. And any one can more easily
imitate superior conduct, when he actually sees it in some life, than he
can guard against low behavior which he merely hears to be prohibited by
edict. Act in every way yourself with circumspection, not condoning any
mistakes of your own, for be well assured that all will straightway learn
everything you say and do. You will live as it were in a kind of theatre,
whose audience is the whole world: and it will not be possible for you to
escape detection if you commit the very smallest error. No act of yours
will ever be in private, but all of them will be performed in the midst
of many persons. And all the remainder of mankind somehow take the
greatest delight in being officious with respect to what is done by their
rulers. Hence, if they once ascertain that you are urging them to one
course and following a different one yourself, they will not fear your
threats, but will imitate your deeds.
"Have an eye to the lives of others, but do not carry your investigations
unpleasantly close. Decide cases which are brought before you by
outsiders, but do not pretend to notice conduct that receives no
outspoken censure from any one, except irregularities not consonant with
public interest. The latter ought to be properly rebuked, even if no one
has aught to say against them. Other private failings you ought to know,
in order to avoid making a mistake some day by employing an assistant
unsuitable for a particular duty: do not, however, take individuals to
task. Their natures impel many persons to commit various violations of
the law. If you make an unsparing campaign against them, you might leave
scarcely one man unpunished. But if you humanely mingle consideration
with the strict command of the law, you may perhaps bring them to their
senses. For the law, though necessarily severe in its punishments, can
not always conquer nature. Some men, if permitted to think they are
unobserved, or if moderately admonished, improve, some through shame
at being discovered and others through fear of failure the next time.
Whereas when they are openly denounced and throw compunction to the
winds, or where they are chastised beyond measure, they overturn and
trample under foot all law and order and obey slavishly the impulses of
their nature. Therefore it is not easy to discipline all of them nor is
it fitting to allow some of them to continue publicly their outrageous
conduct.
"This is the way I advise you to treat people's offences, except the very
desperate cases: and you should honor even beyond the deserts of the deed
whatever they do rightly. In this way you can best make them refrain from
baser conduct by kindliness and cause them to aim at what is better by
liberality. Have no dread that either money or other means of rewarding
those who do well will ever fail you. I think those deserving of good
treatment will prove far fewer than the rewards, since you are lord of so
much land and sea. And fear not that any who are benefited will commit
some act of ingratitude. Nothing so captivates and conciliates any one,
be he foreigner or be he foe, as freedom from wrongs and likewise kindly
treatment.
[-35-] "This is the attitude which I urge you to assume toward others.
For your own part allow no extraordinary or overweening distinction to
be given you through word or deed by the senate or by anybody else. To
others honor which you confer lends adornment, but to your own self
nothing can be given that is greater than what you already have, and it
would arouse no little suspicion of failure in straightforwardness. None
of the ordinary people willingly approves of having any such distinction
voted to the man in power. As he receives everything of the kind
from himself, he not only obtains no praise for it but becomes a
laughing-stock instead. Any additional brilliance, then, you must create
for yourself by your good deeds. Never permit gold or silver images of
yourself to be made; they are not only costly, but they give rise to
plots and last but a brief time: you must build in the very hearts of
men others out of benefits conferred, which shall be both unalloyed and
undying. Again, do not ever allow a temple to be raised to yourself.
Large amounts of money are spent uselessly on such objects, which had
better be laid out upon necessary improvements. Great wealth is gathered
not so much by acquiring a great deal as by not spending a great deal.
Nor does a temple contribute anything to any one's glory. Excellence
raises many men to the level of the gods, but nobody ever yet was made a
god by show of hands. Hence if you are upright and rule well, the whole
earth will be your precinct, all cities your temple, all mankind your
statues. In their thoughts you will ever be enshrined and surrounded by
good repute. Those who administer their power in any other way are not
only not magnified by sites and edifices of worship, though these be
the choicest in all the cities, but erect for themselves therein mute
detractors which become trophies of their baseness, memorials of their
injustice. And the longer these last, the more steadfastly does the
ill-repute of such sovereigns abide. [-36-] Therefore if you desire to
become in very truth immortal, act in this way; and further, reverence
the Divine Power yourself everywhere in every way, following our fathers'
belief, and compel others to honor it. Those who introduce strange ideas
about it you should both hate and punish, not only for the sake of the
gods (because if a man despises them he will esteem naught else sacred)
but because such persons by bringing in new divinities persuade many to
adopt foreign principles of law. As a result conspiracies, factions, and
clubs arise which are far from desirable under a monarchy. Accordingly,
do not grant any atheist or charlatan the right to be at large. The art
of soothsaying is a necessary one and you should by all means appoint
some men to be diviners and augurs, to whom people can resort who desire
to consult them on any matter; but there ought to be no workers of magic
at all. Such men tell partly truth but mostly lies, and frequently
inspire many of their followers to rebel. The same thing is true of many
who pretend to be philosophers. Hence I urge you to be on your guard
against them. Do not, because you have come in contact with such
thoroughly admirable men as Areus and Athenodorus, think that all
the rest who say they are philosophers are like them. Some use this
profession as a screen to work untold harm to both populace and
individuals.