DIO'S ROME
AN
HISTORICAL NARRATIVE ORIGINALLY COMPOSED IN GREEK
DURING THE REIGNS OF SEPTIMIUS SEVERUS, GETA
AND CARACALLA, MACRINUS, ELAGABALUS
AND ALEXANDER SEVERUS:
AND
NOW PRESENTED IN ENGLISH FORM
BY
HERBERT BALDWIN FOSTER, A.B. (Harvard), Ph. D. (Johns Hopkins), Acting
Professor of Greek in Lehigh University
FOURTH VOLUME
Extant Books 52-60 (B.C. 29-A.D. 54).
1905
PAFRAETS BOOK COMPANY TROY NEW YOKK
VOLUME CONTENTS
Book Fifty-two
Book Fifty-three
Book Fifty-four
Book Fifty-five
Book Fifty-six
Book Fifty-seven
Book Fifty-eight
Book Fifty-nine
Book Sixty
DIO'S ROMAN HISTORY
52
VOL. 4-1
The following is contained in the Fifty-second of Dio's Rome:
How Cæsar formed a plan to lay aside his sovereignty (chapters 1-40).
How he began to be called emperor (chapters 41-43).
Duration of time, the remainder of the consulship of Cæsar (5th) and
Sextus Apuleius. (B.C. 29 = a. u. 725.)
_(BOOK 52, BOISSEVAIN)_
[-1-] My record has so far stated what the Romans both did and endured
for seven hundred and twenty-five years under the monarchy, as a
democracy, and beneath the rule of a few. After this they reverted to
nothing more nor less than a state of monarchy again, although Cæsar had
a plan to lay down his arms and entrust affairs to the senate and the
populace. He held a consultation on the subject with Agrippa and Mæcenas,
to whom he communicated all his secrets. Agrippa, first of the two,
answered him as follows:--
[-2-] "Be not surprised, Cæsar, if I try to turn your mind away from
monarchy, in spite of the fact that I might enjoy many advantages from it
if you held the place. If it were going to prove serviceable to you, I
should be thoroughly enthusiastic for it. But those who hold supreme
power are not in a like position with their friends: the latter without
incurring jealousy or danger reap all the benefits they please, whereas
jealousies and dangers are the lot of the former. I have thought it
right, as in other cases, to look forward not for my own interest but for
yours and the public's. Let us consider leisurely all the features of the
system of government and turn whichever way our reflection may direct us.
For it will not be asserted that we ought to choose it under any and all
circumstances, even if it be not advantageous. Otherwise we shall seem to
have been unable to bear good fortune and to have gone mad through our
successes, or else to have been aiming at it long since, to have used our
father and our devotion to him as a mere screen, to have put "the people
and the senate" forward as an excuse. Our object will seem to have been
not to free them from conspirators but to enslave them to ourselves.
Either supposition entails censure. Who would not be indignant to see
that we had spoken words of one tenor, but to ascertain that we had had
something different in mind? How much more would he hate us now than if
we had at the outset laid bare our desires and aimed straight at the
monarchy! It has come to be generally believed that to adopt some violent
course belongs somehow to the nature of man, even if it involves taking
an unfair advantage. Every person who excels in any business thinks it
right that he should enjoy more advantages than his inferior. If he meets
with a success he ascribes it to the force of his individual temperament,
and if he fails in anything he refers it to the workings of the
supernatural. A man, however, who tries to gain advancement by plots and
injuries is in the first place held to be crafty and crooked, malicious
and vicious: (and this I know you would allow no one to say or think
about you, even if you might rule the whole world by it): again, if he
succeeds, he is thought to have gained an unjust advantage, and if he
fails, to have met with merited misfortune. [-3-] This being so, any one
might reproach us quite as much, even if we had nothing of the sort in
mind at the beginning and were to begin to devise it only now. For to let
the situation get the better of us and not restrain ourselves and not
make a right use of the gifts of Fortune is much worse than for a man to
do wrong through ill-luck. The latter sort are often compelled by their
very disasters and in consideration of their own need of profit to behave
against their will in an irregular way: the others voluntarily abandon
self-control even if to do so is contrary to their own interests. And
when men neither have any love of simplicity in their souls nor are able
to show moderation in regard to the blessings bestowed upon them, how
could one expect that they would either rule well over others or behave
themselves uprightly in trouble? Let us make our decision on the basis
that we are in neither of the classes mentioned and do not desire to
act in any way unreasonably, but will choose whatever course after
deliberation appears to us best. I shall speak quite frankly, for I could
not for my part express myself in any other way, and I am aware that you
do not enjoy hearing lies mingled with flattery.
[-4-] "Equality before the law has a pleasant name and its results are a
triumph of justice. If you take men who have received the same nature,
are of kindred race to one another, have been brought up under the same
institutions, have been trained in laws that are alike, and yield in
common the service of their bodies and of their minds to the same State,
is it not just that they should have all other things, too, in common? Is
it not best that they should secure no superior honors except as a result
of excellence? Equality of birth strives for equality of possessions,
and if it attains it is glad, but if it misses is displeased. And human
nature everywhere, because it is sprung from the gods and is to return to
the gods, gazes upward and is not content to be ruled forever by the
same person, nor will it endure to share in the toils, the dangers, the
expenditures, and be deprived of partnership in higher matters. Or, if
it is forced to submit to such conditions, it hates the power which has
applied coercion and if it obtains an opportunity takes vengeance on what
it hates. All men think they ought to rule, and for this reason submit to
being ruled in turn. They do not wish to be defrauded, and therefore do
not insist on defrauding others. They are pleased with honors bestowed by
their peers, and approve the penalties inflicted by their laws. If they
conduct their government on these lines, and believe that profits and the
opposite shall be shared in common, they wish no harm to happen to any
one of the citizens and devoutly hope that all good things may fall to
the lot of all of them. If one of them himself possesses any excellence,
he makes it known without hesitation, practices it enthusiastically,
and exhibits it very gladly: or, if he sees it in another, he readily
advances it, is eager to increase it, and honors it most brilliantly. On
the other hand if any one deteriorates, everybody hates him. If one meets
misfortune, everybody pities him. Each person regards the loss or shame
that such cause to be a common detriment to the city.
[-5-] "This is the constitution of democracies. Under tyrannies exactly
the opposite conditions are found. It is useless to go at length into all
of the details, but the chief feature is that no one is willing to
seem to know or possess anything good, because the whole ruling power
generally becomes hostile to him in such a case. Every one else takes the
tyrant's behavior as a standard of life, and pursues whatever objects he
may hope to gain through him by taking advantage of his neighbor while
incurring no danger himself. Consequently the majority of the people have
an eye only to their own interests and hate all other citizens: they
esteem their neighbor's good fortune as a personal loss, and his
misfortunes as a personal gain.
"Such being the state of the case, I do not see what could possibly
incite you to become sole ruler. Besides the fact that that system is
disagreeable to democracies, it would be far more unpleasant still to
yourself. You surely see how the City and its affairs are even now in a
state of turmoil. It is difficult, also, to overthrow our populace which
has lived during so many years in freedom, and difficult, since so many
enemies confront us round about, to reduce again to slavery the allies
and the subject nations, which from of old have been democratic
communities and were set free by our own selves.
[-6-] "To begin first with the smallest matter, it will be requisite that
you procure a large supply of money from all sides. It is impossible
that our present revenues should suffice for the very expenses, and
particularly for the support of the soldiers. This need exists also in
democracies, for it is not possible to organize any government without
expense. But under such a system many give largely in addition to what
is required, and do it frequently, making it a matter of rivalry and
securing proper honors for their liberality. Or, if perchance there
are compulsory levies upon everybody, they endure it because they can
persuade themselves that it is wise and because they are contributing in
their own behalf. Under sovereignties they think that the ruling power
alone, to which they credit boundless wealth, should bear the expense:
they are very ready to search out the ruler's sources of income, but do
not make a similar careful calculation about the outgo. They are not
inclined to pay out anything extra personally and of their own free will,
nor will they hear of voluntary public contributions. The former course
no one would choose, because he would not readily admit that he was rich,
and it is not to the advantage of the ruler to have it happen. So liberal
a citizen would immediately acquire a reputation for patriotism among the
mass of the people, would become conceited, and cause a disturbance in
politics. On the other hand, a general levy weighs heavily upon them all
and chiefly because they endure the loss whereas others take the gain. In
democracies those who contribute money as a general rule also serve in
the army, so that in a way they get it back again. But in monarchies one
set of people usually farm, manufacture, carry on maritime enterprises,
engage in politics,--the principal pursuits by which fortunes are
secured,--and a different set are under arms and draw pay.
"This single necessity, then, which is of such importance [-7-] will
cause you trouble. Here is another. It is by all means essential that
whoever from time to time commits a crime should pay some penalty. The
majority of men are not brought to reason by suggestion or by example,
but it is absolutely requisite to punish them by disenfranchisement, by
exile, and by death; and this often happens in so great an empire and in
so large a multitude of men, especially during a change of government.
Now if you appointed other men to judge these wrongdoers, they would
acquit them speedily, particularly all whom you may be thought to hate.
For judges secure a pretended authority when they act in any way contrary
to the wish of the ruling power. If, again, any are convicted, they will
believe they have been condemned on account of instructions for which
you are responsible. However, if you sit as judge yourself, you will be
compelled to chastise many of the peers,--and this is not favorable,--and
you will certainly be thought to be setting some of them right in anger
rather than in justice. No one believes that those who have the power to
use compulsion can execute judgment with justice, but everybody thinks
that out of shame they spread out a mere phantom and rough picture of
government in front of the truth, in order that under the legitimate
name of court they may fulfill their desire. This is what happens in
monarchies. In democracies, when any one is accused of committing a
private wrong, he is made defendant in a private suit before judges who
are his equals: or, if he is accused for a public crime, such a man has
empaneled a jury of his peers, whoever the lot shall designate. It is
easier for men to bear their decisions, since they do not think that any
verdict rendered is due to the power of the judge or has been wrung from
him as a favor.[1]
[-8-] "Then again there are many, apart from any criminals, some priding
themselves on birth, others on wealth, others on something different,
in general not bad men, who are by nature opposed to the conception of
monarchy. If a ruler allows them to become strong, he cannot live in
safety, and if he undertakes to impose a check on them, he cannot do so
justly. What then shall he do with them? How shall he treat them? If you
root out their families, diminish their wealth, humble their pride, you
will lose the good-will of your subjects. How can it be otherwise, if no
one is permitted to be born nobly or to grow rich honestly or to become
strong, brave, or learned? But if you allow all the separate classes to
grow strong, you will not be able to deal with them easily. If you alone
were sufficient for carrying on politics and war well and opportunely,
and needed no assistant for any of them, it would be a different story.
As the case stands, however, it is quite essential for you to have many
helpers, since they must govern so large a world: and they all ought
to be both brave and prudent. Now if you hand over the legions and
the offices to such men, there will be danger that both you and your
government will be overthrown. It is not possible for a valuable man to
be produced without good sense, and he cannot acquire any great good
sense from servile practices. But again, if he becomes a man of sense, he
cannot fail to desire liberty and to hate all masters. If, on the other
hand, you entrust nothing to these men, but put affairs in charge of the
worthless and chance comers, you will very quickly incur the anger of the
first class, who think themselves distrusted, and you will very quickly
fail in the greatest enterprises. What good could an ignorant or low-born
person accomplish? What enemy would not hold him in contempt? What allies
would obey him? Who, even of the soldiers themselves, would not disdain
to be ruled by such a man? What evils are wont to result from such a
condition I do not need to describe to you, for you know them thoroughly.
I feel obliged to say only this, that if such an assistant did nothing
right, he would injure you far more than the enemy: if he did anything
satisfactorily, his lack of education would cause him to lose his head,
and he would be a terror to you.
[-9-] "Such a question does not arise in democracies. The more men there
are who are wealthy and brave, so much the more do they vie with one
another and up-build the city. The latter uses them and is glad, unless
any one of them wishes to found a tyranny: him the citizens punish
severely. That this is so and that democracies are far superior to
monarchies the experience of Greece makes clear. As long as the people
had the monarchical government, they effected nothing of importance: but
when they began to live under the democratic system, they became most
renowned. It is shown also by the experience of other branches of
mankind. Those who are still conducting their governments under tyrannies
are always in slavery and always plotting against their rulers. But those
who have presidents for a year or some longer period continue to be both
free and independent.
"Yet, why need we use foreign examples, when we have some of our own? We
Romans, ourselves, after trying a different social organization at first,
later, when we had gone through many bitter experiences, felt a desire
for liberty; and having secured it we attained our present eminence,
strong in no advantages save those that come from democracy, through
which the senate debated, the people ratified, the force under arms
showed zeal, and the commanders were fired with ambition. None of these
things could be done under a tyranny. For that reason, indeed, the
ancient Romans detested it so much as to impose a curse upon that form of
government.
[-10-] "Aside from these considerations, if one is to speak about what is
disadvantageous for you personally, how could you endure the management
of so many interests by day and night alike? How could you hold out in
your enfeebled state? How could you participate in human enjoyments?
How could you be happy if deprived of them? What could cause you
real pleasure? When would you be free from biting grief? It is quite
inevitable that the man who holds so great an empire should reflect
deeply, be subject to many fears enjoy very little pleasure, but hear
and see, perform and suffer, always and everywhere, what is most
disagreeable. That is why, I think, both Greeks and some barbarians would
not accept government by a king when offered to them.
"Knowing this beforehand, take good counsel before you enter upon such an
existence. For it is disgraceful, or rather impossible, after you have
once plunged into it to rise to the upper air again. Do not be deceived
by the greatness of the authority nor the abundance of possessions, nor
the mass of body-guards, nor the throng of courtiers. Men who have great
power have great troubles: those who have large possessions are obliged
to spend largely: the crowd of body-guards is gathered because of the
crowd of conspirators: and the flatterers would be more glad to destroy
than to save any one. Consequently, in view of these facts, no sensible
man would desire to become supreme ruler. [-11-] If the fact that such
rulers can enrich and preserve others and perform many other good deeds,
and that, by Jupiter, they may also outrage others and injure whomsoever
they please leads any one to think that tyranny is worth striving for, he
is utterly mistaken. I need not tell you that to live licentiously and to
do evil is base and hazardous and hated of both gods and men. You are not
that sort of man, and it is not for these reasons that you would choose
to be sole ruler. I have elected to speak now not of everything which one
might accomplish who handled affairs badly, but of what even the very
best are compelled to do and endure when they adopt the system. The other
point,--that one may bestow abundant favors,--is worthy of zeal, to be
sure: yet when this disposition is indulged in private capacity, it is
noble, august, glorious, and safe, whereas in monarchies it is first of
all not a sufficient offset to the other, more disagreeable matters, that
any one should choose monarchy for this especially when one is to grant
to others the benefit to be derived therefrom, and accept himself the
unpleasantness involved in the rest of the conduct of the office.
[-12-] "In the next place, the matter is not simple, as people think. No
one could render assistance enough to satisfy all who need help. Those
who think they ought to receive some gift from the sovereign are
practically all mankind, even though no favors can at once be seen to be
due them. Every one naturally has his own approbation and wishes to enjoy
some benefit from him who is able to give. But the presents which can
be given them,--I mean honors and offices, and sometimes money,--can be
counted quite easily as compared with so great a multitude. This being
so, more hatred would fall to the monarch's lot from those who fail to
get what they want than friendship from such as obtain their desires.
The latter take what they regard as due to them and think there is no
particular reason for being very thankful to the one who gives it, since
they are getting no more than they expected. Moreover, they actually
shrink from such behavior for fear they may appear in the light
of persons undeserving of generous treatment. The others, who are
disappointed of their hopes, are grieved for two causes. First, they feel
that they are robbed of what belongs to them, for by nature all persons
think that everything which they desire is their own: second, they feel
as if they were finding themselves guilty of some wrong, if they show
resignation at not obtaining what they expect. The man who gives such
great gifts rightly of course investigates before all else each person's
worth: some he honors, others he neglects. As a result, then, of his
judgment, some are filled with pride and others with vexation by their
own consciousness of its correctness. If any one were to wish to guard
against this outcome and distribute his presents without system, he would
fail utterly. The base, being honored contrary to their deserts, would
become worse; for they would decide either that they were approved as
being good or, if not so, that they were courted as dangerous persons:
the excellent, on attaining no higher place than they, but held merely in
equal honor with the base, would be more indignant at their reduction to
the latter's level than the others would rejoice to be deemed valuable.
Accordingly, they would give up the practice of better principles and
strive to emulate less worthy men. Thus, even as a result of the very
honors, those who bestow them would reap no benefit and those who receive
them would become worse than before. So that this consideration, which
would please some persons most in the monarchical constitution, has been
proved to be a most difficult problem for you to deal with.
[-13-] "Reflecting on these facts and the rest which I mentioned a little
earlier, be prudent while you may, and restore to the people the arms,
the provinces, the offices, and the funds. If you do it at once and
voluntarily, you will be the most famous of men and the most secure. But
if you wait for some force to be applied, perhaps you might suffer some
disaster together with ill repute. Here is evidence. Marius, Sulla,
Metellus, and Pompey at first, when they got control of affairs, refused
to become princes, and by this attitude escaped harm. Cinna, however, and
Strabo,[2] the second Marius, Sertorius, and Pompey himself at a later
date, through their desire for sovereignty perished miserably. It is hard
for this city which has been under a democracy for so many years and
rules so many human beings to be willing to be a slave to any one. You
have heard that the people banished Camillus when he used white horses
for his triumph: you have heard that they overthrew Scipio after
condemning him for some fraudulent procedure: you remember how they
behaved toward your father because they had some suspicion that he wanted
monarchy. Yet there have never been any better men than these.
"Moreover, I do not advise you merely to relinquish dominion, but to
accomplish beforehand all that is advantageous for the public, and by
decrees and laws to settle definitely whatever business needs attention,
just as Sulla did. For even if some of his ordinances were subsequently
overthrown, yet the majority of them and the more important still hold
their ground. Do not say that even then some will indulge in factional
quarrels, or I may be tempted to say again that all the more the Romans
would not submit to a single ruler. If we were to review all the
calamities that might befall a nation, it would be most unreasonable for
us to fear dissensions which are the outgrowth of democracy rather then
the tyrannies which spring from monarchy. Regarding the terrible nature
of the latter I have not even undertaken to say a word. It has been my
wish not merely to inveigh against a proposition so capable of censure,
but to show you this,--that it is naturally such a régime that not even
the most excellent men....[3]
[-14-] "They cannot easily persuade by frank argument men who possess
less power, or succeed in their enterprises, because their subjects are
not in accord with them. Hence, if you have any care at all of your
country, for whom you have fought so many wars, for whom you would gladly
surrender your life, attune her to greater moderation and order her
affairs with that in view. For the privilege of doing and saving
precisely what one pleases becomes in the case of sensible people, if you
examine it, a cause of prosperity to all: but in the case of the foolish,
a cause of disaster. Therefore he who confers authority upon such men is
holding out a sword to a child and a madman; but he who gives it to the
prudent, besides performing other services, preserves the objects of his
liberality themselves, though they may be unwilling. Therefore I ask you
not to be deceived by regarding fine-sounding names, but to look forward
to the results that spring from them, and so to put an end to the
insolence of the populace, and to impose the management of public affairs
upon yourself and the most excellent of the remainder of the community.
Then the most prudent may deliberate, those most qualified for generals
become commanders, and the strongest and most needy men serve as
soldiers and draw pay. In this way, all zealously discharging the duties
appertaining to their offices and paying without hesitation the debts
they owe one another, they will not be aware of their inferiority and
lack of certain advantages and will secure the real democracy and a safe
sort of freedom. The boasted "freedom" of the mob proves to be the most
bitter servitude of the best element and brings a common destruction upon
both. The other, which I advocate, honors responsible men everywhere and
bestows equal advantages upon all so far as they are worthy: thus it
renders prosperous all alike who possess it. [-15-] Do not think that I
am advising you to enslave the people and the senate and then play the
tyrant. This plan I should never dare to suggest nor you to execute. It
would, notwithstanding, be well and useful both for you and for the city
that you should yourself establish all proper laws with the approval of
the best men without any opposing talk or resistance on the part of the
masses, that you and your counselors should arrange the details of wars
according to your united wishes while all the rest straightway obey
orders, that the choice of officials should be in the power of the
cabinet to which you belong, and that the same men should also determine
honors and penalties. Then whatever pleases you after consulting the
Peers will be immediately a law, and wars against enemies may be waged
with secrecy and at an opportune time; those to whom a trust is committed
will be appointed because of excellence and not by lot and strife for
office; the good will be honored without jealousy and the bad punished
without opposition. Thus what was done would be accomplished in the best
way, not referred to the public, nor talked over openly, not committed to
packed committees, nor endangered by rivalry. We should reap the benefits
of the blessings that belong to us with enjoyment,[4] not entering upon
dangerous wars nor impious civil disputes. These two drawbacks are found
in every democracy: the more powerful, desiring first place and hiring
the weaker men, turn everything continually upside down. They have been
most frequent in our epoch and there is no other way save the one I
propose that will put a stop to them. The proof of my words is that
we have been warring abroad and fighting among ourselves for an
inconceivably long time: the cause is the multitude of men and the
magnitude of the interests at stake. The men are of all sorts in respect
to both race and nature and have the most diversified tempers and
desires. The interests have become so vast that it is very difficult to
attempt to administer them. [-16-] Witness to the truth of my words is
borne by our past. While we were but few, we had no important quarrel
with our neighbors, got along well with our government, and subjugated
almost all of Italy. But ever since we spread beyond the peninsula and
crossed to many foreign lands and islands, filling the whole sea and the
whole earth with our name and power, nothing good has been our lot. In
the first place we disputed in cliques at home and within our walls, and
later we exported this plague to the camps. Therefore our city, like a
great merchantman full of a crowd of every race borne without a pilot
these many years through rough water, rolls and shoots hither and thither
because it is without ballast. Do not, then, allow her to be longer
exposed to the tempest; for you see that she is waterlogged. And do not
let her split upon a reef[5]; for her timbers are rotten and will not be
able to hold out much longer. But since the gods have taken pity on this
land and have set you up as her arbiter and chief; do not betray your
country. Through you she has now revived a little: if you are faithful,
she may live with safety for ages to come.
[-17-] "That I do right to urge you to be sole ruler of the people I
think you have long ere this been persuaded. If so, then be ready and
eager to assume the leadership of the State, or rather, do not let it
slip. For we are not deliberating about taking something, but about not
losing it and about running hazards in addition. Who will spare you if
you commit matters to the people as they were, and to some other man,
seeing that there are great numbers whom you have injured, all of whom,
or nearly all, will lay claim to the sovereignty? No one of them will
fail to wish to punish you for what you have done, or will care to have
you survive as a rival. There is evidence of this in the case of Pompey,
who, when he withdrew from his supremacy, became the victim of scorn and
of plots: he found himself unable to win back his place, and so perished.
Also Cæsar your father, who did this very same thing, was slain for his
trouble. Marius and Sulla would certainly have endured a like fate, had
they not died too soon. Indeed, some say that Sulla anticipated this
very end by making away with himself. Many of the provisions of his
constitution, at any rate, began to be abolished while he was still
alive. You, too, must expect to find that many Lepiduses, Sertoriuses,
Brutuses, Cassiuses will arise against you.
[-18-] "Seeing these facts and reflecting on the other interests
involved, do not abandon yourself and your country, out of fear that you
may seem to some to be pursuing the office of set purpose. First of all,
even if any one does suspect it, the desire is not one repugnant to human
nature, and the danger from it is a noble danger. Second, is any one
unaware of the necessity under which you were led to take this action?
Hence, if there be any blame attached to it, one might most justly
censure your father's slayers therefor. For if they had not murdered him
in so unjust and pitiable a fashion, you would not have taken up arms,
would not have gathered your legions, would not have made a compact with
Antony and Lepidus, and would not have taken measures against those very
men. That you were right and were justified in doing all this no one is
unaware. If any slight errors have been committed, at least we cannot
safely make any further changes. Therefore for our own sakes and for that
of the city let us obey Fortune, who gives you the supremacy. Let us be
very thankful to her that she has not simply filled us with civil woes,
but has put the reorganization of the government in your hands. By paying
due reverence to her you may show all mankind that whereas others wrought
disturbance and injury, you are an upright man.
"Do not, I beg you, fear the magnitude of the empire. The greater its
extent, the more are the preservative influences it possesses; also, to
guard anything is a long way easier than to acquire it. Toils and dangers
are needed to win over what belongs to others, but a little prudence
suffices to retain what is already yours. Moreover, do not be afraid
that you will not live quite safely in the midst of it and enjoy all the
blessings extant among men, if you are willing to arrange all the details
as I shall advise you. And do not think that I am making my appeal depart
from the subject in hand, if I shall speak at some length about the
project. I shall not do this merely to hear myself talk, but to the end
that you may be positively assured that it is both possible and easy, for
a man of sense at least, to govern well and without danger.
[-19-] "I maintain, therefore, first of all that you ought to pick out
your friends in the senatorial body and then subject it to a sifting
process, because some who are not fit have become senators on account
of civil disputes: such of them as possess any excellence you ought to
retain, but the rest you should erase from the roll. Do not, however, get
rid of any man of worth, because of poverty, but give him the money that
he needs. In the place of those who have been dropped introduce the
noblest, the best, the richest men obtainable, selecting them not only
from Italy but from the allies and subject nations. In this way you will
not be employing many assistants and you will insure a correct attitude
on the part of the chief men from all the provinces. These districts,
having no renowned leader, will not be disposed to rebel, and their
prominent men will entertain affection for you because they have been
made sharers in your empire.
"Take precisely these same measures in the case of the knights, by
enrolling in the equestrian class such as hold second place everywhere in
birth, excellence, and wealth. Register as many in both classes as may
please you, not troubling at all about their numbers. The more men of
repute you have as your associates, the more easily will you yourself
settle everything in case of need and persuade your subjects that you are
treating them not as slaves nor in any way as inferior to us, but are
sharing with them besides all the other blessings that belong to us the
chief magistracy also, that so they may be devoted to it as their own
possession. I am so far from assuming this to be a mistaken policy that I
say they ought all to be given a share in the government. Thus, having an
equal allotment in it, they might be faithful allies of ours, believing
that they inhabited one single city owned in common by all of us,
and this _really_ a city, and regarding fields and villages as their
individual property. But about this and what ought to be done so as not
to grant them absolutely everything, we shall reflect in greater detail
at another time.
[-20-] "It is proper to put men on the roll of the knights at eighteen
years of age; for at that period of life physical condition is at its
best and suitability of temperament can be discerned. But for the
senate they should wait till they are twenty-five years old. Is it not
disgraceful and hazardous to entrust public business to men younger than
this, when we will commit none of our private affairs to any one before,
he has reached such an age? After they have served as quæstors and
ædiles, or tribunes, let them be prætors, when they have attained their
thirtieth birthday. These offices and that of consul are the only ones at
home which I maintain you ought to recognize; and that is for the sake of
remembrance of ancestral customs and in order not to seem to be changing
the constitution altogether. Do you, however, yourself choose all who are
to hold them and not put any of these offices longer in charge of the
rabble or the populace,--for they will surely quarrel,--nor in charge of
the senate, for its members will contend for the prize. Moreover, do
not keep up the ancient powers of these positions, for fear history
may repeat itself, but preserve the honor attached while abating the
influence to such an extent as will enable you to deprive each place of
none of its esteem but to forestall any desire of insubordination. This
can be done if you require the incumbents to stay in town, and do not
permit any of them to handle arms either during their period of office or
immediately afterward, but only after the lapse of some time, as much
as you think sufficient in each instance. In this way none of them will
rebel, because they become to an extent by their title masters of armies,
and their irritation will be assuaged by their faring as private citizens
for a time. Let these magistrates conduct such of the festivals as would
naturally belong to their office, and let them all individually try cases
save those of homicide, during their tenure of office in Rome. Courts
should also be made up of the senators and knights, but the final appeal
should be to the aforesaid officials.
[-21-] "Let a præfectus urbi be appointed from the ranks of the prominent
men and from such as have previously passed through the necessary
offices. His duties should not be to govern when the consuls are
somewhere out of town, but to exercise at all times a general supervision
of the City's interests and to decide the cases referred to him by all
the other magistrates I mentioned, both those demanding final decision
and such as may be appealed, together with any that involve the death
penalty; and he must have authority in all of them that concern men both
in the City (except such as I shall name) and those dwelling outside to
the distance of seven hundred and fifty stades.
"Still another magistrate ought to be chosen, himself also from a similar
class, to investigate and watch the matters of family, property, and
morals of senators and knights, alike of men and of the children and
wives belonging to them[6]. He should also set right such behavior as
properly entails no punishment, yet if neglected becomes the cause of
many great evils. The more important details he must report to you. This
duty ought to be assigned to some senator, and to the most distinguished
one after the præfectus urbi, rather than to one of the knights. He would
naturally receive his name from your authority as censor, (for you must
certainly be the dictator of the census), so that he might be called
sub-censor[7].--Let these two hold office for life, unless either of them
deteriorates in any way or becomes sick or superannuated. By reason of
the permanence of their positions they would do nothing dangerous, for
one would be entirely unarmed and the other would have but a few soldiers
and be acting for the most part under your eyes. By reason of their rank
they would shrink from coming into collision with any one and would be
afraid to do any act of violence, for they would foresee their retirement
to ordinary citizenship and the supremacy of others in their stead. Let
them also draw a certain salary, to compensate them for the time consumed
and to increase their reputation. This is the opinion I have to give you
in regard to these officials.
"Let those who have been prætors hold some office among the subject
nations. Before they have been prætors I do not think they should have
this privilege. Let those who have not yet been prætors serve for one
or two terms as lieutenants to such persons as you may have designated.
Then, under these conditions, let them be consuls if they continue to
govern rightly, and after that let them take the greater positions of
command. [-22-] The following is the way I advise you to arrange it.
Divide up all of Italy which is over seven hundred and fifty stades from
the city and all the rest of the territory which owns our sway, both on
the continents and in the islands,--divide it up everywhere according to
races and nations; and pursue the same course with as many cities as are
important enough to be ruled by one man with full powers. Then establish
soldiers and a governor in each one and send out one of the ex-consuls to
take charge of all, and two of the ex-prætors. One of the latter, fresh
from the City, should have the care of private business and the supplying
of provisions: the other should be one of those who have had this
training, who will attend to the public interests of the cities and will
govern the soldiers, except in cases that concern disenfranchisement or
death. These must be referred only to the ex-consul who is governor,
except in regard to the centurions who are on the lists and to the
foremost private individuals in every place. Do not allow any other
person than yourself to punish either of these classes, so that they may
never be impelled by fear of any one else to take any action against you.
As for my proposition that the second of the ex-prætors should be put in
charge of the soldiers, it is subject to the following limitations. If
only a few are in service in foreign forts or in one native post, it is
well enough for this to be so. But if two citizen legions are wintering
in the same province (and more than this number I should not advise you
to trust to one commander), it will be necessary for the two ex-prætors
to superintend them, each having charge of one besides managing
the remaining political and private interests. Therefore, let the
ex-consul[8]... these matters and likewise on the cases, both those
subject to appeal and those already referred which are sent up to him
from[9] his prætors. And do not be surprised that I recommend to you to
divide Italy also into such sections. It is large and populous, and so
is incapable of being well managed by the governors at the capital. The
governor of any district ought to be always present and no duties should
be laid upon our city magistrates[10] that are impossible of fulfillment.
[-23-] "Let all these men to whom affairs outside the city are committed
receive pay, the greater ones more, the inferior ones less, those of
medium importance a medium amount. They can not in a foreign land live
on their own resources nor as now stand an unlimited and uncalculated
expense. Let them govern not less than three years (unless any one of
them commits a crime), nor more than five. These limits are because
annual and short-time appointments after teaching persons what they
need to know send them back again before they can display any of their
knowledge: and, on the other hand, longer and more lasting positions fill
many with conceit and incline them to rebellion. Hence I think that
the greater posts of authority ought not to be given to persons
consecutively, without interval, for it makes no difference whether a man
is governor in the same province or in several in succession, if he holds
office longer than is proper. Appointees improve when a period of time is
allowed to elapse and they return home and live as ordinary citizens.
"The senators, accordingly, I affirm ought to discharge these duties and
in the way described. [-24-] Of the knights the two best should command
the body-guard which protects you. To entrust it to one man is hazardous,
and to several is sure to breed turmoil. Let these prefects therefore be
two in number, in order that, if one of them suffers any bodily harm, you
may still not lack a person to guard you: and let them be appointed from
those who have been on many campaigns and have been active also in many
other capacities. Let them have command both of the Pretorians and of all
the remaining soldiers in Italy with such absolute power that they
may put to death such of them as do wrong, except in the case of the
centurions and any others who have been assigned to members of the senate
holding office. These should be tried by the senatorial magistrates
themselves, in order that the latter may have authority both to honor
and to chastise their dependents and so be able to count on their
unhesitating support. Over all the other soldiers in Italy those prefects
should have dominion (aided of course by lieutenants), and further over
the Cæsarians, both such as wait upon you and all the rest that are of
any value. These duties will be both fitting and sufficient for them to
discharge.[11] They should not have more labors laid upon them than they
will be able to dispose of effectively, that they may not be weighed down
by the press of work or find it impossible to see to everything. These
men ought to hold office for life like the præfectus urbi and the
sub-censor. Let some one else be appointed night watchman, and still
another commissioner of grain and of the other market produce, both of
these from the foremost knights after those mentioned and appointed to
hold their posts for a definite time like the magistrates elected from
the senatorial class. [-25-] The disposition of the funds, also,--of both
the people and the empire, I mean, whether in Rome or in the rest of
Italy or outside,--should be entirely in the hands of the knights. These
treasurers also, as well as all of the same class who have the management
of anything, should draw pay, some more and some less, with reference to
the dignity and magnitude of their employment. The reason is that it is
not possible for them, since they are poorer than the senators, to spend
their own means while engaged in no business in Rome. And then again, it
is neither possible nor advantageous for you that the same men should be
made masters of both the troops and the finances. Furthermore, it is well
that all the business of the empire should be transacted through a number
of agents, in order that many may receive the benefit of it and become
experienced in affairs. In this way your subjects, reaping a multiform
enjoyment from the public treasures, will be better disposed toward you,
and you will have an abundant supply of the best men on each occasion for
all necessary lines of work. One single knight with as many subordinates
(drawn from the knights and from your freedmen) as the needs of the case
demand, is sufficient for every separate form of business in the City and
for each province outside. You need to have these assistants along with
them in order that your service may contain a prize of excellence, and
that you may not lack persons from whom you may learn the truth even
contrary to the wishes of their superiors, in case there is anything
irregular happening.
"If any one of the knights after passing through many forms of service
distinguishes himself enough to become a senator, his age ought not to
hinder him at all from being enrolled in the senate. Let some of those
even be registered who have held the post of company leaders in citizen
forces, unless it be one who has served in the rank and file; for it is
both a shame and a reproach to have on the list of the senate any of
these persons who have carried loaded panniers and charcoal baskets. But
in the case of such as were originally centurions there is nothing to
prevent the most distinguished of them from being advanced to a better
class.