this work of equitation ceases for the whole summer, and the difficult
horses are kept incessantly at drill and field service, it is
inevitable that their defects will develop and become more firmly
fixed; hence one will never get a good average of well-broken horses
in the ranks. That some of them must always be taken for drill goes
without saying; but the point is, that from February onwards, and
throughout the summer, they should be constantly taken in hand and
corrected by good riders. If this idea is applied with thoroughgoing
energy, particularly with the young horses--even if it entails at
first a diminution in the number of files on parade--the number of
difficult horses in the squadron will soon show a most encouraging
diminution.
To all these advantages there comes yet another, to my mind even more
important. According to established custom, after the inspection in
riding on the bit which forms the conclusion of the winter's training,
the whole squadron is completely reformed before it begins the drills.
The new exercises in unaccustomed surroundings are begun by the men on
strange horses, to which they have had no opportunity to accustom
themselves. This drawback can be obviated, if the squadron is
definitely made up already in February--_i.e._, after the close of the
purely equitation course. The men can now ride the same horses in the
school on the drill-ground, and in the country, which they are to
retain throughout the summer, and the squadron will commence the drill
season with much steadier ranks than would otherwise be the case,
particularly if its Commander understands how to make the most of all
the advantages his good methods and well-broken horses secure for him
by changing them about individually as circumstances require.
Much, no doubt, may be urged against this proposal, and the expert
will hardly need my assistance to recognise the difficulties that
await him. But they can be overcome, and their advantages thus
secured--and these seem to me the essential points--enormously
outweigh the minor troubles that follow in their train.
I do not believe that either thorough or essential changes are needed
in our Regulations to adapt them to the principles I have developed.
All that is important is that we should definitely break with the
routine of the several courses and inspections.
To constitute a framework, not with a view of developing a fresh
network of red tape, I here submit an outline programme of the
time-table I suggest, so far as concerns the equitation and the
training of the horses in their several periods.
Commencement of Remount training, at the latest, the end of July. It
is worth consideration whether the young horses could not be sent to
the Regiments even earlier.
Inspection of recruits on the bridoon, and of the Second Ride Second
Class shortly before Christmas.
Inspection of the second year's remounts on the bit of the whole of
the remount training squads, and of the recruits, concluding with the
latter and Second Ride Second Class about the middle of February. Then
constitution of the squadron to meet the requirements of the coming
drill season.
End of March, or beginning of April, bridoon inspection of the young
remounts, in which generally side-paces, collected canter, and the
canter and change, may be demanded.
Inspection of the squadron in 'Military riding' (_i.e._, with arms,
and on the curb); preparatory exercises for single combat, thrusting
at targets, regulation gallop, riding in the ranks, together with a
careful investigation of the teaching received in the school.
Inspection of all difficult horses.
Shortly before the manoeuvres, inspection of the young remounts on the
bit. Inspection of the second year remounts in 'rides' (at the same
time note their condition after the drill). Inspection of the
difficult horses.
Inspection of single combats.
If one tries, naturally with due regard to local and climatic
variations, to adapt the course of training to this plan of
inspection, and endeavours to arrange that every man, if only for a
few minutes every day, should practise lance exercises to develop his
hand and arm, that he should ride every day individually, and every
difficult horse should be taken in hand and corrected at once; that
the principles of dressing, alignment, and of wheeling, are daily
impressed on the men in the school, as I have already indicated; and,
if further, wherever it is in any way possible, the men are exercised
in boldly riding across country--for which purpose funds to cover
possible damage to crops, etc., must be provided by the
authorities--then I believe, and base my belief on the result of my
practical experience, that not only will a higher standard of training
for specifically military purposes be attained, but also a
considerable improvement in equitation.
It will be worth while here to add a few words on the methods of
training the horses I recommend, for it is precisely on this point that
ideas so often divide, and the most opposite views on this subject find
their expression in current literature. To stir up all these
controversies is not my object, but I want to state quite generally that
it is under all circumstances a downright evil to try to follow out any
theoretical system to its logical development, whether the one selected
be that of Captain Plinzner[24] or another's. We have neither such a
uniform type of horse nor sufficiently skilled riders as to be able to
employ the same method to all indiscriminately.
[Footnote 24: Captain Plinzner was Equerry to H.M. the
Emperor, and is author of a well-known work on equitation.]
We must exercise our powers of selection, and find the best method to
meet the idiosyncrasies of each man and each horse, always keeping in
mind the aim to be obtained. What we want are horses that can use
their back muscles, especially in the gallop, with pliable necks,
light on the hand, able to turn easily, and safe across country (with
special reference to rat-holes, etc., not fences), that do not refuse
to quit the ranks, and are not headstrong. To reach this aim with our
material, our present riding instructions applied in their spirit, not
their letter, are for the present, I think, a sufficiently firm
foundation.
A higher standard of riding alone will not, however, suffice. We have
seen that modern War makes also increased demands on the endurance of
the horses, and, in fact, in two directions: first, on their marching
power, and secondly, on their capacity to execute the long gallops at
the regulation pace which are indispensable for the manoeuvring of
large masses and of attacks against modern firearms. That a thorough
physical preparation of the horse increases indirectly its endurance
has been already pointed out, and when exceptional exertions are
called for, breeding plays a great part; but great as is the influence
of these two factors, the ultimate foundation on which the endurance
of our horses depends is the general 'condition' of the animal, and
this again is a consequence of the quality of his food and his
'training,' used here in the same sense as in a racing stable. I lay
special stress on this question of food, because great demands, both
in the way of covering long distances and on the drill ground, can
only be met without injury to the horses if they are supplied with a
sufficient quantity of nourishment, and our peace-time ration is
undoubtedly too small to satisfy this condition. No regiment could
maintain itself always at the high pitch of condition we have
undoubtedly attained if it did not have recourse to all manner of
expedients to increase, at any rate for the time, the amount of the
ration. Of these expedients there are quite an imposing number, and
since, however desirable an increase of the ration may be, we are not
likely to obtain it, it seems to me well worth while to develop them
to the utmost.
How this is to be done will depend mainly on the local conditions of
each garrison. The point is to make the most of the opportunities each
locality offers, and as an example it may be of interest to give my
personal experience on this head.
Thanks to the confidence reposed in me by my General and to his
liberality, I was allowed to draw the equivalent of sixty rations of
oats per day and per squadron in cash, and to handle this money to the
best of my judgment.
Since peas, beans, and white American maize--the yellow Hungarian
quality is generally considered inferior--were ninepence to one
shilling cheaper per hundredweight than oats, I laid in a stock of
them, and was able to give not only an increased weight of ration, but
one of considerably greater nutritive value. Thus I gained the double
advantage, not only of not being compelled to stint the corn ration in
winter in order to save up for the harder work of the summers, but I
was able to increase even the winter ration itself. This I consider an
essential gain, for horses that after the winter season are well fed
and in their full condition are equal to far higher exertions than
those which have been kept low, and then fed up for perhaps a very
short time before the increased strain is thrown upon them.
The food was thus divided: After the manoeuvres, in cases where an
increased ration was required, American maize was issued, and the
ration improved by half a pound. From about Christmas-time onwards
peas and beans were served out, and the amount increased until midway
through the Squadron drills, after which it was kept at the same level
until the manoeuvres. In the end it amounted to the equivalent of 15
pounds of oats, which can be considered as the normal scale for our
medium and light Cavalry horses. The peas and beans were soaked for
twelve hours, the water being twice changed during this time to
prevent their turning sour.
During the manoeuvres, according to circumstances, I laid down at
suitable points in the district stores of forage, or gave the Squadron
Commanders money with which to supply themselves locally, and thus was
able to keep up the increase in the ration during the greater part of
this trying period.
The experiment was continued for nearly two years, and its results
were astonishingly satisfactory. Not only did the visible condition of
the horses develop markedly, and maintain itself throughout the
greatest exertions, both during the manoeuvres and the Divisional
exercises, but in spite of increased performances the numbers of
breakdowns and cases of lameness sensibly diminished; the paces were
fresher; in short, the material improved most noticeably. Are not
these breakdowns, lameness, and dulness in the horses, in the great
majority of cases but the consequences of over-exertion of the animals
when in a low state of condition? The cases of colic, too, diminished
rather than increased, which speaks well for the harmlessness of the
foods employed, but may in part also have been due to the fact that
both the bulk of the ration and the amount of exertion demanded were
only gradually diminished after the manoeuvres.
The experiment also showed that most horses would not touch the white
beans at all, or only unwillingly, and the best proved to be either
the green Smyrna or brown Dutch beans, which for the same weight and
nutritive value bulked bigger, for instance, than the peas, and were
very willingly eaten. Peas and beans as a ration alone were found not
to answer, as the horse misses the mechanical action--irritation of
the bowel and stomach--and requires also certain chemical constituents
present in oats to assist digestion. Even with the proportion of oats
and beans actually used--seventy-six to seventy-eight oats to sixty
beans--it was found advisable to increase the 'Rauffutter' ration to
replace the missing oat-husks. But to provide this addition there were
ample means, since the manure fund of the regiment, or of the
squadron, was available; and in spite of the increased ration it
became possible to make savings which in a single year sufficed to
build a spacious riding-school, and thus contributed in another way
to the training and general efficiency of the squadrons.
In the third year the price of oats fell, and that of the other feed
rose; hence, and for other reasons also, the conversion of the oat
ration into other more nourishing materials had to be abandoned,
although it would still have been possible to maintain a considerable
increase in the nutritive value of the food issued. To keep the ration
up to approximately the same level as in the preceding year, recourse
had to be had to other means.
It was found by experiment that a couple of pounds of straw per horse
could easily be saved per day, and again ample funds for a supplement
to the ration were available, a measure particularly applicable when
the price of straw rules high. This year, too, as the expenditure on
the riding-school was closed, the manure fund was also available, and
the horses did nearly as well as before.
I would not maintain that similar results are everywhere obtainable.
The price of grains varies; the receipts from manure are everywhere
different; in some garrisons peas and beans are difficult to obtain;
the cost of transport also fluctuates. But all this is no reason why
we should not seize an advantage even if we cannot always retain it.
Even a few years of more and better food bring about an improvement in
the horses, which lasts for a considerable time, and every effort,
therefore, should be made to obtain these advantages offered by price
variations whenever it is possible to do so.
It is well to call attention to the fact that to accustom horses to
the most varied food--rye, barley, wheat, etc.--is part of their
indispensable training for War, where such foods are all they can
get, as the experience of our last War sufficiently demonstrated. To
this end it is necessary--and I wish particularly to insist upon this
point--that our Regimental Commanders should have the utmost latitude
of action within certain fixed limits, and should not be dependent on
the consideration of the Commissariat, with its innumerable
regulations and formal considerations. I consider the objection
sometimes urged against me that in the purchase of supplementary foods
by the Regimental Commander there would be an opening for fraud and
speculation on the part of under officials quite untenable, for a
proper system of audit and check could be quite easily devised.
The capacity of the Commander to manage affairs in a businesslike
manner can hardly be called in question, and his interest in the
matter would grow in proportion to the degree of freedom allowed to
him.
Next in importance to the question of food comes the preparation of
the horses for efforts of long duration. That this preparation must go
hand in hand with the food question is obvious, but apart from this
interdependence, it is not possible to keep horses always up to the
necessary standard of endurance; for this training not only throws
heavy strains on the muscles, joints, and sinews, but on the nervous
system of the animal, and in particular attacks the nerves of the
stomach if maintained too long. If one wishes to preserve one's
material, the horses must be allowed from time to time a thorough
rest, during which their feeding must enable them to put on the degree
of fat which is requisite for health.
The best time for this rest is about Christmas, during which one can
reduce the work to the very minimum, and feed with 'Rastfutter' hay,
maize, malt--dried brewer's--molasses, even potatoes; and also, after
reaching the highest points of the training for galloping, there must
be a certain relaxation of the strain to give the nerves time to
recuperate.
Generally, the course of training must be conducted from the
standpoint of what War demands, and never allowed to assume the
characteristics of the racing stable, for the purposes of the two are
entirely distinct, and this is particularly the case with regard to
the gallop.
It is precisely in this respect that the necessities of War are not
always seen with sufficient clearness.
We obtain from our troops by means of most careful preparation quite
remarkable performances in galloping. I have myself seen whole
regiments cover 8,800 yards (5 miles) at the regulation gallop, and
the horses at the end of it had still both strength and wind to
increase the pace. On such and similar performances we then base our
tactical exercises both for the Brigade and Division, and many horses
are sacrificed as a consequence. Now, I am the last man to suggest
that accurate drill at the gallop is not the crowning work of all
tactical education, but it must be accomplished under War conditions,
and it cannot be too persistently insisted on that all these tactical
pictures and the deductions founded thereon, which we attain in the
manner indicated, have practically nothing to do with real War at all.
In these peace exercises we usually ride with considerably less than
field service weights, on specially selected and favourable ground,
and on specially trained horses. All these conditions are wanting in
War. Then horses must carry their full marching-order kit, and
generally they will be entirely lacking in specific training for this
fast kind of work. The ordinary pace on the march and patrol is the
marching trot; only single patrols have now and again to gallop, the
troops as a whole only on the rare occasions when a charge has
actually to be delivered. Then, the carefully-selected conditions of
the drill ground are generally lacking; and, finally, in all War
strength squadrons there are always some augmentation horses and
remounts, whose weaknesses must be taken into account if they are not
to be broken down at the very beginning of operations, as too often
happened in 1870, in which case it would have been better to have left
them behind from the first. Thus the galloping possibilities are
reduced most considerably, and it is only with these reduced
possibilities that the Leader can safely reckon.
That these conditions have a most important influence on tactics is
apparent. The question is whether it is worth while to strain towards
false ideals, at a considerable cost in horseflesh, when in War they
are quite unattainable, and only serve to call up in men's minds false
pictures of the reality.
To this I return an unqualified negative. Certainly, it is
indisputable that the horses must be trained to gallop for long
distances and in suitable poise, and that men should learn to retain a
correct seat even in gallops of long duration; that they should have
their horses under complete control, and learn to turn and check by
the use of the weight of their bodies; but these demands can only be
satisfied by continuous practice under conditions which render control
over the poise both of man and horse comparatively easy to
maintain--that is to say, singly on the galloping track or in squads,
and also as closed tactical units.
Speaking generally, however, such exercises do not need to be extended
materially beyond the limit which can be attained by horses not
specifically trained to galloping under full marching order weights.
This limit depends on the degree of breeding, the strength and
condition of the horses, and may be estimated at the most at two and a
half miles for our Light Cavalry, and somewhat less for the
Cuirassiers. To exceed these distances seems both superfluous and
injurious, particularly when it goes so far as to risk permanent
depreciation of the material.
It is far more important, in my opinion, to habituate the horses to
gallop with their full marching order weights, under service
conditions, and in all kinds of ground; for nothing is more difficult
than to preserve the proper rates of movement and keep the ranks
closed under such circumstances, as experience even in the manoeuvres
abundantly shows.
The 'trot' tends always to get shorter, for the regulation pace is
already as much as Light Cavalry can manage on the Drill ground; and
the gallop, too, falls generally behind the prescribed rate, the
reason being, in my opinion, that as a rule the distances demanded are
too great, and that we do not drill with sufficient frequency in full
marching order, partly to save wear and tear of the kit, but also
because with lighter weights we can undertake in the same time more
exercises, covering a greater area, than would otherwise be possible
without knocking up the horses. Much may be used in defence of this
procedure from the point of view of the training of the Leaders, but
the dangers to the true training of the troops themselves for War
must not be overlooked, and practice under full War service conditions
must thus ever remain the keystone of our whole educational edifice.
But it is not only the training in galloping which suffers from this
practice of riding light. The preparation of the horses as regards
endurance suffers equally, for patrols and long-distance rides are
generally undertaken with stripped saddles; it is only for manoeuvres
and the larger tactical exercises away from the garrison that marching
order is carried. To me this system seems hardly rational. Rather, it
would appear to me, must such sudden increase in the weights on the
horses tend to break them down, and experience confirms this view, for
the first day's marches in the manoeuvres in marching order tire out
the horses to a quite disproportionate degree.
We can never eliminate this evil altogether, for the attempt would
entail either marching order all the year round, or the limitation of
practical exercises to certain periods of the year only, both or
either of which would conflict on the one hand with the necessity of
saving the horses as much as possible, on the other with the needs of
the military training of the men; but a gradual increase in the loads
carried and distances covered seems well within the scope of a
practical policy.
The Company Commander, who wishes to get his men fit for marching,
increases quite gradually and systematically the weight in the men's
knapsacks, till these are scarcely noticed as a hindrance by their
wearers, and similarly one could arrange in the Cavalry. In each
period we should begin with stripped saddles, progressing onwards to
the full kit; but the inspections of tactical units, and the final
inspection in individual combat, should fundamentally be taken in full
marching order always, and horses should be prepared gradually for the
full weight carried in the manoeuvres.
I believe such a system would not only bring about a considerable
improvement in the training for War both of men and horses, but would
secure us from many disappointments by insuring in the Leaders a true
idea of what may reasonably be expected from their commands in the
field. Naturally the demands made on them in the inspections must
undergo a corresponding diminution.
Only by constantly keeping these points in view and combining them in
harmonious progression will it be possible to attain the degree of
perfection in the elementary instruction of men and horses which can
alone guarantee the highest results in practice.
CHAPTER III
THE TRAINING FOR MOUNTED COMBAT
In the same manner as, in the previous chapter, I have endeavoured to
show that in many points in equitation, in the school of individual
combat, and in the 'training' both of man and horse, we can, by
alterations of method, attain more directly to a possibly higher
standard in our performances than is at present achieved, I now
propose to consider the tactical education of the troops as a whole,
with a view to their best utilization in mounted engagements.
According to the existing Regulations, the chief importance is still
laid on the efficiency of the small and medium-sized combinations.
Squadrons, Regiments, and Brigades are prepared with the utmost care
and attention, but exercises of the larger bodies only take place more
or less exceptionally, and on a very restricted scale. The systematic
education of the Cavalry does not, in fact, extend beyond the Brigade.
That this state of affairs no longer responds to the changed nature of
Warfare follows from all that I have already said, and does not
require to be insisted on.
If in War the employment of 'Masses' has become the decisive element,
our system of training must be correspondingly extended, so as to
insure the existence of the skill and power needed for their
successful application. To this end all, even the most elementary,
exercises must be permeated thoroughly by the idea of preparing the
troops for united action in adequate numbers; and the relative
importance of the several periods of training, the allotment of time
to each step in the progression, as well as the exercises themselves,
must all be dominated by the same idea.
The foundation of all sound tactical training will remain now, as
ever, the school of the squadron. The cohesion of this unit and the
ease with which it can be moved is the first condition of its useful
employment at the right time and place, and the importance of
thoroughness in this branch of training grows with every increment in
the total number to be handled. Even more attention, therefore, should
be given to squadron drill in the future than in the past.
Next comes the question of regimental drill. Here, as we shall
presently see, the chief point is to develop the independence of the
Squadron Commander and the tactical handiness of his unit; and as I
understand the problem, this calls for a more extended framework,
within which the regiment must be prepared, than was formerly the
case.
If, even under present conditions, it is scarcely possible in the few
days allowed by the Field Service Regulations to train the squadrons
up to the requirements of active service, even on a level drill
ground, it is obvious that in the future this difficulty will become
intensified. It is a question, therefore, to be considered, whether it
would not be better to remove these time limitations altogether, and
leave it to the Cavalry Commanders themselves to determine
everywhere, with regard to local conditions, how to make the best use
of the total time available. Where considerable expense would be
incurred in bringing in squadrons detached at a distance, the consent
of the War Ministry would, of course, have to be obtained.
Brigade drill, however, stands on quite a different footing; it forms,
as it were, the preparatory school for the movement of 'Masses,' in
which the principle of the employment of the constituent parts of the
'Mass,' whether in 'Lines' or by 'Wings,' has to be inculcated. But as
one has now to deal with tactically thoroughly trained bodies, less
time is required than for either squadron or regimental drill.
On the other hand, it is most essential that the 'Mass' itself, consisting
as it does of several Brigades, should be thoroughly drilled as a
Division or Corps, for it is with these units, and not with Brigades,
that one has to deal in War, and their duties are so many-sided, and
require for their due performance such thoroughly-trained Commanders,
that perfection is not to be attained in a few days, which are not even
available every year. On this point, in my opinion, there is no room for
doubt, and hence it becomes absolutely essential that, if necessary,
Brigade drill must be curtailed in order to give to all Brigades an
annual opportunity of exercising, as part of the higher units.
It might well be possible to allow a wider latitude to the Brigade
Commanders in regard to the choice of time for their special
exercises, in which they might be guided by the special circumstances
of the locality in which they are quartered, and by the advice of
their superiors.
For the exercise of the greater 'Masses,' for which, under all
circumstances, troops have to be brought together from considerable
distances, a particular period must, of necessity, be fixed by
regulations; but it must be borne in mind that these 'Masses' should
not always be formed of equal strength in Divisions of three Brigades,
for the danger to the higher education which lies in always working
with units of similar composition has already been sufficiently dwelt
on. The conditions of War absolutely demand that the higher Cavalry
Leaders should be equally at home in handling 'Masses' with certainty
and precision, no matter what their composition, and the troops
themselves must learn to apply the principles on which efficiency in
action really depends under all and every circumstance.
As regards the manner in which the several periods into which the
training is divided should follow one another, the question arises
whether the squadron, regimental, and brigade drill periods should
follow one another as a continuous whole, or whether they should go
hand in hand with Field Service Exercises.
This seems to me to need a specific reply, because, as a fact, it is
differently answered in different Army Corps.
Where the troops have to leave their garrisons in order to be
quartered in the vicinity of the ground specially selected for those
purposes, the question of expense must play an important part in the
decision; but the principle involved can hardly be affected by these
exceptional circumstances, for in by far the greater number of cases
the troops can find room to drill either within the district of their
own garrisons or on the manoeuvre grounds in the vicinity, and in
these latter the question of extra cost should hardly stand in the way
of an extension of the time allowance. Hence, if such an extension,
due to the intercalation of Field Service practices, really does offer
advantages, one could decide in principle in favour of this solution,
in spite of all other circumstances; but it still seems to me open to
discussion whether it is advisable to make the same principle
applicable in equal measure to all the time intervals.
For the squadron drill, which begins with an entirely untrained troop,
the conditions are obviously quite different to those in the
subsequent exercises, in which the point lies in the working together
of units already finished and completed in themselves; and taking
these differences into account, we must first examine more especially
the case of the squadron.
At the beginning of its drill season, the exertions demanded are
comparatively slight. The distance covered either at the trot or
gallop is only gradually increased, and the paces are at first kept
somewhat below the regulation limits--at least, from practical
experience I should recommend that they should be, for the Instructor
can control and correct the precision of all movements, and the
individual conduct both of man and horse, better at the slower paces
than when moving fast. Riders and horses accustom themselves
gradually, and hence more easily, to movement in closed bodies, and it
is of decisive importance for the whole subsequent course of their
training that at the very beginning of the drills this harmony between
man and horse under the new and unaccustomed conditions should be
secured to the utmost possible degree.
If this point of view be kept in mind, then I think the drills should
be continued daily, for, on the one hand, there is no risk of
overtiring the horses, and, on the other, the object is to weld the
men into a cohesive whole, and impress on them the essential
principles of the elementary tactical evolutions, in order to make
them as soon as possible into a combatant unit.
Towards the latter end of the squadron drills, however, the conditions
change. Now, it becomes necessary to drive into the whole body a
proper appreciation of the several 'paces,' to fit them for long
gallops, and to train them for actual combat. At this period I
consider it better to interpolate one or more Field Service days,
partly because it is of practical moment to press on this side of
their training as quick as possible, and, further, because the drills
now begin to make very considerable demands upon the horses. These
Field Service days afford an opportunity to rest the horses, and thus
to prevent small and inconsiderable injuries developing into severe
lameness and ultimate breakdowns. Further, a quiet ride in the country
gives those horses which have become nervously excited by the
unaccustomed conditions of the drill ground a chance of cooling down,
and thus saving themselves very materially; and this must certainly be
considered as one of the most important functions of the Commander,
whether in Peace or War, to keep his horses fresh on their legs, and
ready to turn out in good condition at whatever hour the call may
sound. Of course, these precautions must not go so far as to endanger
the training for service of the squadron, but drill and manoeuvre
results at excessive cost of horseflesh must be absolutely condemned.
If these reasons speak for an intercalation of Field Service exercises
between the drill days, I am further of opinion that the result which
would be arrived at by this system would give a better standard of
the drill efficiency of the unit for War than can be attained by
continuous drill alone.
With the latter, it is certainly much easier to secure unity,
cohesion, and precision in the movements; but we must remember that in
War the emergency calling for drill performances may arise after weeks
of marching, during which no drill has been practised at all, and our
Peace training must take into account such conditions, and accustom
the troops to execute with safety and cohesion such drill movement as
may be necessary without having practised them day for day.
In still greater degree do these principles apply both to regimental
and brigade drills; since in these the demands on the horses are
constantly increasing, the need to give them opportunity for rest and
recovery becomes even more pronounced.
Moreover, the purpose of these exercises is not so much to secure a
single representation of acquired skill in the exhibition of drill
evolutions, but rather to develop and confirm in the men an
ever-increasing familiarity with the principles of their tactical
employment, and this will only then be attained when, as far as
possible, these practices are continued during the whole summer, so
that the Grand Manoeuvres either in the Division or in the Corps form
the natural conclusion of the whole series. In the period of combined
manoeuvres, it is, of course, impossible, in order to save the horses,
to lengthen the fixed period allotted to them; but all the more
necessary, therefore, does it appear to spare them as much as possible
by the introduction of these Field Service days (exclusive of the
ordinary 'rest days') during the time of the drill exercises. In the
course of the subsequent considerations, we shall see that not only
will our horses gain thereby, but many other important objects of our
training be served as well.
Turning now to the subject of these exercises themselves, it must be
laid down generally that throughout a steady intensification of the
exertions demanded must be maintained, and that the gallop is not to
be employed except when, under service conditions, its use would be
practicable. Further, whatever the Regulations prescribe must be
practised, no matter what the views of the Commanding Officer as to
their practicability or otherwise may be. This is absolutely essential
to secure a uniform standard of execution throughout the Arm.
Nevertheless, it makes a very essential difference in what spirit the
Regulations are approached, for the result will depend upon which
points in the training the chief stress is laid, and generally on the
character given to the exercises.
In drilling the squadron this point is of less importance. Here, in
accordance with the spirit of the whole Arm, it is a matter of formal
drill, and nothing more. It is here that the foundation has to be laid
for smart, never-failing 'drill,' for the unconditional cohesion of
the squadron in itself, and for the certain interpretation of its
Leader's views, whether the latter makes use of commands, signals, or
merely rides in the required direction.
Here the paces must be hammered into the troops till they become
mechanical habit, and the several forms of movement and attack be
practised, so that they can be executed in any direction, whether the
squadron has been told off or not. No matter how hasty the rally may
be, the troop must charge at the moment and without hesitation.
The only difference that can arise here will be due to the
individuality of the Leader, and all are good which lead to the
required end, only the Regulations are not quite clear as to
practising the charge, and the guiding points might be laid down with
rather greater precision.
In the charge against Cavalry cohesion is the first and dominating
condition. It must be absolutely impossible for the horses to swerve
either to right or left. Accurate dressing and the maintenance of the
two ranks come only in the second place. Against Infantry or
Artillery, on the other hand, the essential is that every horse should
have room to gallop in his own form, so that no crowding or jostling
arises, thus giving the horses a chance of avoiding or jumping clear
over falling men or animals. Hence, although on the level drill ground
the requirements of Regulations as regards dressing and the
maintenance of the two well-defined lines must be attended to, one
must remember that it may be impossible to comply with these demands
across country and be prepared in such cases to stick to the spirit,
not to the letter, of the law.
In both cases it will hardly be of advantage to lay too much stress on
dressing and touch. Against Cavalry it is rather a case of jamming the
files together by pressure from the flanks, and the men must hold as a
vital article of faith that only the closest knee-to-knee riding will
guarantee either victory or their personal safety. Against Infantry,
on the contrary, the files must be loosened, and every horse go in his
normal stride, as in hunting; nor must anyone allow himself to be
squeezed out of the ranks to the rear or remain behind as long as the
strength of his horse holds out.
Utmost speed consistent with closely-locked files against Cavalry, a
natural extended gallop against Infantry or Artillery--these are the
two cardinal points to be observed in attacking. Maintenance of
dressing or of the ranks become positive evils if the above are
sacrificed to either. There, in my opinion, should be the essentials
to guide the decision of superior officers in their criticisms.
With these exceptions the lines for the squadron training are so
closely drawn that differences in practice can scarcely arise. The
matter, however, assumes quite a different aspect with the regiment,
and still more with the higher units.
Here it is not only a case of consolidating the cohesion of the troops
by the agency of the discipline of the drill ground, or of teaching
the forms of movement and of fighting, although, of course, these
points of view cannot be entirely disregarded; but the essential is to
teach the methods of employment of the forms laid down in the
Regulations for the combat.
A regiment which can work through the Drill Book smoothly and with
precision is still far from being trained for battle, but at the most
has merely laid the foundations on which such a training can be
subsequently built up. The same applies to a Brigade or Division, each
of which has practised and made certain of the execution of such
movements as passages of defiles, deployments, attacks, changes of
front or of lines, and so forth. All these things are in themselves
necessary and useful, but they make no great demands on the skill of
the Leaders, only requiring an accurate knowledge of the book, and a
certain degree of routine in the application of its prescriptions; but
War makes quite different demands on their ability, and it is for War
that we have to be prepared.
First of all, in the purely formal side of the training, stress must
especially be laid on those forms of movement which can actually be
applied on the battle-field.
Then, the troops must be exercised to apply these forms not only on
the drill ground, but over every kind of country. Further, the
tactical judgment and independence of the Leaders of all ranks must,
be thoroughly developed. They must not only learn to act on
fundamentally sound principles, but to apply these principles
everywhere where circumstances require rapid decision, utilizing at
once the tactical advantages the ground may offer, and adapting
practically the few forms which can be employed before the enemy in
the field instinctively; and, finally, opportunities must be granted
to the Commanders to practise the combination of locally separated
bodies to a single tactical purpose.
In face of these requirements, it seems to me that our tactical
training remains far too elementary in character, and does not tend
with sufficient directness towards what is alone possible in War.
The blame for this state of affairs rests by no means only on the
shoulders of the troops, but is due to a variety of complex causes
which are difficult to disentangle. In the first place comes the
passive resistance, that moment of inertia which custom and tradition
everywhere oppose to changes, and it is not to be expected that the
troops of their own initiative will be able to abandon the accustomed
ruts, when more especially the methods applied in our inspections are
not always of a nature to encourage such attempts.
A further cause is to be found in the Regulations themselves. These
give no firm foothold for the decision of the question as to what
forms and movements really are practicable in War-time, and, probably
in the endeavours not to hamper too much the initiative of the
Leaders, does not express the principle on which the conduct of the
combat is based with sufficient precision to preclude very different
opinions as to what these principles really are. Finally, the local
conditions of many of our garrisons often create an almost insuperable
difficulty for the proper training of the troops over country.
In face of these conditions, we must strike out new paths for our
guidance if we do not intend to remain behind the times altogether.
We must first, however, be perfectly clear in our own minds as to
which of the Regulation forms are really practicable, and hence
require increased attention. Then we must endeavour to formulate the
guiding principles for the conduct of an engagement in a manner so
clear and definite that they can easily be fixed in the memory, and
then work out the best way in which the troops can be thoroughly
grounded in their application. Finally, we must acquire a quite
distinct grasp of what can be practised over country, and from what
points of view such exercises are to be undertaken in order to make
them of direct utility in the solution of the problems modern Warfare
will set before us.
To clear up the first point it will be best to sketch in its general
outline the course in which events succeed one another in an
engagement, and then to deduce the forms of movement which are
essentially practical.
Taking the case of Cavalry in combination with the other Arms, at the
commencement of the action we find the squadrons in 'rendezvous'
formation under cover outside the immediate danger sphere, either on
the flanks or behind the general line of battle.
When the moment to act arrives, they advance at a rapid pace, either
in closed-up column of route or in any other dense formation which
permits of ready deployment in the direction of their allotted target.
Often in this movement they will have to overcome difficulties of the
ground--defiles and the like, of varying breadth.
Arrived in the vicinity of the field of attack, they deploy into lines
of squadron columns, form line to the front, and execute the charge.
In such cases it may often become necessary to secure one's own flanks
by forming protective échelons, or to endeavour to surround those of
the enemy by corresponding offensive movements.
In the case of Cavalry acting alone, it will often be necessary to
form for action directly from column of route, and it will be
essential to establish co-operation not only between the advance guard
and the main body, but also between columns concentrating from
different directions upon the field of coming action.
It is at once evident that for these few manoeuvres few and simple
formations and movements will suffice, and that, in view of the
excitement of the battle-field, only such are, in fact,
applicable.[25]
[Footnote 25: As a measure of this excitement the following
example may be useful. During the great Cavalry engagement on
the plateau west of the Yron brook near Mars-la-Tour a
squadron under most brilliant leadership galloped out in
column of troops to threaten the enemy's flank. When,
however, the order to wheel into line was given, the men were
so excited that it was only with the utmost difficulty that
its Captain succeeded in getting three troops to obey, whilst
the leading one continued on in its original direction. The
Squadron Commander was Rittmeister von Rosenberg, who
afterwards became Inspector-General of Cavalry, and the
above-mentioned incident was related by him personally to the
author.]
Hence it follows that all complicated movements and changes of lines,
and similar formations occurring in the Regulations, may be classed in
the category of evolutions intended mainly for disciplinary purposes.
On the other hand, we must practise, as thoroughly as practicable,
long movements at a rapid pace in the closest formations for
manoeuvre--_i.e._, in double and Regimental Columns; changes of
direction in these columns by shouldering, passage of defiles,
deployments into fighting formations with simultaneous slight
alterations in the line of advance; further, measures to secure one's
own flanks, or to threaten those of the enemy; deployments to the
front immediately out of column of route or after the passage of
defiles; the combination of detachments arriving from different
directions; and, finally, the charge itself under the most varied
assumptions, the transition from the mêlée to pursuit, and rallying in
order to attack again in a new direction against a fresh enemy.
Naturally, the most rapid deployments out of any and every formation
against a suddenly appearing enemy must also be practised, for such
surprises are always possible in War-time.
To be avoided, on the other hand, as for the most part quite
impracticable, are all movements of a dilatory nature for the
formation of fronts of attack, as well as long movements of manoeuvres
and considerable changes of front when already deployed into line.
In all these exercises, as a general and fundamental principle, such a
grouping of the available forces must be striven for that the units
can be employed by 'Wings'; for, as I have endeavoured to point out,
it is this form of employment which best satisfies the requirements of
the combat and meets the needs of the Commander.
For instance, under many circumstances the Regimental Column can be
employed as a practical tactical formation. Thus, if against Infantry
or Artillery, it is desirable to attack in many following 'Lines.' The
need is at once satisfied if our advance is made in a number of
Regimental Columns, wheeled into line to a flank. For a flank attack,
if the movement is initiated in a number of Regimental Columns formed
to the front and following one another, forming line by a subsequent
wheel. In both cases--in the latter after the wheel--one has only to
insure that the laterally adjacent squadrons move off together at
'Treffen' (_i.e._, Line) distance to have all one's Lines complete.
Such a formation can secure its flanks with the greatest ease by the
retention of closed units, or, by bringing up the rearward squadrons,
can prolong its front to either flank. In any case it is preferable to
the triple column of troops, which makes all influence of the leader
impossible, mixes all units in the charge, and hence would best be
left out of the Regulations altogether. Nevertheless, practice in the
employment of 'Treffen' (_i.e._, 'Lines' as opposed to 'Wings') must
not be entirely neglected, as under certain circumstances this form
may also become necessary.
This tendency to group the available forces by 'Wings' in the larger
units from the Brigade upwards must also be extended downwards to the
regiment, which represents the fundamental tactical unit of the
Cavalry, and those formations for manoeuvre which favour the
arrangement of its constituent squadrons one behind the
other--formations which, at the same time, are both handier and
susceptible of more convenient control--must be constantly practised.
That Squadron Columns to the Front hardly meet these demands ideally
can scarcely be denied. They are unhandy, render all changes of
direction materially more difficult, lose direction and distance very
easily, and necessitate complex movements in order to arrange them one
behind the other. Already in Brigade formations these drawbacks are
apparent, and in larger masses they prove most formidable. The
Squadron Column is, in fact, a formation derived exclusively with a
view to 'Line' tactics, and for this reason alone they hamper all
other demands. There is, however, no compelling reason why they should
be retained as the principal working formation for Cavalry, and
therefore as fundamentally beyond the reach of criticism.
It seems to me that a formation which would group every two Squadron
Columns as a unit would be far preferable. The Regimental Commander
would then have only two units to direct, which would maintain their
mutual relations of distance and interval more easily than four, could
change direction more readily, and form line quicker, and allow of a
far easier transition to wing formations and other columns than is
possible at present.
The Regulations certainly do not mention this formation specifically,
but, on the other hand, this regimental double column offers
advantages for certain circumstances greater than can be found in any
of the forms it suggests. It allows in the simplest manner of
deployment into 'Lines,' either to the front or flank, the formation
of échelons in any desired direction; it is very mobile, easily
concealed in folds of the ground, and combines the advantages of
reduced depth both as a marching and as a manoeuvre formation. As the
latter, it is peculiarly adapted to the purposes of large units in
close country; for, as already pointed out, it is easy to conceal, and
whilst keeping the troops well in the hands of the Regimental
Commander, allows also of the most rapid deployments into 'Lines'
either to the front or to the flank. It confers also the same
advantages in brigade when the regiments are formed side by side, and
is particularly applicable to flanking movements in which it is
especially desirable to be able at any moment to develop strong
fighting power in the direction of the movement, and after the wheel
into line, to be formed in successive lines and protected on the
uncovered flank.
[Illustration: Double column.]
It would take us too far at this point to compare in detail the
advantages and disadvantages of this or alternative formations. I only
desire to indicate in what direction practical progress is possible,
even in the domain of formal tactics, without exceeding the limits
laid down by Regulations, although it can only be most desirable that
changes in the Regulations[26] themselves should be forthwith
undertaken. I would, in conclusion, only bring forward one point which
seems to me of particular importance.
[Footnote 26: This formation has since been adopted, and is
almost invariably employed.--TRANSLATOR.]
The more this employment of Cavalry by 'Wings' gains ground, the more
apparent becomes the advantages of the use of the bugle-calls assigned
to the several units, particularly of the regimental call; because
when it is used, the regiment or other unit remains as a closed body,
unmixed with other units, and hence can be employed as a distinct
tactical entity, which is not so much the case when working in
'Lines.'
These sounds are the only ones which never lead to confusion, if they
are employed not as cautions only, but as a call on which the unit
moves at once, whether in line or in column--preferably the latter--in
the direction from which the call is heard. With the call the
Commander would have the means of collecting his men behind him, and
leading them in the direction he desires, no matter in what degree of
order or the reverse they might be, without any verbal commands or
instructions.
Used in this sense these sounds--but particularly the regimental
call--might become the principal drill and manoeuvre calls for the
Cavalry.
Thus it appears to me we could achieve a considerable reduction in the
amount of practical drill necessary, and the change would tell all the
more the more frequently the call was employed, until at last it
became ingrained in the very flesh and blood of each man in the ranks.
Unfortunately the Regulations do not allow their employment in this
sense, but permit them only as cautionary sounds (Section 115, note);
but even in this restricted sense they deserve most constant use in
drilling, for they are always a means of preventing, in a measure,
misapprehensions in the execution of other sounds.
We come now to the second portion of our requirements--viz., how to
obtain clearness in the appreciation of tactical principles.
Fortunately they are few in number, but it is absolutely indispensable
that every Cavalry Leader should most fully have mastered their
meaning. No knowledge, however accurate, of the formal prescriptions
of the Regulations can in any way compensate for a deficiency in this
respect. They are certainly not indicated as 'General Principles' in
the Regulations themselves, but may be read between the lines with
more or less precision from its several paragraphs.
FOR CAVALRY VERSUS CAVALRY.
1. The German Cavalry must always endeavour to attack first in order
to utilize to the utmost its superior 'moral,' and to catch the enemy
in the act of deployment. If an opening for such an attack is offered,
then even the risks of a long preliminary gallop must be accepted
(Section 339).
2. The leading lines must _always_ be followed by supporting squadrons
in adequate numbers (Section 843, and note also Section 346); that is
to say, the enemy's Cavalry will always be attacked in two 'Lines,'
unless special circumstances compel departure from this prescription.
3. One must always endeavour to keep the last closed Reserve in hand,
because in the mêlée the impetus of the last closed body generally
decides. One must never, therefore, as long as one suspects that the
enemy has still further Reserves in hand, engage a greater number of
squadrons than he shows, in order to save up Reserves.
4. Success must be looked for in the vehemence of the onslaught, not
in superiority of numbers (Section 313). The greatest importance must
be attached to cohesion; hence, unless necessary to surprise the enemy
in the act of deployment, the 'gallop' should not be sounded too soon,
or the 'charge' too late (Section 339).
5. Outflanking detachments, or troops in the following lines, turn
against the enemy's Reserves, or remain in reserve. They must never,
except in most pressing circumstances, throw themselves into a mêlée
already formed (Section 313). Following Lines must therefore not keep
too close to the leading ones--a mistake often committed in peace--as
otherwise they are committed to an attack in the same direction. They
should therefore keep so far to the rear that they can overlook the
line of collisions, and move in full freedom wherever their
intervention is most called for. This important principle was always
observed by Frederick the Great's Cavalry.
6. One must always try to cover at least one flank by obstacles of the
ground or by one's own troops; but having satisfied this condition,
then attack on the outer Lines, and endeavour to gain them by previous
strategical directions.
7. Superfluous forces, which do not follow the front as supporting
squadrons, échelon themselves in general, forwards or backwards of the
outer (unsupported) wing, to protect one's own flank and threaten
that of the enemy, also to be ready to engage the enemy's Reserves
(Sections 323, 343, 345), or they are kept together as Reserves behind
the fighting line, if it is not possible to foresee in what direction
they may be required. They must not be too weak.
8. Attempts to surround us made by the enemy are best met by a flank
movement on the original line without change of front (_cf._ Section
338). Defensive flanking cover, with the front turned outwards, gives
the worst conceivable direction for attack, since in case of failure
one is thrown back across the line of retreat of one's main body.
9. Being in 'rendezvous formation,' the leading units are, if
possible, sent off for offensive flank movements, as they have the
shortest way to traverse. Such attacks only then promise success if
they are unnoticed by the enemy--_i.e._, can be executed under the
concealment of the ground--or if the enemy has neither time nor space
to encounter them. The object of flank attacks is to induce the enemy
to use up his rearward Reserves to oppose them, or to induce him to
undertake manoeuvres before attacking.
10. Those units which are to be committed to the attack simultaneously
must never be arranged so that a part follows in échelon
backwards--they must always be disposed on the same alignment.
11. In case of a mêlée, which threatens to terminate unsatisfactorily,
the Reserves must be put in on a broad front and straight forward, not
directed against the flanks. For the longer the line of collision, the
less effect do such flank attacks exercise; they are only too often
mere blows in the air, and lead to waste of energy.
12. Out of every victorious mêlée one must endeavour, as soon as
possible, to rally closed detachments (Section 326). For immediate
pursuit only fractions of the available troops will be employed
(Section 325). This pursuit, however, must be carried out with the
utmost energy, and the complete expenditure of the horses' power--if
possible, to the total extermination of the enemy. The forces employed
must be adequate for the attainment of this end.
CAVALRY AGAINST INFANTRY AND ARTILLERY.
1. The attack must be as concentric as possible, and from different
directions, to compel the defender to scatter his fire. The units are
always to be employed by 'Wings.'
2. If possible, the defender must be surprised, and if Artillery, he
should be attacked from the flank.
3. Where a wide zone of fire has to be ridden through, though even
against Artillery, successive 'Lines' must be employed, and the less
shaken the enemy appears to be the greater the number of such 'Lines'
(Section 350). Artillery attacked frontally must be compelled by the
leading 'Lines' to change both elevation and the nature of their fire.
4. The result, however, depends less on the Form employed than on the
rapid seizure of momentarily favourable circumstances.
5. Only _closed_ 'Lines' on a broad front can be relied on for
success. Where the squadrons each seek independently for an object of
attack, they generally miss it altogether, and to assign each
individual squadron a special target will mostly be impossible, for
the attack will be launched from such a distance that separate objects
in the defender's lines will hardly be recognisable. Once within the
zone of serious losses it will be obviously impossible to undertake
those changes of direction which one sees unhappily so constantly in
peace. One rides, in general, straight at a long fire line, and
penetrates through as far as one can.
6. Such frontal attacks require, generally, reserves on both flanks
for security against possible disengaging efforts of the enemy's
Cavalry.
7. As the crisis of the engagement approaches, one must close well up
on the fighting line, no matter whether one incurs loss or not, in
order to be at hand to take advantage of opportunities.
8. Deployment, changes of direction and of front, are only possible
outside the principal fire zone of the enemy.
9. The distance between following lines varies according to the nature
of the enemy's fire.
To make these principles familiar to the troops must be one's constant
care from the commencement of the regimental drill season onwards. At
the same time, the subordinate Leaders must learn to apply them
independently, even if no direct order reaches them, or if compelled
to act on only the shortest indication of the Superior Commander
(Sections 330, 333, 348), and this independence of the subordinate
must be the more practised the greater the size of the units (Section
317).
To attain this object, as soon as the troops have sufficient mastery
of the purely mechanical part of their drill, it will be necessary to
append a series of exercises designed both to bring out the essentials
of these principles, and, at the same time, to develop the judgment
and independence of the junior officers.
Such exercises must hence always be based on a well-defined tactical
situation, from which it clearly appears whether the Cavalry is
'Independent,' or whether it is acting on the flank or behind the
middle of a fighting line; and the corresponding conditions on the
enemy's side must also be readily deducible, and on such foundation,
under constantly changing assumptions, as to strength and distance of
the enemy, all such movements as changes from one tactical formation
to another--flank attacks, deployment from column of route or after
the passage of defiles--must be practised. In all these exercises the
point at issue must be clearly and comprehensively expressed. When one
has attained a certain degree of security in the application of these
principles, these exercises must be repeated under conditions of
ever-increasing difficulty.
The order for deployment must be given whilst the troops are in rapid
motion. Observation, thought, and command when in full gallop have to
be learnt; they do not come naturally. The most various movements,
without command or bugle-call, must be executed from a message brought
by a galloper. The troops will be practised against a suddenly
appearing enemy on simple warnings such as 'Against Cavalry,' 'Against
Infantry,' or merely on the sound 'Alert,' and pains must always be
taken to see that the fundamentally right formation is adopted. In
these exercises it must be left to the initiative of the subordinates
to judge the situation for themselves, and always move to their proper
place in the prescribed formation by the shortest path. Of course, in
such movements the first principle is that the troops nearest the
enemy furnish the first 'Line'; the remainder fall into their places
as flank coverers, supporting squadrons or reserve.
If, in this manner, we succeed in imparting to the junior Leaders
thorough clearness as to the principles of the game, and to make them
both quick and skilful in their appreciation of the situation, then
the work of education on the drill ground is complete, and the troops
are ready for exercises over country. No pains must be spared to
separate the purely formal and ceremonial side of drill from the
practical field-training. The former keeps always, as I have indicated
in the first section, its full value for the creation of discipline
and alertness, but leads only too easily to a routine which has
nothing in common with the battle-field, and to that poverty-stricken
'schematisimus' to which human nature so readily inclines.
To the formal school of training, which I have hitherto only had in
mind, a whole series of exercises must now be coupled, having for
their purpose the application of the acquired forms and principles
under all circumstances of the ground. But before we proceed to their
detail consideration, we must answer the question how far the drill
ground only suffices for the purpose of training. Generally, one can
subscribe to General von Schlichting's principle--that forms and
principles must be learnt in the drill book, but their application in
action only in the open country. Tactical exercises on the drill
ground, which have not for sole purposes to bring to expression
certain formal principles, are always an evil, and mislead the troops.
On the other hand, the principles of the tactical employment of
Cavalry are particularly suited to representation on the drill ground
because they are frequently of a purely formal nature.
Keeping firmly to these established principles, then, to define the
limits of usefulness of the drill ground, we have only to answer the
question within what tactical units this formal drilling is still
instructive or possible. My opinion is that the Brigade marks the
highest limit, as within it all tactical principles find their
application, and it is the largest body which can still in any way be
handled by drill methods only. In the Division, and still more in the
higher units, the strategical element preponderates so greatly that
anything approaching real drill is out of the question, and all
movements which they can execute are based on a complete command of
these principles already. Of course, it is not intended to prohibit
altogether the formal working together of these masses at the
beginning in order to secure complete control and knowledge of them
for further instruction; but one must not delay over these formal
movements a moment longer than absolutely necessary, since the real
centre of gravity lies in the practical training, and no doubt must be
allowed to exist as to which exercises are intended as purely drill
and which as practical preparation for War.
Nor would I have it implied that brigade and regimental training
should be entirely confined to the drill ground. On the contrary, the
exercises over country are absolutely essential for practical
training, and form the keystone of the whole edifice; but it seems to
me not merely permissible but desirable that a portion of these
exercises should be carried out on the drill ground in order to
expedite this portion of the work. But all the more energetically must
it be insisted on that the remainder of the programme--the greater
part in regard to time--should be executed, as far as possible, in
variable ground, and that all exercises of the larger formations
should be confined to such ground as we shall have to work over in
War; not alone are they by far the most important for the higher
tactical education of the Arm, but they cannot be represented on drill
grounds at all; their whole essence is too entirely out of harmony
with the conditions of a level plain.
That the degree of cultivation existing in the vicinity of the
garrisons may interfere seriously with these demands is obvious, and
in the absence of the necessary spaces to work over we must fall back
on the great training grounds (Truppenübungs Plätze); even the
possibilities of these are very soon exhausted. But this, at least, is
certain: that it is better to hold these exercises on these training
grounds than to confine them exclusively to the drill field. Every
effort must, therefore, be made to transfer all exercises of bodies
above the regiment to the training grounds, on which one will always
find some portion sufficiently suitable for the amount of drill
required, and to extend the period of work on these grounds so that in
all periods it will be possible to interpose between the drill days a
sufficient number of field service days, always supposing that these
training grounds offer sufficient diversity of contour, etc., for our
purposes. Where this is not the case, then, in spite of the expense
entailed by possible damage to crops, etc., suitable ground will have
to be acquired. The extra cost of a few thousand pounds cannot be
allowed to stand in the way of the adequate training of the Arm which,
owing to its numerical strength, relatively small in comparison with
the magnitude of its tasks, is in the last resort dependent for its
success on its internal excellence alone.
As concerns the nature of these exercises, with special reference to
the larger formations, first of all we must secure, by means of a
graduated series, the certain co-operation of the constituent elements
and of their leaders. Next, it must be insisted on that, for the
further actual practical training, as well as for the purely formal
drill, a systematic procedure should be the fundamental principle, so
that all who participate in them may become clearly aware of the
conditions of Warfare, and the means of dealing with them. It is
evident that these conditions must form the foundation of the required
system.
As in War these are constantly changing, there seems a certain degree
of contradiction in this demand; but in reality this is not the case,
for no matter how the situation may vary, there will always be for its
proper criticism some one chief point which will characterize the
whole procedure, and thus be decisive for the systematic arrangement
of these exercises.
The latter can then be divided into two principal groups, according as
to whether they are based on the assumption of a Cavalry force acting
as an independent unit or in combination with the other Arms. The
general conditions in both cases must be clearly brought out, and give
them the point of attachment for the further subdivision of the
exercises.
Thus, with regard to the first case:
Reconnaissance from a great distance. Deployment of one or more
columns out of defiles or in open country. The land in the vicinity of
the training ground can here be advantageously employed. It is not
desirable to place the heads of the separate columns at once on the
scene of action, using these points as starting-points for the
forthcoming exercise. One must give the columns longer marches, and
demand that--assisted by a properly-working mechanism for circulating
information and orders--they should arrive at the point of action at
the proper time, in spite of possible delays or interference on the
road. The enemy, whether skeleton or otherwise, must, of course, be
handled so that collision occurs within the limits of the training
ground.
Transition from the relations of advance (or rear) guard and main body
to the order these assume on the battle-field.
Attacks on a railway or hostile post.
Government boundaries form no support for the flanks; these can only
be considered as secure when protected by natural obstacles; hence, as
a rule, measures must be taken to cover both flanks.
Transition from the tactical to the strategical form after completion
of an encounter; pursuit of the enemy with one fraction of the force,
and continuation of the operation with the remainder; for the latter,
only orders need be issued; but it is a matter of considerable
importance how this division of force rendered necessary by the
tactical encounters is arranged.
Retreat after a repulse, in one or several columns.
Retirement through defiles.
In the second case:
Selection of position on the battle-field in a proper relation to the
fighting line, zone of danger, etc., and reconnaissance to front and
flanks.
Advance from a position in reserve to attack on the enemy's Cavalry
round one wing of an Army.
Transition from a victorious charge against Cavalry to a further
attack against the enemy's flank.
Protection of the outer flank in either case.
Retreat after defeat by the enemy's Cavalry to the protection of one's
own Army wing.
Advance for frontal attack against the enemy's line of battle; passage
through the intervals of one's own Artillery and Cavalry. Protection
of both flanks. Attack upon Infantry, Artillery, or both; disengaging
a front attacked by Cavalry; combat against the latter.
Flank attacks against retreating columns; ambushes at defiles.
Of course, it is not intended in the above to lay down a hard-and-fast
scheme of instruction, but only to indicate how the work to be done
can be systematically arranged, and brought under one point of view,
so that the lessons they are intended to convey become impressed on
the mind. It is also evident that by the supposed conduct of the
enemy, and the strength assigned to him, the utmost variation can be
brought about in the grouping and representation of the several
conditioning circumstances. In short, these exercises must be taken
direct from the most diverse demands of War, and be based, as far as
possible, on an assumed general situation. They must never be allowed
to descend to mere fighting on horseback backwards and forwards across
the training ground, and with often quite unnatural sequence of ideas,
having no connection with the natural order of events. It is also most
desirable that Infantry and additional Artillery should be made
available for their execution.
How far the dismounted action of the Arm is to be represented in these
series will be gone into in the next section; but in all cases,
whether working mounted or on foot, the Leader must insist that the
troops are handled in accordance with tactical precepts suitably
applied in every case to the special circumstances of the given
situation; and for this, even on the smallest training grounds, a
proper utilization of the features of the country is essential.
The desire to suit the formation to the ground; to carry out turning
movements under cover; to find support for the flanks in natural
obstacles, so that they cannot be surrounded; to choose the actual
field of encounter, so that every advantage of the ground, the
direction of the wind, of the sun, of covered approach, etc., all fall
to our advantage; to deal with defiles and passes on correct
principles; to utilize suitably strong defensive positions--all these
must be clearly brought to light, and in the 'Critique' these points
must be particularly borne in mind, for they are by no means
universally current in the Cavalry, which has a tendency always and
everywhere in peace to revert to the levellest ground obtainable. I
have seen at Cavalry Division Exercises troops handled without the
slightest regard to the nature of the country, and without the fact
attracting attention at the 'Critique'; but these are conditions
which, thanks to the energetic action of the Inspector-General, we may
hope, are now everywhere overcome.
It must, further, be brought out in the clearest possible manner under
what conditions the employment of the units by 'Wings' is to be
recommended, and under which others their employment in 'Lines'
becomes necessary. The principles regulating this matter have already
received attention in Book I., Chap. V. The freedom which, as we have
seen, is given us by Section 346 of the Regulations must be utilized
to the fullest extent, for it alone answers to the demands of the
modern battle-field.[27]
[Footnote 27: If, in the course of time, as I fully
anticipate, the necessity should become apparent to give
further expression in the form of Regulations to the point of
view laid down in Section 346, it would certainly necessitate
a complete rearrangement of the whole Regulations, out of
which, in that case, other defects might then be eliminated.
The following ideas might then be taken into consideration:
1. Fundamental and formal separation of tactical prescription
from instructions concerning the methods of training.
2. Simplification of the Regimental drill in the direction of
conferring increased freedom of movements to the Squadrons
and double Squadrons. Limitations in the application of
Squadron Columns, and their partial replacement by more
suitable formations.
3. More precise wording of the tactical principles, and their
extension to prescriptions as to the use of 'Wing' or 'Line'
formation.
4. Re-introduction of the true idea of 'Line tactics,'
limitation of the word 'Échelon' to troops overlapping the
first line, of 'Reserve' for all held back behind it.
5. The preparation for all instructions for the movement and
combat of masses larger than Brigades without reference to
any fixed standard of strength.
6. More extended use of the different bugle sounds.
7. Extension of the instructions for dismounted action to
cover the employment of several Squadrons, Regiments, or
Brigades, and with especial stress on the decisive offensive.
(See next section.)]
One last point requires further consideration, which is of
considerable importance for Cavalry exercises--viz., the use of
skeleton enemies.
In no Arm does the skeleton enemy replace an actual enemy less than
with the Cavalry.
If it rides the prescribed paces, then, as a consequence of the ease
of movement and rapidity of deployment, it has an unfair advantage; if
it rides slowly or halts altogether as a target, it makes things
altogether too easy for the other side. Besides, it is a very much
easier matter to judge a number of flags correctly than to estimate
the actual strength of a rapidly moving body of horse.
Most movements in practice develop so quickly, and, owing to the
ground, the direction in which the dust drives, etc., give such
changing pictures, that it is most difficult to judge them accurately
when one's self is in rapid motion.
Often the Cavalry Commanders must decide, at least in general, on the
instant, strength, tactical distribution, and direction of movement of
a rapidly approaching enemy almost hidden in dense dust clouds; in the
same instant he must make up his mind with reference to the conditions
disclosed by the adversary and the nature of the ground, and issue his
orders clearly and intelligibly. The demand is such a great one that
both the physical and mental sight even of a born Leader needs
constant practice against real objects in order to be in any way equal
to it. Hence the necessity for bringing great Cavalry 'Masses'--at
least, Divisions--as frequently as possible together to manoeuvre
against one another, and in such a manner that the strength of the
opposing forces remains unknown, which, with a little management, can
easily be arranged. If one knows beforehand the precise number of the
opposing forces, as with Divisions of uniform composition will
generally be the case, the matter is very much simplified indeed, but
in proportion it is less practical, a consideration which still
further supports our already formulated demand for Cavalry Divisions
differing as far as possible in their composition.
Thus, it is clear that the field is wide indeed which opens itself for
the practical training of Cavalry as soon as one gets down to the
bed-rock conditions which determine success in actual War, and frees
one's self of all conventional suppositions. Whether we shall succeed
in satisfying the new conditions which press upon us from every side,
taking into consideration the excellence of our existing material,
equal to the highest performances, will depend in the main on the
support of the superior authorities. For the manner in which Cavalry
are inspected decides how they practise and what they learn, just as
the way in which they are led determines what they can do.
CHAPTER IV
TRAINING FOR DISMOUNTED FIGHTING
If in the previous pages it has been shown that increased attention
must be devoted, in the training of our Cavalry for its mounted
duties, to the changed conditions we shall encounter in modern War--if
it is to do justice to itself on the battle-fields of the future--it
must, on the other hand, be insisted on that the foundation available
for such further effort is indeed an excellent one. Our squadrons are,
in general, exceptionally well trained, capable of great endeavour,
and well in the hands of their Commanders.
It needs, therefore, in my opinion, but a slight change in the
direction, the practical consideration of certain new points, and,
above all, a wider range of practice in the higher Commands, to attain
the very highest mark.
With its dismounted action, however, it is a different matter.
In spite of the increased importance this form of fighting has
acquired in modern War, our Cavalry has not as yet paid anything like
the amount of attention to the subject that it deserves. Almost
everywhere it is treated as of quite minor importance, and many
Cavalrymen still close their eyes to the view that, without a training
at once as thorough and earnest for dismounted action as that
bestowed on the Arm to fit it for its mounted duties, modern Cavalry
will hardly survive the trials it will encounter in the future.
This idea rests on long-standing tradition, which is difficult to
overcome. It is not so very long ago that on the rifle ranges some
officers caused volleys to be fired in order to get through their
cartridges so as to get back to quarters the sooner; but mainly, it is
up-borne and continued by the fact that in the Inspections the
superior Commanders generally treat dismounted fighting as a matter
hardly worth their serious consideration, or judge it by
false--_i.e._, too narrow--standards. Further, because in the
manoeuvres, as in the principal Cavalry exercises generally,
situations requiring dismounted action for their due solution hardly
ever arise; and lastly, because of the manner in which the whole
subject is discussed in the Regulations themselves.
The latter approach the question from a far narrower standpoint than I
propose. They lay down quite openly that only under especially
favourable circumstances can Cavalry hope to obtain easy and minor
results from their carbine, fire, and that they are not in a position
to enter on and carry through obstinate encounters.
They lay principal stress on the defensive, and practically exclude
the combat of larger 'Masses' altogether from their horizon.[28] In
fact, they consider only the minimum conditions which the Cavalry must
fulfil if it is not to fall into the background altogether.
[Footnote 28: Section 355, and note 357, 363, 365, 366.]
The final consequences of modern development, hardly even those
resulting from the experiences of 1870-1871, they have emphatically
not yet even approached.
Those who have studied the action of our Cavalry in that campaign
thoroughly--as I myself had full opportunity of doing--will agree that
we seldom had to have recourse to the carbine except on the offensive,
as I have pointed out above, and only in the rarest cases did we need
them for defensive purposes; and though in future against overwhelming
forces this necessity may arise more frequently, still, as in 1870,
this tendency towards a resolute offensive must always stand in the
foreground. Nevertheless, the Regulations, in spite of all practical
experience and theoretical considerations, lay down that in most cases
fire action will be confined to the defensive (Cavalry Regulations,
Section 357).
It is quite natural that the troops themselves should not place their
ideal higher than the Regulations require; all the more necessary,
therefore, do I hold it to express with all emphasis that _our
training must go far beyond the limits prescribed for it officially_
if we are in any degree to satisfy the demands that War will make upon
us. But for these, I hold our Cavalry thoroughly capable (when
trained, understood), and even if they were not, one should never
breathe such a suspicion to the men themselves. For should such an
impression get abroad, one would dig at once the grave of initiative,
daring, and resolution in the execution of all necessary undertakings.
Keenness, the very life and soul of all Cavalry action, can only grow
where the troops believe themselves fully equal to all eventualities.
The idea, therefore, that Cavalry, even when dismounted, is not equal
to any Infantry, must never be allowed to show its head; rather, the
men must be brought up in the conviction that, owing to their longer
term of service, absence of reservists, etc., they are, unit for unit,
more than a match for the best. Only when they feel this thoroughly
will they develop their utmost fighting value. But it is indispensable
that they should be thoroughly at home in all forms of the dismounted
combat, for only then will they feel confidence in the weapons they
carry.
This ideal is as yet far from being attained in our service, and we
must break entirely with the existing training and enter on new paths
if it is in any way to be attained.
For the tactical subdivision of the squadron, and the elementary forms
of skirmishing action, the Regulations afford a sufficient foundation,
but their application must be brought home to the men in a totally
different manner to that at present in use.
A few weeks after their arrival--at latest the beginning of
November--the recruits must be taken out into the country and
practised in utilizing all the advantages it offers, both as a group
and in firing lines, and at the same time they must be taught with the
carbine, aiming, judging distance, etc., always from the point of view
of making each man a practical independent shot, without any
theoretical mystification or pedantry. Soon after Christmas they must
be sufficiently far advanced to commence practice on the range, which
must be carried out with the utmost individual care.
_A considerable increase in the amount of ammunition is essential_ to
keep the men constantly in practice, so that there are no long pauses
between the days set aside for shooting, that these are divided over
the whole year, and that firing at long distances and under field
conditions can be carried out on a greater scale than at present.
Before the beginning of the squadron drills, the men must be
thoroughly at home both in mounting and dismounting for fire action;
with this object, vaulting exercises with horses in full kit must be
especially practised. They must also have progressed so far in the
elementary preliminaries that tactical training of the dismounted
squadron can be proceeded with at once; but the individual exercises
must be continued throughout the whole year if knowledge of them is to
pass over into the flesh and blood of the men.
Special importance is to be attached to field firing, and for this in
particular far more ammunition must be provided. In this most
important respect Cavalry must be put on precisely the same footing as
the Infantry, and be able to practise at real service targets exactly
like the latter. But these exercises must not be begun until the men
are thoroughly at home in judging distance and aiming, the class
shooting is at an end, and the tactical training of the squadron
completed.
In aiming practices, low targets, representing men lying down, or
well-covered shooting lines at great distances, are to be preferred;
but in field firing the targets should be so disposed as to make the
typical cases it is desired to represent, in which Cavalry will
generally have to employ their firearms on service, sufficiently clear
to the men's understanding--such, for instance, as the following:
1. Attack of an occupied position.--Fire opens according to ground at
1,100 to 1,200 yards; gradual advances by rushes to decisive
distances, which, with modern weapons and in open country, may be put
at 700 to 900 yards. Development of the principal fire effort at this
range, and beating down of the enemy's return fire. After attainment
of the fire superiority, rapid advance by rushes, and in larger
bodies. These rushes must be covered by the fire of those still lying
down, until the point for the commencement of their assault is
reached. Meanwhile, advance of the last Reserves, also by rushes, to
the last fire position to give the final impulse for assault; assault;
pursuit by fire. The strongest development possible of concentric fire
consistent with the retention of adequate reserves to carry forward
the fighting line.
2. Defence of a position.--(_a_) Obstinate defence; object not to let
the assailant come too close; hence from 1,100 yards a considerable
development of fire power; continuation of the fight at decisive
range, and, according to the result, either pursuit by fire or rapid
evacuation of the position with ultimate sacrifice of the rearguard to
be formed by the last reserve. (_b_) Defence without the intention of
standing fast, either to gain time or compel the enemy to deploy.
Hence, principal fire effort between 1,000 and 1,300 yards, and then
gradual break-off of the fight before the enemy can approach too
close.
N.B. In practice a favourable position is essential.
3. Surprise fire against marching columns or reserves whilst
reconnoitring the enemy's approach, or whilst working round his flank
and rear in the battle, or in pursuit without the intention of
charging or defending one's self, mainly with the purpose of securing
a momentary but considerable moral and material effect, then
disappearing and renewing the attempt from another place, hence sudden
'Mass' fire from 1,500 to not less than 1,000 yards. At the same
time, it must be explained that with our present carbine even a
nominal effect can hardly be secured at the greater distances. Here I
have anticipated the issue of a better weapon, an unconditional
necessity for the Cavalry in any case.
All these practices, however, will only then be of value when the
officers possess a far more thorough knowledge of musketry and the
capabilities of their weapon than is at present the case with us. It
must therefore be insisted upon that, first our Regimental Commanders,
and then the junior officers, should be ordered to attend the Infantry
School of Musketry, in order that they may thoroughly master this new
branch of knowledge.
It will be asserted that the time for such thorough training in
musketry cannot be found except at the cost of neglecting still more
important branches of our service. But from my practical experience I
cannot assent to this view. There is ample time, if it is not wasted
on unpractical affairs.
Judging distance and the use of ground can be most thoroughly taught
during field-service practices, whilst the troops are on piquet, or
the squadron at the reserve of the outposts, when the men who do not
at the moment happen to be on patrol or vedette often lie about for
hours doing nothing. We have then opportunities to take these matters
in hand in the most practical manner; particularly the former, on
which shooting in the field so essentially depends, and whose
importance is so little appreciated by our Cavalry.
The duties in the afternoon can also be much reduced to save time for
the same purpose. For instance, let me call attention to the waste of
time involved by lengthy parades for lance exercise. No man can keep
on at lance practice for an hour at a time. The consequence is that
most of it is spent in standing easy, and therefore wasted. But the
object--viz., of gradually strengthening the muscles of the arm and
making the man handy with the weapon--can be equally well attained by
a couple of parades for the purpose weekly. Perhaps still better, if
before every afternoon parade and every mounted duty throughout the
year the men are exercised with the lance for a few minutes only. In
this manner the muscles of the arm will develop more rapidly and much
time will be saved. Similarly, more can be gained by the method of
imparting the instruction pursued, if attention is restrained to the
thing that the man must know only, and everything superfluous, such as
the learning by heart of the names of every portion of the weapon and
so forth--at any rate with the recruits--is left out, and at the same
time all such opportunities as occur in stable duty, on the march, in
the cleaning hour, etc., are made the most of.
Finally, speaking generally, not only is more time than is necessary
spent on squadron drill, but also more than is advantageous. If one is
constantly drilling for four weeks at a stretch, that is ample, and
then there is time for a considerable extension of our shooting
training; and if the inspection of the squadron is postponed for any
particular reason, then shooting and field-service days can be
interpolated, which in itself is a very good thing.
If in these ways time for the elementary training for dismounted work
and for shooting can be gained, it is still easier to arrange things
for the foot training of the squadron as a unit. During the drill
period the pauses to rest the horses which must be granted to them
can be utilized, and in the field-service exercise the schemes must
often be framed so as to afford practice in dismounted operations in
suitable ground. For the technical training of the men it is of
particular importance that they should be accustomed, with immobile
horses, to couple (? knee halter) them rapidly, and with mobile horses
in bringing them up or retiring them.
These two essential practices receive far too little attention in the
German Cavalry. The chief difficulty of the latter lies in the way in
which the spare lances which the man cannot hold fast in his hand fly
backwards and forwards when in rapid motion; and the ease with which a
lance can be jerked out of the shoe, and then trail on the ground can
give rise to the gravest disorder, not to mention danger.
It is most desirable that something should be done to remove this
evil. The best, perhaps, would be to devise some arrangement by which
each lance could be attached to its own horse. If that is possible,
then the shoe must be made so deep that the lance cannot be thrown
out. It is obvious that this problem will not be long in finding a
solution as soon as attention is directed to its absolute necessity.
The above will suffice to make it abundantly clear that as far as
concerns the thorough training of the squadron for dismounted purposes
no serious difficulties exist. These only begin when we come to the
employment of larger forces, and principally because the Regulations
give us no point of support for the purpose, whilst our Cavalry
officers themselves are in no way prepared for this branch of their
duties. For the employment of the tactical units and the fundamental
principles governing their use in action we are therefore compelled to
lean on the Infantry Regulations. But how many of our Cavalry officers
are sufficiently acquainted with these to employ them practically? How
is it to be expected that they should be, when nobody expects such
knowledge of them?
Hence to prepare for the training of the Leaders, officers of all
ranks should be encouraged, whenever time and opportunity offers, to
attend the more important tactical exercises of the Infantry. It would
be better still if a sufficient number of Cavalry officers were to be
attached--Lieutenants to Companies, senior officers to Battalions and
Regiments--for suitable periods. But we must be quite clear in our
minds that in this way we have at most an expedient to meet a period
of transition, which will not suffice as a permanent remedy.
It can never be considered otherwise than as a grave disadvantage when
one Arm is compelled to seek the instruction necessary for its
practical application in War from the Regulations and parade grounds
of another, and more especially when, as in this case, the principles
of the Cavalry are by no means applicable without modification to the
other.
Actually, the peculiarities and the duties of Cavalry render many
variations from Infantry practice essential which require
consideration. For instance, the Infantry company is told off in
three, the dismounted squadron with mobile horses in two, with
immobile ones in three fractions, which are always very much weaker
than those of the Infantry, and, therefore, entail entirely different
methods of husbanding their respective strengths. I can only consider
it, therefore, as a most pressing need, and one which can no longer
be delayed, that the Cavalry Regulations should receive the necessary
expansion to meet the different conditions, and that the practical
training of the men on foot should be carried on in the same
systematic way as their preparation for mounted duties.
For these alterations in the Regulations the principles of the Company
Column tactics must, in my opinion, form the general groundwork. A
dismounted squadron with immobile horses bring 125, with mobile ones
about 70, carbines in the line of fire; a regiment, therefore, from
280 to 500--numbers, therefore, materially smaller than those of a
company or battalion respectively, and their power in action is
correspondingly reduced. Nevertheless, it will be well, with regard to
the conditions of command, to treat the squadron tactically on the
same footing as the company, and within these limits the principles
governing extensions, depth and arrangement of the units for attack or
defence must be laid down clear and distinct in the Regulations.
These principles must be formulated in general on the lines which in
discussing the question of tactical direction (Book I., Chap. V.) I
have already attempted to develop. They must distinguish clearly
between the cases of the detachment acting for itself alone or with
either or both flanks protected, and lay down what distribution of
force and apportionment of reserves is of decisive importance, and,
therefore, requiring special instructions.
The chief stress, in opposition to all previous prescriptions, must
now be laid on the combat of the regiment and the brigade, as those
units whose employment will be principally called for in modern War,
and the principle of the offensive must be steadily kept in view.
Fights for localities and about defiles require especial attention,
and further, the conditions must be laid down by Regulation in which
action is to be engaged in with mobile or immobile horses, and how
these led horses are to be placed and protected.
The present Regulations pass lightly over these questions, because, as
I have pointed out, the standpoint from which they view the matter is
fundamentally different. If, however, the increased importance of
dismounted action is granted, then these points call for decision, and
how they are to be dealt with as a matter of principle cannot be left
to the goodwill of the Leader.
A very important defect in the Regulations lies in the uncertainty it
allows to exist as to the subdivision of the dismounted squadron, and
how the skirmishers on dismounting are to form.
According to Section 54 the squadron dismounted is divided into four
troops of twelve files, or if the number of files does not suffice,
into three troops. According to Section 87, eight to twelve men form a
group, two or three groups a troop. In Section 155 the skirmishers of
a troop when dismounted, with mobile horses, form one group. How many
'troops' are to be formed is not indicated. 'The skirmishers fall in,
in front of or by the side of the squadron, arranged as on horseback.'
When working with immobile detachments, then, according to Section
156, the skirmishers form in front or by the side of the squadrons in
two ranks, and in how many groups or troops they are to be told off is
not specified.
The confusion here cannot be explained away, and its consequences are
frequently manifested. It must be laid down once for all that with
mobile horses the dismounted men of a squadron form one troop in four
groups, or with immobile ones two troops, also of four groups, and
that they always form up in front of the squadrons, each troop in
line, and one behind the other. Then everyone should know exactly what
he has to do. It is altogether a misfortune that the dismounted
squadron and the squadron on foot parade are two entirely different
things. The latter is only required for ceremonial, and everything
relating to it should be consigned to Part IV. of the Regulations
(ceremonial, etc.); whilst the training of the squadron on foot should
from the beginning be based on the needs of the squadron dismounted
for action. Then there would be unity and system in the matter.
Turning now to the practical education in larger units, it is
necessary that the fundamental principles guiding the distribution of
the men in attack or defence in the typical kinds of encounter should
be taught and practised on the drill ground. The corresponding
positions of the led horses must also be represented. As typical
situations I would enumerate the following:
Attack on localities, with or without the tendency to outflank.
Attack by surprise, or after preparation.
Defence of a section or of a locality, with known direction of the
enemy's advance, or when the flanks may be threatened.
Obstinate defence and maintenance of an isolated locality.
Keeping open the entrance of a defile, and its utilization for a
further offensive or retreat.
Deployment for surprise fire action, in order to disappear again
immediately.
Combined action of dismounted men with a mounted reserve, to ward off
an attack or pursue a retreating enemy.
In all these cases we require not only fundamentally different
methods, but the methods themselves will be different according to
whether the led horses are mobile or immobile, because in each case
the strength of the tactical units is an entirely different one.
These more or less elementary exercises, after the squadron
inspections, both mounted and on foot, have been concluded, must be
principally carried out in the regiment, which also when dismounted
remains the true tactical unit of the Cavalry; but they must be
continued by the brigade, in which the employment of the regiments
formed side by side--_i.e._, by 'Wings'--must be represented under
most varying circumstances.
It appears to me that in the present state of our training it is
exactly these elementary exercises which are the most important,
because more than any others they are adapted to make clear and
comprehensible the general conditions of successful fire employment.
This comprehension, owing to the specifically Cavalry tendencies of
our training, is in general almost entirely lacking in our Cavalry
Commanders, so that in this direction the tactical education of our
officers requires to be built up almost from the ground.
For the rest, these exercises, like the corresponding ones when
mounted, form only the basis for the true practical training, which it
is not possible to impart on a drill ground, and requires, as a first
condition, natural country, with all its changing features. For this
reason it must be insisted on that a part of the regimental and
brigade drill season should be spent in the country and on wide open
spaces, with great variety of topographical expression. Where such are
not to be had, then we must go to the troop training grounds; and
hence the desire, above expressed, to extend as far as possible the
period spent by the troops in the district or on these training
grounds, and which I have based on the necessity for holding annual
exercises for the higher units, in which all regiments should take
part, finds additional support.
Of course, this does not preclude the necessity of utilizing the
surroundings of the garrisons to their utmost.
As regards the arrangement and nature of these exercises, when working
on the drill ground they will have to be inserted between the pauses
in mounted movements necessary to rest the horses, but they must never
on this account be allowed to be treated as of any less importance.
When out in the country in larger and continuous movements, this
opportunity, from the nature of things, will not be available.
But it is precisely on the larger movements, if possible of whole
Divisions, that the principal stress should be laid. In these the
fight can be initiated under the most varied conditions, as a
consequence of the direction of approach, and after its execution
further operations arising out of the resulting situation can be set
on foot, which, as we have seen (Book I., Chap. VI.), will generally
entail the interaction of dismounted men with mounted reserves.
Such exercises must naturally be laid out quite independently, and
must take rank in the programmes for Brigade and Divisional drills on
an equal footing with the others. All Leaders must by degrees learn
to control the whole of this section, and find themselves as much at
home in every tactical situation on foot as if they were in the
saddle.
Hence great importance must be laid on the capacity for exercising
independent resolve in all ranks of the subordinate officers; but,
above all, they must be made to acquire that relentless tendency to go
forward which is the very soul of their service, and generally the
best adapted to its tactical requirements. Officers and men must
realize that, once dismounted, victory alone can restore to them their
horses. These latter must be so disposed that the impossibility of
making use of them to break off the engagement springs in the eyes of
every man. Only in this way can one get clear ideas: so long as the
men do not look on their action on foot as in itself something
serious, but are thinking principally of how to get back to their
horses, as long as the Leader himself makes his action dependent on
this possibility, for just so long will the men fail to put their
whole soul into their work, and we shall obtain only partial results,
with uncertain handling.
This point of view must be constantly kept in mind throughout the
training, and every effort be made to habituate the men to work up to
it. But we shall only then succeed in breaking with the old
traditions, and in fitting ourselves to meet the changed conditions of
War, when the superior officers in their inspections attach _as much
importance to the combat dismounted as they now do to the fight in the
saddle_, and submit the Leaders to an equally searching and practical
examination in each.
Amongst these changed conditions we must include the intelligent
co-operation of the Artillery with the skirmishers, and also of the
machine-guns, which latter may be expected to play a considerable part
in defence, and also on occasions requiring the sudden development of
a great intensity of fire. It is in this connection that lies (Book
I., Chap. VI.) the chief importance of the Horse Artillery batteries,
and yet in peace they have practically no opportunity to make
themselves familiar with its peculiarities.
Instead, we find in the great Cavalry manoeuvres the constantly
recurring tendency to theatrical display. Batteries accompany the
formal drill evolutions of the Divisions--a performance which, in my
opinion, has not the slightest practical value, but only subjects the
horses to unnecessary exertion, and prevents the Leaders from devoting
their attention to the really important elements of their
business--the enemy and the nature of the ground. Against all such
methods the sharpest protest should be entered.
As long as formal evolutions are being practised, the Artillery has no
place on the drill ground; the Cavalry only require its services when
the tactical training commences, and the batteries belong to the
places they would occupy in War--_i.e._, in the advance guard, or
before the front. But, above all, they must be given opportunity to
co-operate in the dismounted engagements, and not merely for their own
training--though this, of course, is of importance--but principally
for the education of the Cavalry officers, who must learn to employ
the power of this Arm tactically, wait for its effect, and utilize it.