That this object can only partially be o_Cavalry in Future Wars

exercising grounds, and not at all on the drill grounds, is

sufficiently obvious, and it is only necessary to call to mind the

attacks on villages, railway-stations, and the like, which are not

usually found on such places to make the difficulty apparent. The

keystone, therefore, for our purposes can only be found in the country

itself, or in manoeuvres, in which the application of every tactical

form develops naturally, and finds its justification in the general

scheme of operations, and in which the varying conditions are always

creating new situations, more or less practical in their nature.

CHAPTER V

FIELD-SERVICE TRAINING AND MANOEUVRES

If in the above sections we have dealt almost exclusively with the

training of the Cavalry for actual combat, the cause lies in the

nature of things. Victory whether in the shock of 'Masses' or even in

the minor encounters of patrols, forms so much the foundation of every

possible success, whether strategical or otherwise, that training with

this end in view naturally comes first under our consideration.

But as the chief importance of Cavalry no longer lies in its

application on the battle-field, but rather in the solution of the

strategical problems encountered in the progress of operations, so its

training for battle is no longer the one aim and object, but only one

element of its whole preparation for the field. Field service, its

true duties in reconnaissance and strategic movements, must all be

taken into account as factors of equal importance.

I wish to bring this necessity most especially into the foreground,

since hitherto, and particularly in view of the changed conditions of

modern Warfare, it has not attracted anything approaching the

attention it deserves.

What do we practise in the field-service exercises and in the

manoeuvres beyond the normal Cavalry versus Cavalry encounters?

Principally, only formal outpost duties in combination with Infantry,

the smallest incidents of War on the smallest scaled tactical

scouting, and the participation of small Cavalry bodies in the

encounter between the combined Arms--all matters which nowadays come

within the sphere of the Divisional Cavalry; and, indeed, only then

when the divisions to which they belong, or even smaller bodies, are

operating independently, for the daily routine of the Divisional

Cavalry in the enormous Armies of the present day will be on a most

modest scale. At most in the Army Corps manoeuvres we may get as far

as the employment of Brigades, and perhaps to the shadowing of an

enemy's line of advance.

For the most important field of our enterprise, which is to be sought

in the activity of the Independent Cavalry, all this is of small

account. The real duties of Cavalry in War are only practised in peace

on the most confined scale, and often not at all.

Long marches of endurance, independent outposts, attack and defence of

localities, the forcing of defiles, passage of rivers, etc., which are

held by an enemy's dismounted men, reconnaissances in the widest

sense, undertakings against the enemy's communications, pursuit,

protracted engagements covering retreats, marches with columns and

convoys, finally, the arrangement and execution of wide strategic

movements under practical conditions, with accurate computation of

time and space, the suitable employment of fighting power for the

attainment of the strategical object, and the best strategic

introduction of the consciously sought-out combat, all within the

limits imposed by the magnitude of the masses handled, are matters

which in future will form the principal sum of all Cavalry activity,

but find no place in our scheme of education.

Even the Imperial Manoeuvres do not meet the situation, because, in

the first place, only comparatively few regiments are annually

affected by them; and in the second, the forces are generally from the

outset in such close proximity with one another that it is only,

perhaps, on the first day that a suitable situation for their

strategic employment may be said to arise at all.

Whilst in this manner our whole training is adopted for conditions

which in future campaigns can only arise exceptionally, whilst it

practically ignores the true sphere of action of the Cavalry, we are

working in a vicious circle of forms and misrepresentations which

belong to an extinct era of Warfare, and which have long since ceased

to have any but the smallest connection with the facts of stern

reality.

That things were no better in the period before the last Wars the

negative results obtained by our Cavalry in 1866 and 1870 sufficiently

prove. In no sphere of their action during these campaigns did they

obtain the results the Arm is really capable of--not because the

material in the ranks was inferior, but simply and solely because in

equipment and training they had lagged behind the requirements of the

time. These experiences should have been to us a serious warning not

to fall into similar errors a second time; and yet at the present

there is most serious danger that a future War may again find us

regarding by far the most important branch of our duties from a

standpoint which has long since passed away.

The reasons for this state of affairs seem to me of a twofold

character. In the first place, the tasks accruing to the Arm in War do

not receive either amongst its own officers, still less amongst those

of the rest of the Army, their proper appreciation, because in this

direction guidance and instruction are alike lacking; in the second,

because most serious difficulties lie in the way of a practical

adaptation of our training to modern conditions.

In contradistinction to former times, the tasks which await the

Cavalry lie principally in the sphere of strategical operations, and

here is the root of our special difficulty.

Great Armies, with their communications, reconnaissances and raids

under really warlike conditions--that is to say, with their full

allowance of trains and baggage--extended retreats with beaten troops,

and the consequent pursuit, can only with difficulty be represented in

peace, owing to their expense and the consideration necessary to be

shown to local circumstances; but it is precisely in exercises of this

description, which might give a really working representation of the

conditions we shall be called upon to deal with, that circumstances

leave us entirely deficient.

Considering all these conditions, it must be recognised that an ideal

method of instruction is practically beyond the bounds of the

attainable; but for that very reason, in my opinion, we must pursue

with all energy the practically possible, and for the unattainable

find the best substitute we can.

The first point which strikes one, and which lies at the bottom of all

Cavalry undertakings, but in which no real education ever takes place,

is the conduct of patrols, and particularly of those employed for

reconnoitring purposes.

Instruction in the matter is certainly universal, and in the writing

of reports the non-commissioned officers have considerable practice,

but no uniform or systematic method or fixed principle is observed,

and the practical performances of the men are subject to no superior

check. It is left to the Leaders to apply practically their, for the

most part, very nebulous, theoretical knowledge. The young officer in

particular is altogether left to his own devices; no one takes the

trouble to teach him what is essential, and yet he is expected to

instruct his inferiors. The consequences are what might be

anticipated. The performances of the patrols in covering distances are

generally most commendable, but their reports most deficient. Seldom

is a clear distinction drawn between the essential and the

non-essential; the most trivial news is forwarded with the same

expenditure of horses' power as matter of greatest moment; for most

patrol Leaders find it very difficult, for want of an imagination

trained by the study of military history, to think themselves into and

see the situation as it actually would be in War, and thus to act and

ride as the circumstances viewed in this light really require. Most

information, poor as it is, is thus obtained in an unpractical manner;

and seldom is the degree of instruction realized which the situation

affords, namely, to observe keenly and clearly from a distant point,

and to carry out the ride in the spirit of the general situation, with

a proper calculation of time and space. In this branch of duty change

is imperative; the training for scouting must be made the foundation

of the whole course, and carried through in a uniform manner.

Everywhere it must be based on the conditions of a great War.

How the scientific knowledge necessary for the officers, which forms

the basis of this instruction, is to be encouraged and imparted forms

the subject of this next section. Here we can only consider what can

and must be done within the regiments and brigades, and the following

suggestions seem to me to meet the difficulty.

In the winter, as soon as the inspection 'on the curb' is over, the

Regimental Commander with his Staff Officer and Squadron Commanders

must take the training in hand. He must begin with a definite

strategical situation, and from this as a basis, devise corresponding

schemes for patrols, which can be worked out in the neighbourhood of

the garrison, and then ride out with his officers exactly as in

practice the patrols would have to do. Arrived in the vicinity in

which contact with the enemy would take place, he assumes what the

patrols would see, and lets the class form their own decisions, write

their reports, and determine the manner of their further procedure.

In these opportunities he can instil the true principles to be

followed, and demonstrate their practicability by all sorts of

exercises, until he is convinced that his hearers have completely

assimilated his standpoint and method of thought. Particular

importance must be attached to the point that the patrol leaders never

lose sight of the whole problem, and refer their observations always

to this standard, for it is only then that things appear in their true

importance; further, it must always be borne in mind up to what time

the report must be in the hands of the Leader if it is to be of use

for the special operation.

The best information may be valueless if, as in 1870 so often

happened, it arrives too late. This the patrol leader must keep in

mind throughout his ride, and thence deduce the time at which his

report must be despatched. He must also not only state clearly and

precisely what he has seen, but call attention to its probable bearing

on the operations, and inform his superior as to any peculiarities of

the ground that may influence his future conduct. The object of the

ride must be constantly in view, and the report not be overburdened

with trivialities about the enemy's patrols and the like, which are

often in War of quite negligible importance.

If the Commanding Officer chooses to take the whole of his officers

out to these expeditions, he is, of course, free to do so.

The Squadron Commanders now take their subordinates in hand and pass

on the instruction in the same spirit and manner, or hand over the

matter to the senior lieutenant, if he has been thoroughly instructed

for the purpose. In this manner a good uniform system of patrol

leading based on sound principles can be attained if the Commanding

Officer and his subordinates take all types of patrol duty into the

sphere of their practical instruction. The Brigade Commander can use

his discretion in its supervision, and give any assistance he may

consider necessary.

For the practical training of the men, the foundation must, of course,

be found in the squadron. But the teaching must start from constantly

changing standpoints, and must be systematically carried on in the

higher Commands, which is at present not the case. For though at times

such exercises are carried out by the regiments, there is no

systematic progress, and no consequent development or representation

of the most important elements, whilst higher up no attempt is even

made to continue the instruction further. The influence of the

Brigadier is confined in general to the detail education and drill,

and though the Division is now and again drilled, it never 'operates'

in the strategical sense.

As concerns the education of the squadron, this must from the very

beginning be rooted in modern conditions, which in the first place

demand the development in the man of the greatest possible

individuality. War requires this, as well as the gift of grasp and

resolution even in difficult situations, from every Cavalry soldier,

from the highest to the lowest. The exercise, however, of such

qualities can only be demanded from men who bring with them at least a

certain degree of comprehension for the nature of War, and it is

therefore of the utmost importance that this comprehension should be

developed by suitable instruction. This is often sinned against,

because sufficient attention is not paid to such instruction, and also

because we still work on out-of-date lines, and without any

well-defined principles. In my opinion the recruit must not be

overwhelmed with a whole mass of thoroughly unpractical knowledge.

In this period of education one must limit the scope to only the most

important and necessary matters, but teach these so that the men

understand them clearly and thoroughly.

In the latter years one can build out systematically on this

foundation. Thus I consider it quite unnecessary to harass the recruit

with long-winded explanations of the military virtues--loyalty,

obedience, and courage--or with long lists of different salutes to be

given, the recipients of which never come within his ken. It is quite

superfluous to teach them the different parts of the lock of the

carbine and their mutual interaction, all about stable duty and guard

mounting. Even the theoretical instruction about the organization of

the Army, treatment of sore backs, horse sickness, etc., can be

reduced to much smaller dimensions than at present. Stable work and

guard duties, and so forth, a man learns much quicker and better from

daily practice. On the other hand, the time gained by curtailing these

matters must be used most zealously to teach him what he absolutely

must know for War. That is to say, the simplest principles of Field

Service, the composition of mixed detachments, practical shooting, and

the exterior treatment of the carbine. The instruction in Field

Service, which interests us here the most, can, for the recruits, be

kept down to very narrow limits. The principles to be observed in

placing pickets, vedettes, etc., he can very well do without. On the

other hand, he must know thoroughly those things which he will have to

do himself--his duty on patrols, or as bearer of a message, or

orderly, also the general connection of the military conditions

amongst which he will have to move or to notice amongst the enemy,

such as organization of the troops, arrangement of the outposts,

relation of the commands, plan and appearance of entrenchments,

shelter trenches, gun epaulments, cover, etc.[29]

[Footnote 29: Instruction with models helps the man quickest;

it is very difficult for the recruit to form a mental picture

of military things.]

He must know, too, that if taken prisoner, he must give no correct

answers as to anything concerning his own Army.

It is quite possible to awaken the intellectual faculties of the man

and to develop them even within these narrow limits, for the more

tersely the facts are stated, and the more thorough the instructions,

the more is his thinking power stimulated, whereas a mass of material

to be absorbed merely confuses him. This intellectual pressure of the

instructor must not, of course, be limited solely to the lesson hour,

but he must seize every possible opportunity to assert his influence.

Especial attention is to be directed to habituate the men to carry in

their minds verbal messages for a considerable period, and then to

repeat them clearly and concisely. It is of great assistance to the

intellectual development of the men if they are compelled always to

express themselves in grammatically complete sentences, instead of in

broken phrases; but I should consider it as a serious error to attempt

to teach the recruit the neighbourhood of the garrison, both on the

map and on the ground. For in this way one deprives the man of one of

his few opportunities which occur to him during his whole service of

learning to find his way in unknown country, and thus to develop the

instinct of finding his way, which requires considerable practice.

That this faculty is one of the most important in War-time for every

Cavalry soldier can hardly be open to doubt. From the same point of

view I must enter a protest against the absurd misuse of maps in

Peace-time. Of course, the men, and particularly the patrol leaders,

must understand how to read a map and find their way by it, and all

non-commissioned officers and men out of their first year's service

must be trained in so doing, but it is altogether impractical, and

therefore a bad preparation for war, if in the interests of better

manoeuvre results maps are issued in uncounted numbers even on the

larger scales, so that not only every patrol leader, but every

orderly, can obtain one for a couple of pence. In War, and

particularly in an enemy's country, such extravagance in their issue

is obviously out of the question.

The education of the non-commissioned officers must also be

systematically set in hand. They should be divided, according to their

intelligence and performances, in different groups--two will generally

suffice--and the abler men should not only receive instruction for the

higher branches of their duties, but must also be rationally taught

how to teach others. The non-commissioned officers' school must also

receive thorough attention; if it is not conducted seriously, it

involves a scandalous waste of time, but if the men receive a really

earnest and stimulating instruction, it helps most materially in their

intellectual development, and thus reacts most favourably on their

military capacity.

As concerns the practical exercises of the squadron, these must, as

far as possible, cut themselves free from the spirit of minor tactics,

and work as directly as they can towards the requirements of War on a

great scale. The destruction of railways and bridges, service on

requisitioning duties, etc., must naturally continue to be practised;

for though in spirit they belong to minor tactics, they are also

required in great Wars. But, above all, one must break with the old

one-sided schemes of outpost squadron--officers and non-commissioned

officers, posts and vedettes--and the whole subject must be treated on

wider lines more in accordance with the changing requirements of

active service. The different purposes for which localities are held

and utilized in different manners, the use of woods, and waves of the

ground, must all be drawn most thoroughly into the scope of the

exercises; and whilst still at squadron work the men must be made

clearly to understand the difference between mixed outposts and those

of Independent Cavalry, and the chief importance of their whole

training in this branch of their duty must be laid on the latter,

which is even nowadays not yet sufficiently the case. Further, there

must be thorough training in duties of security and reconnoitring at

night, and in particular of the defence of cantonments against

nocturnal attacks.

In general, it must be clearly understood that all squadron training

can only be elementary, and hence must be regarded as a stepping-stone

towards the whole field-service training. Where this is left

altogether to the squadrons, the men never have the opportunity of

becoming acquainted with the conditions of time and space which limit

their action when in large bodies. Continuous exercises also, always

in the same units, lead only too easily to empty repetition and many

misunderstandings. The Squadron Field Service training must,

therefore, be limited in time, and as soon as it is completed it must

be continued in the regiment, and where the conditions at all

allow--_i.e._, where the garrisons are not too far apart--it must

culminate in brigade work.

The 'training'--_i.e._, the condition of the horses-must by this time

have made such progress that marches of twenty to thirty miles for the

main body are well within their power. Here a wide and profitable

field opens for the Brigade Commander, but it is important in every

case--security, screening, reconnaissance, raid, or surprise--to bring

out systematically and clearly the essential difference of procedure

required, so that all grades of Leaders learn to realize the

fundamental distinction which exists between these various forms of

their several duties.

It is also equally important that in each Command operations in

several detachments, the regulation of their marching speed, their

combined action in the fight, the proper working of the arrangements

for collecting information or transmitting orders, should be practised

again and again till certainty in their interaction is secured.

It is further necessary to call attention to the necessity, in the

interests of a prudent economy of one's forces, to arrange the patrol

service systematically, not only as regards the sphere of action

allotted to each, but also as to the time of their departure.

Thus, in the march of a single body, the duty of attending to its

security may be assigned to the troops themselves, whilst the

reconnoitring task is allotted by the officer directing the

operations; or, in the case of separate bodies, that each receives its

own particular scouting mission, with which, then, the Director

refrains from interfering. Otherwise it may easily happen that patrols

are despatched for the same purpose by different Commanders, with a

corresponding waste of power and the risks of leaving gaps in the

whole line.

The Commanders of mixed detachments should also make this need of

systematic procedure clear to themselves, and either leave the whole

duty of reconnaissance in the hands of the Cavalry, or if they elect

to retain certain portions of the work in their own hands they should

inform the Cavalry Commander of the fact, and not interfere afterwards

with his arrangements, or fail to keep him acquainted with the

measures they have themselves taken.

The first course is correct in principle, and will always give the

best results when a competent Cavalry officer is kept sufficiently

acquainted with the views of his superior, and made personally

responsible for results.

Finally, as concerns practice in conjunction with the other Arms,

these, too, must lead into different paths from those at present

pursued. Detachments of Infantry and Artillery need Cavalry for

reconnaissance, security, and orderly duties; but for the Cavalry

itself these exercises (of small bodies) have little importance,

except in so far as they familiarize the men with the organization and

development of the other Armies, and thus learn to form an opinion

when viewing these from a distance. The combined action of Cavalry

with companies, battalions, and regiments has no importance at all,

and is often the merest waste of time. It is much more important to

secure practice for the troops in judging the appearance of

considerable bodies of Infantry, either on the march or in position,

and thence deducing their probable numerical strength.

The former class of exercises will, therefore, be on as restricted a

scale as possible, whilst more time is given to the former, and by

arrangement with neighbouring garrisons opportunities can often be

made. In this way much can be done in the garrison and the Brigade to

further the training of Cavalry for the work of a great War, although

such exercises can in no way replace the actual manoeuvring of large

bodies.

It must rather be insisted on that the whole Field-Service training of

the Arm can only be brought to its legitimate conclusion in the

strategical exercises of large and changing combinations of units.

Even the manoeuvres, important as they undoubtedly are, can never

replace them. They must, therefore, be placed on a footing of equal

importance with the great drill practices of the higher units, since

the strategical value of the Arm to the supreme Commander of the Army

depends on its intelligent handling in this particular field, and it

is here that the difficulties to be overcome are especially great.

Again, system must be inculcated if clearness of apprehension of the

several problems is to be produced.

It will be of the utmost importance that baggage and, if possible,

trains corresponding to the conditions on mobilization should be

employed, and that men and horses should be fed from their contents;

otherwise we would only too easily drop into habits of under-estimating

the difficulties with which in real War we shall have to contend. But to

guard against this self-deception should be the end and object of all

our efforts.

It will, therefore, be necessary to calculate distance and the width

of areas to be swept over, with reference to modern conditions, and

not to work on the scale that sufficed us in France in 1870. The

telegraph must also be taken into account, and it must be strictly

insisted on that it is only to be used for such reports and in such

cases in which it would be available on service. It should, therefore,

be laid down beforehand which side is to be considered as in an

enemy's country. For the representation of following portions of the

Army, flag columns and peace garrisons may be employed, as this is of

the utmost importance for the systematic practice of the patrol

service.

The formation of territorial Cavalry Inspections and Sub-Inspections,

already advocated above, would give the necessary foundation for our

purposes. After finding the Divisional Cavalry necessary on a War

strength, the remaining regiments in their several districts could be

formed in Divisions and Corps of always varying composition in order

to carry out Independent Cavalry manoeuvres.

To practise the participation of the other Arms, corresponding

arrangements with the adjacent Corps Commanders could be made, so that

their annual manoeuvres could work in with the Cavalry scheme, but the

strategic side should have the preference. Operations would not always

culminate in a great Cavalry engagement, but a skilful conduct of the

manoeuvres in practical country would generally insure such encounters

without too great a charge for agricultural compensation.

I do not believe that such a scheme, though it would certainly mean a

complete break with established Routine, would materially increase the

cost of the manoeuvres. The damage, now disseminated by the many

regiments without any corresponding gain to their efficiency, would

now be concentrated on the same district, but the gain to the Arm

itself, as well as for the whole Army, would be both decisive and

epoch-making.

Great though the importance and necessity of such an arrangement seems

to me, yet, as circumstances at present exist, one could hardly count

on seeing it applied at once to the whole service, and meanwhile we

must search for expedients.

From this point of view, also, we must strive to extend the period

allotted for the training of the larger Cavalry bodies to such a

degree that Field-Service days can be interposed between the drill

days, in which at least the combined action of masses within the

limits of Field-Service exercises can be practised.

The question then arises whether it would not be as well to sacrifice

a part of the tactical training of the Divisional Cavalry in the

interest of the proposed strategic manoeuvres, and whether the

advantages we anticipate from these latter might not, at any rate

partially, be attained in another manner. It seems to me that to a

certain extent this may well be possible, if we can only make up our

minds to break with our existing arrangements regulating the present

exercises, and order a certain number of garrisons, detailed in

groups, to operate one against the other. If this grouping is carried

out without reference to Corps boundaries, and the exercises are so

managed that the troops need only spend one night out of quarters,

during which they can bivouac, very great advantages at very small

cost would be derived, because, since in these operations it is not at

all necessary to carry them through to their culmination in an

engagement, but only to concentrate them for the purpose, when

necessary, in a practical manner, and to set all the machinery for

reconnoitring, for transmission of orders, and reports, in operation,

the damages to cultivation might be kept within very reasonable

limits.

An example will help to make the idea clearer. If from the regiments

in Metz, Thionville, and St. Avoid on the one side, and of those in

Saarburg, Saargemund, Saarbrucken on the other, two opposing forces

are constituted, it would be easy to draw up a general idea by which

each element of the group considered as an independent Cavalry screen

covering the advance of an Army had reached on a given night the

points at which they are actually quartered. The distances of the

places named one from another are such that they fairly represent a

possible situation in War, and a single day's march might well bring

them into collision. Inexpensive bivouac places could easily be found

in the wooded districts of Lorraine or elsewhere, and the Infantry in

the respective garrisons might represent the heads of the following

Armies' columns without undue interference with their programme of

training. If the Cavalry march out with four squadrons only per

regiment, the fifth can find horses for a part of the train, the point

being not so much the number of such waggons provided as the service

loading of those that are taken. In the afternoon and night preceding

the march, outposts could be established, and the service of

exploration commenced. Thus in two or three days a strategic exercise

for the Cavalry on a large scale could be arranged at a very low cost

and with very little difficulty. Such operations would naturally be

conducted by the Inspectors-General of Cavalry, and, as the example

shows, they could be generally, if not everywhere, easily

organized.[30]

[Footnote 30: Taking into account these and similar demands

on the Inspectors-General, the question arises whether the

time has not come to attach to them permanently officers of

the General Staff. Every increase in the number of these

officers employed in peace is a great advantage for War,

because the War formations require far more Staff Officers to

fill the new positions created on mobilization than are

employed in peace--a very serious disadvantage. I consider it

absolutely essential that each Inspector-General of Cavalry

should be provided with a permanent Staff.]

Since it is essential in all Cavalry exercises to take into account

the numbers and distances with which we shall have to deal in future

Warfare, it would be a great gain to the Arm if in the manoeuvres, in

which its action in combination with the other Arms should be taught,

this point of view was brought more into the foreground.

Of course it is not intended that the interests of the other Arms

should be sacrificed to those of the Cavalry; the question rather is

whether these interests are not identical even for the Infantry; the

importance of minor tactics has fallen very much into the background,

and both Infantry and Artillery require far more practice in 'masses.'

Detachment warfare can for the most part be quite sufficiently

practised in the garrisons, but the opportunities for exercising the

large units are far more difficult to find.

I consider, therefore, that it would be of advantage to all Arms if

present Brigade manoeuvres, with all their superannuated customs, were

abolished in favour of more Divisional and Corps manoeuvres. The

Cavalry, at any rate, would welcome the innovation, for from its point

of view these manoeuvres could be made far more practical, and it

would be easier to arrange schemes for the latter more in accordance

with reality.

It is also most desirable that from time to time the Cavalry should

have opportunities of practising both pursuit and rearguard action on

a grand scale. At present these only arise in the manoeuvres with

mixed Arms, since in the Independent Cavalry manoeuvres they are

difficult of representation.

The Director of the manoeuvres can also do much to make the operations

instructive for the Cavalry, and also to stimulate the interests of

all engaged, if he takes care that the demands made upon the Cavalry

are kept within reasonable limits. It constantly happens that patrols

are despatched at far too late an hour to make it possible for their

reports to arrive in time. Commanders, again, frequently wish to be

informed as to the exact position of every battalion on the other

side, although they generally know his total force with accuracy, or

they want to know the exact strength of the Garrison holding a certain

village or locality, as if Cavalry could under any circumstances

supply such information; and if at night no sketch of the enemy's

outpost line has been handed in, the Cavalry are held to have failed

in their duty. All these demands are, in my opinion, entirely

unpractical; in War one never has such precise information, and no

rational man dreams of wasting the strength of his Cavalry in

endeavouring to secure such details. These things are mere remnants of

the Paleolithic Age, and only justifiable as an extreme case when

perhaps planning a surprise. Further, it is thoroughly unpractical to

require under all circumstances complete information as to the

progress of an engagement. With modern weapons this is impossible,

unless favoured by unusual topographical conditions. Not merely are

such demands unpractical, but they exercise a most prejudicial effect,

for too accurate and too detailed information gets the Generals into

bad habits of command, and the Cavalry itself is well-nigh ruined.

Certainly, when circumstances demand it, the men must not be afraid to

keep well up to the enemy, and bring back intelligence even out of the

zone of his fire; but, generally, reliable observations are only made

out of range. The Cavalry must learn principally to judge the enemy's

arrangements from a distance; they must direct their attention to the

essential only, and not waste their time in unnecessary side issues.

If justice is to be done to these requirements, it is quite impossible

to collect all the information the Generals so frequently require.

Thus they get in the habit of observing in an unpractical manner, and

the whole of this most important branch of their education suffers

accordingly. So much is this the case that nowadays the patrol leaders

often exchange mutual confidences to one another, as it is practically

impossible, owing to conditions of time and space, to obtain the

required information otherwise, and they consider it better to get it

in this manner than to accustom their men to unpractical feats of

riding.

Reconnaissance and its results can only be of value to the training

when kept within the limits that the nature of things dictates.

Whilst the constant presence of danger is the characteristic element

in which the faculties of observation have to work in War, it is the

constant pressure of uncertainty as to the exact movements of the

enemy which equally characteristically forms the conditioning element

in which the intellectual activity of the Leaders has also to work,

and neither one nor the other may be entirely ignored in our

Peace-time training.

CHAPTER VI

THE HIGHER EDUCATION OF OUR OFFICERS

The consideration we have devoted in the foregoing chapters to the

various fields for Cavalry action opened out by the changed conditions

of modern War have shown us what tremendous demands will be made upon

the leader of a great Cavalry 'Mass' in the future. He must be an

absolute master of the technical side of his own Arm. He must be ready

to enter into the spirit of the widest strategical considerations of

the Superior Command, and according to circumstances to act in harmony

with them on his own initiative. He must know the spirit, the methods

of fighting, and the peculiarities of the other Arms, so as to be able

to intervene at the right time and place in the action. He must with

swift determination combine boldness with circumspection; and in

addition, he must not only be a bold horseman, but must possess

inexhaustible activity of mind and body.

If these are the demands modern War will make upon the higher leaders

of the Arm, those which fall on the lower ranks have been intensified

in similar fashion; for, quite apart from their bodily and mental

qualifications, they will need, for the solution of the various

problems with which they will be confronted, an immensely increased

amount of military knowledge and executive ability.

The amount of initiative which will be required in simple Cavalry

engagements between the larger groups, and in strategic operations of

the Arm, from subordinate leaders has been already discussed above,

and it will be clear that only a thorough comprehension of the whole

situation will enable the individual to act opportunely when such

moments may arrive. It is not merely a general military education

which will be required, but greatly increased endurance, boldness,

and, above all, a wider understanding for the whole connection of the

great operations, and the power of judging a military situation with

accuracy, which must prevail through all ranks, down to the leader of

an independent patrol. The whole method of observation and the results

deduced therefrom will assume quite a different form when managed by

Officers who have learnt to understand and to judge operations on a

large scale. Without such training only isolated facts will be

reported--deductions will not be drawn. There will be no

discrimination between important and unimportant details, and the

Officer himself will not be able to come to a correct decision as to

the direction in which to pursue his mission. But this is exactly what

it is most important that all Officers should be relied on to perform.

They must understand how, from a given mass of observations, to deduce

the strength, bearing, and condition of the enemy in general, to

divine the probable connection of his operations, and hence to

determine the most important points and directions in which to follow

up any available clue.

If an Officer comes upon an outpost or an occupied position, he

should be able from the indications on the spot and from his map to

determine where the flanks are likely to rest, and hence on what point

to direct his further advance.

If he happens on troops at rest or on the march, he must be able to

decide whether it is more important to follow or watch their

subsequent movements, or to carry out his reconnaissance in some other

direction. He must, in fact, judge what it is of the greatest

importance for the superior staff to know when his instructions in

face of altered circumstances leave him in momentary uncertainty.

Such illustrations could be extended indefinitely, but the sum of all

points to the same conclusion--viz., that a comprehensive military

education, and at least a general grasp of the principles of the

Higher Strategy, are essential for every reconnoitring Officer. The

history of previous campaigns points the same moral by innumerable

examples, and how much more frequent must such incidents be in the

future.

Let us take the case of the Battle of Gravelotte only--the point was

to determine whether the French were still clinging to the fortress or

were marching away from it. Not one of the patrols, however, whose

doings can still be traced, or whose reports are still in existence,

seems to have possessed the comprehension of the situation which would

have enabled it to report on what it was of the utmost importance for

the Army Headquarters to know. None of them even noted the direction

in which the troops they saw were moving--a matter of most vital

importance--or estimated the strength of the several encampments, or

reported the fact that certain roads were clear, although they were

all moving in the immediate vicinity, and might easily have

ascertained these facts had they realized their importance. Thus,

because they were uncorroborated, the most important observations led

to false conclusions. The point of transcendent consequence--the

actual position of the French right flank--could not be determined

until hours after the battle had been begun under an entire

misapprehension of the actual circumstances. Similar experiences have

repeated themselves times without number.

When we now reflect upon the greatly increased importance of reliable

information in Modern War, we cannot escape the conclusion that a

proper training of our Cavalry Officers to meet their requirements is

of vital importance. Their present-day education does not sufficiently

guarantee their competence.

The knowledge of the military sciences acquired at the War schools is

on a very modest scale, nor is it, indeed, the business of these

schools to give higher education in such subjects. Hence it is all the

more deplorable that the higher intellectual training of our Cavalry

Officers practically ceases after the War School, because the

practical day-to-day duties of their profession furnishes them with

nothing which can replace the need for a higher theoretical training.

Generally, their attention is absorbed by the smallest of details,

which, though each is of immense importance to the efficiency of the

whole Arm, are not calculated to widen their intellectual horizon, and

in the few great manoeuvres in which an Officer might find an

opportunity of enlarging his knowledge, he finds himself lacking in

the foundation necessary to make full use of it.

The usual course of instruction, in fact, is not adapted to the needs

of the Cavalry Officer, who already in early youth may find himself in

situations requiring adequate strategical knowledge for their

solution; hence there is urgent need for the supreme military

authorities to concern themselves at once both with his theoretical

and practical education.

The latter could best be provided for in connection with the

development of the Field-Service training of the Troops already dealt

with above. The former--_i.e._, the scientific side--could be most

adequately met by the creation of a 'Cavalry School' on the lines of

the special Artillery and Engineer Schools which already provide for

the further education of the Officers of these Arms after they have

spent a couple of years or more in responsible command of men in their

own units.

If on the broader foundations of the military sciences--principally

those relating to the conduct of operations, to Strategy and

Tactics--thus supplied, the Regimental Commanders were to build up by

practical instruction, as above indicated, and the whole spirit of the

training were modified in conformity with the views therein already

expressed, then I consider that, with the admirable material amongst

our Officers which already exists, and which for the most part needs

only opportunity to prove its value, most important results might be

achieved.

Such a school would be most fittingly affiliated to the existing

School of Equitation in Hanover. The bright, attractive side of

Cavalry life, as we there find it, would be a useful counterpoise to

the risk of too much theory, and the district lends itself admirably

to practical exercises in reconnaissances and endurance rides.

So long as this most desirable reform remains only an ideal, we must

strive to do the utmost we can within the limits of our existing

educational system, for the need is urgent, and admits of no delay.

We must devote increased attention to this portion of our officers'

training from the very commencement of their career, and see that they

are so far initiated into the nature both of tactical and strategical

relations that they may be able, on the one hand, to reconnoitre an

enemy in the spirit of the intentions of the Supreme Command; on the

other, that they are capable of commanding their units in any given

strategical situation.

All means must be strained towards the attainment of this purpose.

One of the first stepping-stones in our progress must be the actual

horsemanship of the Officer himself. A man who under every

circumstance feels himself firm in the saddle does not need to exert

force to fight with or restrain his horse, and having learnt both how

to think and command at a gallop, will lead Cavalry and reconnoitre

before the enemy with far greater certainty and much better results

than one to whom these things are hardly second nature.

Bold and determined horsemanship acts and reacts on all a man's other

soldierly characteristics, and forms thus a basis for further progress

of the highest order, apart from the fact that it impresses the men

most favourably, and induces them to follow with greater confidence.

Hence, even from the standpoint of the higher education, the standard

of horsemanship can never be raised too high. Given this, and the

remainder can be acquired in the practical day-to-day work of the

unit, in the training of the men themselves, and in the exercises in

Field-Service duties, in manoeuvres and Cavalry exercises, always

provided that these are all conducted in conformity with the spirit of

modern operations. But since we have seen this practical duty, as at

present carried on, nowhere meets the above conditions, we must find a

supplement to it by recourse to systematic training in Field-Service

rides, War Games, and Staff Tours, for which, of course, the necessary

funds must be provided.

These exercises must be begun in the regiment, and continued through

each successive grade up to the 'Inspection,' the sphere of each being

enlarged with the increase in the importance of the Command.

But they will only then possess value and importance when based on

connected military situations arising from the operations of modern

Armies, and afford opportunities to the participants for the solution

of problems far above their existing rank, for thus only can their

mental horizon be extended. Within the radius of action of his own

Command each Officer is already in daily contact with all that it is

necessary for him to understand, and in minor tactical situations he

has abundant opportunities for training his faculties. It seems to me,

therefore, mere waste of time to give him further employment with

these matters, and the attempt could only end in depriving them of all

interest. On the other hand, the Regimental Officer is seldom if ever

placed in positions which would enable him to form any adequate

conception of the execution and connection of the greater operations,

to realize the importance of the action of the unit within the

framework of the whole, or to notice how faults in details, apparently

trivial in themselves, can mount up in the mass until they may

jeopardize the success of any given undertaking.

The higher the intellectual pinnacle on which he is placed, the wider

becomes his horizon, and consequently his appreciation of the relative

importance of each individual link in the chain.

CONCLUSION

If now, at the conclusion of my investigations, we summarize the chief

results arrived at, we find the following sequence of thought:

The value of Cavalry in relation to the other Arms has risen

materially; as a consequence of the whole range of changes introduced

into the conduct of modern War--viz., those due to changes in the

composition of Armies, to railways, telegraphs, supply, weapons, etc.

Its strategical tasks have increased in importance, and on the

battle-field new opportunities for successes have been disclosed.

Mounted and dismounted action have now become functions of equal

importance. Great results--whether strategical or tactical--can only

be obtained by the employment of 'Masses.'

The changing conditions of War demand increased mobility, both

organic, strategic, and tactical.

The difficulties of leadership, in consequence of these conditions,

have increased very materially. On the other hand, the Cavalry has

remained in every respect relatively behind the other Arms, and hence

we stand face to face with a whole list of new requirements which it

must be the task of our peace-time preparation to satisfy, and of

which the following are the most important items:

Increase in the price paid for our remounts.

Considerable increase in our numerical strength, if possible, on the

lines of our existing and well-tried organization.

Rearmament of our Cavalry with a 6-millimetre carbine, ballistically

equal in all respects to the rifle of the Infantry.

Considerable increase in the amount of ammunition carried both in

peace and War.

Improvement in the whole equipment of man and horse.

Formation of the horse batteries of four guns, with corresponding

increase in the number of batteries; introduction also of a true

quick-firer.

Supply of Maxim guns to the Cavalry. Organization of the whole of the

supply columns and pioneer detachments required to give the necessary

strategical mobility.

Improvement in the method of training horses and men, both

individually and for the purpose of securing better conditions in the

horses to stand the increased strain of modern operations.

Complete reform of our course of training, both tactical and for field

service, to fit us for employment in 'Masses,' and to meet the new

strategic requirements. The increased importance of fire-action must

be taken into account.

Further development of our Cavalry Regulations, which require not only

simplification in many details, but the addition of sections

developing the principles of the employment by 'Wings' of the several

units, an extension of the prescriptions for the use of fire-action,

and more precise formulation of tactical principles.

Rearrangement of the instructions relating to reconnaissance,

security, and the forwarding of reports, in the field-service

regulations, with due regard to the employment of cyclists where

practicable.

A more systematic, practical, and general education for our Officers;

creation of a Cavalry School, in which War should be taught on

scientific principles.

Distribution of the whole Arm into independent territorial districts,

to be termed 'Inspections' (Corps) and 'Sub-inspections' (Divisions),

which are to be entirely independent of the existing Army Corps.

Annual Cavalry Manoeuvres.

Improvement of discipline 'to meet the demands of modern Warfare.

This is a considerable list of extreme requirements put together in a

few words, and I am well aware that they are not to be obtained by a

single stroke of the pen--indeed, it needs a considerable degree of

optimism to believe that they are to be obtained at all; but I am

equally conscious that sound evolution is only possible when the

extremest purpose of our endeavours is clearly placed before our

minds, and if we have the courage to recognise openly how far we fall

short of the standard the pitiless reality of War demands.

Do not let us delude ourselves with the idea that excellence is to be

attained without exertion, or that the path of easy-going reforms,

safeguarding always existing interests, will lead us to a certain

victory.

Half-measures do more harm than good, and it will not be those races

which will survive in the great 'world struggle for existence' which

seek only for a harmonious development of all their living forces, but

rather those which devote themselves with a single mind to the

evolution of the utmost fighting power It is the triumph of

force--fighting power--which conditions the development of all other

social interests. If we possess the 'force,' the rest will follow.

Whilst, however, we seek to develop by every means in our power the

utmost strength of the nation, we must be quite clear in our own minds

as to the limits of the attainable. In War, no more than in any other

'act of human intercourse,' is the 'best' ever reached by mortal

executants. But the palm of success beckons across the field of

destiny to the race which strives towards the highest, and has made

the greatest sacrifices and dared the most to deserve it.

In this sense it is the duty of each individual unit amongst us,

unconcerned about results or consequences, to work with whole heart

and mind in the cause we serve; and the more resistance to be

encountered, the greater the obstacle to be overcome, the less may we

shun the struggle, for here also the old truth holds good: _Per aspera

ad Astra_.

INDEX

Action, typical case of Cavalry, 225;

example of Mars la Tour, 225 (footnote)

Advance, time to be selected for, 32;

rate of, 121;

of enemy marks period for pushing forward, 27

Advantages, in War, must be fought for, 29

Ammunition, carbine, insufficiency of, 175, 179;

increase in amount of, for practice, 250

Ammunition columns, special, required for Cavalry, 179

Armies, change of character of modern, 3

Art of War, new conditions in, 3;

their effect on Cavalry, 9;

result of first engagement of overwhelming importance, 12

Artillery, effect of modern, on defence of villages and woods, 15;

power of, can be over-estimated, 54;

support of dismounted Cavalry by, 60, 100;

protection of, 95;

Horse Artillery must adapt itself to Cavalry's action, 100;

position for, 101;

one battery per brigade recommended, 179;

quick-firing guns wanted, 180;

should be attacked from flank, 234;

co-operation in Cavalry training, 263

Attack, stereotyped forms of, prohibited, 72;

on flank when advisable, 78;

simultaneous, on front and flank, 79;

'mobile' or 'immobile' horses during, 91;

by dismounted troops, 99;

change of direction of, when permissible, 116;

importance of vehemence of onslaught, 232;

formation for, against Infantry and Artillery, 234;

distribution and duties of dismounted men in, 259

Baggage-train should be represented at manoeuvres, 279

Bapaume, Battle of, 57

Barley as forage, 206

Battle-field, place of Cavalry in, 81, 84;

case of Mars la Tour, 82;

best formation for, 85;

decided by circumstances of case, 82, 85;

simple formations alone applicable on, 225;

Mars la Tour, 225 (footnote)

Beans as a ration, 205

Bit and bridoon, merits of, 192, 197

Bivouac, disadvantages of, 122, 125

Breaking in. See 'Training'

Bridging material, sufficient, needed to be carried to deal with

small streams, etc., 175

Bridoon. See 'Bit'

Brigade, highest unit for drill purposes, 238

Bugle calls, when allowable, 69;

value of, 230;

regimental calls, 230;

movements to be practised without, 236

Cantonments, advantages of providing, 125

Carbine, method of attachment, 176;

improved pattern needed, 177

Cartridges, method of carrying, 177

Cavalry must be trained to act in 'mass,' 7;

during Wars of 1870 and 1877-1878, 7;

experiences of the past insufficient, 8;

proportion to other Arms, 10;

importance of, greater than formerly, 11;

new tasks for, 14;

actual fighting value diminished, 16;

best strategic value increased, 16;

public opinion at fault, 16;

exploits in 1870-1871 misjudged, 16;

German organization of, requires reform, 17;

clear conception of requirements during each phase needed, 17;

advance during mobilization deprecated, 23;

should not act till enemy's strategic concentration begins, 28;

importance of superiority over enemy's Cavalry at commencement, 31;

in what cases the principal Arm, 37;

Divisional, 38;

Independent, 38;

fire action of, during battles, 55;

greater tactical cohesion than Infantry, 58;

scope of, enormously increased, 59;

importance of good leadership, 63;

place of, in line of battle, 81, 84;

formation of, on battle-field, 85;

factors determining strategic employment of, 126;

difficulty of supplying reinforcements, 151;

augmentation of German, necessary, 153;

and not to be postponed till mobilization, 158;

training of, requires reforming, 181 _et seq._;

Regulations require amendment to meet dismounted needs, 257;

tasks for, in future War not properly appreciated, 268

Change of formation during action, 69;

from 'rendezvous' to 'attack,' 79

Charge, the, when preferable to fire action, 52;

example of Waterloo, 52;

position of Commander during, 65;

choice of moment for, 87;

cohesion during, 221;

speed of, 221

Chargers. See 'Horses'

Chotusitz, Battle of, 83

Civilians, possible participation in future Wars by, 10;

armed resistance by, to be suppressed, 33

Column, regimental, value of, for War, 227;

squadron, disadvantages of, 228

Combined action, factors essential to success of, 68

Command of Cavalry masses exceeding six regiments, 45;

must be under a single leader, 46;

efficiency of, more important with Cavalry than Infantry, 63

Commander, qualities needed in a good, 64, 286;

place of, before and during charges, 65;

when working with other Arms, 66;

choice of formation to be left to, 72, 76, 77;

must be informed of progress of Infantry combat, 86;

qualities required in covering a retreat, 86;

in dismounted action, 93;

must decide as to extension in strategy, 106;

and concentration in combat, 106;

to be kept informed of general situation, 111, 117;

must organize his own reconnaissance, 120;

personal supervision of front by, 121;

forage reserve to be formed by, 131;

to arrange times for drill, 215;

but not to deviate from Regulations, 220;

importance of handling 'masses,' 216.

That this object can only partially be obtained on the larger