TACTICAL CONDUCT OF DISMOUNTED ACTIONS
If, in the shock between mounted men, the genius of the Leader is the
principal factor of success, nevertheless, the successful conduct of a
dismounted combat and of all the variations this form of action may
assume make almost equal demands upon his capacity. For the timely
recognition of opportunities which can only be turned to account by
recourse to fire power, the transition from one form of action to
another, the skilful and systematic arrangement of a dismounted
engagement, require such a complete command of the situation and such
certainty of military judgment and decision of character that the
combination will be almost as rarely found.
Moreover, in the power of holding the balance correctly between fire
power and shock, and in the training for the former never to allow the
troops to lose confidence in the latter, lies the real essence of the
Cavalry spirit. This, whether it be in the working out of some great
strategical design, or in joining hands with the other Arms to obtain
by united fire action some common purpose, implies a balance of
judgment and absence of prejudice of the rarest occurrence in normal
natures.
The essential point which differentiates the action of Cavalry
fighting on foot and of Infantry engaged in the same operation is the
dependence of the former on their horses; and to arrange that under
all circumstances of the combat the relation of the men on foot to
their means of locomotion shall be suitably maintained is at once the
most important and the most difficult task that falls to the lot of
the Leader.
Primarily we have to decide whether we intend to fight with mobile or
immobile horses,[13] and in every case the question arises how the
conditions of the moment, whether in attack or defence, can best be
dealt with.
[Footnote 13: When only three men in four dismount the horses
are said to be 'mobile.' When the proportion is greater the
horses become 'immobile.']
Turning first to the attack, as the most important form of action,
consideration leads to the following conclusions: If the advance is
made with 'mobile' detachments, then in case of success the horses can
be led forward after us. It is then easy to remount, and continue the
prosecution of our ultimate purpose. If, on the other hand, we fight
with 'immobile' detachments, one cannot at once pursue one's successes
with the same body of troops with which such success has been won.
Either the position which has been captured must be retained for some
considerable period, or we must go back to where the horses were left,
at the cost of considerable loss of time, and at the risk of
intervening circumstances robbing us of further opportunity. Neither
operation commends itself to the true Cavalry spirit.
On the whole, in attack the difficulty is best met by working with
'mobile' detachments, and the requisite number of rifles in the
fighting line can then be provided by dismounting men from a larger
number of units--Squadrons, Regiments, or Brigades.
From this principle one should only deviate when, owing to the
proximity of the enemy's Cavalry or other circumstances, it is
absolutely indispensable to keep a strong mounted reserve at hand, or
when it can be foreseen that the number of rifles available, if the
'mobile' form is preferred, will obviously not be sufficient for the
appointed task; for it must never be forgotten that the rapid
attainment of fire superiority must be striven for under all
circumstances.
If we turn to the consideration of the Defensive, our conclusion must
be the exact converse.
The maintenance of fire superiority now becomes the primary objective,
and since, in case of success, a general advance is precluded by the
very conditions which compelled us to adopt the defensive rôle in the
first instance, and further, owing to the conditions which surround a
defensive combat generally, particularly the nature of the ground, it
is usually practicable to bring the led horses closer up to the firing
line, which remains stationary, and does not, as in the attack,
constantly increase the distance between the two, it will be wiser to
adopt the 'immobile' detachment as a fundamental proposition.
This gives us the further advantage of being able to retain a larger
mounted reserve in hand for the initiation of a possible pursuit, and
one should only depart from this principle when special circumstances
make it appear desirable to advance rapidly after the decision of the
fire fight, and the ground compels us to leave the led horses far
behind the actual shooting line of the position.
Next to this question of 'mobile' or 'immobile' detachments, the
Commander must decide how far away from the actual field of action he
should dismount his men.
Fundamentally, the idea must hold good that one must ride up as close
as possible to the line to be held or the position from whence the
advance is to be made; and the limit to the mounted approach is only
set by the necessity of retaining cover, at least from sight, for the
led horses, and time enough, in the event of failure, to insure that
the men can remount before fire can be brought upon them, even from a
distance. The possibilities of becoming exposed to the indirect fire
of Artillery must not be left out of consideration altogether in the
solution of this question.
Hence, it can only happen very rarely, and then only under
exceptionally favourable topographical conditions, that a suitable
position for the led horses can be found in immediate proximity to the
actual line of action.
We may, however, be less particular when, in fairly favourable
country, it is advisable to engage, without the intention of courting
a decision, our object being only to annoy the enemy by sudden fire,
disappearing again as soon as he retaliates, or when one is reasonably
certain of success, as against inferior or badly shaken troops.
But when such favourable conditions are not present, and a tactical
repulse is always possible, then the place for the led horses can only
be found so far to the rear that the enemy cannot take us under fire
whilst in the act of remounting, and circumstances render it
improbable that this emergency can arise before we have succeeded in
breaking off fighting contact with the enemy.
The Commander, therefore, who decides to undertake a serious fire
action must be perfectly clear in his own mind that by the act of
dismounting he has severed his connection with his horses for a very
considerable time; for if the enemy's resistance proves more obstinate
than originally anticipated, and it becomes clear that the original
purpose is not to be attained with the available means, the
expectation that after once engaging the enemy the fight can be broken
off and the horses remounted will in most cases prove entirely
illusory.
Since this operation of discontinuing a fire combat is most difficult
to carry through, even for Infantry, the dangers are immensely greater
for mounted men, owing to the added complication of their led horses.
Only the passivity of the enemy, or unusually favourable topographical
conditions, as in South Africa, can alter the general soundness of
this conclusion; and it is entirely impracticable to escape these
consequences by any attempt to lay down a limit and distance beyond
which the fight is not to be prosecuted, in the hope that by so doing
we can safely break off a combat once commenced. Generally it must be
accepted, as laid down in Cavalry Regulations, Sections 362 and 364,
that a fire action once accepted must be carried out to the end,
unless the arrival of fresh troops on the flanks makes its
interruption possible.
One must never, therefore, in reliance on this possibility of
withdrawal, allow one's self to be led into the mistake of keeping the
led horses too close at hand; but the resolution to engage in a
dismounted action must always involve measures which fully recognise
the serious possibilities such decision entails, and must be on a
scale which will insure the necessary vigour of execution.
Hence, since in all cases in which a serious dismounted combat is
absolutely necessary it is essential that the horses should be left in
the greatest attainable security, the place for them should be
selected in such a manner that they are protected against possible
turning movements by the enemy--that is to say, behind suitable
shelter provided by the ground, or behind defiles that can be easily
defended. In cases in which these conditions cannot be complied with,
which in practice will often arise, their security must be provided
for by a sufficient reserve of mounted men, particularly when the
enemy's Cavalry is in the vicinity, for 'immobile' detachments are
practically at the mercy of every mounted patrol; and as a further
precaution it will be well to spread around them a sufficient web of
reconnoitring and security patrols, and to arrange for the support of
one's own batteries.
The covering of the led horses, however, is not the only duty of the
mounted reserve: the protection of the Artillery also devolves upon
it, and generally it must be ready to meet any of the demands for
which Reserves are usually set aside. Hence it will have to provide
not only for the safety of its own side and all pertaining thereto,
but it must also threaten the enemy's flanks, undertake turning
movements, reinforce, if necessary, the fighting lines, pursue the
enemy, or cover the possible withdrawal of its own dismounted
combatants; and, further on the offensive, it is its special mission
to hold the conquered ground when the dismounted detachments are
called off to remount, and to continue to carry on the original
mission, interrupted by the combat, until relieved by the men who in
the meanwhile have regained their horses, and again assumed the rôle
of mounted combatants.
The first point the Commander will therefore have to decide is, how
strong it will be necessary to make his mounted reserve if it is to
suffice to meet all these requirements, and then whether, with the
remainder of the men in hand, he has any prospect of successfully
carrying out his immediate purpose. From this it will depend whether
he determines to fight or to reach his object by other means. In
general, the Reserve can be reduced in proportion to the weakness of
the enemy's Cavalry, and to the depth of the zone of security his
patrols have been able to secure for him.
Having by this line of reasoning determined the number of men he can
afford to employ on foot, he must next make up his mind as to their
tactical distribution.
In this case there can be no doubt that the method of employment by
'Wings' must commend itself even more than in cases involving only
mounted combat, for, quite apart from all the many admitted advantages
of this form, in no other way is it possible to guarantee that the
dismounted men can safely and rapidly regain their horses.
The 'Line' system would involve endless confusion and loss of time in
sorting them out amongst their respective commands.
As regards the general considerations of width of front and depth, the
same principles apply as in the case of Infantry. In the defence to
gain time is the main object, and the problem to be solved is to
secure at one and the same moment both fire superiority and a
sufficient reserve to meet all possible emergencies. A skilful
utilization of the ground, previous ascertainment of the ranges, ample
ammunition and sound fire discipline, will, as with the Infantry, be
the best means of attaining one's object.
Special conditions only arise in the defence of villages where the
horses can be brought under cover close to the men, and here it seems
to be necessary to distinguish between several possibilities, all of
which require different treatment.
If the place is to be obstinately defended, then the horses must be
kept on the side away from the enemy, or in the centre of the
buildings, the defence of the boundaries be suitably arranged, and the
men told off to their several sections. The exits must be barricaded,
and the approaches entangled with wire.
A strong inlying piquet, to act eventually as a reserve, must be
placed in a central position.
If, however, the place is to be given up when seriously attacked, and
resistance is only to be sufficient to cover withdrawal, then the
horses should be kept saddled up in the stables, etc., and
arrangements made to withdraw them rapidly without exciting attention.
In the first case, as against Infantry or mounted Cavalry only, one
can count on holding one's own without serious losses for a
considerable time; but the matter becomes very different if the
enemy's Artillery is also to be reckoned with, for modern shell fire
will soon involve the destruction of all the horses, and one must be
prepared to find retreat practically impossible once one has allowed
one's self to be committed to an engagement of this nature. Hence such
positions should only be occupied and defended when it is safe to
count on support from following troops, or when it is improbable that
the enemy will be able to bring Artillery into action. Such situations
may frequently arise in the advanced lines of a concentration zone, in
which the villages nearest the enemy form part of the general system
of security.
In all other cases, and particularly as regards the advanced
squadrons, it will be better to take up 'Alarm' quarters, and the more
unexpectedly the enemy can attack us the more stringent must be the
precautions we adopt.
If we decide to retire, a portion of the men will be detached to take
the horses out of the village, or to have them drawn up in readiness
for mounting behind the position selected, and meanwhile the remainder
of the garrison must compensate for their diminution in numbers by a
greater expenditure of ammunition, thus holding the enemy till all is
ready, and then slipping rapidly back to their horses. Without
losses--amounting, perhaps, to the sacrifice of the last covering
party--such withdrawal can hardly hope to succeed; but previous
systematic arrangements give the best chance of success, and the same
prevision will be equally necessary, even if the place is to be held
at all costs, for the situation may always change, and a retreat
become advisable.
At night, however, the aspect of affairs changes; then any attempt at
withdrawal is to be deprecated, and, as a matter of principle, must
not be contemplated. Even if the enemy breaks into the place by
surprise, it is still better to fight him on the spot rather than to
risk the certain destruction of the whole detachment by retreat. A
successful resistance is in such cases all the more probable, since
in the darkness the use of the enemy's Artillery is practically
precluded--at any rate, can attain but little result. Only the
squadrons far out in advance, and thus liable to be surrounded on all
sides and captured before help can arrive, will have to be prepared
for a night withdrawal before the assailants can close in around them.
As to the principles to be observed in such cases, there should be no
room for doubt. Everyone should know what he has to do when the case
arises.
Turning now to the consideration of the conduct to be observed in
attack, it is clear that here also the same fundamental ideas apply as
with the Infantry. Dismounted Cavalry must be prepared to work their
way up to decisive distances, to break down from this limit the
enemy's resistance, and finally to carry the position by storm. Hence
the fighting line has need of constant reinforcements to give the
necessary forward impulse, and hence we require the same distribution
in regard to 'depth.'
Nevertheless, it would be a great mistake to adopt on this point any
stereotyped formation. It must not be overlooked that the essence of
such Cavalry attacks is rapidity of execution. Hence in all cases
where this necessity for rapidity arises the endeavour must be made to
bring from the very first as many rifles into the firing line as
possible, and it follows that the greater the fire power thus obtained
the less the need for subsequent reinforcement.
If we try to picture to ourselves the conditions under which these
dismounted Cavalry attacks can occur, it is evident that only in the
most unusual instances will the necessity arise of launching them
against wide fronts of dense lines of unbroken Infantry; on the other
hand, we shall often be called upon to capture isolated villages,
etc., such as posts on the line of communication, railway-stations,
and important defiles, and in all such cases it will always be
possible to combine attacks simultaneously against both flanks, front
and rear. Thanks to its mobility, the Cavalry is exceptionally well
suited to the performance of such undertakings, because it can combine
both attack and surprise to the best advantage.
If, thanks to this possibility, it is practicable to diminish the
weight of the front attack, it follows, again, that less
depth--_i.e._, fewer successive reinforcements--will require to be
provided; but these can only be suppressed altogether when the object
aimed at does not imply the actual maintenance of the position to be
assaulted, but our purpose is only to reach a point from whence to
overwhelm the enemy with fire, previous to riding him down by our
closed squadrons, or to break off the action again and retire as soon
as a counter-attack develops. These are cases which will often present
themselves: either when in pursuit it is desirable to strike
unexpectedly at the enemy's columns, or during a battle, when it is
feasible to molest and disturb his reserves.
In the above paragraphs I have put together the chief points to be
considered in the action of dismounted Cavalry when acting
unsupported; it remains now to consider the rôle assigned to the Horse
Artillery allotted to it, if only to bring out those parts which, in
my opinion, lie beyond its proper field.
If we admit that in general, as between two great Cavalry masses in
actual collision, the guns can play an important part, I must yet
insist that the measure of this importance should not be overdrawn;
for it is only when the former are confined to a defensive
attitude--for instance, when they are still under cover or behind
sheltering folds of the ground, or when moving in a widely-extended
screen to mislead the enemy and tempt him into fire-swept ground, in
order to fall upon him when he has ventured into the trap--that much
is to be expected from their co-operation.
But as soon as the Cavalry begins to advance, the part the Artillery
has to play drops into the background. Then the guns become simply an
impediment, because, since they generally require a special escort,
they subtract from the total force available for the actual shock, and
always act more or less as a pivot, which hampers the free movement of
the Cavalry.
On the contrary, the Cavalry must never allow itself to be influenced
in its movements by the position of its own Artillery. The latter must
adapt itself unconditionally to the movements of the former, and must
endeavour to conform to its evolutions, so as not only to co-operate
with it, but, if possible, to dispense with a special escort.
It must, therefore, be the endeavour of the Artillery to keep well out
in front of the Cavalry, so as to take the enemy under fire, and
anticipate his batteries by coming into action first. The latter is a
most important point, for it is the essential duty of the enemy's
gunners to divert and beat down the fire which we endeavour to bring
against their horsemen.
If we can only succeed in unlimbering first, they are bound to accept
the law from us, and are thereby prevented either of availing
themselves of the advantages of the ground or of conforming to the
tactical intentions of their Leader.
The best position for Artillery must always be behind some sheltering
roll of the ground, where it requires none, or at the most a weak,
escort; and this desideratum will be best fulfilled when it is on the
inner--that is, the supported--flank of its Cavalry, because in this
position it can presumably remain in action longest, and hampers the
movements of its own force least. Similarly, in pursuit or in covering
a retreat its sphere of activity is distinctly limited. Its action can
only then become effective when the actual tactical pursuit--_i.e._,
with cold steel--ceases, the combatants have disentangled themselves,
and the strategic pursuit sets in.
The mobility of the target must naturally influence the fire effect to
be expected from the guns, as it increases the difficulty of
'ranging,' and limits the possible duration of action to a few
moments.
The batteries will only then be able to turn their fire on the enemy's
Cavalry when the latter show themselves in considerable masses moving
at the slower paces. But when the Cavalry sweep forward at full speed,
the most they can do will be to take some stretch of ground through
which the opposing Cavalry must pass, and on which there is still time
to range, and then turn on shrapnel fire to its utmost intensity.
But even for this the opportunity will only then arise when either our
own Cavalry holds back, the enemy's Artillery does not require our
full attention and fire power, or, finally, if our own guns are not
attacked by the enemy's Cavalry.
In view of all these considerations, it follows that it is impossible
to assign a decisive importance to the participation of a few Horse
Batteries in the actual shock of the opposing squadrons. Nevertheless,
one should always do one's best to use to the utmost such Artillery
power as is available, and particularly if there is any doubt as to
the strength of the enemy, and we have reason to suspect that he
possesses a marked numerical superiority.
The chief rôle of the Artillery must always remain the support of
dismounted action of Cavalry in attack and defence; in the battle,
protected by their own horsemen, to strike against the enemy's flank
and rear, shell his columns on the march, to drive him out of
weakly-defended places or defiles, and in all similar circumstances,
such as war always develops afresh, to inflict upon him the utmost
possible damage.
In all these cases the batteries can choose their own positions and
the nature of their fire with absolute freedom, according to the
fundamental principles of their own Arm; they have time to pick up
their own range, and to insure results by the duration of their
action.