THE TACTICAL LEADING IN MOUNTED COMBATS
Having admitted that dismounted action has increased considerably in
importance, particularly on the offensive, it nevertheless remains the
fact that the combat with cold steel remains the chief _raison d'être_
of the Cavalry, and when the principles have to be considered
according to which troops have to be employed upon the battle-field,
the actual collision of Cavalry 'Masses' remains the predominant
factor.
The task of the Leader must be to transmit the mechanical power
inherent in the troops in the form of momentum upon the enemy. Where
he, with a clear purpose before him, acts with daring and thorough
comprehension, it is in his power to intensify this momentum many
times over; and this holds true with the Cavalry to a greater degree
than with any other Arm, for with the horsemen the personal impression
conveyed by the appearance and bearing of the Leader reacts on the
mass as in no other case. This reaction is further accentuated by the
fact that the excitement of motion on horseback, inherent in the
performance of Cavalry duties, contains something electrifying,
kindling to the imagination and exciting to the nerves, which
communicates its influence to the Leader, and thus in turn supports
him.
On the other hand, the evils of an indifferent Command make themselves
nowhere more apparent than with Cavalry. In this Arm every impulse
works itself out relentlessly down to the last consequence. Mistakes
once made can rarely be remedied. This is the necessary consequence of
the short time interval to which their activity is limited, the
rapidity of their movements, and the irresistible momentum with which
a Cavalry charge once launched presses on with ever-increasing
momentum to its final decision.
Whilst thus with the Cavalry the influence of the Command is the most
important factor of success, any deficiency in which can rarely be
made good by the excellence of the troops themselves, it is precisely
with this Arm that it is the least frequently found; for admittedly
there is nothing more difficult on the battle-field than correct
disposition and execution at the head of a great body of horsemen.
Several factors unite to explain this circumstance. In the first
place, only the shortest moment of time is available for
consideration, and then this rapid consideration and decision have to
be given under the most unfavourable external conditions, at the
fullest speed of one's horse, or in the maddening confusion of the
mêlée. Further, in most, cases it will be quite impossible for the
Leader of a Cavalry 'Mass' to take in with accuracy the strength and
dispositions of the enemy. The more extended radius of action of
modern firearms and the greater distance between the contending forces
thereby conditioned must in the future render this much more difficult
than in the past. Very rarely will it be possible for the Leader
either to alter or cancel an order once given in consequence of
information subsequently received. Even of the ground itself, the
importance of which is so much greater for the Cavalry than for any
other Arm, it will be impossible for the Leader to form for himself
any actual picture. Either it is already in possession of the enemy
and of his patrols, or at least in their sphere of action, or it
cannot be readily grasped from a single standpoint, and the rapidity
of movement allows no time to reconnoitre it sufficiently. Constant
reference to maps, even when available, is impossible, and the best of
these do not reveal exhaustively the actual nature of the ground to be
traversed. The orders must therefore be based on a general
consideration of the circumstances, for the Leader cannot gauge with
even approximate accuracy the strength of his enemy from the
resistance he encounters, like his more fortunate comrade of the
Infantry. His only remaining means of influencing the course of the
action lie in his intact reserves.
For subordinates, indeed, the case is even worse, for they will rarely
find existing conditions in accordance with the conception on which
their orders were issued, and will seldom have time to refer to
Headquarters for further instructions.
It must, therefore, be apparent that only the most exceptional Cavalry
training, combined with high executive talent, can suffice to
compensate for all these difficulties. Really successful leading will
only be assured to the Cavalry General when the machinery he sets in
motion is technically finished down to the last detail.
In the first place, the least that can be demanded is that the
observation of the enemy and distribution of orders are so organized
that the system works with absolute certainty. On the former depends
the correct choice of the moment of attack; on the latter that the
troops are employed in the required direction.
The place of the responsible Leader until the moment of the charge is,
therefore, well out to the front, in a position from which he can best
overlook the situation as a whole. Even the Leaders of independent
units, if possible down to the Regimental Commanders, should remain
close to him, and try to see the situation through his eyes. The
greatest fault of all is to stick too close to your troops.
Every Cavalry officer must carry his map in his head as well as in his
hand, particularly during the engagement. Every Leader must keep
before his mind the hang of the ground, the lie of the roads, the
peculiarities of the battle-field, with the chances it affords him.
Any defects he must try to make good by reconnaissance. Every possible
consequence of the collision must have been thought out beforehand.
Never should the Chief Commander take part in the charge personally
until he puts in his last reserve, and even then only when he is clear
of all responsibility, which by that time will generally be the case.
In all circumstances he must be in a position to rally his troops
after they have dispersed themselves in a mêlée, and to take measures
either to exploit the success, or, in case of reverse, to avert its
worst consequences. This does not apply only to the Chief Commander.
Here I would enter a particular protest against the opinion one hears
far too frequently emitted, that the place of every Cavalry Leader in
the charge is always in front of his command. This only holds good
when units charge as parts of a higher organization, or where smaller
bodies--_e.g._, squadrons, regiments, or brigades--attack as a whole,
with no rearward lines or supports to be controlled, or further
responsibilities arising out of the charge have to be considered. But
this does not relieve the Commander from the necessity of setting a
personal example in moments of wavering, or when it appears better,
after cool reflection, to risk everything, to carry the men forward to
the extreme limit of effort, rather than to reserve himself for
subsequent emergencies.
In all other cases the Commander, and his Staff, must avoid becoming
entangled in the confusion of a fight in which he must lose all view
and control over his men, and at best could achieve nothing more than
any other equally brave and determined trooper. It is, on the
contrary, his first duty to move in such a direction that he may at
all times be ready to influence with rapidity and decision the
mechanism of his command as a whole.
If he falls, then his Staff Officer or Adjutant assumes the
responsibility of the command until such time as the next senior can
be notified of the circumstance. In no case may the continuity of
action be interrupted by wasting time in looking for his successor.
When the Cavalry is working in combination with the other Arms the
point of observation of its Commander must be connected with the
latter by suitable relays, and officers must be sent out into those
sections of the ground which cannot be overlooked from the position
the Leader has selected.
Combat and security patrols must be sent out in all directions from
which the enemy's reserves or fresh bodies of his troops might
approach, and even towards our own rear the ground must be
reconnoitred as far as possible by officers, who report the result of
their operations, not only to the superior Leader, but to the Brigade
and Regimental Commanders. It will also be advisable to keep the
officers of the other Arms, particularly of the reserves, as well
informed as possible about the nature of the ground and the observed
movements of the enemy's forces, so that these may always act with
full knowledge of the circumstances. A General Staff Officer should be
entrusted with the maintenance of communications with Army
Headquarters itself.
As the crisis approaches the troops must be drawn in nearer to the
point of collision. As soon as the attack has been determined on, the
Leader will be well advised to take up a position on the flank of his
troops from which he will be able to overlook the whole field of
action and keep the enemy well in view. From this point, having
previously instructed his subordinates as to the situation and purpose
of the coming combat, and having sent them back to their troops, he
will despatch executive orders to the several échelons concerned. The
line of attack must be defined with particular care, and a point of
sight visible from a considerable distance must, if possible, be
assigned to them. No room for doubt must be left open as to which
troop it is which is responsible for the direction.
But even with the finest system for reconnaissance and transmission of
orders it will be impossible to guarantee the combined action of large
'Masses' for a common purpose, and to put them into the fight, in a
thoroughly practical and not parade-ground fashion, unless good
observation, able leading, and circulation of orders are combined
with two other most important factors:
First comes the utmost possible independence of the subordinate
leaders, down to the limit of the Squadron Commander. Only when these
can help one out in cases where an order fails to arrive, or where the
circumstances compel a deviation from the letter of the order
received, or where these can only be indicated by word of mouth,
signs, bugle-calls, or even by riding in the required direction, can
there be any guarantee that all will combine intelligently for the
common purpose.
This independence must never be allowed to degenerate into selfish
wilfulness; the actual situation, as encountered on the ground itself;
must never be considered from the subordinate's point of view only,
but rather must always be solved in the spirit of the original
conception formed in the Leader's mind.
In the second place, the Leader requires tactical means and forms of
evolution which combine, with elementary simplicity and clearness, the
greatest possible degree of adaptability. Nowhere else so much as with
the Cavalry does the maxim hold good that 'In War only the simple
secures success.'[5]
[Footnote 5: Clausewitz, 'Im Krieg ist aller Einfach, aber,
das Einfache ist schwer.']
The prescribed orders must not place a strain on the memory of the
Leader or troops, and must operate practically mechanically. Even the
most far-reaching movements should never require either detailed
instructions or commands.
The application of the word of command should be limited to those
units which it can actually control--namely, the squadron.
The use of bugle-calls must be restricted to the utmost, and only be
permitted in circumstances where no possibility of misunderstanding
can arise--a danger not easily excluded where large bodies are acting
together.
Even the use of signs can only be relied on in a limited degree. In
dust and closed country of course they cannot be seen.
On the other hand, all movements depending on verbally transmitted
commands must be executed without loss of the spirit of uniformity.
In practice this is the only form for the communication of orders
which can be depended on to act with any degree of certainty under all
circumstances.
The Regulations must insure the possibility that, no matter under what
conditions, the unit can be formed without many words or commands into
the most diverse fighting formations in any required direction, either
from column of route, rendezvous formation, or even from the mêlée.
Fundamental principles of action against the different Arms must be
laid down so definitely that complicated orders in each particular
case will not be required.
The rapid change from one fighting form to another must be absolutely
guaranteed, and equally so the possibility for each unit to assume
that formation in depth called for by the circumstances of the combat,
without recourse to complicated orders and movements.[6]
[Footnote 6: The Regimental Commander, therefore, requires
his Adjutant and an Orderly Officer, so as to be able to
transmit simultaneously his order to both wings of his
regiment.]
If these requirements are to be fulfilled, then only such elementary
movements must be prescribed and regulated as can be executed under
all circumstances, as laid down in the Regulations.
These matters being settled, then tactical regulations should lay down
no fixed evolutions, but should confine themselves essentially to
forms and principles of action, which should be treated with the
utmost clearness and precision.
It is hardly necessary to adduce elaborate proof to show that our
existing Regulations by no means meet these requirements in all their
sections.
Above all, the movements and deployments laid down for the Regiment
are far too formal, based too much on accurate intervals and fixed
prescriptions for the movements of the individual squadrons to be
suitable for use on the ground which Cavalry must nowadays be prepared
to traverse, or to be executed, exactly as laid down, in face of the
enemy. Such evolutions are only possible on the drill-ground, where
bugle-sounds and words of command can still be heard, and are far too
complicated for practical use.
For instance, let us take the case of deployment to the front out of
any 'deep' formation--columns of fours, half troops, or the like,
which obviously cannot always be executed before the enemy precisely
in the manner prescribed, because all must depend on the space
available and the distance which separates us from the enemy. The head
of the column must suit its movements to these conditions, and in turn
the following sections must conform to the movements of the head;
greater freedom of choice must, therefore, be left to the latter.
On the other hand, there are evolutions of the utmost importance before
the enemy for which the book gives no guidance whatever--_e.g._, the
rapid passage from the double column into squadron columns, either to
the front or flank.
Even for the larger units all the prescriptions are by no means
adapted to the requirements of active service. For instance, the
relief of lines ('Treffen Wechsel') is an operation of no use except
on the drill-ground, and is never attempted even in manoeuvres--at
least, personally I know no instance of its ever being tried, except
as a matter of drill.
That a certain measure of justification may be found for this and
similar formations, I do not wish to dispute.
They certainly possess great educational value as a means to the
acquisition of the requisite discipline and cohesion, and they are
also well adapted for movements beyond the danger zone, when it
becomes necessary to steady the troops by the most absolute insistence
on accuracy of movement and precision of drill; and that such cases do
arise no one who has had experience of War will for one moment
dispute.[7] Hence, even if one may hold the opinion that the same
purpose may be equally well served by less complicated means better
adapted to practical requirements, one can nevertheless subscribe
unconditionally to the soundness of the principle involved. But for
actual purposes of combat we require simpler forms and more freedom in
their application, and in so far as the Regulations tend towards this
end they show a very considerable degree of improvement; for the
squadron, Section 330 provides the necessary amount of independence,
and Sections 331 and 333 give sufficient freedom to the Regiment,
subject only to the limitations referred to above. Section 346 in
particular and Section 348 are also of fundamental importance for the
higher commands.[8] Indeed, I hold the former as the most important
concession contained in the whole book, for it practically initiates a
new phase in the whole course of our drill evolution, by marking the
commencement of the breach with the old doctrine of the Three-Line
system ('Drei Treffen Taktik'). It is true that it still lays chief
importance on this method, but it no longer regards it as the one
royal road to success. Thus we enter on a path on which the Infantry
already long ago preceded us, and which, _mutatis mutandis_, offers
also for the Cavalry similar great and undeniable advantages. It is
safe to predict that Section 346 will prove the starting-point, by
sheer pressure of natural conditions, of a fresh series of development
in our Cavalry Tactics.
[Footnote 7: Rauch's Brigade of the 6th Cavalry Division at
Vionville, under von Schmidt, August 16, 1870.]
[Footnote 8: Section 346 reads: 'The above general principles
applying to the conduct and relations between the several
"Lines" must not be allowed to lead to the adoption of any
stereotyped form of attack. The Division Commander has full
authority to employ his brigades as he thinks best for the
attainment of the purpose in view.']
Thanks to these prescriptions, the Commander has now a free hand to
arrange his units (Brigades or Regiments) side by side, and to give
them the amount of depth that he considers necessary. Hence the
commands remain immeasurably more in the hands of their leaders than
was formerly the case--a point of particular importance on ground
where the view is restricted; and every unit Commander can also form
his own reserves, so that reinforcements from the rear will always
join their own Regiment (or Brigade), and thus the intermixture of the
different commands will be prevented as much as possible; and what a
gain this will be towards rapid rallying after the confusion of an
encounter will be obvious to every reader.
Finally, and perhaps this is of even greater importance, a far higher
measure of initiative will be given to the subordinate leaders than
was conceivable under the old scheme ('Treffen Taktik').
These advantages can hardly be over-estimated. There remain, however,
yet two other directions in which this paragraph may lead to yet more
important consequences.
In the first place, it secures for the Commander himself an immense
simplification of the whole mechanism he is called on to control--for
he has no longer to occupy his mind with the fundamental conception of
the 'Treffen'--_i.e._, Three-Line System.[9]
[Footnote 9: The 'Drei Treffen Taktik' owes its origin to the
study of the Wars of Frederick the Great, and claims to have
again brought to life the fundamental principles to which our
Cavalry successes in those days were due. Against this view I
would point out that Frederick's Cavalry were always formed
in two Lines under one common command. Besides these two
Lines ('Treffen') there was generally, but by no means
always, a 'Reserve'--constituted usually of Hussars
only--who, if I do not err, are only once spoken of as a
'Treffen' (Line). This Reserve, however, was under a special
Commander, and was quite independent of the two 'Treffen'
proper above referred to. Now, no one would venture to
suggest that Frederick's Infantry fought habitually in three
Lines ('Drei Treffen'), although a Reserve was frequently
held back in third Line, exactly as with the Cavalry. The
truth really is that the modern idea of the 'Drei Treffen
Taktik' has actually nothing in common with the methods of
employment of Frederick's days at all.]
The term 'Treffen' (Lines), in the true spirit of Frederick the
Great's day, defines the relation between a leading Line and one or
more following Lines, which succeed one another in due sequence. The
tactical evolution of the last few years has, however, led to this
result--that this definition is no longer in harmony with the modern
conception attaching to the word 'Treffen.' According to the existing
regulations and practice, the second or third Line, or both together,
may just as well form the fighting Line as the one which is
momentarily called the first. The latter may equally be used for a
flank attack or, under a change of circumstances, form the Reserve.
The supporting squadrons, as defined in the new Regulations, or the
second or third Line in the attack against Infantry or Artillery, are
nowadays the only ones to which the original conception of the
'Treffen' applies.
Whilst at present the designation of particular Brigades, etc., as
first, second, or third 'Treffen' (Lines), has practically no bearing
on their use in action, but only assigns them a temporary place during
the particular manoeuvre, we have had to invent, to express the actual
conception of the 'Treffen,' or Line--which, after all, one cannot do
without--all sorts of designations, such as supporting squadrons,
formations according to depth, waves, and so forth. Hence the word
'Treffen' has introduced a complication which finds no justification
in the true spirit of the matter. These disadvantages, of course, are
least evident when the Division is brought into action from a previous
position of assembly; but they are very apparent indeed when it is a
question of uniting a Division which has previously been acting in
separate detachments upon the field of battle itself. Then we come
face to face with the difficulty--in fact, almost impossibility--of
adopting the modern idea of the 'Three Lines.'
On the line of march a Division is divided into Advance guard and
Main body, and if moving on several roads, then into a number of such
constituent parts (two to each road). From this state of subdivision
there result a number of Tactical units which it is practically
impossible to fit into the 'Three-Line' formation without incurring
great loss of time, and possibly the loss of one's opportunity. Hence,
from the retention of this 'Three-Line' idea, we arrive at a tactical
dilemma which must react detrimentally on the handling of the whole
Arm, as long as the Leaders are compelled by Regulations to assume
their 'Three-Line formation' before they can fight at all. It is from
this contradiction that Section 346 releases us.
Of equal importance is a further possibility which the wording of the
same paragraph throws open to us. It allows, in fact, the Cavalry, no
matter in what tactical connection it may find itself, to fight always
in accordance with the same principles.
As long as we adhered to the 'Three-Line system,' this, if not
impossible, was at least practically inexpedient, for the Regulations
took cognizance only of a Division composed of three Brigades of equal
strength, were founded on this idea, and did not allow of adaptation
to any other distribution of force which might have to be employed.
It has already been pointed out in Chapter III. that they do not apply
to a Corps made up of several Divisions, and the same holds good of
Divisions of other than strictly normal composition. Everywhere, in
cases such as referred to above, the subdivision into Lines
('Treffen') in the spirit of the Regulations would very soon lead to
even worse disruption of the units than already happens with normal
Divisions of three Brigades. The want of proportion between the
number of the Lines and the columns from which they have to be formed
would be more glaring then than nowadays, when the number of Brigades
happen to be the same as the number of Lines; with the larger units
the difficulty of uniform speed and control would be a factor.
Now, Section 346 helps us over all these difficulties by
disembarrassing us of all stereotyped formations based upon numbers
alone, and leaves the Commander free to choose in what proportion and
in what order he will divide and move these masses.
Under modern conditions this latitude is indispensable, for the amount
of force to be applied depends on what is known about the enemy; but
the special shape the attack itself assumes, and more particularly its
breadth of front, will be determined by the width of front the enemy
opposes and the nature of the ground it has to move over; whilst as to
depth, this must be decided by our estimate of the quality of the
adversary's force, hence his shock power and the amount of his
possible reserves.
The consideration of all these conditions may, in proportion to the
numbers in hand, lead us to employ whole Brigades, Divisions, Corps,
or portions of these units, arranged in the most varied succession to
one another. Whether we should attack by 'Wings' or by 'Lines' must
depend on the circumstances of the movement, the order in which the
troops reach the field, and the nature of the country to be traversed;
and generally the preference will have to be given to the 'Wing
Attack,' for the reasons we have above developed.
This 'Wing Attack' will, therefore, always have to be employed when
time is available to form up the troops systematically for action, or
when the lines of approach of the units lead naturally to the
adoption of the formation. 'Lines' only then, when it is absolutely
necessary to deliver an attack from column of route as rapidly as
possible, and hence the time is lacking for a more systematic
formation. Such cases can, for instance, arise in the deployment at
the issue of a defile, or in bringing up troops from Assembly
formation through the intervals of a crowded battle-field, or under
analogous conditions; but even in these cases a foreseeing command
will endeavour to facilitate the execution of the 'Wing Attack' by the
choice of some such formation as the 'double column,' which admits of
deployment to either hand.
Thus we see that our Regulations at least give to the Leader the
possibility of choosing the best and most suitable formations for the
execution of his purpose, but the latter also must be sufficiently
master of his art to know which to select.
Further, it is the duty of the Leader, in the case of mutual encounter
between manoeuvring bodies of the Arm, to choose the momentarily most
favourable form of attack with reference to his own line of approach.
It is not easy to lay down in general terms in what manner this can be
best insured, for the circumstances of the operations themselves and
the nature of the ground are capable of influencing the decision in
too many ways. One can only lay down certain general principles which
may form a basis in the appreciation of each situation as it happens
to arise.
In the first place, one must select one's own base of attack in such a
direction that the following blow will force the enemy to retire in
what will be for him the most disadvantageous direction, and,
conversely, for one's own purposes the best.
But, naturally, in making this choice the tactical advantages or
otherwise of the ground must not be overlooked or left to the enemy,
for the tactical victory is the necessary preliminary to further
results. Further, we should always endeavour to secure the advantage
of the 'outer lines' so as to act concentrically upon the enemy. In
this position, if beaten, his lines of retreat cross one another, and
to avoid this predicament he will be compelled to endeavour to
manoeuvre across our front, always a most dangerous undertaking.
On the other hand, if our attack fails, we have still the advantage of
eccentric retreat, which compels the adversary to divide his forces,
and thus opens to us the opportunity of further tactical success if we
can concentrate our own men with sufficient rapidity, whilst at the
worst we run no risk of seeing our own troops entangled with one
another.
It should be our constant endeavour to gain these positions on the
'outer lines' by previous strategical operations, in order to avoid
the danger of being compelled at the last moment to initiate wide
flanking movements in face of the enemy. Again, a further advantage
accrues if we can rest one flank on inaccessible or difficult ground.
This flank at least will be secure, so we can spare troops from it to
strengthen the other, and thus, perhaps, act with decisive effect.
Finally, when it is presumable that we shall have to deal with
considerable numerical superiority, we should direct all our efforts
to throwing the whole weight of our charge against the enemy's flank,
so as to compel him at the last moment to change his front to meet the
blow. The opportunity for such action will arise in cases in which,
thanks to our previous strategic direction, we can succeed in uniting
the mass of our forces more rapidly than our opponent is able to do,
and this may often be the case where the ground favours our advance
and conceals the direction of our march.
Generally, it may be laid down that a simultaneous attack directed
against the enemy's front and flank is justified when we have the
advantage of a considerable numerical superiority, or when our
opponent retains for too long a faulty distribution of his forces; but
in all other cases a blow with united force against his flank will
give the most far-reaching consequences, as it brings immediate
pressure against the adversary's line of retreat, and compels him to
employ his own forces in succession, not in a concentrated effort.
Hence this form of attack gives the chance of a success even to a
force in a numerical minority, as it will often afford it the
opportunity of beating the enemy in detail, whereas against a
concentrated mass there would be no hope of success at all.
It will be evident that for the execution of such an attack the forms
laid down in the Regulations to be observed in the transition from
rendezvous to attack formations are--one is almost tempted to
write--about as unfavourable as they well can be. It is true they
afford, as already pointed out, the possibility of presenting the same
fighting formation in succession to any required point of the compass,
an advantage which has no practical importance in warfare; but against
this they increase the difficulties of deployment for attack to the
front to the utmost. If it is necessary, for instance, to send the
first Line at the enemy's flank, because at the moment that happens to
be the shortest way, the front of one of the following Brigades is at
once masked, and the latter hampered in its movements. Or if it is
desirable to employ one of the rearward Brigades for a flank movement
or any similar purposes, then either the leading 'Line' must be
checked until the others have gained the required position, or it is
certain that these latter will arrive too late to co-operate.
Further, the forms prescribed by the Regulations render it more
difficult to make use of such assistance as the nature of the ground
may offer us.
Plainly, it is very much more to our advantage in the conduct of
offensive operations to bring up those units which one has at one's
disposal--with the sole exception of a Reserve, which is not to be
kept too weak, at deploying intervals on the same alignment--in
formations which adapt themselves well to the ground, and insure rapid
deployment to the front, with the necessary depth in the supports
following. For this purpose I recommend primarily the 'double column'
either in Brigades or in Regiments.
This arrangement of the troops satisfies all practical conditions, and
insures, above all, the possibility of bringing all forces
simultaneously into action, and of carrying out offensive flanking
operations; further, it makes it easier for the Commander to take
advantage of such support as the ground affords, and to mass his chief
strength on one wing; and, finally, it gives us the shortest line of
attack upon the enemy, and makes it easier to avoid the use of inner
lines. It unites thus all the advantages of the regulation 'Line'
('Treffen') formation, and avoids its many serious disadvantages;
hence it should be employed fundamentally wherever possible.
Turning now to the employment of Cavalry on the battle-field, the
first condition which has to be satisfied is to assign to the 'Masses'
their proper place in the line of battle. They must not only be at
hand when wanted, but also at the spot which promises the most
favourable tactical chances and the greatest prospect of decisive
results. Further, they must be able to recognise the right moment to
take part in the combat.
With reference to the first point, I should, above all, like to call
attention to the writings of General von Schlichting.[10]
[Footnote 10: 'Tactical and Strategical Principles of the
Present Day,' part i., chap, vii., B.]
Theoretically, the Cavalry 'Mass' is best united on that wing of the
battle front which is not supported, but destined for further
manoeuvres, hence on which the Arm will enjoy freedom of movement as
far as the ground allows. Naturally, it will not always be possible to
assign them such a place, but their position will result generally
from the course of the previous manoeuvring.
Either the Cavalry must clear the front of the Army in preparation for
the battle, in which case it is not always a matter of free choice in
which direction one has to clear off, nor can the Cavalry Commander
from his standpoint always determine which wing of the battle front
will have to manoeuvre; or it must close in from a flank for the
decision, in which case the nearest wing is their natural destination.
But they must always endeavour--and here I differ from General von
Schlichting--to range themselves forwards and sidewards of their own
Army. It will only be in cases where it is necessary to keep them in
rear of the general alignment--as, for instance, it is proposed to
use them as a last resort in the interests of the other Arms, as at
Mars la Tour--or where the battle front itself is broken up by the
nature of the ground or the grouping of the forces in such manner that
the whole engagement is divided into a series of individual actions,
as may often be the case in future Wars, that this rule must be
departed from.
Such dispositions are always less favourable because they imply in a
certain degree defensive action, whereas when placed forward in the
framework of the battle the offensive element of the Arm finds its
fullest opportunity.
That the desire to occupy such positions must not become stereotyped
goes without saying; it must always be conditioned by the general and
particular circumstances of the moment.
The course of events may, indeed, require us to take up a position to
the flank and rear of the Army, but fundamentally, forwards and to the
flank, remains the most desirable disposition. In this position the
Cavalry 'Masses' are best prepared to act against the enemy's flank,
and can best combine the fire of their own Artillery concentrically
with that of the guns and Infantry of the main body without losing
their tactical connection, and thus divert the forces of the enemy
into eccentric operations. Here they occupy the most suitable position
to initiate without loss of time a parallel pursuit of the enemy, or
to counter his attempts at pursuit; and here also they are best placed
to accept the inevitable challenge of the enemy's Cavalry.
General von Schlichting considers these combats as generally
superfluous--a kind of family concern which affects the rival
Cavalries only--having no connection with the ultimate decision
between the two armies.[11]
[Footnote 11: See 'Tactical and Strategical Principles of the
Future,' p. 83. The view that Cavalry which has delivered one
charge in the day is useless for the rest of the operations,
I cannot accept. It finds no support in the facts of Military
history--on the contrary, the most complete refutation.]
I cannot share this opinion, which seems to me to be based mainly on
peace-time experiences, in which the opposing Cavalry forces generally
neutralize one another. In actual War, however, victory more usually
opens the path to other and proportionately more far-reaching results.
I hold, therefore, not only that such Cavalry duels are essential, but
that the opportunity for engaging in them should be sought out from
the first; for it is only the defeat of the enemy's horse which can
open the door for further successful action against his other troops;
otherwise the two Cavalries mutually paralyze one another, as at Mars
la Tour.
If in practice it has often happened that this Cavalry deadlock has
supervened, and the result of their encounter has remained unimportant
on the decision of the day, this result, in my opinion, has always
been due to a reluctance on one or the other sides to press the combat
to its utmost limitations, as in the above-mentioned instance of Mars
la Tour, or because the victorious side has retained neither force nor
cohesion sufficient to act against the enemy's flanks, as at Chotusitz
and at Prague.
Matters, however, will be very different when the Cavalry is really
adequate to its duties--when it not only beats the enemy out of the
field, but remains, as at Roszbach and Soor, fit for further efforts
in pursuit.
To reach this ideal we must strain every fibre of our being, and never
rest satisfied, as on the plateau of Ville sur Yron (Mars la Tour),
with half results as long as a single trooper remains fit to gallop
and handle his lance. The last man and the last breath of his horse
must be risked, and he who is not willing to stake his soul is no true
'Cavalry Soldier.'
If we have successfully achieved this first result--_i.e._, victory
over the enemy's horsemen--then the next step is to secure rapid
rallying and the pursuit of the beaten enemy till they are finally
driven from the field; and whilst detachments follow up, the main
force of our Cavalry must wheel in upon the flank and rear of the
enemy's Army, ready to act with all vigour and determination to bring
about the final decision when and where the opportunity offers.
That we failed in the campaigns of 1866 and 1870 to obtain this
crowning purpose of the Arm is no evidence in itself that the ideal is
inaccessible, only proof that neither our training nor comprehension
of our duties was on a level with the requirements of the time.
It is certainly possible that our opponent may seek to withdraw his
horsemen from the Duel to save their strength for the protection of
his threatened flanks; but the consideration remains that by such
conduct he voluntarily renounces the best sphere of his own
activity--a degree of renunciation on his part hardly to be
expected--and precisely because its action to avert defeat may prove
of essential consequence, it is our part, in accordance with the
offensive spirit of the Arm, to seek him out and destroy his forces
before such opportunity arrives.
For this purpose, again, the position to the front and flank is most
suitable. The constant threat upon the enemy's communications it
implies cannot be disregarded, and will compel him to find means to
rid himself of such embarrassment.
Having, therefore, made it clear where the Cavalry should seek its
position on the battle-field, the next step is to settle how it should
be formed. In this direction General von Schlichting has reached the
most practicable solution in laying down that a position in which each
Division retains full space for deployment and room to manoeuvre for
the common purpose is theoretically the ideal, and this would still
apply to Divisions united to form a Corps.
It is, indeed, evident that it is far easier to unite troops for
action towards the front than, under the circumstances of the
battle-field, to deploy them outwards from a common centre. This
latter operation will be all the more difficult in proportion as the
troops themselves have been brought forward to the front to meet a
coming crisis. The danger then is ever present that, by the necessity
of gaining room for deployment,[12] the opportunity to strike will be
lost, or that the endeavour to seize the opportunity will lead to the
troops being put in without order and in confusion.
[Footnote 12: The 6th Cavalry Division at Vionville, August
16, 1870.]
The fundamental principle, therefore, follows that troops, whether
Corps, Divisions, or Brigades, should be grouped on the battle-field,
preserving always their full deploying intervals.
Of course, local conditions must be taken into account, above all
things the necessity of finding cover both from view and fire in the
shape of the ground. In practice, therefore, it is only the actual
facts as one finds them which can decide as to the best formation to
be assumed, but it must always be of advantage to be perfectly clear
in one's own mind as to which disposition to adopt and the
consequences which must follow from one's choice.
The chief difficulty always remains--viz., the chance of seizing the
opportunity. In the Battle of Mars la Tour our Cavalry failed to solve
the problem, and in the subsequent course of the War--particularly
against the forces of the Republic--it might often have obtained far
better results had it possessed a clearer conception of its mission
and better tactical training, as, for instance, in the action at
Coulmiers, where we missed a grand opportunity.
The more difficult it becomes, with every increment in the range of
firearms, to recognise our opportunities, the more essential is it
that we should take the field with a thorough knowledge of our
tactical power and its limitations, and it is above all things
necessary that we should keep well up to the front, and not shirk even
_heavy punishment_ if by so doing we can best secure opportunities for
great results.
If this end is to be obtained, then every Cavalry Commander requires
to have a complete grasp of the nature of the Infantry combat. He must
be able to estimate with as equal certainty as an Infantry General the
general course of an engagement, the consumption of reserves, and the
gradual moral degradation of the enemy's foot soldiers.
At any moment he must be able to grasp in his mind the whole balance
of forces in conflict on any point of the battle-field, so as to be
able to decide whether the employment of his own command at any
particular point and time is justified by the general situation of
affairs.
It is, and always must be, the moments of great crises which give the
Cavalry the best opportunities.
Since attempts to ride through the zone controlled and swept by
effective Infantry fire may be looked on as synonymous with
self-destruction, only such moments must be chosen for a charge during
which the enemy is prevented from bringing his full fire power to bear
against the assailants. These, however, only occur--except always
where the nature of the ground allows of a thorough surprise
action--when the moral disintegration of the enemy's Infantry is such
that, under the impression of the threatening Cavalry attack, they are
no longer under control, or when they are so completely taken up with
their own fire action that it is impossible for them to concern
themselves with the coming danger. Where such opportunities arise they
must be seized with lightning-like decision and be exploited with the
utmost energy. On the other hand, one should never allow one's self to
be induced to undertake charges in which the probable losses bear no
reasonable proportion to the possible results. Such conduct could only
lead to the purposeless sacrifice of men and horses, just as happened
to the French Cavalry at Woerth and Sedan.
We can always take as an example the wise restraint exercised by von
Seidlitz at Zorndorf, who, in spite of the Royal Command, refused to
attack because he did not consider that the right moment had arrived.
The Leader must always keep before his eyes the demands which either
pursuit or retreat may make on his horses. One should never sacrifice,
to secure results of secondary consideration, means that can be used
to better purposes at other times and other places, for the calls
which may be made upon Cavalry after the battle are quite exceptional
in their nature.
When, after long marches, hours of fighting, and heavy losses, the
exhausted victor bivouacs on the hard-won field, when the day is
drawing to its close and the shadows are spreading far across the
pastures, then the real work of the Cavalry begins; then, without
drawing rein, the horsemen must press forward to intercept the enemy's
retreat, attack him anywhere where he least expects it, and harry him
to utter exhaustion and dispersal (see Book I., Chap. IV., 1.4); or it
must, under the difficult conditions of a retreat at night, sacrifice
itself in charges or in protracted fire action in every direction in
which the pursuing Army can threaten danger to the retreating columns.
In such situations they must be prepared to hold suitable positions by
the hour, without thought for their own retreat, without any knowledge
of the general situation, and without any connection with the
remainder of their forces. Threatened in flank and rear, and yet
unshaken by the general collapse, by the flight and panic of their
comrades, they must hold their own, relying on their own strength and
self-reliance. These are the conditions which make the highest demands
both on the material and moral excellence of the men, as well as on
the indomitable energy and skill of the Cavalry Leader, and to few
mortals is it given to prove equal to such contingencies; hence one
must prepare one's self beforehand for such situations.
Primarily one must remember to give opportunities to both men and
horses to feed, water, and rest even during the progress of the
battle. One must endeavour, even while the fight is still raging, to
become perfectly clear in one's own mind as to the possible lines of
retreat, and the probable ulterior operations. One must try to
impress upon one's memory the lie of the roads according to the map,
and the important defiles and positions which might be favourable
either to pursuit or retreat, in order to be able to act at the right
moment, without loss of time or hesitation, in full cognizance of the
circumstances of the case. _Nothing helps a decision more than a
complete intellectual command of the situation._
Hence we see that the leading of Cavalry has been rendered
immeasurably more difficult by a whole series of external
considerations, as we have shown at the beginning of the chapter; that
at every moment the highest demands will be made on the intellectual
perception, the boldness and strength of character of the Leader, if
on the battle-field of the future he is to handle the Arm with any
prospect of success; and that the best Cavalry under modern
circumstances must fail if their Leaders prove unequal to their task.