INCREASED IMPORTANCE OF DISMOUNTED ACTION
If the changed conditions of modern war have brought about new
conditions and demands which require to be considered in the
strategical combinations of the Cavalry, I believe that a similar
influence must make itself felt in the field of tactics. Whereas
formerly the _arme blanche_ was recognized as the principal method by
which the Cavalry made its inherent fighting power felt, the
employment of dismounted action nowadays has gained in importance to
such an extent that the whole character of our activity appears
completely changed.
Although hitherto the general conception has been that Cavalry should
only make use of the carbine for defence, nowadays its employment in
attack must be recognized as of the utmost importance.
Undoubtedly, however, it is, and must remain even to-day, the chief
aim of every leader in whose veins flows the hot Cavalry blood to
seize his opportunities wherever they offer themselves, and, above
all, to attack the enemy's Cavalry wherever and whenever accessible
with cold steel; but we cannot conceal from ourselves the fact that
nowadays numerous problems will present themselves to the Cavalry
which can only be solved by fire action.
In the first place, the opportunity will often arise for the weaker
side to avoid an encounter in the open field, and, with the help of
its firearm, at least to attempt behind defiles, or strong positions,
to defy the enemy's superior forces. In such cases the assailant also
will be compelled to have recourse to his carbine.
Further considerations reveal that in future, quite apart from
encounter with the enemy's Cavalry, our own horsemen will find tasks
before them which will make appeal to the rifle inevitable.
The enemy will cover his railways, and important depots by troops of
the second and third class. Reinforced by the resisting power of
popular levies, they will block woods, river crossings, and defiles.
Even the guards of their Convoys will be amply provided with
far-ranging firearms.
In the pursuit of an enemy's beaten Cavalry we shall happen upon
Infantry detachments sent out to cover their retreat, or upon defiles
which have been occupied for a similar purpose. Important
communications will be held by strong detachments of cyclist Infantry,
who will find in woods and villages protection and favourable
opportunities to use their weapons.
All these means of resistance lie beyond the field of mounted action,
but they must be overcome if success is to crown our efforts.
Already in reconnaissances, particularly in those directed against the
enemy's communications, we shall meet with these impediments, and the
same will be the case when we come to the strategical pursuit, or the
protection of a retreat.[3] In the pursuit the main object is to keep
the beaten enemy on the run, to give him neither peace nor rest until
complete exhaustion sets in. But for the mass of the Cavalry the idea
of a purely frontal pursuit should not be encouraged, for Cavalry,
even when supported by several batteries, can easily be held up by any
rearguard position in which a few intact troops remain.
[Footnote 3: Compare 'Cavalry Regulations,' § 376.]
The frontal pursuit must in such cases be left to the other Arms, only
to be taken up again when the last resistance of the enemy is broken,
and the exhaustion of our own Infantry and Horse Artillery renders
further effort on their part impossible.
On the other hand, all energy must be devoted to the initiation of a
pursuit on parallel lines, in order that we may appear unexpectedly
and repeatedly against the flanks of the enemy's columns, with the
ultimate intention of anticipating him at some point on the line of
his retreat, such as a defile, thus bringing him between two fires in
a sheerly desperate position.
Man and horse must in these cases be driven to the utmost limit of
their powers of endurance.
It is evident that in such situations the principal rôle falls to the
firearm, for only in the fire fight is it possible to break off an
attack without loss, in order to appear again at some other point and
recommence the engagement. In case of anticipating an enemy at a
defile, the rifle will be practically the only weapon that can find
employment.
What can be achieved in this direction is best illustrated by
Sheridan's Cavalry, whose successful flanking operations against the
lines of communication of General Lee's heroic Army brought about the
capitulation of Clover Hill.
The charge will only then secure a greater result than dismounted
action, when the tactical cohesion of the enemy has been dissolved, and
his fire power utterly broken; that is to say, generally it will be of
greater service in tactical than in strategical pursuits--unless,
indeed, as at Waterloo, the defeat has led to the complete and permanent
dissolution of the enemy's fighting power.
Further, in the endeavour to support the rearguard of a defeated Army
in retreat it will be necessary, as soon as we have got rid of the
pursuing Cavalry, to take to the rifle, because with the sword alone
we cannot hope to make any impression upon the Infantry and Artillery
of the victor.
In such cases we must strive to attack with the firearm against the
flanks of the pursuing columns, in order to draw off their attention
from our beaten main body.
Cases may frequently arise when we in turn can hold up the pursuit at
defiles and other positions by a purely frontal defence.
In such circumstances a fresh and intact Cavalry, which has not
allowed itself to be dispirited or demoralized, may render invaluable
services to the beaten Infantry, and enable them, together with the
columns and the whole supply organization of the Army, to effect an
orderly withdrawal without being molested by the enemy, thus affording
to its commander an opportunity of restoring the lost cohesion and
tactical order. It will only be the rifle of the Cavalry which will
gain for our hard-pressed comrades what is most needed--_i.e._, time.
The idea is often put forward that Cavalry should not involve itself
in an obstinate fight on foot, that it should act only by short
surprise attacks, and that it possesses in its mobility the infallible
means of circumventing points of resistance. This conception, which
restricts the functions of Cavalry within their narrowest limits,
seems to me entirely untenable. It is essentially indefensible when it
is a matter of gaining time or of carrying a given position, such as a
defensible post on the lines of communication, a convoy marching under
escort, the destruction of a defended railway, or in any similar
undertaking. It will be impossible to work round such positions--at
least when engaged on the greater operations of War--both on account
of the widths of the fronts occupied and the possibility of
interfering with the sphere of operations of the neighbouring
detachments. Often, indeed, the nature of the ground will preclude
such attempts, and the experience of 1870-1871 should suffice to show
how rarely such a circumvention can hope to succeed. But even where
neither the strategic situation nor our immediate purpose compels us
to fight, it is not always advisable or expedient to attempt to evade
the opportunity. For every evasion leaves the front of our own Army
clear, gives the enemy the very opportunity he is looking for to
reconnoitre the position of our main bodies, uncovers our own
communications (_i.e._, our own Cavalry trains and baggage), exposes
our flank to the enemy, and thus offers him many chances of obtaining
tactical results.
Again, these attempts at circumvention lead easily to a loss of
direction, which in certain cases might endanger the success of our
whole operations; and, finally, the amount of time required by such
outflanking attempts may not be justified by the possible results. In
such cases it might on the whole be better to attack direct, for
turning movements mean always a postponement of the tactical decision,
and hence are always a disadvantage to the attacking side.
The theory that Cavalry, thanks to its mobility, can always ride round
and turn the positions it encounters breaks down in practice before
the tactical and strategical demands upon the Arm, partly by reason of
the local conditions, and partly because of the consideration which
has to be given to time, to the endurance of the horses, and the
position of the following columns.
The same applies to another theory with which one tries to explain
away the necessity of dismounted combats. It is maintained that the
fire power of the Horse Artillery will suffice to clear the road for
the Cavalry; hence the latter will rarely be placed in a position
which will require energetic dismounted action on their part. This
assumption involves, in my opinion, an altogether overrated estimate
of the power of Artillery. The same reasoning would lead us logically
to the false conclusion that even Infantry do not require their
rifles. One must demand from every reliable body of troops that they
will not allow themselves to be driven out of a covered position by
Artillery alone. All previous War experience testifies to the
impossibility of achieving such results against even moderate
Infantry, and it is only with such that we are here dealing. The fact
that in 1870-1871 the Artillery often did succeed in driving a weak
and demoralized enemy out of localities the possession of which was of
no material consequence to him cannot be considered as to the point.
Certainly the effect of modern guns is greater than anything of which
we have had experience, and will act upon the defender with
correspondingly greater intensity; but, on the other hand, it must be
insisted upon that the assailant's Artillery will have to act under
the increased effect of the defender's fire power, and the latter
will choose different terrain, and utilize it far better than in the
past. The actual assault remains necessary now, as ever, to bring
about the final decision.
Anyone who has had to conduct staff rides and similar operations of
large bodies of independent Cavalry, and has endeavoured to carry
these out in the spirit of actual warfare, can hardly have failed to
notice the tendency which displays itself with all leaders to take to
dismounted action, and will have realized that one has far more
frequently to check rather than encourage this tendency; but he will
also come to the conclusion, perhaps, that this desire is well founded
on existing conditions, and that even a determined Cavalry will have
to make use of their firearms almost every day; indeed, without
adequate employment of their carbines they are no longer able to carry
out the most important of their incumbent duties.
Hence, if the use of the rifle is thus shown by instances taken from
the most divergent directions to be of absolute necessity, the
conclusion follows that even in the battle itself, that point on which
all military action is focussed, it can hardly fail to find both its
opportunities and its full justification.
In this direction the horsemen of Stuart and Sheridan have set us a
brilliant example, taking part on foot in regular pitched battles
(Stuart at Fredericksburg, and Sheridan at Five Forks), and deciding,
rifle in hand, the fate of numerous engagements, in order immediately
afterwards to mount and pursue the enemy by a succession of vehement
charges (Stuart at Brandy Station).
The South African War also has shown us what can be done by a mounted
force supplied with a reliable firearm. The Boers fought exclusively
as Cavalry (_sic_), supported by Artillery, and some of the most
celebrated British Infantry regiments suffered defeat at their hands
as long as the numerical proportion was not altogether too
unfavourable to the assailants.
Even in dismounted attack, particularly in the later period of the
war, they often attained very considerable successes, and thus proved
incontrovertibly that the double rôle of Cavalry on foot and on
horseback is thoroughly practical; for even the charge itself of these
same Boers often achieved brilliant results, although they were
lacking in any kind of tactical training for this particular
result.[4]
[Footnote 4: I venture to differ from the author. The Boers
did not fight as Cavalry. Their whole tactics were those of
Mounted Infantry. They did on one or two occasions bring
about a decision by rifle fire from their horses, but I can
recall no instance where they actually charged--_i.e._,
endeavoured to decide the action by shock.--C. S. G.]
Certainly weapons and numbers have altered materially since the days
of the American Civil War, and the experiences of South Africa,
largely conditioned by the peculiar topographical conditions and the
out-of-door habits and sporting instincts of the Boers, cannot be
transferred to European circumstance without important modifications.
But even in Europe the Cavalry retain, thanks to their mobility, their
power of opening fire in a manner calculated to create the greatest
degree of surprise against the flanks and rear of the enemy as soon as
they make up their minds to cut themselves adrift from their own Army,
and get in rear of the enemy's troops. Such enterprises offer the best
guarantee of producing a great moral result. The history of the
Franco-German War demonstrated this possibility. What might not our
Cavalry have achieved in 1870-1871 against the undisciplined forces of
the Republic had they been provided with a good firearm, and sought of
a set purpose for such opportunities?
It would take us too far to produce the numerous proofs from the pages
of our War records; only, as an example, I should like to quote the
Battle of Bapaume. In this instance the 7th Cavalry Brigade belonging
to the 3rd Cavalry Division lay on the flank--in fact, almost in rear
of--the enemy's Army, without being able to come to the help of the
hard-pressed 15th Division. Had they on that occasion been able to act
by fire, by surprise, and with determination against the rear of the
French Army of the North, the results must have been invaluable.
In future, beyond doubt, we shall have to deal with much larger masses
of the enemy than formerly, and against them one must make up for want
of numbers by an enormous expenditure of ammunition, and further
endeavour to reinforce our fire power by repeating-rifles. We must
also aim at intensifying the effect of our fire power by attacking
only at decisive points. On the other hand, it must be admitted, that
in the magnitude of the masses themselves there lies the germ of
weakness, and in our future wars we can hardly expect to find Infantry
as firmly welded together as in the Armies of the past. I therefore by
no means hold the opinion that dismounted Cavalry can achieve nothing
against Infantry, or that their chances are limited to only very
favourable opportunities.
It is, of course, true that the Infantry receive a more thorough
musketry training, particularly at long ranges, and that their
education in the use of the ground, as well as in fire control, in
peace is naturally better than with the Cavalry.
But the results obtained by the Cavalry in the field practices are by
no means so much behind those of the Infantry that any superiority of
the latter on the battle-field need be expected. A better firearm for
the Cavalry is unquestionably a necessity, for the inferiority of the
carbine compared with the infantry rifle is undoubtedly a source of
weakness; but, on the other hand, we must insist that the Cavalry
possesses sources of strength peculiar to its whole organization which
render it materially superior to the Infantry.
I have already pointed out that modern Infantry, when mobilized,
cannot be considered like the Cavalry as a standing force--that is to
say, that the latter possess much greater tactical and moral cohesion.
Let us look at this question a little more closely.
A squadron at War strength can dismount, after due deduction made of
the horse-holders, seventy carbines. These seventy men, if the annual
contingent is equally divided throughout the squadron, will consist
pretty uniformly of men belonging to all three terms of their service,
and will not include more than eight reserve men, so that there will
be at most twenty recruits amongst them, whilst the remainder will
consist half of men in their third year and half of men in their
second year; but these seventy men are led by three officers,
generally all on the active list, who in turn are supported by eight
non-commissioned officers and one trumpeter, who also mostly belong to
the active list.
Against this a section of Infantry which, when raised to War strength,
is about seventy-five strong, consists of about forty men on the
active list, of whom half are recruits, the other half men in their
second year of service, and of thirty-five reservists.
It possesses, therefore, at the outside twenty trained colour
soldiers, and these are led in most cases by a Reserve or Landwehr
officer, supported by at most seven non-commissioned officers, of whom
four on an average will belong to the Reserve. This Infantry will, as
a rule, under normal peace-time conditions, as experience teaches us,
shoot very well; but it is scarcely necessary to discuss in which body
we shall find greater cohesion, or on which one is more likely to be
able to depend in cases where moral qualities and fire discipline are
all essential, and it is these qualities which primarily condition the
number of hits in the firing line. I should only like to add, apart
from all other considerations, that the direct influence of the
Leaders in the Cavalry and their knowledge of their men is much more
highly developed than in the Infantry. It must also be remembered that
there are generally much fewer skulkers in the mounted arms, partly
because of their longer period of service and closer supervision, and
partly because everybody endeavours not to be separated from his
horse, and finds in his presence with the men of his detachment the
best guarantee of getting back to it. In view of these considerations,
I think that our Cavalry can safely claim that they can engage the
best existing Continental Infantry with reasonable prospects of
success, and against inferior foot soldiers may always preserve its
sense of superiority.
Granted this much, then, the scope of our activity is enormously
increased.
We can now approach tasks which hitherto had to be regarded as
impossible, because the conviction existed that on the appearance of
the enemy's Infantry the rôle of Cavalry _ipso facto_ came to an end,
unless, indeed, an opportunity could be found for the Cavalry to
charge. For now we are in a position, in harmony with the whole spirit
of the Arm, to lay principal stress upon the offensive, even when
fighting on foot. We can carry through even serious engagements, with
chances of success which no longer depend on the favour of special
circumstances.
Confident in our own strength, we can apply tactical compulsion where
formerly we could only trust to cunning, rapidity, or luck. I hold it
to be an altogether antiquated standpoint to assume that Cavalry on
foot can only attack with hope of success when it can approach on
horseback near to its enemy, suddenly deploy against him in the most
decisive directions, and generally is in a position to utilize any
special advantages offered by local circumstances.
The campaign of 1870-1871 shows that in most cases in which the
Cavalry had to take to its firearms it was acting on the offensive,
and was compelled to attack the enemy--exactly like the Infantry--in
the most diverse situations, and to shoot its way up to him. Under
modern conditions it is clear this necessity will be even more
apparent, and it would be to deprive the Cavalry again of the
independence secured for it by the addition of the rifle to its
equipment if one were to limit its power of attack on foot only to
exceptionally favourable circumstances. The Cavalry must, in fact, be
able to attack on foot exactly like Infantry when the situation
imperatively demands it; but if it is to be handled in this spirit,
then it will require to be very strongly provided with Artillery.
If it is already considered almost impossible for Infantry to turn
well-covered defenders out of their position without Artillery
support, the same naturally applies to the Cavalry. In fact, a strong
Artillery will be all the more necessary, for the attack with Cavalry
should be carried through with the utmost rapidity, and when acting on
the defensive its purpose is to gain the greatest amount of time.
Against this must be borne in mind that the Infantry should not
without necessity be deprived of its due share of Artillery, but I
think the two views can be readily united. As long as the Cavalry
'Masses' are out in front of the Armies we can safely give them as
many horse batteries as they require, and the same is the case after a
victory or after a lost battle. In the decisive battle itself this
Artillery reinforcement to the Cavalry must not be expended
eccentrically, and must be utilized to the utmost in the most decisive
direction on the battle-field itself. Here, too, a certain elasticity
of organization is most desirable, and a strict adherence to a
prearranged order of battle can only act most prejudicially.