As I find that I have not yet touched upon some of the subjects which
I am anxious to bring under consideration. I must again beg here to
remind the reader, that having shown, in several instances, in what
manner considerable savings can be effected, I will now go on to point
out a very injudicious piece of economy, the consequences of which
have been always felt in our regiments, viz. that of never allowing
one quarter enough of ammunition for practice; and the result was,
that our soldiers, in general, I will venture to say, were probably
as bad marksmen as any in the world. Our game laws are in a certain
degree the cause that the lower orders of the people are all so
ignorant of the use of fire-arms; but this is a subject with which I
do not intend to meddle, and shall only say, that when English archers
were so formidable, the people were encouraged and even compelled
to assemble at various times of the year to practise this to them
amusing craft; and the result of this wise policy on the part of their
rulers was fully evinced in battle. I must, however, observe, that our
old-fashioned heavy muskets recoil, or kick so violently, after firing
even a few rounds, that if they then go off at all, they cause a man
to think twice, and probably to raise his eye from the object aimed
at, before he ventures to pull the trigger; but since I made a note of
this, with the intention of bringing the subject under consideration,
I find that an improvement in fire-arms, for the army in general, is
actually in contemplation.
I by no means wish to increase the quantity of blank cartridges usually
allowed to amuse grown children at mock-fights, &c. but of ball and
buckshot ammunition; for it is most desirable that the soldier should
know and be able to calculate, at what distances he ought to use both
with proper effect.
A general officer, now long in his tomb, entertained certain very odd
notions, in which I sometimes fancy that I participate; in one of his
usually laconic addresses, or exhortations, in which he was fond of
indulging even when going into action, upon one occasion, and rather
to the astonishment of the soldiers he led, though accustomed to his
ways, and after cautioning them, that he would not give the word _fire_
until he could see the white of the enemy's eyes; and he was very
near-sighted--he thus addressed them--"Now, lads, there is the enemy,
if you don't kill them, they will certainly kill you; and it is better
to break their shanks than to fire o'er the crown of their heads."
There was much to be admired in this pithy address, which could be
perfectly understood by soldiers. But I must say, that I have often
regretted seeing a useless, distant fire kept up, which had no effect
whatever upon the enemy, and certainly did not improve the taste of
our soldiers for the bayonet, in whose hands it may be always made
a very useful instrument for deciding the fate of battles. I must,
however, apologize for taking up the reader's time with these remarks,
and also for having so unceremoniously introduced the general, my
worthy ancestor, to him; yet I must beg to add, that a very brave and
esteemed friend of mine, Major Smith, 45th regiment, who fell fighting
gloriously, but too rashly, for he really went up to the French
bayonets at Busaco, had also sometimes a very odd way of expressing
himself. I remember hearing him on one occasion emphatically observe,
"I don't like your prudent officers, Sir, who deal in long shots,
and who talk so much of sparing the effusion of human blood--their
prudence, Sir, always increases it in the end, Sir." But those who
knew him will readily recognize this to be genuine; and it may be well
supposed, that he must have come up to Sir Thomas Picton's ideas of
what a good soldier should be; at all events, he considered that the
3rd division and the country, sustained an irreparable loss when Major
Smith fell. But to proceed--I beg to recommend, that there be erected,
as near as may be deemed consistent with the safety of the passers
by, and even against the high walls of barracks, sufficient mounds of
earth against which to fire with ball; and this should not only be made
the means of useful instruction, but also, like the bayonet and sword
exercises, conducive to the soldier's amusement; and whilst I would
greatly increase the allowance of ammunition for practice, I would
also suggest that a sum of money be annually granted to regiments
to be laid out at the discretion of commanding officers, in rewards
to the best shots and the best swordsmen. This is very essential, as
light troops are so much employed in modern warfare, that their being
good marksmen cannot be dispensed with; therefore, with a superior
description of musket, having a good percussion lock, serviceable in
wet as well as in dry weather, and fire never being uselessly thrown
away in action in a volley like a single report, which in former times
was considered so fine, our soldiers would be more than a match for the
Yankee Back-woodsmen, or any other troops in the world.
I have now arrived at a part of my undertaking in which I am very much
interested, and to which I am desirous of attracting attention; for
I am sure it will be readily allowed, that amongst any body of men,
there will always exist irregularities and misconduct; it is therefore
indispensable, that there should be at hand the means of making those
guilty of offences promptly feel the consequences of committing them.
With this in view, I conclude it will be thought necessary, that there
should be several small, dark, dry, and well ventilated cells in all
prisons attached to barracks at home and abroad, in which offenders
can be separately confined, either upon bread and water, low diet, or
otherwise for fixed periods, according to the present system, and to
the sentences of courts-martial, for I am obliged to write so as to
suit the times, and whilst undergoing this kind of punishment, the
inmates should be subjected to the most perfect silence; which, if duly
attended to, will soon be found to constitute the severest part of the
punishment, and to produce the most desirable results; every necessary
precaution should, therefore, be taken on this head; but it should
never be overlooked, that such kinds of punishment for the maintenance
of discipline, can never be resorted to when regiments are in the field.
In no regiment that I have ever had any thing to do with, have I yet
found the link of responsibility perfectly kept up. For instance, the
majors were not made answerable for the state of their respective
wings. The captains were almost never interfered with by the majors,
who were really little else than sinecurists: indeed, commanding
officers in general, did not like their doing so; as they too
frequently looked upon it as meddling with what did not concern them;
and they too often rendered the captains also mere nonentities with
their companies; managing all promotions, &c. (so powerful is the
love of patronage) between themselves and their adjutants. It was the
same as to granting leave of absence from the regiments, or even from
common parades; and thus captains were entirely stripped of influence.
It was also much the same with regard to men guilty of crimes or
irregularities: their names were found in guard reports; the adjutants
were made to inquire into the reasons of their confinement, and they
were sometimes sentenced by courts-martial, and even punished, without
any reference whatever being made to their captains; and I have heard
commanding officers say, that there was no use in consulting them, as
they knew nothing about their companies; but whose fault was that, and
why were they not encouraged and made to do their duty, and to look
after their men's conduct?
In former days (and I may go back even to the days of Marlborough)
captains were men of some importance, and were allowed to exercise much
more authority over their companies, than has for many years past been
the fashion. They could keep them at drill, or confined to barracks,
or camp, if their conduct was irregular, till the offenders were found
out, and punished by the soldiers themselves. These offenders were
tried by what were then called Company Courts-Martial, which consisted
of a non-commissioned officer and four privates. The sentence (nothing
else being written) having been approved of by the captain, or officer
commanding the company, it was in presence of the non-commissioned
officers, and sometimes of a subaltern, privately carried into
execution, either by the drummers of the company giving the culprit a
certain number of blows, or else all the soldiers had to do so with
the slings of their firelocks. This having been properly, and often
severely done by _themselves_, the company was considered as purified,
and were then dismissed from drill, or released from confinement
to barracks or camp. If a plan of this kind in spirit was properly
followed up, how admirably it would be found calculated for service in
the field even in our days. When the importance of company officers is
raised, so is proportionally that of the non-commissioned officers;
and does not the superiority of our companies of guards consist in the
respectability of their non-commissioned officers?
Not very long ago, what, I believe, was called Picketting, was
practised as a punishment in our regiments of cavalry for minor
offences, and I have heard from old officers, that the soldiers had
a great dread of it; they assured me it did not in the least injure
their health, or unfit them for immediate duty; and it almost entirely
obviated the necessity for flogging. Would it not therefore be well,
if the reviving of this kind of punishment in every corps, when an
army took the field, were to have due consideration. I am aware of the
outcry which most likely would be raised by injudicious men against
such a plan, and nothing would have induced me to venture to mention
it, but my abhorrence of flogging, and my fear that capital punishments
might become frequent and unavoidable, if there were no other mode,
of maintaining discipline amongst our troops. I therefore must not
shrink from suggesting it, as I feel convinced, that in the field, our
military police, might be safely trusted with the power of using it
as a punishment; and it would, I have no doubt, deter soldiers from
straggling from their corps in search of liquor or plunder.
We are constantly hearing of the horrors of flogging in our regiments,
and scarcely an instance occurs, but that some of the newspapers
endeavour to hold it up in the most exaggerated language, and strongest
colouring, to the detestation of the nation; but after all, what
is such punishment, as now inflicted, to what takes place all over
Germany, and in the armies of the Czar? We are told--and it should be
known in Great Britain--that the kind of bastinado, by which the flesh
is most cruelly torn off by the point of the stick, is so severe in
the German and other armies, that few men can stand many blows of the
corporals who inflict it; and as for the Russian knout, half a dozen
strokes, or even less, can be made fatal by a skilful hand.
Unluckily, by our mode of proceeding, punishment is, in some measure,
converted, by its slowness, into a kind of torture; and if flagellation
is to be unfortunately allowed to continue in a British army, it most
probably would be better if fewer lashes were awarded by the sentences
of courts-martial, but to be inflicted more after the manner practised
in our navy. At all events, what may be termed the teasing system,
which now prevails in regiments, and to which commanding officers,
in compliance with existing circumstances, must adhere, cannot be
productive of good, and must from necessity, and want of time and
means, be nearly abandoned when our army is actually in the field. In
what way then, I beg to ask, are officers to maintain discipline, if
their power and influence in their companies are not increased?
It has always been the practice in our army to direct attention--and in
this commanding officers of regiments had no choice--more particularly
to what was necessary for home service, or garrison duty abroad, or
their attention was called (as in the Russian service) to what would
produce effect, through a splendid display of neatness, uniformity, and
regularity in dress, messing, barrack and other arrangements; which
in themselves are much to be lauded and admired; but with regard to
what were really essential and indispensable in the field, for which
most of this instruction or knowledge, but little prepared them, such
matters seemed generally to be left to chance, or to be acquired by
both officers and men when once there; and this was one of the reasons
why so few regiments did not fall off in every respect, the very first
campaign in which they were employed.
One of the chief objects which I have in view being, however, to
do away with corporal punishment, and still to insure our having a
well-conducted and highly disciplined army, I consider as essential
towards securing this, that the utmost attention should be paid to what
was formerly so lamentably neglected--that is to say--the religious
instruction, and general education of corps. Without this all our
efforts must be useless and unavailing.
To expect that such objects can be attained by merely paying the
clergymen of towns, where troops are usually quartered, a certain
sum annually for performing clerical duties, is altogether out of
the question. Every regiment ought to have its own chaplain, and the
changes which have of late years taken place in the religious, as well
as in the moral feelings of the country, (for we ought not to attend
to the wild ideas and effusions of men, who in the present day are
leading the unwary astray,) have rendered their appointment to corps
no longer objectionable. The regimental chaplains should be required,
before appointment, to produce to the chaplain general, certificates
from bishops of the church of England, or from, at least, two ministers
of the church of Scotland, setting forth the respectability of their
characters, their fitness to discharge the religious duties, and to
direct and superintend the instruction of the regiment, to which they
might be attached, and in which a higher description of education was
hereafter to be looked for.
I must here declare, and I do so after long and serious consideration
of the subject, that the consequences of a mixture in corps of men
professing Protestant and Roman Catholic creeds have always been, that
religion, of any kind, became altogether a forbidden subject, and I
firmly believe, that much of the depravity and irregularities committed
by our soldiers, may be attributed to this cause; for what could be
expected from men, who, I may say, never gave religion even a thought.
The officers were almost all Protestants, whilst a considerable
proportion of the soldiers, in many regiments, from having been raised
in Ireland, were Papists; and it, unfortunately, yet clearly, became
the duty of those under whose command they were placed, to show no
respect of persons, or to hurt the feelings of either party on account
of religious opinions or differences; and thus what is commonly looked
upon as sacred amongst men, could not even be named, and much less
brought to the assistance of officers in the management of their men,
so that fear of punishment was all they had to depend upon (and even
corporal punishment when too frequently resorted to, lost its effects,)
for the maintenance of discipline, it was, therefore, to the system
pursued, and not to the officers that blame ought to have been attached
for much of the misconduct which the commanders of our armies, and Lord
Wellington in particular, had to lament and contend with. Much more
might be said upon this subject, but I do not wish to pursue it farther.
But let us for a moment look at the effects of unanimity in religious
views in a Russian army, in which, however, is to be clearly seen far
too much of the old Prussian severity of discipline to be productive
of good; and I am also aware, that in consequence of the power that
the upper class--themselves exempted from the conscription--possess
over their serfs, many bad characters are forced into their ranks; yet
their Emperor, generals, officers and soldiers are, I may say, of one
mind and of one religion. See the whole joining in its--to them--sacred
offices, and imposing ceremonies; and who then can deny, but that their
chiefs thus establish a firm hold upon the minds and affections of
their soldiers, who may, by this means, be led to respect morality,
and to imitate praise-worthy conduct, whilst they are at the same time
rendered more formidable as enemies.
Regimental chaplains ought to be married, and should be allowed
sufficient means to provide themselves with suitable lodgings, and
when it could be done, outside the barrack walls; and to insure their
respectability and fitness for the performance of their important
duties, they ought to receive the same pay and allowances as
pay-masters.
Very few churches in provincial towns, or villages, can afford proper
accommodation for the troops quartered in them, and they ought not
to be dependant upon this; and as regiments would thus have their
own clergymen, there should be attached to every barrack, at home or
abroad, a large comfortable school-house, in which divine service might
be performed twice a day on Sundays; so that one wing of a regiment
could be accommodated in the morning, and the other in the afternoon.
Every corps ought to have a well paid, and highly respectable
school-master, with whom no one should have a right to interfere,
but the commanding officer and chaplain; and part of the duty of the
latter should be to superintend the school and to direct the system of
education to be pursued in it. Every school-house ought to be furnished
with a carefully selected collection of books, which should be handed
over, in good order, from one chaplain to another, and according to an
inventory kept for the purpose. Of course the regiment relieved would
have to pay for any books lost or damaged. There ought to be also a
sufficient allowance of fuel and candles granted for the school-house;
and it would be most desirable that the soldiers should, as much as
possible, be induced to spend their evenings there; and in order to
increase this inducement, the books should not only be instructive,
but also amusing; and as far as practicable, different at every
station. A place of public resort of this kind, where a certain number
of non-commissioned officers should be required to be present, would
be particularly desirable everywhere, but especially in our North
American possessions, where in winter it is so difficult to find means
of amusement, for soldiers, and thereby to keep them out of mischief.
But all kinds of out-door amusements ought also to be encouraged in
every part of the world, and even money should be allowed to commanding
officers to provide what is required for them; and every thing possible
done, so as to make soldiers feel that their regiments are their homes,
and their officers their best friends. With this most desirable object
in view, officers must see what vast responsibility devolves upon them,
and how much they are called upon to teach by example.
It is well known, that in the United Kingdom, society is very
differently circumstanced to what it is in any other part of the world.
No nation can boast of such a high-minded and enlightened middle class
as we possess; and education and manners place most of them upon a
level with the highest. Almost all the officers of our army and navy
are taken from this middle class; but I regret to say, that too many
of them, as well as the first class, know as little of the habits
or feelings of the lower orders, as the latter know of theirs. Thus
the very formation of society is against that community of feeling
and interest, which ought to exist between officers and soldiers, or
sailors; and to the want of this sympathy among us, may be attributed
much of that powerful influence which dangerous men are able to
exercise over the lower orders of the people of the present day; for
they are generally destitute of the virtues or principles to be found
among men in a similar state; and the dependence in which they are
held by the more wealthy part of the community, engenders feelings of
jealousy and even dislike towards them, which may be expected at any
time, when opportunity offers, to burst forth in those acts of open
violence, which occasionally disturb the tranquillity of the empire.
The fancies and absurdities of some of our commanders in former times,
were most truly surprising; but to us who were their victims they
were any thing but amusing or laughable. Some of them ought to be
held up as beacons to warn others to avoid them; but doing so, and
showing their effects upon those under them, would occupy much more
time and space than I can devote to the purpose. But how rapidly an
army whose spirit has been already subdued by a too severe system of
discipline is vanquished, was clearly proved, by what occurred in the
year 1806. On the 7th of October in that year, the Emperor Napoleon
announced to the Senate, that he had quitted his capital to repair to
his army in Germany. Already had the Prussian army, completed to its
war establishment, passed their frontier, in all the confidence of
discipline, and had invaded Saxony; and their advanced posts had even
made their appearance not far from the cantonments of the Imperial army.
The French were instantly put in motion to cross the Rhine, and by
forced marches, the several corps occupied the points assigned them,
and every thing was arranged for advancing against the Prussians. By
the evening of the 8th, the French, after several brilliant affairs,
in which the Prussians were invariably beaten, had passed the Saale.
Events succeeded each other with great rapidity, and according to
the Emperor's account of what occurred, Marshal Davoust arrived at
Naumbourg on the night of the 12th of October. The Prussian army being
thus caught, "en flagrant délit," their left being turned, and many of
their depots of provisions taken. The king of Prussia intended to have
commenced hostilities on the 9th of October, by moving his right upon
Frankfort, his centre upon Wurtzbourg, and his left upon Bamberg; but
the Emperor seems to have anticipated this arrangement by marching upon
Saalbourg, Lobenstein, Schleitz, Gera, and Naumbourg, when the 9th,
10th, 11th, and 12th, were necessarily occupied by the Prussians in
changing their positions, and in recalling their detachments; so that
upon the 13th they were, by concentrating their troops, in number about
150,000, enabled to offer battle to the French between Capelsdorf and
Amerstadt.
At two o'clock in the afternoon of the 13th, the Emperor arrived at
Jena; and from a height occupied by his advanced guard, he reconnoitred
the Prussian position, and made his dispositions for the morrow.
The Prussian army on the morning of the 14th displayed a splendid front
of infantry, cavalry, and seven or eight hundred pieces of cannon.
All their manœuvres were executed with that precision and rapidity
which might be expected from troops who spent their lives at constant
drill, and in military evolutions; in all of which the French were
very inferior; yet they had been sufficiently taught their business as
soldiers, without that severity of discipline having been resorted to,
which too frequently dispirits men, and renders them indifferent to
events.
The results of this campaign, of seven days duration, and the famous
battle of Jena, were 30,000 prisoners, and amongst them twenty
generals; upwards of twenty colours, three hundred pieces of cannon,
and great quantities of provisions taken by the French. The Prussian
loss was estimated at 20,000 in killed and wounded; and the wreck of
their army fell back in consternation and disorder, whilst the French
admitted only the loss of a few generals, and about 1,500 men killed
and wounded.
We are not to suppose that the Emperor Napoleon could have gained such
advantages over a Prussian army, manœuvred by such able officers as
those who led it, by superiority of tactics, though he evidently wished
the world to think so; and we must attribute the results of the battle
to the gallantry and superior intelligence of the French officers and
soldiers over troops in whom such a spirit no longer existed; for had
it not, in a great measure been banished, for the time, from amongst
them, by the severity of Prussian discipline, which is most certainly
calculated to eradicate courage out of any army in the world but that
composed of English, Scotch, and Irishmen, upon whom its effects were
but too long tried; and though it did not exhaust their innate national
bravery, and love of war, yet it rendered them at all times ready and
anxious to free themselves from the restraint under which they were so
tightly kept; and when once they could contrive to get out of the sight
of their officers, and to _think_ for themselves,--to do which they
perhaps had very few opportunities in the course of their lives--they
bade farewell to subordination, and took good care, in every kind
of excess, to make up for what they had suffered, under the kind of
discipline we had in a great measure copied from the Prussians; and to
this I venture to ascribe many of our soldiers' irregularities, and
even their crimes.
Let us see the effects of such absurd discipline upon a Russian army.
In the month of June, 1807, the Russians occupied Heilsburg, where they
had collected vast quantities of provisions, and all that was necessary
for an army. Their position was excellent, and during a period of
four months every thing possible had been done to render it, by field
works, more formidable. The Russians even attempted to be the first
to commence hostilities, but they were attacked by the French, and
completely beaten with the loss of 30,000 killed and wounded, and 4,000
prisoners; while the French lost (and the results go to prove their
statements to be correct) only 700 killed, and about 2,000 wounded;
and I do not hesitate to attribute the loss of the battle of Eylau to
the same cause as I do that of Jena; that is to say, the injurious,
depressing effects of Prussian discipline; and which system seems to be
even to this day followed up in the Russian armies.
In further proof of this, I must beg the reader's attention to what I
am going to mention, and which actually occurred in a regiment that
shall be nameless.
The day was fixed upon which it was to be reviewed. Its commanding
officer was suddenly taken ill, and he was confined to his bed. So far
had preparations been carried for this great event, that even the large
cards, as was the practice in those days, containing the manœuvres
to be performed, had been made out for the inspecting General. This
illness of the Lieutenant-Colonel was an event quite unforeseen, and
the senior Major, a good-natured old gentleman, whose military career
had been in the West Indies, and who was more agreeably occupied at
the time than in studying Dundas, was completely thunderstruck when he
found that at the shortest notice he had to make up his mind to assume
the command on this truly alarming occasion; for the General was well
known to be a first-rate tiger. It was, therefore, a very hopeless case
with the gallant Major, as he really could not at any time manœuvre
a battalion, and much less under such trying circumstances; and what
made matters worse, his Lieutenant-Colonel would rarely allow him to
try whether he could do so or not, for he was one of those commanders
who carried on every thing himself, aided by his adjutant, and a well
trained set of drummers, whom he kept in constant practice.
His Adjutant was a well-meaning man, and in kindly feelings, and good
will towards the Major, and in his great zeal for the reputation of his
corps, he went with the beautifully written out card of the manœuvres
(the produce of many an anxious hour of the Lieutenant-Colonel's
valuable time) to the Major, to explain it fully to him, and also
comfort him with the hope, that as the regiment had most diligently
practised every march, counter-march, and wheel of it, things must
go off well, if he would only not be alarmed. Accordingly, that very
evening, well prompted by the Adjutant, he actually got the regiment
through it handsomely enough. At night the Adjutant went to see and
condole with his most yellow, billious-looking commander. "How will
ever the poor Major get through with the review to-morrow?" "O, there
is no fear whatever of him, for he put the regiment through _it_
tolerably this evening." "Through what, Sir--have you presumed to show
him my manœuvres?" "Yes, Sir, but I thought there could be no harm in
doing so, as----" "You thought, Sir--no harm, Sir. Go immediately, Sir,
and bring back my manœuvres, and let Major ---- make out a review for
himself--he shall certainly not have mine."
The cards were consequently delivered up to their unselfish owner. But
the Adjutant, who flattered himself, that he was also something of a
manœuvrer, though, at the risk of irritating the Lieutenant-Colonel,
thought it would be well, before he should terrify the Major out of his
senses with this awful intelligence, to sit down and concoct a very
pretty review--one, at all events, which would show that the battalion
knew how to act against an enemy in its front and rear, and probably
upon both its flanks at the same moment. In short, he went that very
night with a splendid plan, which he proudly and confidently displayed
before the astounded Major; who, at last, after a good deal of trouble,
made so far to comprehend it, that he was able next morning, at five
o'clock, to put the regiment through it very tolerably. But this was
rather sharp work upon all concerned; for the grand review was to take
place at 11, A.M.--the Major was quite hoarse--and a new card
had to be finely written out for the General.
The review came off admirably--the Major (his voice cleared by the
yolks of eggs) was not often wrong; at least this was not observed, and
it did not signify, as both officers and men had fully determined to do
well, not only on the Major's account, but on their own.
At the long wished-for conclusion, the General came solemnly forward,
and in front of the regiment, really covered the blushing, but
exhausted, Major with praises and honourable acknowledgments, and
approbation of his own and the corps' most admirable performances.
On the return of the Adjutant from the field, he, as in duty bound,
waited upon his Commanding officer. "I suppose, poor ---- made a very
pretty business of it to-day?" "A most admirable review; and I have,
upon no occasion, ever seen the regiment do better; so much, so, that
the General expressed in the strongest terms his admiration of our
day's performance!"
This was quite enough, but the symptoms of the Lieutenant-Colonel's
attack of bilious fever, were not alleviated by the account of the
Major's unlooked-for success. Such were the men to whom the command of
our regiments was too often confided, and who generally contrived to
render soldiers indifferent to events, and reckless in their conduct.
I had the luck to be stationed in the West of Ireland under a General,
who considered that nothing tended so effectually to make first-rate
soldiers, as to accustom them to prolonged exposure, under arms, to
deluges of rain, and to all kinds of weather; and certainly in that
part of Ireland, there was no want of his favourite specific--rain. I
must, however, at the same time acknowledge, that of this he himself
took ample doses. Two other regiments, and the one to which I belonged,
and a body of cavalry and artillery, formed his brigade; and the
more gloomy and threatening the weather, the more certain were we of
a repetition of the General's admired refrigerant system, for his
practice in this line was extensive and unwearied; we had frequently,
on such occasions, to take up favourite positions, and to make long
and fatiguing excursions, over high sand-hills, which were some miles
distant from our cantonments. But, notwithstanding this excellent
treatment, our soldiers did not become a whit the more water-proof; and
many of them most provokingly went into hospitals with violent pains
in their backs, bones, &c. and which, to the General's surprise, often
terminated in fever.
How differently were Sir Thomas Brisbane's kindly feelings evinced for
those placed under his care (indeed Sir Thomas Picton always wished his
commanding officers to act in the same manner). No officer commanding
a corps was allowed, under any pretence, to keep his men unnecessarily
under arms, especially after a march. As soon as the soldiers reached
their cantonments, or ground of encampment, they were ordered to be
instantly dismissed, and allowed to go into their quarters or tents
to take off their accoutrements, knapsacks, &c. so that they might as
soon as possible recover from the fatigues of the march; for keeping
men standing, after being heated, till they became chilled, was always
found to be injurious to their health.
After the troops came down the river Plata from Buenos Ayres, we were
kept in what our Generals chose to denominate, barracks afloat--that
is to say--in transports off Monte Video. One of these great officers
came unexpectedly on board our head-quarter ship, which was certainly
kept in fine order. The moment he set his foot on deck he called for
the officer of the day, who happened to be also the senior officer on
board, and ordered him to show him all over the ship. I believe he
must have been surprised at the man-of-war style adopted, and at the
extreme cleanliness and regularity of every thing (for even in spite of
the remonstrances of the masters of the transports, as to their decks
being ruined, the soldiers were kept constantly rubbing away with the
holy stones), at all events, he found no fault, but unfortunately in
passing the ship's coppers, he thought fit to demand what was in them,
and being told rice for the soldiers' dinners, he, with great dignity
and gravity, inquired of the alarmed officer the quantity of rice
in them? The unlucky wight, not knowing well what to say, and being
fully aware, that to betray ignorance upon such important points, was
an unpardonable crime, answered at once, about 1000 pounds--terrible
mistake, at least the threatened consequences were terrible--for this
worthy coadjutor of General Whitelock, in an instant, set upon the
unlucky miscalculator of boiled and unboiled rice, and declared that
he had never met with such a downright ignorant blockhead in all his
life; for the hold of the ship (and she was 700 tons burden) could not
contain that quantity when boiled; "and now, Sir," continued this great
commander, "I shall take care to make you suffer for such ignorance
and inattention to your duty, and shall report your conduct upon this
occasion to the Horse Guards, in order to have your promotion stopped."
Whether he kept his word or not I cannot tell; but I am rather inclined
to believe, that he had other matters to occupy his attention, on his
return to England, which came more home to himself.
I could bring many more examples of this kind forward, but I must no
longer occupy the reader's attention with such frivolous matters.
But it is impossible to show in a more satisfactory manner, what was
the state of a British army in the field than by giving, as I intend
to do after a few observations, a letter from his Grace the Duke of
Wellington to the Generals commanding divisions and brigades; yet,
I trust it will not be deemed presumptuous if I venture to say that
the real causes of irregularities and bad conduct on the part of
soldiers, are not always perceived or ascribed even by men of the
greatest talents and experience to the proper sources; but having, in
the retreat from Madrid and Burgos, which is that alluded to by his
Grace, had much to do with the part of the rear-guard under Sir Edward
Pakenham, who then commanded the 3rd division of infantry, during the
absence of Sir Thomas Picton, and having also seen a good deal on many
other occasions, I hope I may be considered authorized to remark, that
owing to the admirable management and unwearied exertions of Sir Edward
Pakenham, the conduct of the division on that retreat was, I may say,
tolerably good, except upon the night after we left Madrid; when many
a pig was slain in the woods, and the lives of the staff and other
officers of the division and brigades seriously endangered in their
endeavours, under a sharp fire of musketry, kept up at these animals,
to put a stop to such disorderly conduct on the part of the soldiers,
as actually left the division, from the hunt having become almost
general, at the mercy of the French, had they known what we were
about; for they were close at hand, and must have wondered what could
have occasioned the uproar and firing in our camp. But what occurred,
day after day, during the retreat amongst the numerous disorderly
stragglers from the several divisions, some of whom, in spite of all
that could be done, occasionally fell into the hands of the enemy,
most clearly evinced very bad conduct on the part of the troops, and
also a want of management somewhere; but the irregularities, his Grace
laments, were comparatively nothing to what occurred in the retreat to
Corunna. In this instance, also, the weather, as usual in Spain, in
the month of November, was very severe, so much so, that some men who
had been barely able to reach the resting, or rather halting place for
the night, which was, perhaps, an open ploughed field, become quite a
swamp from the rain, were in the morning found dead, from the effects
of cold, wet, and want of sufficient food, much of which, from those
having charge of it, not knowing in what direction to move, had gone
astray; and in one instance, we, as rear-guard, obtained a supply
of biscuit, by taking a quantity of it off the hands of a conductor
of a brigade of mules, who, in a few minutes more, had he not been
prevented, would have led them in amongst the enemy.
After the troops from Madrid and Burgos met, the army, when there
were roads running nearly parallel to each other, marched generally
in two columns; but I must say matters were not always well managed,
and we had no properly organized police, who could have promptly,
when necessary, enforced discipline, for what were a few provosts
with their infantry guards, generally accompanying the baggage? The
columns sometimes unfortunately and probably unavoidably, came into
contact with each other on the same road, occasioning a certain degree
of confusion, which afforded opportunities for some of the soldiers
to escape from under the eyes of their officers, however watchful
they might be, and to become as usual irregular; and at other times
the columns (probably also unavoidably), considering the state of the
weather, the nature of the country, and the then bad roads, were at
times too far asunder, and the communication not having been kept up as
it should have been by either our cavalry or infantry, the army became
liable to sudden and unlooked for events; and in one instance of this
kind, I believe it was, that one of our generals was taken by a French
patrole, that through mistake, occasioned by the rain, and a hazy state
of the atmosphere, and a want of proper precaution on our part, had
actually contrived to get in between our columns, certainly not very
much to our military credit.
When his Grace's letter reached us after the retreat, the feeling of
the officers commanding brigades and corps was, that, in this instance,
if nothing were said about the pig hunt, the 3rd division, although a
few of its soldiers had fallen into the hands of the enemy, did not
deserve the censure pronounced against the army in general; and it was
thought right that Sir Edward Pakenham should be waited upon, in order
to induce him to point out this to Lord Wellington, for they were
besides hurt at the implied superiority of the French in even making
fires and in quick cooking. Sir Edward, however, soon settled the
matter, by declaring in his usually laconic manner, that "he would do
no such thing," and adding, "let whoever the cap fits wear it."
They all knew well in what this supposed superiority of the French
lay, for the truth was, they never hesitated to turn a town or village
inside out, if it suited their purposes, or to pull down a house, or
half a dozen of them, if necessary, so as to get dry wood for their
fires, whereas our people had to be marched regularly under officers
for beef, bread, water, and wood, and they had seldom any thing else
for it, but to cut down, bring in, and use the green branches of trees
as fuel to cook with. This accounts for the observable difference
between the two armies, for when our soldiers occasionally, and when
not a tree was to be seen, got a house or two to burn, which were
always paid for, they could then cook as quickly as their practised
foes.
"Sir, _Frenada, Nov. 28th, 1812._
"I have ordered the army into cantonments, in which I hope that
circumstances will enable me to keep them for some time, during which
the troops will receive their clothing, necessaries, &c. which are
already in progress by different lines of communication to the several
divisions and brigades.
"But besides these objects I must draw your attention in a very
particular manner to the state of discipline of the troops. The
discipline of every army, after a long and active campaign, becomes in
some degree relaxed, and requires the utmost attention on the part of
the general and other officers to bring it back to that state in which
it ought to be for service; but I am concerned to have to observe that
the army under my command has fallen off in this respect in the late
campaign to a greater degree _than_ any army with which I have ever
served, or of which I have ever read. Yet this army has met with no
disaster; it has suffered no privations, which but trifling attention
on the part of the officers could not have prevented, and for which
there existed no reason whatever in the nature of the service; nor has
it suffered any hardships, excepting those resulting from the necessity
of being exposed to the inclemencies of the weather at a moment when
they were most severe.
"It must be obvious however to every officer, that from the moment the
troops commenced their retreat from the neighbourhood of Burgos on the
one hand, and from Madrid on the other, the officers lost all command
over their men. Irregularities and outrages of all descriptions were
committed with impunity, and losses have been sustained which ought
never to have occurred.
"Yet the necessity for retreating existing, none was ever made in which
the troops made such short marches; none in which they made such long
and repeated halts, and none in which the retreating armies were so
little pressed on their rear by the enemy. We must look therefore for
the existing evils, and for the situation in which we now find the
army to some cause, besides those resulting from the operations in
which we have been engaged.
"I have no hesitation in attributing these evils to the habitual
inattention of the officers of the regiments to their duty, as
prescribed by the standing regulations of the service, and by the
orders of this army.
"I am far from questioning the zeal, still less the gallantry and
spirit of the officers of the army, and I am quite certain, that if
their minds can be convinced of the necessity of minute and constant
attention to understand, recollect, and carry into execution the orders
which have been issued for the performance of this duty, and that the
strict performance of this duty is necessary to enable the army to
serve the country as it ought to be served, they will in future give
their attention to these points.
"Unfortunately the inexperience of the officers of the army has induced
many to consider that the period during which an army is on service is
one of relaxation from all rule, instead of being, as it is, the period
during which of all others every rule for the regulation and control
of the soldier, for the inspection and care of his arms, ammunition,
accoutrements, necessaries, and his field equipments, and his horse
and horse appointments, for the receipt and issue and care of his
provisions, and the regulation of all that belongs to his food, and the
forage of his horse, must be most strictly attended to by the officers
of his company or troop, if it is intended that an army, and a British
army in particular, shall be brought into the field of battle in a
state of efficiency to meet the enemy on the day of trial.
"These are points then to which I most earnestly intreat you to turn
your attention, and the attention of the officers of the regiments
under your command, Portuguese as well as British, during the period in
which it may be in my power to leave the troops in their cantonments.
The commanding officers of regiments must enforce the orders of the
army, regarding the constant inspection and superintendance of the
officers over the conduct of the men of their companies in their
cantonments, and they must endeavour to inspire the non-commissioned
officers with a sense of their situation and authority, and the
non-commissioned officers must be forced to do their duty, by being
constantly under the view and superintendance of the officers. By these
means the frequent and discreditable recourse to the authority of the
Provost, and the punishments by the sentence of courts-martial will
be prevented, and the soldiers will not dare to commit the offences
and outrages, of which there are too many complaints, when they know
that the officers and non-commissioned officers have their eyes and
attention turned towards them.
"The commanding officers of regiments must likewise enforce the orders
of the army, regarding the constant _real_ inspection of the soldiers'
arms, ammunition, accoutrements, and necessaries, in order to prevent
at all times the shameful waste of ammunition, and the sale of that
article, and of the soldiers' necessaries. With this view, both should
be inspected daily.
"In regard to the food of the soldier, I have frequently observed and
lamented in the late campaign, the facility and celerity with which the
French soldiers cooked, in comparison with those of our army.
"The cause of this disadvantage is the same with that of every other
description, the want of attention of the officers to the orders of
the army, and to the conduct of their men, and the consequent want of
authority over their conduct. Certain men of each company should be
appointed to cut and bring in wood, others to fetch water, and others
to get the meat, &c., to be cooked; and it would soon be found, if this
practice were daily enforced, and a particular hour for seeing the
dinners, and for the men dining named, as it ought to be, equally as
for the parade, that cooking would no longer require the inconvenient
length of time which it has lately been found to take, and that the
soldiers would not be exposed to the privation of their food at the
moment at which the army may be engaged in operations with the enemy.
"You will, of course, give your attention to the field exercise and
discipline of the troops. It is very desireable, that the soldiers
should not lose the habit of marching; and the divisions should march
ten or twelve miles twice in each week, if the weather should permit,
and the roads in the neighbourhood of the cantonments of the division
should be dry. But I repeat, that the great object of the attention
of the general and field officers must be, to get the captains and
subalterns of regiments to understand and perform the duties required
of them, as the only mode by which the discipline and efficiency of the
army can be restored and maintained during the next campaign.
"I have the honour to be, &c. &c.
(Signed) "Wellington.
"_To the Officer commanding -- Division._"
The Duke of Wellington in this letter again accuses the officers of
being, in a great measure, the cause of irregularities, by their
neglect of duty; nevertheless, I still venture to attribute the bad
conduct of the soldiers more particularly to what I am convinced was
the chief cause, viz. the description of men they had to deal with.
As a proof of this, we find what follows in a general order, dated
Vizar, 28th February, 1810. "No. 6. The Commander of the Forces draws
the attention of the soldiers of the army to the consequences of the
crimes committed by the soldiers thus ordered for execution, under
the sentence of a General Court-Martial. Cornelius McGuire, of the
27th regiment, and George Chambers, of the 88th regiment, committed a
crime, which the Commander of the Forces is concerned to observe is too
common in this army; they robbed and ill-treated an inhabitant of this
country, whom they met on the road; a crime which the Commander of the
Forces is determined in no instance to forgive.
"The soldiers of the army have been invariably well treated by the
inhabitants of Portugal, and the frequent instances which have
occurred of their being robbed and ill treated, and of murder being
committed, by soldiers who straggle from their detachments on a march,
are a disgrace to the character of this army, and of the British nation.
"The Commander of the Forces is therefore determined, in every instance
of the kind, that may occur, to have proof adduced of the crime
committed, and the sentences of the General Courts-Martial, whatever
they may be, shall be carried into execution.
"The Commander of the Forces is concerned to observe, that the crime
committed by John McDonough, private in the 58th regiment, is no less
common in this army, than robbery and murder, and in respect to this
crime, (repeated desertion) he is equally determined to carry into
execution, the sentences of the General Courts-Martial, whatever they
may be."
We again find in a general order, dated Coimbra, 30th September,
1810, that four soldiers of the 45th regiment were found guilty, and
sentenced to be executed, for stopping on the highway, assaulting,
and robbing some Portuguese inhabitants, at, or near the bridge of
St. Euphemia; and which sentence was confirmed by his Excellency the
Commander of the Forces, but who was, as will be seen by what follows,
pleased to pardon them. "No. 3. Although the Commander of the Forces
has long determined that he will not pardon men guilty of crimes of
which the prisoners have been convicted, he is induced to pardon these
men in consequence of the gallantry displayed by the 45th regiment
on the 27th instant. (Battle of Busaco.) He trusts that this pardon
will make a due impression upon the prisoners, and that by their
future regular and good conduct, they will endeavour to emulate their
comrades, who have, by their bravery, saved them from a disgraceful
end."
I have already stated, that our soldiers certainly possess one
redeeming quality, which is undaunted courage in battle; but how
lamentable it was constantly to find that this was so much marred by
irregularities and crimes, which invariably and instantly followed the
most brilliant displays of it. As an instance of this, I beg to say,
that upon the night of the storming of Ciudad Rodrigo, I was in the
trenches with the 45th regiment, which was destined to lead the assault
of the main breach. Whilst waiting for the hour fixed upon for this
purpose, an order arrived from Sir Thomas Picton, to form a forlorn
hope. The officers commanding companies were therefore called together,
and desired to bring to the head of the column, six men from each for
the purpose. They soon returned, but to my surprise, unaccompanied
by a single soldier, all of them declaring, that every man present
volunteered for the pre-eminence, and they wished to know how they were
to act, for that the oldest soldiers claimed it as their right. Well
might officers be proud of such men, who could evince such a spirit
with the breach, I may say, yawning for their destruction. The moment
for the assault had however arrived--no time could be spared--the
officer commanding knew not well what to do, when the Captain of
Grenadiers, (now Major Martin) who was there dreadfully wounded, put an
end to all difficulties, by requesting permission to lead as he stood
with his company at the head of the column. This was very reluctantly
acquiesced in, but there was no time to make any other arrangements,
and thus the regiment advanced rapidly, but compactly and in perfect
order, towards the breach.
The outer edge of the ditch was soon reached. The 45th, stoutly
supported by the 88th and 74th, the other fine corps composing the
leading brigade, jumped in upon bags of hay thrown there by the
sappers. At that instant a very loud and prolonged explosion took
place, seemingly at the foot of the breach, which, providentially,
the regiment had not then reached. This did not, even for a moment,
stop their progress, and the rugged breach was ascended under a most
destructive fire from all points. Many brave men had already fallen.
The enemy's fire continued to be most ruinous, and to our horror we
saw that the breach was completely cut off, and that there was no
possibility of advancing or descending into the city. The left was
first tried, but in vain; and although the loss of officers and men of
the brigade, but especially of the leading regiment was very great, yet
no one supposed that retracing our steps could even be thought of. I
had just made my way back, but with great difficulty, from the left of
the breach, when I met General McKinnon, who commanded the brigade,
and who had, by some means or other, contrived to get through the
dense crowd below; and though I tried, amidst the uproar, to make him
understand how we were situated, and that we could not gain ground to
the left, yet he seemingly did not understand me, and went on in that
direction. Whilst thus situated, another and a most dreadful explosion
took place, which shook the ramparts like a powerful earthquake, and
destroyed General McKinnon and most of those who had followed him.
A short but fearful pause insued, when Brigade-Major Wylde suddenly
appeared, coming greatly animated from the right, and pointing in that
direction; all followed him with loud cheers, and I will venture to
say, that he was the first man, who that night entered Ciudad Rodrigo.
In their hurry in falling back from the breach, the French had not had
time to remove a few planks laid across the cut to our right, and more
were found on the other side; and thus by unflinching and persevering
gallantry on the part of the leading brigade of the 3rd division, under
a most appalling fire, the city was carried.
I make no remarks upon the gallantry of those employed at the smaller
breach, but undaunted courage was unquestionably displayed upon this
occasion by the soldiers; but all the corps engaged immediately broke
away in search of plunder and liquor, or with the intention of enjoying
themselves in every kind of irregularity and excess, and that too in
spite of the utmost exertions of their officers, who could not for a
moment be supposed capable of countenancing their atrocities.
I found myself again with the 45th regiment, which had in so noble a
manner volunteered the forlorn hope, and had led so gallantly into
the breach. A great part of the regiment had been got together, by
the officers' exertions, in a large building in which they posted
themselves immediately after the city was gained. The officers had
begun to flatter themselves, and even to say to each other, that the
corps would surely in this instance gain great credit for its proper
behaviour; but while some watched one door, and all thought they had
the soldiers secure for once, and out of harm's way, they almost all
contrived to escape by another, and the officers, however zealous, had
nothing for it, but to arm themselves with patience and resignation.
Nevertheless several of them were ordered out into the streets to
endeavour to bring back the stragglers, but the horrors witnessed,
and which could not by any means be prevented, were beyond belief or
description. I well remember, looking on in dismay, at a party of these
madmen, belonging to all the corps engaged, sitting round a table,
in a large house, carousing, singing, cheering, and firing off their
muskets. The windows were all open, so that we could see every thing
that was going forward, for the house was in a blaze about them. I
called aloud, and did every thing possible to induce them to come out,
but all in vain; they neither listened to me, nor to several other
officers who were equally exerting themselves to save them, and we even
ran great risks of being shot by these idiots, who continued drinking,
singing, firing and cheering, and in which delightful occupations, I
saw that they were most cordially joined by some of the French garrison.
This noise, however, and the reports of their muskets suddenly ceased;
the roof of the building had fallen in, and they were all swallowed up
amidst the ruins!
These wretched men were, I conclude, returned by their regiments as
killed in the assault of the fortress.
Lord Wellington, I have reason to believe, ordered the 45th regiment,
(then under the command of the present Major-General Sir Leonard
Greenwell,) such was his opinion of their firmness, at the battle of
Fuentes d'Onor, to receive in line, and without forming square, the
enemy's cavalry then advancing in force towards them, if they should
venture to charge. The experiment was not, however, made, for the
French, I conclude, observing such a steady determined front presented
to them, thought it wiser to retire, especially as they were at the
time suffering severely from our cannon; but I have no doubt, as to
what would have been the result, had they ventured to charge; yet
this, if even successful, could not have been compared to the splendid
achievement of the 5th regiment, in the famous retreat of the 3rd
division from Elbodon to Guinaldo, in which I saw that corps receive
the charge of the French cavalry steadily and firmly; to my delight and
astonishment, however, they in turn charged them, and drove them down
the hill with considerable loss. The 5th and 45th were, perhaps, as
steady under arms, and as well conducted regiments as any in the army;
yet I have seen both led away at sieges, and upon other occasions, when
opportunities presented themselves, like the rest. I feel, however,
that I ought here to give Lord Wellington's orders issued immediately
after the retreat alluded to.
"G.O. _Richosa, 2d October, 1811._
"No. 3. The Commander of the Forces is desirous of drawing the
attention of the army to the conduct of the 2d battalion, 5th and 77th
regiments, and the 21st Portuguese regiment, and Major Arentschild's
Portuguese artillery, under the command of the Hon. Major-General
Colville, and of the 11th Light Dragoons and 1st Hussars, under
Major-General Alten, in the affair with the enemy on the 26th ult.
These troops were attacked by between thirty and forty squadrons of
cavalry, with six pieces of cannon, supported by a division consisting
of fourteen battalions of infantry, with cannon.
"No. 4. The Portuguese artillerymen were cut down at their guns before
they quitted them; but the 2nd battalion, 5th regiment, attacked the
cavalry which had taken the guns, and retook them. At the same time the
77th regiment were attacked in front by another body of cavalry, upon
which they advanced and repulsed them.
"No. 5. While these actions were performed, Major-General Alten's
brigade, of which there were only three squadrons on the ground, were
engaged on the left, with numbers infinitely superior to themselves.
These squadrons charged repeatedly, supporting each other, and took
above twenty prisoners; and notwithstanding the immense superiority of
the enemy, the post would have been maintained, if the Commander of the
Forces had not ordered the troops to withdraw from it, seeing that the
action would become still more unequal, as the enemy's infantry were
likely to be engaged in it, before the reinforcement ordered to the
support of the post could arrive.
"No. 6. The troops then retired with the same determined spirit, and
in the same good order with which they had maintained their post--the
2nd battalion, 5th regiment, and 77th, in one square, and the 21st
Portuguese regiment in another, supported by Major-General Alten's
cavalry and the Portuguese artillery. The enemy's cavalry charged
three faces of the square of the British infantry, but were beaten
off; and finding from their repeated fruitless efforts, that the brave
troops were not to be broken, they were contented to follow them at
a distance, and with firing upon them with their artillery, till the
troops joined the remainder of the 3rd division, and were afterwards
supported by a brigade of the 4th division.
"Although the 21st Portuguese regiment were not actually charged by the
cavalry, their steadiness and determination were conspicuous, and the
Commander of the Forces observed with pleasure the order and regularity
with which they made all their movements, and the confidence they
showed in their officers.
"No. 7. The Commander of the Forces has been particular in stating the
details of this action in the general orders, as, in his opinion, it
affords a memorable example of what can be effected by steadiness,
discipline and confidence. It is impossible that any troops can, at
any time, be exposed to the attack of numbers relatively greater than
those which attacked the troops under Major-General Colville, and
Major-General Alten, on the 25th of September; and the Commander of
the Forces recommends the conduct of those troops to the particular
attention of the officers and soldiers of the army, as an example to be
followed on all such circumstances.
"No. 8. The Commander of the Forces considers Major-General Alten and
Major-General Colville, and the commanding officers of the regiments
under their command, respectively, viz. Lieutenant-Colonel Cummings,
Lieutenant-Colonel Arentschild, Lieutenant-Colonel Broomhead, Major
Ridge, and Colonel Bacellar of the 21st Portuguese regiment, and
the officers and soldiers under their command to be entitled to his
particular thanks, and he assures them that he has not failed to report
his sense of their conduct in the action of the 25th September to those
by whom he trusts it will be duly appreciated and recollected."
His Grace the Duke of Wellington very rarely bestowed such public
praise upon any part of his army; yet how strange it was that soldiers
who could, in the presence of their officers, behave so bravely
and merit such encomiums should, when out of their sight, act so
recklessly. I do not hesitate in saying that the officers of the army
deserved more credit for whatever was found deserving of commendation
in their men than was usually allowed them. It was of old a common
saying that, "with French officers and English soldiers the world might
easily be conquered." Whatever slur this may have been intended to
convey against British officers, it certainly no longer exists, and it
could be easily proved that they are now second to none; and all they
want is a superior description of men to act with, which the United
Kingdom can easily furnish, and a better system for their guidance--a
system which would allow them to treat those placed under them as
beings endowed with reason, and not as mere pieces of machinery.
The castle of Badajoz, after three unsuccessful attempts, was at last
carried chiefly through the wonderful exertions, persevering zeal
and gallantry of the officers of the 3rd division, several of whom
had waited, according to orders, just before the assault, upon Sir
James Kempt, then one of its generals of brigade, when a plan of the
castle was shown to them, and much pains taken to point out what was
to be overcome in order to capture it; and it must have been obvious
to those officers, that retreating, when once under the walls of the
castle, was quite impossible, and this clearly shows that the idea of
a false attack could never have been entertained; indeed it was talked
of and considered by many of us as an enterprise fit only for the
knight-errants of old.
To these explanations, and to the extraordinary perseverance and
gallantry of the officers, I have always chiefly attributed the
taking of the Castle of Badajoz by the 3rd division. But in giving
what follows, I cannot avoid again calling the reader's attention to
the praises so justly due to the officers, and also to the soldiers
for undaunted courage in following them; and I regret to say, to the
censure, the next moment, so well deserved by the latter. It may be
asked, why I persevere in making such severe remarks upon the conduct
of our soldiers? I readily answer, that my only motive is to induce the
country, if possible, to employ hereafter such men, as can be called
out in the way I have proposed in our armies, and not the inferior and
most difficult to be restrained part of our fine and warlike population.
"G.O. _Camp before Badajoz, 7th April, 1812._
"No. 1. The Commander of the Forces returns his thanks to the general
officers, officers and soldiers of the 3rd, 4th, and light divisions,
to the Royal engineers and artillery, and to the Portuguese artillery,
for their persevering patience and laborious industry, and the
gallantry which they have uniformly manifested throughout the late
siege of Badajoz.
"In thanking them for the uncommon gallantry displayed last night in
the assault of the place, under the most trying circumstances, the
Commander of the Forces must include among those the general officers,
officers and soldiers of the 5th division."
"G.O. _Fuente Guinaldo, 16th May, 1812._
"No. 1. The Commander of the Forces has great satisfaction in
communicating to the army the following extract of a letter from the
Earl of Liverpool, one of his Majesty's principal Secretaries of
State, dated Downing-street, 28th April, 1812:--
'His Royal Highness has commanded me to express to your Lordship the
sense he entertains of the great services rendered to this country, and
to her allies, by the reduction of Badajoz.
'The Prince Regent has perused with most sincere regret the long
list of brave men who have suffered in this memorable siege, and
particularly in the assault of Badajoz, on the night of the 6th
instant. Never, perhaps, was immoveable intrepidity more imperiously
required, and never was it more conspicuously and more gloriously
displayed.
'The great proportion of officers of high rank who have bled in this
tremendous conflict, affords an affecting proof of the zeal with which
they pointed out the path of victory to their willing followers.
'The Prince Regent desires that your Lordship will receive his Royal
thanks for your conduct throughout these important and arduous
operations; and likewise that you would convey his thanks, in the
most public manner to the general officers, the officers of engineers
and artillery, and to all the officers, non-commissioned officers and
soldiers, (both British and Portuguese) employed under your command,
at the siege of Badajoz, for their distinguished services on this
occasion, in which their superiority has been so unequivocally and
nobly manifested.'"
But we must now, I am sorry to say, turn to the other side of the
picture:--
"G.O. _Camp before Badajoz, 7th April, 1812._
"No. 4. The regiments of the 5th division are to return to their
bivouac by regiments, as soon as Lieutenant-General Leith will think
proper, excepting the Royal Scots and 9th regiment, which are to remain
in Badajoz as late this day, 'till the soldiers will have been turned
out of the town and order will be restored."
"After General Order. _7th April 1812._
"No. 1. It is now full time that the plunder of Badajoz should cease,
and the Commander of the Forces requests that an officer and six steady
non-commissioned officers may be sent from each regiment, British and
Portuguese, of the 3rd, 4th, 5th and light divisions into the town
to-morrow morning at five o'clock, in order to bring away any men that
may be straggling there.
"No. 2. The Commander of the Forces has ordered the Provost-marshal
into the town, and he has orders to execute men he may find in the act
of plunder after he shall arrive there."
"G.O. _Camp before Badajoz, 8th April, 1812,
at 11 o'clock, p.m._
"No. 1. The rolls must be called in camp every hour, and all persons
must attend till further orders.
"No. 2. Brigadier-General Power is ordered and held responsible that no
British or Portuguese soldiers, except those belonging to the place,
or having a passport from a field-officer, shall go into Badajoz till
further orders.
"No. 3. The Commander of the Forces is sorry to hear that the brigade
in Badajoz, instead of being a protection to the people, plunder them
more than those who stormed the town.
"No. 6. The Commander of the Forces calls upon the staff officers of
the army and the commanding and other officers of regiments, to assist
him in putting an end to the disgraceful scenes of drunkenness and
plunder which are going on at Badajoz.
"No. 7. The Provost-marshal of the army, and the Assistant Provosts of
the several divisions, are to attend there to-morrow at daylight and
throughout the day.
"No. 8. Brigadier-General Power is requested to place 50 men, with
officers in proportion, on guard at the gate of Elvas, and another of
the same number at the breaches; and to prevent soldiers from entering
the town, or from quitting it with bundles of any description.
"No. 9. British and Portuguese soldiers are forbid to go into Badajoz,
and the Provosts are to punish those they may find there as being
guilty of disobedience of orders, unless they have a pass signed by a
field officer, or the commanding officer of the regiment."
This must surely open the eyes of the most incredulous as to the
behaviour of our army; but even long before the Peninsular war the
conduct of the British soldiers, wherever they had an opportunity of
breaking loose, was much to be deplored, indeed nothing can show this
more strongly than the following extracts from a modern publication,
and for the correctness of which I think I could answer, from what I
myself saw in South America.
"We took the cannon and turned them on the fugitives, after which
we pursued them into Maldonado, and sweeping from house to house,
were in five minutes masters of the town. Then followed a scene of
barricading and plunder, such as I have no words to describe. While
some ran to fill up the ends of the streets with barrels, cars, and
household furniture, others broke into wine and spirit stores, or
ranged through the dwellings of the inhabitants, carrying destruction
and terror into all their quarters. For our commandant gave his people
three hours license, and never surely did men make better use of the
opportunities afforded them. It was in vain that the officers flew
from cellar to cellar, knocking in the heads of casks, and pouring out
the contents into the streets. The soldiers if they could not get at
liquor elsewhere, dropped their canteens into the kennel and were soon
in a state which set all subordination and discipline at defiance. It
was well for us that the Spaniards did not think of returning to the
attack. If they had done so, we should have been cut to pieces almost
without resistance." We again read in the same publication, "Meanwhile
the few among our people who were fit for duty, took the out-posts,
and the rest slept where they had fallen down: some in houses, some in
the streets, but all in a state of helpless intoxication. Under such
circumstances, the night was, to those in command, an anxious one."
I think it must now be allowed, that the object I have in view has been
effected; and that I have brought forward sufficient to sanction my
entertaining a hope, that the plans I have proposed for calling out
men for our regular army may be deemed worthy of notice; and I also
trust that after what I have shown to be the conduct of our soldiers,
in spite of the utmost exertions of their officers, the idea of
enlisting men at low bounties for the militia will be well considered
before it is adopted.