There are many schools in which officers should study in order to gain
a perfect knowledge of the military profession, but certainly none
can be selected superior to that of experience, in which previously
acquired science or theory can be usefully exemplified. But the best
of all teachers is decidedly Cæsar, who still speaks to soldiers in a
language which they can understand; and of this Napoleon was so well
aware, that he always expected his officers to have carefully studied
that great general's Commentaries, and which are so well translated
into French by General Toulongeon. As an instance--selected out of
many to be found in that finely written narrative--what can possibly
be a more admirable piece of military policy, than when Cæsar, as
he tells us, having found that his army had become alarmed at the
accounts received of the warlike appearance, and desperate valour of
the Germans under Ariovistus, he decides at once, to allow all who had
no stomach for fighting to depart, if they thought fit to do so; and
which instantly produced the effects he so wisely anticipated. And let
me ask, if a British army were again to get into a scrape, like that in
which the 3rd division, and part of our troops, found themselves on the
Garonne, just before the battle of Toulouse, and had at least four to
one pitted against them; and if our General announced, that those who
did not like the appearance of matters might go home; how many would go?
Cæsar perfectly understood the feelings of a Roman army, and knew how
to act upon them; but let us see what were those of even a commander of
a British regiment.
Colonel Forbes was left by order of Sir Thomas Picton, after the 3rd
division moved up the Garonne towards Toulouse, with the 45th regiment,
to guard the pontoon bridge across it, where a considerable part of
the army had passed. He had reason to think that a battle was about to
be fought; and the idea of his remaining in the rear in command, even
of such a regiment as the 45th, and though employed upon an important
duty, was intolerable. Almost every hour I received a letter from him,
urging me to represent to Sir Thomas Brisbane how unhappy he and his
regiment felt, at being left in such a situation; and entreating that
he might be allowed to give up his post to some troops more in the
rear, or to detachments coming up to join the army. His impatience was
for some time laughed at; but at last I had the pleasure of sending him
orders to abandon his post, and to replace himself and his regiment at
the head of the right brigade of the 3rd division. He came up just in
time for the battle of Toulouse; and in it he fell, gallantly leading
on his regiment in the unfortunate attempt made to force the passage of
the canal.
To be able to take advantage of the proper moment for acting upon
national feeling or character, is a strong proof of an officer being
qualified to command. But a Commander-in-Chief cannot give the world a
stronger proof of his fitness or unfitness for his high station than in
the men by whom he surrounds himself or employs--if the choice is left
to him--upon the staff of the army placed under his orders.
It is the opinion of many of our best soldiers, that no officer should
ever be taken from his regiment to be employed upon the staff, unless
his place in it be immediately and permanently supplied by another; for
no corps ought thus to be deprived of those allowed for carrying on its
duties; and such appointments have often been found to injure, in some
degree, the individuals themselves ever after as regimental officers.
What a corps might suffer in being thus deprived of its officers,
seemed to be always overlooked; and interest or patronage alone too
often guided those who had the power of recommending or selecting
officers for such important appointments; their fitness to perform the
duties attached to them was quite another matter, with which they did
not appear to trouble themselves; and I have no doubt but I would be
set down as a mere simpleton in the ways of the world, if I were to
imagine that they would ever act otherwise.
It must be acknowledged, that our selections of officers for staff
appointments were too often injudicious; but I do not allow that they
were ever carried to the extent, shewn by an able French writer, that
they were brought in France at the commencement of the year 1792,
when the Etat Major of their armies were in so wretched a state, that
it was found necessary to re-establish, quietly, but imperfectly,
what had been destroyed by a decree of the 5th of October, 1790. The
difficulties of the service augmented incessantly, from their ignorance
even of the old forms gone through, and which some fancied they could
remedy, by multiplying the numbers employed. The power of attaching
assistants to the Etat Major consequently grew into a complete abuse;
and at last, in the month of April, 1792, rose to such a pitch, that
what with the numbers employed, and through the choice made, the
Minister of War saw himself forced to try to put things to rights, by
a circular letter addressed to Generals commanding military divisions,
and which led to the dismissal from their employments of the whole of
these assistants. It, however, soon after became necessary to employ
the same, or others equally useless; and this letter did not by any
means put a stop to the increasing evils of interest and patronage,
for there were still appointed to the Etat Major the most improper
and ignorant men, and even girls, who had mounted uniforms, and
substituted the sword for the distaff. We are told that there is still
to be seen a letter from General Dumourier to Pache, the Minister of
War, reproaching him for having sent to his army an opera dancer as
an adjutant-general. Men of abilities were, as may be well supposed,
disgusted, whilst they were overwhelmed with business, to make up for
the ignorance of others; and they were necessitated to use every
expedient in order to get through, in any way, the tasks assigned them;
and thus the service only presented one mass of confusion, the Minister
of War not receiving connected reports or returns; and, as a matter of
course, he could not give satisfactory information, when called upon
to do so, to those really interested in knowing the state of the army.
Another circular was, in consequence, issued by the Minister of War,
dated Paris, the 20th of April, 1793; but it had no effect whatever,
because it was not only unreasonable, but ridiculous, to require from
men what they neither could do, nor knew how to do. The Committee of
Public Safety, struck with this state of things, set about putting
matters to rights; but two or three of its members, interested that the
disorders should continue, found means to overturn all, and the state
of the Etat Major was allowed to remain as hopeless as ever. It was
not therefore until about the 4th year of the Republic, that they were
able in some measure to put things into order, by turning out ignorant
and incapable men, and the Etat Major then became composed of some good
officers, who established plans to keep its machinery in movement; but
France had then had time to see the danger, which there always is, in
even slightly disorganizing useful establishments, under the pretence
of reforming them. These remarks do not apply directly to us, farther
than in the occasional appointment, through interest, of inefficient
officers, for the returns of a British army, at least its regiments,
were and are still well and regularly kept. Yet, I must say, that for
the guidance of our staff in the field, we can scarcely show that we
have a system, or what ought to be considered as such.
The staff of an army ought to be a distinct and permanent branch of
the service, and no officers should be employed upon it but those who
had received such an education, as is usually given to our engineers,
the usefulness of which is so ably demonstrated by experiments and
practice under Colonel Pasley, whose establishment for instruction (if
we except what the artillery are taught at Woolwich,) is the only one
worth keeping up; but it is a great drawback to our military service,
that the officers of engineers are not more frequently placed in high
responsible situations, and intrusted with high important commands and
missions; at all events, officers employed even as Aides-de-Camp, but
certainly as Brigade-Majors, or in the departments of the Adjutant
and Quarter-Master-General, should have had a first-rate military
education; but I repeat, that I would not ask where it had been
acquired, whether in France, Germany, or wherever it can be had upon
the most reasonable terms, for in England it is far too expensive.
Staff officers ought to be men of talents and of great enterprise and
perseverance, and should possess even a certain knowledge of what
is considered business, both in a civil and military point of view,
which would render them capable of ascertaining and calling forth the
various resources of a country. They should also be well acquainted
with military police duties, or the best modes of exercising military
law, in all its bearings, and to enable them to do this with advantage
to the army, and to the country, they should have attached to them
an intelligent _mounted police corps_. From the want of such an
establishment, which it is the work of years to form, how often, and
how severely have our armies suffered, and must continue to suffer till
a change takes place.
Inexperienced officers, if even well educated, taken suddenly from
their regiments, and, according to the fancy of general officers, or
in compliance with the wishes of injudicious and interested friends,
are unfit for, and must be ignorant of the complicated duties of the
staff; and our generals, at least of old, were themselves too often
unequal to instruct them. The consequences therefore invariably were,
that on first taking the field, nothing could be worse managed than the
departments over which our misnamed staff had to preside. The system,
if it deserved to be so called, being undefined or ill-digested, the
movements or manœuvres of the army, were, as a matter of course, often
badly arranged, and nearly as badly executed; its combinations, as
far as the staff were concerned in them, were frequently defective.
The General-in-Chief had little or no assistance from the generality
of them in the time of need, and it was really ridiculous to see how
even our common out-posts were sometimes thrown out, leaving the most
essential points unwatched, or wholly disregarded.
These are sweeping charges, and I ought to be able to shew that I am
justified in making them: for example then--some may remember that
on the 27th of July, 1809, the first day, I may say, of the battle of
Talavera, the enemy's light troops broke unexpectedly in upon us at
the Alberche river, when our troops were quite unprepared for such an
event; some young corps were surprised and consequently did not behave
well. Lord Wellington, himself, if I mistake not, and some of his staff
were placed in a very perilous situation in an old unroofed house, into
which they had gone in order to ascertain from its highest windows what
was going forward; and his Lordship had, immediately after, to take
upon himself, in a great measure, the direction of the hastily-formed
rear guard of infantry, consisting of the 45th regiment and 5th
battalion 60th; which corps, assisted by our cavalry, covered the
retreat of the advanced division till it reached the position in which
the battle of that night, and the following day were fought. But who,
that witnessed it, can ever forget the scene of confusion which took
place on the night of the 27th, amongst the Spaniards! They literally
swept away with them, in their panic, occasioned by the fire of a few
French sharpshooters who had followed up to their position, the part
of the rear-guard to which I belonged. These untoward events, were, in
a great measure, the consequence of the advanced division not being
managed by instructed or experienced staff officers; but I can scarcely
undertake to say, that even for some time afterwards this branch of our
service had become respectable, though it certainly had improved by
practice. In short, in point of movement and intelligence on the part
of regimental officers, the British corps of cavalry and infantry were,
in general, excellent; but we had not, with a few exceptions, many
officers of rank employed, either as generals or upon the staff, who
were capable of directing or making use of such troops scientifically,
or to advantage. It may be said, that in thus speaking of British
soldiers I now contradict my former assertions, but I by no means do
so; I here only allude to their discipline and courage in the field,
under good regimental officers, and not to what occurred too often upon
other occasions.
The French fairly worked us into practical knowledge of war at last;
not that the officers of that gallant nation were themselves so greatly
enlightened, as was generally supposed, or that they or their troops
gained the battles fought--although I often, and especially at first,
wondered they did not--but we had almost always to pay most dearly for
victory, that is to say, for getting possession of the field of battle,
which was sometimes all we had to boast of.
I may not, perhaps, appear to be borne out in the opinions I have
ventured to give, by Lord Wellington's general orders after the battle
of Talavera; I must, nevertheless, bring it before the reader to enable
him to come to a right conclusion:--
"G.O. _Talavera de la Reyna, 29th July, 1809._
"No. 1. The Commander of the Forces returns his thanks to the officers
and troops for their gallant conduct in the two trying days of
yesterday and the day before, in which they have been engaged with,
and beaten off the repeated attacks of an army infinitely superior in
number.
"He has particularly to request that Lieutenant-General Sherbrooke will
accept his thanks for the assistance he has received from him, as well
as from the manner in which he led on the infantry under his command to
the charge of the bayonet. Major-General Hill, and Brigadier-General
Alexander Campbell, are likewise entitled, in a particular manner, to
the acknowledgments of the Commander of the Forces, for their gallantry
and ability with which they maintained their posts against the attacks
made upon them by the enemy.
"The Commander of the Forces has likewise to acknowledge the ability
with which the late Major-General M'Kenzie (whose subsequent loss the
Commander of the Forces laments,) withdrew the division under his
command from the out-posts, in front of the enemy's army, on the 27th
instant, as well as to Colonel Donkin for his conduct on that occasion.
"The Commander of the Forces, likewise, considers Lieutenant-General
Payne and the cavalry, particularly Brigadier-General Anson and his
brigade, who was principally engaged with the enemy, to be entitled
to his acknowledgments; as well as Brigadier-General Howarth and
his artillery; Major-General Tilson, Brigadier-General R. Stewart,
Brigadier-General Cameron, and the brigades under their commands,
respectively.
"He had opportunities of noticing the gallantry and discipline of the
5th battalion 60th and the 45th, on the 27th; and of the 29th and 1st
battalion 48th, on that night; and on the 28th, of the 7th and 53rd:
and he requests their commanding officers, Major Davey, Colonel Guard,
Colonel White, Colonel Donallan, Lieutenant-Colonel Sir William Myers,
and Lieutenant-Colonel Bingham to accept his particular thanks.
"The charge made by the brigade of Guards, under the command of
Brigadier-General H. Campbell, on the enemy's attacking column, was a
most gallant one, and the mode in which it was afterwards covered by
the 1st battalion of the 48th, was most highly creditable to that most
excellent corps, and to their commanding officer, Major Middlemore.
"The Commander of the Forces requests Colonel Fletcher, the Chief
Engineer, Brigadier-General the Hon. Charles Stewart, Adjutant-General,
Colonel Murray, Quarter-Master-General, and the officers of those
departments, respectively, and Lieutenant-Colonel Bathurst and those
of his personal staff, will accept his thanks for the assistance he
received from them throughout these trying days."
Before the great French revolution, or about the year 1790, some
able French officers had given their attention to the formation of
an état-major, or staff, for their armies, which would have greatly
conduced to improvement in carrying on business in the various branches
of their service; and this was proposed to be chiefly accomplished by
establishing an uniform, comprehensive, and connected system; embracing
objects, to a certain degree, both civil and military; the details of
which would develop themselves, as the several heads of service came
to be examined.
These objects, owing to the confusion that arose out of the sudden
elevation to power of daring and able, but generally inexperienced
men, and the displacing of the old accomplished officers of the
royal army were frustrated, or at least lost sight of for some time:
but, although the French marched on from victory to victory over the
neighbouring panic struck and astonished nations, the want of such an
organized department, was seriously felt by the Commanders-in-chief
of their armies, so much so, that upon an able work being published
at Paris, by General Grimoard in 1809, styled "Traité sur le service
de l'Etat-major-general des Armées," it was received with great
approbation, and I may say, continued from that period to be a guide
to the French Marshals and Generals, in the formation of the staff of
the armies put under their charge; and it seemed also to be the system
adopted, or approved of, by the Emperor.
Not long before this General Thiebault had also published a very useful
work upon the same subject; but not by any means so comprehensive as
that of General Grimoard; which I am inclined to think, would afford
many useful hints to us in establishing a system for carrying on the
duties of this essential branch of our service; but taken as a whole,
it would, I am persuaded, be found too diffuse and complicated to
be advantageously adopted by any army. I may however observe, that
strictly speaking, we have no established system of this kind; for
the experience of a few officers, acquired on service, most of whom
are now high in rank, cannot be considered as such; and what a deal
an officer who wants information, would have to wade through, if he
endeavoured to find it in the several volumes of general orders of His
Grace the Duke of Wellington, who must have felt, and evidently did
feel, throughout his protracted operations in the field, how hard and
wearing it was, not only to command a British army, but also to have
so much of the weight and annoyance of attending to minute details of
military police, the commissariat, and of almost every thing else,
thrown upon him, and requiring his constant superintendence and
watchfulness. I am aware, that after they had acquired experience in
the field, he received assistance, to a considerable extent, from some
of the head-quarter staff, and from the generals and staff of divisions
and brigades; but I do not believe, and his orders fully bear me out
in saying so--that any of our other generals could have been equal to
the task he found it necessary to impose upon himself; for at first
he was evidently not much better off, than a commander of a regiment,
who happens to have an indifferent adjutant, and who is in the habit
of hopelessly attempting to carry on the whole of its duties, and
managing all its details, between himself and that functionary, without
considering for what purpose he has been furnished with two majors, ten
captains, twenty or thirty subalterns, and a number of non-commissioned
officers. But it is really wonderful what His Grace had at first to
get through, from the want of a properly organized staff for his
army, who could have acted upon fixed principles, or established
regulations. From not being able to avail himself of such assistance
(and no Commander-in-chief of a British army can ever under present
circumstances do so), he was obliged to come too much into contact
with divisions, brigades, and regiments, and their minute details; and
had even to decide, after having had all the trouble of inquiry into
intricate matters, either personally or through the means of a general
court-martial, as to the punishment the misconduct of many of our
soldiers merited, and even to order it to be carried into effect.
These and many other considerations should convince us, that there
ought never to be, what is usually termed a second in command, without
a division to take charge of, for he is too often only in the way; but
there should be a head, or chief of the staff of an army, in constant
and immediate communication with the commander of it; and he ought to
possess, in virtue of his office, considerable authority. He should
have under him, for carrying into effect the orders or views of the
Commander of the Forces, an adjutant, and a quarter-master-general,
with a sufficient number of assistants attached to them; and one of
each department, according to our present plan, should be appointed to
each division of the army; and a brigade-major ought also to have the
superintendance of the staff duties of each brigade.
The respective duties of the adjutant and quarter-master-general's
departments ought to be clearly defined in every point, and carefully
kept distinct; and the strictest system of responsibility, should at
all times, and in all situations, be enforced throughout the whole;
and it should never again be necessary for a Commander of the Forces
to issue such an order as that which follows, and which shows at once,
what must have been at first the composition of the staff of a British
army.
"G.O. _Zarza Mayor, 4th July, 1809._
"No. 1. The assistant-adjutant-generals, and brigade-majors of those
divisions and brigades stationed in the neighbourhood of head-quarters,
must attend at the adjutant-general's office for orders at 10 o'clock
precisely.
"No. 2. The brigade-majors will attend at the
assistant-adjutant-generals of divisions to receive the division orders
at half-past 11 o'clock, and at one, the brigade-majors must give out
the orders to the adjutants of regiments, which must be given out to
the troops and companies, and read to the soldiers at evening parades.
"No. 3. In case circumstances should prevent the brigade-majors from
issuing the general orders to the adjutants of regiments before 3
o'clock on any halting day, they are to receive and issue on that
day only the orders requiring immediate execution, of which the
general-officers commanding brigades are to make the selection, and on
the following day the other orders of general regulation.
"No. 4. All orders received by the adjutants of regiments must, at the
first parade, or earlier, if necessary, be read to the troops.
"No. 5. On marching days the assistant adjutant-generals and
brigade majors, stationed near head-quarters, will attend at the
adjutant-general's office for orders as soon as the troops reach their
ground.
"No. 6. All orders requiring immediate execution issued on marching
days, must be given to the adjutants, and read to the troops as soon as
possible.
"No. 7. The general orders will be sent from head-quarters to divisions
at a distance by the first opportunity, those requiring immediate
execution must be issued and read to the troops as soon as received;
the others, if not received by the general officer of the division
before 2 P.M., are not to be issued till the following day.
"No. 8. The assistant adjutant-generals, or the brigade major, of the
division or brigade at a distance to which the general orders will have
been sent, must send to the adjutant-general by the first opportunity,
a receipt for the orders received, specifying the number for each day.
"No. 9. When pass orders will be sent, directions will be written
on the back of them, stating whether they are to be circulated by
the person who will have carried them from head-quarters, or to the
officers respectively to whom they have been addressed.
"No. 10. Every officer, to whom they are addressed, must sign his name
on the paper on receiving them, and insert the hour of the day at which
they reached him.
"No. 11. As pass orders invariably must require immediate execution,
they must be issued and read to the troops without loss of time.
"No. 12. The numberless mistakes which have occurred, and the many
instances of neglect and disobedience of orders issued referring to
the health, subsistence, or the convenience of the troops, renders it
necessary not only to observe the early circulation of orders, but, if
possible, obedience to them and their early and prompt execution.
"No. 13. The obedience to orders of general regulations must depend
upon the attention of general officers commanding brigades, and
commanding officers of regiments, and their determination to enforce
regularity and discipline, but obedience to them requiring execution
can be secured by other means.
"No. 14. Accordingly the Commander of the Forces desires that officers
commanding regiments shall report to the general officer commanding the
brigade, that the general orders requiring the performance of any duty,
or the execution of any arrangement, have been obeyed."
All this proves that the knowledge and experience of the staff of a
British army were, at that period, at a very low ebb; but matters were
afterwards greatly improved, and the valuable time of the staff saved,
which was thrown away in attending for orders, by Lord Wellington
ordering the distribution of printed copies of general orders for
departments, divisions, brigades, and regiments; but, still, too
much of the time of the non-commissioned officers, who might have
been much better employed in assisting their officers in looking
after the soldiers, was always taken up in the field, in writing out
orders for their respective companies. This ought to be dispensed
with altogether. The corps should be quickly assembled in square, or
close column, and the orders or regulations, which should be few in
number, as almost every thing could be arranged before hand at the
Horse Guards, ought to be read distinctly to them by the commanding
officer, a field officer, or the adjutant; and when thus assembled, any
explanations, or farther directions, which might be necessary, could be
given, and the orders themselves more forcibly impressed upon the minds
of the soldiers, which is rarely properly done, if left to company
officers, or non-commissioned officers.
This plan would not only save much time, but also prevent many mistakes
from happening.
It is not my intention here, nor in any other part of this work, to
be unnecessarily minute in bringing matters before the readers; or
at present to enter fully into the various details of the duties of
staff officers; and I may, therefore, only now observe, and I shall
not hesitate in doing so to take advantage of the suggestions, or
hints, of any military writer, when it may suit my purpose, that the
duties or functions of the staff, which have hitherto, with us, been
only determined by what was considered custom, or by some obsolete
modes of practice, which, after much trouble, may, perhaps, be found
scattered through numerous orders and regulations, which from time to
time, have been issued by various commanders, or in books which have no
claim whatever to be considered official; and so completely is this the
case, that the practice of modern warfare makes it desirable, and even
indispensable, that where any authority may be attached to them, they
ought to be annulled or suppressed, and a new system, constructed on
a wise, and, if it can be done, on a limited scale, soon promulgated,
as the established regulations of the army, which would render it
scarcely possible, that mistakes, as to staff duties, could hereafter
happen when brought into practice; for, in the field, the slightest
misunderstanding, or disputing about points, perhaps in themselves
trivial, might destroy that unity and rapidity of acting, which is so
essential towards ensuring success in war.
The officer employed as chief of the staff should possess first-rate
talents, much military information or experience; great activity, and
perseverance. There are very few officers capable of filling this
important and responsible appointment; for it demands a complete
knowledge of the profession of a soldier. He should be well acquainted
with the country about to become the seat of war; with its history,
and with the wars which may have been there carried on, either in
ancient or modern times; so that the general in command of the army
could consult and arrange with him, if he thought proper, as to the
best mode of directing his operations, and his suggestions might in
many respects be of the most essential service. He should be looked up
to by both the generals and the army, as not only intrusted with the
plans or views of the Commander-in-Chief, but as also of being fully
aware how they were to be executed; so that all the details of service
would properly come from him; and thus freed from much care and
trouble, the General-in-chief would more particularly be able to devote
his attention to the grand objects of the enterprise in view. But the
duties of chief of the staff and those of the several departments under
him, being, as far as practicable, clearly defined by regulations;
with what little difficulty or danger from the effects of ignorance or
inexperience an army handled by officers so taught, and always kept
in readiness when called for, could be brought into the field in an
efficient state for service; whereas by the way in which we now try
to get through matters, a Commander-in-Chief in any future war would
have to wade through all the difficulties encountered, and by so much
perseverance overcome by his Grace the Duke of Wellington.
I must now observe, and in as few words as possible, that issuing of
orders and regulations, and upon all occasions seeing that they were
obeyed; keeping an historical journal of the events of a campaign;
making out returns for head-quarters, and calling for all those usually
required from divisions, brigades, and regiments, and the ordinary
correspondence appertaining to such subjects; arrangements for the
maintenance of the discipline of the army; furnishing of officers and
troops for guards and out-posts; issuing necessary instructions for a
well-regulated and mounted police force, whose commander, captains, and
subalterns, being well-taught their duties, and competent to perform
them, should be entrusted with even more power than was allowed to
provost-marshals;--these, with some other points of service, ought to
come under the Adjutant-General and his assistants. But all this, it
may be said, is already the common routine of business, and should be
known to staff-officers; yet every one of them, I am certain, who has
had experience in the field, must have felt the want of an efficient
police, and of a better system for their guidance.
No division of the army should ever be without a strong detachment of
police, either temporarily or permanently attached to it; and thus
crimes would either be prevented through their vigilance, or those
guilty of them immediately punished; the resources of a country would
then neither be lawlessly seized and frittered away by marauders,
nor would the inhabitants fail to bring supplies to the regularly
established markets of the army, where they would be sure to find
protection from the police. But all sutlers and persons permitted
permanently to supply articles in camp or cantonments ought to have
licenses from the head of the police, without which they should not be
allowed to do so.
As more irregularities are generally committed by soldiers when absent
from their corps, either upon duty or otherwise, than at other times;
patroles of the police ought therefore to be constantly moving upon the
roads in all directions, and should particularly have their eyes upon
all guards, and people allowed for the service of the commissariat,
either when foraging in collecting supplies of any kind, or in bringing
them from the depots in the rear; and this useful corps should also
extend their observations, even as far to the rear as the hospital
stations more immediately belonging to the army in the field. These
various, important, and indispensable duties if properly performed, and
their due performance being shown by simple returns or reports, would
require a considerable police force; but as I would expect them to be
armed and equipped in all respects as dragoons, they could, upon any
emergency, be called upon to act as such, and they must, therefore, in
no way be looked upon as taken away from the fighting part of the army;
by the regulations they would enforce, and by their preventing all
straggling of soldiers or followers of the camp in search of plunder or
liquor, the army would be rendered considerably more efficient through
their exertions. Therefore, to the establishing of such a corps,
which ought to be composed of well-conducted and well-paid men, I beg
particularly to request attention.
There is a point too much overlooked, or, at least, but little
understood in our army, viz. that of employing spies in order to obtain
intelligence; and, as I should expect, that the head of the police is
a man of ability and penetration, I would recommend that he should be
entrusted with the management of this necessary point of service. If
it is properly conducted, most useful information may be procured;
especially if sufficient means for this purpose are placed at the
disposal of a commander of the forces. There are various classes of
spies, but I am anxious to be as brief as possible in alluding to them.
1st. Men considered of importance and in high situations, who, through
avarice or meanness, yield to corruption. It belongs, however, to the
Government of a country to employ such spies, and it is believed that
Russia especially has, at this moment, many of them engaged in various
countries, and in various ways.
2nd. Men supposed to be respectable in character, priests and
intriguing women (I here adopt the words of a French writer), to be
almost always found in countries in which war may be carried on; who,
through a good use of part of the money, which it may be contrived to
remit to them, can procure sometimes valuable information; but the best
of such spies are usually found amongst those mentioned, and who are
the least liable to raise suspicion.
3rd. Individuals admitted in various ways into the enemy's army--such
as servants to general and other officers, sellers of spirits,
provisions, and many trifling articles required by soldiers; and some
men may through them be induced to desert at particular moments,
especially when any important movements are about to take place. Such
people can repeat the conversations they may have listened to; they can
say pretty correctly where the enemy is in force; what direction he
is moving in, as well as what places are occupied by his detachments;
but this is generally all that can be looked for from them, their
communications being frequently too confused and uncertain to be much
relied upon. But some men, for money, as I know from experience, can
be found (indeed they offer themselves) who would perform acts that
would scarcely be believed, were I to state them.
4th. Intelligent peasants of the country, of whom there are always
plenty to be found; but a good many of them should be sent out at one
time, under the pretence of selling various articles in the enemy's
camp, or cantonments; also to the detachments on his flanks, and lines
of communication and operation. Such men should not, however, be
employed at any great distance from their homes, as they soon become
ignorant of the country and roads.
5th. Good information can often be obtained from prisoners of war of
all ranks, if prudently and judiciously questioned by an officer, such
as I suppose the head of the police would be; and correct intelligence
was even sometimes, to my knowledge, pumped out of our single-minded
officers at the out-posts, by the French, during the Peninsular war.
6th. The best and most useful of all spies, are those, who, though
known as such, are employed and paid by both parties, according to
the value of the information they are able to obtain. It is at the
same time prudent, that they should be closely watched by the police,
without their being aware of it, whilst they remain with our army; and
it is not difficult to deceive them, and thereby make them convey false
intelligence to the enemy. It would, however, be very imprudent at any
time, to place too much reliance upon the reports of even the best
spies. It is, however, an established principle, that every possible
information should be extracted from spies, without unguardedly opening
the mind to them, which too much zeal or anxiety might sometimes lead
us into; and it is always wise to employ for the same object, men
unknown to each other, so that they cannot concert between them to
deceive. Only one spy should be spoken to at a time, and that in the
most secret manner. Little should be said to them; but they ought by
every means to be induced to talk much. They should also be led astray
by seeming to attach much importance to objects which are little cared
about; at the same time it requires much attention, to find out whether
one is dealing with double spies or not, for without this knowledge,
we must be taking unnecessary trouble, and often acting in the dark.
Now, no commander of the forces, nor chief of the staff, could possibly
be supposed to enter personally into such transactions, nor could
they possibly find time to devote to such minute investigations; but
the head of the police, whose duty it would be to make them, in the
prudent manner I have suggested, could communicate the result of his
perseverance in these respects to either, as he might be directed.
Spies should be well paid, especially when it is ascertained that
they have acted faithfully; and Frederick the Great of Prussia, who
has always been considered good authority, says in his military
instructions to his generals, (a work which should be carefully read
by all officers,) "a man, who, in your service, runs the risk of a
halter, deserves to be well rewarded."
I beg to apologise for here intruding what may be looked upon as a
digression; but mentioning information to be obtained from deserters,
has brought to my recollection the extraordinary circumstance--at
least I consider it as such--that it should have fallen to my lot, to
have had the lieutenant of my company desert to the enemy; the only
instance of the kind I ever heard of in the British army. It occurred
just before our advancing in pursuit of the French, from what were
considered the lines of Torres Vedras. I do not know in what part of
Ireland Mr. B---- first saw the light, but he had been sent in early
life to Salamanca, to be brought up for the Roman Catholic priesthood.
It was, however, I suppose, found that he was unfit for that calling;
at least, I understood that he had never been ordained; and having
married, some person had most unwarrantably taken it upon himself to
recommend him for an ensigncy in the army, for which he was still
more unfit than to be a priest, for he was both vulgar in looks and
manners; but as he spoke Spanish, and some Portuguese, and announcing
himself wherever he went as a good Catholic, he got on, though very
ignorant and illiterate, famously, both with the priests and people of
Portugal. But he had, on one occasion, very nearly, in that country,
come to an untimely end; for having been sent off, in order to get him
away from the regiment, with part of the 3rd division's "advanced guard
of infamy"--that is to say--the soldiers' wives, whom it was found
necessary to send to the rear, in consequence of the depredations they
daily committed; these Amazons, headed by a well known character, rose
upon him with the most diabolical intentions, as some may remember,
for the circumstance was much laughed at at the time, and he only
escaped from their clutches, by jumping out of a window, at the risk of
breaking his neck.
As soon as he disappeared, and that it was conjectured he had gone
over to the enemy, as captain of his company, I was called upon to
report upon the circumstances which could have led to so extraordinary
an event; and I was at the same time given to understand, that Lord
Wellington was uneasy lest he might have conveyed to the French some
useful intelligence; but I conclude that an explanatory letter which I
addressed to the officers commanding the regiment, set his Lordship's
mind at ease; for I unhesitatingly declared him to be totally unfit
to make any observations of consequence, as to the positions or state
of the army, or upon the country in rear of the lines; and in this
opinion, as we were afterwards able to ascertain, I proved to be quite
correct, for Marshal Massena finding him useless, he was altogether
neglected, and having been left by the French, in their retreat, asleep
in a hut, he fell into the hands of some of our light troops. It was
intended that he was to have been tried for deserting to the enemy, and
I was in consequence ordered to appear as the principal witness against
him; but upon his being brought before the General Court-Martial by
the Provost Marshal, it was at once ascertained, that he had become
deranged during his confinement. Upon this circumstance being made
known to Lord Wellington, he, I understood, ordered him to be sent
home, and I heard some time afterwards, that the unfortunate man died
in a lunatic asylum in Ireland. This was a melancholy instance of the
consequences of improper recommendations of persons for commissions in
the army, which I regret to say, was but too common in those days; and
my chief object in giving the story at all, is, that it may cause some
gentlemen in future, to consider what they are about, before they take
upon themselves the responsibility of introducing such men as Mr. B.
into her Majesty's army.
In the French armies, according to the system they pursue, an officer
possessing in many respects power not inferior to what I am so desirous
that our officers of military police should be intrusted, takes up
his station generally with or near the head-quarters of the army, or
close to what is to be the line of march of the following day, and, if
possible, within a reasonable distance of where he intends the markets
to be held, should the army be stationary even for a few days only, and
this enables him either personally to superintend what is going on,
or else to send his subordinates to do so. He or some of his people
patrole the neighbourhood of the camps, in order to protect all who
are coming to the markets with supplies, and, on the spot, he punishes
any one guilty of infringing the orders of the army.--Upon the line
of march he distributes his police in such a manner as to insure good
order amongst the soldiers, bat-men, carters, those attached to the
commissariat, sutlers, and even amongst the people bringing supplies to
the markets.
As he acts under the orders of the principal officer of the
"état-major," or the commander-in-chief, he and his subordinates have
the power of inflicting summary punishment, according to the rules of
the service; and they are, therefore, even accompanied by executioners,
the very sight of whom is conducive to good behaviour on the part
of the troops and followers of the army of every description. It is
something of this kind, but superior in arrangement, and in the rank
of those employed, that the British army so much wants, and what I
am anxious to have established upon a most respectable footing; but
in all arrangements for this purpose it should be kept in view how
beneficial it would be to the public service that a proper provision
should be made for the necessities of divisions of the army when acting
separately or independently. The French plan seems more particularly
adapted to the wants of the head-quarters only, and is therefore so far
defective.
In my anxiety to have an intelligent and efficient police established
in connexion with the adjutant-general's department, I have been
obliged to say more upon the subject than I at first intended, and
as everything relating to the discipline of an army comes under that
branch of the staff, I must also take the liberty to observe (and in
doing so I know that I am coincided with in the opinion I am about to
express by many officers,) that our courts-martial which are, even in
these quiet times, almost constantly sitting, have brought matters, as
the natural consequence of such a plan, into an unprofitable state, and
which cannot possibly from want of time, and for other obvious reasons,
exist, on service in the field. The strange system now pursued seems as
if intended to weaken the power and influence of commanding and other
officers in the corps, and which they must possess, if discipline is
to be maintained as it ought to be; and this state of things looks as
if brought about to suit the notions of men who are always dragging
military matters before the public, whilst they show the world that
they are quite ignorant of them. All this can, however, scarcely have
any other tendency than to prevent officers from duly performing their
duties lest they should be hauled over the coals for so doing, and I
greatly fear that this must before long seriously injure the discipline
of the army, so much so that if even what I have ventured to propose
for its good should not be thought worthy of consideration, events
alone may compel the legislature to look to the consequences likely to
be produced if the present system is adhered to, and the result may
most likely be that our military chiefs will have to be intrusted with
greater power than they ever before possessed, especially on service;
when far too much of the time of officers was always occupied upon
courts-martial of all kinds, which might have been employed in looking
after their men, and have prevented the crimes from being committed
which became the subject for investigation, and as a proof of this the
books of general orders issued upon service, are almost filled with
parts of their proceedings and the observations of Commanders of the
Forces upon them.
It is by no means with the view of inducing any one to follow
their example I now mention that, in the French armies, before the
Revolution, courts-martial were only assembled for the trial of those
guilty of very serious crimes; and in the field, even these were often
summarily judged and punished, occasionally upon a simple verbal order.
The National Constituent Assembly, however, without knowing what they
were about, and from a sheer love of novelty, under the pretext of
doing away with arbitrary military proceedings, rendered them, as
now with us, most vexatiously frequent and complicated, by requiring
courts-martial to be assembled for the investigation of even the most
trivial offences, in order to award the most trifling punishments; and
which commanding officers, as in our navy, could before have ordered
upon their own authority and responsibility. The new laws which they
made for this wise purpose had soon to undergo many and endless
changes, all tending to occupy the time of officers and to make the
proceedings of military tribunals more tedious and annoying; and they
are now, after all that has been done, no better than our own, and they
have attached to them a court of revision in which the matter, in case
of appeal, is re-considered. But to make up for being thus hampered,
the French état-major often found it necessary, under the delegated
authority of their commander-in-chief, to act in a very arbitrary and
summary manner in the field.
Other branches of the service, such as the Post-office, &c., come under
the Adjutant-General and his department, but I have already been too
minute upon this head; yet I do not see how I can be less so if I am at
all to enter upon the Quarter-Master-General's department, and in doing
so I must touch upon what is well known to many officers.
All military plans, sketches, &c. especially such as afford information
like the following:--
Plan pointing out where are situated, the stone bridges, &c. &c., which
exist upon the Ebro, from Reynosa to Tudela.
+---------+----------------+---------+---------+---------+-------------+
| Stone | Wooden Bridges | | | | |
| Bridges.|fit for Infantry| Ferries.| Fords in| Fords in|Observations.|
| | only, when the | | Summer.| Winter.| |
| | river is low. | | | | |
+---------+----------------+---------+---------+---------+-------------+
|Mirando, | Pollentes, | Baca, | Porlata,| Vadillo,| |
| Haro, | Rampalais, | &c. &c. | &c. &c. | &c. &c.| |
| &c. &c.| &c. &c. | | | | |
+---------+----------------+---------+---------+---------+-------------+
Also the arrangements for the movements or marches of an army; its
encampments, bivouacs, quarters, in the field fixing upon the general
line for out-posts, supplies of almost every description, and the
arrangements connected with them, and various other matters come under
the Quarter-Master-general and his department; and it is the duty of
these officers to furnish the chief of the staff, for the information
of the Commander of the Forces, and also generals of divisions, when
necessary, with comprehensive returns, according to established forms,
which would show at one view the various resources of a country in
which war might be carrying on. These returns, of course, according to
circumstances, should embrace the cities, towns, villages, hamlets,
and the number of inhabitants in each. The number of carts, waggons,
or other carriages; the number of horses or mules for draught, burden
or saddle; the number of bullocks, cows or sheep; the agricultural
productions, such as the usual quantity of wheat, barley, oats, &c.;
also of hay, straw or green forage; the returns should likewise show
the quantity of each absolutely required for the use of the country,
and the supplies, if any, also the number of pairs of boots or shoes
fit for soldiers, or shoes for horses, which could be provided in a
given time, or any other manufactured articles, which it might be
supposed were likely to be required by an army.
Such information as this would enable the Commander of the Forces, or
the generals acting under his instructions, to employ the commissariat
advantageously, and also to order from the cities, towns or country,
whatever number of men, animals, &c. might be required for various
military purposes; and they would be enabled to decide what part of
the resources of the country could be made available for supplying
many of the wants of an army, so that considerable quantities of food,
forage, &c. might thus be obtained upon the spot, in place of its being
necessary to bring supplies from perhaps distant countries, and even
by ships, at an enormous expense, as was often the case during the
Peninsular war.
I do not pretend to be able, nor have I any wish to write a regular
military treatise; but I beg to observe, that acting thus upon system,
and every thing being, if possible, punctually paid for, or good
arrangements entered into, in cases of forced contributions, almost
any country could be made to contribute considerably towards the wants
of an army; but without such arrangements its resources are either
plundered or wasted. But nothing of this kind can possibly be effected,
unless an army has attached to it, a well organized mounted police, to
enforce regularity and punctuality.
The officers of the Quarter-Master-General's department, cannot
possibly perform the many duties required of them, without the
occasional aid of such a police force as I have in view, and which in
the end would be found to be a vast saving of expense, incurred in many
ways, by the country; nor without the assistance of a corps of mounted
men, usually termed guides; and which ought, if practicable, to be
raised in the country, the seat of war; and they should be so well paid
and treated as to insure their fidelity.
I must now, however, conclude this part of my undertaking, by
remarking, that into whatever parts or branches the duties, services,
or the business of an army may be divided, the whole should, as far as
possible, be brought under the Adjutant or Quarter-Master-General's
departments, and their correct and punctual performance should be shown
by the most simple, yet sufficiently comprehensive, returns or reports,
of which the forms should always be given; and they should be similar,
in many respects, to that which enabled the Duke of Wellington to
know, every day, the exact state or distribution of his army; returns
or reports of this kind cannot possibly be dispensed with from the
commissariat or ordnance, as the Commander of the Forces, and generals
of divisions and brigades ought to know, at all times, how the army,
and the parts of it under their charge respectively, are to be supplied
with provisions, ammunition, &c. &c.
It may probably, by those who wish to remain independent at the head
of departments, be deemed desirable, that the medical, commissariat,
and ordnance branches of the army should remain distinct, and that
they should continue to communicate direct with the Commander of
the Forces; but in this I cannot coincide, and it strikes me that
it would be desirable, to place the medical department and its
establishments under the Adjutant-General, and the commissariat
under the Quarter-Master-General. My reason, in the first place, for
the former is, that no where is it so essential, that the strictest
discipline should be maintained, as at the several hospital stations,
and in every thing connected with the medical department of an army;
and in our future wars this must be particularly necessary, from the
rapidity with which they must be carried on, as I intend more fully to
show hereafter, when the instant removal of sick and wounded to places
of safety will appear to be indispensable.
The Duke of Wellington, a most excellent teacher, says, in a General
Order, dated Pero Negro, 23d Oct. 1810--
"No. 1. The Commander of the Forces has observed, with great concern,
the large number of men returned by the several regiments, as sick
in hospitals, compared with the returns received from the medical
officers, of the number of men actually on their books in the hospitals.
"No. 2. The former at present is more than double the latter, and it
must be owing to some existing abuse.
"No. 3. The Commander of the Forces has besides been informed by many
officers, commanding regiments and brigades in the army, that there are
many non-commissioned officers and soldiers walking about the streets
in Belem and Lisbon, quite recovered, while others are doing the duties
of these men before the enemy in the field.
"No. 4. In order to put a stop to these abuses, the Commander of the
Forces desires that the following regulations be attended to."
It is unnecessary here to give these regulations, but his Grace
repeats the orders which had been so frequently issued, that no
officer of the medical department should have any soldier from the
ranks as his servant and bat-man, or to attend upon him in any
manner; and he declares his determination to bring to trial before a
general-court-martial, any of the medical department, who should make
use of a non-commissioned officer or soldier in any menial capacity
whatever.
We had formerly attached to the medical department large cumbersome
waggons, which could scarcely have answered any wise purpose, even upon
our English roads, but which were next to useless in such countries as
Portugal; and the tortures and sufferings of the wounded and sick, when
sent off to the rear upon commissariat mules going for provisions, or
in country carts, drawn by bullocks, were beyond belief, especially
when aggravated by the effects of a burning sun, or the severity of the
wet and cold seasons of the Peninsula.
It is absolutely necessary that this department should be better
organized hereafter, as soldiers are induced to go forward and into
battle with much more confidence, when they know that it is enabled,
through good management, to remove them with care and kindness, if sick
or wounded, to places where they can be properly attended to.
The head of this department ought to be a man of great energy and
ability, capable of arranging and carrying into effect whatever plans
may have been adopted for the removal and care of the sick and wounded,
and above all he should possess, like the celebrated Dr. Larrey, of
the French army, not only extraordinary perseverance, but also that
kind-hearted benevolence, which insured for him, on all occasions, the
respect and affections of both officers and soldiers.
Under such a head, there should be placed, to be disposed of as he
might deem best, but in communication with the Adjutant-General, or
his assistants attached to divisions, who could, through the means of
the police at their disposal, afford him great help in carrying their
united views into effect, a complete establishment of conveyances, or
cars upon springs, calculated to contain, at most, four men each, of
a light but strong construction, with covers to them sufficient to
afford the sick and wounded protection from the sun and rain. They
should only be of such a size and weight that two horses of ordinary
powers could draw them and the four patients with the greatest ease,
even when required to move with some degree of rapidity, and the
generally low condition of horses on service in the field, should
not in the calculations be overlooked. The corps, as I may call it,
to which these conveyances should belong, ought to consist of steady
drivers, one for each car and pair of horses, (but he ought not upon
any account to be allowed to ride) some non-commissioned officers and
officers having certain military rank and authority. This useful body
of men should be formed by enlistment in the United Kingdoms, and the
horses either procured there, or in the country to become the seat of
war; but the corps and its cars and equipments should accompany any
military force whenever it was ordered to embark for service. It should
however always remain at the disposal of the medical officer at the
head of the department, who could appropriate parts of it, as might be
arranged between him and the Adjutant-General, and as circumstances
required, for the removal of sick and wounded from the divisions or
brigades to the hospital stations, and they could from thence assist
recovered men to rejoin their corps with less fatigue than they might
otherwise be too soon exposed to, and the officers and non-commissioned
officers of this establishment, occasionally assisted by the police,
could take the entire charge of such men, together with the usual lists
furnished by officers commanding companies or troops, of the articles
of necessaries, &c. sent with them, so that it would no longer be
necessary to detach numbers of officers and non-commissioned officers
from their regiments, where their presence is always required, to
perform this important duty.
The great utility of what I have just pointed out, must be obvious
to all experienced officers, who will, I think, coincide with me in
opinion, that such an establishment is indispensable in the field,
indeed both humanity and prudence most strongly call for it, as it
would tend to render an army much more efficient than it could possibly
be, if defective in this respect, or if such matters are left merely
to chance, or to the generally miserable resources of this kind to be
found in most countries.
It appears to me that the commissariat cannot properly or prudently
be separated from the Quarter-master-general's department, for all
its arrangements must depend upon the intended movements, stations,
positions, and views of the Commander of the Forces, to be carried into
effect by the Quarter-master-general, and his assistants, attached
to the division. But the commissariat ought to be under the immediate
superintendance of an officer of considerable abilities; possessing
a mind capable of comprehending, and performing with accuracy his
extensive part in all military combinations, for almost every thing in
war depends upon the troops being regularly supplied with food.
The officers of this branch of the service, cannot be formed in a day;
for they require not only the knowledge and habits of business, but
also experience in the modes of ascertaining and calling forth the
various resources of countries. Providing transport for supplies of
provisions is alone an extensive and difficult part of the duty of
the commissariat. There are few countries in which such means would
present themselves so efficiently and opportunely, as the brigades of
mules did in the Peninsula. It will not answer, entirely to depend
upon the resources of countries which may become the seat of war,
for such transport; but how far this may be prudent, can sometimes
be ascertained beforehand. But I beg here to ask, if it would not
be important to arrange how far rice might occasionally be made a
substitute for some of the articles usually issued to our troops in
the field by the commissariat? A little of it becomes a considerable
quantity of nourishing food when cooked, but its great advantage is,
that the means of transport required for it is trifling when compared
with what it takes to bring bread or biscuit from perhaps a distant
point, to an army acting in the field. Soldiers may not like rice at
first, but it should be remembered, that it constitutes in India, the
principal part of their food.
It is at all times very hazardous to allow the roads in the vicinity
of an army, especially when near the enemy, to become blocked up, but
especially in bad weather, by heavy waggons or carts of any kind; so
that pack-horses or mules, (the breeds in Great Britain and Ireland
of the former have mostly become too large for this purpose) with
well fitted saddles, and perhaps panniers, are the only conveyances
for provisions or stores, which should be allowed to come up to an
army in the field. But all such subjects require much consideration,
and also able arrangements, which should, as far as possible, be
completed before troops are allowed to quit our shores. The expense
is always great to provide even what is indispensable in this respect
for an army, but it would cost, in all probability, twice as much,
to form such an establishment in a country in which war had already
commenced. This naturally leads the mind to form plans so as to meet
the difficulties which will certainly present themselves, and to
calculate as to the manner in which a well-organized department, with
means at its command, can be produced; and though its vast extent
may be apt to discourage, yet it ought to be wisely looked into by a
Commander of the Forces, his quarter-master and commissary generals.
But if the commissariat consists of able, responsible and experienced
officers, much apprehension on this head may be removed. The selection
therefore of gentlemen qualified for this branch of the service, ought
always to be of primary importance, and their advancement in rank, and
consequent higher payment, should depend upon the ability and habits
of business they evinced in the discharge of their duties; and to the
exclusion, if such a thing can be, of interest or patronage.
I hope I shall be excused for here introducing what I may call a
commissariat anecdote; which those who knew Sir Thomas Picton will at
once recognize as characteristic of him.
During the splendid movement which Lord Wellington made from the
frontiers of Portugal, and which ultimately compelled the French to
concentrate their army and fight the disastrous battle of Vittoria; the
Assistant-commissary-general attached to one of the divisions, had,
through mistake, come into a part of the country, the supplies to be
got from which were allotted to the 3rd; and he was waiting patiently,
in a neat Spanish village, for the baking of a large quantity of bread,
to be finished; which he intended for his own division. Whilst this
was going forward, he had taken care, as commissaries usually did, to
establish himself in one of the best houses. Sir Thomas Picton very
soon learnt what he was about; and ordered that he should be brought
before him. "How dare you, Sir, to plunder that village?" "I am no
plunderer, Sir, and am only procuring bread for my division," "Neither
you nor your division, have a right to any thing in that village; and
if you don't instantly be off, Sir, I will order the provost-marshal
to hang you up on that tree." The zealous commissary (indeed he was
one of the most efficient in the army, and well known to be so by
Sir Thomas, who during the scene could scarcely conceal how much
he was amused), set off in great alarm, and without further reply,
at speed, to head-quarters; which happened to be not very distant,
where, we were told, he requested to see Lord Wellington: "What is
the matter?" demanded his Lordship, upon observing the commissary's
great perturbation. He told his story; concluding by declaring, "and
he was actually going to hang me!" His Lordship, now scarcely able,
as the story was told--to keep his gravity, asked with much apparent
earnestness, "Did he really say, that he would hang you?" "Yes, he
really did." "Then," said his lordship, "take my advice, and keep out
of his way, or he will certainly do so." The worthy commissary now
began, for the first time, to suspect that he had been made to cut a
ridiculous figure.
Sir Thomas Picton, though stern in aspect, possessed a most warm,
benevolent, and feeling heart. As an instance of this I cannot help
relating what occurred on one occasion in Spain. An officer, commanding
one of the regiments of his division, was killed in action. He, like
too many soldiers who fell in battle, left his widow and a child in
very narrow circumstances. This by some means or other came to Sir
Thomas Picton's knowledge, when he sent for a field-officer of the
regiment, to find out from him the widow's address; and his feeling
remark on the occasion was, "that both grief and poverty were hard
to be borne at one time." Having got the information he wanted, he
took care that a large sum of money (being apprehensive of making a
mistake, I shall not venture to say how much) was paid to her.
Towards the close of the war in the South of France, the Duke of
Wellington had brought his army--not only improved in its staff, but in
many other respects--into a complete state for service; indeed he had
made it as much so, as a British force, composed as it was and still
is, can be; and his plan of giving good commissariat establishments
to divisions and brigades, which enabled them to act at all times
efficiently and independently, was most admirable, and should, as
far as possible, be always imitated whenever our troops, in any
considerable numbers, may be hereafter required to take the field; but
those, who from experience, could properly form such establishments,
may most probably have then passed away, and the advantages which might
have been looked for from their practical knowledge of commissariat
duties, cannot be available, and I do not know where I could recommend
any one to look for correct information upon such subjects. But does
not this most clearly point out, the want of established system in this
as well as in other essential branches of our service, and for which I
do perseveringly contend.
It may appear to some, that to accomplish the various objects I have
alluded to, would be attended with vast expense to the country,
yet this will not be found, upon a calm consideration, or rather
investigation, to be so great as might be imagined; but no one
acquainted with military matters will pretend to say, that they can
be dispensed with, if the country is to be served by its armies as it
ought to be; and, I trust, that I have already shown in what manner
savings can be effected, more than sufficient to meet any increase of
expenditure I may venture to propose. I must now, however, leave the
subject of the staff of an army for the present, and proceed to other
matters which must still be brought before the reader.