The escalade of the castle of Badajoz, ought to be held up as an
example to future commanders of such enterprises. Good maps, and
plans of fortifications can almost always be purchased, or procured
by some means or other, of any country about to become the scene of
warfare. If they cannot be purchased in Great Britain, it ought to
be the business of some department of the state to endeavour, if
possible, to procure them; and the generals and staff of the army
about to leave our shores should be furnished with correct copies of
such maps; and when necessary, they should be referred to as official
documents. All those therefore intended to be used, whether by the
General commanding-in-chief, or by any general or staff officer,
should be strictly alike; and how easy it would then be to direct the
movements of bodies of troops, though even stationed at a distance,
upon particular points by certain lines of march, and thereby to insure
punctuality and correct performance of all the parts of a combined
operation. And what a quantity of writing and explanation would thus
be rendered unnecessary. I however repeat, that to the plan of the
castle of Badajoz--which had been much strengthened during the time
the French held it--and which was, I believe, obtained through the
means of a deserter, I attribute our success in that very difficult
enterprise; for by it the officers were shown where to go, what they
might expect to encounter, how they were to overcome the obstacles
which would present themselves; and they were even encouraged to ask
questions, and for explanations upon points which they might not
clearly understand. How different was this to the display of consummate
wisdom, by some of our chiefs at the attack upon Buenos Ayres in South
America; who seemed, I must say, generally to have been selected
because they possessed, to say the least of it, most overbearing
manners, and truly Prussian ideas of discipline. A field-officer
who was to command one of the wings of a regiment in that very
injudiciously arranged undertaking, ventured to ask, how he was to act
after reaching a certain point, which was a conspicuous building shown
him--a general present on the occasion deigned to reply yet in any
thing but an encouraging manner, and at the same time turning from the
unlucky querist, to the Commander of the Forces--"General Whitelock,
the city of Buenos Ayres will never be taken, if our time is to be
occupied in answering silly questions." Now all the wings of regiments
accomplished what was required of them, and it was entirely owing to
such silly questions not having been answered, and to those bodies of
gallant troops becoming isolated, and no communications being kept up,
or orders sent for their farther proceedings, that the total failure
of that ill-fated, and badly managed enterprise was chiefly to be
attributed.
I hope I shall be forgiven if I presume to observe, that if the manner
of carrying on war since the time of Julius Cæsar has been necessarily
changed, the spirit which a soldier should possess, and the attainments
requisite for rendering an officer fit to command-in-chief, or even to
be an able subordinate, are still the same.
The art of commanding, and of inspiring that confidence, which Cæsar
possessed so transcendently, and which can make men fight, who are not
much inclined to do so, are also still the same.
A General should not only have studied attentively the sciences which
qualify him for his profession, but he ought also to be an experienced
soldier. He should know, with due discrimination, how to appreciate
men, and to employ them, so as to reap the greatest advantages from
their various talents and acquirements, especially those which fit them
for staff appointments. He should know how to act, so as to make the
most of both the fear and love of those he leads. He should, like the
Duke of Wellington, command the respect of mankind by the uprightness
of his public dealings with them; even to the exclusion of his own
family or intimates, from appointments, which he could have, even
with apparent justice, bestowed upon them. He should possess that
rapid _coup d'œil_, which would enable him in war to take advantage
of any error in tactics, which his adversary might commit, and to
avail himself of events to the utmost; and whilst he inspired all with
confidence in his military skill, in his actions, and in the example he
set others, he should not only teach, but also create in them ambition
to resemble him.
The great Emperor Napoleon, possessed, as a soldier, many of these
essential qualities; and carried along with him, not only the hearts
and feelings of Frenchmen, but also those of the people of many other
countries, even in his most ambitious aspirations; and, perhaps, no
period of the world produced two men of greater or more opposite
characters, views, and abilities, not only for the welfare of mankind,
but also for their bane, than Wellington and Napoleon. In short, I look
for talents, acquirements, and many perfections in a soldier, who aims
at the distinction of commanding-in-chief, or even of holding a high
staff appointment; and amongst others, that confidence in himself, not
the fruits of presumption, but of matured experience, which a perfect
knowledge of the art of war naturally produces.
How often in his intercourse with his troops did we find the Emperor
Napoleon imitating Cæsar. At the battle of Jena, the infantry of the
Imperial Guard could not, as he tells us, conceal their annoyance,
when they saw all around them engaged, and they themselves kept only
as spectators of the battle. He at last heard from many voices the
words, "en avant." "What is that I hear?" said the Emperor, "Ce ne peut
étre qu'un jeune homme qui n'a pas de barbe, qui peut vouloir préjuger
ce que je dois faire; qu'il attende qu'il ait commandé dans treute
batailles rangées avant de prétendre me donner des avis!"
As it may serve as a lesson to many a gallant soldier, and show him how
to act, if ever it should be his fortune to be similarly situated, I
must now relate, and in as few words as I can, what I saw Sir Edward
Pakenham achieve at the battle of Salamanca, in which, during the
absence of Sir Thomas Picton, he commanded the 3rd division; and I am
anxious also to give the reader some idea of its style of fighting.
I shall not indulge myself in giving a description of the splendid
movements of the two armies, useful as they might be to the young
soldier, which took place previous to that battle--this has already
been done by able military writers; and I shall only say, that the
3rd division crossed the Tormes in the forenoon of the 22nd July, and
took up a position in the rear, and towards the right of our army.
Here the troops commenced cooking, but from what I saw going forward
in both armies, I did not expect that the soldiers would be allowed
to eat their dinners in tranquillity. The ground we occupied was well
selected, and offered many advantages to the part of the army intended
to form a rear-guard; in case, as appeared very likely, that we were to
fall back on Ciudad Rodrigo; and the manner in which Marshal Marmont
manœuvred at the moment, evidently showed that his object was to force
us to do so, under certain disadvantages. I, therefore, looking upon
the 3rd division as intended for that rear-guard, fully expected hot
work before long.
Thus situated, we were able to enjoy a delightful view of what was
going on in both armies. We were not, however, destined to remain long
mere idle spectators; but, on the contrary, to take a most active and
conspicuous part in the approaching action.
It might have been near two o'clock, when Lord Wellington, followed by
some of his staff, galloped up to where the 3rd division was posted;
and calling for Sir Edward Pakenham, he gave him certain orders in
a very few impressive words, and Sir Edward's reply was quite in
character.
Our camp kettles were in an instant overturned, and packed on the
mules, which started for the rear; many looking blank enough at having
lost their dinners; and venting their ire upon the stubble they had
been obliged to use as fuel, and which had made the business of cooking
so tedious.
The division was soon under arms, and moved off rapidly in open column,
right in front, the 45th regiment leading. To me, as Brigade-Major of
the right brigade, Sir Edward Pakenham, in his quick decided manner,
pointed out the direction we were to take, and desired me to tell
Colonel Wallace, 88th regiment, the officer in the temporary command of
the brigade, to move on with as much rapidity as possible, but without
blowing the men too much. We soon descended into a kind of valley, or
rather hollow, and having brought up our left shoulders a little, we
pushed on at a quick pace, but in excellent order, to the right; the
side of the hollow towards the enemy concealing our movements from
their sight.
The whole scene was now highly animating. The left brigade, headed
by the 5th regiment, was, I saw, marching parallel to the right, so
as to be ready to form a second line. The Portuguese brigade followed
the right, and the whole of the left flank of the columns was covered
by a cloud of sharpshooters, composed of light infantry companies, and
riflemen of the 5th battalion, 60th regiment.
Having moved a considerable distance in this order, (field officers and
adjutants prolonging the line of march,) the head of the column, by
bringing up the right shoulder, began gradually to ascend the hill, on
the top of which we expected to find the enemy still extending to their
left. At length, having fairly outflanked the French left, the whole
formed line, and with Sir Edward Pakenham in front, hat in hand, the
brigades advanced in beautiful style, covered by our sharpshooters, the
right of the first line admirably supported by the left brigade.
The enemy's skirmishers and ours now set to work, yet we did not wait
for their indecisive long shots; but advancing still rapidly and
steadily, our right soon came into contact with their left, which had
opened a very heavy and destructive fire upon us, and which would have
lasted long enough had the brigade been halted to return it, but it was
instantly charged and overthrown. It was now evident to us all that
Sir Edward Pakenham knew how to handle Picton's division. But at this
critical moment some of the enemy's cavalry charged in turn, and most
gallantly, the right flank of the 45th regiment, but a well directed
fire from the 5th, which had been brought up, so as to be close at
hand, removed all apprehensions in that point, and the enemy's infantry
were quickly pursued, chiefly by Colonel Wallace, at the head of the
88th, whose impetuosity was found most difficult to restrain.
The division continued to advance; and though in motion, and still
exposed to a heavy fire, order was soon restored in the ranks of the
corps which had been so warmly engaged, and with Sir Edward Pakenham
still in front, we were again ready for another dash at the enemy,
who were trying to reform on a gentle height, a short distance in
front of us. But how truly inspiring the scene had now become, and how
"beautifully the practice" of Major Douglas's artillery was telling
among the French! Another charge was intended; the French would not,
however, stand, and retired in tolerable order, but most severely
galled by our sharpshooters, who were close at their heels. They then
took up another position, in which they were reinforced by a large body
of their troops, and many guns, which opened on us.
We were not at the time aware that Marmont had been wounded; but
I must say, that I was much surprised to see such a want of skill
and combination in all their movements and arrangements; nor can I
imagine what had become of their cavalry, for they ought before this
to have endeavoured to check us, or it must have been obvious to them
that their ruin was inevitable. But our dragoons, with General Le
Merchant and Sir John Elley at their head, having come up to us, the
regiments were cautioned, that on no account were they to follow up the
enemy when they should next force them to retire; but as soon as the
height was carried, they were to halt, so as to admit of our dragoons
charging with proper effect. It was now most animating to behold Sir
Edward Pakenham. He had again taken off his hat, as he had done at the
commencement of the battle; bare-headed, he rode in front, endeavouring
by his gestures to restrain the too eager advance of the troops. We
soon approached the enemy, who began to waver, being terribly shook by
our admirable artillery, and the unceasing fire of our light troops.
We at once saw that they would not stand our charge, but as they were
going off we sent a rattling fire after them.
Under a heavy fire from their numerous and well-served artillery, and
from a very large body of skirmishers, with which the French bravely
endeavoured to cover their retreat, our noble dragoons now dashed at
them, and such a scene instantly presented itself as has seldom been
witnessed.
The 3rd division again advanced steadily. We saw before us our foes
completely overthrown. Thousands of them were taken prisoners by the
dragoons, numbers were cut down, and the remainder, in total deroute,
were running as fast as their legs could carry them towards another
height, where a considerable number of their troops were posted, and
from whence they kept up a heavy fire upon the divisions engaged upon
our left. They soon after, however, began to retire, under a ruinous
fire from our artillery and sharpshooters, who, intermixed with some
of our dragoons, gave them not a moment's respite. Our loss, however,
had been considerable, for the French, before they gave way, generally
contrived to open a very heavy irregular fire upon us, which the
battalions advancing in line, and with our light infantry in front,
could not return, had it even been desirable that they should have
done so. The 3rd division, thus aided and supported by our splendid
dragoons, were, however, completely victorious. The enemy's left was
entirely discomfited, carrying alarm and confusion amongst their centre
and right; and just before darkness hid them from our sight, their
right alone seemed to me to maintain any thing like order, though the
whole still kept up a heavy fire upon the divisions of our army with
which they were engaged. We had, however, committed one mistake, in
following up the enemy, for we had inclined too much to our left, and
had thereby thrown away the advantage we would have had in still acting
even after dark, upon the French left and rear. Had the 3rd division
been kept more to the right, instead of coming at dusk almost in
rear of the troops engaged with the enemy upon our left; and had it,
supported by our cavalry, continued to act even in the dark, I cannot
imagine how the enemy could have been able to re-cross the Tormes.
The celebrated Lord Stair being asked by Voltaire, at the Hague, what
he thought of the battle of Dettingen, in which he commanded the
British under George the Second, he replied, that the French had
committed one great fault, and the allies two. That of the French was,
that they did not know how to wait; and the allies, after having placed
the French on the brink of ruin, did not profit by the victory they had
gained. At Salamanca, French impatience and eagerness to force us to
retreat, when we most likely would have done so had they let us alone,
hurried them to their ruin; and it being probably unavoidable, that we
should have halted on the field of battle for the night, afforded the
French, after being completely defeated, time to escape.
I do not even attempt to describe the whole of the battle of Salamanca;
and I know but little of the achievements of the other divisions of the
army. No officer, actively occupied as I was, could possibly do so; and
I have mentioned only what came more particularly under my own eye;
and my great object in doing so, is to show the style of fighting the
3rd division was accustomed to, and which, I trust, will be imitated
by our troops in future wars. I at the same time hope, that I have
said enough to enable any one to understand and appreciate the part so
nobly performed in that action by Sir Edward Pakenham. It may be also
observed, that I have avoided saying more of particular corps, where
all distinguished themselves, than I found to be necessary to make
myself understood by the reader, but as the country cannot possibly
remember what regiments then composed the 3rd or Picton's division, I
shall here beg leave to record them.
{ 45th Regiment British } Under Major-General Sir
Right { 74th do. do. } Thomas Brisbane, during
Brigade { 88th do. do. } a considerable part of the
{ 5th Bat. 60th do. Germans } war.
{ 5th Regiment British } Under Major-General the
Left { 83rd do. do. } Hon. Sir Charles Colville,
Brigade { 87th do. do. } during a considerable part
{ 94th do. do. } of the war.
Centre { 9th Regiment Portuguese } Under Maj-Gen. Sir Manley
Brigade { 21st do. do. } Power, during the greater
{ A batt. of Caçadores, do. } part of the war.
Artillery Brigade of 9 pounders, British Major Douglas, do. do.
Sir Edward Pakenham, upon the retreat from Madrid, and subsequent to
the battle of Salamanca, and whilst still in the command of the 3rd
division, issued the following orders, which those who had the honour
and pleasure of his acquaintance, will at once know as characteristic
of him. These orders also confirm, if farther confirmation is wanted,
the opinions I have expressed of the conduct of the men who composed
our armies.
"D.O. _Guinaldo, 26th November, 1812._
"No. 2. This approval and divisional order of punishment is to give
publicity to the example, and to convince the soldiers that no delay
from the circumstances of service, shall prevent punishment falling
on the individual, who shall basely absent himself from his post or
company, when in movement before the enemy.
"No. 3. The 3rd division of infantry has often been led against the
enemy's troops, and as often has defeated them. The manly spirit which
the officers and soldiers have shown on these occasions has been worthy
of record. And it is the more unaccountable, how men of those corps
could, by want of perseverance, allow themselves to fall into the power
of that enemy, on a limited retreat, who was unable to take them in the
field.
"No. 4. The[1] absentee list is large, and in proportion is
discreditable to every corps to which it relates, and which future
discipline and efforts on this point of service, is the only means now
left to remove."
"D.O. _Moimenta de Beira, Jan. 20, 1813._
"No. 1. Major-General the Honourable Charles Colville proposes to
assume the command of the 3rd division on the 23rd instant. All reports
from that date are to be addressed accordingly.
"No. 2. When superseded, Major-General Pakenham is to join the 6th
division.
"Although he cannot allow himself the liberty to regret leaving the 3rd
division from a due obedience to orders; the Major-General wishes to be
understood, that he will know how to value the corps that compose it,
and to remember the personal notice he has acquired from the splendid
conduct of those corps in the field, a notice to which, under other
circumstances, he could have had no pretensions.
"No. 3. As good conduct commonly commands good fortune, General
Pakenham expects to hear of the 3rd division's fair fame, each
opportunity bringing new acknowledgments in additional thanks from
England; and the increased dread of her inveterate enemy."
I believe that I should have, earlier in this work, protested against
its being supposed, when I stated, that I considered our army to be
deficient in good system in many points, that I have presumed to say,
that there were not employed upon the staff of Lord Wellington's
army, scientific and able officers; for it was well known, that many
of them, as well as our generals, had become excellent; but it was
in the school of experience, that most of them had received those
lessons which made them so; and what they chiefly wanted was greater
assistance, especially from a police force, in performing their duties,
and a sufficiently comprehensive and well considered system for their
guidance. I will also venture to say, that we were quite equal, and,
in some points, even superior to the French in this branch of military
service; and the extraordinary mistakes which they often committed,
fully justify me in saying so.
Probably the severe check which Massena's army had received at Busaco,
had rendered him and his état-major more cautious than Napoleon's
officers were reported to be; but could any thing have possibly been
more surprising, than after they had found out the strength of the
lines of Torres Vedras to be so great as to deter them from venturing
an attack, that they should have remained a single day, much less
a whole winter in front of them, exposing their fine army to the
ruinous Fabian system adopted by Lord Wellington, who by the steady
and composed front he displayed, whilst the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo
was going forward, and by the lesson he gave them at Busaco, must have
told them plainly enough what they were to expect. Surely Massena,
his generals, and état-major should have come to the conclusion,
either to attack, at all hazards, these lines, or that they ought
instantly to have made arrangements for falling back into Spain upon
their resources, which they very likely might have been able to do
undisturbed by us, from the melancholy state in which Portugal then was.
Had the two armies changed positions, and I think I am fully borne
out in what I am going to assert by the line of proceeding adopted by
Lord Wellington at the Nivelle and at Toulouse, I have no doubt but he
would have attacked Massena, and carried the lines of Torres Vedras,
strong as they were represented to be. Some points in such intrenched,
or fortified positions, may always be carried by concentrated attacks
of brave and ably directed troops, like the British and French, when
generally the whole of the defences, constructed probably at great
expense and labour, must be abandoned, and at all events an attack, if
even unsuccessful, could not have been so disastrous to the French as
the effects of want of cover, a short allowance of unwholesome food,
naturally producing diseases and causing many deaths amongst them, all
of which they experienced during the winter, miserably and uselessly
spent by them before the lines of Torres Vedras, and in their ultimate
retreat from Portugal, when the whole of the country, north of the
Tagus, was completely, imprudently, but unavoidably laid waste; thereby
proclaiming to the world, that the idea of attacking the Duke of
Wellington there, at any future period, had been abandoned.
In the next place, and in farther illustration of the inefficiency
of the French état-major, I beg to ask, was not the extension of the
French left till it became weakened, and of which Lord Wellington so
ably availed himself, a great error on the part of Marmont, or rather
of his staff, at the battle of Salamanca? Could Marshal Soult and his
état-major not have been aware of our situation before the battle
Toulouse, when our pontoon bridge was unavoidably removed, or it would
have been carried away by the floods in the Garonne, and by the masses
of timber, &c. sent down, I conclude, by the Marshal's orders; and when
part of our troops, having previously crossed, were left apparently at
his mercy--and that of his whole army: and why was not advantage taken
of such a favourable opportunity to attack us? For I cannot imagine,
that Soult's prudence in reserving his army for the defence of the
field works about Toulouse, ought to be looked upon as an excuse for
his not having done so, and for what I am more inclined to attribute
to his, or his staff's want of intelligence. Picton, his generals, and
his division had certainly made up their minds to fight lustily on that
occasion; and, having only a short time before, single handed, disposed
handsomely of two French divisions at Vic Bigore, even when fighting
in their own favourite manner--skirmishing on a large scale--certainly
did not diminish their confidence in themselves, and in their chiefs,
who I firmly believe, would have liked nothing better, had the light
division been only within a reasonable distance of them, than to have
contended with Soult and his whole army. Every precaution was, however,
taken, and preparation made for the expected attack; for we were well
aware of the situation in which circumstances, that could not have been
foreseen, had placed us, and that we could only look for assistance
from our splendid artillery, supporting effectually our right by firing
across the Garonne. Soult, his generals, and état-major, however,
allowed the opportunity to escape, but in a few days after, this very
confidence in himself, and in his division, was the cause of Sir Thomas
Picton receiving at Toulouse a severe check--the only one instance, as
well as I remember, in which the 3rd division was ever repulsed, or
rather obliged to be brought back from an assault during the whole war.
I had every reason to suppose Sir Thomas Picton was aware that the
passage of the canal could not be forced, and that the very point he
was induced to attack, was covered by a tête du pont, and another field
work which the enemy had recently constructed. I believe he was told
that the passage could be easily forced; but this, as the result, and a
careful examination afterwards proved was impossible. But it was most
mortifying, indeed, to the 3rd division, that its last feat in arms,
and after so long and brilliant a career, should have terminated in a
failure, and in the loss of many gallant officers and men killed and
wounded, and amongst the latter Sir Thomas Brisbane, who had so often
before led on his brigade to victory.
But I must give another conspicuous instance, out of many which might
be adduced, in support of what I assert respecting French generals
and staff; but I beg in the first place, to ask what could be more
extraordinary than their evident want of knowledge of the country, and
even of preparation for the battle of Vittoria? For I cannot suppose
that the French Commander-in-Chief and his état-major could have been
ignorant of our vicinity, or of the positions we occupied the evening
before the action; or, in the second place, could they have calculated
upon Lord Wellington not venturing to attack their fine army, when
concentrated under so many renowned chiefs.
The Duke of Wellington had adopted an excellent plan, which ought to be
followed by all commanders of armies, of never issuing his orders or
instructions, for any movement or object of importance, until within a
very few hours of the time at which they were to be executed, so that
the enemy could not possibly know, either through spies, or by any
other means, what he intended to do the following day; it was therefore
towards the middle of the night of the 20th of June, 1813, that I
received from an orderly dragoon, as senior staff officer in camp, for
the 3rd division, the following concise and excellent instructions, or
order of battle for the morrow.
"_Arrangements for the movements of the Army, the 21st of June._
"_Subejana de Murillos, June 20th, 1813._
"Extract.
"The 3rd division, followed by the 7th division, will move (marching by
the left of divisions), at day break, and will proceed near the village
of Anda, and thence (turning to the right) towards the village of Los
Questos, on the road from Anda to Vittoria.
"On approaching Los Questos, this column will throw out detachments
to the right towards Mancharez, to put itself in communication with
detachments, which will be thrown out from the left of the column which
moves upon the village.
"Lieut.-General the Earl of Dalhousie will have the immediate command
of the column composed of the 3rd and 7th divisions.
"The baggage of these divisions will remain sufficiently in the rear
of the troops, not to become an embarrassment to the column under any
circumstances.
"The left column of the army (divisions moving by the left) must move
from Murquia towards Vittoria. Lieut.-General Sir Thomas Graham will
put himself in communication as soon as possible with the column of
the 3rd and 7th divisions, at Los Questos, and these divisions will
therefore throw out parties when near Los Questos, towards Murquia, to
facilitate this communication.
"The movements of the two columns on the left, viz. the Earl of
Dalhousie's and Sir Thomas Graham's, are to be regulated from the
right; and although these columns are to make such movements in advance
as may be evidently necessary to follow the progress of the two columns
on their right (that moving on Mancharez and Sir Rowland Hill's), they
are not however to descend into the low grounds towards Vittoria on the
great road, nor give up the advantage of turning the enemy's position,
and the town of Vittoria by a movement to their left. This part of the
instructions more particularly applies to the column under the orders
of Lieut.-General Sir Thomas Graham.
"All communications intended for the Commander of the Forces, are to be
sent to the column composed of the light division and the troops which
follow it, which is the column which moves on Mancharez.
(Signed) "G. Murray, Q.M. General."
About the dawn of day on the 21st of June, 1813, the 3rd division
moved off under its chief, Sir Thomas Picton, to perform perhaps more
than the part assigned it in the splendid scenes with which we were
about to treat our spectacle-loving foes. I went on with the advance,
consisting of our Light Infantry companies, and the 5th battalion
60th German riflemen, all experienced troops, and well acquainted
with and accustomed to their work. To my surprise, and I believe that
of Sir Thomas Brisbane, and many others, we met with no opposition
in passing the Zadorra, on the banks of which, as is well known, the
Black Prince, in olden times, astonished his foes, not only by his own
valour and knightly bearing, but also by the deeds of such soldiers
as I wish to bring into the ranks of our regiments, and of whom there
are still abundance in Great Britain and Ireland. I must however here
take the liberty to remark, that I have often since wondered, why Lord
Wellington did not allude, just before the troops went into battle, to
what history tells us was by that gallant prince achieved on the ground
which then lay before us. Napoleon, and I think Nelson also, would have
done so; but Lord Wellington, perhaps less enthusiastic, very likely
considered that his army required no such incitement to perform what he
looked upon as merely their duty. I believe I am not wrong, but I have
always fancied this seeming want of enthusiasm, to be a kind of defect
in the Duke of Wellington, for it certainly has had at all times, and
in all situations, when judiciously worked upon, a most surprising
influence upon the minds and hearts of mankind in general.
Whilst the troops were passing this, in a military point of view,
formidable object, over some very narrow bridges, I again went on
some distance, and even in front of our light troops, to ascertain,
if possible, what might be before us, for by this time Lord Hill was
sharply engaged considerably to our right, and we began strongly to
suspect, that the French still intended to be for once patient, and
to deceive us; so much so, that I every instant expected to see their
masses and cannon crown the rising ground just before us, prepared to
attack us, whilst still embarrassed in the passage of the deep, high
banked, but narrow river.
I very soon observed on the more distant heights a few videttes, whose
attention seemed entirely attracted to their left, in which direction
the firing had greatly increased.
Sir Thomas Picton and his generals were also soon aware of the mistake
the French had evidently committed in neglecting or overlooking
this essential position; Sir Thomas therefore (for I know not what
had become of Lord Dalhousie and the 7th division) with his usual
impetuosity, pushed his light troops, cannon and columns, rapidly for
the unoccupied heights, of which he got possession without firing a
shot, and before the enemy seemed to be aware of their importance; or
else they had erroneously calculated, that the natural difficulties we
should encounter at the Zadorra would either greatly delay, or perhaps
deter us altogether from advancing in the direction we had taken. As
soon, however, as they saw what we had achieved, and which threatened
them with such ruinous consequences, they quickly brought forward a
large body of troops of all arms, to recover what they ought never to
have lost. A desperate struggle ensued, especially in a village just
behind the heights, and which ought to have been guarded with the
utmost care by the French, being an important point in their position;
but Sir Thomas Brisbane, with his brigade, after a severe contest, and
by turning their left with his right regiment, had got full possession
of it, and the fate of the battle was thus, I may say, in a moment
decided, for their centre being forced, the wings, especially the left,
had also to give way, and to my delight, I beheld at this critical
moment, our old and often tried friends, the light division, coming on
in our own style, upon our right, carrying all before them.
When we had repulsed the enemy, who had fought very gallantly, from the
village, and were again advancing upon them in the usual manner of the
3rd division, Lord Wellington rode up to us, followed by his staff;
and he knew well how to profit from what had been, at least to us, so
unexpectedly accomplished.
There was much hard fighting after this, and many brilliant feats were
performed by the three brigades, in following up the French, who were
so hard pressed, that even before they reached Vittoria, they were
unable to offer any effectual resistance to our continued and impetuous
attacks.
I apprehend, as will appear by referring to the instructions from
Sir George Murray, that this was not the manner in which it had been
intended that the action was to have been fought; and I even fear that
I am not borne out in my statements by the Gazette account of it; but I
feel convinced they can be corroborated by many, and I think I owe this
detail of the part it performed to the 3rd division and its chiefs. I
have, however, no intention of farther detailing what occurred between
us and the French during the remainder of that eventful day; yet I
must observe, that the loss of the 3rd division, in consequence of
Sir Thomas Picton's perhaps too rapid advance, was great in officers
and men; for undoubtedly he had thus drawn upon it the brunt of the
battle; but my chief object, in at all alluding to it, was to shew that
the French Marshal, who commanded under Joseph, and his état-major,
committed great errors, especially in neglecting, or not understanding
their position, and which in the end became irretrievable and ruinous
to their brave army.
Towards the close of this battle, and when I thought the 3rd division
had got well through its day's work, in the usual manner, and when the
part of the French infantry before us were going off in hopeless and
irretrievable confusion, intermixed with their baggage, their cavalry
suddenly appeared before us, presenting a firm and most imposing front.
Our cavalry--I think they were all light--had now got in front of us,
in considerable force; it was therefore evident, that an important
moment in the battle approached; and as Sir Thomas Brisbane was anxious
to see how our cavalry would accomplish a charge, which we concluded
must be made, I most willingly went on with him some distance before
his brigade, still advancing in column. Our cavalry went on bravely
to the attack, but the French did not wait to receive it: on the
contrary, they advanced boldly, rapidly, and in fine order, to meet our
people. The shock was severe. But I soon saw, and I believe so did my
general, that it was high time for us to be off to the infantry, for
I must confess that the battle of Marengo flashed across my mind at
the instant. We soon rejoined the brigade, when commanding officers
of corps were requested to keep them well in hand, and ready, if
necessary, to form squares. But the French seemed to have accomplished
what they had in view; that is to say, to cover the retreat of their
discomfitted infantry.
Having, in the course of this work, occasionally touched upon military
tactics and arrangements, I must, in corroboration of what I ventured
to say with regard to the Duke of Wellington and Massena at the lines
of Torres Vedras, and in farther proof that the French were not
superior to us as tacticians, here allude briefly to what occurred
upon the Nivelle. Let the reader cast his eyes over a good map of the
country, or rather a plan of the action, which bears that name, and
which may be seen in Colonel Jones's account of the Peninsular war; and
let him consider and calculate upon the apparent consequences of an
attack upon a position of such strength, taken up after due examination
by Soult, and covered by his directions, with strong and well planned
redoubts, mutually supporting each other; and I think he will admit
that the French lines upon the Nivelle, and those held by our army at
Torres Vedras were not very dissimilar. It could not also have been
unknown to Massena, that a very great part of the troops under Lord
Wellington were untried Portuguese, destitute of military reputation;
and which had only been recently placed under British officers.
It is not to be supposed, that the commander of a French army was
without information, or that he was not allowed to incur the expense
of employing spies, or otherwise obtaining intelligence; I cannot,
therefore, imagine he was entirely ignorant of the preparations making
by his adversary for his reception at Torres Vedras; and he might
also have learnt that the redoubts and lines of connection in that
position could not be finished by the time he might arrive before it.
If, therefore, he were to advance at all into Portugal, he undoubtedly
should have made his arrangements for attacking the lines of Torres
Vedras the moment he could reach them; but whether what I have stated
was known or not to Massena, he had probably been spoiled by too much
good fortune, until it was his fate to meet Lord Wellington in the
field.
But how did the Duke of Wellington act when nearly similarly situated
to what Massena was before the lines of Torres Vedras?
His army was encamped in the month of November in the Pyrenees, exposed
in crowded tents, to severe sufferings, from cold, rain, and snow,
enough to make any men, and especially British soldiers, anxious to
fight three times their numbers, or to storm all the redoubts or
intrenched camps in the world in order to get out of such a situation,
and some even fancied that his Lordship kept them there with that
intention.
I partook along with the brigade to which I was attached, and with
the rest of the 3rd division, of the comforts of that encampment in
the Pyrenees. On the 9th of November I was sent for by Sir Thomas
Brisbane, and I think he will remember the awful kind of cavern,
with the torrent rushing through it at Zugarramurdi, in which he
gave me directions for bringing down the division to where it was
to remain, until the hour should arrive for its advance, under Sir
Charles Colville, against the lines of the Nivelle. I scrambled back
to the camp, leading my horse the greater part of the way, which was
an excellent climber; but I had to look well about me, for by this
very path, if it deserved the name, I was to bring down, as soon as
it became dark, the fighting division; every individual of which then
in camp being perfectly ignorant, that the moment was at hand, when
they were to resign the comforts which they had there enjoyed. At the
hour fixed upon, the bugle sounded for the troops to get under arms,
and in twenty-five minutes more, the usual time allowed, the right
brigade, followed by the other two, commenced the descent, the whole
being cautioned to look carefully, if they could in the dark, to where
they placed their feet. The baggage was to remain upon the ground, and
to follow by another circuitous road, when ordered, in the morning,
after some hours of pretty hard work, we at last found ourselves at
Zugarramurdi, through which the division passed, and the brigades, in
contiguous columns, were allowed to repose upon the ground for the
remainder of the night, under the canopy of heaven, and until the hour
for assaulting the redoubts and entrenchments arrived. Of course the
same difficult operation had been performed unknown to the enemy, by
the other divisions of the army, for the third had not advanced far
when the cannon on our left belonging to Sir Lowry Cole's division,
announced that others as well as ourselves were awake; and when day
dawned, our army, to the right and left of us, was seen moving in most
perfect order to make combined attacks upon the enemy's entrenchments.
I have been so far minute to show in how able a manner Lord
Wellington's arrangements were invariably made for combined movements;
but I have no intention of entering into a detail account of the
action; and shall only say, that at night, the 3rd division, having
carried the redoubts and entrenchments before them, and having
accomplished, as usual, the work assigned them, found themselves beyond
St. Pé; and we were able to congratulate ourselves that Lord Wellington
had at last thought fit to allow us to find a way into a part of the
country blessed with a more genial climate than the Pyrenees. Had
Massena acted thus at Torres Vedras, there is no saying what might have
been the result, for the Portuguese, as I before observed, were then
young and inexperienced as soldiers, and but little to be depended
upon, had the parts of the position occupied by them been assailed by
the French.
It was an extraordinary occurrence in the action upon the Nivelle that
a redoubt carried by our 88th regiment should have been defended by the
greater part of the French 88th, the latter thus becoming prisoners to
the former. And it was likewise the fate of the French 45th at Talavera
to have been nearly destroyed by the fire of ours, as was ascertained
by the numbers of killed and wounded left upon the ground, and also
by the late Major-General Guard (who then commanded our 45th), who was
left amongst the wounded at Talavera when our army retreated after the
action.
I believe it is an axiom in war, at least it ought to be, that no
extended position--fortify it as you please--can be held for any length
of time against a properly combined movement of good troops. Had not
we to fall back through the Pyrenees before Soult, and did we not
find ourselves unable to make any effectual stand before him till we
reached the ground in front of Pampeluna? Sir Thomas Picton certainly,
the previous evening, checked the French for a short time; but after a
night's march we found ourselves in the excellent position selected by
him, and in which, when our army was more concentrated, we were able to
frustrate all Soult's efforts, great as they were.
I must not here omit remarking, that it was insinuated, and even
believed by many, that if Lord Wellington had not arrived in time,
followed by a part of the army at this position, Sir Thomas Picton
intended to have abandoned it, and to have retired behind Pampeluna,
and thereby would have removed our blockading force, and thrown it open
to Soult.
I can positively say that he had no such intention, and I feel I
ought to make this assertion, if it were only in justice to Sir
Thomas Picton's military reputation, and I know I can be borne out
in it. I had been particularly employed with the 3rd division in
originally forming the blockade of Pampeluna; that is to say, in
taking up with the troops the positions to be occupied around it,
and Sir Thomas Picton was aware that, in consequence, I was likely to
be well acquainted with the various roads in the neighbourhood; he
therefore sent for me on the night previous to the day upon which it
was insinuated that he intended to have abandoned the position. He
told me he expected to be attacked by Marshal Soult in the morning,
that he was determined to stand his ground; but wished to know, if,
before Lord Wellington could come to his assistance, and if such a
misfortune should happen as that of his being obliged, by very superior
numbers, and the unforeseen events of a battle, to fall back, if I was
sufficiently acquainted with the roads around the city to enable me to
undertake, under such circumstances, to conduct the troops, so as to
keep them out of the range of the cannon upon the ramparts of the city.
I replied, that I knew the roads sufficiently for the purpose, and was
about to retire, when he repeated his determination to maintain his
position, and even betrayed a kind of feeling of delight at the idea
of giving Soult and his army battle, with only the few troops he could
oppose to him, until the arrival of Lord Wellington.
Almost at this moment, as I learnt afterwards, an engineer officer
(I don't remember his name) arrived to report himself, who had been
looking for the 3rd division amongst the mountains; I think he said he
had been sent to supply the place of Colonel Burgoyne, who had been
taken ill, and was obliged to go to the rear. Sir Thomas, who at such a
time, would have wished not to be plagued by a stranger, desired him,
partly, it was fancied, with the intention of getting rid of him, to
go and find out the different roads leading to the rear of Pampeluna;
and I have often since wondered if in this could have originated the
silly story of Sir Thomas Picton's intention of abandoning the position
in which the battle was fought, and in which the 3rd division performed
its usual brilliant part.
I think it but fair next to mention, that the dispositions made by the
French at Orthes, were not only superior to what we usually met with,
but they also fought that battle with seemingly more confidence in
themselves, and in their chief, than they had latterly done. For some
time after the action commenced, neither the 3rd nor 4th divisions,
whose movements came more particularly under my observation, were
able to gain any ground to their front, or to set properly to work;
indeed, it was next to impossible for the former to advance, the
position before them being judiciously and most formidably occupied by
a considerable part of Soult's army; and we were aware that the moment
we should attempt to go forward, we would have been taken in flank
by a large body of troops, of whom part held very strong ground, and
part possessed a wooded ravine, which separated the 3rd from the 4th
divisions. We were thus most provokingly brought to a complete stand,
exposed to a heavy cannonade, and also to the fire of the infantry in
our front; and the French troops will fire away in that manner, and
usually with considerable effect, as long as their opponents please.
Sir Thomas Brisbane saw plainly how his brigade, the most advanced of
the three, was situated; and though most anxious to push forward to
assail the enemy, so well posted in his front, and to fight as the 3rd
division always did, yet in this state of things, it would have been
decidedly wrong to have done so. I was carefully observing what the
French before us, as well as those hitherto successfully opposed to
the 4th division, were about; and seeing a body of cavalry assembling
behind the infantry, with which we were more particularly engaged, I
pointed them out to Sir Thomas Brisbane, who took such steps as he
thought necessary in case of their venturing to charge us. Impolitic as
it was, with such a large force to contend with, it was evident that
there was nothing for it, but to detach some companies into the ravine,
to drive out the French skirmishers, who invariably took in flank the
4th division, in the several gallant attempts successively made on the
narrow tongue of land, by the regiments composing it, to get forward. I
conclude Lord Wellington saw how the two divisions were situated, and
sent a considerable part of the light division to our support, and to
clear the ravine; and to my delight, I saw Sir Andrew Bernard coming on
at their head for that purpose.
He soon completely scoured out the ravine, in the style the light
division were accustomed to do every thing they undertook; and it was
then no longer difficult for the 3rd and 4th divisions to advance,
and in a few minutes, the advantageous ground, upon which the French
had made so brave a stand, was in possession of the leading brigade.
A chase then commenced, during which it was found very difficult to
restrain the ardour of the troops, and had it been deemed advisable for
our cavalry to have charged sooner than they did, the loss of the enemy
must have been much greater than it was reported to be.
I have been again rather minute in detailing the part performed in this
battle by the 3rd division, as I wish to attract attention to the mode
of fighting invariably practised, and with so much success, by Sir
Thomas Picton, who would have thought but little of any commander of a
brigade or regiment who did not instantly, but in compact order, push
forward upon the enemy; a mode of fighting which he knew to be most
suitable to British soldiers and the least relished by their foes, who
would always have preferred firing away, either skirmishing or even in
line.
It was not in the power of the British armies either at Talavera or
Waterloo (the actions which most resembled each other in fighting under
a heavy fire,) to go forward in the manner I have mentioned against the
French; and our losses were, consequently, in both these actions, very
great from the enemy's fire.--Since the battle of Fontenoy, in which
a long-continued steady advance of British troops, in compact order,
effected such wonders, and which would have been completely successful
if supported by the Dutch and the rest of the Duke of Cumberland's
army, down to the present day, I cannot find that the style of
fighting practised in the 3rd division was ever unsuccessful; but,
on the contrary, was always attended with the best results, and even
with much less loss than would have been sustained in any other mode of
acting: I therefore trust I may be pardoned for having endeavoured to
illustrate the correctness of the opinion I entertain in this respect,
not only by what I have related of the battle of Orthes, but also by
the rather minute description I ventured to give of the achievements of
the 3rd division at Salamanca.
But even in acting as skirmishers on a large scale, when Sir Thomas
Picton's division had, at Vic Bigore, to contend with two French
divisions, each at least equal in number to the 3rd, the same
system of fighting was, as far as practicable, observed. Besides
the 5th battalion 60th, a battalion of Portuguese caçadores and our
light infantry companies, whole regiments, (and here we felt the
want of knowledge of light infantry movements in all corps,) only
retaining some companies in reserve and for support, were engaged as
sharpshooters. They were, however, constantly pushed forward upon the
French, and recommended not to throw away their fire in long shots, but
rather, as much as possible, to endeavour to close with them; and if a
halt was any where perceived in any part of the advancing skirmishers a
staff officer was invariably sent to the point to ascertain the cause.
The French, therefore, invariably gave way, and in their confused
retreat they became exposed, in running from one enclosure to another,
to the fire of our troops. After driving them for a considerable
distance before us in this style, the coming of night stopped our
career, but had we stood and fired, as usual upon such occasions, this
brilliant feat of the 3rd division would never have been heard of. At
dark, Lord Wellington came up to Sir Thomas Brisbane's brigade, which
was still warmly engaged.--He wished to know how the French, we had so
long followed up, were situated; but so thickly wooded, enclosed, and
covered with vineyards was the neighbourhood of Vic Bigore, near to
which this splendid affair terminated, that it was impossible to give
him any information about them.
A soldier of the 88th, hearing what had been said, volunteered to get
up into a tree, and thereby to make himself an object to be shot at.
This he accomplished with some difficulty, and being asked what he
could see; replied, "Och, nothing but them wearisome vineyards, and bad
luck to them, and a power of their scrimigers." Night closed the scene,
the firing had ceased. The French sentinels and ours being posted
not twenty yards from each other, they, as usual, thought no more of
strife; but in the course of the night, the enemy silently and quietly
moved off towards Tarbes. The day following we crossed the Adour at
that town. Picton was again advancing against the enemy, whose right
having been turned by the divisions on our left, they were marching,
or rather running in great confusion along the road, which passes
through a wooded height above Tarbes to Tournay. Sir Thomas Brisbane's
dispositions were even made to have had a dash at them; when an
order, which greatly surprised us, came for the troops to halt, when
without almost meeting with any resistance, we must have cut off and
taken vast numbers of the fugitives, who were thus allowed to "live to
fight another day." Upon receiving this order to halt from Sir Thomas
Picton's aide de camp, (who was questioned in order to ascertain if he
was sure he was correct in the message he delivered) I went back to
find out what could possibly have occasioned it. I soon met Sir Thomas,
and venturing cautiously to express my regret at such an opportunity
having been allowed to escape, of intercepting so considerable a number
of the enemy's troops, he replied, "That is no fault of mine; but go
now, Sir, and desire your general to move on." But before I could
return to the brigade, which were greatly amazed at being kept back,
the last of the French were just disappearing behind a hill about half
a mile off.
Colonel Napier says, in speaking of French and British soldiers, "place
an attainable object of war before the French soldier, and he will make
supernatural efforts to gain it, but failing, he becomes proportionally
discouraged. Let some new chance be opened, some fresh stimulus applied
to his ardent sensitive temper, and he will rush forward again with
unbounded energy; the fear of death never checks him, he will attempt
any thing."
This is a well-drawn picture of the French, yet I hope he will excuse
me for saying, that I think an officer of great experience, like
Colonel Napier, must often have seen supernatural efforts made by
French officers, both to bring on their men and to make them stand
their ground, but all in vain, when they saw British troops about to
close with them. Again Colonel Napier speaks of the unrelenting vigour
of British infantry, and of their deafening shout, rolling over a
field of battle, more full and terrible than that of any other nation,
and followed by the strong and unwavering charge. All this must be
fully acquiesced in, and the British soldier well merits this praise;
for I do not think that Colonel Napier ever had any difficulty in
getting his men to stand or follow him, either to the charge or to the
assault of the most rugged and impracticable breach; on the contrary,
I should suppose he must have found more difficulty in restraining
them in their headlong course, with their officers, still more daring
than themselves, at their head. In the comparison, therefore, drawn
between French and British soldiers, I consider that Colonel Napier
scarcely does the undaunted brilliant courage of the latter justice,
when he only speaks of the unrelenting vigour of the British infantry.
I conclude, when Colonel Napier composed this passage, he had the
fields of Talavera and Waterloo before his eyes, where, certainly,
great endurance of fire was necessary on the part of British troops,
and where the French had full scope for displaying their best qualities
as soldiers; but in the 3rd division, when it fought in Picton's
style, and was led as he expected his officers to lead, he would, on
all occasions, have witnessed the fine qualities attributed to French
soldiers most amply displayed, and even surpassed. Much, however, as
I admire the undaunted courage of British soldiers in following the
bravest and most noble-minded officers in the world, I cannot be blind
to their imperfections, and especially to their conduct after victory,
and upon other occasions, which often threatened us with the most
serious consequences; and it is this makes me so anxious to have more
of the good and true men of the British empire brought into our ranks,
and of whom there are enough to be found to form a well conducted
invincible army.
But let us imagine such troops as these, in a high state of discipline,
and properly supported by our splendid heavy dragoons and artillery,
charging an enemy sword in hand, in the manner I have before alluded
to, and it may be readily allowed that the fate of a campaign, or even
that of a kingdom, would be decided in a single battle; for the enemy's
troops, thus closed with, could not well escape from the field; and
we should no longer be incredulous when we read of the consequences
resulting from a charge of Roman legions. It has pleased Divine
Providence to form the men of the British empire for such a kind of
warfare; having bestowed upon them daring hearts, and powerful arms to
execute whatever may be required of them.
If ever the plan of calling out men by ballot is adopted, I would beg
leave to suggest, that a certain number of battalions of the regular
army, from adjoining districts, should be permanently considered a
division; and when a force was wanted in any part of the world, either
the division, or a brigade of it, should compose the whole or a part
of that force; and would not thus an esprit du corps be established in
such a division, like what was found so admirably calculated for mutual
support amongst the battalions and brigades of the light, 3rd, 4th, &c.
divisions under the Duke of Wellington; and which induced them readily
to make any effort, or any sacrifice, to aid each other in battle. And
how often have I witnessed this feeling prevail, to a great extent,
among the officers and soldiers of the 45th, 74th, 88th regiments,
and 5th battalion, 60th, which composed the brigade to which I was
so long attached as brigade-major. I can never forget one instance
of this kind in particular, which occurred at the battle of Fuentes
d'Onor. After a long and dreadful struggle in that village, between
the British and a large body of the French Imperial Guard and other
troops which supported them, the right brigade of the 3rd division was
at last brought up to take the place of the fatigued regiments so long
engaged, under a heavy fire, without any decided advantage being gained
by either party, the French holding the lower and our troops the upper
part of the village. The 88th, supported by the 45th, was ordered to
charge into it and drive out the enemy. They soon did so in the usual
style of the 3rd division. But I shall ever think with pleasure, of the
extraordinary eagerness evinced by the 45th to advance to the help of
their old friends the Rangers, who on that occasion wanted none. This
feeling, however, between these two corps in particular, was always
most strongly marked throughout the whole war; and I have no doubt
would be revived, if they ever met again in presence of an enemy.
It may, perhaps, be considered out of place, but, before closing this
chapter, I must beg leave to observe that I read--as I think every
one else must have done--with great interest what the Marquis of
Londonderry has told us in the account he has given of his visit to
Russia, of the enormous establishments of the Czar for the instruction
of those intended for the staff and other branches of his military
and naval services. The country ought always to feel indebted to
officers who can, like his Lordship, give useful information upon such
subjects; for we certainly, by some means or other, should be made
acquainted with what is going on in the military and naval world. And
although the grand reviews, or showing off of troops and establishments
were evidently got up in order to produce strong impressions, I feel
confident it must, hereafter, be found that the expense of keeping up
the latter will be much greater than the advantages to be derived from
them. But our army does not require such an extended and overgrown
system, which is neither suited to the feelings, ideas, or the genius
of the free people of the British Empire.--An absolute government,
which may one day have cause to tremble at the effects of what it has
produced, could alone be supposed capable of creating and carrying
out a plan of such magnitude, and which must, I should fear, prove
hazardous to the safety of the country in which it is adopted, and
also to its institutions.--I certainly would require that all gentlemen
intended for commissions in our service should have had a certain
military or naval education, but I would not ask where it had been
acquired, provided they could pass the examinations I have already
alluded to.
From our staff, at their own cost, well and probably expensively
educated, we might naturally expect that officers would be selected,
to be employed as consuls or otherwise, in ascertaining what might be
going forward in countries likely to be, or which have already become
the scenes of warfare, and about which, or the parties engaged, Great
Britain might be deeply interested, yet not altogether justified in
taking an active part in the contest, such as Circassia, Persia, South
America, and perhaps Spain; and, above all, we might constantly have
an eye upon our North American democratic neighbours, who can only be
properly dealt with by a military governor-general of the whole of
our North American territories, and who should be entrusted with much
authority, both civil and military, so that he could act at all times
with decision and promptitude.
Accomplished staff officers, such as I have in view, could give
such information as might be relied upon, and would enable those,
who direct the affairs of this great empire, to act judiciously and
advantageously; and when these officers wished to do so, they ought to
be allowed to go wherever war of any kind was carrying on, if it were
only with the view of acquiring greater knowledge of their profession;
for no matter what might be the nature of the warfare, some things
may always be learnt. But these officers should, at the same time,
be strictly prohibited from meddling with, or in any way aiding, or
advising either party, without permission to do so from our Government.
Civilians, in general, ought to be looked upon as not calculated for
employment such as that I speak of, and we had once a lesson given us
in this respect, if we will only profit by it, when Sir John Moore's
army was so nearly lost through the foolish presumption of our agent or
minister, sent out to the Spanish government of that day.
Many think that France could not be better governed than it is at
present by Louis Philip, who is universally allowed to be an able
sovereign; but I have often heard the question asked, how it was, that
Paris, and all France in its train, fell so easily and unaccountably
into the hands of the men of July, 1830. Although I know Paris
tolerably well, and a good deal of France and Frenchmen, yet the only
answer, I believe, that can be given is, that it did not suit the
views, prejudices, or feelings of the military, that the existing
order of things should be maintained; many of them, very probably,
at the time belonging to the political coteries, with which Paris in
particular always abounds, and in which are broached and discussed the
strangest possible doctrines and dogmas. British officers can never
belong to such dangerous associations, if they even did exist in the
United Kingdom.
Any tumultuous assemblage of men, if even partially armed, can at
first, as was the case the other day at Newport, be easily dispersed
or put down, by rightly disposed and well officered regular troops.
As for the barricades, of which we heard so much, they could only
have led, had the troops done their duty, to the greater destruction
of the city and the rioters; but as they were put up, why did an able
and enlightened officer like Marshal Marmont, who commanded, send
his soldiers in the manner he did into the streets of Paris, for
this was quite as useless as our going headlong into those of Buenos
Ayres, where some streets, and almost every house, were strongly
barricaded, and yet I believe we forced them all; but probably, if
he had ever heard of our exploits there, he had forgotten them. It
appears strange to many, that Mont-Martre and other commanding points
in and about Paris were not occupied by the Marshal in force with
cannon and mortars, his communications with the country secured by his
cavalry, and that he did not, without delay, bring up to the capital
a sufficient number of troops to restore order. But even before their
arrival, it is likely, that the peaceable and well-disposed part of
the inhabitants, and especially the householders, would have found
it to be their interest to declare openly against a lawless mob and
their political leaders; and to have taken part with the troops
opposed to them; but should this not have been the case, and it then
clearly appearing, that all were leagued to resist the established
government, which it is the duty of armies in all countries to uphold,
the Marshal, however painful it might have been to his feelings, could
have had no alternative but to announce to the riotous people, that
if tranquillity and obedience to the laws, and to the constituted
civil authorities, were not instantly restored, Paris, with the view
of punishing its lawless inhabitants, would be laid in ruins. It will
no doubt be asked, if such reasoners would have consented to destroy
that large, beautiful, and populous city, the seat of the arts, and
where every thing magnificent is to be found? Blucher would have done
this for them sometime before, for he had a great fancy to treat Paris
as General Steinbock did Altona years ago, had it not been for Lord
Wellington; and for this, I fear, the French people were not afterwards
even grateful to him. But this question is very like one I had put to
me some time ago, when I ventured to hint, that a certain determined
mode of acting, would, in the end, but in another country, prove to be
the most humane, viz. "Would you shoot the people--the poor misguided
people of Ireland?" I answered, that as an officer, I should be obliged
to do so, however reluctant I might be to adopt such a measure; but I
would begin with their selfish agitators, if they would not discontinue
their wicked practices, and cease holding out expectations to the
people of a dismemberment of the empire, and allow the laws, whatever
they may be, to be obeyed. If the laws are bad, or fancied to be bad,
and if they do not please all men, without regard to difference of
religion, and in other respects, upon an equality, let the Government,
whose business it is, endeavour to have them altered; but as long as
they stand the laws of the realm, it is the duty of officers and
soldiers to uphold them, and the civil authorities in the execution of
them, and they have nothing more to say to the matter. Had the French
acted thus, and upon such principles--for I cannot suppose that their
officers had lost all influence and command over their men--and as I
am convinced, British officers, if necessary, would act, we should
not now have before our eyes the awful example, of an established
government overturned, as was the case in 1830, and which, with what
has occurred in that country for many years past, ought to be held up
for ever as a lesson to the United Kingdom. I hope, however, that Great
Britain will never become so humbled, as to require salvation from
naval and military patriotism; but I boldly assert, and without fear of
contradiction, that no where on earth, amongst men, is this virtue to
be found so pure as in the hearts of the officers of our navy and army.