proper, from his situation, TO HAVE SENT IN VESSELS EARLIER THAN THEY
WERE SENT, though there might be a great risk in so doing, there was a
possibility of annoying the enemy more than they were annoyed.”
CAPTAIN GEORGE FRANCIS SEYMOUR (of the _Pallas_.)—“I saw the
_Impérieuse_ inform the Commander-in-chief, by signal, that if allowed
to remain he could destroy the enemy: there was every prospect of
preventing them from getting off, as it would prevent their carrying
out hawsers to heave off by. From what I afterwards saw, I think the
ships might have floated in sooner—they might have come in with the
last half of the flood-tide.”
PRESIDENT.—“How much sooner would that have been than the time they
actually did join?”
_Answer._—“At _eleven o’clock_.”
_Question._—“What time did the line-of-battle ships join?”
_Answer._—“_Within a short time after two o’clock._”
_Question._—“Is your opinion formed from information obtained since
the 12th of April, or on that day?”
_Answer._—“It was formed from the depth of water _we found_ ON GOING
IN.”
This evidence, coming from an officer of Captain Seymour’s character and
standing, was so decisive, that it was subjected to a severe
cross-examination, of which the subjoined is the substance:—
“It is impossible for me to foretell the event of such an attack, it
so much depending on fortuitous circumstances. I cannot say that the
line-of-battle ships _should_ have gone in; I was not in possession of
the Commander-in-chief’s information. _I state the fact, and leave the
Court to judge._ I mean to say, _there would have been water enough
for the line-of-battle ships to have floated in_. As to the opposition
they would have met with, the Court has as much before them as I
have.”
If the reader will refer to Lord Gambier’s expression, in his second
despatch of the 10th of May (see page 407), it will be evident that no
attack whatever was intended; “but observing the _Impérieuse_ to
advance,” it became imperative to support her, _i.e._ when the
_flood-tide “had nearly done running.”_ This is the true explanation of
the British ships having been sent in _at all_. I repeat, that the
advance of the _Impérieuse_ thus forced on the little that was done. Had
an attack been seriously intended, the time at which the British fleet
should have gone in was that pointed out by the preceding officers, viz.
when the French ships were aground, and the whole within reach of
destruction; instead of when the few, which were unable to get off by
any exertions, were assailed. To have rested a case upon the danger to
the British fleet from the fire of the ships _ashore_, with their guns
thrown overboard to lighten them, was a course of defence which, for the
honour of the British navy, is elsewhere unparalleled.
There is no necessity to adduce further extracts on this head; and I
have purposely refrained from introducing my own evidence; but the
_animus_ by which the Court was actuated in the case must not be lightly
passed over.
One of the principal witnesses was, as a matter of course, the Captain
of the Fleet, Sir Harry Neale. This officer, though thoroughly
conversant with both the acts and intentions of the commander-in-chief,
was directed by the President openly, _not to state the opinions he had
given to Lord Gambier on public services_! By Admiral Young Sir Harry
Neale was told _to say nothing but what he was directed to detail_! This
would be incredible were it not printed in “Minutes of the
Court-Martial, revised by Lord Gambier!”
Sir H. NEALE (Captain of the Fleet).—“There were continued
conversations between the Commander-in-chief and me. I have given him
my opinion _on different services_; some of those he may have
approved, and _some he may not have approved_.”
PRESIDENT.—“I apprehend _these_ are _not_ to be stated!”
Yet Sir H. Neale carefully marked the distinction between private
conversation and the _public service_, by using the term “different
services;” he being evidently ready to tell all he knew as regarded the
public service. He was, however, stopped by Admiral Young in one of the
strangest injunctions which ever fell from the lips of a judge.
ADMIRAL YOUNG.—“If you are directed _to detail_ any circumstances, you
are _then_ to say all you know of the circumstances you _are directed
to detail_; but if you are asked a specific question, your oath, I
imagine, will _only_ oblige you to answer SPECIFICALLY and directly,
and as fully as you _can, the question which is proposed to you_!”
So that Sir Harry Neale was cautioned that, if he was _not_ directed to
detail circumstances, he was not to relate them, however important they
might be! And if asked only a specific question, he was merely to answer
_specifically_; though the Court could know nothing of the facts, unless
they permitted the witnesses to tell the truth, and the whole truth, in
the very words of the oath.
But as Sir Harry Neale was known to be a man not likely to be thus
peremptorily silenced, half a dozen insignificant questions were,
therefore, only put to him by the Court, with the exception of one or
two leading questions from Lord Gambier.
CHAP. XXIII.
LORD GAMBIER’S DESPATCH.
ITS OMISSIONS AND SUPPRESSIONS.—MOTIVE FOR LORD GAMBIER’s
MISSTATEMENTS.—MR. FAIRFAX REPORTS THAT THE MEDIATOR WENT IN FIFTH,
NOT FIRST.—REASON OF THE CONTRARY ASSERTION.—NAPOLEON ATTRIBUTES THE
ESCAPE OF HIS FLEET TO THE IMBECILITY OF LORD GAMBIER.—MISMANAGEMENT
OF THE FIRESHIPS.—LORD GAMBIER’s DELAY AND MISDIRECTION.—HIS
PERVERSION OF FACT.—HIS MISPLACED PRAISE.—THE DESPATCH FAILS TO
SATISFY THE PUBLIC.—CRITICISED BY THE PRESS.—ADMIRAL GRAVIÈRE’s
ACCOUNT OF THE TERMINATION OF THE ACTION.
The despatch brought to England by Sir Harry Neale set out with the
perversion, that the fireships, “arranged according to my plan,” were
“led on in the most undaunted and determined manner by Captain
Wooldridge in the _Mediator, preceded by some vessels filled with powder
and shells, as proposed by Lord Cochrane, with a view to explosion_!”
The omission of the fact that before Captain Wooldridge “led the
fireships” I had myself preceded them in the explosion vessel, and that,
even before the _Mediator_ proceeded on service in obedience to the
signals made by my order from the _Impérieuse_, the explosion vessel
under my personal command was half-way towards the French fleet; the
suppression of my name as having anything at all to do with the attack
by means of the explosion vessels, notwithstanding that by going first I
ran all the risk of being boarded by the French guard-boats, and myself
and crew murdered, as would have been the case had we been captured,
showed that the object of the commander-in-chief was to suppress all
mention of me, my plans, or their execution, as entitled to any credit
for the mischief done to the enemy.
The despatch leads the reader to infer that the success subsequently
obtained arose from the “undaunted and determined manner in which
Captain Wooldridge led the fireships,” from “Admiral Stopford’s zealous
co-operation with the boats,” though not one of these ever stirred from
alongside the _Cæsar_, anchored full four miles from the scene of
action, and from the plans of the commander-in-chief himself.
That this suppression of all mention of the success of my plans in
driving the whole enemy’s fleet ashore with the exception of two ships
of the line, was deliberately intended by the commander-in-chief, is
placed beyond question by the contemptuous manner in which he speaks of
the means which really effected the mischief,—“_some vessels filled with
powder and shells, with a view to explosion_.” That these means,
conducted by myself, not Captain Wooldridge, _did_ drive the French
ships ashore, has been admitted by every French and English historian
since that period; and that this was done by my personal presence and
instrumentality is a historical fact which nothing can shake or pervert.
The only person ignoring the fact was the commander-in-chief of the
British force, who not only gives me no credit for what had been done,
but does not even mention my name, as having, by the above means,
contributed to the result!
The sole conceivable motive for such a suppression of the success of my
plans must have been that, having neglected to take advantage of the
helpless condition of the French ships driven ashore, it was desirable
to conceal the whole of the facts from the British public, by ascribing
the success gained to other, and totally different causes, and thus to
convert a deep discredit into a great victory!
The despatch goes on to state that, “the _Mediator, by breaking the
boom!_” opened the way for the fireships, “but, owing to the darkness of
the night, several mistook their course and failed.”
At the conclusion of the last chapter, such reasons have, I think, been
given why the _Mediator_ could not have broken a double boom nearly a
mile in extent as ought to have set the question for ever at rest. But
as that statement, notwithstanding its impossibility, is endorsed by the
commander-in-chief as the groundwork of his despatch, it will be
necessary to refute his lordship’s statement also, and that from the
evidence of an officer upon whose testimony he must necessarily rely,
viz. Mr. Fairfax, the master of the fleet, who was deputed in the _Lyra_
to observe the effect produced by the fireships, and, as a matter of
course, reported to the commander-in-chief the result of his
observations, which were as follows:—
“When the explosion-vessel blew up, she was about two cables’ length
from the _Lyra_. The _Lyra_, as well as the other explosion-vessel, is
marked in the chart produced by me. When she blew up, the fire vessels
_all_ seemed to steer for that point. _I hailed four of them, and the
Mediator_, and desired the _Mediator_ to steer south-east, or else she
would miss the _French fleet_.”—_Minutes_, p. 177.
In another place Mr. Fairfax states that the night was so dark that it
was difficult to make out exact positions; but the testimony of Captain
Proteau, of the _Indienne_, that the explosion took place _at the boom_,
“_à l’estacade_,” is indisputable, as the _Indienne_, by Captain
Proteau’s testimony, was lying so close to the boom and the
explosion-vessel also, as only to escape the effect of the latter by her
shells going over. The spot, therefore, where the explosion took place
is historically beyond doubt.
The testimony of Mr. Fairfax, then—and it must be borne in mind that I
had no worse enemy in the fleet than that person—is this:—1st, The
explosion took place; 2ndly, _all_ the fireships steered for the point
where it had taken place; 3rdly, Mr. Fairfax hailed _four_ of them;
4thly, the _Mediator_ then came up, _steering in a wrong direction_, so
that in place of “leading the fireships in the most undaunted and
determined manner,” as vouched for by the commander-in-chief, the master
of the fleet, who was on the spot, vouches that she was the _fifth
fireship which came up_, and that had he not set her right in her course
she would have “missed the French fleet;” _i.e._ she was behind the
other fireships, and _steering outside the boom, which lay in front of
the French fleet!_
It would, I think, be superfluous to say another word about this
extraordinary story of the boom, nor should I have condescended to
notice it at all in connection with the despatch, but that the
commander-in-chief makes it the groundwork of his report to the
Government, for the unworthy purpose of altogether omitting my name as
connected with the explosion-vessels, and for leading the public to
infer that these produced _no effect whatever, either on the boom or the
French fleet!_ which is indeed the main object of the despatch.
It was, however, necessary to give some reason why the French fleet ran
ashore; and as it was not considered expedient to give me the credit of
causing it to do so by the terror created from the explosion, the
commander-in-chief, despite his own judgment as a seaman, appears to
have caught at Captain Wooldridge’s story of breaking the boom, and
other subsequent exploits just as unfounded; though the master of the
fleet must have reported that some time after the explosion-vessel had
done its work _he fell in with the Mediator, steering in a wrong
direction, and set her right in her course!!!_
I forbear to speak of having myself encountered the _Mediator_ after
passing several other fireships, as that would be assertion only. Of the
effect produced, and by what means it was produced, the subjoined
extract from the _Times_ newspaper of May 4th, 1809, will furnish some
idea, as coming from French sources:—
“Some letters have been received from the French coast, which bear
testimony to the destructive result of the late attack an the enemy’s
fleet in Basque Roads. ‘Your _infernal machines_,’ says one of the
letters, ‘have not only destroyed several of our ships, but they have
rendered almost all the remainder unfit to put to sea again. They have
proved the destruction of more than 2000 of our people, (?) and
_petrified the rest with fear_. The mouth of the Charente river is
completely blocked up with wreck.’”[55]
-----
Footnote 55:
That is, of the boom, for no ship had been wrecked at the mouth of the
Charente.
-----
Yet two days after the departure of the _Impérieuse_, the
commander-in-chief addressed another despatch to the Admiralty, from
which the subjoined is an extract:—
“_Caledonia_, April 16, 1809.
“It has blown violently from the southward and westward ever since the
departure of the _Impérieuse_, which has rendered it _impracticable to
act in any way with the small vessels or boats of the fleet_ against
the enemy. I have the satisfaction to observe this morning, that the
enemy have set fire to their frigate _L’Indienne_, and that the ship
of the line which is aground at the entrance of the river—supposed to
be the _Regulus_—there is every reason to believe will be wrecked.”
The Emperor Napoleon himself is, moreover, an authority on the subject,
not to be passed over.
“Some conversation now took place about Lord Cochrane, and the attempt
which his lordship had made to capture or destroy the ships in the
Charente.
“I said it was the opinion of a very distinguished officer, whom I
named, and who was well known to him (Napoleon), that if Cochrane had
been properly supported, he would have destroyed the whole of the
French ships.
“‘He would not only have destroyed them,’ replied Napoleon, ‘but _he
might and would have taken them out_, had your admiral supported him
as he ought to have done. For, in consequence of the signal made by
L’Allemand’ (I think he said) ‘to the ships to do the best in their
power to save themselves—_sauve qui peut_, in fact—they became
panic-struck, and cut their cables. The terror of the _brûlots_[56]
was so great, that they _actually threw their powder overboard, so
that they could have offered very little resistance_.’
-----
Footnote 56:
Napoleon, like other French writers, includes the explosion vessels
under the general term _brûlot_.
-----
“‘The French admiral,’ continued Napoleon, ‘was an _imbecile_, but
yours was just as bad. I assure you, that if Cochrane had been
supported, he would have taken every one of the ships. They ought not
to have been alarmed by your _brûlots_, but fear deprived them of
their senses, and they no longer knew how to act in their own
defence.’”—_O’Meara’s Napoleon_, vol. ii. p. 291.
Were it worth while, numerous testimonies of the like character could be
gathered from French official sources, but it is necessary to mention
some other points of the despatch.
The commander-in-chief’s assertion, that, “_owing to the darkness of the
night, several fireships mistook their course and failed_,” was true
enough, but not the _whole truth_, which was, that, from their clumsy
management—neither going in the right direction, nor being kindled at
the right time or place—_not one out of the twenty-three fireships took
effect_!
The despatch goes on to state, that at daylight Lord Cochrane signaling
that seven of the enemy’s ships were on shore, and might be destroyed,
the commander-in-chief “_immediately_”[57] ordered the fleet to unmoor
and weigh, _intending_ to proceed with it to their destruction; but the
wind blowing fresh _from the northward_[58], and _the flood-tide
running_[59], rendered it too hazardous to enter Aix Roads, wherefore
the fleet again anchored about three miles from the forts on Isle d’Aix.
-----
Footnote 57:
Four hours afterwards.
Footnote 58:
And therefore a fair wind.
Footnote 59:
Consequently favourable for the fleet to enter Aix Roads.
-----
This was, indeed, all that the fleet collectively did, or that the
commander-in-chief intended it to do. Seeing, however, the “_enemy
warping off their ships_” and that, whilst the fleet was unmooring and
anchoring again, “_they had succeeded in getting off all but five of the
line!_” the commander-in-chief “gave orders to Capt. Bligh of the
_Valiant_, with the _Revenge_, frigates, bombs, &c.,”—to attack those
that remained aground? Nothing of the kind, but—“_to anchor near the
Boyart Shoal, in readiness for an attack_!!” An odd way truly of
preventing the five remaining enemy’s ships, then throwing their guns
overboard for the purpose of lightening themselves, from warping off!!
“At twenty minutes past two, P.M.,” continues the commander-in-chief,
“Lord Cochrane advanced in the _Impérieuse_, with his accustomed
gallantry and spirit, and opened a well-directed fire on the _Calcutta_,
which _struck her colours to the Impérieuse_.” Lord Gambier afterwards
_denied this_, though almost the only part of the action which he was
near enough to see with his own eyes! Indeed, the terms of the despatch
are decisive of having been detailed from his own personal observations!
But now comes the monstrous part of the assertion; viz. “The ships and
vessels above-mentioned _soon after_ joined in the attack on the _Ville
de Varsovie_ and _Aquilon_, and obliged them to strike their colours,”
&c. Instead of “_soon after_,” the _Valiant_, _Revenge_, &c., remained
at anchor near the Boyart, till my signal “In want of assistance,” had
been wrongly interpreted as a signal of “distress.” But for this, it is
clear that not an anchor would have been weighed. Yet the
commander-in-chief made the act of sending in these ships, _when it
could no longer be avoided_, appear part of a previous plan to attack
the _Ville de Varsovie_ and _Aquilon_, and that they were sent for this
purpose _soon after_ my attack on the _Calcutta_ and them
simultaneously!
This is not only a perversion of fact, but a suppression of it; for the
commander-in-chief must have seen that the _Impérieuse_ was engaged with
the _Aquilon_ and _Ville de Varsovie_, as well as with the _Calcutta_,
before the _Valiant_, _Revenge_, &c., were ordered in to our assistance,
as requested by my signal. And here it must be distinctly understood,
that _had not a portion of the fleet been compelled by this justifiable
device of my signaling “In want of assistance,” to come to our supposed
aid, no attack would have been made_. To avert this disgrace, I
resolved, if necessary, to sacrifice my ship.
Throughout the whole despatch, there is not a word to indicate that the
terror caused by the explosion-vessels had anything to do with the
success gained. On the contrary, the success is attributed to causes
purely imaginary. Great credit is given to me “for the vigorous and
gallant attack on the French line-of-battle ships ashore,” and for “my
judicious manner of approaching them, and placing my ship in a position
most advantageous to annoy the enemy, and _preserve my own ship!_
which,” continued his Lordship, “could not be exceeded by any feat of
valour hitherto achieved by the British navy!”
The plain fact is, and it will by this time be evident to others besides
nautical men, that the just quoted piece of claptrap was considered in
the light of a sop to my supposed vanity, sufficient to insure my
holding my peace on the subject of the fleet not having even
contemplated an attack till forced into it by my signal being mistaken
for being “in distress.”
Instead of being praised for what my plans really effected, I was
praised for what was neither done nor intended to be done. Instead of
adopting “a judicious manner of approaching the enemy, so as _to
preserve my ship_,” I drifted the _Impérieuse_ in like a log with the
tide, and stern foremost, for fear of being recalled, and then went at
the enemy with a determination, not to preserve, but _to lose_ my ship,
if the commander-in-chief did not relieve her before she was riddled
with shot; this being my only hope of forcing on an attack of any kind.
My motive was, no doubt, fathomed from seeing me attack three
line-of-battle ships simultaneously. Not a moment was to be lost, and
for the first time, since the French ran their ships ashore in terror,
two British line-of-battle ships, and some frigates, approached the spot
where the enemy’s vessels had been lying aground _ever since the
previous midnight_, helpless, and, as every French authority admits,
hopeless of escape, had the slightest effort been made to prevent it.
In place, then, of attacking these with a single frigate, in such a way
as to “_preserve my ship_,” I here avow that I rushed at the enemy in
the bitterness of despair, determined that if a portion of the fleet was
not sent in, the _Impérieuse_ should never again float out; for rather
than incur the stigma which would have awaited me in England, from no
fault of mine, but because it was not expedient that plans which had
been partially successful should be fully accomplished, she should have
been destroyed.
This despatch, inexplicable as it was felt to be, naturally suggested to
the public mind in England, that, despite its assumption of a great
victory, the result of the victory was by no means commensurate with the
tone of exultation assumed. The French fleet was _not_ destroyed; and it
was equally manifest, that if but little had been effected, it was owing
to the time which had been suffered to elapse between my first signals
and the tardy aid reluctantly yielded in support of them. By that kind
of intuitive perception characteristic of the British press, it was
agreed that there had been mismanagement somewhere, but _where_ was not
to be gathered from the commander-in-chief’s despatch, in which
everything “by favour of the Almighty,”[60] as the despatch most
reprehensibly set forth, had succeeded.
-----
Footnote 60:
There is something very revolting to a truly religious mind in these
derogatory phrases, which couple the beneficent Author of our being
with the butcheries of war. Under no circumstances are they
defensible. But when the name of the great and merciful Creator is
made subservient to an attempt to palm off as a great victory that
which, in reality, was a great disgrace even to the human means
available, there is something shocking in the perversion of language
which should only be uttered with the profoundest reverence, and on
occasions in strict coincidence with the attributes of the sacred name
invoked. In this case _fireships_ had been denounced as horrible and
antichristian, yet _explosion vessels_—engines of destruction tenfold
more diabolical—had, “by favour of the Almighty,” succeeded!
-----
It is not surprising, then, that the press began to criticise the
despatch on its own merits. The following remarks are extracted from a
_Times_ leading article in the paper of April 25th, 1809, by way of
specimen:—
“None felt more joy than ourselves at the destruction of four French
vessels in Basque (Aix) Roads. We have, however, been given to
understand that there are some people conversant in these things,
whose satisfaction is not quite so complete as was our own on the
result of the action.
* * * * * * * *
“Lord Cochrane’s first signal, as we learn from the _Gazette_, to the
admiral of the fleet, was that ‘seven of the enemy’s ships were on
shore, and might be destroyed.’ The question which hereupon naturally
suggests itself to the mind is, ‘Why, then, if seven might be
destroyed, were there only four?’