“GAMBIER.
“Capt. Lord Cochrane.”
Here was a repetition of the same thing. I was ordered away from the
attack, to “convey Sir H. Neale to England,” or I “might return to carry
on the service where I was,” viz. after the enemy had got clear off,
_and after being formally superseded in the service to which the Board
of Admiralty had appointed me, by a senior officer whom I could not
again supersede_!!!
There was, however, no evading Lord Gambier’s letter this time without
positive disobedience to orders, and that was not lightly to be risked,
even with the Board’s instructions to back me. I therefore returned to
the _Caledonia_, and at once told Lord Gambier that the extraordinary
hesitation which had been displayed in attacking ships helplessly on
shore, could only have arisen from my being employed in the attack, in
preference to senior officers. I begged his lordship, by way of
preventing the ill-feeling of the fleet from becoming detrimental to the
honour of the service, to set me altogether aside, and send in Admiral
Stopford, with the frigates or other vessels, as with regard to him
there could be no ill-feeling; further declaring my confidence that from
Admiral Stopford’s zeal for the service, he would, being backed by his
officers, accomplish results more creditable than anything that had yet
been done. I apologised for the freedom I used, stating that I took the
liberty as a friend, for it would be impossible, as matters stood, to
prevent a noise being made in England.
His lordship appeared much displeased; and making no remark, I repeated,
“My Lord, you have before desired me to ‘speak candidly to you,’ and I
have now used that freedom.”
Lord Gambier then replied, “_If you throw blame upon what has been done,
it will appear like arrogantly claiming all the merit to yourself._”
I assured his lordship that I had no such intention, for that no merit
was due, and told him that I had no wish to carry the despatches, or to
go to London with Sir Harry Neale on the occasion, my object being alone
that which had been entrusted to me by the Admiralty, viz. to destroy
the vessels of the enemy.
His lordship, however, cut the matter short by giving me written orders
immediately to convey Sir Harry Neale to England with despatches. In
obedience to this order we quitted Basque Roads for Plymouth on the
following morning.
These matters are officially on record, and therefore do not admit of
dispute. I will not comment further upon them, but will leave them to
the judgment of posterity. I will even go further, and acquit Lord
Gambier of all blame up to this period, except that of an easy
disposition, which yielded to the advice of officers interested in my
failure, that calm judgment which should characterise a
commander-in-chief, and which, had it been exercised, would have
rendered, as Napoleon afterwards said, the whole French fleet an easy
prey.
As much misrepresentation was made at the time relative to the damage
inflicted by the explosion-vessel under my immediate command, and as the
same misrepresentation has been adopted by all English historians, it
will be necessary particularly to advert to this. As mere assertion on
my part may be deemed egotistical, if not partial, I will adduce the
testimony of Captain Proteau, who commanded the enemy’s frigate
_Indienne_, and was _close to the boom_ at the time it was destroyed by
the explosion-vessel. The point here alluded to is the statement of the
commander of the _Mediator_, that HIS VESSEL BROKE THE BOOM BY HER
WEIGHT!! and Lord Gambier, without any personal knowledge of the fact,
was thereby led to endorse his statement.
The captain of the _Indienne_, on the other hand, states that when the
explosion-vessel blew up she was “_at the boom_,” or, nautically
speaking, “_brought up by the boom_.” His words, are “_flottant à
l’estacade_.”
It will be best, however, to extract the passage entire:—
“Nous distinguâmes, à 9 heures et demie, sous notre boussoir de
tribord, un corps _flottant à l’estacade_. L’explosion s’en fit
tout-à-coup, et vomit quantité de fusées artificielles, grenades et
obus, qui éclatèrent en l’air sans nous faire le moindre mal,
cependant nous n’en étions qu’à une demie encâblure.”—_Captain
Proteau’s Journal._
As the _Indienne_ was only half a cable’s length from the boom when the
explosion took place, the testimony of her captain on this point ought
to be decisive.
Lord Gambier stated in his despatch, and afterwards in his defence, that
the explosion-vessel blew up at half-past nine, whilst at three-quarters
past nine (_a quarter of an hour later_), the _Mediator_ and other
vessels came up, and were fired on by the French ships!
Lord Gambier, being himself more than a dozen miles from the scene of
action, made this statement on the authority of Captain Wooldridge, who
commanded the _Mediator_, and who reiterated in his evidence on the
court-martial the statement he had previously made to Lord Gambier, viz.
that _his ship_, and not the explosion-vessel, broke the boom: of the
truth of which statement the nautical reader shall judge on professional
grounds.
Admiral Allemand, who commanded in Aix Roads, thus describes, in his
despatch to the French Government, the boom which had been laid down by
his directions:—“Elle (the French fleet) étoit flanquée _d’une estacade
à quatre cents toises au large, qui avoit huits cents toises de long_.”
The boom formed two sides of a triangle, with the apex towards the
British fleet, thus,—
.
. .
400 toise. . . 400 toises.
. .
. .
. .
800 toises.
That is to say, each wing of the boom was more than half a mile long,
and the distance between the extremities of the base was nearly a mile.
This formidable obstacle was composed of large spars, bound by chains,
and moored along its whole double line with heavy anchors at appropriate
intervals, forming the most stupendous structure of the kind on record.
The statement of Captain Wooldridge to Lord Gambier, therefore, amounts
to this,—that his ship, the _Mediator_, an Indiaman of 800 tons, broke
up a double boom, each side of which was upwards of half a mile in
length; tore up, by pressure on one point only, a double line of heavy
anchors more than a mile in extent; and snapped many miles of iron
chains and lashings connecting the spars together!!!—though her contact
could not have been more than a few feet, the collision necessarily
taking place on one wing of the boom only. This was Captain Wooldridge’s
own version to Lord Gambier. To the nautical reader it is unnecessary to
write one word of comment; so much so, indeed, that I will not insult
the common sense even of the unprofessional reader by any attempt at
further explanation.
Yet this statement was made by Captain Wooldridge, not only to Lord
Gambier but to the officers composing the subsequent court-martial; more
strangely still, it was _accepted by those officers_, though every one
present must have known that the _Mediator_ would either have been
brought up on her first contact with the boom, or, if she were weighty
enough to overcome the obstacle, must have passed over it, by pressing
it beneath her bow into the water.
It was not even pretended by those on board the _Mediator_ that any
shock was felt! a pretty clear proof that, when she passed over the
place where the boom _had been_, no such obstacle existed. That a vessel
could have broken up a boom of such magnitude is too absurd for
reflection. Nor, had not this version of the matter appeared in every
naval history since 1809, should I have deemed a statement so truly
incredible worthy of notice.[53]
-----
Footnote 53:
The _Mediator’_s log, now amongst the Admiralty records, is conclusive
on the point. It is carried up to midnight on the 11th, two hours and
a half after notifying that the ship was set on fire at 9.30 P.M., but
_does not say a word about breaking or even feeling a shock from any
boom_.
-----
Even the explosion-vessel did not break the boom by actual contact. It
was the combined effect of the explosion upon the boom and upon the
surface of the sea that shook it to pieces. The huge waves caused by the
explosion lifted the boom along its entire length, and the strain so
loosened the chains which bound the spars together, that the latter
floated out of the fastenings, and were carried away with the tide, the
chains sinking as a matter of course. It is certain that at daylight the
next morning not a vestige of this formidable boom was to be seen; no
one pretended to have seen so much as a single spar of it; though, had
the _Mediator_ broken through it, as falsely alleged, the whole length
of the boom, except the part ruptured, must necessarily have remained at
anchor!!
CHAP. XXII.
ARRIVAL IN ENGLAND.
INTENDED VOTE OF THANKS TO LORD GAMBIER.—RESOLVE TO OPPOSE IT.—INTERVIEW
WITH LORD MULGRAVE.—LORD GAMBIER DEMANDS A COURT-MARTIAL.—HE IS
DIRECTED TO MAKE A FRESH REPORT OF THE ACTION IN BASQUE
ROADS.—INJUSTICE OF THIS SECOND DESPATCH.—ATTEMPT TO ENTRAP ME INTO
THE POSITION OF PROSECUTOR.—COMPOSITION AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE
COURT-MARTIAL.—THE ADMIRAL’S POINTS OF JUSTIFICATION.—DISPOSED OF BY
CAPTAIN BROUGHTON’S EVIDENCE, AND BY THAT OF CAPTAINS MALCOLM,
NEWCOMBE, AND SEYMOUR.—SIR HARRY NEALE’S EVIDENCE STOPPED BY ADMIRAL
YOUNG.
On the 26th of April, His Majesty was pleased to confer on me the
Knighthood of the Order of the Bath.
Soon after Lord Gambier’s arrival in England, Lord Mulgrave informed me
that a vote of thanks to the commander-in-chief would be proposed in the
House of Commons. Whereupon I told Lord Mulgrave that it was my duty to
apprise him that in my capacity as one of the members for Westminster, I
would oppose the motion, on the ground that the commander-in-chief had
not only done nothing to merit a vote of thanks, but had neglected to
destroy the French fleet in Aix Roads, when it was clearly in his power
to do so.
Lord Mulgrave entreated me not to persist in this determination, as such
a course would not only prove injurious to the Government, but highly
detrimental to myself, by raising up against me a host of enemies. The
public, said his lordship, was satisfied with what had been done, and
gave me full credit for my share therein, so that as I should be
included in the vote of thanks, the recognition of Lord Gambier’s
services could do me no harm.
I told his lordship that, speaking as a member of the House of Commons,
I did not recognise Lord Gambier’s services at all, for that none had
been rendered; and as for any thanks to myself, I would rather be
without them, feeling conscious that I had not been enabled
satisfactorily to carry out the earnest wishes of the Admiralty by the
destruction of the enemy’s fleet, as impressed on me by his lordship
before accepting the command with which I had been entrusted. I
nevertheless begged his lordship to consider that in my professional
capacity as a naval officer, I neither did offer nor had offered, any
opinion whatever on Lord Gambier’s conduct, but that my position as
member of Parliament for Westminster forbade my acquiescence in a public
misrepresentation.
Lord Mulgrave replied, that I was even now accusing Lord Gambier in my
professional capacity; the public would not draw the distinction between
my professional and parliamentary conduct. I expressed my regret for the
public want of discrimination, but told his lordship that this would not
alter my determination.
Soon after this conversation Lord Mulgrave sent for me, and again
entreated me, for my own sake, to reconsider my resolution, saying that
he had reported our former conversation to the Government, which was
highly dissatisfied therewith. His lordship further assured me that he
was anxious about the matter on my account, as the course intimated
would certainly bring me under high displeasure. To this I replied, that
the displeasure of the Government would not for a moment influence my
Parliamentary conduct, for which I held myself answerable to my
constituents.
His lordship then said, “If you are on service, you cannot be in your
place in Parliament. Now, my lord, I will make you a proposal. I will
put under your orders three frigates, with _carte blanche_ to do
whatever you please on the enemy’s coasts in the Mediterranean. I will
further get you permission to go to Sicily, and embark on board your
squadron my own regiment, which is stationed there. You know how to make
use of such advantages.”
I thanked Lord Mulgrave for the offer, at the same time expressing my
gratitude for his anxiety to preserve me from the evils of acting
contrary to the wishes of the Government; but told his lordship that,
were I to accept this offer, the country would regard my acquiescence as
a bribe to hold my peace, whilst I could not regard it in any other
light. Self-respect must, therefore, be my excuse for declining the
proposal.
The anxiety of the then Government was, no doubt, to convert what had
been effected in Aix Roads into political capital, as a victory which
merited the thanks of parliament. My tacit aquiescence in the object of
Government would have subjected me, and rightly, to a total loss of
political confidence in the estimation of those with whom I acted. No
man with the slightest pretensions to personal honesty or political
consistency could, therefore, have decided otherwise than I did, even
with the kind warning of Lord Mulgrave, that evil consequences to myself
would follow—a prediction subsequently verified to the letter.
The upshot of the matter was, that on Lord Mulgrave communicating my
determination to Lord Gambier, the latter demanded a court-martial.
As soon as my fixed resolution of opposing the vote of thanks became
known to the Government, the Board of Admiralty directed Lord Gambier to
make a _fresh report_ of the action in Basque Roads! requiring his
lordship to call upon various officers for further reports as to the
part they took therein!
Accordingly, on the 10th of May, Lord Gambier forwarded _a new despatch_
to the Admiralty, _in which my services were altogether passed over!!!_
notwithstanding that, in Lord Gambier’s previous report, he had written
as follows:—“I cannot speak in sufficient terms of admiration and
applause of the vigorous and gallant attack made by Lord Cochrane upon
the French line-of-battle ships which were on shore; as well as of his
judicious manner of approaching them, and placing his ship in a position
most advantageous to annoy the enemy and preserve his own ship, which
could not be exceeded by any feat of valour hitherto achieved by the
British navy.”
Still more singularly, in the second despatch, which is too long for
insertion[54], Lord Gambier inadvertently confirms the fact that _no
attack on the French fleet would have been made at all_, had it not been
for my having commenced an attack with the _Impérieuse_ alone, which
movement, as has been said, was executed literally _by stealth_, under
the fear that the signal of recall would be hoisted by the
commander-in-chief!
-----
Footnote 54:
The letter in question will be found at p. 7 of “Minutes of a
Court-Martial on Lord Gambier, taken in short-hand by W. B. Gurney,”
and, as therein stated, revised by his lordship.
-----
It having, for reasons described in a former chapter, become imperative
on Lord Gambier to send us assistance, he, nevertheless, construed this
into an _intention_ on his part to attack the enemy. “_Observing the
Impérieuse to advance, and the time of flood nearly done running, the
Indefatigable_, &c. &c. were ordered to the attack!” It is not very
probable that, had Lord Gambier intended an attack, he would have let
the flood-tide go by, without taking advantage of it in a channel which
was afterwards declared unsafe from want of water!
This passage alone of Lord Gambier’s second despatch ought to have
decided the result of any court-martial. The Board of Admiralty would
not, however, see anything inculpatory of their former colleague; but,
on the 29th of May, ordered me, through their secretary, to become the
accuser of the commander-in-chief; “I am commanded by their Lordships to
signify their directions that you state fully to me, for their
information, the grounds on which your lordship objects to the vote of
thanks being moved to Lord Gambier, to the end that them Lordships’
objections may be of a nature to justify the suspension of the intended
motion in Parliament, or to call for any further information.”—(Signed)
“W. W. POLE.”
This command was manifestly intended to entrap me into the position of
Lord Gambier’s prosecutor, and was, moreover, an improper interference
with my Parliamentary capacity, in which alone I had declared my
intention to oppose an uncalled-for vote of thanks to the
commander-in-chief. I therefore wrote to the Secretary of the Admiralty
the subjoined reply.
“Portman Square, 30th May, 1809.
“SIR,—I have to request that you will submit to their Lordships that I
shall, at all times, entertain a due sense of the honour they will
confer by any directions they may be pleased to give me; that in
pursuing the object of these directions, my exertions will invariably
go hand in hand with my duty; and that, to satisfy their Lordships’
minds in the present instance, I beg leave to state that the log and
signal log-books of the fleet in Basque Roads contain all particulars,
and furnish premises whence accurate conclusions may be drawn; that,
as these books are authentic public documents, and as I cannot myself
refer to them, anything I could offer to their Lordships on the
subject would be altogether superfluous, and would appear presumptuous
interruptions to their Lordships’ judgment, which will, doubtless,
always found itself upon those grounds only that cannot be disputed.
“I have, &c. &c.
“COCHRANE.
“The Hon. W. W. Pole,
Secretary to the Admiralty.”
This reply, though plain, was respectful; but, as I had afterwards good
reason to know, was deemed very offensive; the result being that, _after
two months’ delay_ to enable Lord Gambier to get up his defence, a
court-martial was assembled on the 26th of July, on board the
_Gladiator_, at Portsmouth, the court being composed of the following
members:—
PRESIDENT—Sir Roger Curtis, Port-Admiral.
ADMIRALS—Young, Stanhope, Campbell, Douglas, Duckworth, and Sutton.
CAPTAINS—Irwin, Dickson, Hall, and Dunn.
It may perhaps be asked in what way a court-martial on Lord Gambier can
so far concern me as to occupy a prominent place in this autobiography?
The reply is, that, notwithstanding my repudiation, I was regarded at
the court-martial as his accuser, though not permitted to be present so
as to cross-examine witnesses; the whole proceeding being conducted in
my absence, rather as a prosecution against me than Lord Gambier; and
that the result was injurious to myself, as Lord Mulgrave had predicted,
involving the punishment of not being employed with my frigate at
Flushing, there to put in execution plans for the certain destruction of
the French fleet in the Scheldt; so that, in order to punish me, the
enemy’s fleet was suffered to remain in security, when it might easily
have been destroyed.
The reader must not imagine that I am about to inflict on him the
evidence of a nine days’ trial; but without some extracts therefrom, it
is impossible to comprehend the matter. Let him bear in mind that Lord
Gambier relied for justification on three points:—1st, That, had he sent
in the fleet, its safety would have been endangered by the
fortifications of Aix (which he had previously spoken of as being
dismantled); 2nd, Want of water to navigate the fleet in safety; and
3rdly, From the fire of the enemy’s vessels driven ashore (though
lightened of their guns and stores).
CAPTAIN BROUGHTON (of the _Illustrious_).—“I was in Basque Roads, in
the _Amelia_, on the 17th of March, and when within gunshot of the
Isle of Aix observed the fortifications as being under repair, from
the quantity of rubbish thrown up. I thought the fortifications on the
island were not so strong as we supposed, and so reported to Lord
Gambier. This was on the 1st of April. I did not notice any furnaces
for heating red-hot shot. We were just out of gunshot,—_they fired at
us from both sides, but none reached us_.”
In reply to the question, “whether everything was done that could be
done to effect the destruction of the enemy’s ships?” Captain Broughton
said:—
“It would have been more advantageous if the line-of-battle ships,
frigates, and small vessels had _gone in at half-flood_, about 11
o’clock. There were _nine sail ashore_, and if the British ships had
been ordered in, it would have been more advantageous. There were only
_two_ of the enemy’s ships at anchor, and the _fleet_, had it gone in,
would have been exposed to _their_ fire; but I conceived they were
panic-struck, and on the appearance of a force might have been induced
to cut their cables, and escape up the river. A ship or two might have
been placed, in my opinion, against the batteries on the southern part
of Isle d’Aix so as to take off their fire, and _silence them_. I told
Sir Henry Neale, on board the _Caledonia_, when the signal was made
for all captains in the mooring, that ‘_they were attackable from the
confused way in which the French ships were at the time_;’ viz. from
having run ashore in the night, in order to escape from the
fire-ships, which they imagined would explode.
“As the wind was north-westerly and northerly, ships might have found
safe anchorage in what is called, in my French chart, le Grand
Trousse, where there is thirty or forty feet of water _out of range of
shot or shells in any direction_. When we first came into Basque
Roads, if the charts were to be believed, _there appeared to be water
enough in that position. I do not know anything of any shoal water. I
sounded from the wreck of the Varsovie to that anchorage, and found no
shoal there_. Two ships of the line would have been sufficient to have
silenced the batteries on Aix, and five or six of the least draught of
water to attack the enemy’s ships. The discomfited French squadron
would have made very little resistance. The loss would have been very
little, as few of their ships were in a situation to fight their
guns.”
Here a distinguished officer shows that two ships could have silenced
the batteries; that, in case of damage, there was plenty of water for
them to retire to out of reach; and that the French ships, being ashore,
could not use their guns.
CAPTAIN PULTENEY MALCOLM (of the _Donegal_).—“I saw the enemy’s
three-decker on shore. Till about noon she was heeling over
considerably, and appeared to me to be _heaving her guns overboard_.
She got off about two o’clock; _all the ships got off, except those
that were destroyed_. Had it appeared to me that there was no other
chance of destroying those ships but by such an attack, I CERTAINLY
THINK IT OUGHT TO HAVE BEEN MADE. _Had they been attacked by the
British ships, in my opinion they could not have been warped off from
the shore, as it was necessary so to do, to lay out anchors to heave
them off._”
_Question._—“Would you, had you commanded the British fleet, have sent
in ships to attack the enemy’s ships on shore?”
_Answer._—“The moment the two ships quitted their defensive position,
the risk was then small, and OF COURSE I WOULD HAVE SENT THEM IN
INSTANTLY.”
This evidence is pretty decisive, but its plain tendency was attempted
to be neutralised by the question whether there would have been _risk of
damage_, had the British fleet been sent in to attack the enemy’s ships
when ashore! The great point of defence throughout was risk to the
ships, as though the chief use of ships of war was to save them from
injury.
CAPTAIN F. NEWCOMBE (of the _Beagle_).—“Can you state any instance of
neglect, misconduct, or inattention in the proceedings of the
Commander-in-chief, between the 11th and the 18th?”