position in which the French fleet is at present anchored under the
Isle d’Aix, that their Lordships may be able to form a judgment of the
success that may be expected to attend an attack upon the enemy’s
fleet, in either of the modes directed by their Lordships in your
letter above-mentioned.
“The enemy’s ships are anchored in two lines, very near each other, in
a direction due south from the Isle d’Aix, and the ships in each line
not further apart than their own length; by which it appears, as I
imagined, that the space for their anchorage is so confined by the
shoaliness of the water, as not to admit of ships to run in and anchor
clear of each other. The most distant ships of their two lines are
within point-blank shot of the works on the Isle d’Aix; such ships,
therefore, _as might attack the enemy would be exposed to be raked by
red-hot shot, &c. from the island, and should the ships be disabled in
their masts, they must remain within range of the enemy’s fire until
they are destroyed_—there not being sufficient depth of water to allow
them to move to the southward out of distance.
“The enemy having taken up their position apparently with the view not
only to be protected by _the strong works on the Isle d’Aix_, but also
to have the entrance of the Charente open to them, that in case of
being attacked by fire-ships and other engines of the kind, they can
run up the river beyond the reach of them. The tide and wind that are
favourable to convey this kind of annoyance to the enemy, serve
equally to carry them up the river.
“With respect to the attempt that may be made to destroy the enemy’s
ships with shells, &c., I am not competent to give an opinion until it
is ascertained whether the booms can be placed within the reach of
their mortars from the enemy’s ships, without being exposed to the
fire of the Isle d’Aix.
“I beg leave to add that, _if their Lordships_ are of opinion that an
attack on the enemy’s ships by those of the fleet under my command is
practicable, I am ready to obey any orders they may be pleased to
honour me with, _however great the risk may be of the loss of men and
ships_.
“I have the honour, &c.
“GAMBIER.
“The Hon. W. W. Pole.”
I have marked some passages of this singular letter in italics, for the
purpose of showing their important bearing on subsequent events. On the
11th Lord Gambier had informed the Board of Admiralty—as to my own
personal knowledge was the fact—that “the advanced work on the Isle
d’Aix was _no obstacle to bombardment_.” “Now,” says his lordship, “_the
ships attacking would, from the fire of this fort, be exposed to be
raked by red-hot shot, and if disabled in their masts, must be
destroyed_.” In the former letter his lordship stated that the fort was
“_injured in its foundations_, and in no state of progress.” It is now
characterised as “_the strong works_” on _the_ Isle d’Aix.
That there was really little damage to be feared from these
fortifications, either to ships or bombs, was afterwards corroborated by
the fact, that when a partial attack only was reluctantly made, neither
suffered from their fire, the result proving that these works had from
the first been rightly characterised by Lord Gambier as “_forming no
obstacle_,” though magnified into “strong works.”
In my interview with Lord Mulgrave, I had stated to his lordship, that
the works on the Isle d’Aix were no impediment, because of the facility
with which the enemy’s ships could be brought between the attacking
British force and the fortifications, so as completely to interpose
between the fire of the latter. Lord Gambier does not appear to have
taken this view, but he completely proved its soundness by stating that
the enemy’s ships lay within point-blank shot of their own works, so as
to expose them to the fire of their own forts on Aix, if these fired at
all, whilst my previous knowledge of the anchorage made it a matter of
certainty to me, that it was not difficult for the British fleet to
place the enemy in such a position. Lord Gambier’s assertion was one of
the main points relied on in the subsequent court-martial, and his
lordship’s own letter just quoted is in direct contradiction to the
evidence upon which he relied for acquittal.
A more singular declaration is made by his lordship, that if the enemy
were attacked by “fire-ships and other engines of the kind, they could
run up the river beyond their reach.” In place of this the result, as
will presently be seen, proved that the attempt to do so only ended in
all running ashore, with the exception of two, and they ultimately
escaped up the river because they were not attacked at all! But we must
not anticipate.
Had Lord Gambier been, as I was, from having previously blockaded
Rochefort in the _Pallas_, practically acquainted with the soundings, he
must have taken the same views that I had laid before Lord Mulgrave, and
in place of writing to the Admiralty all sorts of evil forebodings to
“men and ships,” he would have seen that the attack, with the means
indicated, was certain in effect, and easy of accomplishment.
CHAP. XX.
SAIL FOR THE BASQUE ROADS.—MY AWKWARD POSITION.—ILL-HUMOUR OF THE
FLEET.—ADMIRAL HARVEY.—IMPRUDENCE OF ADMIRAL HARVEY.—COMPLAINS OF
LORD GAMBIER.—INACCURATE SOUNDINGS.—LORD GAMBIER’S TRACTS.—COBBETT’S
COMMENTS ON THE TRACTS.—DISSENSIONS IN THE FLEET.—LETTER TO LORD
MULGRAVE.—MY PRINCIPLES OF WARFARE.—NIGHT-WORK.—MY PRINCIPLES OF
ACTION.—THE ISLE D’AIX.—EXPLOSION VESSELS.
Without waiting to convoy the fire-ships and explosion vessels, the
_Impérieuse_ sailed forthwith for Basque Roads in order to expedite the
necessary arrangements, so that on their arrival no time might be lost
in putting the project in execution; a point on which the Board of
Admiralty was most urgent, not more in a belligerent than a political
point of view, for as has been stated, the public was dissatisfied that
the enemy had been permitted to escape from Brest; whilst our West
Indian merchants were in a state of panic lest the French squadron,
which had escaped the vigilance of the blockading force before Brest,
might again slip out, and inflict irretrievable disaster on their
colonial interests, then the most important branch of our maritime
commerce.
The _Impérieuse_ arrived in Basque Roads on the 3rd of April, when I was
received with great urbanity by the commander-in-chief; his lordship
without reserve communicating to me the following order from the
Admiralty:—
“Admiralty Office, 25th March, 1809.
“MY LORD,—My Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty having thought fit
to select Captain Lord Cochrane for the purpose of conducting, under
your lordship’s direction, the fire-ships to be employed in the
projected attack on the enemy’s squadron off Isle d’Aix, I have their
Lordships’ commands to signify their direction to you to employ Lord
Cochrane in the above-mentioned service accordingly, whenever the
attack shall take place; and I am to acquaint you that the twelve
fire-ships, of which you already had notice, are now in the Downs in
readiness, and detained only by contrary winds, and that Mr. Congreve
is also at that anchorage, with an assortment of rockets, ready to
proceed with the fire-ships.
“I am also to acquaint you that the composition for the six
transports, sent to your lordship by Admiral Young, and 1000 carcases
for 18-pounders, will sail in the course of three or four days from
Woolwich, to join you off Rochefort.
“I have, &c. &c.
“W. W. POLE.
“Admiral Lord Gambier.”
Whatever might have been the good feeling manifested by Lord Gambier, it
did not, however, extend to the officers of the fleet, whose _amour
propre_ Lord Mulgrave had either not attempted, or had failed to
satisfy. Every captain was my senior, and the moment my plans were made
known, all regarded me as an interloper, sent to take the credit from
those to whom it was now considered legitimately to belong. “Why could
we not have done this as well as Lord Cochrane?” was the general cry of
the fleet, and the question was reasonable; for the means once devised,
there could be no difficulty in effectually carrying them out. Others
asked, “Why did not Lord Gambier permit us to do this before?” the
second query taking much of the sting from the first, as regarded
myself, by laying the blame on the commander-in-chief.
The ill-humour of the fleet found an exponent in the person of Admiral
Harvey, a brave Trafalgar officer, whose abuse of Lord Gambier to his
face was such as I had never before witnessed from a subordinate. I
should even now hesitate to record it as incredible, were it not
officially known by the minutes of the court-martial in which it some
time afterwards resulted.[42]
-----
Footnote 42:
Minutes of a court-martial on Admiral Harvey, on board H. M. S.
_Gladiator_, at Portsmouth, May 22nd, 1809.
-----
On ascertaining the nature of my mission, and that the conduct of the
attack had been committed to me by the Board of Admiralty, Admiral
Harvey came on board the flag-ship with a list of officers and men who
volunteered, under his direction, to perform the service which had been
thrust upon me. On Lord Gambier informing him that the Board had fixed
upon me for the purpose, he said, “he did not care; if he were passed
by, and Lord Cochrane or any other junior officer was appointed in
preference, he would immediately strike his flag, and resign his
commission!”
Lord Gambier said he “should be sorry to see him resort to such an
extremity, but that the Lords of the Admiralty having fixed on Lord
Cochrane to conduct the service, he could not deviate from their
Lordships’ orders.”
On this explanation being good-naturedly made by Lord Gambier, Admiral
Harvey broke out into invectives of a most extraordinary kind, openly
avowing that “he never saw a man so unfit for the command of the fleet
as Lord Gambier, who instead of sending boats to sound the channels,
which he (Admiral Harvey) considered the best preparation for an attack
on the enemy, he had been employing, or rather amusing himself with
mustering the ships’ companies, and had not even taken the pains to
ascertain whether the enemy had placed any mortars in front of their
lines; concluding by saying, that had Lord Nelson been there, he would
not have anchored in Basque Roads at all, but would have dashed at the
enemy at once.”
Admiral Harvey then came into Sir Harry Neale’s cabin, and shook hands
with me, assuring me that “he should have been very happy to see me on
any other occasion than the present. He begged me to consider that
nothing personal to myself was intended, for he had a high opinion of
me; but that my having been ordered to execute such a service, could
only be regarded as an insult to the fleet, and that on this account he
would strike his flag so soon as the service was executed.” Admiral
Harvey further assured me, that “he had volunteered his services, which
had been refused.”
To these remarks I replied: “Admiral Harvey, the service on which the
Admiralty has sent me was none of my seeking. I went to Whitehall in
obedience to a summons from Lord Mulgrave, and at his lordship’s request
gave the Board a plan of attack, the execution of which has been thrust
upon me, contrary to my inclination, as well knowing the invidious
position in which I should be placed.”
“Well,” said Admiral Harvey, “this is not the first time I have been
lightly treated, and that my services have not been attended to in the
way they deserved; because I am no canting methodist, no hypocrite, no
psalm-singer, and do not cheat old women out of their estates by
hypocrisy and canting! I have volunteered to perform the service you
came on, and should have been happy to see you on any other occasion,
but am very sorry to have a junior officer placed over my head.”
“You must not blame me for that,” replied I; “but permit me to remark
that you are using very strong expressions relative to the
commander-in-chief.”
“I can assure you, Lord Cochrane,” replied Admiral Harvey, “that I have
spoken to Lord Gambier with the same degree of prudence as I have now
done to you in the presence of Captain Sir H. Neale.”
“Well, admiral,” replied I, “considering that I have been an unwilling
listener to what you really did say to his lordship, I can only remark
that you have a strange notion of prudence.”
We then went on the quarter-deck, where Admiral Harvey again commenced a
running commentary on Lord Gambier’s conduct, in so loud a tone as to
attract the attention of every officer within hearing, his observations
being to the effect that “Lord Gambier had received him coldly after the
battle of Trafalgar, that he had used him ill, and that his having
forwarded the master of the _Tonnant’s_ letter for a court-martial on
him, was a proof of his methodistical, jesuitical conduct, and of his
vindictive disposition; that Lord Gambier’s conduct, since he took the
command of the fleet, was deserving of reprobation, and that his
employing officers in mustering the ships’ companies, instead of in
gaining information about the soundings, showed himself to be unequal to
the command of the fleet.” Then turning to Captain Bedford, he said,
“You know you are of the same opinion.”
Admiral Harvey then left the ship, first asking Captain Bedford “whether
he had made his offer of service _on any duty_ known to the
commander-in-chief?” To which Captain Bedford replied in the
affirmative.
My reason for detailing this extraordinary scene, the whole of which,
and much more to the same effect, will be found in the minutes of the
court-martial previously referred to—is to show into what a hornets’
nest my plans had involuntarily brought me. It may readily be imagined
that I bitterly regretted not having persisted in my refusal to have
anything to do with carrying them into execution, for now they were
known, all believed,—and, being my senior officers, had no doubt a right
to believe—that they could execute them better than myself.
So far as regarded the neglect to take soundings of even the approaches
to the channel leading to the enemy’s fleet, Admiral Harvey was quite
right in his statement. Nothing of the kind had been attempted beyond
some soundings on that part of the Boyart shoal, _farthest from the
French fleet_! Had not my previous knowledge of the anchorage, as
ascertained in the _Pallas_ a few years before, supplied all the
information necessary for my conduct of the plans proposed, this neglect
would in all probability have been fatal to their execution. Unlike
Admiral Harvey, I am not, however, prepared to blame Lord Gambier for
the neglect, as a slight acquaintance with the masters, whose duty it
was to have made the examination, showed me that they were quite capable
of misleading the commander-in-chief, by substituting their own surmises
for realities. Certain it was, that although no soundings whatever of
the approaches to the enemy’s fleet had been taken, those whose duty it
was to have made them, as far as practicable, pretended to know more of
the anchorage than I did![43] and had, no doubt, impressed the
commander-in-chief that their reports were founded on actual
observations.
-----
Footnote 43:
In the subsequent court-martial, one of these men constructed a chart
of the soundings, as from his own personal knowledge, and in his
verbal evidence said that he had never sounded at all! His chart was,
nevertheless, made the basis of the trial, to the exclusion of the
official charts!
-----
How far Admiral Harvey was justified in his intemperate allusions to the
“_musters_” and _quasi_ religious practices on board the fleet, is a
point upon which I do not care to enter, further than to state that
these “musters” were found to relate to catechetical examinations of the
men, and that I had not been many days in the fleet before the
commander-in-chief sent a number of tracts on board the _Impérieuse_,
with an injunction for their distribution amongst the crew.
Having by this time ascertained that, rightly or wrongly, the fleet was
in a state of great disorganisation on account of the orders given to
various officers for the distribution of tracts, and being naturally
desirous of learning the kind of instruction thereby imparted, I found
some of them of a most silly and injudicious character, and therefore
declined to distribute them, but imprudently selected some, and sent
them to my friend Cobbett, together with a description of the state of
the fleet, in consequence of the tract controversy. It was a false step,
though I did not at the time contemplate the virulent animosity which
might be excited at home from Cobbett’s hard-hitting comments, nor the
consequent amount of enmity to myself, which only ceased with my
eventual removal from the Navy!
The fact was, that the fleet was divided into two factions, as bitter
against each other as were the Cavaliers and Roundheads in the days of
Charles I. The above-mentioned imprudent step incurred the ill will of
both parties. The tractarian faction, consisting for the most part of
officers appointed by Tory influence or favour of the Admiral, and
knowing my connection with Burdett and Cobbett, avoided me; whilst the
opposite faction, believing that from the affair of the tracts I should
incur the irreconcilable displeasure of Lord Gambier, lost no
opportunity of denouncing me as a concocter of novel devices to advance
my own interests at the expense of my seniors in the service.
Strange as it may appear, almost the only persons who treated me with
consideration were Lord Gambier, his second in command, Admiral
Stopford, and his flag-captain, Sir H. Neale.
For this urbanity Lord Gambier had to incur the bitter sarcasm of the
fleet—that when the Admiralty wanted to attack the enemy with
fire-ships, he had denounced the operation as a “horrible and
anti-Christian mode of warfare;” but that now he saw my plan of
explosion vessels, in addition to fire-ships, was likely to be crowned
with success, he no longer regarded it in the same light.
It was evident that amidst these contending factions, so fatal in a
fleet where all ought to be zeal and unity of action—I should have to
depend on myself. Disregarding, therefore, the disunion prevalent, and,
indeed, increased four-fold by the further division of opinion with
respect to Admiral Harvey’s disrespectful expressions to the
commander-in-chief, I determined to reconnoitre for myself the position
of the French ships, especially as regarded their protection by the
batteries on Isle d’Aix, and for this purpose made as minute a
_reconnaissance_ as was practicable.
Perhaps it ought to have been previously mentioned, that on the evening
of our arrival, I had gone close in to the island, and had embodied the
result of my observations in the following letter to Lord Mulgrave, to
whom I considered myself more immediately responsible.
“_Impérieuse_, Basque Roads, 3rd April.
“MY LORD,—Having been very close to the Isle d’Aix, I find that the
western sea wall has been pulled down to build a better. At present
the fort is quite open, and may be taken as soon as the French fleet
is driven on shore or burned, which will be as soon as the fire-ships
arrive. The wind continues favourable for the attack. If your lordship
can prevail on the ministry to send a military force here, you will do
great and lasting good to our country.
“Could ministers see things with their own eyes, how differently would
they act; but they cannot be everywhere present, and on their opinion
of the judgment of others must depend the success of war—possibly the
fate of England and all Europe.
“No diversion which the whole force of Great Britain is capable of
making in Portugal or Spain, would so much shake the French government
as the capture of the islands on this coast. A few men would take
Oleron; but to render the capture effective, send twenty thousand men,
who, without risk, would find occupation for a French army of a
hundred thousand.
“The batteries on Oleron are all open, except two of no importance.
Isle Gros would also be of infinite use to our cruisers in the
destruction of the French trade.
“The commerce on this coast—and indeed on all the French coasts—is not
inferior to that of England in number of vessels and men employed,
though not in size of coasting craft.
“The coasting trade is the great nursery of English seamen, and yet we
strangely affect to despise the French coasting trade. Must not the
corn of the French northern provinces give food to the south? Are the
oil and wine of the south of no consequence to those who grow none for
themselves? I do not state these matters to your lordship but as an
answer to the opinions generally current in England, and, indeed, too
much entertained in the naval service also.
“Ships filled with stones would ruin for ever the anchorage of Aix,
and some old vessels of the line well loaded would be excellent for
the purpose.
“I hope your lordship will excuse the way in which I have jumbled
these thoughts together. My intentions are good, and if they can be of
any use, I shall feel happy.
“I have the honour to be, my Lord,
“Your most obedient servant,
“COCHRANE.
“The Right Hon. Lord Mulgrave.”
In this hurried letter the reader will readily recognise the principles
laid down by me in a former chapter, for the most advantageous mode of
warfare, viz. by harassing the enemy on his own coast, and by a
perpetual threat of a descent thereon at any moment, to prevent his
employing his forces elsewhere.
In place of the advice being even taken in good part, I had afterwards
reason to know, that the views briefly expressed in this letter were
regarded by the government as an act of impertinence. Yet nothing could
be more sound. The French islands captured, and occupied by an adequate
force, protected by a few ships, would have kept the enemy’s coasts in a
constant state of alarm, so that it would have been impossible for the
enemy to detach armies to the Spanish peninsula; had this policy been
pursued, the Peninsular war, as has been stated in a former chapter, and
its millions of National Debt, would never have been heard of. So much
does the useful or useless expenditure of war depend on the decision of
a cabinet, which can practically know little of the matter.
As it was—the French laughed at the clouds of cruisers intent on
watching their coasting trade, which was carried on almost without
interruption; our vessels going in shore in the day time, when the
French coasters kept close under their batteries, and going off shore in
the night, when they pursued their course unmolested. Provisions and
stores were thus moved as wanted from one part of the enemy’s coast to
another, with absolute safety. The great number of prizes which had
fallen to the lot of the _Speedy_, _Pallas_, and _Impérieuse_ was almost
solely owing to our working in shore at night, when the enemy’s coasters
were on the move. In the day time we are usually out of sight of land,
with the men fast asleep in their hammocks.
The constant readiness at sea for an enemy who never willingly left
port, was, in those days, a great evil, though it was the one point
inculcated by the Admiralty. It would have been far more to the purpose
to have inculcated the necessity of damaging and alarming the limited
seaboard of France, by means of small frigates capable of running
in-shore, and to have left the French fleets, whenever they ventured
out, to the supervision of squadrons composed of large ships, and
specially appointed for the purpose. From the hundreds of ships then in
commission, traversing the seas with no advantage to themselves or the
country, such an arrangement would have annihilated the commerce, and
with it the naval power of France. In place of this, attention to the
condition of ships was the most certain way to reward. As the men could
not always be employed in exercising guns and furling sails, a system of
cleaning and polishing was enforced, till it became positive cruelty to
the crews.