Board of Admiralty, he will fully comprehend my meaning. His lordship
states that Lord Cochrane’s services on the coast of Languedoc in the
_Impérieuse_ “kept the French coast in constant alarm, causing a total
suspension of trade, and harassing a body of troops employed to oppose
him; he has probably prevented those troops, which were intended for
Figueras, from advancing into Spain, by giving them employment in the
defence of their own coasts.” For “Figueras” read “Corunna,” and it will
be evident, that had the same course been generally pursued on the
Atlantic coasts of France, by order, or even under the countenance of
the Admiralty, Sir John Moore would neither have retreated nor fallen;
because, from the occupation which the French army would have found on
its own coasts, he could not have encountered one on the Spanish soil.
One of my principal objects in returning to England, as has been said in
a former chapter, was to impress upon the government the efficiency of
this mode of proceeding on the Atlantic coasts of France, so as to
prevent reinforcements from being sent to their army in the Peninsula.
The success of the _Impérieuse_, I again repeat, warranted such an
application on my part to the Board of Admiralty, in the expectation of
being appointed to the command of an expedition to be carried into
effect on this principle.
To return from this digression to the _reconnaissance_ of the enemy’s
works on Isle d’Aix.
The opinion which I had expressed to Lord Mulgrave respecting the
trifling importance of these works, was strengthened on actual
inspection; indeed any opposition which they could have offered was too
insignificant for notice, as was afterwards proved when a partial attack
took place.
I could not say as much to Lord Gambier, after the opinion he had
expressed in his letter to the Admiralty, for this would have amounted
to a flat contradiction of his judgment, even though, as was afterwards
known, such opinion had been formed on the reports of others, who gave
his lordship their surmises as ascertained facts, an assertion which
will be hereafter fully demonstrated.
In place, therefore, of officially reporting the result of my
_reconnaissance_, I urged upon his lordship not to wait the arrival of
the fire-ships from England, but as the fleet had abundance of
materials, rather to fit up, as fire-ships and explosion vessels, some
transports which happened to be present.
With this request Lord Gambier promptly complied, manifesting his
anxious desire that my project should be put in execution without delay.
Several vessels were, therefore, chosen for the purpose; the fire-ships
being prepared by the fleet, whilst I worked hard at the explosion
vessels, two, at least, of which I determined to conduct personally; not
because I deemed myself more competent to conduct them than others, but
because, being novel engines of warfare, other officers could not have
given that attention to their effect which long deliberation on my part
had led me to anticipate, if directed according to the method on which
their efficacy depended; it being certain, even from the novelty of such
a mode of attack, that the officers and crews of the line-of-battle
ships would be impressed with the idea that every fire-ship was an
explosion vessel, and that in place of offering opposition, they would,
in all probability, be driven ashore in their attempt to escape from
such diabolical engines of warfare, and thus become an easy prey. The
creation of this terrorism amongst the enemy’s ships was indeed a main
feature of the plan, the destruction or intimidation of the guard-boats
being secondary, or rather preparatory.
The nature of the explosion vessels will be best understood from the
subjoined description of the manner in which one was prepared under my
own directions. The floor of the vessel was rendered as firm as
possible, by means of logs placed in close contact, into every crevice
of which other substances were firmly wedged, so as to afford the
greatest amount of resistance to the explosion. On this foundation were
placed a large number of spirit and water casks, into which 1500 barrels
of powder were emptied. These casks were set on end, and the whole bound
round with hempen cables, so as to resemble a gigantic mortar, thus
causing the explosion to take an upward course. In addition to the
powder casks were placed several hundred shells, and over these again
nearly three thousand hand grenades; the whole, by means of wedges and
sand, being compressed as nearly as possible into a solid mass.
This was the vessel in which I subsequently led on the attack. A more
striking comment on the “red-hot shot,” &c., of which Lord Gambier made
so much in one of his letters to the Admiralty, could scarcely be found.
Of course, had a red-hot shot from the batteries on Aix reached us—and
they were not half a mile distant[44]—nothing could have prevented our
being “hoist with our own petard.” I can, however, safely say, that such
a catastrophe never entered into my calculations, for the simple reason,
that from previous employment on the spot, on several occasions, I well
knew there was plenty of room in the channel to keep out of the way of
red-hot shot from the Aix batteries, even if, by means of blue lights or
other devices, they had discovered us.
The explosion vessels were simply naval mines, the effect of which
depended quite as much on their novelty as engines of war, as upon their
destructiveness. It was calculated that, independently of any mischief
they might do, they would cause such an amount of terror, as to induce
the enemy to run their ships ashore as the only way to avoid them and
save the crews. This expectation was fully answered, but no adequate
attack on the part of the British force following up the effect of the
explosion vessels, the stranded ships were permitted to heave off, and
thus escaped, for the most part, as will be detailed in the succeeding
chapter.
-----
Footnote 44:
Admiral Allemand had given instructions to the commandant on the Isle
d’Aix to use every precaution in case of the anticipated attack.
-----
CHAP. XXI.
PRESS FOR AN ATTACK.—RESULTS OF DELAY.—THE FRENCH PREPARATIONS.—FRENCH
ADMIRAL’S ACCOUNT. INSULT TO THE ENGLISH FLEET.—STATE OF
PREPARATIONS. START FOR THE ATTACK.—THE ATTACK.—THE
EXPLOSION.—FAILURE OF THE ATTACK.—TERROR OF THE FRENCH.—THE FRENCH
AGROUND.—APATHY OF LORD GAMBIER.—THE AIX ROADS.—THE FRENCH FLEET
PERMITTED TO ESCAPE.—DRIFT TOWARDS THE ENEMY.—ATTACK THE FRENCH
FLEET.—THE CALCUTTA STRIKES.—THE ATTACK.—FAILURE OF
FIRESHIPS.—SINGULAR INCIDENT.—SIGNAL OF RECALL.—CAPTAIN
SEYMOUR.—LORD GAMBIER’S EVASIVENESS.—AM RECALLED.—REMONSTRATE WITH
LORD GAMBIER.—AM SENT HOME.—LORD GAMBIER’S DESPATCH.—THE FRENCH
DESPATCH.—DESTRUCTION OF THE BOOM.—THE MEDIATOR.
On the 10th of April, the _Beagle_, having arrived from England with the
fireships in company, I pressed Lord Gambier to permit an attack to be
made on the same night; but, notwithstanding that the weather was
favourable, his lordship saw fit to refuse. My reason for pressing an
immediate attack was, that as the enemy could not remain in ignorance of
the character of the newly arrived vessels, they might have less time to
make additional preparations for their reception.
Notwithstanding the importance of prompt action in this respect,
argument was unavailing. His lordship urged that the fireships might be
boarded, and the crews murdered, though there was more danger of this
from delay than from attacking unawares. There was in reality no danger;
but I urged in vain that it was an essential part of my plan personally
to embark in an explosion vessel, _preceding_ the fireships, so that in
conducting and firing her all risk would fall on myself and the
volunteer crew which would accompany me; it not being probable that
after the explosion the enemy’s guard-boats would board the fireships
which might follow, as every one would certainly be taken for a mine
similarly charged. Under that impression, however gallant the enemy,
there was little chance of the fireships being boarded.
His lordship replied, that “if I chose to rush on self-destruction that
was my own affair, but that it was his duty to take care of the lives of
others, and he would not place the crews of the fireships in palpable
danger.”
To this I rejoined, that there could not be any danger, for the use of
explosion-vessels being new to naval warfare, it was unlikely that,
after witnessing the effect of the first explosion, the enemy’s officers
and men would board a single fireship. I further told his lordship that
my brother, the Hon. Basil Cochrane, and Lieut. Bissel were on board the
_Impérieuse_ as my guests, and so well satisfied were both of the little
danger to be apprehended that they had volunteered to accompany me. Lord
Gambier, however, remained firm, and further remonstrance being useless,
I had no alternative but to delay, whilst the French, who quickly became
aware of the character of the newly arrived vessels, adopted all
necessary precautions.[45]
-----
Footnote 45:
“Le 10 il arriva 16 batimens, qui me parurent des transports ou
brulôts. Je fis dégréer les mâts de perroquets, et caler ceux de
hune,” &c.—_Vice-Admiral Allemand’s Despatch, of the 12th of April._
-----
A most favourable opportunity was thus thrown away. The French admiral,
however, lost no time in turning the delay to account, by altering the
positions of his fleet, so as to expose it to the smallest possible
amount of danger.
The enemy’s ships of the line struck their topmasts, got their
topgallant yards on deck, and unbent sails, so as to expose as little
inflammable matter aloft as possible; the frigates only being left in
sailing trim, ready to act as occasion might require; whilst the boats
and launches of the fleet, to the number of seventy-three, were armed
and stationed in five divisions for the purpose of boarding and towing
off the fireships.[46]
-----
Footnote 46:
The subjoined was the French force at anchor in Aix roads:—
SHIPS OF THE LINE: _L’Océan_, 120, bearing the flag of Vice-Admiral
Allemand; _Foudroyant_, 80, bearing the flag of Rear-Admiral Gourdon;
_Cassard_, 74; _Tourville_, 74; _Regulus_, 74; _Patriote_, 74;
_Jemappes_, 74; _Tonnerre_, 74; _Aquilon_, 74; _Ville de Varsovie_,
74. Total, 10.
FRIGATES: _Indienne_, _Elbe_, _Pallas_, and _Hortense_. Total, 4.
STORESHIP: _Calcutta_, 56, armed _en flûte_. This vessel had been a
British East Indiaman, captured some time before off St. Helena.
Total, 15.
-----
The French admiral, Allemand, disposed his force in the following
manner:—The ten sail of the line, which before the arrival of the
fireships had been moored in two lines overlapping each other, were
formed afresh in a double line, nearly north and south; the outer line
comprising five, and the inner six ships, including the _Calcutta_; the
inner fine being so anchored as to face the openings between the ships
of the outer line, the extremity of which was somewhat more than a mile
from the batteries on the Isle of Aix. About half a mile in advance of
the whole lay the four frigates, and immediately in front of these was a
boom of extraordinary dimensions. As this boom will form an important
feature in the narrative, I subjoin the French admiral’s description,
first premising that, although there was reason to expect that an
obstacle of the kind would have to be encountered, its exact nature was
not known till the attack was made[47]:—
“Notre armée étoit sur deux lignes de bataille, endentées,
très-serrées, gisant au nord, un quart nord-ouest et sud, un quart
sud-est du monde, afin de présenter moins de surface à l’envoi des
brûlots.
“Elle étoit flanquée _d’une estacade à quatre cents toises au large,
qui avoit huit cents toises de long_, le bout nord étoit à une
encablure et demie des roches de l’île.
“Au coucher du soleil il ventoit encore très-gros frais. _Je laissai
chaque capitan libre de sa manœuvre pour la sûreté de son vaisseau._
“J’envoyai un officier prévenir le général Bronard, commandant à l’île
d’Aix, que l’ennemi, par sa manœuvre, annonçoit vouloir profiter du
gros vent et de la marée pour entreprendre un _coup de main_. Il me
fit dire qu’il l’attendoit de pied ferme, et qu’il répondoit de la
terre.”—_Vice-Admiral Allemand’s Despatch of the 12th of April._
-----
Footnote 47:
A better proof of the subsequent untruths uttered by the masters of
the fleet and the flagship, as to their pretended knowledge of the
soundings in the vicinity of the enemy, could not be afforded, than
their ignorance of the existence of this boom, which must from its
magnitude have occupied a considerable time in its construction, and
laying down the necessary moorings.
-----
The French, no doubt, considered their position secure against
fireships, having no expectation of other means of attack; and so it
undoubtedly was, from the protection afforded by the boom, which, from
its peculiar construction, could neither be destroyed nor burned by
fireships—as well as further defended by the guard-boats, which were
judged sufficient to divert the course of such fireships as might drift
past the boom. Their fleet was anchored so as to expose the smallest
possible front; and what added no little to their sense of security was
the delay which had taken place on the part of the British admiral
without attack of any kind. On such grounds, therefore, they not
unreasonably felt confident that, if the fireships failed, as from the
judicious preparations made, Admiral Allemand had every reason to
anticipate, no attack on the part of the British fleet would follow. In
this belief, on altering their position, the French dressed their fleet
with flags, and, by way of contempt for their assailants, hung out the
English ensign of the _Calcutta_—which, as has been said, was a captured
English vessel—under her quarter gallery! The peculiar nature of the
insult needs not to be explained—to naval men it is the most atrocious
imaginable.
The fortifications on Isle d’Aix, alluded to by Admiral Allemand, were,
as Lord Gambier had reported to the Admiralty in his letter of the 11th
of March, insignificant, or, as his Lordship at first expressed it, “no
obstacle;” a dozen guns being the utmost number mounted on the batteries
commanding the roads, though these were afterwards characterised by his
Lordship as the “strong works on the Isle of Aix.”[48] The nearest of
the batteries on _Oleron_ was out of gunshot, and therefore of no
account.
-----
Footnote 48:
Two ships of the line would have been quite sufficient to silence “the
batteries on Aix.”—_Captain Broughton’s Evidence on the Court
Martial._
-----
As narratives of the attack on the French fleet in Basque Roads have
been often, though in some of the main points incorrectly, written from
the contradictory, and in many instances incomprehensible, evidence on
the subsequent court-martial, as compared with the no less contradictory
despatches of Lord Gambier, I shall in the following account strictly
confine myself to what took place under my own personal conduct and
observation.[49]
-----
Footnote 49:
The British force present in Basque Roads was as follows:—
SHIPS OF THE LINE: _Caledonia_, 120, bearing the flag of Lord Gambier;
_Cæsar_, 80, bearing the flag of Rear-Admiral Stopford; _Gibraltar_,
80; _Revenge_, 74; _Donegal_, 74; _Heron_, 74; _Illustrious_, 74;
_Valiant_, 74; _Bellona_, 74; _Resolution_, 74; _Theseus_, 74. Total,
11.
FRIGATES: _Indefatigable_, _Impérieuse_, _Aigle_, _Emerald_,
_Unicorn_, _Pallas_, and _Mediator_. Total, 7.
GUNBRIG SLOOPS: _Beagle_, _Dotterel_, _Foxhound_, _Lyra_, _Redpole_.
Total, 5.
GUN-BRIGS: _Insolent_, _Conflict_, _Contest_, _Encounter_, _Fervent_,
and _Growler_. Total, 6.
OTHER VESSELS: _Whiting_, _Nimrod_, _King George_, and 23 fire-ships
and explosion vessels. Total, 55.
-----
On the 11th of April, it blew hard with a high sea. As all preparations
were complete, I did not consider the state of the weather a justifiable
impediment to the attack, to which Lord Gambier had now consented; so
that after nightfall, the officers who volunteered to command the
fireships were assembled on board the _Caledonia_, and supplied with
instructions according to the plan previously laid down by myself.
The _Impérieuse_ had proceeded to the edge of the Boyart shoal, close to
which she anchored with an explosion vessel made fast to her stern, it
being my intention, after firing the one of which I was about to take
charge, to return to her for the other, to be employed as circumstances
might require. At a short distance from the _Impérieuse_ were anchored
the frigates _Aigle_, _Unicorn_, and _Pallas_, for the purpose of
receiving the crews of the fireships on their return, as well as to
support the boats of the fleet assembled alongside the _Cæsar_, to
assist the fireships. The boats of the fleet were not, however, for some
reason or other, made use of at all.
The enemy had calculated on the impending attack, and, as was afterwards
ascertained, by way of precaution against fireships, sent two divisions
of their guard-boats, with orders to lie under the boom till two in the
morning; but wind and tide being against them, they were compelled to
put back, without effecting their orders. Both wind and tide, however,
though dead against the French boats, were favourable for the boats of
the British fleet, had they been employed as arranged; and they would
have been of great use to the less efficient boats of the fireships,
some of which, in returning, were nearly swamped. For want of such
assistance, as will presently be seen, most of the fireships were
kindled too soon, no doubt to save the men the terrible pull back,
against a gale of wind and a high sea.
Having myself embarked on board the largest explosion vessel,
accompanied by Lieut. Bissel and a volunteer crew of four men only, we
led the way to the attack; the _Impérieuse_ afterwards, in accordance
with my instructions, signalising the fireships to “proceed on service.”
The night was dark, and as the wind was fair, though blowing hard, we
soon neared the estimated position of the advanced French ships, for it
was too dark to discern them. Judging our distance, therefore, as well
as we could, with regard to the time the fuse was calculated to burn,
the crew of four men entered the gig, under the direction of Lieut.
Bissel, whilst I kindled the port fires; and then, descending into the
boat, urged the men to pull for their lives, which they did with a will,
though, as wind and sea were strong against us, without making the
progress calculated.
To our consternation, the fuses, which had been constructed to burn
fifteen minutes, lasted little more than half that time, when the vessel
blew up, filling the air with shells, grenades, and rockets; whilst the
downward and lateral force of the explosion raised a solitary mountain
of water, from the breaking of which in all directions our little boat
narrowly escaped being swamped. In one respect it was, perhaps,
fortunate for us that the fuses did not burn the time calculated, as,
from the little way we had made against the strong head wind and tide,
the rockets and shells from the exploded vessel went over us. Had we
been in the line of their descent, at the moment of explosion, our
destruction, from the shower of broken shells and other missiles, would
have been inevitable.
The explosion vessel did her work well, the effect constituting one of
the grandest artificial spectacles imaginable. For a moment, the sky was
red with the lurid glare arising from the simultaneous ignition of 1500
barrels of powder. On this gigantic flash subsiding, the air seemed
alive with shells, grenades, rockets, and masses of timber, the wreck of
the shattered vessel; whilst the water was strewn with spars, shaken out
of the enormous boom, on which, according to the subsequent testimony of
Captain Proteau, whose frigate lay just within the boom, the vessel had
brought up, before she exploded. The sea was convulsed as by an
earthquake, rising, as has been said, in a huge wave, on whose crest our
boat was lifted like a cork, and as suddenly dropped into a vast trough,
out of which, as it closed upon us with a rush of a whirlpool, none
expected to emerge. The skill of the boat’s crew, however, overcame the
threatened danger, which passed away as suddenly as it had arisen, and
in a few minutes nothing but a heavy rolling sea had to be encountered,
all having again become silence and darkness.
This danger surmounted, we pulled in the direction of the _Impérieuse_,
whose lights could be distinguished at about three miles’ distance. On
our way we had the satisfaction of seeing two fireships pass over the
spot where the boom had been moored. Shortly afterwards we met the
_Mediator_ steering in the direction of the enemy, whose ships of the
line were now firing towards the spot where the explosion had taken
place, and consequently on their own advanced frigates! which, as was
afterwards learned, cut their cables, and shifted their berths to a
position in the rear of the larger ships.
On reaching the _Impérieuse_, I found, to my great mortification, that
the second explosion vessel, which, by my orders, had been made fast to
the frigate’s stern, had been cut away, and thus set adrift: a fireship
in flames having come down on her instead of the enemy! The _Impérieuse_
herself had a narrow escape of being burned, and was only saved by
veering cable; the fireship which caused the disaster drifting
harmlessly away on the Boyart Shoal. This clumsy occurrence completely
frustrated the intention with which I had reserved her, viz. for further
personal operations amongst the enemy’s fleet, now that the first
explosion vessel had cleared the way.
Of all the fireships, upwards of twenty in number, _four only reached
the enemy’s position, and not one did any damage_! The way in which they
were managed was grievous. The _Impérieuse_, as has been said, lay three
miles from the enemy, so that the one which was near setting fire to her
became useless at the outset; whilst several others were kindled a mile
and a half to windward of this, or four miles and a half from the enemy.
Of the remainder, many were at once rendered harmless, from being
brought to on the wrong tack. Six passed a mile to windward of the
French fleet, and one grounded on Oleron. I could scarcely credit my own
vision when I saw the way in which they were handled; most of them being
fired and abandoned before they were abreast of the vessels anchored as
guides.
The fear of the fireships operated strongly enough, but, notwithstanding
the actual effect attributed to them by naval historians, they did no
damage whatever. A matter of little consequence, had the British fleet,
or even a portion thereof, subsequently taken advantage of the panic
created amongst the enemy.
As the fireships began to light up the roads, we could observe the
enemy’s fleet in great confusion. Without doubt, taking every fireship
for an explosion vessel, and being deceived as to their distance, not
only did the French make no attempt to divert them from their course,
but some of their ships cut their cables and were seen drifting away
broadside on to the wind and tide—whilst others made sail, as the only
alternative to escape from what they evidently considered certain
destruction from explosive missiles!
Had the commander-in-chief witnessed this scene, he would never again
have deemed such extraordinary precaution on his part requisite to guard
against fireships being boarded when preceded by explosion vessels. In
place of becoming the aggressors, as his Lordship had anticipated, the
only care of the enemy was how to get out of the way, even at the risk
of running their ships ashore. Unfortunately the commander-in-chief was
with the fleet, fourteen miles distant.
At daylight on the morning of the 12th not a spar of the boom was
anywhere visible, and with the exception of the _Foudroyant_ and
_Cassard_, _the whole of the enemy’s vessels were helplessly aground_.
The former of these ships lying out of the sweep of the tide, and being
therefore out of danger from the fireships, appeared not to have cut her
cable, and the _Cassard_, which had at first done so, again brought up
about two cables’ length from the _Foudroyant_.