during our operations against the French on the Spanish coast, I had
seen so much of them as to convince me, that if with a single frigate I
could paralyse the movements of their armies in the Mediterranean—with
three or four ships it would not be difficult so to spread terror on
their Atlantic shores, as to render it impossible for them to send an
army into Western Spain. My object then was—as from long and unceasing
experience I considered myself entitled to the command of more than one
ship—to propose to the Government to take possession of the French
islands in the Bay of Biscay, and to let me with a small squadron
operate against the enemy’s sea-board there, as I had previously done
with the _Speedy_ and _Impérieuse_, from Montpellier to Barcelona.
Had this permission been granted, I do not hesitate to stake my
professional reputation that _neither the Peninsular war, nor its
enormous cost to the nation, from 1809 onwards, would ever have been
heard of_. It would have been easy—_as it will always be easy in case of
future wars_—that is, provided those who have the direction of national
affairs have the sagacity to foresee disaster, and, _foreseeing it, to
take the initiative_, so to harass the French coast as to find full
employment for their troops at home, and thus to render any operations
in Western Spain, or even in foreign countries, next to impossible.
By members not aware of this power of harassing an enemy’s coast by
means of a few frigates, the ministry was greatly blamed for not having
sent a military force to Catalonia, instead of despatching the very
inadequate force under Sir John Moore to the western shores of the
Peninsula. That the latter step was a great mistake, likely only to end
in disaster, is now admitted. But what I contend for is, that no
military force was at all needed in Spain, had the government seized and
held, by a comparatively small military force, the isles on the coast of
France, viz., Isles Dieu, Rhe, Oléron, and a few others; following up or
preceding this seizure by a limited number of active frigates harassing
the whole western coast of France, which, in consequence, would not have
been able to send a single regiment into Spain, and hence, as has been
said, we should have had no Peninsular war with its hundreds of millions
of national debt. Had the French been thus employed in the defence of
their own coasts, the Spaniards on the west coast would have been a
match for their enemies, as, with the assistance of a few small British
frigates, they were rendered a match for them on the east coast. This
was the work I was prepared to recommend to the British Government;
considering, moreover, that from the part the _Impérieuse_ had taken in
harassing the enemy on the east coast of Spain, I was fairly entitled to
ask that any small squadron of frigates, appointed for the purpose of
operating on the west coast of France, should be placed under my
command.
How my plans for this end, and together with them, my own career as a
naval officer, were sacrificed by an occurrence which forms the subject
of the next chapters, will there be seen.
The reader will by this time have gathered some idea of what the
_Impérieuse_ had effected, as testified by the warmly expressed
satisfaction of Lord Collingwood; yet it will scarcely be believed that,
in place of approbation, I was reproached for the expenditure of more
sails, stores, gunpowder, and shot than had been used by any other
captain in the service!
Attention to saving ropes and sails, though without other results, was
praised. Expending them, though in energetic service, remarked with
displeasure. Nothing that I had done was deemed worthy of notice at
home, whilst officers who brought back them ships in as good condition
as they left port, were honoured with praise and substantially rewarded;
but no mark of approbation or reward was ever conferred on me till
upwards of thirty years afterwards, the late Earl of Minto generously
remedied the injustice by conferring upon me the ordinary good service
pension. A comparison of my services with the services of those who were
rewarded with pensions of 1000_l._ and 1200_l._ a year, will show the
actuating principle of the Admiralties of those days, which bestowed on
me nothing but marked neglect.
CHAP. XIX.
APPOINTMENT TO COMMAND FIRE-SHIPS IN BASQUE
ROADS.
UNDERTAKING AGAINST ROCHEFORT.—HOPES EXCITED.—PRESENT MYSELF AT THE
ADMIRALTY.—AM CONSULTED BY LORD MULGRAVE.—LORD GAMBIER’S
STATEMENT.—ANXIETY OF GOVERNMENT.—MY PLAN OF ACTION.—DECLINE THE
COMMAND.—THE COMMAND PRESSED UPON ME.—RETURN TO THE
IMPÉRIEUSE.—PREPARATIONS FOR ATTACK.—LORD GAMBIER OBTAINS THE
LAURELS,—BUT DISSUADES THE ATTACK.—THE ISLE D’AIX.—LORD GAMBIER’S
STATEMENT.
Almost immediately after arrival of the _Impérieuse_ at Plymouth, I
received the subjoined letter from the Hon. Johnstone Hope, Second Lord
of the Board of Admiralty:—
“Admiralty, March 21, 1809.
“MY DEAR LORD,—I congratulate you on your safe arrival after the
fatigues you underwent at Trinity. Be assured your exertions there
were highly applauded by the Board, and were done most ample justice
to by Lord Collingwood in all his despatches.
“There is an undertaking of great moment in agitation against
Rochefort, and the Board thinks that your local knowledge and services
on the occasion might be of the utmost consequence, and, I believe, it
is intended to send you there with all expedition; I have ventured to
say, that if you are in health, you will readily give your aid on this
business.
“Before you can answer this I shall be out of office, and on my way to
Scotland, as I found I could not continue here and keep my health. But
if you will write to Sir R. Brotherton in reply, and state your
sentiments on the getting at the enemy at Rochefort, I am sure it will
be kindly taken.
“I am, my dear Lord, your’s faithfully,
“W. JOHNSTONE HOPE.
“Captain Lord Cochrane.”
On the receipt of this letter hope appeared to dawn. The St. Vincent or
any other official _animus_ against me had evidently been satisfied with
the punishments with which I had in one shape or other been visited. I
was now to be consulted and employed on matters in which my experience
and services were to be fully recognised, and my ambition of being
ranked amongst those brave defenders of my country, to whose example I
had looked up, was about to be fulfilled! Alas, for the simplicity of my
ideas! Nothing could be further from the intention of those who wanted
to consult me!
Scarcely had the letter reached me, when a telegraphic message was
transmitted from the Admiralty, requiring my immediate presence at
Whitehall. A brief narrative of recent events will show the reason for
the summons.
Early in the year Lord Gambier had been appointed to blockade the French
fleet at Brest. Towards the end of February they, however, contrived to
elude his vigilance, and got out without leaving a trace as to the
direction taken. Despatching Admiral Duckworth in pursuit, his lordship
returned to Plymouth. Admiral Duckworth meanwhile reached Cadiz, where
he ascertained that the Brest fleet had not entered the Mediterranean.
He then ran for Madeira, in the hope of obtaining intelligence of them,
should they, as was feared in England, have made for the West Indies.
The fact was that the French squadron, consisting of eight sail of the
line and two frigates, had gone to L’Orient, and liberated the ships
there blockaded. They next made for Isle d’Aix, intending further to
reinforce themselves with the ships at that anchorage, and thence
proceed to harass our West India colonies. By the vigilance of Admiral
Stopford they were, however, discovered and thwarted as to their
ultimate purpose, though successful in forming a junction with the
Rochefort squadron. On finding Admiral Stopford in their vicinity,
though with four ships of the line only, they put into Basque Roads,
subsequently withdrawing into Aix Roads, where Admiral Stopford having
been reinforced, blockaded them with seven ships of the line. On the 7th
of March Lord Gambier arrived in Basque Roads with an additional five
sail, several frigates and small vessels, the British squadron being now
numerically superior to that of the enemy.
On presenting myself at the Admiralty, the First Lord (Mulgrave) did me
the honour to consult me confidentially as to the practicability of
destroying or disabling the French squadron as it lay at anchor under
the protection of the batteries of Isle d’Aix, where, as his lordship
told me, the commander-in-chief did not consider it prudent to attack
them. Lord Mulgrave further stated that the Board of Admiralty, fearing
that “the French fleet might again slip out, as it had done at Brest,
were extremely desirous that it should forthwith be destroyed. With that
view they had already consulted various naval officers on the
practicability of accomplishing the object by means of fire-ships; but
that their opinions were discouraging.”
“Now,” added his lordship, “you were some years ago employed on the
Rochefort station, and must, to a great extent, be practically
acquainted with the difficulties to be surmounted. Besides which, I am
told that you then pointed out to Admiral Thornborough some plan of
attack, which in your estimation would be successful. Will you be good
enough again to detail that or any other plan, which your further
experience may suggest. But first let me tell you what Lord Gambier has
written to the Admiralty on the subject.”
Lord Mulgrave then read me an extract from Lord Gambier’s letter, to the
following effect, that “an attack by means of fire-ships was hazardous,
if not desperate;” but that “if the Board of Admiralty wished to order
such an attack, it should be done secretly and quickly.”
I respectfully reminded his lordship that he was asking me to suggest
means for an attack which the admiral commanding considered “hazardous,
if not desperate;” and which other naval officers, no doubt my seniors
in the service, had pronounced impracticable. On both these accounts
there was reason to fear that if means suggested by me were adopted, the
consequence would be an amount of ill-feeling on the part of those
officers, which any naval officer in my position should feel reluctant
to provoke.
Lord Mulgrave replied that “the present was no time for professional
etiquette. The Board was, if possible, bent on striking some decisive
blow before the French squadron had an opportunity of slipping out; for
if their sailing were not prevented they might get off to the West
Indies, and do our commerce an immense amount of mischief. However,”
added his lordship, “there is Lord Gambier’s letter. Give me your
opinion on it.”
As this letter was afterwards made public, there can be no reason for
withholding it.
“_Caledonia_, off the Nertuis d’Antioche,
“11th March, 1809.
“MY DEAR LORD,—The advanced work between the Isles of Aix and Oleron,
which I mentioned in my last letter, I find was injured in its
foundation, and is in no state of progress; it is, therefore, no
obstacle to our bombarding the enemy’s fleet, if you should be
disposed to attempt to destroy it.
“A trial was made six years ago, when a Spanish squadron lay at the
same anchorage, but without effect. The report of it you will find in
the Admiralty. It was made by Sir C. Pole.
“The enemy’s ships lie much exposed to the operation of fire-ships,
_it is a horrible mode of warfare, and the attempt hazardous, if not
desperate_; but we should have plenty of volunteers for the service.
If you mean to do anything of the kind, it should be with secrecy and
quickly, and the ships used should not be less than those built for
the purpose—at least a dozen, and some smaller ones.
“Yours, my dear Lord, most faithfully,
“GAMBIER..nf-
“The Right Hon. Lord Mulgrave.”
“You see,” said Lord Mulgrave, “that Lord Gambier will not take upon
himself the responsibility of attack, and the Admiralty is not disposed
to bear the _onus_ of failure by means of an attack by fire-ships,
however desirous they may be that such attack should be made.”
It was now clear to me why I had been sent for to the Admiralty, where
not a word of approbation of my previous services was uttered. The
Channel fleet had been doing worse than nothing. The nation was
dissatisfied, and even the existence of the ministry was at stake. They
wanted a victory, and the admiral commanding plainly told them he would
not willingly risk a defeat. Other naval officers had been consulted,
who had disapproved of the use of fire-ships, and, as a last resource, I
had been sent for, in the hope that I would undertake the enterprise. If
this were successful, the fleet would get the credit, which would be
thus reflected on the ministry; and if it failed, the consequence would
be the loss of my individual reputation, as both ministry and
commander-in-chief would lay the blame on me.
I had, however, no fear of failure in the plans at that moment uppermost
in my mind, but from the way in which my co-operation was asked, I
determined to have nothing to do with the execution of the plans,
believing that I should have to deal with some who would rather rejoice
at their failure than their success.
My reply to Lord Mulgrave, therefore, was, that, “the opinion of Lord
Gambier, and the naval officers consulted by the Admiralty, as to the
use of fire-ships, coincided with my own; for if any such attempt were
made upon the enemy’s squadron, the result would in all probability be,
that the fire-ships would be boarded by the numerous row-boats on
guard,—the crews murdered,—and the vessels turned in a harmless
direction. But that if, together with the fire-ships, a plan were
combined which I would propose for his Lordship’s consideration, it
would not be difficult to sink or scatter the guard-boats, and
afterwards destroy the enemy’s squadron, despite any amount of
opposition that might be offered. I further told Lord Mulgrave that my
opinion agreed with the expression of Lord Gambier, that the
fortifications on Isle d’Aix were “no obstacle;” though this opinion on
my part was expressed for different reasons to the one assigned by his
lordship, my own previous knowledge of the anchorage satisfying me that
the channel was of sufficient breadth to enable an attacking force to
interpose the enemy’s fleet between itself and Isle d’Aix, as well as to
keep out of reach of the fortifications on Aix, even though those
fortifications might be in a state of efficiency, in place of being “no
obstacle,” from their dilapidated condition, as Lord Gambier had, no
doubt, correctly described them.
I then briefly recapitulated to his lordship the outline of my plan,
which, if seconded by the fleet, must certainly result in the total
destruction of the French squadron. His lordship appeared very much
gratified by the communication, and after praising its novelty and
completeness, frankly expressed his entire confidence in the result,
requesting me to put the substance of my suggestion in writing, so that
he might at once lay it before the Board of Admiralty, which was then
sitting.
The request was immediately complied with, and the letter placed in the
hands of Lord Mulgrave, who shortly afterwards personally communicated
to me his own satisfaction, and the entire concurrence of the Board in
my plan. His lordship at the same time asked me “if I would undertake to
put it in execution?”
I told him that “for reasons before assigned I would rather not do so,
as being a junior officer, it would excite against me a great amount of
jealousy. Besides which, Lord Gambier might consider it presumptuous on
my part to undertake what he had not hesitated to describe as
‘hazardous, if not desperate.’ It was, moreover, by no means certain
that Lord Gambier would be satisfied to put my plans in execution, as it
was not impossible that he might deem them still more ‘desperate’ and
‘horrible’ than those to which he had already objected. I, however,
assured his lordship that the plans were at the service of the
Admiralty, and Lord Gambier also, irrespective of any share in their
execution to which I might be considered entitled.”
“But,” objected his lordship, “all the officers who have been consulted
deem an attack with fire-ships impracticable, and after such an
expression of opinion, it is not likely they would be offended by the
conduct of fire-ships being given to another officer who approved of
their use.”
My answer was, “that the plan submitted to his lordship was not an
attack with fire-ships alone, and when its details became known to the
service, it would be seen that there was no risk of failure whatever, if
made with a fair wind and flowing tide. On the contrary, its success on
inspection must be evident to any experienced officer, who would see
that as the enemy’s squadron could not escape up the Charente, their
destruction would not only be certain, but, in fact, easy. The batteries
on Isle d’Aix were scarcely worth notice, not so much from their
dilapidated condition, though that was rightly estimated in Lord
Gambier’s letter, as from there being plenty of room to steer clear of
them, as well as from the ease with which the enemy’s ships might be
brought between the fortifications and the ships attacking; the channel
being sufficient for this purpose, as well as for their passage without
any exposure to shot likely to be detrimental. As all this would be
apparent to the officers of the fleet whenever the plan submitted should
be communicated to them, I must emphatically repeat my objection to
undertake its execution, not only on this ground, but for the additional
reason that my health had been so much shattered by recent exertions as
to require repose.
Lord Mulgrave did not deny the reasonableness of my objections,
admitting that “although he did not believe Lord Gambier would feel hurt
at my undertaking to put my own plan in execution, other officers might
not be well pleased that its superintendence should be committed to a
junior officer. On this ground he would reconsider the matter, and
endeavour to find some one else to put it in execution.
I then took leave of Lord Mulgrave, who, next day, again sent for me,
when he said, “My lord, you must go. The Board cannot listen to further
refusal or delay. Rejoin your frigate at once. I will make you all right
with Lord Gambier. Your own confidence in the result has, I must
confess, taken me by surprise, but it has increased my belief that all
you anticipate will be accomplished. Make yourself easy about the
jealous feeling of senior officers; I will so manage it with Lord
Gambier that the _amour propre_ of the fleet shall be satisfied.”
On this I requested a short time for final consideration, and before its
expiration sent a letter to his lordship again declining the command;
but at the same time informing him that it had ever been a maxim with me
not to shrink from duty to my country under any circumstances, however
disadvantageous to myself, and that if officers my seniors could not be
found to put the project in execution, I would then waive further
objection.
The immediate result was the following letter from Lord Mulgrave, who,
contrary to the tenour of mine, had construed it into an unqualified
acceptance of the command.
[Private.]
“Admiralty, March 25, 1809.
“MY DEAR LORD,—The letter I have just received from your lordship is
truly characteristic of the whole tenour of your professional life. If
your health will admit of your undertaking the important service
referred to, I am fully persuaded that I cannot so well commit it to
any other hands.
“I have the honour to be, with the highest esteem,
“Your lordship’s most faithful servant,
“MULGRAVE.
“The Lord Cochrane.”
“P.S. I think the sooner you go to Plymouth the better. You will there
receive an order to join Lord Gambier, to whom a secret letter will be
written, directing him to employ your Lordship on the service which we
have settled against the Rochefort fleet.”
I have been thus minute in detailing the circumstances connected with my
acceptance of a command so unusual, because it has been said, and for
anything that has appeared to the contrary, may still be considered,
that I thrust myself into the position, which, as my own foresight had
anticipated, became eventually a very serious one for me, as bringing
upon my head an amount of enmity, such as even my own misgivings had not
considered possible.
Having made the requisite suggestions to Lord Mulgrave relative to the
contents and mode of fitting up the explosion vessels, the fire-ships to
be employed being of the usual description, I returned on board the
_Impérieuse_ at Plymouth, there to await further orders from the
Admiralty.
Such was the despatch used, that by the 19th of March the Board was in a
position to apprise Lord Gambier of the steps taken, by the following
letter addressed to his lordship by the Board of Admiralty.
“Admiralty Office, March 19th, 1809.
“MY LORD,—I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to
acquaint your lordship, that they have ordered twelve transports to be
fitted as fire-ships, and to proceed and join you off Rochefort; and
that Mr. Congreve (afterwards Sir W. Congreve) is under orders to
proceed to your lordship in a coppered transport (the _Cleveland_),
containing a large assortment of rockets, and supplied with a
detachment of marine artillery, instructed in the use of them, and
placed under Mr. Congreve’s orders.
“That the vessels named in the margin (_Etna_, _Thunder_, _Vesuvius_,
_Hound_, and _Fury_), are likewise under orders to fit for sea with
all possible expedition, and to join you as soon as they may be ready.
That all preparations are making with a view to enable your lordship
to make an attack upon the French fleet at their anchorage off Isle
d’Aix, if practicable; and I am further commanded to signify their
Lordships’ directions to you, to take into your consideration the
possibility of making an attack upon the enemy, either conjointly with
your line-of-battle ships, frigates, and small craft, fire-ships,
bombs, and rockets—or separately by any of the above-named means.
“It is their Lordships’ further direction, that you state to me for
their information, whether any further augmentation of force of any
description is in your opinion necessary to enable you to perform this
service with full effect, that it may be prepared and forwarded to you
without a moment’s delay—their Lordships having come to a
determination to leave no means untried to destroy the enemy’s
squadron.
(Signed) “W. W. POLE.
“The Right Hon. Lord Gambier.”
Lord Gambier’s reply to this intimation, that on the receipt of the
above-mentioned appliances he would be expected to attack the French
squadron, was, that “_if the Board_ deemed an attack practicable, he
would obey any orders with which they might honour him, however great
might be the loss of men and ships.” A plain declaration that he _still
declined to take upon himself the responsibility of attack_.
It will be necessary to bear this fact in mind, as after the attack was
made, Lord Gambier, in his first despatch to the Admiralty, gave me
credit for everything but the success of my plan, and in his second
despatch _omitted my name altogether as having had anything to do with
either planning or executing it!!!_ and in the vote of thanks
subsequently given to his lordship in parliament, the officers under my
orders were thanked, but no mention whatever was made of me, either as
having conducted, or even taken any part in the attack, the whole merit
of which was ascribed to Lord Gambier, who was never nearer than nine
miles to the scene of action, as will subsequently appear.
Lord Gambier’s answer to the previous letter from the Board is, however,
so material to the right understanding of the events which followed,
that it will be better to subjoin the whole of it.
“_Caledonia_, in Basque Roads,
“March 26th, 1809.
“SIR,—In obedience to their Lordships’ directions to me, contained in
your letter of the 19th instant, I beg leave to state that it is
advisable that I should be furnished with six gun-brigs in addition to
those I may be able to collect of such as are under my command; at
present there are only two at this anchorage. I shall, however, order
the _Insolent_ and _Contest_ to join me from Quiberon Bay; and I
should hope that the _Martial_ and _Fervent_ will shortly return from
Plymouth.