in the service of France (in pursuance of discretionary orders which
your lordship gave me, to assist the Spaniards whenever it could be
done with most effect), I hastened here. The citadel on the 22nd
instant was already half invested, and the enemy was making his
approaches towards the south-west bastion, which your lordship knows
was blown down last war by the explosion of a magazine and tumbled
into the ditch; a few thin planks and dry stones had been put up by
the Spanish engineers, perhaps to hide the defect; all things were in
the most deplorable state without and within; even measures for their
powder and saws for their fuses were not to be had, and mats and axes
supplied their place. The castle of Trinity, situated on an eminence,
but commanded by heights, was also invested. Three 24-pounders
battered in breach, to which a fourth was afterwards added, and a
passage through the wall to the lower bomb-proof being nearly effected
on the 23rd, the marines of the _Fame_ were withdrawn. I went to
examine the state of the castle, and, as the senior officer in the bay
had not officially altered the orders I received from your lordship, I
thought this a good opportunity, by occupying a post on which the
acknowledged safety of the citadel depended, to render them an
effectual service. The remaining garrison consisted of about eighty
Spaniards, who were on the point of surrendering; accordingly, I threw
myself into the fort with fifty seamen and thirty marines of the
_Impérieuse_. The arrangements I made need not be detailed to your
lordship; suffice it to say, that about a thousand bags (made of old
sails), besides barrels and palisades, supplied the place of walls and
ditches, and that the enemy, who assaulted the castle on the 30th with
full 1000 picked men, were repulsed with the loss of their commanding
officer, storming equipage, and all who had attempted to mount the
breach. The Spanish garrison having been changed, gave good
assistance. As to the officers, seamen, and marines of this ship, the
fatigues they underwent, and the gallant manner in which they behaved,
deserve every praise. I must, however, particularly mention Lieutenant
Johnson, of the navy, Lieutenant Hoare, of the marines, Mr. Burney,
the gunner, Mr. Lodowick, the carpenter, and Messrs. Stewart, Sloven,
and Marryat, midshipmen.
“Captain Hall, of the _Lucifer_, at all times and in every way gave
his zealous assistance. I feel also indebted to Captain Collens, of
the _Meteor_, for his aid.
“The citadel of Rosas capitulated at twelve o’clock this day. Seeing,
my lord, farther resistance in the castle of Trinity useless, and
impracticable against the whole army, the attention of which had
naturally turned to its reduction; after firing the trains for
exploding the magazines, we embarked in the boats of the
_Magnificent_, _Impérieuse_, and _Fame_.
“I have the honour to be, &c.
(Signed) “COCHRANE.
“The Right Hon. Lord Collingwood.”
LORD COLLINGWOOD’S _Letter to the Admiralty._
“H.M. Ship _Ocean_, Jan. 7. 1809.
“SIR,—The _Impérieuse_ having with other ships been employed in the
Bay of Rosas, to assist the Spaniards in defending that fortress, and
Captain Lord Cochrane having taken on himself the defence of Trinity
Castle, an outwork of that garrison, I have received from him a
letter, dated the 5th of December, a copy of which is enclosed,
stating the surrender of Rosas by the Spaniards on that day, and of
his having embarked the garrison of Trinity Castle on board his ship
from the castle destroyed.
“The heroic spirit and ability which have been evinced by Lord
Cochrane in defending this castle, although so shattered in its works,
against the repeated attacks of the enemy, is an admirable instance of
his lordship’s zeal; and the distinguished conduct of Lieutenants
Johnson and Hoare, of the Royal Marines, and the officers and men
employed in this affair under his lordship, will, doubtless, be very
gratifying to my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.
(Signed, &c.) “COLLINGWOOD.
“To the Secretary of the Admiralty.”
To these despatches I may be pardoned for appending the following
extract from the _Gerona Gazette_, as it appeared in the Naval Chronicle
of 1809.
LORD COCHRANE.
The Spanish _Gerona Gazette_, when inserting a letter from Lord
Cochrane, January 1, 1809, subjoins the following liberal testimony to
his noble conduct:—
“This gallant Englishman has been entitled to the admiration and
gratitude of this country from the first moment of its political
resurrection. His generosity in co-operating with our earliest
efforts, the encouragement we received from the interest he took with
the commanders of the Balearic islands, to induce them to succour us
with troops and ammunition, can never be erased from our recollection.
The extraordinary services which we owe to his indefatigable activity,
particularly this city and the adjacent coast, in protecting us from
the attempts of the enemy, are too well known to be repeated here. It
is a sufficient eulogium upon his character to mention, that in the
defence of the castle of Trinidad, when the Spanish flag, hoisted on
the wall, fell into the ditch, under a most dreadful fire from the
enemy, his lordship was the only person who, regardless of the shower
of balls flying about him, descended into the ditch, returned with the
flag, and happily succeeded in placing it where it was.”
Without any degree of egotism, I may—considering that no praise beyond
Lord Collingwood’s was ever awarded to me for my defence of Trinidad—be
excused from adducing the following remarks, known to be from the pen of
Sir Walter Scott.
“Thus, in consequence of our cooperation, were the French detained a
whole month before a neglected and ill-provided fortress, which,
without that cooperation, could not have resisted the first attack.
The event might have been different had there been a floating army off
the coast—the whole of the besieging force might then have been cut
off. Of the errors which the English Government committed in the
conduct of the Spanish war, the neglect of this obvious and most
important means of annoying the enemy, and advantaging our allies, is
the most extraordinary. Five thousand men, at the disposal of Lord
Cochrane or Sir Sidney Smith, or any of those numerous officers in the
British Navy who have given undoubted proofs of their genius as well
as courage, would have rendered more service to the common cause _than
five times that number on shore_, because they could at all times
choose their points of attack, and the enemy, never knowing where to
expect them, would everywhere be in fear, and everywhere in reach of
the shore in danger.
“Lord Cochrane, during the month of September 1808, with his single
ship the _Impérieuse_, kept the whole coast of Languedoc in
alarm,—destroyed the numerous semaphoric telegraphs, which were of the
utmost consequence to the numerous coasting convoys of the French, and
not only prevented any troops from being sent from that province into
Spain, but even excited such dismay that 2000 men were withdrawn from
Figueras to oppose him, when they would otherwise have been marching
farther into the peninsula. The coasting trade was entirely suspended
during this alarm; yet with such consummate prudence were all Lord
Cochrane’s enterprises planned and executed, that _not one of his men
were either killed or hurt_, except one, who was singed in blowing up
a battery.”
For none of the services detailed in the last two chapters did I ever
receive praise or reward from the Admiralty authorities! though from the
nature of the services they were necessarily accompanied by the
deprivation of all chance of prize-money, either to myself, officers, or
crew. The check opposed to the advance of the French in Catalonia—as
testified by Lord Collingwood—was therefore made at _my expense_,
without costing a farthing to the nation beyond the expenditure of
ammunition; a strange contrast to some of the costly expeditions of the
period for less results, and one which ought to have secured for me
anything but the political animosity with which all my services were
regarded.
CHAP. XVIII.
CRUISE OF THE _IMPÉRIEUSE_ CONTINUED.
DEFEAT OF THE SPANIARDS.—ATTACK SOME FRENCH VESSELS.—FRENCH
OPERATIONS.—LETTER OF LORD COCHRANE.—LORD COLLINGWOOD.—OPERATIONS OF
THE ENEMY.—FALL IN WITH THE CYRENE.—SAIL FOR MINORCA.—APPLY FOR
LEAVE.—MOTIVES FOR LEAVING.—APATHY OF THE GOVERNMENT.—REPROACHED FOR
SERVICE.—NEGLECT OF THE ADMIRALTY.
When in the roads of San Felin, on the 7th of December, a boat came off
with a request from the Spanish commandant that I would reconnoitre the
enemy’s position in the direction of Gerona. I had, at first,
considerable doubts whether compliance with a request to act in a
military capacity came within the sphere of a naval officer’s duty; but
considering that Lord Collingwood’s instructions were to aid the
Spaniards by any means within my power, I resolved for once to forego my
reluctance to leave the frigate, and accordingly accompanied the
commandant and his staff in the direction of the enemy, whom we found
assembled in such numbers as to render successful opposition out of the
question.
Being unable to advise the Spaniards in this locality to adopt any
beneficial course, or indeed how to act in any effective way against the
enemy, we again sailed in the direction of Barcelona, where a Spanish
force of 40,000 men, under General Vives, was closely investing the
town, so as to cut off supplies from the French garrison. As the
consequent scarcity of provisions affected the inhabitants also, all who
could afford to hire boats were quitting the place with their families;
the garrison offering no obstacle.
On the 17th, a body of French—or rather Italian troops embodied in the
French army—made their appearance for the purpose of relieving the
garrison. As they numbered only about 10,000, and the Spaniards fully
40,000, posted on the top of a hill, with every advantage in their
favour, the defeat of the Franco-Italians appeared so much a matter of
course as to induce me to go on shore to witness the engagement.
To my surprise, Vives allowed his flank to be turned, and the French
attacking in front and rear at the same time the Spaniards became
panic-struck, and fairly ran away. The rout was complete; and it was
with difficulty that I managed to get on board the frigate.
Shortly after gaining the ship, a boat full of officers was seen to put
off from the shore and make for the _Impérieuse_. On coming alongside,
it was reported to me that General Vives was amongst their number, on
which I returned a message expressive of disbelief; adding that it could
not be the general, for that to my certain knowledge he was on shore,
driving back the French who were attempting to relieve Barcelona. After
some hesitation, General Vives personally avowed himself, and demanded a
conveyance for himself, officers, and 1000 men to Tarragona; which
demand being flatly refused, they left for the _Cambrian_, which lay at
anchor not far off.
On the 19th we got under weigh, and soon after fell in with a vessel
bound for Palamos, and crowded with families escaping from Barcelona,
all of whom bitterly complained of the shameful treatment they had
experienced at the hands of the French soldiery. On the 21st we came to
off St. Philou, which had just been plundered of everything.
Nothing material occurred till the 30th, when, beating up towards
Caldagues Bay, we received intelligence that several French vessels,
bound to Barcelona with provisions for the relief of the French army,
were at anchor there. To attack these, as we had reason to believe that
there was a considerable body of the enemy at Caldagues, and as the
harbour was not more than half a mile broad, was a dangerous affair, on
account of the necessity of anchoring within point-blank range of
musketry. It was, however, of great importance that the provisions
should not reach their destination, and, in place of waiting for them to
proceed on their voyage, I decided on attacking them as the convoy lay
at anchor.
At mid-day we were close to the entrance of the harbour, and made out
the convoy and two vessels of war in charge of them, the whole being
protected by a battery and a number of French troops on the hills.
Bringing the _Impérieuse_ to an anchor we commenced firing on the
vessels of war, one of which shortly afterwards sank; when directing our
attack on her consort, she also sank and fell on her broadside, the crew
escaping on shore.
The protecting vessels being thus disposed of, we warped closer in shore
for the purpose of silencing some guns which whilst engaged in sinking
them had repeatedly struck us. In order to divide the enemy’s attention,
a party of marines was despatched to make a feint of landing near the
town, whilst with the other marines and the blue jackets we dashed on
shore between the former and the French who were still firing on us from
the battery. The latter, seeing the double attack and afraid of being
cut off from their comrades in the town, ran off to the hills,
abandoning their guns, which, on landing, we threw over the cliff, with
the exception of four brass 18-pounders and one 24-pounder, which were
taken on board the _Impérieuse_. We then blew up the magazine.
The coast being now clear, all boats were sent in to bring out eleven
vessels laden with provisions, and by dark they were all close
alongside, with our marines safely on board. They had, indeed, met with
no opposition, the French troops in the town having run away and joined
their comrades on the hills, the whole shortly afterwards marching in
the direction of Rosas. During this affair the inhabitants remained
quiet spectators on the hills—afraid to assist us, lest the French, who
were certain to return on our departure, should retaliate after their
usual fashion.
On the 31st we made an effort to raise the vessels of war which had sunk
in shallow water near the shore, and after some time, succeeded in
stopping the leak of the one which had fallen over on her broadside, and
was full of water, which being pumped out she floated and was towed
alongside the frigate.
By this time a number of Spanish boats from the neighbouring coast came
in, and without ceremony set to work plundering our prizes! It was not
till after some rough treatment from a party of marines sent for the
protection of the captured vessels, that the Spaniards were made to
comprehend that the prizes belonged to us and not to them!
Towards midnight the Spaniards gave us information that the French, with
reinforcements from Rosas, were on the point of re-entering the town. We
therefore sent a party of marines on board the brig-of-war to protect
her from recapture.
Early in the morning of the 1st of January 1809, the enemy opened upon
the brig with a smart fire of musketry, which the marines as smartly
returned,—the frigate and a gun in the pinnace meanwhile plying the
assailants with grape so effectually that they immediately abandoned
their position, and marching round a hill, commenced firing from the
other side, where, as the movement was anticipated by the frigate, they
met with a similar reception immediately on showing themselves. Finding
us fully prepared at all points, they followed the example of their
predecessors, and retreated to the hills, offering no further
opposition, whilst we were engaged in weighing the other vessel of war,
in which we succeeded also. As soon as the French saw that they could
not save either of these vessels, they abandoned the victuallers, and
again marched off in the direction of Rosas.
The 2nd was employed in repairing our prizes, and in getting off other
brass guns found on shore. On the 3rd we blew up the barrack and another
magazine close to the town, without any further interference on the part
of the enemy. Our operations being now completed, the smallest vessel of
war was despatched to Lord Collingwood, off Toulon, with the following
account of our success.
“His Majesty’s Ship _Impérieuse_, Caldagues,
2nd January, 1809.
“MY LORD,—Having received information of two French vessels of war,
and a convoy of victuallers for Barcelona being in this port, I have
the honour to inform your lordship, that they are all—amounting to
thirteen sail—in our possession.
“The French have been driven from the tower of Caldagues with the loss
of nine cannon, which they had mounted or were mounting on the
batteries.
“I have the honour, &c.
“COCHRANE.
“The Right Hon. Lord Collingwood.”
“_La Gauloise_, cutter, 7 guns and 46 men, commanded by Mr. Avanet,
Member of the Legion of Honour.
“_La Julie_, lugger, 5 guns, 4 swivels, 44 men, commanded by Mr.
Chassereau.
“And eleven victuallers.”
In consequence of which his lordship was pleased to write to the
Admiralty as follows:—
“_Copy of a Letter from_ Vice-Admiral LORD COLLINGWOOD,
_Commander-in-Chief of His Majesty’s ships and vessels in the
Mediterranean, to the_ Hon. W. W. POLE, _dated on board the_ Ocean,
_at sea, the 6th of May 1809_.
“SIR,—I inclose—to be laid before their Lordships—a letter I have
received from Lord Cochrane, captain of his Majesty’s ship
_Impérieuse_, who has been for some time past employed on the coast of
Catalonia, and where the good services of his lordship in aid of the
Spaniards and in annoyance of the enemy could not be exceeded.
“I have, &c.
“COLLINGWOOD.”
Having put to sea with our prizes, except the smallest, which we gave to
the Spaniards,—the _Impérieuse_ stood, on the 9th of January, towards
Silva, anchoring in that port at 4 P.M. Observing a battery of ten guns
mounted ashore, we landed, rolled them into the sea, and afterwards
demolished the battery without opposition.
On the 10th, the Spaniards gave us intelligence of a large detachment of
French troops being on their march from Rosas. Anticipating much the
same kind of opposition as we had experienced at Caldagues, the marines
were directed to take possession of the hill on which the demolished
battery had been placed, and soon afterwards the enemy was seen
advancing in three divisions. Shortly before reaching the hill, they
halted and reconnoitred, after which they filed off towards the opposite
mountain, and piled their arms in sight of the ship.
About noon they were reinforced by great numbers, and the whole advanced
down the hill, their skirmishers keeping up a brisk fire upon our
marines. As it was impossible for these to hold their position against
such numbers, and as there was no particular object in so doing, it
became necessary to embark them, for which purpose the boats had been
placed in readiness. On the first appearance of the reinforcement, the
French reentered their battery, but only to find the iron guns thrown in
the sea and the brass ones in our possession. Exasperated at this, they
opened upon us so heavy a fire of musketry that we were glad to get off
as fast as we could, with the loss of three men.
Scarcely had we pushed off, when they manned a lower battery, which we
had not had time to destroy—but though they fired very smartly, we had
only two men wounded. It was fortunate we took precautions to reembark
the marines in time—five minutes later would have lost us half their
number, and we might have been compelled to leave some of the wounded.
It was no less fortunate that, from the entrance being high and narrow,
I had, before anchoring in a passage so exposed, taken the precaution of
laying out a kedge to seaward, with something like a mile of coir rope
attached, to be used in case of emergency. Hauling on this, we were
quickly out of reach of the battery, but again anchored just within our
own range of the enemy, when the frigate reopened her fire with shot and
shell, keeping up an intermitting cannonade till after nightfall.
We learned in a curious way that the principal portion of the troops who
attacked us were Swiss! About midnight a boat was reported alongside
with a letter from the commandant of the troops with which we had been
engaged. Wondering what he could want with me, I opened the letter, and
found it to contain a rigmarole account of himself and the extraordinary
achievements of his regiment, which belonged to some canton whose name I
forget; the letter concluding with a request for a few _bottles of
rum_!! I sent him the rum, together with a reply not very complimentary
to his country or present occupation.
On the 11th some of our missing men got on board, and reported that the
French had received still larger reinforcements, with heavy artillery,
of which, indeed, we had ample proof, they having this morning got their
guns to bear so accurately, that almost every shot struck us, so that it
became necessary to display the better part of valour, and be off. The
wind, unluckily for us, had died away, but a southerly air at length
springing up, we put our prisoners ashore, and stood out of the bay,
anchoring on the following day at Caldagues.
It would be tedious to narrate the remainder of our cruise, which
chiefly consisted in sailing along the Spanish coast, and firing upon
French troops wherever they came within reach, this being principally in
the vicinity of Barcelona.
On one occasion only did we make much havoc amongst them, viz. on the
22nd. On the previous day we had been reconnoitring Barcelona, and fell
in with the _Cyrene_. Whilst rounding a small promontory in company, we
observed a foraging expedition of at least 5000 troops, with immense
numbers of mules laden with provisions,—the spoil of the surrounding
country,—coming along a road close to the sea. Both ships immediately
beat to quarters, and running well within shot and shell range,
commenced a heavy fire, which told admirably on the troops and convoy,
as was evident from the disorder into which they were thrown. After
about two hours persevering—though not continuous fire,—as from the
strong breeze blowing, we were occasionally carried past the enemy, and
lost time in regaining our position; the French abandoned their line of
march, and filed off into the interior, the ships harassing their
retreat with shells till they were out of range. The loss of the enemy
on this occasion must necessarily have been very severe.
On the 30th we joined Admiral Thornborough’s squadron of thirteen sail
at Minorca. On the following day we received the unwelcome intelligence
of Lieutenant Harrison’s having been taken prisoner by the French. I had
placed this excellent officer in command of the man-of-war cutter taken
with the French convoy at Caldagues, and when off Tarragona he
imprudently went on shore with only two hands, to gain information about
us. On landing he was immediately surrounded by French troops, a body of
whom was embarked in boats to regain possession of his cutter, but by
promptly making sail she escaped.
Some time previous to this period I had applied to the Admiralty for
permission to return to England. My reasons for the application were
various, the ostensible ground being the state of my health, which had
in reality suffered severely from the incessant wear and tear of body
and mind to which for nearly two years I had been exposed. A more urgent
reason was to get back to my place in the House of Commons, in order to
expose the robberies of the Admiralty Courts in the Mediterranean, the
officials of which were reaping colossal fortunes at the expense of
naval officers and seamen, who were wasting their lives and blood for
official gain! The barefaced peculations of these courts would be almost
incredible, especially as regarded the Maltese Court, were there not
some living at the present time who can testify to their enormity. To
such an extent was this now carried, that a ship captured without cargo
never yielded a penny to the captors, the whole proceeds being swallowed
up by the Admiralty Court. With cargo, some trifling surplus might
remain, but what between pilfering and official fees, the award was
hardly worth the trouble of capture.
The effect of this upon the Navy generally was most disastrous, and not
upon the Navy only, but upon the nation also, which had upwards of 1000
ships in commission without any result at all commensurable with the
expenditure. Captains were naturally disinclined to harass themselves
and crews for nothing, and avoided making prizes certain to yield
nothing but the risk and trouble of capture, and which, in addition,
might bring them in debt, as was the result in my own case.
It will now be evident why I preferred harassing the French army in
Spain to making prizes for the enrichment of the officials of the
Maltese and other Admiralty courts. It was always my aim to serve my
country before my own interests, and in this case I judged it better to
do so where the service could be most effectual. Prizes, of which the
proceeds were monopolised by a body of corrupt officials, neither under
the eye nor control of the government, were not worth troubling
ourselves about; so I determined on a course of service where there were
no prizes to take, but abundance of highly interesting operations to be
undertaken. The frigate’s officers and crew willingly seconding my
views, I now—more on their account than my own—put on record that _none_
of the services previously narrated, though lauded by the admirals
commanding them, and by historians subsequently, were ever rewarded,
either as regarded myself, or any one under my command, even promotion
to the officers being shamefully withheld; their fault, or rather
misfortune, consisting in having served under my command.