CHAPTER XVI.

CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS.

The constitutional requirements of a country are never determined

solely by its political needs. Some account must be taken of its prior

history, for theories of government are apt to sink deep into the mind

of a people and to become unconsciously a part of its political

outlook. No form of education is less conscious or more abiding in its

effects. It may even happen that the fabric which such theories

created has been deliberately overthrown with the popular consent, but

none the less the theories are still there in some form or other to

obtrude themselves in future experiments. It is always worth while,

therefore, in any reconstruction to look at the ideas of government

which held sway before, whether in the shape of a professed creed or

in the practical form of institutions. The constitutional history of

South Africa is not long, and it is not complex. In Natal and Cape

Colony we possess two specimens of ordinary self-governing colonies.

Natal, which began life as a Crown colony, subject to the Governor of

the Cape, was granted substantive independence by charter in 1856, and

in 1893 was given representative government. It possesses a nominated

legislative council of nine members, and an elective legislative

assembly of thirty-nine members, elected on an easy franchise. Cape

Colony also began as a Crown colony, and followed nearly the same

path. Her legislative council was created in 1850, and by an

ordinance of this legislature in 1872, ratified by an Act of the

Imperial Parliament, she obtained full representative institutions.

Her council and her house of assembly are each elected and on the same

franchise. In these two colonies we have, therefore, types of

colonial autonomy--that is to say, an unfettered executive and

freedom to legislate subject to the consent of the Governor and the

Crown in Council, a limitation which is daily becoming more of a

pious fiction. In Southern Rhodesia we have a specimen of that very

modern experiment, government by a commercial company. It is a

provisional form, and has been made to approximate as far as is

reasonably possible to a Crown colony. The executive power is in the

hands of the company's officials, subject to an indirect control by

the Imperial Resident Commissioner, the High Commissioner, and

ultimately by the Crown. There is a legislative council, partly

nominated by the company and partly elected, and all legislation is

contingent upon the sanction of the imperial authorities. Lastly,

there are the native states, the Crown colony of Basutoland, and the

protectorates of Bechuanaland, North-West Rhodesia, and Swaziland,

all of which are directly or indirectly under the authority of the

High Commissioner. So far there is no constitutional novelty--Crown

colonies advancing to an ordinary type of self-government, or

remaining, provisionally or permanently, under full imperial control.

There remain the late Governments of the Republics, which to the student

of constitutional forms show certain interesting peculiarities.[30]

These constitutions were framed by men who had no tradition[31] to

fall back upon, if we exclude the Mosaic law, and no theories to give

effect to--men who would have preferred to do without government, had

it been possible, but who, once the need became apparent, brought to

the work much shrewdness and good sense. The Natal emigrants in 1838

had established a Volksraad, but the chief feature in their scheme was

the submission of all important matters to a primary public assembly, a

Homeric gathering of warriors. By the time the Sand River and

Bloemfontein Conventions were signed and the two republics became

independent, the people were scattered over a wide expanse of country,

and some form of representation was inevitable. At the same time, it

had become necessary to provide for a military organisation coextensive

with the civil. In the Transvaal transient republics had arisen and

departed, like the changes in a kaleidoscope. Around both states there

was a native population, actively hostile and potentially dangerous.

Some central military and civil authority was needed to keep the

country from anarchy. But if the farmers were without political

theories, they had a very vigorous sense of personal independence; so

the doctrinal basis of the new constitution lay in the axiom that one

burgher in the State is as good as another, and that the people are the

final repository of power. In this at least they were democratic,

though from other traits of democracy they have ever held aloof.

The _Constitutie_ of the Orange Free State was rigid--that is, it

could be altered only by methods different from those of ordinary

legislation: in the Transvaal _Grondwet_, on the other hand, there

was no provision for change at all, and reforms, when necessary, were

made in the ordinary legislative manner. The _Constitutie_ created one

supreme legislature, the Volksraad, elected by the qualified white

population. The President was elected by the whole people, though the

Volksraad, like the Roman consuls, reserved the power to make

nominations, which were generally accepted. The Volksraad had not only

supreme legislative power, but, while formally independent of the

President and the executive, it could reverse any executive Act,

except the exercise of the President's right of pardon and the

declaration of martial law. It was limited only by its own charter,

which forbade it to restrict the right of public meeting and petition

(one of the few Bill of Rights elements in this constitution), and

bound it to promote and support the Dutch Reformed Church. The

Transvaal _Grondwet_ began by making the Dutch Reformed Church an

established national Church (a provision repealed later), and

declaring that "the people will not tolerate any equality between

coloured and white inhabitants in Church or State." No man was

eligible for a seat in the Volksraad unless he was a member of a

Protestant Church.[32] In the Transvaal, as in the Orange Free State,

the Volksraad was the supreme legislative authority, but when any law

was proposed the people were given the opportunity of expressing their

opinion in a mild form of the referendum. The President was elected by

the whole people and acted as chief of the executive, though

responsible to the Volksraad, which could dismiss him or cancel his

appointments. He could sit and speak in the Volksraad, but had no

vote. The chief military authority was the Commandant General, who was

elected by all the burghers, and under him there was a long hierarchy

of district commandants and field-cornets. The local administrative

officer for civil matters was the landdrost or district magistrate. It

is unnecessary to consider the Second Volksraad, which was an

ineffective advisory body elected on a wider franchise, a mere sop to

the Cerberus whose hundred tongues were clamouring for representation.

But there was one curious development of considerable historic

interest. In cases of urgency the Volksraad could pass laws without

reference to the people at large, but such an enactment was called a

resolution (_besluit_) as contrasted with a law (_wet_), and was

supposed to have only a provisional force. But the habit grew of

calling most matters "specially urgent," and allowing the old popular

referendum to fall into desuetude.

The common feature of both constitutions was the immense nominal powers

of the legislatures. Nominally they had the right to make all

appointments, to veto the President's action, and to say the last word

in all questions of revenue and expenditure. But certain facts wrought

against this legislative supremacy. The members came from districts

widely apart, and there was no serious attempt to form groups or

parties; the President could sit and speak in the Volksraad, and he

might be elected as often as he could persuade the people to elect him.

The way was paved for the tyranny of a strong man. In the Orange Free

State, that country of mild prosperity and simple problems, the system

worked admirably; but in the Transvaal, when burning questions arose,

the republican methods for all serious purposes broke down, and were

replaced by a dictatorship. There remain, however, certain doctrines

from the old _regime_ which will have to be reckoned with under the

new. The supremacy of the legislature is not one, for no Boer cared

much for the dogma, and Mr Kruger ruled on the simple maxim, "L'etat

c'est moi." But the democratic principle of equality among citizens is

one cherished belief, and another is the absolute disqualification of

all coloured races.[33] The Boer is not a parliamentarian in the

ordinary sense, and he did not grieve when his Volksraad was slighted

and made impotent; but he likes his representative to go to Pretoria,

as a sort of tribute to his importance, and, if he is to vote, he

demands to vote on an equal basis with all. He was attached to his

local administration with its landdrost system, and any change which

bore no relation to the old plan might begin by confusing and end by

souring him.

We have therefore to face two existing constitutional traditions--among

the British from the Cape or Natal or over-seas, the old love of

colonial self-government; among the Boers, at least in the Transvaal, a

kind of ingenuous republican independence, quite consistent with a

patient tolerance of absolutism, but not so easy to adapt to the

gradations of our representative system. Hence in many ways the Boer is

far more likely to remain patient for years under a Crown colony

Government than the English or colonial new-comer. He does not

particularly want to vote or interfere in administration, so long as

he has no personal grievance; but it might annoy him to see the

franchise denied to him and given to his cousin who was a little richer

or better educated, when he remembered the old _Grondwet_ doctrines of

equality, and it would certainly exasperate him to learn that any

native had been granted a civic status beyond him.

* * * * *

Such being the constitutional history, we may turn to the present. The

term Crown colony is used so loosely that very few of its many critics

could define the peculiar features of this form of government. "One of

the greatest of all evils," wrote Lord Durham in the famous Report

which has become the charter of colonial policy, "arising from this

system of irresponsible government, was the mystery in which the

motives and actual purposes of their rulers were hid from the

colonists themselves. The most important business of government was

carried on, not in open discussions or public acts, but in a secret

correspondence between the Governor and the Secretary of State." This

feature, more than any other, tends to dissatisfaction. The Crown

colony system is necessarily a secret one. The newspapers, till

blue-books are issued, are informed only as much or as little as the

authorities may think good for them; and the natural critics of all

administration have the somewhat barren pleasure of finding fault with

a policy after it has become a fact. There is no safety-valve for the

escape of grievances, no official channel even for sound local advice.

It is not to be wondered at, therefore, if it seems an intolerable

burden to men full of anxiety about the methods by which they are

governed.

The Crown colony system is not new to Africa. It existed for years in

the Cape and Natal; it still exists in its most rigid form over

native states, and at its worst it does not spurn public opinion in

the fashion of the Kruger _regime_--it simply neglects it. The name is

really a misnomer, for it is no part of the English colonial system.

The American Revolution is sometimes described as the revolt of an

English people from Crown colony government, but in those days the

thing was not in existence. It is fundamentally the method invented to

govern a race which is incapable of free representative institutions,

or to tide over a temporary difficulty. The Governor is absolute,

subject to the conditions of his appointment and the instructions

accompanying his letters-patent. He may be assisted by a council, but

it is his privilege, on reasons shown, to override his council. He is

the sole local fountain of executive and legislative power. But if he

is absolute in one sense, he is strictly tied in another. The methods

of his administration are subject to certain regulations issued by the

Colonial Office. The Secretary of State must approve his appointments,

and all important administrative acts, as well as all legislation.

Further, in serious questions the Home Government exercises a general

oversight of policy before the event, and the Governor in such

matters is merely the mouthpiece of the Cabinet. It is in itself a

rational system, and works well under certain conditions. In a

serious crisis, when large imperial issues are involved, and when

local policy is but a branch of a wider policy, it is highly

important that this day-to-day supervision should exist; and in a

case where speed is essential, Crown colony methods, though slow

enough in all conscience, are rapidity itself compared with the

cumbrous machinery of representative government.

The necessity of treating the Transvaal and the Orange River Colony

temporarily as Crown colonies was beyond argument. Reconstruction began

in the midst of war, when the material of self-government was wanting.

It goes on amidst unsettled and dimly understood conditions, where

certain facts of policy stand out in a strong light and all else is

shadow. It involves many financial transactions in which the Home

Government is deeply interested; and it is natural that a close

administrative connection should be thought desirable. It comes at the

end of a costly war, and it is right that England should have a direct

say in securing herself against its repetition. The racial problem is

still too delicate to submit to the arbitrament of popular bodies; and

if it were settled out of hand there might remain an abiding cause of

discontent. The time is not ripe for self-government, the country has

not yet found herself, having but barely awakened from the torpor of

war and begun to set her house in order. Again, there are factors to be

borne in mind in re-creating the new colonies which extend far beyond

their borders. It is impossible to imagine that due consideration could

be given to them by the ablest elective body in the world, called

together in the present ferment. Above all, what is to be done must be

done quickly. The wants of the hour are too urgent for delays. There

must be some authority, trusted by the British Cabinet, capable of

determining the needs of the situation, and giving summary effect to

his decision.

On this all thinking men in the new colonies are agreed. I do not

suppose that any of the more serious critics of the expedient would

be prepared to propose and defend an alternative. But irritation

remains when reason has done its best, and it is not hard to see the

causes. One is the natural disinclination of Englishmen to be ruled

from above, a repulsion which they feel even when arguing in its

favour. Another is the secrecy of Crown colony government, to which I

have already referred. It is painful to find matters of vital

importance to yourself decided without your knowledge, even when you

have the fullest confidence in the deciding power. There is also,

perhaps, a little distrust still left in South Africa of the British

Government,--not of particular Ministers, but of the vague entity

behind them--a distrust which has had in the past such ample

justification that it is hard to blame it. The colonial mind, too, is

averse to English officialdom, even when represented by the several

highly competent men who have shared in the present administration.

Red-tape, which in its place is most necessary and desirable, seems to

lurk in the offices of men who are in reality trying hard to deal with

facts in the simplest way. A certain amount of formal officialdom is

necessary in all government. There must be people to keep an office in

order, to make a fetich of etiquette, to insist on a stereotyped

procedure, and to see the world dimly through a mist of "previous

papers." It is a useful, but not very valuable, type of man, and we

cannot wonder that a South African, who imagines that such a one has,

what he rarely has, an influence in grave decisions, should view with

distrust the form of government which permits him. It is a mistake,

but one based on an honest instinct.

Self-government is the goal to which all things hasten, and critics of

the present administration check their complaints at the thought of

that beneficent day. Meanwhile it is our business to set things in

order so that the chosen of the people, when they enter into their

inheritance, may find it swept and garnished. Representative

institutions should not spring full grown from an Order in Council,

like Athene from the brain of Zeus: if they do, there is apt to be a

painful crudeness about their early history. The way should be

prepared by gentle means, for, after all, it is a country in which the

bulk of the residents have had no experience of governing themselves.

The experiment has so far been tried in two ways. The municipalities

represent the highest level of intelligence and political training; in

municipal affairs, therefore, it is safe to begin at once with

representation. The first town councils were for all practical

purposes Government departments, nominated by Government and assisted

on their difficult career by Government supervision. But a nominated

town council is an anomaly even within a Crown colony, since a town

council is not concerned with high politics but only with the

administration of the area in which its citizens choose to dwell, and

any owner of property has a right to a voice in determining the ways

in which his property shall be safeguarded. The basis of any municipal

franchise is the payment of rates, which imply the ownership of

property; and questions of race, loyalty, even of education, have no

logical place in what is simply a practical union for the protection

of proprietary interests and the care of the amenities of civilised

life. The question of elective municipalities is therefore a simple

one, and as soon as a municipal law could be put together, the system

was inaugurated. This is not the place to examine the type of

municipal franchise adopted in the Transvaal, which is a skilful

compendium of various colonial precedents. But on one matter, the

coloured and alien vote, there was manifested a vigorous tendency to

conservatism and exclusion. As I have said, this is a province where

racial distinctions have no logical place. If a black man is a

ratepayer he has the citizen's right to vote. Nor can we on purely

rational grounds confine this franchise to British subjects. But the

country thought differently. As the municipal was her only form of

representation, political considerations crept in unawares, and the

result, while logically indefensible, has a certain practical

justification. For in a time of reconstruction a community is apt

rather to narrow than enlarge its boundaries, feeling above all things

the need of a compact front against the unknown. In time, no doubt,

the true theory of municipal franchise will reassert itself, and if,

when the time comes, a constructive policy towards the subject races

has also come into being, the delay will have been not in vain.

A more important step towards self-government was the creation of

nominated legislative councils for both colonies, which held their

first meetings in the early part of 1903. In the Transvaal there were

sixteen official members representing the different Government

departments, and fourteen non-official members selected from

representative Englishmen and Boers in the country. In the Orange

River Colony there were six official members and four non-official.

Some of the new measures which concerned more deeply the people of the

colonies were kept back on purpose for the opinion of the new

councils. Such were the new gold and diamond laws, the municipal

franchise law, and the ordinances governing the disposal of town

lands. So far the expedient has promised well; an outlet has been

created for public opinion, though for the present such opinion cannot

carry with it practical force; and the procedure of Government has

ceased to be a state secret, and is patent to any one who has the

curiosity or the patience to attend the council's debates. It is

interesting to observe how the unofficial members already appear in a

quasi-representative capacity, and are beginning to attach themselves

to particular districts, for which, so far as airing grievances and

obtaining information go, they perform most of the duties of an

elected member. There is no reason why such members should not be

elected instead of nominated, and in this way provide a trial for the

form of franchise on which autonomy is to be based. There are many

obvious difficulties in any franchise for the new colonies, and it

would be well for such difficulties to be realised and faced while the

whole matter is still mainly academic, and errors are not yet attended

with practical disaster.

* * * * *

The franchise for the new colonies is the constitutional problem which

is of the most immediate importance. It will not be wise to delay the

era of self-government long, for between the most elastic Crown colony

and the narrowest free colony there is an inseparable gulf, and though

it may be said justly that with an elective legislature the colonies

have something very like freedom, the one thing needful will still be

lacking. It is not enough to put the oars into their hands; we must

cut the painter before they are truly free. There is one postulate in

all franchise discussions which is likely to be vigorously attacked.

The franchise must be based in the first instance upon the principle

of giving adequate representation to all districts and every interest;

but, once this has been recognised, the second principle appears--of

providing for the supremacy of the British population. That saying of

Dogberry's, "An two men ride of a horse, one must ride behind," is a

primary law not only of equitation but of politics in the treatment of

a conquered country. For conquered it is, and there is little use

disguising it: we have not been fighting for the love of it or for

fine sentiment, but to conquer the land and give our people the

mastery. The last word in all matters must rest with us--that is, with

the people of British blood and British sympathies. Both men must be

on the horse, or, apart from parable, each race must have fair and

ample representation. To deny this would be to sin against sound

policy. But not to take measures to see that our own race has the

casting vote is to be guilty of the commonest folly. "An two men ride

of a horse, one must ride behind."

Whoever denies this principle may spare himself the trouble of reading

further, for it is proposed to treat it as axiomatic. The first type

of franchise need not be permanent: a day may come when it will be

needless to consider the distinction of Dutch and British. But as it

was right and politic on the conclusion of war to disarm our

opponents, so it is right and politic in the first franchise to put no

weapon of offence into their hands. The primary adjustment of the

franchise and the primary distribution of seats must be made with this

clear end in view--to secure a working majority for the British people.

It is obvious that the words "British population" are vague, and

include many odd forms of nationality, but the thing itself is simple,

the class whose interests and sentiment are on the British side, who

seek progress on British lines. It does not follow that the majority

of the Dutch will go into opposition, but it is ordinary prudence to

keep on the safe side. Such a policy involves no distrust of the Dutch

population, but is the common duty of those who for a certain period

must, as conquerors, take the initiative in administration, and, as

bearing the responsibility, preserve an adequate means of control.

The terms of the franchise are a more difficult matter. In Cape Colony

citizenship and a low property qualification are the chief conditions.

In Southern Rhodesia, whose franchise law is an especially clear and

sensible code, an oath of loyalty is accepted in lieu of technical

citizenship, and an easy educational test is demanded--the ability of

a voter to sign his name and write his address and occupation. In

Natal there is a sharp distinction drawn between Europeans and all

others. To them the only tests are citizenship, and the ownership or

occupation of property of a certain value, or the receipt of a certain

amount of income. The native is practically disqualified by a law

denying the franchise to any person subject to special courts or

special laws, and though a means of escape is provided, the conditions

are too complex even for more intelligent minds than the native. It is

an ingenious but not wholly satisfactory device. Asiatics are excluded

by the law which denies votes to natives, or descendants in the male

line of natives, of any country which does not enjoy the blessings of

representative government; and though in their case also there is a

way of escape, it is almost equally difficult. The root distinction

between types of franchise lies in the method employed to exclude an

undesirable class, whether a direct one, by disqualifying in so many

words, or an indirect, by setting one standard of qualification for

all, to which, as a matter of fact, the undesirable class cannot

attain. The balance of argument is, on the whole, on the side of the

second method, which has been adopted in Cape Colony and Rhodesia,

though, perhaps, with too low a standard. But the first method, if

followed more frankly than in Natal, has something to be said for it.

There is no reason why the better class of Indians should not vote, if

their race is considered fit to mix on equal terms with English

society elsewhere; but to my mind there is a very good reason why the

native should not vote--at least, not for the present. The easy way of

securing this result is the old method of the Transvaal _Grondwet_,

which said shortly, "There shall be no equality between black and

white." It is the way, too, which, under the Conditions of Surrender,

would have to be adopted in any trial franchise put into force before

self-government. I am not sure whether it is not the most philosophic

as well as the simplest way, for it denies the native the franchise

not for a lack of property or educational qualification, but for

radical mental dissimilarity. In any case it is a matter which must be

left for the people of the colony to settle for themselves. But for

all others, while the property basis of the franchise should be low,

there are grounds for thinking that a reasonably high educational test

should be added. The lower type of European and the back-veld Dutchman

have in their present state no equitable right to the decision, which

the franchise gives, on matters which they are unable to come within a

measurable distance of understanding. The fact that the fool may have

a vote at home is no reason for exalting him to the same level in a

country which is not handicapped by a constitutional history. Some

form of British citizenship, obtainable by a short and simple method,

must also be demanded if the land is to remain a British colony.

Once the franchise has been determined there remains the division of

constituencies. The axiom has already been explained which appears to

govern this question. But in the absence of anything approaching

correct census returns it is difficult to suggest, even tentatively, a

distribution of seats. The fairest way to secure the representation of

all interests seems to be to divide constituencies into three types.

First, there are the large towns, which for the present, to take the

Transvaal, may be limited to Johannesburg and Pretoria. These would be

given members according to their population. Second, come groups of

country burghs, such groups as the Northern Burghs, with Nylstroom,

Warm Baths, Piet Potgieter's Rust, and Pietersburg; and the Eastern

Burghs, with Middelburg and Belfast, Lydenburg and Barberton. Here,

too, members would be allotted according to population, though the

number of voters required to form a constituency should be fewer.

Lastly, there would be the country districts, substantially the present

fourteen magisterial divisions, and there the numbers of a constituency

would be still smaller. That it is fair to differentiate in favour of

the counties against the burghs, and in favour of the burghs against

the large towns, will appear on a brief consideration. The interests of

the different constituencies in a city, at least in a new city, are

practically identical. In the country burghs the interests vary, but

still within narrow limits. In the counties, on the other hand, there

is often a very wide variation. The dwellers in Barberton have wholly

different problems and grievances from the dwellers in Bloemhof or

Standerton. But while this principle is right, the former axiom must be

kept in mind, that, provided fair representation is granted to all, the

constituencies must be so arranged as to ensure British predominance.

Certain counties will, I believe, be on the whole British in

time--Bloemhof, Marico, Zoutpansberg, possibly Waterberg, possibly

Lydenburg, undoubtedly Barberton. The burghs, too, will yield on the

whole a British voting population. In all likelihood, therefore, our

purpose will be secured by the division of constituencies which I have

suggested, even allowing for a differentiation in favour of the rural

districts. Figures are still impossible in the absence of a census, but

on the roughest estimate there may be in the Transvaal at the present

moment a Boer population of 100,000, with a voting proportion of

30,000, and a British population of perhaps 150,000, with a voting

proportion of 50,000 or upwards. In the Orange River Colony before the

war the voters' roll showed just over 17,000, and if we put the vote on

an enlarged franchise at 20,000, we may be near the mark. The position

of the latter colony will not change greatly in the next decade, but

the Transvaal may easily in a few years show a million inhabitants and

more. With a population thus constantly increasing and liable to great

local fluctuations, redistribution may soon become a vexed question and

a source of political chicanery. It would be well if the endless

friction which attends redistribution courts and commissions could be

saved by some automatic system under which sudden local inequalities

could be speedily and finally adjusted.

* * * * *

The greatest constitutional calamity which could befall South Africa

would be for the Dutch in the new colonies to go as a race into

opposition. I have said that they are not born parliamentarians, and

that, to begin with at least, they will be a little strange to the

forms and methods of English representative government. But they are

a strong and serious people, and if they desire, as a race, to form

an opposition, they will learn the tactics of a parliament as readily

as their kinsmen have done in the Cape. It will be difficult to form

out of so practical and stable a folk such an opposition as the

Nationalist party in Ireland; but if they have real grievances to

fight for, it is conceivable that the Dutch people might be organised

into as solid a voting machine as the Irish peasantry under the

control of the Land League and the Church. Attempts will doubtless be

made to bring this about. Certain institutions will spare no pains to

secure so promising a recruit in their policy of emphasising every

feature in the South African situation which tends to disunion. On

the other hand, certain of the natural leaders of the Dutch people,

who have acquired the spurious race-hatred which intriguers and

adventurers have built up during the past twenty years, in a

desperately discreet and orthodox manner may work to the same end.

But fortunately there are signs that the party division, when it

comes, will be lateral and not vertical. It is a phenomenon often

observed in a long war, that a day of apathy sets in, differences

arise in a party, and one section begins to dislike the other far

more than it hates the common enemy. This phenomenon, which in war

spells disaster, is salutary enough in civil politics. In both races

there are signs of divisions, and on each side there is a party

unconsciously drawing nearer to their old opponents. The majority of

the Dutch have little rancour, except against each other; to many

the Bond is as much an object of suspicion as, let us say, Mr

Chamberlain. The old nebulous Pan-Afrikander dreams were in no way

popular with the Transvaal Boer, who would have been nearly as much

annoyed at being harassed with an Afrikander federation as at being

annexed to Natal. Besides, he is not a good party man, being too

sincere an individualist. Intrigue of the carpet-bag and secret-league

variety he will never shine in, and he does not desire to, though apt

enough at a kind of rustic diplomacy. There is, further, a party ready

made for him. He is frankly anti-Johannesburg, a pure agrarian.

Already the anomalous labour party of the Rand are making overtures to

him, and with loud declamations on his merits strive to attract his

sympathies. On certain matters he may join them, but it will be an odd

union, and not a long one. Town and country will never long remain in

conjunction, and there are few items, indeed, of a labour programme to

which he would subscribe.

It is difficult to draw with any confidence the political horoscope of

the new colonies. Certain eternal antitheses will exist,--Capital and

Labour, Rand and Veld, Progress and the staunchest of staunch

Conservatisms,--but none of them seem likely to coalesce so as to form

any permanent division of parties. It is as easy to imagine Rand

capitalists and country Dutch united on certain questions as Boer and

Labour. Possibly the old distinction of Liberal and Tory in some form

or other will appear in the end. It is said that the colonies are

aggressively Liberal; but these are different from other colonies, and

the groundwork of Conservatism already exists. We have a plutocracy

and a landed aristocracy. We have also in the legal element a class,

in its South African form, peculiarly tenacious of the letter of the

law. We have an established kirk in all but name, and a racial

tradition of resistance to novelty. With the growth of a rich and

leisured population, and of social grades and conventions, there will

come a time when politics may well be divided between those who are

satisfied with things as they are, and those who hunger for things as

they cannot be--with, of course, a sprinkling of plain men who do

their work without theories. We shall have the doctrinaire idealist,

doubtless, to experiment on the labour and native questions; and in

place of having politics based on interests, we may have them based in

name and reality on creeds and dogmas, which is what English

constitutionalism desires. All such developments are just and normal,

and in any one the land may find political stability.

There is one contingency alone which must be regarded with the

greatest dread--the growth of a South African party, which is South

African because anti-British. The war raised colonial loyalty to a

height; but such loyalty is like a rocket, which may speedily expire

in the void in a blaze of brightness, or may kindle a steady flame if

the material be there. We must remember that we have in the Dutch a

large population to which the British tie means nothing; a large and

important class, in the cosmopolitan financiers, who may be covertly

hostile to British interests; and even in some of the most sterling

and public-spirited citizens men who, if the Dutch Government had

allowed them, would have surrendered their nationality and become

citizens of the republics. South African loyalty, splendid as it is,

is rather fidelity to British traditions than to that overt link which

constitutes empire. You will, indeed, hear the true theory of colonial

policy well stated and strongly defended; but it must not be

forgotten that in South Africa it is still somewhat of an exotic

plant, and wants careful tending before it can come to maturity.

Unadvised action on our part may nip the growth, and give a chance for

a party which might declare, to adopt the words of the old loyalists

of Lower Canada, that it was determined to be South African even at

the cost of ceasing to be British. A too long or too straitly ordered

tutelage might do it, or a harsh dictation on some local question of

vital interest, or the continuance of the old calumnies about the

Rand, the old vulgar sneer at the colonial-born. It is well to

remember that while the land is a Crown colony it is one only in name,

and that all the tact and discretion which we use in dealing with

self-governing colonies should be used in this case also.

Such a party may arise, but there is no reason in the nature of things

for its existence. South African and British are not opposites. As I

understand the theory of colonial government, England stands towards

her colonies as a parent who starts his sons in the world, wishing

them all prosperity; and though in after-years he may exercise the

parental right of giving advice, he will not attempt to coerce the

action of those who have come to years of maturity. The tie is

strongest when it is not of the letter but of the spirit. At the same

time it is well to preserve certain outward and visible signs of

descent,--well for the fatherland, better for the colonies, who draw

from that fatherland their social and political traditions and their

spiritual sustenance. At the moment South Africa is in a transition

stage. Her public opinion is scarcely formed on any subject; she is

full of vague aspirations, uneasy yearnings, and half-fledged hopes.

She will develop either into the staunchest of allies in any imperial

federation, or the most recalcitrant and isolated of colonies. She has

enough and to spare of good men who desire nothing more than that the

African nation, when it comes, should be a British people, and if she

is trusted whole-heartedly, she will not betray the trust. She will

even accept advice and reproof in proper cases, for, unless we drive

her to ingratitude, she is not ungrateful for the blood and treasure

which Britain has spent on her making. But she is like a young

well-bred colt, whose mouth may be easily spoiled by over-bitting, and

whose temper will be ruined by the bad hands or too hasty temper of

its trainer.

Two important constitutional questions remain. One is the great policy

of Federation, which looms as a background behind all sporadic

constitutional forms. The second concerns that part of the imperial

forces which is to be stationed in South Africa--a matter which is not

only an army question but one deeply affecting colonial interests. To

these the two succeeding chapters are devoted.

[30] Mr Bryce, in his 'Studies in History and Jurisprudence,'

vol. i. pp. 430-467, has a valuable examination of the

old Transvaal and Orange River Colony constitutions.

[31] Stray dogmas from the French Revolution had undoubtedly

some share in the ferment preceding the Great Trek, but

I cannot think that the voortrekkers carried any such

baggage with them to the wilderness.

[32] The original _Grondwet_ declared that no Roman Catholic

Church, nor any Protestant Church which did not teach

the Heidelberg Catechism, should be admitted within the

Republic.

[33] There was no reason _in law_ under the old Orange Free

State Government why a native should not have the

municipal franchise through ownership, and an Asiatic

through occupation of town property. But in practice--a

practice deduced from the spirit of the

_Constitutie_--no such voters were registered.

The African Colony: Studies in the Reconstruction · 第 6 / 9 章