THE POLICY OF FEDERATION.
No South African problem is more long-descended than the question of
Federation. It was a dream of Sir George Grey's in the mid-century,
and it was a central feature in the policy of Sir Bartle Frere--that
policy which, after twenty years of obscuration, is at last seen in
its true and beneficent light. Nor was it held only by English
governors. Local statesmen in Cape Colony saw in it a panacea for the
endless frontier difficulties which tried their patience and their
talents. The ultra-independent colonist, in whose ears "Africa for the
Afrikanders" was beginning to ring, seized upon it as a lever towards
a more complete autonomy. Men like Mr Rhodes, to whom Africa was an
empire and its people one potential nation, looked on it as the first
step towards this larger destiny. Every student of political history
for the last fifty years, considering the physical situation of the
different states and the absence of any final dividing line between
them, confidently anticipated for South Africa, and under more
favourable conditions, the development which Australia has already
reached. But the movement shipwrecked on the northern republics. Old
grievances and jealousies set the Transvaal and the Orange Free State
in arms against the prospect, and, since the essence of federation
is full mutual consent, the project failed at the first hint of
serious opposition. Now all things are changed. The social and
constitutional difficulties which would obviously arise from the
inclusion of independent or all but independent states in a federation
of colonies have disappeared with the independent states themselves.
Now at last all South Africa save the Portuguese and German seaboards
is under one flag.
The chief barriers have gone, but the need for federation is as
insistent as ever. A common flag is a strong tie, but it does not in
practice prevent many local jealousies and petty oppositions. Disunion
is only justifiable among colonies of equal standing when there is
some insuperable physical barrier between them or some radical
disparity of interests. Providence is so clearly on the side of the
larger social battalions, that an isolated state, though within a
colonial system, is at a disadvantage even in matters concerning its
own interests. The nationalism which rejoices in local distinctions,
however recent in origin, is admirable enough in its way, and ought to
be preserved; therefore the complete merging of several units in one
is always to be regretted, even when justified by grave needs. The new
state will never or not for a long time acquire the consistency and
proud self-consciousness of the destroyed units. But federation shows
another and a better way. The parts are maintained in full national
existence, but in so far as their interests transcend their own
boundaries they are united in one larger state. There is another
advantage, often pointed out by American writers on the subject,
which concerns a country like South Africa, whose boundaries cannot
yet be said to be finally delimited. North of the Zambesi there is a
vast vague region, partly under the High Commissioner, partly
included in British Central Africa, which in time will become
separate colonies, with interests wholly different from the states of
the south. To add a new tract and a novel population to a state is
always a difficult matter, for the existing _regime_ may be most
unsuited for such extension. But it is easy to include a new colony
in a federation. In Mr Bryce's words, federation "permits an
expansion, whose extension and whose rate and manner of progress
cannot be foreseen, to proceed with more variety of methods, more
adaptation of laws and administration to the circumstances of each
part of the territory, and altogether in a more truly natural and
spontaneous way than can be expected under a centralised government.
Thus the special needs of a new _regime_ are met by the inhabitants
in the way they find best; its special evils are met by special
remedies, perhaps more drastic than an old country demands, perhaps
more lax than an old country would tolerate; while at the same time
the spirit of self-reliance among those who build up these new
communities is stimulated and respected."[34]
The need for federation in the case of South Africa is made greater by
the fact that there are one or two burning questions common to all her
states which cannot be satisfactorily settled save by joint action.
Foremost stands the native problem. If there is not some sort of
geographical continuity of policy in the treatment of natives, all our
efforts will be unavailing. The natives of South Africa may be
regarded, among other things, as a great industrial reserve; and if
the policy outlined in another chapter is to be followed, different
labour laws and different methods of taxation may work incalculable
harm. If extravagant inducements to work are held out in the
Transvaal, it will not be long before the labour market is ruined
elsewhere. If an improvident system of taxation exists in Natal, it
may unsettle and discontent other native populations, since it is
highly probable that in the future natives will be less tied to
localities, and will move through the whole country in search of work.
The mining authorities have long recognised the necessity of a single
policy, as is shown by such institutions as the Chamber of Mines and
the Native Labour Association; and it would be odd if in political
questions, where the need is equally urgent, the same truth should be
neglected. In connection with natives the control of the sale of
intoxicants is another matter of South African importance. It is a
matter on which South Africa is now practically at one; but there are
limits to the prescience of local legislation and local officials,
and it may easily happen that an inadequate law inadequately
administered in one colony may undo most of the good that an
energetic administration is attempting in another. If identity of
policy, again, is indispensable in relation to the subject races, the
same identity is most desirable in those inter-racial questions
between white men which will long have their place in South African
politics. An unwise treatment of the Dutch population in the Cape
will infallibly react on the new colonies. Any one who knows the way
in which Cape precedents in this connection are quoted in the
Transvaal, just as Transvaal precedents were quoted before the war in
the Cape, will recognise the difficulty which the present disunion
creates. In educational matters, such as the proportion of time
devoted to the teaching of the Dutch language, while every colony
must necessarily decide for itself, there is great need of one
controlling authority to supervise and direct. There is, again, the
question of permit law and the exclusion of undesirables, and the
kindred matter of the position of the imperial forces. A lax permit
law in one colony nullifies all the strictness of its neighbours.
Army questions--whatever the future position of the South African
force--will always have an intercolonial significance, for the
different troops are under one commander-in-chief, they will meet for
training and manoeuvres, and they are part of one general scheme of
imperial defence. In some questions an attempt at co-operation has
already been made,--in railway conferences and customs unions,--but
it is obviously a clumsy method which proceeds from conference
agreements to ratification by the several legislatures; and many
important and difficult questions will go on arising from day to day
which will be decided in quite different ways by local authorities,
to the confusion of all and the increase of unnecessary distinctions.
Lastly, there are a number of lesser matters, of which veterinary and
game regulations may be taken as the type, whose treatment, to be
satisfactory, must be governed by a common principle and in the hands
of a common executive.
Such are a few of the practical reasons for federation. There is a
deeper reason based on the future of our colonial system. South Africa
at the present moment is deeply cleft by gulfs of race, fiscal policy,
imperial attachment. There will always be within her bounds a party,
not perhaps a very important or very intelligent party, made up of
those to whom the British tie is galling and the tradition of kinship
mere foolishness. If the present particularism is allowed to remain
unreformed, it may easily happen that in this colony or that some turn
of the political wheel may give such a party an authoritative voice,
and the result may be the beginning of endless misunderstandings, and
in the end the creation of an impassable gulf. It is because South
Africa as a whole is so unswerving in her loyalty that it is wise to
create some united authority representing the whole land, and looking
at this great question from a high standpoint, which can provide
against the parochialism of a party and the accidental caprice of a
state. This feeling is strong among the English inhabitants of the new
colonies, and is, I believe, destined to grow in width and strength
throughout the country, when the fever of reconstruction is at an end
and South Africa has leisure to meditate on her political future.
If we examine present conditions we can discern, to borrow the common
metaphor of writers on federation, both centripetal and centrifugal
tendencies. To begin with, the constitutional framework exists. The
head of a federation is already at hand in the High Commissioner, in
whom is vested the government of all South Africa apart from the
self-governing colonies. It was the custom formerly to combine this
office with the governorship of the Cape: for the moment it is joined
with the governorship of the Transvaal and the Orange River Colony.
With the present narrow definition of the High Commissioner's duties,
it is right that this should be so; but there is no constitutional
reason why he should not be a separate official. It has never been a
popular office with self-governing colonies, who dislike the idea that
the governorship should have in one of its aspects powers over which
the colony has no control; but this objection could not arise to the
head of a federal government. By the letters patent of 1900 the High
Commissioner is invested with the control of the South African
Constabulary in the new colonies and the administration of the Central
South African railways, and he is empowered to call together
conferences of the self-governing colonies for the discussion of
common problems. Here is already existing the administrative machinery
of a federation. The rock on which many federal enterprises have split
is the election of the supreme head, and in most systems it is the
weakest point. But South Africa is saved this part of the problem. She
has a supreme federal office, which has existed for more than twenty
years, and with the slightest alteration of functions the High
Commissionership could be transformed into a Federal Viceroyalty.
South Africa, again, is for all practical purposes a geographical
whole. The vast tableland which makes up nine-tenths of it has
almost everywhere uniform climatic conditions, and the strips of
coast land have among themselves a comparatively uniform character,
so that two types may be said to exhaust its geographical and
climatic features. There is no distinction so radical as between the
Atlantic states and Texas or between Nebraska and the Pacific
seaboard. This physical harmony prevents any natural cleavages, such
as impassable mountain-ranges or large navigable rivers; and it
imposes upon the inhabitants uniformity in modes of travel, and in
the simpler conditions of life. If we look at the people of the
several states we find a common nationality--or rather a common
admixture of nationalities. The English proportion may be much higher
in Natal and the eastern province of Cape Colony, the Dutch in the
western province and the Orange River Colony; but everywhere there is
the same divided race, and in consequence kindred political problems.
There is, further, one supreme Imperial Government for all, one
constitutional tradition to provide, as it were, a background to local
politics and a basis for federation. There are common dangers from
invasion, against which all the colonies are protected by one navy.
Subject to minor local differences, there is a common structure
observable in the constitutions of the several self-governing colonies
to which the Transvaal and Orange River Colony will no doubt in time
approximate. Many of the most vital problems are the same for the
whole of South Africa,--the control and the civilisation of the
natives, the amalgamation of the two white races, the conservation of
water, the protection against pests and stock diseases. Two of the
most important administrative departments have already a common basis,
if they are still far from complete union. All South African railway
systems, now that the old Beira line has been relaid, have the same
gauge, their rolling stock is interchangeable, officials pass readily
from one system to another, and by means of railway conferences
attempts have been made to arrive at a common understanding on railway
policy. Finally, all South Africa is now united in one Customs Union.
But if the centripetal elements,[35] which make for federation, are
numerous and potent, disjunctive and centrifugal forces also exist,
though they create no difficulties which a patient statesmanship could
not surmount. The obvious historical and racial differences between
the colonies may be neglected, for, though on one side a force of
separation, they are in another and more important aspect an agency
for union, since they create a problem which in some form or other
every colony has to meet. The primary disruptive force is economic.
The interests, the material interests, of the population of each
colony are widely different. In Cape Colony, on the whole, the farming
interest predominates, though there, again, there is an internal
distinction between the aims of the vine-growing and agricultural
south-west and the pastoral north and east. Natal, so far as it is not
a huge forwarding agency, is also based on agriculture. The Orange
River Colony, though it has a respectable mining interest, is, and
will doubtless remain, pre-eminently a pastoral state. The development
of Rhodesia is not yet quite apparent, but it is probable that it will
end by having a mining and a farming interest of about equal strength.
But the Transvaal is overwhelmingly industrial both in population and
prospects. In time, no doubt, Transvaal agriculture will play an
important part, but the main asset of the colony must long be found
in her mines, and the subsidiary industries created by them, which
will be left as a legacy when the reefs are worked out to the last
pennyweight. That is to say, in South Africa there are three colonies
where the predominant interest is agricultural,--one in which the
mining and farming interests are likely to be evenly matched, and one,
the richest and therefore not the least important, in which the mining
interest casts all others into the shade. It is obvious that economic
policy will vary greatly in each, even in those general matters which
would naturally fall under the survey of a federal government. The
bias of the agricultural colonies is towards protection; the absolute
necessity of Rhodesia and the Transvaal is free trade or a near
approach to it. The industrial population of the Rand must have food
at a reasonable price, else the labour bill will wipe off the profits
of the mines, and to secure this cheap food, taking into consideration
the long railway freights, entry at the coast free of duty is desired.
So too with the raw material of mining: any taxation of such imports
is directly inimical to the prosperity of South Africa's foremost
industry. On the other hand, the coast farmers have good grounds to
complain. They look to the Rand for their market, and unless they are
to be secured from the competition of lands like the Argentine, where
food-stuffs can be grown almost as a waste product, they will grumble
against any rebate of coast duties.
The deadlock might be final were it not for the geographical position
of the Transvaal. Had she a port of her own she might well decline any
federation, and continue to import on her own terms, leaving the other
colonies to make the best of it. But, as things stand, she has to
bring in most of her imports through ports in the coast colonies, and
for a large part of the distance over their lines of railway. Were
this, again, a full statement of the case, the Transvaal might be at
the mercy of the other colonies, and be compelled to accept their
terms or starve. But fortunately the Transvaal, while not in a
position to dictate absolutely, has a card of her own by which she can
command reasonable treatment. She can import by the much shorter line
from Delagoa Bay, and she is contemplating the construction of an
alternative line to the same port. These two lines, when completed,
will make her virtually independent of the coast colonies, provided--a
provision which there seems no reason to doubt--a good understanding
is maintained with Portugal. Clearly some _modus vivendi_ must be
arrived at if there is not to be an endless friction, which can only
result in inconvenience to the interior colony and great financial
loss to the coast.[36]
This chief centrifugal force, divergence of economic interests,
becomes, therefore, in practice a powerful centripetal force, the
chief lever of federation. Some kind of harmony must be attained; the
only question is whether this agreement is to be partial and temporary
or thorough and final. Federation, while on its practical side a
familiar policy to all classes in South Africa, is still in its
political aspect a little strange to men's minds, smacking somewhat of
constitutional doctrinairedom. When we are dealing with self-governing
colonies, there can be no question of imposing it as a mandate from
above: to be effective and permanent it must come from within, a
proposal based on a national conviction. There was, indeed, a time in
the last year of the war when Cape Colony lay in the throes of
disruption, and her wisest citizens were weary of the vagaries of her
politics; when Natal was acquiescent, and when the new colonies were
still a battlefield. It seemed to many that then a federation might
have been imposed with the consent of most thinking men. But the
moment passed; local politics were restored to their old activity, and
the opportunity for imperial interference was gone. A federal movement
must therefore advance slowly and circumspectly, and be content with
small beginnings, lest any hint of coercion should drive the units
still farther apart.
There is no argument so convincing as success, and a satisfactory
federation in miniature would go far to prepare the way for the larger
scheme. Fortunately we have one sphere where experiments towards
federation can be given a fair trial. The Transvaal and the Orange
River Colony are under one governor and the same system of government.
Though they have many points of difference, they have also many common
problems which are even now dealt with by one central authority. The
South African Constabulary in the two colonies is one force under one
Inspector-General. The Central South African railways, which control
the whole railway system, are under one Railway Commissioner and one
General Manager. Education is under one Director of Education. In
addition to this departmental union, the two colonies are subject to
one common debt, the Guaranteed Loan. The War Debt lies for the
present wholly on the Transvaal;[37] but the loan for reconstruction
is devoted to purposes common to both, and they are jointly and
severally liable for its interest and redemption. If the Orange River
Colony were to pay its fair share of the interest--having regard to
the capital expenditure apportioned to it--it would be bankrupt
to-morrow. It must either pay a great deal less than its due, or some
arrangement must be arrived at by which there is no fixed apportionment
of either interest or capital, but the whole debt is administered
jointly, and charged upon certain common properties.
The method adopted has been fully explained in another chapter. Here
it will be sufficient to point out the federal consequences of the
arrangement. If the railways, the South African Constabulary, and all
common services are to be charged to one common budget, and subjected
to a common administration, then some kind of common council must be
established with a share of both legislative and executive powers. It
would be necessary to give this council, or some committee of it, the
final decision in railway administration, to grant it power to operate
upon railway profits, and to make grants for the services of the loan,
and for other services placed under its authority, without reference
to the councils of the separate colonies. Such powers have not been
unknown in constitutional history, and Austro-Hungary furnishes an
instructive precedent. There we find a common executive, not
responsible to either of the two Parliaments, for such common
interests as foreign affairs, the army, and imperial finance. On most
matters connected with these common interests the separate Parliaments
legislate; but the voting of money for common purposes and the control
of the common executive is placed in the hands of the famous
Delegations, which are appointed by the two Parliaments. The position
is, therefore, that there is a common Ministry for Finance, War, and
Foreign Affairs, controlled by the Delegations, and working on funds
voted and appropriated by the Delegations. This power of appropriation
without ratification by the separate colonies is the essence of the
new council, which is thus, to continue the parallel, a compound of
the Delegations and the Common Ministry of Austro-Hungary. Certain
funds are ear-marked for its use, and its deficits, if any, will be
met by contributions, in certain fixed proportions, from the
treasuries of the two colonies; while its surplus, if it is ever
fortunate enough to have one, will be divided, in whole or in part,
between the two colonies, going as a matter of fact to assist in
meeting the charges of the War Debt. It has an administrative control
over all existing common services, and any other which may be
subsequently put under its charge by the local legislatures.
Such a council obviously falls far short of a true federation. It is
primarily a financial expedient to provide a simple and effective
machinery for administering somewhat complicated finances. But it is a
step, and a considerable step, in the right direction. Its executive
functions are concerned with truly federal matters; and its powers of
acting alone in questions of administration, and of voting and
appropriating funds without reference to the separate legislatures, is
a recognition of the central doctrine of federation. Indeed at the
present moment the two new colonies have a _de facto_ federal
government. The grant to the new council of legislative powers on
matters of common interest, and the corresponding limitation of the
powers of the separate legislatures, would establish a complete _de
jure_ federation. There is no reason why this goal should not soon be
reached. The two colonies are bound together by many ties,--above
all, by that most stringent bond, a common debt. For three years they
have been administered by one governor. Though there may be symptoms
of local jealousy in both, there can be no real popular objection, as
there is no logical reason, against their federation.
But while the new colonies present a simple problem, the extension of
the policy to the self-governing colonies requires delicate and
cautious handling. If the limited federation be a success, it will
have the power of a good example, especially since there are many
throughout South Africa to seize and emphasise the lesson. Meantime
other agencies are at work for union. The Bloemfontein Conference of
March 1903, which, in addition to settling a customs' tariff and
recommending a preferential policy for British goods, passed
resolutions on certain questions, such as native affairs, of wide
South African interest, is the type of that informal advisory union
which may well come into being at once. The appointment, further, of a
South African committee to investigate some of the more vexed and
obscure details of native policy, is another step in the same
direction. The new colonies, which contain the chief motive force for
South Africa's future, must give the lead. They hold in their hands
the guide-ropes, for federation may be said to depend upon the
development of two problems--the racial and the economic; and both
reach their typical form in the new colonies. In these questions are
involved the chief grounds of separation and the chief impulses towards
union, and according as the new colonies settle them within their own
bounds will arise the need and desire for a more comprehensive
settlement.
The type of federation which South Africa may adopt will, no doubt,
vary considerably from most historical precedents. It should in
certain respects be more rigid, since, apart from a few outstanding
troubles, there are no permanent differences between the parts. In
certain respects, too, it should be more elastic, for a federated
South Africa would be not only a substantive state, but a member of a
greater system, and some of the old free colonial traditions which
pertain to that system should be left to the federated units. It is a
vain task at this stage to attempt the outlines of a scheme, since the
foundations are not yet fully apparent. Needs which are now in embryo
will be factors to be reckoned with when the time is ripe, and perhaps
some of the forces which seem to us to-day to dominate all else will
have disappeared or decreased in strength. There is a wealth of
historical precedent for South African statesmen to follow; for, apart
from the United States and sundry European parallels, there are two
types of federation within the colonial system--the Dominion of Canada
and the recently created Australian Commonwealth. Between them these
two cases provide a most complete parallel for South Africa. In Canada
there was a distinction of races not less marked than Dutch and
English. There was, further, an imperfectly explored hinterland which
the colonists looked to bring by degrees under the same constitution.
In Australia there were grave intercolonial disputes on railways and
customs and a wide divergence of economic interests. A keen jealousy
was felt by the smaller for the larger states, and the scheme of
federation had to be delicately framed to adjust state pride with
federal requirements. On the whole, the difficulties which the
framers of the federal constitution had to face in Canada and
Australia were greater than we find in South Africa: in the United
States, immeasurably greater. But often the probability of federation
stands in inverse ratio to the ease with which it can be effected,
and the very simplicity of this South African problem may delay its
settlement. There are, however, forces which must between them hasten
the end. One is the economic disparity, at least as great as in
Australia and greater than in Canada, which makes itself felt so
constantly in the daily life of the inland colonies, that they may
find themselves compelled to push the matter in spite of the apathy
of the coast. The other is the very real national sentiment which is
growing to maturity in the country. The war has welded the English
inhabitants into something approaching a nation. Having suffered so
deeply, they are the less prone to local jealousies and the more
attached to the ideal of imperial unity.
A scheme of South African federation, as has been said, will have to
differ materially from any of the existing types. Though details are
premature, certain principles may be accepted as essential. The first
concerns the subjects relegated to the Federal Government. In the
United States these are, roughly, foreign affairs, the army and navy,
federal courts of justice, commerce, currency, the post office, certain
general branches of commercial law, such as copyrights and patents, an
oversight of the separate states to protect the inhabitants against any
infringement of the fundamental rights granted by the constitution, and
taxation for federal purposes. Several of these functions are needless
in a federation of English colonies. Foreign affairs and army and navy
questions assume a different form from what they present in a wholly
separate community; and since there is no _Grondwet_ known to English
constitutional law, there is no need for an oversight of the separate
states in case of its infringement. That is already provided for by the
ultimate right of the British Crown to annul legislation which may
conflict with the chartered rights or limitations of a colony. But
there are certain powers, not referred to in the American scheme,
which are essential to a modern system. Railways, telephones, and
telegraphs should come under the purview of the national Government,
as also all customs tariffs and all bounties which may be granted on
production. Powers must be given to the national Government to take
over the existing debts of the separate states, and in times of
financial distress to come to their assistance. On judicial and legal
questions--the nature of the federal courts, the mechanism of appeal,
the branches of law which are suitable for federal jurisdiction--it is
impossible to speak; as it is premature to attempt an outline of the
constitution of the federal Government, the form of its legislation,
the functions of its executive. Such questions require long and
careful consideration on the part of the South African colonies, and
may happily take their colour, when the time arrives, from some
accepted scheme of imperial federation. Two points only may be noted
as even now obvious desiderata of policy. In Canada the state
governors are appointed by the federal Ministry; in Australia they are
nominated by the Crown in the same way as the Governor-General.
Experience has shown that the Australian method is the superior one,
since it allows a state governor and his ministers to communicate
directly with the imperial Government, and so preserve a formal
independence which is at once harmless and grateful to state pride. It
is impossible to doubt that the Australian precedent should be
followed in South Africa. The second point concerns the method of
effecting federation. The Canadian scheme was based on resolutions
drafted by a conference of delegates at Quebec. They were approved by
the legislatures of the provinces, embodied in a bill drafted by a
committee of Canadian statesmen, and passed by the imperial Government.
Federation was thus, as in the United States, the work of conferences
and legislatures alone. Australia, recognising that this was a question
which deeply concerned the population of the colonies, followed a
better plan. The federal constitution, after passing through a long
period of conferences and examinations by state legislatures, was
submitted to a direct popular vote, and a certain majority was
prescribed for it in each state. Such a federation, secured by the
consent of a whole people, has a stability against future attacks and
captious emendation which belongs to no scheme sanctioned only by a
legislative body. For though popular representation is in theory a
representation for all things, yet a matter so vital in its application
and so far-reaching in its issues deserves to be made the subject of a
special mandate.
I have said that foreign affairs and army and navy questions do not,
under the ordinary practice of the colonial system, have much
connection with colonial governments, and therefore may be left out of
most federal proposals. But though the technical last word may never
lie with the Federal Government, yet a South African federation would
have genuine foreign interests, and would keep a watchful eye on the
movements of the colonising Powers of Europe. Had there been a
federation, there would have been no German acquisition of Damaraland,
nor would we have found imperial authorities refusing the offer of
Lourenco Marques for a trifling sum. No colonist can ever quite
forgive those memorable blunders, which prevented British South Africa
from having that geographical unity from the Zambesi to the Cape which
its interests demand. Thirty years ago it would have been easy for
Britain to proclaim a Monroe doctrine for South Africa--for that
matter of it, for East Africa also. The opportunity has passed, but a
strong national Government could still exercise great influence on
foreign affairs, and prevent encroachment upon Portuguese territories
by that Power which twenty years ago saw in Africa material for a new
German Empire and has never forgotten its grandiose dreams, as well as
keep an eye upon that dangerous mushroom growth, the Congo Free State,
and check its glaring offences against civilisation. Army and navy
questions belong, in their broadest sense, to schemes of imperial
federation, a discussion of which here would be out of place; but
since there is already in South Africa a large military force under
one commander-in-chief, certain army questions arise which may find
their proper answer only in federation, but which even now require a
provisional settlement. According as we treat the matter, it may
become a unifying or a violently disjunctive force, a step towards
federation or a movement towards a wider disintegration. The bearing
of the army question on South African policy is the subject of another
chapter.
[34] American Commonwealth, vol. i. p. 465.
[35] The grounds of Australian federation are a useful
parallel for South Africa. I give Mr Bryce's list
('Studies in History and Jurisprudence,' vol. i. p.
478): "The gain to trade and the general convenience to
be expected from abolishing the tariffs established on
the frontiers of each colony; the need for a common
system of military defence; the advantages of a common
legislature for the regulation of railways and the
fixing of railway rates; the advantages of a common
control of the larger rivers for the purposes both of
navigation and irrigation; the need for uniform
legislation on a number of commercial topics; the
importance of finding an authority competent to provide
for old-age pensions and for the settlement of labour
disputes all over the country; the need for uniform
provision against the entry of coloured races
(especially Chinese, Malays, and Indian coolies); the
gain to suitors from the establishment of a High Court
to entertain appeals and avoid the expense and delay
involved in carrying cases to the Privy Council in
England; the probability that money could be borrowed
more easily on the credit of the Australian Federation
than by each colony for itself; the stimulus to be given
to industry and trade by substituting one great
community for six smaller ones; the possibility of
making better arrangements for the disposal of the
unappropriated lands belonging to some of the colonies
than could be made by those colonies for themselves."
[36] A provisional _modus vivendi_ has been found in the new
Customs Union. See p. 238.
[37] There is a contingent liability on the Orange River
Colony to pay a sum of L5,000,000, as its special
contribution, from any profit which may fall to its
Government from the discovery of precious minerals. See
p. 245.