HOWE AGAIN GOES AFLOAT. THE FINAL RELIEF OF GIBRALTAR
1782
The fall of Lord North's Ministry, besides occasioning the recall
of Rodney, drew Lord Howe out of his long retirement, to command the
Channel Fleet. He hoisted his flag on the 20th of April, 1782, on
board the _Victory_, 100. Owing to the various directions in which
the efforts of Great Britain had to be made, either to defend her own
interests or to crush the movements of the many enemies now combined
against her, the operations of the Channel fleet were for some months
carried on by detached squadrons,--in the North Sea, in the Bay
of Biscay, and at the entrance of the Channel; Howe having under
him several distinguished subordinates, at the head of whom, in
professional reputation, were Vice-Admiral Barrington, the captor of
Santa Lucia, and Rear-Admiral Kempenfelt. In the North Sea, the Dutch
were kept in their ports; and a convoy of near 400 merchant ships
from the Baltic reached England unmolested. In the Bay of Biscay,
Barrington, having with him twelve of the line, discovered and chased
a convoy laden with stores for the fleet in the East Indies. One of
the ships of the line accompanying it, the _Pégase_, 74, surrendered,
after a night action of three hours with the _Foudroyant_, 80, Captain
John Jervis, afterwards Earl St. Vincent. Of nineteen transports,
thirteen, one of which, the _Actionnaire_, was a 64-gun ship armed
_en flûte_,[133] were taken; a weighty blow to the great Suffren,
whose chief difficulty in India was inadequate material of war, and
especially of spars, of which the _Actionnaire_ carried an outfit for
four ships of the line. After Barrington's return, Kempenfelt made a
similar but uneventful cruise of a month in the Bay.
Howe himself went first to the North Sea in the month of May. Having
there held the Dutch in check during a critical moment, he was
directed next to go to the entrance of the Channel, leaving only a
division in the Downs. Information had been received that an allied
fleet of thirty-two ships of the line, five only of which were
French, had sailed from Cadiz early in June, to cruise between Ushant
and Scilly. It was expected that they would be joined there by a
reinforcement from Brest, and by the Dutch squadron in the Texel,
making a total of about fifty of the line, under the command of the
Spanish Admiral, Don Luis de Cordova. The Dutch did not appear, owing
probably to Howe's demonstration before their ports; but eight ships
from Brest raised the allied fleet to forty. To oppose these Howe
sailed on the 2d of July with twenty-two sail, of which eight were
three-deckers. Before his return, in the 7th of August, he was joined
by eight others; mostly, however, sixty-fours. With this inferiority
of numbers the British Admiral could expect only to act on the
defensive, unless some specially favourable opportunity should offer.
The matter of most immediate concern was the arrival of the Jamaica
convoy, then daily expected; with which, it may be mentioned, de
Grasse also was returning to England, a prisoner of war on board the
_Sandwich_.
On its voyage north, the allied fleet captured on June 25th eighteen
ships of a British convoy bound for Canada. A few days later it was
fixed in the chops of the Channel, covering the ground from Ushant
to Scilly. On the evening of July 7th it was sighted off Scilly by
Howe, who then had with him twenty-five sail. The allies prepared for
action; but the British Admiral, possessing a thorough knowledge of
the neighbouring coasts, either in his own person or in some of his
officers, led the fleet by night to the westward through the passage
between Scilly and Land's End. On the following morning he was no more
to be seen, and the enemy, ignorant of the manner of his evasion, was
thrown wholly off his track.[134] Howe met the convoy; and a strong
gale of wind afterwards forcing the allies to the southward, both it
and the fleet slipped by successfully, and reached England.
Howe was ordered now to prepare to throw reinforcements and supplies
into Gibraltar, which had not received relief since Darby's visit, in
April, 1781. For this urgent and critical service it was determined
to concentrate the whole Channel Fleet at Spithead, where also the
transports and supply-ships were directed to rendezvous. It was while
thus assembling for the relief of Gibraltar that there occurred the
celebrated incident of the _Royal George_, a 100-gun ship, while
being heeled for under-water repairs, oversetting and sinking at her
anchors, carrying down with her Rear-Admiral Kempenfelt and about nine
hundred souls, including many women and children. This was on the 29th
of August, 1782. On the 11th of September the expedition started, one
hundred and eighty-three sail in all; thirty-four being ships of the
line, with a dozen smaller cruisers, the rest unarmed vessels. Of the
latter, thirty-one were destined for Gibraltar, the remainder being
trading ships for different parts of the world. With so extensive a
charge, the danger to which had been emphasised by numerous captures
from convoys during the war, Howe's progress was slow. It is told that
shortly before reaching Cape Finisterre, but after a violent gale of
wind, the full tally of one hundred eighty-three sail was counted.
After passing Finisterre, the several "trades" probably parted from
the grand fleet.
On the 8th of October, off Cape St. Vincent, a frigate was sent ahead
for information. It was known that a great combined force of ships
of war lay in Algeciras Bay,--opposite Gibraltar,--and that an attack
upon the works was in contemplation; but much might have happened
meantime. Much, in fact, had happened. A violent gale of wind on
the 10th of September had driven some of the allied fleet from their
moorings, one vessel, the _San Miguel_, 72, being forced under the
batteries of Gibraltar, where she had to surrender; but there still
remained the formidable number of forty-eight ships of the line,
anchored only four miles from the point which the relief ships must
reach. This was the problem which Howe had to solve. More important
still, though of less bearing upon his mission, was the cheering news
brought by the frigate, when she rejoined on October 10th, that the
long-intended attack had been made on the 13th of September, and had
been repelled gloriously and decisively. The heavily protected Spanish
floating batteries, from which success had been expected confidently,
one and all had been set on fire and destroyed. If Howe could
introduce his succours, the fortress was saved.
The admiral at once summoned his subordinate officers, gave them
full and particular instructions for the momentous undertaking, and
issued at the same time, to the masters of the supply-ships, precise
information as to local conditions of wind and currents at Gibraltar,
to enable them more surely to reach their anchorage. On the 11th of
October, being now close to its destination, the fleet bore up for
the Straits, which it entered at noon with a fair westerly wind. The
convoy went first,--sailing before the wind it was thus to leeward
of the fleet, in a position to be defended,--and the ships of war
followed at some distance in three divisions, one of which was led
by Howe himself. At 6 P.M. the supply-ships were off the mouth of
the Bay, with a wind fair for the mole; but, through neglect of the
instructions given, all but four missed the entrance, and were swept
to the eastward of the Rock, whither the fleet of course had to follow
them.
On the 13th the allied fleets came out, being induced to quit their
commanding position at Algeciras by fears for two of their number,
which shortly before had been driven to the eastward. During the
forenoon of the same day the British were off the Spanish coast, fifty
miles east of Gibraltar. At sunset the allies were seen approaching,
and Howe formed his fleet, but sent the supply-ships to anchor at
the Zaffarine Islands, on the coast of Barbary, to await events. Next
morning the enemy was close to land northward, but visible only from
the mastheads; the British apparently having headed south during the
night. On the 15th the wind came east, fair for Gibraltar, towards
which all the British began cautiously to move. By the evening of the
16th, eighteen of the convoy were safe at the mole; and on the 18th
all had arrived, besides a fireship with 1,500 barrels of powder, sent
in by the Admiral upon the governor's requisition. Throughout these
critical hours, the combined fleets seem to have been out of sight.
Either intentionally or carelessly, they had got to the eastward and
there remained; having rallied their separated ships, but allowed
Gibraltar to be replenished for a year. On the morning of the 19th
they appeared in the north-east, but the relief was then accomplished
and Howe put out to sea. He was not willing to fight in mid-Straits,
embarrassed by currents and the land; but when outside he
brought-to,--stopped, by backing some of the sails,--to allow the
enemy to attack if they would, they having the weather-gage. On the
following day, the 20th, towards sunset they bore down, and a partial
engagement ensued; but it was wholly indecisive, and next day was not
renewed. The British loss was 68 killed and 208 wounded; that of the
allies 60 killed and 320 wounded. On the 14th of November the fleet
regained Spithead.
The services rendered to his country by Howe on this occasion were
eminently characteristic of the special qualities of that great
officer, in whom was illustrated to the highest degree the solid
strength attainable by a man not brilliant, but most able, who gives
himself heart and soul to professional acquirement. In him, profound
and extensive professional knowledge, which is not inborn but gained,
was joined to great natural staying powers; and the combination
eminently fitted him for the part we have seen him play in Delaware
Bay, at New York, before Rhode Island, in the Channel, and now at
Gibraltar. The utmost of skill, the utmost of patience, the utmost of
persistence, such had Howe; and having these, he was particularly apt
for the defensive operations, upon the conduct of which chiefly must
rest his well-deserved renown.
A true and noble tribute has been paid by a French officer to this
relief of Gibraltar:[135]--
"The qualities displayed by Lord Howe during this short
campaign rose to the full height of the mission which he
had to fulfil. This operation, one of the finest in the
War of American Independence, merits a praise equal to
that of a victory. If the English fleet was favoured by
circumstances,--and it is rare that in such enterprises one
can succeed without the aid of fortune--it was above all the
Commander-in-Chief's quickness of perception, the accuracy of
his judgment, and the rapidity of his decisions, that assured
success."
To this well-weighed, yet lofty praise of the Admiral, the same writer
has added words that the British Navy may remember long with pride,
as sealing the record of this war, of which the relief of Gibraltar
marked the close in European and American waters. After according
credit to the Admiralty for the uniform high speed of the British
vessels, and to Howe for his comprehension and use of this advantage,
Captain Chevalier goes on:--
"Finally, if we may judge by the results, the
Commander-in-Chief of the English fleet could not but think
himself most happy in his captains. There were neither
separations, nor collisions, nor casualties; and there
occurred none of those events, so frequent in the experiences
of a squadron, which often oblige admirals to take a course
wholly contrary to the end they have in view. In contemplation
of this unvexed navigation of Admiral Howe, it is impossible
not to recall the unhappy incidents which from the 9th to the
12th of April befell the squadron of the Count de Grasse....
If it is just to admit that Lord Howe displayed the highest
talent, it should be added that he had in his hands excellent
instruments."
To quote another French writer: "Quantity disappeared before quality."
[Footnote 133: That is, with a great part of her guns dismounted, and
below as cargo.]
[Footnote 134: Chevalier, following La Motte-Picquet's report,
ascribes Howe's escape to greater speed. ("Mar. Fran. en 1778," p.
335.) It must be noted that Howe's object was not merely to escape
eastward, up Channel, by better sailing, but to get to the westward,
_past_ the allies, a feat impracticable save by a stratagem such as is
mentioned.]
[Footnote 135: Chevalier, "Mar. Fran, dans la Guerre de 1778," p.
358.]