THE NAVAL OPERATIONS IN THE EAST INDIES, 1778-1783. THE CAREER OF THE
BAILLI DE SUFFREN
The operations in India, both naval and military, stand by themselves,
without direct influence upon transactions elsewhere, and unaffected
also by these, except in so far as necessary succours were intercepted
sometimes in European waters. The cause of this isolation was the
distance of India from Europe; from four to six months being required
by a fleet for the voyage.
[Illustration]
Certain intelligence of the war between Great Britain and France
reached Calcutta July 7th, 1778. On the same day the Governor-General
ordered immediate preparations to attack Pondicherry, the principal
seaport of the French. The army arrived before the place on the 8th
of August, and on the same day Commodore Sir Edward Vernon anchored
in the roads to blockade by sea. A French squadron, under Captain
Tronjoly, soon after appearing in the offing, Vernon gave chase, and
on the 10th an action ensued. The forces engaged were about equal, the
French, if anything, slightly superior; a 60-gun ship and four smaller
vessels being on each side. As the French then went into Pondicherry,
the immediate advantage may be conceded to them; but, Vernon returning
on the 20th, Tronjoly soon after quitted the roads, and returned to
the Ile de France.[136] From that day the British squadron blockaded
closely, and on the 17th of October Pondicherry capitulated.
On the 7th of March, 1779, Rear-Admiral Sir Edward Hughes sailed
for the East Indies with a small squadron. The French also sent out
occasional ships; but in 1779 and 1780 these went no further than the
Ile de France, their naval station in the Indian Ocean. Hughes's force
remained unopposed during those years. The period was critical, for
the British were at war with Hyder Ali, Sultan of Mysore, and with the
Mahrattas; and all depended upon command of the sea. In January, 1781,
when Hughes was wintering at Bombay, the French squadron under Comte
d'Orves appeared off the Coromandel coast, but, despite Hyder Ali's
entreaties, it refused to coöperate with him. The different spirit of
the two commanders may be illustrated from contemporary documents.
"We have advices from Fort St. George of a French squadron
which appeared off that place on January 25, 26, and 27,
consisting of 1 seventy-four, 4 sixty-fours, and 2 fifties.
They proceeded south without making any attempt on five
Indiamen then in the roads, with a number of vessels laden
with grain and provisions; the destroying of which might have
been easily accomplished, and would have been severely felt."
"On December 8th, off Mangalore,"[137] writes Hughes, "I
saw two ships, a large snow, three ketches, and many smaller
vessels at anchor in the road with Hyder's flag flying; and,
standing close, found them vessels of force and all armed for
war. I anchored as close as possible, sent in all armed boats,
under cover of three smaller ships of war, which anchored in
four fathoms water, close to the enemy's ships. In two hours
took and burned the two ships, one of 28 and one of 26 guns,
and took or destroyed all the others, save one which, by
throwing everything overboard, escaped over the bar into the
port. Lost 1 lieutenant and 10 men killed, 2 lieutenants and
51 wounded."
It is interesting to note these evidences of Hughes's conceptions of
naval warfare and enterprise, common though they were to the British
service; for their positive character brings into strong relief the
qualities of his next antagonist, Suffren, and his great superiority
in these respects over the average run of French officers of that day.
D'Orves returned to the Ile de France.
When war with Holland began, the British government decided to attempt
the capture of the Cape of Good Hope. For that object a squadron of
one 74, one 64, and three 50's, with numerous smaller vessels, under
Commodore George Johnstone, convoying a considerable body of troops,
sailed from England on the 13th of March, 1781, in company with the
Channel fleet under Vice-Admiral George Darby, then on its way to
relieve Gibraltar. The French government, having timely notice of the
expedition, undertook to frustrate it; detailing for that purpose
a division of two 74's, and three 64's, under the since celebrated
Suffren.[139] These ships left Brest on the 22d of March, with the
fleet of de Grasse. They also carried some battalions of troops.
On April 11th the British squadron reached Porto Praya, Cape de Verde
Islands. This bay is open to the southward, extending from east
to west about a mile and a half, and is within the limits of the
north-east trade-winds. Although aware that a French division was
on his track, and conscious, by the admissions of his report, that
protection could not be expected from the neutrality of the place,
Johnstone permitted his vessels to anchor without reference to attack.
His own flagship, the _Romney_, 50, was so surrounded by others that
she could fire only with great caution through intervals. On the
16th of April, at 9.30 A.M., the _Isis_, 50, which was the outermost
of the British squadron, signalled eleven sail in the north-east.
Fifteen hundred persons were then ashore engaged in watering, fishing,
embarking cattle, and amusing themselves. The strangers were Suffren's
division. The meeting was not expected by the French commander, whose
object in entering was simply to complete the water of the ships; but
he determined at once to attack, and hauled round the east point of
the bay in column, the two seventy-fours at the head, his own ship,
the _Héros_, leading with the signal for battle (line ab). Passing
through, or along, the disordered enemy until he reached the only
seventy-four among them, he there luffed to the wind, anchoring five
hundred feet from the starboard beam of this vessel (f) which by an
odd coincidence bore the same name--_Hero_. From this position he at
once opened fire from both broadsides. His next astern, the _Annibal_
(b), brought up immediately ahead of him, but so close that the
_Héros_ had to veer cable and drop astern (a), which brought her on
the beam of the _Monmouth_, 64[140] (m). The captain of the _Annibal_
had thought the order for battle merely precautionary, and had not
cleared for action. He was therefore taken unawares, and his ship did
no service proportionate to her force. The third French vessel (c)
reached her station, but her captain was struck dead just when about
to anchor, and in the confusion the anchor was not let go. The ship
drifted foul of a British East Indiaman, which she carried out to sea
(c' c"). The two remaining French (d, e) simply cannonaded as they
passed across the bay's mouth, failing through mishap or awkwardness
to reach an effective position.
[Illustration]
The attack thus became a mere rough and tumble, in which the two
seventy-fours alone sustained the French side. After three quarters
of an hour, Suffren, seeing that the attempt had failed, slipped his
cable and put to sea. The _Annibal_ followed, but she had been so
damaged that all her masts went overboard; fortunately, not until her
head was pointed out of the harbour. Johnstone, thus luckily escaping
the consequences of his neglect, now called his captains together to
learn the condition of their ships, and then ordered them to cut their
cables and pursue. All obeyed except Captain Sutton of the _Isis_, who
represented that the spars and rigging of his ship could not bear sail
at once. Johnstone then ordered him to come out anyhow, which he did,
and his fore topmast shortly went overboard. The disability of this
ship so weighed upon the Commodore that his pursuit was exceedingly
sluggish; and the French kept drawing him away to leeward, the
_Annibal_ having got a bit of canvas on a jury foremast. Night,
therefore, was falling as Johnstone came near them; the _Isis_ and
_Monmouth_ were two or three miles astern; the sea was increasing;
if he got much further to leeward, he could not get back; he had
forgotten to appoint a rendezvous where the convoy might rejoin; a
night action, he considered, was not to be thought of. Yet, if he
let the enemy go, they might anticipate him at the Cape. In short,
Johnstone underwent the "anguish" of an undecided man in a "cruel
situation,"[141] and of course decided to run no risks. He returned
therefore to Porto Praya, put the captain of the _Isis_ under arrest,
and remained in port for a fortnight. Suffren hurried on to the Cape,
got there first, landed his troops, and secured the colony against
attack. Johnstone arrived in the neighbourhood some time later, and,
finding himself anticipated, turned aside to Saldanha Bay, where
he captured five Dutch East Indiamen. He then sent the _Hero_,
_Monmouth_, and _Isis_ on to India, to reinforce Hughes, and himself
went back to England.
No accusation of misbehavior lies against any of the British
subordinates in this affair of Porto Praya. The captain of the _Isis_
was brought to a court-martial, and honourably acquitted of all
the charges. The discredit of the surprise was not redeemed by any
exhibition of intelligence, energy, or professional capacity, on the
part of the officer in charge. It has been said that he never had
commanded a post-ship[142] before he was intrusted with this very
important mission, and it is reasonably sure that his selection for
it was due to attacks made by him upon the professional conduct
of Keppel and Howe, when those admirals were at variance with the
administration.[143] His preposterous mismanagement, therefore, was
probably not wholly bitter to the Navy at large. In the British ships
of war, the entire loss in men, as reported, was only 9 killed, 47
wounded. Several casualties from chance shots occurred on board the
convoy, bringing up the total to 36 killed and 130 wounded. The French
admit 105 killed and 204 wounded, all but 19 being in the _Héros_ and
_Annibal_. Although precipitated by Suffren, the affair clearly was
as great a surprise to his squadron as to the British. Therefore, the
latter, being already at anchor and more numerous as engaged, had a
distinct advantage; to which also contributed musketry fire from the
transports. Nevertheless, the result cannot be deemed creditable to
the French captains or gunnery.
Suffren remained in the neighbourhood of the Cape for two months.
Then, having seen the colony secure, independent of his squadron, he
departed for the Ile de France, arriving there October 25th. On the
17th of December the whole French force, under the command of d'Orves,
sailed for the Coromandel coast. On the way the British 50-gun ship
_Hannibal_, Captain Alexander Christie, was taken. On the 9th of
February, 1782, Comte d'Orves died, and Suffren found himself at
the head of twelve ships of the line: three 74's, seven 64's and two
50's.[144] On the 15th Hughes's fleet was sighted, under the guns of
Madras. It numbered nine of the line: two 74's, one 68, five 64's, and
one 50. Suffren stood south towards Pondicherry, which had passed into
the power of Hyder Ali. After nightfall Hughes got under way, and also
steered south. He feared for Trincomalee, in Ceylon, recently a Dutch
port, which the British had captured on the 5th of January. It was a
valuable naval position, as yet most imperfectly defended.
[Illustration]
At daylight the British saw the French squadron twelve miles east (A,
A) and its transports nine miles south-west (c). Hughes chased the
latter and took six. Suffren pursued, but could not overtake before
sunset, and both fleets steered south-east during the night. Next
morning there were light north-north-east airs, and the French were
six miles north-east of the British (B, B). The latter formed line
on the port tack (a), heading to seaward; Hughes hoping that thus the
usual sea-breeze would find him to windward. The breeze, however, did
not make as expected; and, as the north-east puffs were bringing the
enemy down, he kept off before the wind (b) to gain time for his ships
to close their intervals, which were too great. At 4 P.M. the near
approach of the French compelled him to form line again, (C), on the
port tack, heading easterly. The rear ship, _Exeter_, 64 (e), was left
separated, out of due support from those ahead. Suffren, leading one
section of his fleet in person, passed to windward of the British
line, from the rear, as far as Hughes's flagship, which was fifth from
the van. There he stopped, and kept at half cannon-shot, to prevent
the four ships in the British van from tacking to relieve their
consorts. It was his intention that the second half of his fleet
should attack the other side of the English rear. This plan of
intended battle is shown by the figure D in the diagram. Actually,
only two of the French rear did what Suffren expected, engaging to
leeward of the extreme British rear; the others of the French rear
remaining long out of action (C). The figure C shows the imperfect
achievement of the design D. However, as the position of Suffren's
flagship prevented the British van from tacking into action, the net
result was, to use Hughes's own words, that "the enemy brought eight
of their best ships to the attack of five of ours." It will be noted
with interest that these were exactly the numbers engaged in the first
act of the battle of the Nile. The _Exeter_ (like the _Guerrier_
at the Nile) received the fresh broadsides of the first five of the
enemy, and then remained in close action on both sides, assailed by
two, and at last by three, opponents,--two 50's, and one 64. When the
third approached, the master of the ship asked Commodore Richard King,
whose broad pennant flew at her masthead, "What is to be done?" "There
is nothing to be done," replied King, "but to fight her till she
sinks." Her loss, 10 killed and 45 wounded, was not creditable under
the circumstances to the French gunnery, which had been poor also at
Porto Praya. At 6 P.M. the wind shifted to south-east, throwing all
on the other tack, and enabling the British van at last to come into
action. Darkness now approaching, Suffren hauled off and anchored at
Pondicherry. Hughes went on to Trincomalee to refit. The British loss
had been 32 killed, among whom were Captain William Stevens of the
flagship, and Captain Henry Reynolds, of the _Exeter_, and 83 wounded.
The French had 30 killed; the number of their wounded is put by
Professor Laughton at 100.
On the 12th of March Hughes returned to Madras, and towards the end
of the month sailed again for Trincomalee carrying reinforcements and
supplies. On the 30th he was joined at sea by the _Sultan_, 74, and
the _Magnanime_, 64, just from England. Suffren had remained on the
coast from reasons of policy, to encourage Hyder Ali in his leaning
to the French; but, after landing a contingent of troops on the 22d of
March, to assist at the siege of the British port of Cuddalore, he put
to sea on the 23d, and went south, hoping to intercept the _Sultan_
and _Magnanime_ off the south end of Ceylon. On the 9th of April
he sighted the British fleet to the south and west of him. Hughes,
attaching the first importance to the strengthening of Trincomalee,
had resolved neither to seek nor to shun action. He therefore
continued his course, light northerly airs prevailing, until the 11th,
when, being about fifty miles to the north-east of his port, he bore
away for it. Next morning, April 12th, finding that the enemy could
overtake his rear ships, he formed line on the starboard tack, at
two cables' intervals, heading to the westward, towards the coast
of Ceylon, wind north by east, and the French dead to windward (A,
A). Suffren drew up his line (a) on the same tack, parallel to the
British, and at 11 A.M. gave the signal to steer west-south-west all
together; his vessels going down in a slanting direction (bb'), each
to steer for one of the enemy. Having twelve ships to eleven, the
twelfth was ordered to place herself on the off side of the rear
British, which would thus have two antagonists.
In such simultaneous approach it commonly occurred that the attacking
line ceased to be parallel with the foe's, its van becoming nearer and
rear more distant. So it was here. Further, the British opening fire
as soon as the leading French were within range, the latter at once
hauled up to reply. Suffren, in the centre, wishing closest action,
signalled them to keep away again, and himself bore down wrathfully
upon Hughes to within pistol-shot; in which he was supported closely
by his next ahead and the two next astern. The rear of the French,
though engaged, remained too far distant. Their line, therefore,
resembled a curve, the middle of which--four or five ships--was
tangent to the British centre (B). At this point the heat of the
attack fell upon Hughes's flagship, the _Superb_, 74 (C, d), and her
next ahead, the _Monmouth_, 64. Suffren's ship, the _Héros_, having
much of her rigging cut, could not shorten sail, shot by the _Superb_,
and brought up abreast the _Monmouth_. The latter, already hotly
engaged by one of her own class, and losing her main and mizzen masts
in this unequal new contest, was forced at 3 P.M. to bear up out of
the line (m). The place of the _Héros_ alongside the _Superb_ was
taken by the _Orient_, 74, supported by the _Brillant_, 64; and when
the _Monmouth_ kept off, the attack of these two ships was reinforced
by the half-dozen stern chasers of the _Héros_, which had drifted into
the British line, and now fired into the _Superb's_ bows. The conflict
between these five ships, two British and three French, was one of the
bloodiest in naval annals; the loss of the _Superb_, 59 killed and 96
wounded, and of the _Monmouth_, 45 killed and 102 wounded, equalling
that of the much larger vessels which bore the flags of Nelson and
Collingwood at Trafalgar. The loss of the three French was 52 killed
and 142 wounded; but to this should be added properly that of the
_Sphinx_, 64, the _Monmouth's_ first adversary: 22 killed and 74
wounded. At 3.40 P.M., fearing that if he continued steering west he
would get entangled with the shore, Hughes wore his ships, forming
line on the port tack, heading off shore. The French also wore, and
Suffren hoped to secure the _Monmouth_, which was left between the two
lines; but the quickness of a British captain, Hawker, of the _Hero_,
ran a tow-rope to her in time, and she was thus dragged out of danger.
At 5.40 Hughes anchored, and Suffren did the same at 8 P.M. The total
British loss in men on this occasion was 137 killed and 430 wounded;
that of the French 137 killed, and 357 wounded.
[Illustration]
The exhausted enemies remained at anchor in the open sea, two miles
apart, for a week, repairing. On the 19th of April the French got
under way and made a demonstration before the British, inviting
battle, yet not attacking; but the condition of the _Monmouth_ forbade
Hughes from moving. Suffren therefore departed to Batacalo, in Ceylon,
south of Trincomalee, where he covered his own convoys from Europe,
and flanked the approach of his adversary's. Hughes, on the 22d of
April, got into Trincomalee, where he remained till June 23d. He then
went to Negapatam, formerly a Dutch possession, but then held by the
British. There he learned that Suffren, who meanwhile had captured
several British transports, was a few miles north of him, at
Cuddalore, which had surrendered to Hyder Ali on April 4th. On the 5th
of July, at 1 P.M., the French squadron appeared. At 3 P.M. Hughes
put to sea, and stood south during the night to gain the wind,--the
south-west monsoon now blowing.
Next morning, at daylight, the French were seen at anchor, seven or
eight miles to leeward. At 6 A.M. they began to get under way. One of
their sixty-fours, the _Ajax_, had lost her main and mizzen topmasts
in a violent squall on the previous afternoon, and was not in the
line. There were therefore eleven ships on each side. The action,
known as that of Negapatam, began shortly before 11, when both fleets
were on the starboard tack, heading south-south-east, wind south-west.
The British being to windward, Hughes ordered his fleet to bear up
together to the attack, exactly as Suffren had done on the 12th of
April. As commonly happened, the rear got less close than the van
(Position I). The fourth ship in the French order, the _Brillant_, 64
(a), losing her mainmast early, dropped to leeward of the line, (a'),
and astern of her place (a"). At half-past noon the wind flew suddenly
to south-south-east,--the sea-breeze,--taking the ships a little on
the port bow. Most of them, on both sides, paid off from the enemy,
the British to starboard, the French to port; but between the main
lines, which were in the momentary confusion consequent upon such
an incident, were left six ships--four British and two French--that
had turned the other way (Positions II and III).[145] These were the
_Burford_, _Sultan_ (s), _Worcester_, and _Eagle_, fourth, fifth,
eighth and tenth, in the British order; and the _Sévère_ (b), third
in the French, with the dismasted _Brillant_, which was now towards
the rear of the fight (a). Under these conditions, the _Sévère_, 64,
underwent a short but close action with the _Sultan_, 74; and with
two other British ships, according to the report of the _Sévère's_
captain. The remainder of the incident shall be given in the latter's
own words.
"Seeing the French squadron drawing off,--for all the
ships except the _Brillant_ had fallen off on the other
tack,--Captain de Cillart thought it useless to prolong his
defence, and had the flag hauled down. The ships engaged
with him immediately ceased their fire, and the one on the
starboard side moved away. At this moment the _Sévère_ fell
off to starboard, and her sails filled. Captain de Cillart
then ordered the fire to be resumed by his lower-deck guns,
the only ones which remained manned, and he rejoined his
squadron."
When the _Sévère's_ flag came down, Suffren was approaching with his
flagship. The _Sultan_ wore to rejoin her fleet, and was raked by the
_Sévère_ in so doing. The _Brillant_, whose mainmast had been shot
away in conflict with either the _Sultan_ or the _Burford_, both much
heavier ships, had at this later phase of the fight fallen under the
guns of the _Worcester_ and the _Eagle_. Her captain, de Saint-Félix,
was one of the most resolute of Suffren's officers. She was rescued by
the flagship, but she had lost 47 killed and 136 wounded,--an almost
incredible slaughter, being over a third of the usual complement of a
sixty-four; and Suffren's ships were undermanned.
These spirited episodes, and the fact that his four separated ships
were approaching the enemy, and being approached by them, caused
Hughes to give the orders to wear, and for a general chase; the flag
for the line being hauled down. These signals would bring all the main
body to the support of the separated ships, without regard to their
order in battle, and therefore with the utmost expedition that their
remaining sail power would admit. Two of the fleet, however, made
signals of disability; so Hughes annulled the orders, and at 1.30
formed on the port tack, recalling the engaged vessels. Both squadrons
now stood in shore, and anchored at about 6 P.M.; the British near
Negapatam, the French some ten miles north. The loss in the action
had been: British, 77 killed, 233 wounded; French, 178 killed, 601
wounded.
On the following day Suffren sailed for Cuddalore. There he received
word that two ships of the line--the _Illustre_, 74, and _St. Michel_,
60, with a convoy of supplies and 600 troops--were to be expected
shortly at Pointe de Galle, then a Dutch port, on the south-west side
of Ceylon. It was essential to cover these, and on the 18th he was
ready for sea; but the necessity of an interview with Hyder Ali
delayed him until the 1st of August, when he started for Batacalo.
On the 9th he arrived there, and on the 21st the reinforcement joined
him. Within forty-eight hours the supply-ships were cleared, and
the squadron sailed again with the object of taking Trincomalee.
On the 25th he was off the port, and, the operation being pushed
energetically, the place capitulated on the 31st of August.
It is difficult to resist the impression that greater energy on
Hughes's part might have brought him up in time to prevent this
mishap. He reached Madras only on July 20th, a fortnight after the
late action; and he did not sail thence until the 20th of August,
notwithstanding that he apprehended an attempt upon Trincomalee.
Hence, when he arrived there on the 2d of September, not only had
it passed into the hands of the enemy, but Suffren had reëmbarked
already the men and the guns that had been landed from his fleet.
When Hughes's approach was signalled, all preparations for sea were
hastened, and the following morning, at daybreak, the French came out.
Hughes had been joined since the last action by the _Sceptre_, 64,
so that the respective forces in the action fought off Trincomalee on
September 3d were twelve of the line to fourteen, viz.: British, three
74's, one 70, one 68, six 64's, one 50; French, four 74's, seven 64's,
one 60, two 50's. Suffren had also put into the line a 36-gun ship,
the _Consolante_.[146]
While the French were getting underway from Trincomalee, the British
fleet was standing south-south-east towards the entrance, close-hauled
on the starboard tack, a fresh south-west monsoon blowing. When
Hughes made out the hostile flags on the works, he kept away four
points,[147] and steered east-south-east, still in column, under short
canvas (A). Suffren pursued, being to windward yet astern, with his
fleet on a line of bearing; that is, the line on which the ships were
ranged was not the same as the course which they were steering. This
formation, (A), wherein the advance is oblique to the front, is
very difficult to maintain. Wishing to make the action, whatever the
immediate event, decisive in results, by drawing the French well to
leeward of the port, Hughes, who was a thorough seaman and had good
captains, played with his eager enemy. "He kept avoiding me without
taking flight," wrote Suffren; "or rather, he fled in good order,
regulating his canvas by his worst sailers; and, keeping off by
degrees, he steered from first to last ten or twelve different
courses." Hughes, on his part, while perfectly clear as to his
own object, was somewhat perplexed by the seeming indecision of an
adversary whose fighting purpose he knew by experience. "Sometimes
they edged down," he wrote; "sometimes they brought-to; in no regular
order, as if undetermined what to do." These apparent vacillations
were due to the difficulty of maintaining the line of bearing, which
was to be the line of battle; and this difficulty was the greater,
because Hughes was continually altering his course and Suffren's ships
were of unequal speed.
At length, at 2 P.M., being then twenty-five miles south-east of the
port, the French drew near enough to bear down. That this movement
might be carried out with precision, and all the vessels come into
action together, Suffren caused his fleet to haul to the wind, on the
starboard tack, to rectify the order. This also being done poorly and
slowly, he lost patience,--as Nelson afterwards said, "A day is soon
lost in manoeuvring,"--and at 2.30, to spur on the laggard ships,
the French admiral gave the signal to attack, (a), specifying
pistol-range. Even this not sufficing to fetch the delinquents
promptly into line with the flagship, the latter fired a gun to
enforce obedience. Her own side being still turned towards the
British, as she waited, the report was taken by the flagship's men
below decks to be the signal for opening fire, and her whole broadside
was discharged. This example was followed by the other ships, so that
the engagement, instead of being close, was begun at half cannon-shot.
[Illustration]
Owing to his measured and deliberate retreat, Hughes had his fleet
now in thoroughly good shape, well aligned and closed-up. The French,
starting from a poor formation to perform a difficult evolution,
under fire, engaged in utter disorder (B). Seven ships, prematurely
rounding-to to bring their broadsides to the enemy, and fore-reaching,
formed a confused group (v), much to windward and somewhat ahead
of the British van. Imperfectly deployed, they interfered with one
another and their fire consequently could not be adequately developed.
In the rear a somewhat similar condition existed. Suffren, expecting
the bulk of his line to fight the British to windward, had directed
the _Vengeur_, 64, and the _Consolante_, 36, to double to leeward
on the extreme rear; but they, finding that the weather sides of the
enemy were not occupied, feared to go to leeward, lest they should be
cut off. They attacked the rear British ship, the _Worcester_, 64 (w),
to windward; but the _Monmouth_, 64 (m), dropping down to her support,
and the _Vengeur_ catching fire in the mizzen top, they were compelled
to haul off. Only Suffren's own ship, the _Héros_, 74 (a), and her
next astern, the _Illustre_, 74, (i), came at once to close action
with the British centre; but subsequently the _Ajax_, 64, succeeding
in clearing herself from the snarl in the rear, took station ahead (j)
of the _Héros_. Upon these three fell the brunt of the fight. They not
only received the broadsides of the ships immediately opposed to them,
but, the wind having now become light yet free, the British vessels
ahead and astern, (h, s,) by luffing or keeping off, played also upon
them. "The enemy formed a semicircle around us," wrote Suffren's chief
of staff, "and raked us ahead and astern, as the ship came up and
fell off with the helm to leeward." The two seventy-fours were crushed
under this fire. Both lost their main and mizzen masts in the course
of the day, and the foretopmast of the flagship also fell. The _Ajax_,
arriving later, and probably drawing less attention, had only a
topmast shot away.
The British total of killed and wounded was very evenly distributed
throughout the fleet. Only the rear ship lost an important spar,--the
main topmast. It was upon her, as already mentioned, and upon the two
leading ships, the _Exeter_ and _Isis_, that fell the heaviest fire,
proportionately, of the French. From the position of the seven van
ships of the latter, such fire as they could make must needs be upon
the extreme British van, and the _Exeter_ was forced to leave the
line. The loss of the French that day was 82 killed and 255
wounded; of which 64 killed and 178 wounded belonged to the _Héros_,
_Illustre_, and _Ajax_. The British had 51 killed and 283 wounded; the
greatest number of casualties in one ship being 56. Singularly enough,
in such a small list of deaths, three were commanding officers:
Captains Watt of the _Sultan_, Wood of the _Worcester_, and Lumley of
the _Isis_.
At 5.30 P.M. the wind shifted suddenly from south-west to
east-south-east (C). The British wore together, formed on the other
tack, and continued the fight. It was during this final act, and at
6 P.M., that the mainmast of the French flagship came down. The van
ships of the French had towed their heads round with boats before
4, in order to come to the support of the centre, in obedience to a
signal from Suffren; but the light airs and calms had retarded them.
With the shift they approached, and passed in column (c) between their
crippled vessels and the enemy. This manoeuvre, and the failure of
daylight, brought the battle to an end. According to Hughes's report,
several of his fleet "were making much water from shot-holes so very
low down in the bottom as not to be come at to be effectually stopped;
and the whole had suffered severely in their masts and rigging."
Trincomalee being in the enemy's possession, and the east coast of
Ceylon an unsafe anchorage now, at the change of the monsoon, he
felt compelled to return to Madras, where he anchored on the 9th of
September. Suffren regained Trincomalee on the 7th of the month, but
the _Orient_, 74, running ashore at the entrance and being lost, he
remained outside until the 17th, saving material from the wreck.
The break-up of the south-west monsoon, then at hand, is apt to be
accompanied by violent hurricanes, and is succeeded by the north-east
monsoon, during which the east coasts of the peninsula and of Ceylon
give a lee shore, with heavy surf. Naval operations, therefore, were
suspended for the winter. During that season Trincomalee is the only
secure port. Deprived of it, Hughes determined to go to Bombay, and
for that purpose left Madras on the 17th of October. Four days later
a reinforcement of five ships of the line arrived from England,
under Commodore Sir Richard Bickerton, who at once followed the
Commander-in-Chief to the west coast. In the course of December the
entire British force was united at Bombay.
In Trincomalee Suffren had a good anchorage; but the insufficiency
of its resources, with other military considerations, decided him to
winter at Acheen, at the west end of Sumatra. He arrived there on
the 2d of November, having first paid a visit to Cuddalore, where the
_Bizarre_, 64, was wrecked by carelessness. On the 20th of December he
left Acheen for the Coromandel coast, having shortened his stay to the
eastward for reasons of policy. On the 8th of January, 1783, he was
off Ganjam, on the Orissa coast, and thence reached Trincomalee again
on the 23d of February. There he was joined on the 10th of March by
three ships of the line from Europe: two 74's and one 64. Under their
convoy came General de Bussy, with twenty-five hundred troops, which
were at once despatched to Cuddalore.
On the 10th of April Vice-Admiral Hughes, returning from Bombay,
passed Trincomalee on the way to Madras, The various maritime
occurrences, wrecks and reinforcements, since the battle of September
3d had reversed the naval odds, and Hughes now had eighteen ships
of the line, one of which was an eighty, opposed to fifteen under
Suffren. Another important event in the affairs of India was the death
of Hyder Ali, on the 7th of December, 1782. Although his policy was
continued by his son, Tippoo Saib, the blow to the French was serious.
Under all the conditions, the British authorities were emboldened
to attempt the reduction of Cuddalore. The army destined to this
enterprise marched from Madras, passed round Cuddalore, and encamped
south of it by the shore. The supply-ships and lighter cruisers
anchored near, while the fleet cruised to the southward. Being there
to windward, for the south-west monsoon had then set in, it covered
the operations against disturbance from the sea.
Towards the beginning of June the investment of the place was complete
by land and by water. Intelligence of this state of things was brought
on the 10th of June to Suffren, who by Bussey's direction was keeping
his inferior fleet in Trincomalee until its services should be
absolutely indispensable. Immediately upon receiving the news he left
port, and on the 13th sighted the British fleet, then at anchor off
Porto Novo, a little south of Cuddalore. Upon his approach Hughes
moved off, and anchored again five miles from the besieged place. For
the next two days the French were baffled by the winds; but on the
17th the south-west monsoon resumed, and Suffren again drew near.
The British Vice-Admiral, not caring to accept action at anchor,
got under way, and from that time till the 20th remained outside,
trying to obtain the weather-gage, in which he was frustrated by the
variableness of the winds. Meanwhile Suffren had anchored near the
town, communicated with the general, and, being very short of men at
the guns, had embarked twelve hundred troops for his expected battle;
for it was evident that the issue of the siege would turn upon the
control of the sea. On the 18th he weighed again, and the two fleets
manoeuvred for the advantage, with light baffling airs, the British
furthest from shore.
On the 20th of June, the wind holding at west with unexpected
constancy, Hughes decided to accept the attack which Suffren evidently
intended. The latter, being distinctly inferior in force,--fifteen
to eighteen,--probably contemplated an action that should be decisive
only as regarded the fate of Cuddalore; that is, one which, while not
resulting in the capture or destruction of ships, should compel his
opponent to leave the neighbourhood to repair damages. The British
formed line on the port tack, heading to the northward. Suffren ranged
his fleet in the same manner, parallel to the enemy, and was careful
to see the order exact before bearing down. When the signal to attack
was given, the French kept away together, and brought-to again on
the weather beam of the British, just within point-blank range. The
action lasted from shortly after 4 P.M. to nearly 7, and was general
throughout both lines; but, as always experienced, the rears were
less engaged than the centres and vans. No ship was taken; no very
important spars seem to have been shot away. The loss of the British
was 99 killed, 434 wounded; of the French, 102 killed, 386 wounded.
As the ships' heads were north, the course of the action carried them
in that direction. Suffren anchored next morning twenty-five miles
north of Cuddalore. There he was sighted on the 22d by Hughes, who had
remained lying-to the day after the fight. The British Vice-Admiral
reported several ships much disabled, a great number of his
men--1,121--down with scurvy, and the water of the fleet very short.
He therefore thought it necessary to go to Madras, where he anchored
on the 25th. Suffren regained Cuddalore on the afternoon of the 23d.
His return and Hughes's departure completely changed the military
situation. The supply-ships, upon which the British scheme of
operations depended, had been forced to take flight when Suffren first
approached, and of course could not come back now. "My mind is on the
rack without a moment's rest since the departure of the fleet," wrote
the commanding general on the 25th, "considering the character of M.
de Suffren, and the infinite superiority on the part of the French now
that we are left to ourselves."
[Illustration]
The battle of June 20th, 1783, off Cuddalore, was the last of the
maritime war of 1778. It was fought, actually, exactly five months
after the preliminaries of peace had been signed on January 20th,
1783. Although the relative force of the two fleets remained
unchanged, it was a French victory, both tactically and strategically:
tactically, because the inferior fleet held its ground, and remained
in possession of the field; strategically, because it decided the
object immediately at stake, the fate of Cuddalore, and with it,
momentarily at least, the issue of the campaign. It was, however, the
triumph of one commander-in-chief over another; of the greater man
over the lesser. Hughes's reasons for quitting the field involve the
admission of his opponent's greater skill. "Short of water,"--with
eighteen ships to fifteen, able therefore to spare ships by
detachments for watering, that should not have happened; "injury to
spars,"--that resulted from the action; "1,121 men short,"--Suffren
had embarked just that number--1,200--because Hughes let him
communicate with the port without fighting. Notwithstanding the
much better seamanship of the British subordinates, and their dogged
tenacity, Suffren here, as throughout the campaign, demonstrated again
the old experience that generalship is the supreme factor in war. With
inferior resources, though not at first with inferior numbers, by
a steady offensive, and by the attendant anxiety about Trincomalee
impressed upon the British admiral, he reduced him to a fruitless
defensive. By the seizure of that place as a base he planted himself
firmly upon the scene of action. Able thus to remain, while the
British had to retire to Bombay, he sustained the Sultan of Mysore
in his embarrassing hostility to the British; and in the end he saved
Cuddalore by readiness and dexterity despite the now superior numbers
of the British fleet. He was a great sea-captain, Hughes was not; and
with poorer instruments, both in men and ships, the former overcame
the latter.
On the 29th of June a British frigate, the _Medea_, bearing a flag of
truce, reached Cuddalore. She brought well-authenticated intelligence
of the conclusion of peace; and hostilities ceased by common consent.
[Footnote 136: Now Mauritius.]
[Footnote 137: On the Malabar--western--coast.]
[Footnote 139: See _ante_, p. 163.]
[Footnote 140: I infer, from the accounts, that the _Monmouth_ was
well east of the _Hero_, that the French had passed her first, and
that the _Héros_ was now on her port beam; but this point is not
certain.]
[Footnote 141: Expressions in Johnstone's Report.]
[Footnote 142: Charnock, however, says that in 1762, immediately after
receiving his post-commission, he commanded in succession the _Hind_,
20, and the _Wager_, 20. Moreover, before his appointment to the
expedition of 1781, he had been Commodore on the Lisbon Station. But
he had spent comparatively little time at sea as a captain.--W.L.C.]
[Footnote 143: See _ante_, pp. 79, 80.]
[Footnote 144: One being the captured British _Hannibal_, 50, which
was commissioned by Captain Morard de Galles, retaining the English
form of the name, Hannibal, to distinguish her from the _Annibal_, 74,
already in the squadron.]
[Footnote 145: In the plan, Positions II and III, the second position
is indicated by ships with broken outlines. These show the two
lines of battle in the engagement until the wind shifted to
south-south-east. The results of the shift constituted a third
position, consecutive with the second, and is indicated by ships in
full outline.]
[Footnote 146: Previously the British East Indiaman, _Elizabeth_.]
[Footnote 147: Forty-five degrees.]
GLOSSARY
OF NAUTICAL AND NAVAL TERMS USED IN THE TEXT
(_This glossary is intended to cover only the technical expressions
actually used in the book itself._)
ABACK. A sail is aback when the wind blows on the forward part tending
to move the vessel astern.
ABAFT. Behind, towards the stern.
ABEAM. }
ABREAST. } See "Bearing."
AFT. See "Bearing."
AHEAD. See "Bearing."
ASTERN. See "Bearing."
BEAM. The width of a vessel, so used because of the cross timbers,
called beams.
BEAR, to. To be in a specified direction from a vessel.
BEAR, to. To change the direction of a vessel's movement.
To bear _down_, to move towards; to bear _up_, or _away_, to move
away, from the wind or from an enemy.
BEARING. The direction of an object from a vessel; either by compass,
or with reference to the vessel itself. Thus, the lighthouse bears
north; the enemy bears abeam, or two points off the port bow.
BEARING, Line of. The compass bearing on which the vessels of a fleet
are ranged, whatever their bearings from one another.
BEARINGS, with reference to the vessel.
Abeam. }
Abreast. } Perpendicular to the vessel's length.
Aft. } Directly behind.
Astern. }
Ahead. Directly before; forward.
Abaft the beam, starboard or port, weather or lee. To the rear of
abeam, to the right or left, to windward or to leeward.
Before (or forward of) the beam (as above). Ahead of abeam, etc.
Broad. A large angle of bearing, used ordinarily of the bow. "Broad
off the bow" approaches "before the beam."
On the bow, starboard or port, weather or lee. To one side of
ahead, to right or left, to windward or to leeward.
On the quarter, starboard or port, weather or lee. To one side of
astern; to right or left, to windward or to leeward.
BEARINGS, by compass. The full circle of the compass, 360 degrees,
is divided into thirty-two _points_, each point being subdivided into
fourths. From north to east, eight points, are thus named: North;
north by east; north-northeast; northeast by north; northeast;
northeast by east; east-northeast; east by north; East.
From East to South, from South to West, and from West to North, a
like naming is used.
BEAT, to. To gain ground to windward, by successive changes of
direction, called tacks.
BOOM. See "Spars."
BOW, or head. The forward part of a vessel, which is foremost when in
motion ahead.
On the Bow. See "Bearing." To head "bows-on": to move directly
towards.
BOW AND QUARTER LINE. See pp. 84, 200.
BOWSPRIT. See "Spars."
BRACES. Ropes by which the yards are turned, so that the wind may
strike the sails in the manner desired.
BRING-TO. To bring a vessel's head as near as possible to the
direction from which the wind blows; usually with a view to
heaving-to, that is, stopping. See heave-to and luff.
BROADSIDE. The whole number of guns carried on one side of a vessel;
starboard or port broadside, weather or lee broadside.
CABLE. The heavy rope which was attached to the anchor, and held the
ship to it. Cables are now chains, but in the period of this book
were always hemp. To veer cable, to let more out, to let the ship
go farther from the anchor. To slip the cable, to let it all go
overboard, releasing the vessel. Cable's length: 120 fathoms.
CHASE, General. A chase by a fleet, in which, in order to more rapid
advance, the places of the vessels in their usual order are not to be
observed.
CLOSE-HAULED. See "Course."
COLUMN. See "Line Ahead."
COME UP. A ship comes up, when her bow comes more nearly to the
direction of the wind. Used generally when the movement proceeds from
some other cause than the movement of the helm. See "Luff."
CONVOY. A body of unarmed or weakly armed vessels, in company with
ships of war.
CONVOY, to. To accompany a number of unarmed vessels, for their
protection.
COURSE. The direction of a vessel's movement, with regard to the
compass or to the wind.
Compass course. The point of the compass towards which the vessel heads.
Wind courses:
Close-hauled. As nearly in the direction from which the wind blows as
is compatible with keeping the sails full; for square-rigged vessels
six points. (See "Bearings by Compass.") For a north wind, the
close-hauled courses are east-northeast and west-northwest.
Free. Not close-hauled.
Large. Very free.
Off the wind. Free.
On (or by) the wind. Close-hauled.
COURSES. The lowest sails on the fore and main masts.
CRUISE, to. To cover a certain, portion of sea by movement back and
forth over it.
CRUISER. A general term for armed ships, but applied more specifically
to those not "of the line," which therefore are more free and wider in
their movements.
CURRENT.
Lee Current. One the movement of which is away from the wind.
Weather Current. One which sets towards the wind.
EBB, ebb-tide. See "Tide."
FAIR, wind. A wind which allows a vessel to head her desired compass
course.
FALL OFF. A vessel falls off, when, without the action of the helm,
her head moves away from the wind. See "Come up."
FILL. } Sails are said to fill, or to be full, when the wind
FULL. } strikes the rear side, tending to move the vessel ahead.
FLOOD, flood tide. See "Tide."
FORE AND AFT. In classification of vessels, indicates those whose
sails, when set, stretch from forward aft; more nearly lengthwise than
across. Opposite to square-rigged.
FOREMAST, fore-topmast, etc. See "Spars."
FORESAIL, fore-topsail, etc. See "Sails."
FOUL, to. To entangle, to collide. A foul anchor, when the cable gets
round the anchor.
FOUL, wind. A wind which prevents the vessel heading the desired
compass course, compelling her to beat.
FREE, wind. A wind which allows the vessel to head the course
desired. The amount to spare from the close-hauled course is sometimes
designated. E.g., the wind four points free; the wind would allow the
vessel to come four points nearer the wind than her course requires.
FRIGATE. See "Vessel."
GAGE, weather and lee. A vessel, or fleet, is said to have the weather
gage, when it is to windward of its opponent. Lee is opposite to
weather.
HAUL, to. To haul (to) the wind is to change the course to that
nearest the direction whence the wind comes.
To haul down the colors: to strike, to surrender.
HEAVE DOWN. To incline a vessel on one side, by purchases at the lower
mastheads.
HEAVE-TO. (HOVE-TO.) To bring-to, (which see), and then to lay some
sails aback, in order to keep the ship without movement ahead or
astern.
HEEL, to. To incline a vessel on one side by shifting the weights on
board, such as guns. "On the heel": to be thus inclined.
HELM. The tiller, or bar, which like a handle turns the rudder, and
thus changes the course of the vessel.
Port the helm. To put the tiller to port, which turns the vessel's
head to the right; to starboard the helm is the reverse.
Helm down. Tiller to leeward, vessel's head to windward; helm up,
the reverse. See "Rudder."
HULL. The body of a vessel, as distinguished from the spars, or
engines.
HULL, to. (HULLED.) A cannon ball striking the hull of a vessel is
said to hull her.
JIB. See "Sails."
JIB-BOOM. See "Spars."
KEEP, to. To keep off, or away, is to change course away from the wind
or from an enemy. See "To bear up."
LARGE. See "Course."
LEE. The direction toward which the wind blows. "Under the lee of,"
protected from wind and sea by land, or by a vessel, interposed.
Lee Tide. See "Tide."
LEECH. The vertical side of a square sail. The upper and lower sides,
horizontal, are called head and foot.
LEEWARD (pronounced looard). Direction of movement, or of bearing,
opposite to the wind.
LIE-TO, to. To bring the vessels head on, or near, the wind, and
remain nearly stopped. Usually in heavy weather, but not always.
LINE ABREAST. See p. 122.
LINE AHEAD. See p. 85.
LINE OF BATTLE. In the line of battle the vessels are ranged on the
same straight line, steering the same course, one behind the others,
so that all the broadsides are clear to bear upon an enemy. The
line preferred is one of the close-hauled lines, because on them the
movement of a vessel in the line is more easily regulated by backing,
or shaking, some of the sails.
LINE OF BEARING. See "Bearing, line of."
LINE, Ship of the. A vessel fitted by its force for the line of
battle. Opposite generically to "cruiser." The modern term is
"battleship."
LUFF, to. The movement of changing the course to nearer the direction
whence the wind comes, by using the helm.
MAIN. }
MIZZEN.} See "Spars" and "Sails."
MAST. See "Spars." "To the mast." A sail is said to be so when aback.
MONSOON. A trade wind, in the China and Indian seas, which blows
uniformly from the northeast in winter, and from southwest in summer.
NEAP. See "Tide."
OFF--the wind. See "Course."
ON--the wind. See "Course."
PENNANT. A flag, indicating either the rank of the senior officer on
board, or a signal applicable to a particular vessel.
POINT. See "Bearings, by Compass."
PORT. To the left hand, or on the left side, of a vessel, looking from
aft forward. Opposite to Starboard.
PORT, to. Applied to steering. To move the tiller, or helm, to the
left, which moves the rudder to the right and causes the vessel to
change course towards the right hand.
QUARTER. Either side of the after part of a vessel;--as starboard
quarter, port quarter; weather quarter, lee quarter. Quarter deck:
one side of the after upper deck, reserved for the officer exercising
command, and for ceremonial purposes.
QUARTERS. A crew is at quarters when at the stations for battle.
RAKE, to. To fire the broadside from ahead or astern of an antagonist,
so that the shot may sweep the length of the vessel, which at the
period of this book was about four times the width.
RANDOM SHOT. The extreme range to which a gun could send its shot,
giving very uncertain results.
REEF, to. To reduce the surface of a sail.
RUDDER. A solid framework, pivoted at the stern of a vessel, which
being turned to one side deflects her course. See "Helm" and "Wheel."
SAILS. Sails are of two kinds: square, and fore and aft. Square sails
spread more across the vessel, in the direction of her width. Fore and
aft sails more in the direction of the length. Square sails are better
for a free wind; and also for large vessels, because they can be more
readily subdivided. Fore and aft sails trim nearer to the wind, and so
are convenient for coasters, which generally are smaller.
Vessels carrying square sails are called square-rigged. They have
always two masts, usually three; each carrying three or four sails,
one above the other. These are named from the mast on which they are
carried (see "Spars"); e.g., _main_ sail, _fore_ topsail, _mizzen_
topgallant-sail; and also from their positions on the same mast.
Thus, from lowest up, main sail, main topsail, main topgallantsail;
and main royal, if there be a fourth. The fore and main sails are
called also courses.
The topsails were the chief battle sails, because the largest, except
the courses, and more manageable than the courses.
All square-rigged vessels carry fore and aft sails, three cornered,
stretched between the bowsprit and jib-booms, and the fore topmast.
These sails are called jibs.
Fore and aft vessels also carry jibs; but on each upright mast they
have one great sail, the size of which makes it less easily handled
in an emergency, therefore less fit for fighting. Above the big sail
they have a small, light, three-cornered topsail, but this is merely
a fair weather sail, useless in battle.
Vessels of war were almost all square-rigged, with three masts.
SAILS, STUDDING. Light square sails, for moderate weather, extended
beyond the other square sails, to increase the normal spread of
canvas. Set only with a free wind, and never in battle.
SCANTLING. The size, and consequent weight and strength, of the
timbers of a vessel's hull.
SCHOONER. See "Vessel."
SHAKE, to. So to place a sail that the wind blows along it, neither
filling nor backing. The sail is thus neutralized without taking in.
SHARP-UP. A yard is sharp-up, when turned by the braces as far as the
rigging of the mast will allow. A close-hauled course requires the
yards to be sharp-up, in order that the sails may be full.
SHIP. See "Vessel."
SLIP. See "Cable."
SLOOP. See "Vessel."
SPARS. A spar is a long piece of timber, cylindrical, tapering, in
masts, towards one end, and in yards towards both. Spars serve for
spreading the several sails of a vessel.
The names of spars vary with their use and position. Chiefly, for
ships of war, they divide into masts, yards, and booms.
A mast is an upright, and is in three connected pieces: the lower
mast, the topmast, and the top-gallant-mast. Most ships of war had
three such masts: fore, near the bow; main, near the centre; mizzen,
near the stern.
The bowsprit is also a mast; not upright, but projecting straight
ahead from the bow, approaching horizontal, but inclining upwards.
Like the masts, it has three divisions: the lower, or bowsprit
proper, the jib-boom, and the flying-jib-boom.
Across the masts, horizontal, are the yards, four in number, lower,
topsail, topgallant, and royal. Yards are further designated by the
name of the mast to which each belongs; e.g., foreyard, main topsail
yard, mizzen topgallant yard, main royal yard.
The bowsprit formerly had one yard, called the spritsail yard. This
has disappeared. Otherwise it serves to spread the three-cornered
sails called jibs. These sails were useful for turning a vessel,
because their projection before the centre gave them great leverage.
Fore and aft vessels had no yards. See "Sails."
SPRING. See p. 65, note.
SQUARE-RIGGED. See "Sails" and "Spars."
STAND, to. Used, nautically, to express movement and direction, e.g.,
"to stand toward the enemy," "to stand out of harbor," "to stand
down," "to stand south." The underlying idea seems to be that of
sustained, decided movement.
STARBOARD. TO the right hand, or on the right side, of a vessel,
looking from aft forward. Opposite to Port.
STEER, to. To control the course by the use of the helm and rudder.
STERN. The extreme rear, or after, part of a vessel.
STRATEGY. That department of the Art of War which decides the
distribution and movements of armies, or of fleets, with reference to
the objects of a campaign as a whole.
STRIKE, to. Applied to the flag. To haul down the flag in token of
surrender.
TACK. A vessel is on the starboard tack, or port tack, according as
the wind comes from the starboard or port hand. See p. 84, note.
TACK, to. When a vessel is close-hauled, with the wind on one side,
to tack is to turn round towards the wind, in order to be again
close-hauled, with the wind on the other side.
To wear is to attain the same object by turning away from the wind.
Wearing is surer than tacking, but loses ground to leeward.
To tack, or wear, _in succession_, the leading vessel tacks, and
those which follow tack, each, as it arrives at the same point; the
order thus remaining the same. To tack, or wear _together_, all
tack at the same moment, which reverses the order.
TACTICS. That department of the Art of War which decides the
disposition and movements of an army, or of a fleet, on a particular
field of battle, in presence of an enemy.
TIDAL CURRENTS.
Ebb tide, the outflow of the water due to the tides.
Flood tide, the inflow of the water due to the tides.
Lee tide, the set of the current to leeward.
Weather tide, the set of the current to windward.
TIDE. The rise and fall of the water of the oceans under the influence
of the moon. Used customarily, but inaccurately, to express the
currents produced by the changes of level.
High tide, or high water, the two highest levels of the day.
Low tide, or low water, the two lowest.
Neap tide: the least rise and fall during the lunar month.
Spring tide: the greatest rise and fall during the same, being soon
after full and change of moon.
TRADE, the. A term applied to a body of merchant vessels, to or from a
particular destination.
TRADE WIND. A wind which blows uniformly from the same general
direction throughout a fixed period. In the West Indies, from the
northeast the year round. See also "Monsoon."
VEER. See "Cable."
VESSEL. A general term for all constructions intended to float upon
and move through the water. Specific definitions applicable to this
book:
Ship, a square-rigged vessel with three masts.
Brig, a square-rigged vessel with two masts.
Schooner, a fore and aft rigged vessel with two or more masts.
Sloop, a fore and aft rigged vessel with one mast. See pp. 9, 15, 17.
VESSELS OF WAR. Ship of the Line. A ship with three or more tiers of
guns, of which two are on covered decks; that is, have a deck above
them. See "Line of Battle Ship."
Frigate. A ship with one tier of guns on a covered deck.
Sloop of War. A ship, the guns of which are not covered, being on
the upper (spar) deck.
Sloops of war were sometimes brigs, but then were usually so styled.
WAKE. The track left by a vessel's passage through the water. "In the
wake of": directly astern of.
WAY. Movement through the water. "To get underway": to pass from
stand-still to movement.
WEAR, to. See under "Tack."
WEATHER. Relative position to windward of another object. Opposite to
Lee. Weather side, lee side, of a vessel; weather fleet, lee fleet;
weather gage, lee gage (see "Gage"); weather shore, lee shore.
WEATHER, to. To pass to windward of a vessel, or of any other object.
WEATHERLY. The quality of a vessel which favors her getting, or
keeping, to windward.
WEIGH, to. To raise the anchor from the bottom. Used alone; e.g., "the
fleet weighed."
WHEEL. So called from its form. The mechanical appliance, a wheel,
with several handles for turning it, by which power is increased, and
also transmitted from the steersman on deck to the tiller below, in
order to steer the vessel.
WIND AND WATER, between. That part of a vessel's side which comes out
of water when she inclines to a strong side wind, but otherwise is
under water.
WINDWARD. Direction from which the wind blows.
YARD. See "Spars."
INDEX
Algeciras, in Gibraltar Bay, station of Franco-Spanish Fleet
supporting the Siege of Gibraltar, 121, 230, 231.
Arbuthnot, Marriott, British Admiral, commands North American
Station, 1779, 113, 148;
anger at Rodney's intrusion on his command, 150;
supports the attack on Charleston, 1780, 151;
station in Gardiner's Bay, 151, 170;
action with French squadron under des Touches, 1781, 171;
regains command of Chesapeake Bay, 174;
superseded, 1781, 176.
_Arethusa_, British frigate. Encounter with French frigate _Belle
Poule_ marks beginning of War of 1778 with France, 62, 82.
Armed Neutrality, The, of 1780, 3, 158.
Arnold, Benedict, American General. Effects following his action
on Lake Champlain in 1776, 3, 4, 7, 25;
with, Ethan Allen, seizes Ticonderoga and Crown Point, 1775, 8;
captures or destroys all hostile shipping on Lake Champlain, 9;
traverses Maine forests, and joins Montgomery before Quebec, 10;
maintains blockade of Quebec till arrival of a British squadron,
10;
retreats to Crown Point, and destitution of his troops, 11;
schemes for maintaining command of Lake Champlain, 12;
his force, and its character, 14, 15, 17;
compelled by shore batteries to abandon lower Narrows of the
Lake, 15;
selects Valcour Island as position for defence, 15;
decision to risk destruction of force rather than retire, 18, 19;
sound strategic and tactical ideas, 20;
Battle of Valcour Island, 21;
successful withdrawal after defeat, 23;
overtaken and flotilla destroyed, 25;
effect of his resistance in delaying British advance, 25;
conduct, courage, and heroism throughout, 27;
his subsequent treason, 18, 27, 152;
commands British detachment in Virginia, 153, 169, 170, 174.
Asiatic Immigration, Danger involved in, 4.
Barbados, West India Island, headquarters of British Leeward
Islands Station, 99;
advantage of Santa Lucia over, 104, 144, 207;
notably for crippled ships, 144;
devastated by hurricane, 1780, 159.
Bartington, Samuel, British Admiral, commands Leeward Islands
Station, 99;
capture of Santa Lucia by, 100-102;
successfully resists d'Estaing's effort to recapture, 103, 104;
superseded in chief command by Byron, 105;
share in Byron's action with d'Estaing, 107, 109;
goes home wounded, 112;
refuses command-in-chief of the Channel Fleet, 1780, 157;
serves in it under Howe, 227;
captures a French convoy for East Indies, 227.
Basse Terre, St. Kitts, Operations around, 1782, 196-205;
character of anchorage at, 199.
Battle, Order of, defined, 93 (note), 200 (note).
Battles, Naval, Valcour Island, October 11, 1776, 19-23.
Charleston Harbor, June 28, 1776, 33.
D'Estaing and Howe, August 10 and 11, 1778, 73-75.
Ushant, July 27, 1778, 84-91.
Barrington and d'Estaing, Santa Lucia, December 15, 1778, 102-104.
Byron and d'Estaing, Grenada, July 6, 1779, 105-112.
De Langara and Rodney, Cape St. Vincent, January 16, 1780, 123.
De Guichen and Rodney, off Martinique, April 17, 1780, 131-135.
De Guichen and Rodney, May 15, 1780, 143, 144.
De Guichen and Rodney, May 19, 1780, 144.
Cornwallis and La Motte-Picquet, off Haiti, March 20, 1780, 153.
Cornwallis and de Ternay, June 20, 1780, 155-157.
De Grasse and Hood, off Martinique, April 29, 1781, 163-167.
Arbuthnot and des Touches, off Cape Henry, March 16, 1781,
171-173.
De Grasse and Graves, off Cape Henry, September 5, 1781, 179-183.
The Doggers Bank, August 5, 1781, 189-193.
De Grasse and Hood, St. Kitts, January 25 and 26, 1782, 199-204.
De Grasse and Rodney, near Dominica, April 9 and 12, 1782,
207-221.
Howe with Franco-Spanish Fleet near Gibraltar, October 20, 1782,
231, 232.
Johnstone and Suffren, Porto Praya, Cape Verde Islands, April
16, 1781, 236-238.
Hughes and Suffren, Coromandel Coast, February 17, 1781, 240-242.
Hughes and Suffren, off Ceylon, April 12, 1782, 242-244.
Hughes and Suffren, off Nega-patam, July 6, 1782, 244-246.
Hughes and Suffren, off Trincomalee, September 3, 1782, 247-251.
Hughes and Suffren, off Cuddalore, June 20, 1783, 253.
N.B. Naval Battles end here.
_Belle Poule_, French Frigate. Encounter with British _Arethusa_
marks beginning of War of 1778 with Great Britain, 61, 82.
Blane, Sir Gilbert, Physician to British Fleet under Rodney,
quoted, 124, 219, 220, 221.
Burgoyne, Sir John, British General, 3, 6, 14, 23, 27, 28, 50-53,
55;
decisive effect of American control of Lake Champlain, in 1776,
upon his expedition, in 1777, 3, 9, 13, 14, 25;
his surrender at Saratoga, 53;
it determines France to intervene, 6, 58.
Byng, John, British Admiral, influence of his execution, in 1756,
upon the minds of naval officers, 93, 139, 146.
Byron, John, British Admiral, ordered to North American Station,
1778, 59;
delayed by heavy weather, and puts into Halifax, 62;
Howe superseded by, 80;
goes to West Indies, 105;
action with D'Estaing off Grenada, 105-111;
comments upon course of, 110-112;
returns to England, 112.
Canada, Strength of, against attack from southward, 7;
its advantage in this respect over New York, 8;
comprehension of these facts by Americans of 1775, from the old
French Wars, 8;
attempt to utilize, by British, frustrated by Arnold's
promptitude, 9;
invasion of, under Montgomery, ordered by American Congress,
1775, 9;
failure of the attempt, decided by British Navy, 10-12;
British advance from, under Carleton, 1776, 15-26;
Burgoyne's advance from, 1777, 51-53.
Cap François (now Cap Haitien), French naval station on north side
of Haiti, 147-149, 153, 154, 168, 176, 178, 206, 223, 225.
Carkett, Robert, British Naval Captain, misunderstanding of
Rodney's orders by, causes failure of British attack of
April 17, 1780, 133;
Rodney's censure of, 137-139.
Carleton, Sir Guy, Governor and Commander-in-Chief, in Canada,
1775-6, 9;
besieged and blockaded in Quebec by Americans, 10-12;
relieved by British Navy, 11;
takes the offensive, 17;
delayed decisively by Arnold's preparations on Lake Champlain,
13, 18;
battle of Valcour Island, 20-23;
successfully eluded by Arnold, 23;
honored by Government for the campaign, 26.
Carolinas, North and South, supposed British sympathies in, 31,
exaggerated, 175;
expedition against Charleston, and battle of Charleston Harbor,
1776, 31-38;
operations against, and against Georgia, renewed, 1779, 113-115,
and 1780, 151-153;
disastrous consequences to British operations, 114, 152, 174-176.
Champlain, Lake, Decisive effect of naval operations upon, 3, 4,
7, 13, 14, 25, 26;
strategic importance of, 7;
naval campaign upon, 1775-1776, chapter i;
remains in naval control of British throughout the war, 28.
Charleston, South Carolina, attack upon by British squadron, 1776,
32-37;
siege and capture of, by the British, 1780, 114, 151.
Chesapeake Bay, naval command of, by French, 1781, accomplishes
independence of United States, 4, 114, 184;
Sir William Howe moves by way of, against Philadelphia, 1777, 52;
operations in and near, 1781, 169-174, 177-185;
British control of, in 1781, prior to arrival of de Grasse, 174;
de Grasse reaches, 1781, 178.
Clinton, Sir Henry, British General, commands land force employed
in Carolinas, 1776, 31, 32;
in seizure of Narragansett Bay, 48;
left in command at New York by Howe, 1777, 52;
advance up the Hudson River, 1777, 55;
relieves Howe as Commander-in-Chief in North America, 56, 63;
evacuates Philadelphia, and retreats upon New York, 1778, 63;
narrowness of his escape, 63, 64;
evacuates Narragansett Bay, 1779, 115;
operations of, in South Carolina, and capture of Charleston, 151;
leaves Cornwallis in command in Carolina, and returns to New
York, 152;
sends detachments to Virginia, for diversion in favor of
Cornwallis, 1781, 153, 169;
serious difference of opinion between, and Cornwallis, 115, 175;
orders of, to Cornwallis, which result in position at Yorktown,
1781, 175.
Commerce, effects upon, through inadequate naval preparation,
59-61, 117, 126, 158;
table of losses of British, 61 (note).
Convoys, effect of, upon naval action, strategic or tactical, 105,
106, 109, 122, 126, 130, 148, 155-157, 158, 166, 176, 188,
189, 193, 199, 206-209, 227-229, 229-231, 235, 236-238,
240, 246.
Cornwallis, Charles, Earl, British General, accompanies expedition
against Charleston, 1776, 31;
hurried to Trenton, after Washington's victory there, 49;
professional quarrel with Sir H. Clinton, 115, 175;
at siege and capture of Charleston, 152;
left in command of southern department, 1780, 152;
defeats Gates at Camden, 1780, 152;
pushes on to North Carolina, 152;
embarrassments there, 152;
enters Virginia, and joins Arnold at Petersburg, 1781, 153, 174;
ordered by Clinton to occupy a defensive position which should
cover anchorage for a fleet, 175;
evacuates Portsmouth, and takes position at Yorktown, 175;
French cruisers bar his retreat towards the Carolinas, and
occupy York River, 179;
enclosed by French fleet and French and American armies, 184;
compelled to surrender, 185.
Cornwallis, Sir William (brother of Lord), British naval captain,
share in action between Byron and d'Estaing, 1779,
108-110, 153;
in command of a squadron, action with La Motte-Picquet, 1780, 153;
action with de Ternay's squadron, 155-157;
characteristics, and nickname of, 157;
distinguished part in Hood's action with de Grasse, 1782, 201;
share in Rodney's victory, 217;
quoted, 156, 198, 200, 203, 211.
Crown Point, military post on Lake Champlain, 8;
seized by Benedict Arnold and Ethan Allen, 1775, 8;
General Montgomery embarks at, to invade Canada, 1775, 9;
Arnold retreats to, in 1776, after reverses in Canada, 12;
part in campaign of 1776, 24;
recovered by British, 25;
reoccupied by Americans after Burgoyne's surrender, 28.
Cuddalore, British post in India, on Coromandel Coast, besieged by
Hyder Ali and Suffren, 242;
taken by Hyder Ali, 244;
British attempt to retake, 252;
relieved by Suffren, 252-254.
Darby, George, British Admiral, commands Channel Fleet, 1780, 157;
relief of Gibraltar by, 1781, 186-188;
blocked in Torbay by Franco-Spanish fleet, 1781, 188-189.
Delaware, Naval Operations in the, 1777, 52-55;
in 1778, 59, 62-64.
De Barras, French Commodore, commands squadron in Newport, 1781,
174;
opinion concerning des Touches' conduct, 174;
junction with de Grasse in Chesapeake Bay, 1781, 184.
De Bouille, French General, governor of Martinique, 1780, concerts
with de Guichen an attack on British West Indies, 130;
project against Barbados, 1782, 197;
capture of St. Kitts, 197-205.
De Cordova, Spanish Admiral, commands in allied fleet under
d'Orvilliers, 1779, 118, 119;
in chief command, at Cadiz, 125;
in Channel, 1781, 188;
in 1782, 228;
at Algeciras, during Howe's relief of Gibraltar, 230-232.
D'Estaing, Comte, French Admiral, in chief command, in 1778, of
first French fleet sent to America, 59;
biographical summary of, 59 (note);
Government instructions to, 59;
slowness of movements of, 62-64;
failure to attack Howe at Sandy Hook, 66-68;
professional inefficiency of, 67, 79, 111, 112;
proceeds to Newport, R.I., 69, and enters the harbor, 70;
joins Americans in siege of the town, 70;
abandons it on Howe's appearance and puts to sea, 73;
manoeuvres against Howe, 73-75;
fleet scattered by gale, 75;
refuses to renew siege of Newport, and goes to Boston, 77, 78;
outgeneralled throughout by Howe, 78;
goes to West Indies, 1779, 100;
fails to recover Santa Lucia, 102-104;
captures Grenada, 105;
action with Byron, 106-112;
fails in attempt to retake Savannah, 115;
returns to Europe with ships of his original command, 115;
sent to Cadiz, in 1780, to bring back to Brest French contingent
of Allied Fleet, 158.
De Grasse, Comte, French Admiral, exercises the decisive effect in
obtaining American Independence, 4;
sails to take chief command in America, 1781, 162;
action with Hood off Martinique, 163-165;
Chevalier's comment on conduct of, 166;
abortive attempt against Santa Lucia, 167;
capture of Tobago by, 168;
goes to Cap François, 168, 176, and there prepares for
expedition against Cornwallis, 178;
on this occasion shows energy and foresight unusual to him, 178;
anchors in Chesapeake Bay, 178;
action with Graves, 179-184;
regains Chesapeake, 184;
returns to West Indies after Cornwallis's surrender, 185;
expedition against St. Kitts, 1782, 197-205;
outgeneralled by Hood, 201, 204, 205;
St. Kitts surrenders to, 205;
Hood escapes from, 205;
returns to Martinique, 206;
expedition against Jamaica, plan of, 206;
puts to sea, 207;
transactions from April 8 to April 12, 207-212;
defeated in great battle of April 12, 213-221, and captured with
flagship, 221;
professional character of, illustrated, 166, 178, 184, 198, 205,
207, 209, 214, 215, 216.
De Guichen, Comte de, succeeds d'Estaing in North American
command, 1780, 115, 130;
biographical summary of, 115 (note);
project of against Barbados, 130;
frustrated by Rodney, 130;
action of April 17, with Rodney, 130-135;
orders of French Government to, 141;
consequent conduct of, 141-145;
actions with Rodney, May 15, 142, and May 19, 144;
broken down by responsibility, 145;
under orders, accompanies Spanish squadron to Cap François, 147;
there refuses to coöperate with Americans, 147;
returns to Europe, 148;
commands French contingent to Allied Fleet under de Cordova,
1781, 188;
advises attack upon British Fleet in Tor Bay, 189;
loses great part of West India military convoy entrusted to his
charge, 196.
De Langara, Spanish Admiral, squadron under command of, defeated,
and himself captured by Rodney, 122, 123;
inefficiency of, 125.
D'Orves, Comte, French Admiral, commands in East Indies, 1781,
235, 236;
joined by Suffren, 239;
sails for Coromandel Coast, 240;
dies, and succeeded by Suffren, 240.
D'Orvilliers, Comte, French Admiral, commander-in-chief of Brest
Fleet, 1778, 82;
puts to sea, 82;
Government instructions to, 83;
encounter with British Fleet under Keppel, 83;
manoeuvres of, and action of July 27, 83-91;
comment upon, 92, 97;
summer cruise of, 1779, 116-120;
hampered by instructions, 119;
returns to Brest unsuccessful, 120.
De Suffren, Bailli, French Captain and Admiral, with d'Estaing in
Narragansett Bay, 1778, 69;
in the action with Byron off Grenada, 111;
his comment upon d'Estaing's conduct, 111;
biographical summary of, 111 (note);
sails for East Indies, 1781, 163, 236;
effect upon operations of, in India, by capture of a French
convoy in Bay of Biscay, 228;
attacks British squadron in Porto Praya, 236-238;
saves Cape of Good Hope, 238;
arrives Ile de France, 239;
succeeds to chief command in East Indies, 240;
five battles with British squadron, 240, 242, 244, 247, 253;
captures Trincomalee, 1782, 247;
relieves Cuddalore, 252-254;
estimate of, 254, 255.
De Ternay, French Commodore, commands squadron with convoy, from
Brest for Newport, R.I., 155;
action with British squadron under Cornwallis, 1780, 155-157;
comment, favorable and unfavorable, 156;
death of, 1781, and succeeded by des Touches, 170.
Des Touches, French Commodore, succeeds de Ternay in command at
Newport, 1781, 170;
sails to enter Chesapeake Bay, to check British operations in
Virginia, 170;
pursued by Arbuthnot, 171;
action between the two squadrons, 171-173;
gains tactical advantage, but leaves the field to the British,
174;
justified by de Barras, who arrives and supersedes him, 174.
De Vaudreuil, Marquis, French Admiral, second to de Grasse in
1782, 209;
commands-in-chief partial attack on Hood's division, 209;
quoted, 214;
succeeds to chief command upon de Grasse's surrender, 222;
condition of his command after the battle, 223;
pursued by Rodney, but reaches Cap François, 225.
Doggers Bank, Battle of the, 1781, 189-194.
Dominica, British West India Island, captured by French, 1778, 99;
battle of, 208, 209, 210, 213, 215.
Douglas, Sir Charles, British naval captain, commands squadron
which relieves Quebec, 1776, 10;
quoted, 11, 14, 17, 18, 22, 25, 26;
energetic preparations by, to regain control of Lake Champlain,
15-17;
force created by, 17;
made a baronet for his services at this time, 26;
captain of the fleet to Rodney, 1782, 222;
opinion as to Rodney's conduct cited, 222.
Farragut, at Mobile, cited in illustration, 66 (note).
Fighting Instructions, Additional, point in, bearing upon the
failure of Rodney's plan of attack, April 17, 1780, 133,
138, 139 (and note).
"Fleet in Being," 73, 174;
how regarded, apparently, by D'Orvilliers in 1779, 119.
France, intervention of France in the American quarrel determined
by Burgoyne's defeat, and leads to Spanish intervention,
3, 58, 116;
vacillating naval instructions of Government of, 83, 118, 119,
141, 154;
divergence of views between Spain and, 120, 121, 147, 158, 186,
188, 189.
France, Ile de (now Mauritius), French naval station in Indian
Ocean, 126, 234, 236, 239.
Gardiner's Bay, east end of Long Island, station of British fleet
under Arbuthnot, watching French at Newport, 151, 170.
Gates, Horatio, American General, defeated by Cornwallis at
Camden, 152.
George, Lake, a link in consecutive water communications from New
York to Canada, 7, 51.
Gibraltar, d'Estaing ordered to commence hostilities when forty
leagues west of, 59;
capture of, a leading object with Spanish Government, 120;
this desire affects the major operations of Allies throughout
the war, 121, 186;
blockade of, by land and sea, 121;
Rodney's relief of, 1780, 121-126, 157;
Darby's relief of, 1781, 186, 188;
Howe's relief of, 1782, 229-233.
Glossary, of technical terms used in this book, 257.
Grant, James, British General, share of in capture of Santa Lucia,
102-104.
Graves, Sir Thomas, British Admiral, brings reinforcement of
vessels to New York, 151;
relieves Arbuthnot in command of North American Station, 1781,
176;
difficulties of, owing to interception of communications, 177;
joined by Hood off New York, 177;
sails for the relief of Cornwallis, 178;
action of, with French fleet under de Grasse, 179-184;
conduct of, criticized by Hood, 181, 182, 184;
returns to New York, 184;
relieves Sir Peter Parker in Jamaica command, 185.
Great Britain, feeble hold of, upon Canada, 1775, 10;
shown by rewards for saving the colony, 26;
inadequate provision of force by, 1774-1776, 29, 30, 59, 62, 79,
82, 99, 112, 116, 117, 120, 127, 148, 189, 193, 226;
improper dispersion of effort by, 30, 31, 48, 52, 56, 62, 63,
72, 113-115, 151-153, 175;
distrust of Government of, among naval officers, 79, 81, 93, 95,
97, 99, 135, 146, 157, 158, 193;
alarm in, produced by Allied fleets in Channel, 1779, 117;
declares war against Holland, 1780, 158.
Grenada, British West India Island, captured by French, 105;
naval battle off, 105-112.
Haiti, French West India Island, 147, 148, 168 (see "Cap François");
squadron action off north coast of, 153-155.
Hardy, Sir Charles, British Admiral, commands Channel Fleet, 117,
119.
Holland, brought into War of American Independence by concurring
in Armed Neutrality of Baltic Powers, 1780, 3, 158, 236;
colonial possessions of, 3, 158, 160-162, 236, 240, 246;
St. Eustatius, St. Martin, and Saba, West India Islands of,
taken by Rodney, 160-162;
battle of Doggers Bank, 189-193;
fleet of, held in check by Howe, 1782, 228;
Cape of Good Hope menaced by British, saved by Suffren, 236-238;
Trincomalee, in Ceylon, taken by British, 240, recaptured by
Suffren, 247.
Hood, Sir Samuel (afterwards Lord), British Admiral, arrives in
West Indies, 1781, with reinforcements for Rodney, 160;
sent to cruise off Martinique, to intercept de Grasse, 162;
action between, and de Grasse, 163-167;
exceptional ability of, 166, 184;
French tribute to, 167;
sent by Rodney with fourteen ships-of-the-line to reinforce
North American station, 176;
under command of Admiral Graves, sails for Chesapeake, 177;
part of, in action between Graves and de Grasse, 180-183;
criticisms of, upon Graves's conduct, 181, 182, 184;
returns to West Indies, 185;
in chief command there for two months, 196-205;
brilliant operations of, at St. Kitts, 197-205;
superseded by Rodney's return, 205;
part of, in action of April 9, 1782, 208-210;
in battle of April 12, 212-221;
de Grasse's flagship strikes to, 221;
censures passed by, upon Rodney's course after the battle, 220,
222, 224, 225;
detached in pursuit, captures a small French squadron, 224;
returns to England after the peace, 226.
Hotham, William, British naval Captain, in operations against New
York, 1776, 42;
convoys reinforcement of troops to West Indies, 100;
left in West Indies in temporary command, by Rodney, 148.
Howe, Richard, Earl, British Admiral, appointed to command North
American Station, 1776, 30;
invested also with powers as peace commissioner, 39;
arrives at New York, 39;
failure of peace negotiations, 39;
operations at and about New York, 39, 42-47;
tribute of, to force under his command, 47;
accompanies army expedition to Chesapeake Bay, 52;
operations in the Delaware, 53-55, and coastwise, 56;
purpose of d'Estaing to intercept, in Delaware, 59;
serious exposure of, through inadequate force, 62, 66;
"extricates himself by rapid movements, 62-64;
preparations to defend entrance to New York, 65-68;
inferiority of force to d'Estaing, 66;
follows French Fleet to Narragansett Bay, 70, and by his
presence there induces d'Estaing to abandon siege of
Newport, and put to sea, 73;
manoeuvres of, with inferior force, 73-75;
fleet of, scattered by gale, 75;
returns to New York, 76, and again follows French Fleet to
Boston, 77;
admirable qualities of, as illustrated in this campaign, 78;
futile contemporary criticism of, 79;
relinquishes command, and returns to England, 1778, 81;
not employed again, until change of Ministry, 1782, 81, 227;
appointed to command Channel Fleet, 1782, and primary operations
there, 227-229;
successful evasion of very superior Franco-Spanish Fleet, 229;
skilful conduct of relief of Gibraltar by, 1782, 229-231;
engagement with Allied Fleet, 232;
special qualities of, again illustrated, 232;
French eulogy of, 232, and of force under his command, 233.
Howe, Sir William (brother of Earl), British General, failure of
to support Burgoyne, 1777, 28, 51, 52;
evacuates Boston, 1776, and retires to Halifax, 29, 30;
extent of regions under his command-in-chief, 30;
appointed peace commissioner, jointly with Lord Howe, 39;
goes from Halifax to New York, 39;
fruitless peace negotiations, 39;
reduction of New York by, 42-45;
subsequent operations of, to Battle of Trenton, 45-49;
constitutional sluggishness of, 45, 47;
occupies Narragansett Bay, 48;
injudicious extension of front of operations, 48;
small results after New York, 49;
rewarded with the Order of the Bath, 49;
takes the greater part of his force to Chesapeake Bay, 52;
effect of this upon Burgoyne's operations, 52, 53, 55;
occupies Philadelphia, 53;
this success worse than fruitless, 56;
relieved in command by Clinton, and returns to England, 56, 63.
Hudson River, a link in the chain of water communications from
Canada to New York, 7, 30, 45;
mentioned, 28, 41, 44, 45, 46, 49, 50, 51, 53;
alternative name, North River, 41;
Washington retreats across, into New Jersey, 45;
British advance up valley of, 1777, 55.
Hughes, Sir Edward, British Admiral, commander-in-chief in East
Indies, 1779, 235;
enterprise of, 235;
engagements with French Fleet under Suffren, 240, 242, 244, 247,
253;
loses Trincomalee, 247, and compelled thereby to leave
Coromandel coast for Bombay, 251;
reinforced by Bickerton, 251;
contrasted with Suffren, as a general officer, 254.
Hughes, Sir Richard, succeeds to West India command at peace of
1783, 226;
subsequent controversy with Nelson, 226.
Hyder, Ali, Sultan of Mysore, at war with British, 1779, 235;
French Admiral d'Orves refuses coöperation with, 235;
Suffren acts with, 240, 242;
captures Cuddalore, 1782, 244;
death of, 1782, 252;
succeeded by Tippoo Saib, 252.
_Inflexible_, British cruiser built by Sir Charles Douglas on Lake
Champlain, 1776, 16;
in herself sufficient to control the lake, 17.
Jamaica, British West India Island, 38, 110, 149, 153, 159, 176,
177, 185, 224, 226;
conquest of, intended by France and Spain, 1782, 206;
attempt leads to defeat of de Grasse by Rodney, 208, 209;
Rodney repairs to, after his victory, 225.
Japan, significance of contrast of population of, to square mile,
with that of the United States, 5.
Johnstone, George, British Commodore, commands squadron despatched
to take Cape of Good Hope from Dutch, 236;
attacked by Suffren in Porto Praya Bay, 237;
arrives at Cape too late, Suffren having strengthened it, 238;
returns to England, 238;
professional capacity of, 239;
attacks made by, upon professional conduct of Howe and Keppel,
239. (See also p. 80.)
Jones, John Paul, American naval captain, serves as a volunteer in
French Fleet, 1782, 212.
Kempenfelt, Richard, British Admiral, captures in Bay of Biscay
great part of French convoy going to West Indies, 1781,
195, 196;
commands a division in Channel Fleet under Howe, 1782, 227, 228;
lost in sinking of the _Royal George_, 229.
Keppel, Augustus, British Admiral, refuses to serve against
Americans, 81;
commander-in-chief of Channel Fleet, 1778, 61, 82;
encounter with French Brest Fleet, 83-91;
comments on the conduct of, 92, 97;
controversy with Palliser, third in command under, 95;
returns to port with fleet, 96;
court martial upon, 93;
and cited from, 87, 88, 95;
resigns command, 97;
becomes first Lord of the Admiralty, 97, 225;
quoted, 107 (note).
La Motte Picquet, French Commodore, 115;
action with a British division off Martinique, 1779, 128;
encounter with squadron under Cornwallis, 1780, 153-155;
captures great part of a British convoy returning from West
Indies, 1781, 188;
quoted, 229 (note).
Leeward Islands Station, extent of, 99;
under command of Barrington when war begins, 1778, 99;
Byron succeeds to command, 1779, 105;
held temporarily by Hyde Parker, 1779, 113;
Rodney takes command, 1780, 121, 128;
Hood in temporary charge of, 1782, 177, 185, 196-205;
Rodney relieved by Pigot, 225.
Les Saintes, small West India Islands, between Dominica and
Guadeloupe, scene of Rodney's battle with de Grasse, 209,
211, 213.
Manners, Lord Robert, British naval captain (killed in the battle
of April 12, 1782), encomiums of, upon Hood, quoted, 202,
205.
Martinique, French West India Island, 99, 104, 128, 130, 140, 141,
142, 144, 147, 149, 153, 167, 206, 207;
principal French depot in West Indies, 100;
action off, between de Grasse and Hood, 162-167.
Mathews, Thomas, British Admiral, Influence in British Navy of
court martial upon, in 1744, 93, 139.
Minorca, Mediterranean Island in British possession, Byng's action
off, 1756, 93, 94;
recovery of, a primary object with Spain, 120;
supplied by Rodney, 1780, 125, 126;
by Darby, 1781, 187;
attack upon by France and Spain, 1781, 188;
capitulates, 1782, 189.
Mobile, Farragut's attack in entering, cited in illustration, 66
(note).
Monroe Doctrine, in last analysis is the formulation, in terms, of
a purpose to prevent the propagation to the American
continents of wars arising elsewhere, 4;
recognition of same danger in unchecked Asiatic immigration, 4;
necessity of adequate force in order to maintain, 29.
Montgomery, Richard, American General, sent by the Congress to
conduct invasion of Canada, 9; killed in assault on
Quebec, 10.
Moultrie, Fort, Description of, 33.
Moultrie, William, American officer, commands Fort Moultrie when
attacked by British squadron, 32-36.
Narragansett Bay, occupation of by British, 1777, 47;
value of, 47, 56;
Rodney's opinion of, 48, 115;
description of, 69;
military and naval situation in, 1778, 72, 73;
abandonment of, by British, 1779, because of improper dispersion
of their army, 113, 114, 115;
occupied by French squadron and troops, 1780, 149, 150, 155-157;
Rodney neglects to attack, 150;
French division in, watched by British from Gardiner's Bay, 151,
170;
but starts, 1781, for Chesapeake Bay, 170;
returns to, unsuccessful, 173;
sails again from, 177, and joins main fleet in the Chesapeake,
184.
Navy, and Navies, Washington's remark that to them belonged "the
casting vote" in the War of American Independence, 4, 147;
exercised on two decisive occasions, by Arnold on Lake
Champlain, 1776, and by de Grasse at Yorktown, 1781, 4, 7,
9, 168, 176, 178, 179, 184;
decisive influence also in American War of Secession, 4;
present and future dependence upon, of Monroe Doctrine and of
question of Asiatic Immigration, 4, 5;
military explanation for this "casting vote," 5;
Pacific question essentially one of, 5;
military reasons for general dominant effect of, in War of
Independence, 6, 114;
British, saves Canada for Great Britain, 12;
specific effect, on ultimate result of the general war, exerted
by American, on Lake Champlain, 1776, 12, 13, 14, 25;
inadequacy of British, to demands upon it, 29, 30, 59, 62, 79,
82, 99, 116, 117, 120, 127, 148, 189, 193, 226;
British, in operations at New York, 1776, 40, 44, 47;
in Burgoyne's advance, 1777, 51;
misuse of British, to divide the land forces, 51, 52, 114, 115,
152;
subsidiary operations of British, 56, in the Carolinas, 151, in
Virginia, 170;
under Howe, though inadequate, saves Army under Clinton, 63, 64,
and also New York, 64-68, and subsequently Narragansett
Bay with army division at Newport, 72, 77;
tone of French, as indicated by Government instructions, and
action of officers, 83, 89, 91, 92, 166, 235;
effect of seasonal conditions upon operations of, in Europe and
in America, 98, 100, 113, 115, 147, 149, 159;
in East Indies, 251;
inefficiency of Spanish, 116, 125, 147, 189, 231, 232.
Nelson, mentioned or quoted, 38, 39, 109, 126, 132, 140, 155, 160,
202, 225, 226, 243.
New Jersey, Washington crosses from New York into, 45;
operations in, 1776, 46-49;
impracticable to British, in 1777, and consequent effect upon
Howe's course, 51, 52, 56;
retreat of British from Philadelphia through, 1778, 63, 64.
Newport, Rhode Island, taken possession of by British, 47;
importance of, 48;
siege of, by Americans and French, 70, 73, 77;
abandoned by British, 115;
occupied by French, 150, 155, 170, 173, 174, 179. See
Narragansett Bay.
New York, water communications between St. Lawrence and, 7, 8;
British occupy harbor of, 1776, 38;
operations around, 1776, 39-46;
harbor, approaches, and fortifications about, 40-42;
Washington abandons, 45, 46;
British occupy, 45;
British forces in, unable to coöperate with those in
Philadelphia, 56, 63;
Lord Howe's preparations to defend, 64-67;
d'Estaing's failure to attack, 67, 68;
Rodney goes from West Indies to, 150, 152, 159.
Order, of Battle, 93 (and note), 137-140, 191;
comparison between Keppel's, off Ushant, and Byron's, off
Grenada, 112;
Graves', off Cape Henry, 179-183, criticized by Hood, 181, 182;
Hood's at anchor off St. Kitts, 202, 203.
Palliser, Sir Hugh, British Admiral, third in command at Battle of
Ushant, 84, 87, 90, 91, 93-96;
court of inquiry upon, 95-97.
Parker, Sir Hyde, (1) British Admiral, left in temporary command
at New York by Howe, 1778, 80 (and note);
in like position in Leeward Islands by Byron, 1779-1780, 113, 128;
biographical summary of, 113;
quoted, 129, 130;
nickname of, 130;
implied censure of, by Rodney, in battle of April 17, 1780, 136;
returns to England, 136;
commands at Battle of the Dogger Bank, 189-193;
his reply to George III, 193;
ordered to East Indian command, and lost at sea, 194.
Parker, Hyde, (2) British Naval captain (afterwards Admiral Sir
Hyde), in operations about New York, 1776, 39, 44, 46;
in expedition against Savannah, 1778, 113, 114;
biographical summary of, 113 (note). (In 1801,
commander-in-chief over Nelson, at Copenhagen, 39, 80,
note).
Parker, Sir Peter, British Admiral, commands naval force in
expedition against Charleston, 1776, 31;
attack of, upon Fort Moultrie, 33-38;
gives promotion to Nelson, Collingwood, and Saumarez, 38;
at operations around New York, 38, 43, 45, and at Narragansett
Bay, 48;
commands Jamaica Station, 149, 153, 155, 159, 176, 177, 185;
superseded at Jamaica by Graves, 1781, 185.
Pellew, Edward, (afterwards Admiral Lord Exmouth), British
midshipman, at Lake Champlain, 1776, 22;
in Burgoyne's advance to Saratoga, 1777, 51.
Philadelphia, occupation of, by British, 52-55;
brief tenure of, 55;
inutility of, to British, 56;
evacuation of, by British, and hazardous retreat from, to New
York, 63, 64.
Quebec, attack upon by Americans, under Montgomery, 1775, 9, 10;
blockade of, by Arnold, 1776, 10, 11;
relieved by British navy, 10-12;
utility of, to British preparations to control Lake Champlain,
15-17, 26.
Raids, by British navy, 56, 114.
Rhode Island, 47, 48, 69, 70, 72, 77, 78, 79, 115, 150, 155. See
Narragansett Bay.
Riedesel, Baron, commander of German troops in Canada, 1776;
testimony of, to effects of delay by Arnold's flotilla on
Lake Champlain, 13, 25;
quoted, 21, 23.
Rochambeau, French general, commanding forces in America, requests
coöperation of de Grasse against Cornwallis, 168.
Rodney, Sir George (afterwards Lord), British Admiral, appointed
to command Leeward Islands Station, 1779, 115, 121;
sails to relieve Gibraltar, 122;
on the way, destroys two Spanish squadrons, 122-125;
relieves the place, and sails for West Indies, 125, 126;
actions with de Guichen, April and May, 1780, 130-135, 142-144;
censures officers of the fleet, 135-139, 145; further
proceedings in West Indies, 1780, 146-150;
takes fleet to New York, 150, and turns to West Indies, 159;
capture of Dutch islands, 1781, 160;
proceedings of, at St. Eustatius, 161, 162;
sends Hood off Martinique to intercept de Grasse, 162;
successes of de Grasse against, 167, 168;
sends Hood to New York with fleet, 176, 177, and returns to
England on leave, 177;
returns to West Indies, 1782, and rejoins Hood, 205;
pursuit of French armament against Jamaica, 207-212;
victory of, in battle of April 12, 213-220;
failure of, to improve his success, 220-225;
superseded by Pigot, and returns finally to England, 225.
Rowley, Joshua, British Admiral, brilliant conduct of, in Byron's
action, 106, 107, 109;
implicitly censured by Rodney, 136.
Sandy Hook, at entrance to New York Harbor, 52, 63, 64, 65, 66,
76, 113, 150, 177, 184, 185;
Lord Howe's preparations at, for defence of New York, 1778, 65,
66.
Santa Lucia, French West India Island, capture of, by British,
1778, 100-102;
d'Estaing's ineffectual attempt to retake, 103, 104;
military value of, 104, 207;
de Guichen seeks to retake, 142;
mentioned, 105, 106, 128, 141, 144, 148, 165, 167, 168, 206.
Saratoga, surrender of Burgoyne at, why decisive, 3, 6;
capitulation there, determined by Arnold's defence of Lake
Champlain, 3, 7, 13, 14, 25;
Burgoyne's surrender at, 28, 50-53.
Saumarez, James (afterwards Lord de), British naval officer,
midshipman at attack upon Fort Moultrie, 1776, 35, 38;
lieutenant at the battle of the Dogger Bank, 1781, 192 (note);
captain in West Indies, 1782, 196;
biographical summary of, 196 (note);
in Rodney's victory, 1782, 218, 221.
Savannah, capture of, by British, 1778, 113;
disastrous effect of operations thus initiated upon the British
position in America, 114, 115, 151-153, 175-178, 184;
failure of d'Estaing's attempt to retake, 115, 151.
Schuyler, Philip, American General, commanding Northern
Department, 1776; quoted, 12.
Seasons, effect of, upon naval operations, 98, 113, 115, 145, 149,
159, 251.
Spain, induced to enter the war, 1779, 3, 116;
cruise of fleet of, in conjunction with French, 1779, 116-121;
divergence of views between France and, 120, 121, 147, 158, 186;
two squadrons of, dispersed or destroyed by Rodney, 122-126;
inefficiency of navy of, 125, 126, 147, 158, 187-189;
fruitless cruise of fleet of, in conjunction with French, 1781,
188, 189;
projected conquest of Jamaica, 206.
St. Eustatius, Dutch West India Island, capture of, by British,
1781, 160-162;
a great trade centre in the war, prior to capture, 160.
St. Kitts, British West India Island, attacked by French, 1782, 196;
naval operations of Hood and de Grasse about, 196-205;
capitulates to French, owing to lack of British land force, 205.
St. Lawrence, River, the centre of French power in Canada, 7;
strength of, as a military line, 7, 8; as a naval line of
communications, closed by ice, 10, 11, but at other
seasons controlling, 11, 12;
relations, to the decisive naval campaign on Lake Champlain,
1776, 15-17, 25-26.
Ticonderoga, strong post at head of Lake Champlain, 8, 9, 13, 18,
20, 27, 28, 46, 50;
saved from capture in 1775, and 1776, by Arnold's naval action
on Lake Champlain, 9, 13, 25;
taken by British, 1777, but reoccupied by Americans after
Burgoyne's surrender, 28.
Tiller. See "Helm."
Tippoo Saib, Sultan of Mysore, in India, succeeds his father,
Hyder Ali, 1782, and continues his policy, 252.
Tobago, British West India Island, taken by French, 167, 168.
Trenton, battle of, 48.
Trincomalee, harbor in Ceylon, a Dutch possession in 1780,
captured by British, 1782, 240;
importance, and imperfect defences, of, 240, 242, 244, 251, 252,
255;
taken by French, 1782, 247;
naval battle off, between Hughes and Suffren, 247-251.
Ushant, battle of, 83-93.
Valcour, Island in Lake Champlain, 15, 17, 18, 20, 21, 23, 24;
selected by Arnold as the position in which to await British
advance, 1776, 15;
description of, 19, 20;
battle of, 20-23;
American retreat from, 23-25.
Washington, George, commander-in-chief of the American armies,
expression of, that the navies had "the casting vote" in
the War of Independence, 4, 151;
arrangements of, for defence of New York City, 1776, 41-43;
withdraws the exposed division on Brooklyn Heights, 43, 44;
successive retirements of, to Harlem River, to New Jersey, and
across Delaware River, 44-46;
wins battle of Trenton, 1776, and recovers great part of New
Jersey, 48, 49;
comment of, on Howe's sailing from New York, 1777, 52;
disputes, unsuccessfully, Howe's advance on Philadelphia, 53, 55;
skilful strategic position of, in New Jersey hills, 56;
comment of, upon effects of d'Estaing's long passage out, 1778,
63;
hot pursuit by, of Clinton in retreat from Philadelphia to New
York, 64;
disappointment of, at failure of French naval assistance, 1780,
150, 152;
comment of, on Arnold's treason, 152;
with Rochambeau, asks coöperation of de Grasse, 1781, 168;
movement of, against Cornwallis at Yorktown, 178, 184;
surrender of Cornwallis to, 185;
mentioned incidentally, 67, 72.
Washington, Fort, commanding Hudson River, 1776, 44, 46;
Washington orders evacuation of, 45;
stormed by British, and garrison taken, 46.
West Indies, dependence of, upon American continent, 60;
seasonal conditions in, affecting naval operations, 98, 115,
149, 159;
commercial importance of, 98;
naval battles in, 103, 106-112, 129, 130-135, 142-144, 153,
163-167, 198-205, 207-220.
White, Thomas, British naval author serving during War of American
Independence, quoted, 108, 183 (note), 204.
Yorktown, series of events which brought Cornwallis to, 152, 153,
169, 170, 174, 175;
naval actions affecting control of waters around, 170-173,
179-184;
Cornwallis shut up in, 176;
French navy in force before, 184;
French and American armies arrive before, 184;
surrender of Cornwallis at, 185.
Zoutman, Johan A., Dutch Admiral, commands the squadron at the
battle of the Dogger Bank, 189-193.
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