THE FINAL NAVAL CAMPAIGN IN THE WEST INDIES. HOOD AND DE GRASSE.
RODNEY AND DE GRASSE. THE GREAT BATTLE OF APRIL 12, 1782
The year 1781 closed with an incident more decisive in character than
most of the events that occurred in European waters during its course;
one also which transfers the interest, by natural transition, again to
the West Indies. The French government had felt throughout the summer
the necessity of sending de Grasse reinforcements both of ships and of
supplies, but the transports and material of war needed could not be
collected before December. As the British probably would attempt to
intercept a convoy upon which the next campaign so much depended,
Rear-Admiral de Guichen was ordered to accompany it clear of the Bay
of Biscay, with twelve ships of the line, and then to go to Cadiz.
Five ships of the line destined to de Grasse, and two going to the
East Indies, raised to nineteen the total force with which de Guichen
left Brest on the 10th of December. On the afternoon of the 12th, the
French being then one hundred and fifty miles to the southward and
westward of Ushant, with a south-east wind, the weather, which had
been thick and squally, suddenly cleared and showed sails to windward.
These were twelve ships of the line, one 50, and some frigates, under
Rear-Admiral Richard Kempenfelt, who had left England on the 2d of the
month, to cruise in wait for this expedition. The French numbers were
amply sufficient to frustrate any attack, but de Guichen, ordinarily
a careful officer, had allowed his ships of war to be to leeward and
ahead of the convoy. The latter scattered in every direction, as the
British swooped down upon them, but all could not escape; and the
French ships of war remained helpless spectators, while the victims
were hauling down their flags right and left. Night coming on, some
prizes could not be secured, but Kempenfelt carried off fifteen,
laden with military and naval stores of great money value and greater
military importance. A few days later a violent storm dispersed and
shattered the remainder of the French body. Two ships of the line
only, the _Triomphant_, 84, and _Brave_, 74, and five transports,
could pursue their way to the West Indies. The rest went back to
Brest. This event may be considered as opening the naval campaign of
1782 in the West Indies.
Kempenfelt, before returning to England, sent off express to Hood
in the West Indies the fireship _Tisiphone_, 8, Commander James
Saumarez,[105]--afterwards the distinguished admiral,--with news of
the French approach. Saumarez, having been first to Barbados, joined
Hood on the 31st of January, 1782, in Basse Terre Roads, on the lee
side of St. Kitts; a position from which Hood had dislodged de Grasse
six days before by a brilliant manoeuvre, resembling that which he
had contemplated[106] as open to Graves the previous September at
Chesapeake Bay for the relief of Cornwallis. The campaign for the year
1782 had opened already with an attack upon St. Kitts by the French
army and navy; and the French fleet was even then cruising close at
hand to leeward, between St. Kitts and Nevis.
The original intention of de Grasse and de Bouillé had been to capture
Barbados, the most important of the Eastern Antilles still remaining
to the British; but the heavy trade-winds, which in those days made
a winter passage to windward so long and dreary a beat, twice drove
them back to port. "The whole French fleet," wrote Hood, "appeared
off Santa Lucia on the 17th of last month, endeavouring to get
to windward, and having carried away many topmasts and yards in
struggling against very squally weather, returned to Fort Royal Bay
on the 23d, and on the 28th came out again with forty transports,
manoeuvring as before." On the 2d of January it disappeared from Santa
Lucia, and, after a short stay again at Martinique, proceeded on the
5th to St. Kitts, anchoring in Basse Terre Roads on the 11th. The
British garrison retired to Brimstone Hill, a fortified position at
the north-west of the island, while the inhabitants surrendered the
government to the French, pledging themselves to neutrality. The
adjacent island of Nevis capitulated on the same terms on the 20th.
On the 14th of January, an express sent by General Shirley, governor
of St. Kitts, had informed Hood at Barbados that a great fleet
approaching had been seen from the heights of Nevis on the 10th. Hood
at once put to sea, though short of bread and flour, which could not
be had, and with the material of his ships in wretched condition.
"When the _President_[107] joins," he wrote the Admiralty, "I shall be
twenty-two strong, with which I beg you will assure their Lordships
I will seek and give battle to the Count de Grasse, be his numbers
as they may." On the way a ship reached him with word that the French
fleet had invested St. Kitts. On the 21st he anchored at Antigua
for repairs and supplies, indispensable for keeping the sea in the
operations which he contemplated, the duration of which could not be
foreseen. About a thousand troops also were embarked, which, with the
marines that could be spared from the squadron, would give a landing
force of twenty-four hundred men.
St. Kitts being less than fifty miles from Antigua, Hood doubtless now
got accurate information of the enemy's dispositions, and could form
a definite, well-matured plan. This seems to have been carefully
imparted to all his captains, as was the practice of Nelson, who was
the pupil of Hood, if of any one. "At 9.15 A.M. the Admiral made the
signal for all flag-officers," says the log of the _Canada_; "and at
4 P.M. the Admirals and Commodore made the signals for all captains
of their divisions." At 5 P.M. of the same day, January 23d, the fleet
weighed and stood over for Nevis, round the southern point of which
Basse Terre must be approached; for, the channel between Nevis and St.
Kitts being impracticable for ships of the line, the two islands were
virtually one, and, their common axis lying north-west and south-east,
the trade-wind is fair only when coming from the south.
Basse Terre, where de Grasse then was, is about fifteen miles from the
south point of Nevis. The roadstead lies east and west, and the French
fleet, then twenty-four of the line and two fifties, were anchored
without attention to order, three or four deep; the eastern ships so
placed that an enemy coming from the southward could reach them with
the prevailing trade-wind, against which the western ships could not
beat up quickly to their support. This being so, we are told that
Hood, starting shortly before sunset with a fair, and probably fresh
wind, from a point only sixty miles distant, hoped to come upon the
French by surprise at early daybreak, to attack the weather ships,
and from them to sail along the hostile order so far as might seem
expedient. His column, thus passing in its entirety close to a certain
exposed fraction of the enemy, the latter would be cut up in detail by
the concentration upon it. The British then, wearing to the southward,
would haul their wind, tack, and again stand up to the assault, if the
enemy continued to await it.
This reasonable expectation, and skilful conception, was thwarted by
a collision, during the night, between a frigate, the _Nymphe_, 36,
and the leading ship of the line, the _Alfred_, 74. The repairs to
the latter delayed the fleet, the approach of which was discovered
by daylight. De Grasse therefore put to sea. He imagined Hood's
purpose was to throw succours into Brimstone Hill; and moreover the
position of the enemy now was between him and four ships of the line
momentarily expected from Martinique, one of which joined him on the
same day. The French were all under way by sunset, standing to the
southward under easy sail, towards the British, who had rounded the
south point of Nevis at 1 P.M. Towards dark, Hood went about and stood
also to the southward, seemingly in retreat.
During the following night the British tacked several times, to keep
their position to windward. At daylight of January 25th, the two
fleets were to the westward of Nevis; the British near the island,
the French abreast, but several miles to leeward. Foiled in his
first spring by an unexpected accident, Hood had not relinquished his
enterprise, and now proposed to seize the anchorage quitted by the
French, so establishing himself there,--as he had proposed to Graves
to do in the Chesapeake,--that he could not be dislodged. For such a
defensive position St. Kitts offered special advantages. The anchorage
was a narrow ledge, dropping precipitately to very deep water; and
it was possible so to place the ships that the enemy could not easily
anchor near them.
At 5.30 A.M. of the 25th Hood made the signal to form line of battle
on the starboard tack, at one cable interval.[108] It is mentioned
in the log of the _Canada_, 74, Captain Cornwallis, that that ship
brought-to in her station, fourth from the rear, at 7 o'clock. By 10
o'clock the line was formed, and the ships hove-to in it. At 10.45 the
signal was made to fill [to go ahead], the van ships to carry the same
sail as the Admiral,--topsails and foresails,--followed, just before
noon, by the order to prepare to anchor, with springs on the cables.
The French, who were steering south, on the port tack, while the
British were hove-to, went about as soon as the latter filled, and
stood towards them in bow and quarter line.[109]
[Illustration]
At noon the British fleet was running along close under the high land
of Nevis; so close that the _Solebay_, 28, one of the frigates inshore
of the line, grounded and was wrecked. No signals were needed, except
to correct irregularities in the order, for the captains knew what
they were to do. The French were approaching steadily, but inevitably
dropping astern with reference to the point of the enemy's line for
which they were heading. At 2 P.M. de Grasse's flagship, the _Ville
de Paris_, fired several shot at the British rear, which alone she
could reach, while his left wing was nearing the _Barfleur_, Hood's
flagship, and the vessels astern of her, the centre of the column,
which opened their fire at 2.30. Hood, trusting to his captains,
disregarded this threat to the rear half of his force. Signals flew
for the van to crowd sail and take its anchorage, and at 3.30 P.M. the
leading ships began to anchor in line ahead, (Fig. 1, a), covered as
they did so by the broadsides of the rear and the rear centre (b).
Upon the latter the French were now keeping up a smart fire. Between
the _Canada_ and her next astern, the _Prudent_, 64,--which was a
dull sailer,--there was a considerable interval. Towards it the
French admiral pressed, aiming to cut off the three rear vessels; but
Cornwallis threw everything aback and closed down upon his consort,--a
stirring deed in which he was imitated by the _Resolution_ and
_Bedford_, 74's, immediately ahead of him. De Grasse was thus foiled,
but so narrowly, that an officer, looking from one of the ships which
had anchored, asserted that for a moment he could perceive the _Ville
de Paris's_ jib inside the British line. As the rear of the latter
pushed on to its place, it cleared the broadsides of the now anchored
van and centre, (Fig. 2, a), and these opened upon the enemy, a
great part of whom were strung out behind the British column, without
opponents as yet, but hastening up to get their share of the action.
Hood's flagship, (f), which anchored at 4.03, opened fire again at
4.40 P.M. Thus, as the _Canada_ and her few companions, who bore the
brunt of the day, were shortening sail and rounding-to, (b), still
under a hot cannonade, the batteries of their predecessors were
ringing out their welcome, and at the same time covering their
movements by giving the enemy much else to think about. The _Canada_,
fetching up near the tail of the column and letting go in a hurry, ran
out two cables on end, and found upon sounding that she had dropped
her anchor in a hundred and fifty fathoms of water. The French column
stood on, off soundings, though close to, firing as it passed, and
then, wearing to the southward in succession, stood out of action on
the port tack, (c), its ineffectual broadsides adding to the grandeur
and excitement of the scene, and swelling the glory of Hood's
successful daring, of which it is difficult to speak too highly. Lord
Robert Manners, the captain of the _Resolution_, which was fifth
ship from the British rear, writing a week later, passed upon this
achievement a verdict, which posterity will confirm. "The taking
possession of this road was well judged, well conducted, and well
executed, though indeed the French had an opportunity--which they
missed--of bringing our rear to a very severe account. The van and
centre divisions brought to an anchor under the fire of the rear,
which was engaged with the enemy's centre (Fig. 1); and then the
centre, being at an anchor and properly placed, covered us while we
anchored (Fig. 2), making, I think, the most masterly manoeuvre I ever
saw." Whether regard be had to the thoughtful preparation, the crafty
management of the fleet antecedent to the final push, the calculated
audacity of the latter, or the firm and sagacious tactical handling
from the first moment to the last, Nelson himself never did a more
brilliant deed than this of Hood's.[110] All firing ceased at 5.30.
Naturally, an order taken up under such conditions needed some
rectifying before further battle. As the proper stationing of the
fleet depended in great measure upon the position of the van ship,
Hood had put a local pilot on board her; but when the action ceased,
he found that she was not as close to the shore as he had intended.
The rear, on the other hand, was naturally in the most disorder, owing
to the circumstances attending its anchorage. Three ships from the
rear were consequently directed to place themselves ahead of the van,
closing the interval, while others shifted their berths, according
to specific directions. The order as finally assumed (Fig. 3) was as
follows. The van ship was anchored so close to the shore that it was
impossible to pass within her, or, with the prevailing wind, even to
reach her, because of a point and shoal just outside, covering her
position. From her the line extended in a west-north-west direction
to the fifteenth ship,--the _Barfleur_, 98, Hood's flagship,--when it
turned to north, the last six ships being on a north and south line.
These six, with their broadsides turned to the westward, prevented a
column passing from south to north, the only way one could pass, from
enfilading the main line with impunity. The latter covered with its
guns the approach from the south. All the ships had springs on their
cables, enabling them to turn their sides so as to cover a large arc
of a circle with their batteries.
[Illustration]
At daylight on the following morning, January 26th, the ships began
changing their places, the French being then seven or eight miles
distant in the south-south-east. At 7 A.M. they were seen to be
approaching in line of battle, under a press of sail, heading for the
British van. The _Canada_, which had begun at 5 A.M. to tackle her
200-odd fathoms of cable, was obliged to cut, whereby "we lost the
small bower anchor and two cables with one 8-inch and one 9-inch
hawsers, which were bent for springs." The ship had to work to
windward to close with the fleet, and was therefore ordered by the
Rear-Admiral to keep engaging under way, until 10.50, when a message
was sent her to anchor in support of the rear. The action began
between 8.30 and 9 A.M., the leading French ship heading for the
British van, seemingly with the view of passing round and inside it.
Against this attempt Hood's precautions probably were sufficient; but
as the enemy's vessel approached, the wind headed her, so that she
could only fetch the third ship. The latter, with the vessels ahead
and astern, sprung their batteries upon her. "The crash occasioned by
their destructive broadsides was so tremendous on board her that whole
pieces of plank were seen flying from her off side, ere she could
escape the cool concentrated fire of her determined adversaries."[111]
She put her helm up, and ran along outside the British line, receiving
the first fire of each successive ship. Her movement was imitated by
her followers, some keeping off sooner, some later; but de Grasse in
his flagship not only came close, but pointed his after yards to the
wind,[112] to move the slower. As he ported his helm when leaving the
_Barfleur_, this brought these sails aback, keeping him a still longer
time before the British ships thrown to the rear. "In this he was
supported by those ships which were astern, or immediately ahead of
him. During this short but tremendous conflict in that part of the
field of battle, nothing whatever could be seen of them for upwards
of twenty minutes, save de Grasse's white flag at the main-topgallant
masthead of the _Ville de Paris_, gracefully floating above the
immense volumes of smoke that enveloped them, or the pennants of those
ships which were occasionally perceptible, when an increase of breeze
would waft away the smoke."[113]
[Illustration]
Though most gallantly done, no such routine manoeuvre as this could
shake Hood's solidly assumed position. The attempt was repeated in the
afternoon, but more feebly, and upon the centre and rear only. This
also was ineffectual; and Hood was left in triumphant possession of
the field. The losses in the several affairs of the two days had been:
British, 72 killed, 244 wounded; French, 107 killed, 207 wounded.
Thenceforth the French fleet continued cruising to leeward of the
island, approaching almost daily, frequently threatening attack, and
occasionally exchanging distant shots; but no serious encounter took
place. Interest was centred on Brimstone Hill, where alone on the
island the British flag still flew. De Grasse awaited its surrender,
flattering himself that the British would be forced then to put
to sea, and that his fleet, increased by successive arrivals to
thirty-two of the line, would then find an opportunity to crush the
man who had outwitted and out-manoeuvred him on January 25th and 26th.
In this hope he was deceived by his own inaptness and his adversary's
readiness. Hood was unable to succour Brimstone Hill, for want of
troops; the French having landed six thousand men, against which the
British twenty-four hundred could effect nothing, either alone or in
coöperation with the garrison, which was but twelve hundred strong.
The work capitulated on the 13th of February. De Grasse, who had
neglected to keep his ships provisioned, went next day to Nevis and
anchored there to empty the storeships. That evening Hood called
his captains on board, explained his intentions, had them set their
watches by his, and at 11 P.M. the cables were cut one by one, lights
being left on the buoys, and the fleet silently decamped, passing
round the north end of St. Kitts, and so towards Antigua. When de
Grasse opened his eyes next morning, the British were no longer to be
seen. "Nothing could have been more fortunately executed," wrote Lord
Robert Manners, "as not one accident happened from it. Taking the
whole in one light, though not successful in the point we aimed at,
nevertheless it was well conducted, and has given the enemy a pretty
severe check; and if you give him half the credit the enemy does, Sir
Samuel Hood will stand very high in the public estimation."
Hood's intention had been to return to Barbados; but on the 25th of
February he was joined, to windward of Antigua, by Rodney, who had
arrived from England a week earlier, bringing with him twelve ships of
the line. The new Commander-in-Chief endeavoured to cut off de Grasse
from Martinique, but the French fleet got in there on the 26th.
Rodney consequently went to Santa Lucia, to refit Hood's ships, and
to prepare for the coming campaign, in which it was understood that
the conquest of Jamaica was to be the first object of the allies.
An important condition to their success was the arrival of a great
convoy, known to be on its way from Brest to repair the losses
which Kempenfelt's raid and subsequent bad weather had inflicted in
December. Hood suggested to Rodney to halve the fleet, which then
numbered thirty-six of the line, letting one part cruise north of
Dominica, between that island and Deseada, while the other guarded
the southern approach, between Martinique and Santa Lucia. Rodney,
however, was unwilling to do this, and adopted a half-measure,--Hood's
division being stationed to windward of the north end of Martinique,
reaching only as far north as the latitude of Dominica, while the
center and rear were abreast of the centre and south of Martinique;
all in mutual touch by intermediate vessels. It would seem--reading
between the lines--that Hood tried to stretch his cruising ground
northwards, in pursuance of his own ideas, but Rodney recalled him.
The French convoy consequently passed north of Deseada, convoyed by
two ships of the line, and on the 20th of March reached Martinique
safely. De Grasse's force was thus raised to thirty-five of the line,
including two 50-gun ships, as against the British thirty-six. At the
end of the month Rodney returned to Santa Lucia, and there remained at
anchor, vigilantly watching the French fleet in Fort Royal by means of
a chain of frigates.
The problem now immediately confronting de Grasse--the first step
towards the conquest of Jamaica--was extremely difficult. It was to
convoy to Cap François the supply vessels essential to his enterprise,
besides the merchant fleet bound for France; making in all one hundred
and fifty unarmed ships to be protected by his thirty-five sail of the
line, in face of the British thirty-six. The trade-wind being fair,
he purposed to skirt the inner northern edge of the Caribbean Sea;
by which means he would keep close to a succession of friendly ports,
wherein the convoy might find refuge in case of need.
With this plan the French armament put to sea on the 8th of April,
1782. The fact being reported promptly to Rodney, by noon his whole
fleet was clear of its anchorage and in pursuit. Then was evident the
vital importance of Barrington's conquest of Santa Lucia; for, had the
British been at Barbados, the most probable alternative, the French
movement not only would have been longer unknown, but pursuit would
have started from a hundred miles distant, instead of thirty. If the
British had met this disadvantage by cruising before Martinique, they
would have encountered the difficulty of keeping their ships supplied
with water and other necessaries, which Santa Lucia afforded. In
truth, without in any degree minimizing the faults of the loser, or
the merits of the winner, in the exciting week that followed, the
opening situation may be said to have represented on either side an
accumulation of neglects or of successes, which at the moment of their
occurrence may have seemed individually trivial; a conspicuous warning
against the risk incurred by losing single points in the game of war.
De Grasse was tremendously handicapped from the outset by the errors
of his predecessors and of himself. That the British had Santa Lucia
as their outpost was due not only to Barrington's diligence, but also
to d'Estaing's slackness and professional timidity; and it may be
questioned whether de Grasse himself had shown a proper understanding
of strategic conditions, when he neglected that island in favour of
Tobago and St. Kitts. Certainly, Hood had feared for it greatly the
year before. That the convoy was there to embarrass his movements,
may not have been the fault of the French admiral; but it was greatly
and entirely his fault that, of the thirty-six ships pursuing him,
twenty-one represented a force that he might have crushed in detail
a few weeks before,--not to mention the similar failure of April,
1781.[114]
Large bodies of ships commonly will move less rapidly than small. By
2.30 P.M. of the day of starting, Rodney's look-outs had sighted the
French fleet; and before sundown it could be seen from the mastheads
of the main body. At 6 next morning, April 9th, the enemy, both
fleet and convoy, was visible from the deck of the _Barfleur_, the
flagship of Hood's division, then in the British van. The French bore
north-east, distant four to twelve miles, extending from abreast of
the centre of Dominica northwards towards Guadeloupe. The British had
gained much during the night, and their centre was now off Dominica to
leeward of the enemy's rear, which was becalmed under the island. Some
fourteen or fifteen of the French van, having opened out the channel
between Dominica and Guadeloupe, felt a fresh trade-wind, from east by
north, with which they steered north; and their number was gradually
increased as individual ships, utilising the catspaws, stole clear of
the high land of Dominica. Hood's division in like manner, first among
the British, got the breeze, and, with eight ships, the commander of
the van stood north in order of battle. To the north-west of him were
two French vessels, separated from their consorts and threatened to
be cut off (i). These stood boldly down and crossed the head of Hood's
column; one passing so close to the leading ship, the _Alfred_, that
the latter had to bear up to let her pass. Rodney had hoisted a signal
to engage at 6.38 A.M., but had hauled it down almost immediately,
and Hood would not fire without orders. These ships therefore rejoined
their main body unharmed. At 8.30 the French hoisted their colours,
and shortly afterwards the vessels which had cleared Dominica tacked
and stood south, opposite to Hood.
De Grasse now had recognised that he could not escape action, if
the convoy kept company. He therefore directed the two 50-gun ships,
_Expériment_ and _Sagittaire_, to accompany it into Guadeloupe, where
it arrived safely that day (Position 1, dd); and he decided that the
fleet should ply to windward through the channel between Dominica
and Guadeloupe, nearly midway in which lies a group of small islands
called Les Saintes,--a name at times given to the battle of April
12th. By this course he hoped not only to lead the enemy away from
the convoy, but also to throw off pursuit through his superior speed,
and so to accomplish his mission unharmed. The French ships, larger,
deeper, and with better lines than their opponents, were naturally
better sailers, and it may be inferred that even coppering had not
entirely overcome this original disadvantage of the British.
At the very moment of beginning his new policy, however, a subtle
temptation assailed de Grasse irresistibly, in the exposed position of
Hood's column (h); and he met it, not by a frank and hearty acceptance
of a great opportunity, but by a half-measure. Hood thoroughly
crushed, the British fleet became hopelessly inferior to the French;
Hood damaged, and it became somewhat inferior: possibly it would
be deterred from further pursuit. De Grasse decided for this second
course, and ordered part of his fleet to attack. This operation was
carried out under the orders of the Marquis de Vaudreuil, the second
in command. The ships engaged in it bore down from the windward,
attacked Hood's rear ships, stood along northward (f) on the weather
side of his column at long range, and, having passed ahead, tacked (t)
in succession and formed again in the rear, (f^2) whence they repeated
the same manoeuvre (Positions 1 and 2). Thus a procession of fifteen
ships kept passing by eight, describing a continuous curve of
elliptical form. They were able to do this because Hood was condemned
to a low speed, lest he should draw too far away from the British
centre (a) and rear (c), still becalmed under Dominica (Position 2).
The French, having choice of distance, kept at long gunshot, because
they were deficient in carronades, of which the British had many.
These guns, of short range but large calibre, were thus rendered
useless. Could they have come into play, the French rigging and sails
would have suffered severely. This first engagement (Position 1)
lasted, by Hood's log, from 9.48 to 10.25 A.M. It was resumed in
stronger force (Position 2) at 14 minutes past noon, and continued
till 1.45 P.M., when firing ceased for that day; Rodney hauling
down the signal for battle at 2. Between the two affairs, which were
identical in general character, Hood's column was reinforced, and
great part of the British centre also got into action with some of
the French main body, though at long range only. "Except the two rear
ships," wrote Rodney to Hood that night, "the others fired at such a
distance that I returned none."
[Illustration]
The injuries to the British ships engaged were not such as to compel
them to leave the fleet. The _Royal Oak_ lost her main topmast, and
that of the _Warrior_ fell two days later, not improbably from wounds;
but in these was nothing that the ready hands of seamen could not
repair so as to continue the chase. Rodney, therefore, contented
himself with reversing the order of sailing, putting Hood in the rear,
whereby he was able to refit, and yet follow fast enough not to be out
of supporting distance. This circumstance caused Hood's division to
be in the rear in the battle of the 12th. One of the French ships,
the _Caton_, 64, had been so injured that de Grasse detached her into
Guadeloupe. It must be remembered that a crippled ship in a chased
fleet not only embarrasses movement, but may compromise the whole
body, if the latter delay to protect it; whereas the chaser keeps
between his lame birds and the enemy.
During the night of the 9th the British lay-to for repairs. The next
morning they resumed the pursuit, turning to windward after the
enemy, but upon the whole losing throughout the 10th and the 11th. At
daylight of the 10th the French, by the logs of Hood and Cornwallis,
were "from four to five leagues distant," "just in sight from the
deck." During that night, however, the _Zélé_, 74, had collided with
the _Jason_, 64; and the latter was injured so far as to be compelled
to follow the _Caton_ into Guadeloupe. At sunset of that day Rodney
signalled a general chase to windward, the effect of which was to
enable each ship to do her best according to her captain's judgment
during the dark hours. Nevertheless, on the morning of the 11th
the French seem again to have gained, for Hood, who, it will be
remembered, was now in the rear, notes that at 10 A.M. twenty-two
French sail (not all the fleet) could be counted _from the masthead_;
Cornwallis, further to windward, could count thirty-three. Troude,
a French authority, says that at that time nearly all the French had
doubled The Saintes, that is, had got to windward of them, and it
looked as though de Grasse might succeed in throwing off his pursuer.
Unluckily, two ships, the _Magnanime_, 74, and the _Zélé_, 74, the
latter of which had lost her main topmast, were several miles to
leeward of the French main body. It was necessary to delay, or to drop
those vessels. Again, trivial circumstances conspired to further a
great disaster, and de Grasse bore down to cover the crippled ships;
so losing much of his hard-won ground, and entailing a further
misfortune that night. Rodney hung doggedly on, relying on the
chapter of accidents, as one who knows that all things come to him
who endures. To be sure, there was not much else he could do; yet
he deserves credit for unremitting industry and pluck. During the
afternoon, the signals noted in the British logs--to call in all
cruisers and for the fleet to close--attest mutely the movement of de
Grasse in bearing down,--coming nearer.
[Illustration]
During the night, at 2 A.M. of April 12th, the _Zélé_ and de Grasse's
flagship, the _Ville de Paris_, 110, crossing on opposite tacks, came
into collision. The former lost both foremast and bowsprit. It has
been stated by John Paul Jones, who by permission of Congress embarked
a few months later on board the French fleet as a volunteer, and
doubtless thus heard many personal narratives, that this accident
was due to the deficiency of watch-officers in the French navy; the
deck of the _Zélé_ being in charge of a young ensign, instead of
an experienced lieutenant. It was necessary to rid the fleet of the
_Zélé_ at once, or an action could not be avoided; so a frigate
was summoned to tow her, and the two were left to make their way to
Guadeloupe, while the others resumed the beat to windward. At 5 A.M.
she and the frigate were again under way, steering for Guadeloupe, to
the north-west, making from five to six miles (Position 3, a); but in
the interval they had been nearly motionless, and consequently when
day broke at 5.30 they were only two leagues from the _Barfleur_,
Hood's flagship, which, still in the British rear, was then standing
south on the port tack. The body of the French, (Position 3), was at
about the same distance as on the previous evening,--ten to fifteen
miles,--but the _Ville de Paris_ (c) not more than eight. Just before
6 A.M. Rodney signalled Hood, who was nearest, to chase the _Zélé_;
and four of the rearmost ships of the line were detached for that
purpose (b). De Grasse, seeing this, signalled his vessels at 6 A.M.
to close the flagship, making all sail; and he himself bore down to
the westward (cc'), on the port tack, but running free, to frighten
away Rodney's chasers. The British Admiral kept them out until 7
o'clock, by which time de Grasse was fairly committed to his false
step. All cruisers were then called in, and the line was closed to one
cable.[115] Within an hour were heard the opening guns of the great
battle, since known by the names of the 12th of April, or of The
Saintes, and, in the French navy, of Dominica. The successive losses
of the _Caton_, _Jason_, and _Zélé_, with the previous detachment of
the two 50-gun ships with the convoy, had reduced the French numbers
from thirty-five to thirty effective vessels. The thirty-six British
remained undiminished.
The British appear to have been standing to the south on the port
tack at daylight; but, soon after sending out the chasers, Rodney had
ordered the line of bearing (from ship to ship) to be north-north-east
to south-south-west, evidently in preparation for a close-hauled line
of battle on the starboard tack, heading northerly to an east wind.
Somewhat unusually, the wind that morning held at south-east for some
time, enabling the British to lie up as high as east-north-east on
the starboard tack (Position 3, d), on which they were when the battle
joined; and this circumstance, being very favourable for gaining to
windward,--to the eastward,--doubtless led to the annulling of the
signal for the line of bearing, half an hour after it was made, and
the substitution for it of the line of battle ahead at one cable. It
is to be inferred that Rodney's first purpose was to tack together,
thus restoring Hood to the van, his natural station; but the accident
of the wind holding to the southward placed the actual van--regularly
the rear--most to windward, and rendered it expedient to tack in
succession, instead of all together, preserving to the full the
opportunity which chance had extended for reaching the enemy. In the
engagement, therefore, Hood commanded in the rear, and Rear-Admiral
Drake in the van. The wind with the French seems to have been more to
the eastward than with the British,--not an unusual circumstance in
the neighbourhood of land.
As Rodney, notwithstanding his haste, had formed line from time to
time during the past three days, his fleet was now in good order, and
his signals were chiefly confined to keeping it closed. The French, on
the other hand, were greatly scattered when their Commander-in-Chief,
in an impulse of hasty, unbalanced judgment, abandoned his previous
cautious policy and hurried them into action. Some of them were over
ten miles to windward of the flagship. Though they crowded sail to
rejoin her, there was not time enough for all to take their stations
properly, between daylight and 8 A.M., when the firing began. "Our
line of battle was formed under the fire of musketry,"[116] wrote the
Marquis de Vaudreuil, the second in command, who, being in the rear
of the fleet on this occasion, and consequently among the last to be
engaged, had excellent opportunity for observation. At the beginning
it was in de Grasse's power to postpone action, until the order should
be formed, by holding his wind under short canvas; while the mere
sight of his vessels hurrying down for action would have compelled
Rodney to call in the ships chasing the _Zélé_, the rescue of which
was the sole motive of the French manoeuvre. Instead of this, the
French flagship kept off the wind; which precipitated the collision,
while at the same time delaying the preparations needed to sustain it.
To this de Grasse added another fault by forming on the port tack,
the contrary to that on which the British were, and standing southerly
towards Dominica. The effect of this was to bring his ships into the
calms and baffling winds which cling to the shore-line, thus depriving
them of their power of manoeuvre. His object probably was to confine
the engagement to a mere pass-by on opposite tacks, by which in all
previous instances the French had thwarted the decisive action that
Rodney sought. Nevertheless, the blunder was evident at once to
French eyes. "What evil genius has inspired the admiral?" exclaimed du
Pavillon, Vaudreuil's flag-captain, who was esteemed one of the best
tacticians in France, and who fell in the battle.
[Illustration]
As the two lines drew near to one another, standing, the French south,
the British east-north-east, the wind shifted back to the eastward,
allowing the French to head higher, to south-south-east, and knocking
the British off to north-north-east (Position 4). The head of the
French column thus passed out of gunshot, across the bows of Rodney's
leading vessel, the _Marlborough_, (m), which came within range when
abreast the eighth ship. The first shots were fired by the _Brave_,
74, ninth in the French line, at 8 A.M. The British captain then put
his helm up and ran slowly along, north-north-west, under the lee of
the French, towards their rear. The rest of the British fleet followed
in his wake. The battle thus assumed the form of passing in opposite
directions on parallel lines; except that the French ships, as they
successively cleared the point where the British column struck their
line, would draw out of fire, their course diverging thenceforth from
that of the British approach. The effect of this would be that the
British rear, when it reached that point, would be fresh, having
undergone no fire, and with that advantage would encounter the French
rear, which had received already the fire of the British van and
centre. To obviate this, by bringing his own van into action, de
Grasse signalled the van ships to lead south-south-west, parallel
with the British north-north-east (4, a). The engagement thus became
general all along the lines; but it is probable that the French van
was never well formed. Its commander, at all events, reached his post
later than the commander of the rear did his.[117]
At five minutes past eight, Rodney made a general signal for close
action, followed immediately by another for the leading ships to head
one point to starboard--towards the enemy--which indicates that he
was not satisfied with the distance first taken by the _Marlborough_.
The _Formidable_, his flagship, eighteenth in the column, began
to fire at 8.23;[118] but the _Barfleur_, Hood's flagship, which
was thirty-first, not till 9.25. This difference in time is to be
accounted for chiefly by the light airs near Dominica, contrasted
with the fresh trades in the open channel to the northward, which the
leading British vessels felt before their rear. De Grasse now, too
late, had realised the disastrous effect which this would have upon
his fleet. If he escaped all else, his ships, baffled by calms and
catspaws while the British had a breeze, must lose the weather-gage,
and with it the hope of evading pursuit, hitherto his chief
preoccupation. Twice he signalled to wear,--first, all together, then
in succession,--but, although the signals were seen, they could not
be obeyed with the enemy close under the lee. "The French fleet,"
comments Chevalier justly, "had freedom of movement no longer. A fleet
cannot wear with an enemy's fleet within musket-range to leeward."
The movement therefore continued as described, the opposing ships
slowly "sliding by" each other until about 9.15, when the wind
suddenly shifted back to south-east again. The necessity of keeping
the sails full forced the bows of each French vessel towards the enemy
(Position 5), destroying the order in column, and throwing the fleet
into _échelon_, or, as the phrase then was, into bow and quarter
line.[119] The British, on the contrary, were free either to hold
their course or to head towards the enemy. Rodney's flagship (5, a)
luffed, and led through the French line just astern of the _Glorieux_,
74, (g), which was the nineteenth in their order. She was followed
by five ships; and her next ahead also, the _Duke_ (d), seeing her
chief's movement, imitated it, breaking through the line astern of the
twenty-third French. The _Glorieux_, on the starboard hand of Rodney's
little column, received its successive broadsides. Her main and mizzen
masts went overboard at 9.28, when the _Canada_, third astern of
the _Formidable_, had just passed her; and a few moments later her
foremast and bowsprit fell. At 9.33 the _Canada_ was to windward of
the French line. The flagship _Formidable_ was using both broadsides
as she broke through the enemy's order. On her port hand, between her
and the _Duke_, were four French ships huddled together (c), one of
which had paid off the wrong way; that is, after the shift of wind
took her aback, her sails had filled on the opposite tack from that
of the rest of her fleet.[120] These four, receiving the repeated
broadsides, at close quarters, of the _Formidable_, _Duke_, and
_Namur_, and having undergone besides the fire of the British van,
were very severely mauled. While these things were happening, the
_Bedford_, the sixth astern of the _Formidable_, perhaps unable to
see her next ahead in the smoke, had luffed independently (b), and was
followed by the twelve rearmost British ships, whom she led through
the French order astern of the _César_, 74, (k), twelfth from the van.
This ship and her next ahead, the _Hector_, 74, (h), suffered as did
the _Glorieux_. The _Barfleur_, which was in the centre of this column
of thirteen, opened fire at 9.25. At 10.45 she "ceased firing, having
passed the enemy's van ships;" that is, she was well on the weather
side of the French fleet. Some of the rearmost of Hood's division,
however, were still engaged at noon; but probably all were then to
windward of the enemy.
[Illustration]
The British ships ahead of the _Duke_, the van and part of the centre,
in all sixteen sail, had continued to stand to the northward. At the
time Rodney broke the line, several of them must have passed beyond
the French rear, and out of action. One, the _America_, the twelfth
from the van, wore without signals, to pursue the enemy, and her
example was followed at once by the ship next ahead, the _Russell_,
Captain Saumarez. No signal following, the _America_ again wore and
followed her leaders, but the _Russell_ continued as she was, now
to windward of the French; by which course she was able to take a
conspicuous share in the closing scenes. At 11.33 Rodney signalled the
van to tack, but the delay of an hour or more had given the _Russell_
a start over the other ships of her division "towards the enemy" which
could not be overcome.
The effect of these several occurrences had been to transfer the
weather-gage, the position for attack, to the British from the French,
and to divide the latter also into three groups, widely separated
and disordered (Position 6). In the centre was the flagship _Ville de
Paris_ with five ships (c). To windward of her, and two miles distant,
was the van, of some dozen vessels (v). The rear was four miles away
to leeward (r). To restore the order, and to connect the fleet again,
it was decided to re-form on the leewardmost ships; and several
signals to this effect were made by de Grasse. They received but
imperfect execution. The manageable vessels succeeded easily enough
in running before the wind to leeward, but, when there, exactitude of
position and of movement was unattainable to ships in various degrees
of disability, with light and baffling side airs. The French were
never again in order after the wind shifted and the line was broken;
but the movement to leeward left the dismasted _Glorieux_, (g),
_Hector_, (h), and _César_, (k), motionless between the hostile lines.
It has been remarked, disparagingly, that the British fleet also
was divided into three by the manoeuvre of breaking the line. This
is true; but the advantage remained with it incontestably, in two
respects. By favor of the wind, each of the three groups had been able
to maintain its general formation in line or column, instead of being
thrown entirely out, as the French were; and passing thus in column
along the _Glorieux_, _Hector_, and _César_, they wrought upon these
three ships a concentration of injury which had no parallel among the
British vessels. The French in fact had lost three ships, as well as
the wind. To these certain disadvantages is probably to be added a
demoralisation among the French crews, from the much heavier losses
resultant upon the British practice of firing at the hull. An officer
present in the action told Sir John Ross[121] afterwards that the
French fired very high throughout; and he cited in illustration that
the three trucks[122] of the British _Princesa_ were shot away. Sir
Gilbert Blane, who, though Physician to the Fleet, obtained permission
to be on deck throughout the action, wrote ten days after it, "I
can aver from my own observation that the French fire slackens as we
approach, and is totally silent when we are close alongside." It is
needless to say that a marked superiority of fire will silence that of
the bravest enemy; and the practice of aiming at the spars and sails,
however suited for frustrating an approach, substantially conceded
that superiority upon which the issue of decisive battle depends. As
illustrative of this result, the British loss will be stated here. It
was but 243 killed and 816 wounded in a fleet of thirty-six sail. The
highest in any one ship was that of the _Duke_, 73 killed and wounded.
No certain account, or even very probable estimate, of the French loss
has ever been given. None is cited by French authorities. Sir Gilbert
Blane, who was favourably placed for information, reckoned that of
the _Ville de Paris_ alone to be 300. There being fifty-four hundred
troops distributed among the vessels of the fleet, the casualties
would be proportionately more numerous; but, even allowing for this,
there can be no doubt that the loss of the French, to use Chevalier's
words, "was certainly much more considerable" than that reported by
the British. Six post-captains out of thirty were killed, against two
British out of thirty-six.
Rodney did not make adequate use of the great opportunity, which
accident rather than design had given him at noon of April 12th. He
did allow a certain liberty of manoeuvre, by discontinuing the order
for the line of battle; but the signal for close action, hoisted at
1 P.M., was hauled down a half-hour later. Hood, who realised the
conditions plainly visible, as well as the reasonable inferences
therefrom, wished the order given for a general chase, which would
have applied the spur of emulation to every captain present, without
surrendering the hold that particular signals afford upon indiscreet
movements. He bitterly censured the Admiral's failure to issue this
command. Had it been done, he said:--
"I am very confident we should have had twenty sail of the
enemy's ships before dark. Instead of that, he pursued only
under his topsails (sometimes his foresail was set and at
others his mizzen topsail aback) the greatest part of the
afternoon, though the _flying_ enemy had all the sail set
their very shattered state would allow."[123]
To make signal for a general chase was beyond the competence of a
junior admiral; but Hood did what he could, by repeated signals to
individual ships of his own division to make more sail, by setting all
he could on the _Barfleur_, and by getting out his boats to tow
her head round. Sir Gilbert Blane unintentionally gives a similar
impression of laxity.
"After cutting the French line, the action during the rest of
the day was partial and desultory, the enemy never being able
to form, and several of the [our] ships being obliged to lie
by and repair their damages. As the signal for the line
was now hauled down, every ship annoyed the enemy as their
respective commanders judged best."[124]
For this indolent abandonment of the captains to their own devices,
the correctest remedy was, as Hood indicated, the order for a general
chase, supplemented by a watchful supervision, which should check the
over-rash and stimulate the over-cautious. If Hood's account of the
sail carried by Rodney be correct, the Commander-in-Chief did not
even set the best example. In this languid pursuit, the three crippled
French ships were overhauled, and of course had to strike; and a
fourth, the _Ardent_, 64, was taken, owing to her indifferent sailing.
Towards sunset the flagship _Ville de Paris_, 110,[125] the finest
ship of war afloat, having been valiantly defended against a host of
enemies throughout great part of the afternoon, and having expended
all her ammunition, hauled down her colours. The two British
vessels then immediately engaged with her were the _Russell_ and
the _Barfleur_, Hood's flagship, to the latter of which she formally
surrendered; the exact moment, noted in Hood's journal, being 6.29
P.M.
At 6.45 Rodney made the signal for the fleet to bring-to (form line
and stop) on the port tack, and he remained lying-to during the night,
while the French continued to retreat under the orders of the
Marquis de Vaudreuil, who by de Grasse's capture had become
commander-in-chief. For this easy-going deliberation also Hood had
strong words of condemnation.
"Why he should bring the fleet to because the _Ville de Paris_
was taken, I cannot reconcile. He did not pursue under easy
sail, so as never to have lost sight of the enemy in the
night, which would clearly and most undoubtedly have enabled
him to have taken almost every ship the next day.... Had I
had the honour of commanding his Majesty's noble fleet on the
12th, I may, without much imputation of vanity, say the flag
of England should now have graced the sterns of _upwards_ of
twenty sail of the enemy's ships of the line."[126]
Such criticisms by those not responsible are to be received generally
with caution; but Hood was, in thought and in deed, a man so much
above the common that these cannot be dismissed lightly. His opinion
is known to have been shared by Sir Charles Douglas, Rodney's Captain
of the Fleet;[127] and their conclusion is supported by the inferences
to be drawn from Rodney's own assumptions as to the condition of
the French, contrasted with the known facts. The enemy, he wrote,
in assigning his reasons for not pursuing, "went off in a _close
connected body_,[128] and might have defeated, by rotation, the ships
that had come up with them." "The enemy _who went off in a body of
twenty-six ships of the line_,[128] might, by ordering two or three
of their best sailing ships or frigates to have shown lights at times,
and by changing their course, have induced the British fleet to have
followed them, while the main of their fleet, by hiding their lights,
might have hauled their wind, and have been far to windward by
daylight, and intercepted the captured ships, and the most crippled
ships of the English;" and he adds that the Windward Islands even
might have been endangered. That such action was in a remote degree
possible to a well-conditioned fleet may be guardedly conceded; but it
was wildly improbable to a fleet staggering under such a blow as the
day had seen, which had changed its commander just as dark came on,
and was widely scattered and disordered up to the moment when signals
by flags became invisible.
The facts, however, were utterly at variance with these ingenious
suppositions. Instead of being connected, as Rodney represents, de
Vaudreuil had with him next morning but ten ships; and no others
during the whole of the 13th. He made sail for Cap François, and was
joined on the way by five more, so that at no time were there upwards
of fifteen[129] French ships of the line together, prior to his
arrival at that port on April 25th. He there found four others of the
fleet. The tale of twenty-five survivors, from the thirty engaged on
April 12th, was completed by six which had gone to Curaçao, and which
did not rejoin until May. So much for the close connected body of the
French. It is clear, therefore, that Rodney's reasons illustrate the
frame of mind against which Napoleon used to caution his generals
as "making to themselves a picture" of possibilities; and that his
conclusion at best was based upon the ruinous idea, which a vivid
imagination or slothful temper is prone to present to itself, that
war may be made decisive without running risks. That Jamaica even
was saved was not due to this fine, but indecisive battle, but to the
hesitation of the allies. When de Vaudreuil reached Cap François, he
found there the French convoy safely arrived from Guadeloupe, and also
a body of fifteen Spanish ships of the line. The troops available for
the descent upon Jamaica were from fifteen to twenty thousand. Well
might Hood write: "Had Sir George Rodney's judgment, after the enemy
had been so totally put to flight, borne any proportion to the high
courage, zeal and exertion, so very manifestly shown by every captain,
_all_ difficulty would now have been at an end. We might have
done just as we pleased, instead of being at this hour upon the
defensive."[130]
The allies, however, though superior in numbers, did not venture
to assume the offensive. After the battle, Rodney remained near
Guadeloupe until the 17th of April, refitting, and searching the
neighbouring islands, in case the French fleet might have entered some
one of them. For most of this time the British were becalmed, but Hood
remarks that there had been wind enough to get twenty leagues to the
westward; and there more wind probably would have been found. On the
17th Hood was detached in pursuit with ten sail of the line; and a
day or two later Rodney himself started for Jamaica. Left to his own
discretion, Hood pushed for the Mona Passage, between Puerto Rico and
Santo Domingo, carrying studding-sails below and aloft in his haste.
At daybreak of the 19th he sighted the west end of Puerto Rico; and
soon afterwards a small French squadron was seen. A general chase
resulted in the capture of the _Jason_ and _Caton_, sixty-fours, which
had parted from their fleet before the battle and were on their way to
Cap François. A frigate, the _Aimable_, 32, and a sloop, the _Cérès_,
18, also were taken. In reporting this affair to Rodney, Hood got a
thrust into his superior. "It is a very mortifying circumstance to
relate to you, Sir, that the French fleet which you put to flight
on the 12th went through the Mona Channel on the 18th, only the day
before I was in it."[131] A further proof of the utility of pursuit,
here hinted at, is to be found in the fact that Rodney, starting six
days later than de Vaudreuil, reached Jamaica, April 28th, only three
days after the French got into Cap François. He had therefore gained
three days in a fortnight's run. What might not have been done by an
untiring chase! But a remark recorded by Hood summed up the frame of
mind which dominated Rodney: "I lamented to Sir George on the 13th
that the signal for a general chase was not made when that for the
line was hauled down and that he did not continue to pursue so as to
keep sight of the enemy all night, to which he only answered, 'Come,
we have done very handsomely as it is.'"[132]
Rodney stayed at Jamaica until the 10th of July, when Admiral
Hugh Pigot arrived from England to supersede him. This change was
consequent upon the fall of Lord North's ministry, in March, 1782, and
had been decided before the news of the victory could reach England.
Admiral Keppel now became the head of the Admiralty. Rodney sailed for
home from Port Royal on the 22d of July; and with his departure the
war in the West Indies and North America may be said to have ended.
Pigot started almost immediately for New York, and remained in
North American waters until the end of October, when he returned to
Barbados, first having detached Hood with thirteen ships of the line
from the main fleet, to cruise off Cap François. It is of interest to
note that at this time Hood took with him from New York the frigate
_Albemarle_, 28, then commanded by Nelson, who had been serving on the
North American station. These various movements were dictated by those
of the enemy, either actually made or supposed to be in contemplation;
for it was an inevitable part of the ill-effects of Rodney's most
imperfect success, that the British fleet was thenceforth on the
defensive purely, with all the perplexities of him who waits upon the
initiative of an opponent. Nothing came of them all, however, for
the war now was but lingering in its death stupor. The defeat of de
Grasse, partial though it was; the abandonment of the enterprise upon
Jamaica; the failure of the attack upon Gibraltar; and the success of
Howe in re-victualling that fortress,--these had taken all heart out
of the French and Spaniards; while the numerical superiority of the
allies, inefficiently though it had been used heretofore, weighed
heavily upon the imagination of the British Government, which now
had abandoned all hope of subduing its American Colonies. Upon the
conclusion of peace, in 1783, Pigot and Hood returned to England,
leaving the Leeward Islands' Station under the command of Rear-Admiral
Sir Richard Hughes, an officer remembered by history only through
Nelson's refusing to obey his orders not to enforce the Navigation
Acts, in 1785.
[Footnote 105: James Saumarez, Lord de Saumarez, G.C.B. Born, 1757.
Commander, 1781. Captain, 1782. Captain of _Russell_ in Rodney's
action, 1782. Knighted for capture of frigate _Réunion_, 1793. Captain
of _Orion_ in Bridport's action, at St. Vincent, and at the Nile (when
he was second in command). Rear-Admiral and Baronet, 1801. Defeated
French and Spaniards off Cadiz, July 12th, 1801. Vice-Admiral, 1805.
Vice-Admiral of England and a peer, 1831. Died, 1836.]
[Footnote 106: _Ante_, p. 183.]
[Footnote 107: Probably _Prudent_, 64. There was no _President_ in the
fleet.]
[Footnote 108: The times and general movements are put together from
Hood's Journal and the Log of the _Canada_, published by the Navy
Records Society. "Letters of Lord Hood," pp. 64, 86.]
[Footnote 109: When ships were in order of battle, or column, close
to the wind, if they all tacked at the same time they would still
be ranged on the same line but steering at an angle to it, on the
opposite tack. This formation was called bow and quarter line, because
each vessel had a comrade off its bow--to one side and ahead--and one
off its quarter--to one side but astern. The advantage of this, if
heading towards the enemy, was that by tacking again together they
would be at once again in column, or line ahead, the customary order
of battle.]
[Footnote 110: Illustrations of other phases of this battle can be
found in Mahan's "Influence of Sea Power upon History," pp. 470, 472.]
[Footnote 111: White, "Naval Researches."]
[Footnote 112: Sharp up by the starboard braces, the wind being on the
starboard quarter. This emptied the aftersails of wind, neutralizing
their effect, and, by causing the ship to move more slowly, kept her
longer abreast an anchored opponent.]
[Footnote 113: White, "Naval Researches."]
[Footnote 114: _Ante_, p. 164.]
[Footnote 115: Seven hundred and twenty feet. For ships of the line
of that day this would make the interval between each two about four
ships' length. At five knots speed this distance would be covered in
something over a minute.]
[Footnote 116: Probably not over one or two hundred yards from the
enemy.]
[Footnote 117: The position, in the French order, of the ships taken
in the battle, is shown by the crosses in Positions 4, 5, 6.]
[Footnote 118: _Canada's_ log, 8.15; reduced to Hood's times, which
are generally followed.]
[Footnote 119: _Ante_, p. 200 (note).]
[Footnote 120: This mishap occurred to three French vessels.]
[Footnote 121: Ross, "Life of Saumarez," i. 71.]
[Footnote 122: Circular pieces of wood which cap the top of the
masts.]
[Footnote 123: Letters of Lord Hood, p. 103. Navy Records Society.]
[Footnote 124: Mundy, "Life of Rodney," ii. 234.]
[Footnote 125: She is thus rated in the British Navy Lists published
between the time of her capture and the receipt of news of her loss;
but she seems to have carried 120 guns.]
[Footnote 126: Letters of Lord Hood, pp. 103, 104.]
[Footnote 127: See letter of Sir Howard Douglas, son to Sir Charles;
"United Service Journal," 1834, Part II, p. 97.]
[Footnote 128: Author's italics; Mundy, "Life of Rodney," ii. 248.]
[Footnote 129: Troude. Chevalier says sixteen, differing with. Troude
as to the whereabouts of the _Brave_.]
[Footnote 130: Letters of Lord Hood, p. 136.]
[Footnote 131: Letters of Lord Hood, p. 134.]
[Footnote 132: Ibid., p. 104.]