NAVAL EVENTS OF 1781 IN EUROPE. DARBY'S RELIEF OF GIBRALTAR, AND THE
BATTLE OF THE DOGGER BANK
In Europe, during the year 1781, the two leading questions which
dominated the action of the belligerents were the protection, or
destruction, of commerce, and the attack and defence of Gibraltar. The
British Channel Fleet was much inferior to the aggregate sea forces of
France and Spain in the waters of Europe; and the Dutch navy also was
now hostile. The French government represented to its allies that by
concentrating their squadrons near the entrance of the Channel they
would control the situation in every point of view; but the Spaniards,
intent upon Gibraltar, declined to withdraw their fleet from Cadiz
until late in the summer, while the French persisted in keeping their
own at Brest. The Channel Fleet was decisively superior to the latter,
and inferior to the Spaniards in numbers only.
No relief having been given Gibraltar since Rodney had left it
in February, 1780, the question of supplying the fortress became
pressing. For this purpose, twenty-eight ships of the line, under
Vice-Admiral George Darby, sailed from St. Helen's on the 13th of
March, 1781, with a large convoy. Off Cork a number of victuallers
joined, and the whole body then proceeded for Gibraltar, accompanied
by five ships of the line which were destined for the East Indies,
as well as by the West India and American "trade." These several
attachments parted from time to time on the way, and on the 11th of
April the main expedition sighted Cape Spartel, on the African coast.
No attempt to intercept it was made by the great Spanish fleet in
Cadiz; and on the 12th of April, at noon, the convoy anchored in the
Bay of Gibraltar. That night thirteen sail of the transports, under
charge of two frigates, slipped out and made their way to Minorca,
then a British possession. The British ships of war continued under
way, cruising in the Bay and Gut of Gibraltar.
As the convoy entered, the besiegers opened a tremendous cannonade,
which was ineffectual, however, to stop the landing of the stores.
More annoyance was caused by a flotilla of gunboats, specially built
for this siege, the peculiar fighting power of which lay in one
26-pounder, whose great length gave a range superior to the batteries
of ships of the line. Being moved by oars as well as by sails, these
little vessels could choose their distance in light airs and calms,
and were used so actively to harass the transports at anchor that
Darby was obliged to cover them with three ships of the line. These
proved powerless effectually to injure the gunboats; but, while the
latter caused great annoyance and petty injury, they did not hinder
the unlading nor even greatly delay it. The experience illustrates
again the unlikelihood that great results can be obtained by petty
means, or that massed force, force concentrated, can be effectually
counteracted either by cheap and ingenious expedients, or by the
coöperative exertions of many small independent units. "They were
only capable of producing trouble and vexation. So far were they from
preventing the succours from being thrown into the garrison, or from
burning the convoy, that the only damage of any consequence that
they did to the shipping was the wounding of the mizzen-mast of the
_Nonsuch_ so much that it required to be shifted."[103] On the 19th
of April--in one week--the revictualling was completed, and the
expedition started back for England. The fleet anchored again at
Spithead on the 22d of May.
While Darby was returning, La Motte Picquet had gone to sea from
Brest with six ships of the line and some frigates to cruise in the
approaches to the Channel. There, on the 2d of May, he fell in with
the convoy returning from the West Indies with the spoils of St.
Eustatius. The ships of war for the most part escaped, but La Motte
Picquet carried twenty-two out of thirty merchant ships into Brest
before he could be intercepted, although a detachment of eight sail
sent by Darby got close upon his heels.
After a long refit, Darby put to sea again, about the 1st of August,
to cover the approach of the large convoys then expected to arrive.
Being greatly delayed by head winds, he had got no further than the
Lizard, when news was brought him that the Franco-Spanish grand fleet,
of forty-nine ships of the line, was cruising near the Scilly Isles.
Having himself but thirty of the line, he put into Tor Bay on the 24th
of August, and moored his squadron across the entrance to the Bay.
This appearance of the allies was a surprise to the British
authorities, who saw thus unexpectedly renewed the invasion of the
Channel made in 1779. Spain, mortified justly by her failure even
to molest the intrusion of succours into Gibraltar, had thought to
retrieve her honour by an attack upon Minorca, for which she asked the
coöperation of France. De Guichen was sent in July with nineteen ships
of the line; and the combined fleets, under the chief command of the
Spanish admiral, Don Luis de Cordova, convoyed the troops into the
Mediterranean beyond the reach of Gibraltar cruisers. Returning thence
into the Atlantic, de Cordova directed his course for the Channel,
keeping far out to sea to conceal his movements. But though thus
successful in reaching his ground unheralded, he made no attempt to
profit by the advantage gained. The question of attacking Darby at
his anchors was discussed in a council of war, at which de Guichen
strongly advocated the measure; but a majority of votes decided
that Great Britain would be less hurt by ruining her fleet than
by intercepting the expected convoys. Even for the latter purpose,
however, de Cordova could not wait. On the 5th of September he
informed de Guichen that he was at liberty to return to Brest; and
he himself went back to Cadiz with thirty-nine ships, nine of which
were French. "This cruise of the combined fleet," says Chevalier,
"diminished the consideration of France and Spain. These two powers
had made a great display of force, without producing the slightest
result." It may be mentioned here that Minorca, after a six months'
siege, capitulated in February, 1782.
While Darby was beating down Channel in the early days of August,
1781, Vice-Admiral Hyde Parker, lately Rodney's second in command in
the West Indies, was returning to England convoying a large merchant
fleet from the Baltic. On the 5th of August, at daylight, a Dutch
squadron, also with a convoy, but outward bound, from the Texel to
the Baltic, was discovered in the south-west, near the Doggersbank.
Heading as the two enemies then were, their courses must shortly
intersect. Parker, therefore, ordered his convoy to steer to the
westward for England, while he himself bore down for the enemy. The
Dutch Rear-Admiral, Johan Arnold Zoutman, on the contrary, kept the
merchant vessels with him, under his lee, but drew out the ships of
war from among them, to form his order on the side towards the enemy.
Each opponent put seven sail into the line. The British vessels,
besides being of different rates, were chiefly very old ships, dragged
out from Rotten Row to meet the pressing emergency caused by the
greatly superior forces which were in coalition against Great Britain.
Owing to the decayed condition of some of them, their batteries had
been lightened, to the detriment of their fighting power. Two of them,
however, were good and new seventy-fours. It is probable that the
Dutch vessels, after a long peace, were not much better than their
antagonists. In fact, each squadron was a scratch lot, in the worst
sense of the phrase. The conduct of the affair by the two admirals,
even to the very intensity of their pugnaciousness, contributes a
tinge of the comic to the history of a desperately fought action. The
breeze was fresh at north-east, and the sea smooth. The Dutch, being
to leeward, awaited attack, forming line on the port tack, heading
south-east by east, a point off the wind, under topsails and
foresails, a cable's length apart. There is little room to doubt that
an adversary who thus holds his ground means to make a stand-up fight,
but Parker, although the sun of a midsummer day had scarcely risen,
thought advisable to order a general chase. Of course, no ship
spared her canvas to this, while the worse sailers had to set their
studdingsails to keep up; and the handling of the sails took the men
off from the preparations for battle. Parker, who doubtless was still
sore over Rodney's censure of the year before, and who moreover had
incurred the Admiralty's rebuke, for apparent hesitation to attack the
enemy's islands while temporarily in command in the West Indies, was
determined now to show the fight that was in him. "It is related that,
upon being informed of the force of the Dutch squadron in the morning,
he replied (pulling up his breeches), 'It matters little what their
force is; we must fight them if they are double the number.'" At 6.10
A.M. the signal was made for line abreast, the ships running down
nearly before the wind. This of course introduced more regularity, the
leading ships taking in their lighter sails to permit the others to
reach their places; but the pace still was rapid. At 6.45 the order
was closed to one cable, and at 7.56 the signal for battle was
hoisted. It is said that at that moment the 80-gun ship was still
securing a studding-sail-boom, which indicates how closely action trod
on the heels of preparation.
The Dutch admiral was as deliberate as Parker was headlong. An English
witness writes:--
"They appeared to be in great order; and their hammocks,
quarter-cloths, etc., were spread in as nice order as if for
show in harbour. Their marines also were well drawn up, and
stood with their muskets shouldered, with all the regularity
and exactness of a review. Their politeness ought to be
remembered by every man in our line; for, as if certain
of what happened, we came down almost end-on upon their
broadsides; yet did not the Dutch admiral fire a gun, or
make the signal to engage, till the red flag was at the
_Fortitude's_ masthead, and her shot finding their way into
his ship. This was a manoeuvre which Admiral Zutman should not
be warmly thanked for by their High Mightinesses; as he had
it in his power to have done infinite mischief to our fleet,
coming down in that unofficer-like manner. Having suffered
Admiral Parker to place himself as he pleased, he calmly
waited till the signal was hoisted on board the _Fortitude_,
and at the same time we saw the signal going up on board
Admiral Zutman's ship."
The British, thus unmolested, rounded-to just to windward of the
enemy. A pilot who was on board their leading ship was for some reason
told to assist in laying her close to her opponent. "By close," he
asked, "do you mean about a ship's breadth?" "Not a gun was fired
on either side," says the official British report, "until within the
distance of half musket-shot." Parker, whom an on-looker describes as
full of life and spirits, here made a mistake, of a routine character,
which somewhat dislocated his order. It was a matter of tradition for
flagship to seek flagship, just as it was to signal a general chase,
and to bear down together, each ship for its opposite, well extended
with the enemy. Now Parker, as was usual, was in the centre of
his line, the fourth ship; but Zoutman was for some reason in the
fifth. Parker therefore placed his fourth by the enemy's fifth. In
consequence, the rear British ship overlapped the enemy, and for a
time had no opponent; while the second and third found themselves
engaged with three of the Dutch. At 8 A.M. the signal for the line
was hauled down, and that for close action hoisted,--thus avoiding a
mistake often made.
All the vessels were soon satisfactorily and hotly at work, and the
action continued with varying phases till 11.35 A.M. The leading two
ships in both orders got well to leeward of the lines, the British two
having to tack to regain their places to windward. Towards the middle
of the engagement the Dutch convoy bore away, back to the Texel, as
the British had steered for England before it began; the difference
being that the voyage was abandoned by the Dutch and completed by
the British. At eleven o'clock Parker made sail, and passed with the
flagship between the enemy and the _Buffalo_, his next ahead and third
in the British order; the three rear ships following close in his
wake, in obedience to the signal for line ahead, which had been
rehoisted at 10.43.[104] A heavy cannonade attended this evolution,
the Dutch fighting gloriously to the last. When it was completed, the
British fleet wore and the action ceased. "I made an effort to form
the line, in order to renew the action," wrote Parker in his report,
"but found it impracticable. The enemy appeared to be in as bad a
condition. Both squadrons lay-to a considerable time near each other,
when the Dutch, with their convoy, bore away for the Texel. We were
not in a condition to follow them."
This was a most satisfactory exhibition of valour, and a most
unsatisfactory battle; magnificent, but not war. The completion of
their voyage by the British merchant ships, while the Dutch were
obliged to return to the port which they had just left, may be
considered to award success, and therefore the essentials of victory,
to Parker's fleet. With this exception the _status quo_ remained much
as before, although one of the Dutch ships sank next day; yet the
British loss, 104 killed and 339 wounded, was nearly as great as
in Keppel's action, where thirty ships fought on each side, or in
Rodney's of April 17th, 1780, where the British had twenty sail;
greater than with Graves off the Chesapeake, and, in proportion, fully
equal to the sanguinary conflicts between Suffren and Hughes in the
East Indies. The Dutch loss is reported as 142 killed, 403 wounded.
Both sides aimed at the hull, as is shown by the injuries; for
though much harm was done aloft, few spars were wholly shot away. The
_Buffalo_, a small ship, had 39 shot through and through her, and a
very great number pierced between wind and water; in the British van
ship as many as 14, another proof that the Dutch fired low.
With the rudimentary notions of manoeuvring evinced, it is not
surprising that Parker was found an unsatisfactory second by an
enlightened tactician like Rodney. The Vice-Admiral, however, laid his
unsuccess to the indifferent quality of his ships. George III visited
the squadron after the action, but Parker was not open to compliments.
"I wish your Majesty better ships and younger officers," he said. "For
myself, I am now too old for service." No rewards were given, and it
is asserted that Parker made no secret that none would be accepted,
if offered, at the hands of the then Admiralty. He voiced the protest
of the Navy and of the nation against the mal-administration of the
peace days, which had left the country unprepared for war. The gallant
veteran was ordered soon afterwards to command in the East Indies. He
sailed for his station in the _Cato_, which was never heard of again.
Though unfruitful in substantial results, Parker's action merits
commemoration; for, after all, even where skill does its utmost,
staunchness such as his shows the sound constitution of a military
body.
[Footnote 103: Beatson, "Military and Naval Memoirs," v. 347.]
[Footnote 104: Sir John Ross, in his "Life of Saumarez," who was
lieutenant in the flagship, says that the flagship only passed ahead
of the _Buffalo_, and that the rear ships closed upon the latter.
The version in the text rests upon the detailed and circumstantial
statements of another lieutenant of the squadron, in Ekins's "Naval
Battles." As Ekins also was present as a midshipman, this gives, as it
were, the confirmation of two witnesses.]