NAVAL OPERATIONS PRECEDING AND DETERMINING THE FALL OF YORKTOWN.
CORNWALLIS SURRENDERS
1781
Having now brought the major naval transactions in the West Indies
to the eve of the great events which determined the independence of
the American States, it is expedient here to resume the thread of
operations, both sea and land, on the American continent, so as to
bring these also up to the same decisive moment, when the military
and naval blended and in mutual support forced the surrender of the
British army at Yorktown under Lord Cornwallis.
It has been said that, to support the operations of Cornwallis in the
Carolinas, Clinton had begun a series of diversions in the valley
of the James River.[94] The first detachment so sent, under General
Leslie, had been transferred speedily to South Carolina, to meet the
exigencies of Cornwallis's campaign. The second, of sixteen hundred
troops under Benedict Arnold, left New York at the end of December,
and began its work on the banks of the James at the end of January,
1781. It advanced to Richmond, nearly a hundred miles from the sea,
wasting the country round about, and finding no opposition adequate to
check its freedom of movement. Returning down stream, on the 20th
it occupied Portsmouth, south of the James River; near the sea, and
valuable as a naval station.
Washington urged Commodore des Touches, who by de Ternay's death had
been left in command of the French squadron at Newport, to interrupt
these proceedings, by dispatching a strong detachment to Chesapeake
Bay; and he asked Rochambeau also to let some troops accompany the
naval division, to support the scanty force which he himself could
spare to Virginia. It happened, however, that a gale of wind just then
had inflicted severe injury upon Arbuthnot's squadron, three of which
had gone to sea from Gardiner's Bay upon a report that three French
ships of the line had left Newport to meet an expected convoy. One
seventy-four, the _Bedford_, was wholly dismasted; another, the
_Culloden_, drove ashore on Long Island and was wrecked. The French
ships had returned to port the day before the gale, but the incident
indisposed des Touches to risk his vessels at sea at that time. He
sent only a sixty-four, with two frigates. These left Newport on
February 9th, and entered the Chesapeake, but were unable to reach
the British vessels, which, being smaller, withdrew up the Elizabeth
River. Arbuthnot, hearing of this expedition, sent orders to some
frigates off Charleston to go to the scene. The French division, when
leaving the Bay, met one of these, the _Romulus_, 44, off the Capes,
captured her, and returned to Newport on February 25th. On the 8th
of March, Arnold reported to Clinton that the Chesapeake was clear of
French vessels.
On the same day Arbuthnot also was writing to Clinton, from Gardiner's
Bay, that the French were evidently preparing to quit Newport. His
utmost diligence had failed as yet to repair entirely the damage done
his squadron by the storm, but on the 9th it was ready for sea. On the
evening of the 8th the French had sailed. On the 10th Arbuthnot knew
it, and, having taken the precaution to move down to the entrance of
the bay, he was able to follow at once. On the 13th he spoke a vessel
which had seen the enemy and gave him their course. Favoured by a
strong north-west wind, and his ships being coppered, he outstripped
the French, only three of which had coppered bottoms. At 6 A.M. of
March 16th a British frigate reported that the enemy were astern--to
the north-east--about a league distant, a thick haze preventing the
squadron from seeing them even at that distance (A, A). Cape Henry,
the southern point of the entrance to the Chesapeake, then bore
southwest by west, distant forty miles. The wind as stated by
Arbuthnot was west; by the French, south-west.
The British admiral at once went about, steering in the direction
reported, and the opposing squadrons soon sighted one another. The
French finding the British between them and their port, hauled to the
wind, which between 8 and 9 shifted to north by west, putting them
to windward. Some preliminary manoeuvres then followed, both parties
seeking the weather-gage. The weather remained thick and squally,
often intercepting the view; and the wind continued to shift until
towards noon, when it settled at north-east. The better sailing, or
the better seamanship, of the British had enabled them to gain so
far upon their opponents that at 1 P.M. they were lying nearly up in
their wake, on the port tack, overhauling them; both squadrons in line
of battle, heading east-south-east, the French bearing from their
pursuers east by south,--one point on the weather bow (B, B). The
wind was rising with squalls, so that the ships lay over well to their
canvas, and the sea was getting big.
As the enemy now was threatening his rear, and had the speed to
overtake, des Touches felt it necessary to resort to the usual parry
to such a thrust, by wearing his squadron and passing on the other
tack. This could be done either together, reversing the order of the
ships, or in succession, preserving the natural order; depending much
upon the distance of the enemy. Having room enough, des Touches
chose the latter, but, as fighting was inevitable, he decided also to
utilise the manoeuvre by surrendering the weather-gage, and passing to
leeward. The advantage of this course was that, with the existing sea
and wind, and the inclination of the ships, the party that had the
opponent on his weather side could open the lower-deck ports and use
those guns. There was thus a great increase of battery power, for the
lower guns were the heaviest. Des Touches accordingly put his helm up,
his line passing in succession to the southward (c) across the head
of the advancing British column, and then hauling up so as to run
parallel to the latter, to leeward, with the wind four points free.
[Illustration]
Arbuthnot accepted the position offered, stood on as he was until
nearly abreast of the French, and at 2 P.M. made the signal to wear.
It does not appear certainly how this was executed; but from the
expression in the official report, "the van of the squadron wore in
the line," and from the fact that the ships which led in the attack
were those which were leading on the port tack,--the tack before
the signal was made,--it seems likely that the movement was made in
succession (a). The whole squadron then stood down into action, but
with the customary result. The ships in the van and centre were all
engaged by 2.30, so Arbuthnot states; but the brunt of the engagement
had already fallen upon the three leading vessels, which got the first
raking fire, and, as is also usual, came to closer action than those
which followed them (C). They therefore not only lost most heavily
in men, but also were so damaged aloft as to be crippled. The British
Vice-Admiral, keeping the signal for the line flying, and not hoisting
that for close action, appears to have caused a movement of indecision
in the squadron,--an evidence again of the hold which the line then
still had upon men's minds. Of this des Touches cleverly availed
himself, by ordering his van ships, which so far had borne the brunt,
to keep away together and haul up on the other tack (e), while the
ships behind them were to wear in succession; that is, in column,
one following the other. The French column then filed by the three
disabled British vessels (d), gave them their broadsides one by one,
and then hauled off to the eastward, quitting the field (D). Arbuthnot
made signal to wear in pursuit, but the _Robust_ and _Prudent_, two
of the van ships, were now wholly unmanageable from the concentration
of fire upon them caused by des Touches's last movement; and the
maintopsail yard of the _London_, the only British three-decker, had
been shot away. The chase therefore was abandoned, and the squadron
put into Chesapeake Bay, for which the wind was fair (D). The French
returned to Newport. The respective losses in men were: British, 30
killed, 73 wounded; French, 72 killed, 112 wounded.
In this encounter, both sides had eight ships in line, besides smaller
craft. The advantage in force was distinctly with the British, who
had one three-decked ship, three 74's, three 64's, and a 50; while
the French had one 84, two 74's, four 64's, and the late British
_Romulus_, 44. Because of this superiority, probably, the action was
considered particularly discreditable by contemporaries; the more
so because several vessels did not engage closely,--a fault laid to
the British admiral's failure to make the signal for close action,
hauling down that for the line. This criticism is interesting, for
it indicates how men's minds were changing; and it shows also that
Arbuthnot had not changed, but still lived in the middle of the
century. The French commodore displayed very considerable tactical
skill; his squadron was handled neatly, quickly, and with precision.
With inferior force he carried off a decided advantage by sheer
intelligence and good management. Unluckily, he failed in resolution
to pursue his advantage. He probably could have controlled the
Chesapeake had he persisted.
His neglect to do so was justified by Commodore de Barras, who on the
10th of May arrived in Newport from France to command the squadron.
This officer, after pointing out the indisputable tactical success,
continued thus:--
"As to the advantage which the English obtained, in fulfilling
their object, that is a necessary consequence of their
superiority, and, _still more_, of their purely defensive
attitude. _It is a principle in war that one should risk much
to defend one's own positions, and very little to attack
those of the enemy._ M. des Touches, whose object was purely
offensive, could and should, when the enemy opposed to him
superior forces, renounce a project which could no longer
succeed, unless, _contrary to all probability_, it ended
not only in beating but also in _destroying entirely_, that
superior squadron."
This exaltation of the defensive above the offensive, this despairing
view of probabilities, this aversion from risks, go far to explain the
French want of success in this war. No matter how badly the enemy was
thrashed, unless he were entirely destroyed, he was still a fleet "in
being," a paralysing factor.
The retreat of des Touches and the coming of Arbuthnot restored to
the British the command of Chesapeake Bay. Clinton, as soon as he
knew that the British and French squadrons had sailed, had sent off
a reinforcement of two thousand troops for Arnold, under General
Phillips. These arrived in Lynnhaven Bay on March 26th, ten days after
the naval battle, and proceeded at once to Portsmouth, Virginia. It is
unnecessary to speak of the various operations of this land force. On
the 9th of May, in consequence of letters received from Cornwallis,
it moved to Petersburg. There on the 13th Phillips died, the command
reverting momentarily to Arnold. On the 20th Cornwallis joined from
Wilmington, North Carolina,[95] and Arnold soon after returned to New
York.
Cornwallis now had with him about seven thousand troops, including the
garrison at Portsmouth; but a serious difference of opinion existed
between him and Clinton, the Commander-in-Chief. The latter had begun
the conquest of South Carolina, and did not welcome the conclusion of
his lieutenant that the conquest could not be maintained away from the
seaboard, unless Virginia also were subdued; for from there, a rich
and populous region, men and supplies supported the American cause
in the south. Cornwallis had tested the asserted strength of the
Royalists in the Carolinas, and had found it wanting. Offensive
operations in Virginia were what he wished; but Clinton did not
approve this project, nor feel that he could spare troops enough for
the purpose. Between October, 1780, and June, 1781, he said, seven
thousand seven hundred and twenty-four effectives had been sent from
New York to the Chesapeake; and he could not understand the failure
to cut off the greatly inferior force of the enemy in Virginia. This
at least did not indicate probable success for a renewed offensive.
The garrison of New York was now short of eleven thousand and could
not be diminished further, as he was threatened with a siege. In
short, the British situation in America had become essentially
false, by the concurring effect of insufficient force and
ex-centric--double--operations. Sent to conquer, their numbers
now were so divided that they could barely maintain the defensive.
Cornwallis therefore was ordered to occupy a defensive position which
should control an anchorage for ships of the line, and to strengthen
himself in it. After some discussion, which revealed further
disagreement, he placed himself at Yorktown, on the peninsula formed
by the James and York rivers. Portsmouth was evacuated, the garrison
reaching Yorktown on the 22d of August. Cornwallis's force was
then seven thousand troops; and there were with him besides about a
thousand seamen, belonging to some half-dozen small vessels, which
were shut up in the York by the arrival from Haïti of the French fleet
under de Grasse, which on August 30th, 1781, had anchored in Lynnhaven
Bay, inside of Cape Henry.
On July 2d Arbuthnot had sailed for England, leaving the command at
New York to Rear-Admiral Thomas Graves. Graves on the same day wrote
to Rodney by the brig _Active_, that intercepted dispatches of the
enemy had revealed that a large division from the West Indies was to
arrive on the American coast during the summer, to coöperate with the
force already in Newport. Rodney, on the other hand, dispatched to New
York on July 7th the _Swallow_ sloop, 16, with word that, if he sent
reinforcements from the West Indies, they would be ordered to make the
Capes of the Chesapeake, and to coast thence to New York. He asked,
therefore, that cruisers with information might be stationed along
that route. Two days later, having then certain news that de Grasse
had sailed for Cap François, he sent this intelligence to Sir Peter
Parker at Jamaica, and gave Sir Samuel Hood preparatory orders to
command a reinforcement of ships destined for the continent. This,
however, was limited in numbers to fifteen sail of the line, Rodney
being misled by his intelligence, which gave fourteen ships as the
size of the French division having the same destination, and reported
that de Grasse himself would convoy the trade from Cap François to
France. On the 24th instructions were issued for Hood to proceed on
this duty. He was first to convoy the trade from Jamaica as far as the
passage between Cuba and Haïti, and thence to make the utmost speed
to the Chesapeake. A false rumour, of French ships reaching Martinique
from Europe, slightly delayed this movement. The convoy was dispatched
to Jamaica with two ships of the line, which Sir Peter Parker was
directed to send at once to America, and requested to reinforce with
others from his own squadron. Hood was detained until the rumour could
be verified. On the 1st of August Rodney sailed for England on leave
of absence. On the 10th Hood left Antigua with fourteen ships of the
line, direct for the Capes. He had already received, on August 3d,
Graves's letter by the _Active_, which he sent back on the 8th with
his answers and with a notification of his speedy departure.
The _Swallow_ and the _Active_ should have reached Graves before Hood;
but neither got to him at all. The _Swallow_ arrived safely in New
York on the 27th of July; but Graves had sailed with all his squadron
on the 21st, for Boston Bay, hoping there to intercept an expected
convoy from France, concerning which a special caution had been sent
him by the Admiralty. The _Swallow_ was at once sent on by the senior
naval officer at New York, but was attacked by hostile vessels, forced
ashore on Long Island, and lost. The _Active_ was captured before she
reached New York. Graves, thus uninformed of the momentous crisis at
hand, continued cruising until the 16th of August, when he returned to
Sandy Hook. There he found the duplicates of the _Swallow's_ letters,
but they only notified him of the course a reinforcement would take,
not that Hood had started. On August 25th the latter, being then off
the Chesapeake, sent duplicates of the _Active's_ dispatches, but
these preceded by little his own arrival on the 28th. That evening
news was received in New York that de Barras had sailed from Newport
on the 25th, with his whole division. Hood anchored outside the Hook,
where Graves, who was senior to him, undertook to join at once. On
the 31st five sail of the line and a 50-gun ship, all that could be
got ready in time, crossed the bar, and the entire body of nineteen
ships of the line started at once for the Chesapeake, whither it was
understood now that both the French fleet and the united armies of
Washington and Rochambeau were hurrying.
Count de Grasse upon his arrival at Cap François had found that many
things must be done before he could sail for the continent. Measures
needed to be taken for the security of Haïti; and a large sum of
money, with a considerable reinforcement of troops, was required to
insure the success of the projected operation, for which but a short
time was allowed, as it was now August and he must be again in the
West Indies in October. It was not the least among the fortunate
concurrences for the American cause at that moment, that de Grasse,
whose military capacity was not conspicuous, showed then a remarkable
energy, politic tact, and breadth of view. He decided to take with him
every ship he could command, postponing the sailing of the convoys;
and by dexterous arrangement with the Spaniards he contrived to secure
both the funds required and an efficient corps of thirty-three hundred
French troops, without stripping Haïti too closely. On the 5th of
August he left Cap François, with twenty-eight ships of the line,
taking the route through the Old Bahama Channel,[96] and anchored
in Lynnhaven Bay, just within the entrance of the Chesapeake, on the
30th, the day before Graves sailed from New York for the same place.
The troops were landed instantly on the south side of the James River,
and soon reached La Fayette, who commanded the forces so far opposed
to Cornwallis, which were thus raised to eight thousand men. At
the same time Washington, having thrown Clinton off his guard, was
crossing the Delaware on his way south, with six thousand regular
troops, two thousand American and four thousand French, to join La
Fayette. French cruisers took position in the James River, to prevent
Cornwallis from crossing, and escaping to the southward into Carolina.
Others were sent to close the mouth of the York. By these detachments
the main fleet was reduced to twenty-four sail of the line.
On the 5th of September, at 8 A.M., the French look-out frigate,
cruising outside Cape Henry, made the signal for a fleet steering for
the Bay. It was hoped at first that this was de Barras's squadron
from Newport, known to be on its way, but it was soon evident from
the numbers that it must be an enemy. The forces now about to be
opposed, nineteen. British sail of the line to twenty-four French,
were constituted as follows: British, two 98's (three-deckers);
twelve 74's, one 70, four 64's, besides frigates; French, one 104
(three-decker),[97] three 80's, seventeen 74's, three 64's.
The mouth of the Chesapeake is about ten miles wide, from Cape Charles
on the north to Cape Henry on the south. The main channel is between
the latter and a shoal, three miles to the northward, called the
Middle Ground. The British fleet, when the French were first seen
from it, was steering south-west for the entrance, under foresails and
topgallant sails, and it so continued, forming line as it approached.
The wind was north-north-east. At noon the ebb-tide made, and the
French began to get under way, but many of their ships had to make
several tacks to clear Cape Henry. Their line was consequently late in
forming, and was by no means regular or closed as they got outside.
At 1 P.M. Graves made the signal to form column on an east and west
line, which with the wind as it was would be the close-hauled line
heading out to sea, on the other tack from that on which his fleet
still was. In this order he continued to head in for the entrance. At
2 P.M. the French van, standing out, three miles distant by estimate,
bore south from the _London_, Graves's flagship, and was therefore
abreast of the centre of the British line. As the British van came
near the Middle Ground, at 2.13 P.M., the ships wore together. This
put them on the same tack as the French, Hood's division, which had
been leading, being now the rear in the reversed order. The fleet then
brought-to,--stopped,--in order to allow the centre of the enemy to
come abreast of the centre of the British (aa, aa.) The two lines
now were nearly parallel, but the British, being five ships fewer,
naturally did not extend so far as the rear of the French, which in
fact was not yet clear of the Cape. At 2.30 Graves made the signal
for the van ship (the _Shrewsbury_), to lead more to starboard
(l)--towards the enemy. As each ship in succession would take her
course to follow the leader, the effect of this was to put the British
on a line inclined to that of the enemy, the van nearest, and as the
signal was renewed three quarters of an hour later,--at 3.17,--this
angle became still more marked (bb).[98] This was the original and
enduring cause of a lamentable failure by which seven of the rear
ships, in an inferior force undertaking to attack, never came into
battle at all. At 3.34 the van was ordered again to keep still more
toward the enemy.
[Illustration]
At 3.46 the signal was made for ships to close to one cable, followed
almost immediately by that to bear down and engage the enemy,--the
signal for the line still flying. Graves's flagship, the _London_, 98
(f), which was hove-to, filled and bore down. Under the conditions,
the van ships of course got first under fire, and the action gradually
extended from them to the twelfth in the order, two ships astern of
the _London_. According to the log of the latter, at 4.11 the signal
for the line ahead was hauled down, that it might not interfere with
that for close action, but at 4.22 it was rehoisted, "the ships not
being sufficiently extended." The meaning of this expression may be
inferred from Beatson's account:--
"The _London_, by taking the lead, had advanced farther
towards the enemy than some of the ships stationed immediately
ahead of her in the line of battle; and upon luffing up (f')
to bring her broadside to bear, they having done the same
thing, her second ahead (m) was brought nearly upon her
weather beam. The other ships ahead of her were likewise too
much crowded together."
As the ship on the _London's_ weather beam could not fire upon the
enemy unless she drew ahead, this condition probably accounts for the
flagship being again hove-to, while firing, as Hood says that she
was. The signal for the line was hauled down again at 4.27, by the
_London's_ log, that for close action being up, and repeated at 5.20,
when Hood (h) at last bore down with his division (h'), but the French
ships bearing up also, he did not near them. Firing ceased shortly
after sunset. The loss of the British was 90 killed, 246 wounded; that
of the French is given only in round numbers, as about 200 killed and
wounded.
Hood's statement introduces certain important qualifications into the
above account:--
"Our centre began to engage at the same time as the van, at
four, but at a most _improper_ distance, and our rear, being
barely within random shot, did not fire while the signal for
the line was flying. The _London_ had the signal for close
action flying, as well as the signal for the line ahead at
_half a cable_ was under her topsails, with the main topsail
to the mast,[99] though the enemy's ships were pushing on."
As showing the improper distance at which the _London_ brought-to to
fire, he says:--
"The second ship astern of her (of the _London_) received
but trifling damage, and the third astern of her received no
damage at all, which most clearly proves [at] how much too
great a distance was the centre division engaged."
The day after the action Hood made a memorandum of his criticisms upon
it, which has been published. The gist of this is as follows. As the
French stood out, their line was not regular or connected. The van was
much separated from the centre and rear, and it appears also, from the
French narratives, that it was to windward of the rest of the fleet.
From these causes it was much exposed to be attacked unsupported.
There was, by Hood's estimate, "a full hour and a half to have engaged
it before any of the rear could have come up." The line of battle
on the port tack, with the then wind, was east and west, and Graves
had first ranged his fleet on it, as the French were doing; but
afterwards, owing to his method of approach, by the van bearing down
and the other ships following in its wake, the two lines, instead of
being parallel, formed an angle, the British centre and rear being
much more distant from the enemy than the van was. This alone would
cause the ships to come into battle successively instead of together,
a fault of itself; but the Commander-in-Chief, according to Hood,
committed the further mistake that he kept the signal for the
line of battle flying until 5.30 P.M., near to sunset. In Hood's
understanding, while that signal flew the position of each ship was
determined by that of Graves's flagship. None could go closer than the
line through her parallel to the enemy. Hence Hood's criticism, which
is marked by much acerbity towards his superior, but does not betray
any consciousness that he himself needed any justification for his
division not having taken part.
"Had the centre gone to the support of the van, _and the signal for
the line been hauled down_, or the Commander-in-Chief had set the
example of close action, _even with the signal for the line flying_,
the van of the enemy must have been cut to pieces, and the rear
division of the British fleet would have been opposed to those ships
the centre division fired at, and at the proper distance for engaging,
or the Rear-Admiral who commanded it[100] would have a great deal to
answer for."[101]
So much for the tactical failure of that day. The question remained
what next was to be done. Graves contemplated renewing the action, but
early in the night was informed that several of the van ships were too
crippled to permit this. He held his ground, however, in sight of the
French, until dark on the 9th, when they were seen for the last time.
They were then under a cloud of sail, and on the morning of the 10th
had disappeared. From their actions during this interval, Hood had
inferred that de Grasse meant to get back into the Chesapeake without
further fighting; and he implies that he advised Graves to anticipate
the enemy in so doing. Though some ships were crippled aloft, the
British batteries were practically intact, nor had men enough been
disabled to prevent any gun in the fleet from being fought. Could but
a single working day be gained in taking up an anchorage, a defensive
order could be assumed, practically impregnable to the enemy, covering
Cornwallis, and not impossibly intercepting the French ships left in
the Bay. In the case of many men such comment might be dismissed as
the idle talk of the captious fault-finder, always to the fore in
life; but in the case of Hood it must be received with deference, for,
but a few months later, when confronted with greater odds, he himself
did the very thing he here recommended, for an object less vital than
the relief of Cornwallis. Having regard to the character of de Grasse,
it is reasonable to believe that, if he had found the British fleet
thus drawn up at anchor in Chesapeake Bay, as he found Hood at St.
Kitts in the following January, he would have waited off the entrance
for de Barras, and then have gone to sea, leaving Washington and
Rochambeau to look at Cornwallis slipping out of their grasp.
On the 10th of September Graves decided to burn the _Terrible_, 74,
which had been, kept afloat with difficulty since the action. This
done, the fleet stood towards the Chesapeake, a frigate going ahead
to reconnoitre. On the 13th, at 6 A.M., Graves wrote to Hood that the
look-outs reported the French at anchor above the Horse Shoe (shoal)
in the Chesapeake, and desired his opinion what to do with the fleet.
To this Hood sent the comforting reply that it was no more than what
he had expected, as the press of sail the (French) fleet carried
on the 9th, and on the night of the 8th, made it very clear to him
what de Grasse's intentions were. He "would be very glad to send an
opinion, but he really knows not what to say in the truly lamentable
state [to which] we have brought ourselves."[102] On the 10th de
Barras had reached the Bay, where he was joined by de Grasse on the
11th, so that there were then present thirty-six French ships of the
line. Graves, therefore, returned to New York, reaching Sandy Hook
September 19th. On the 14th Washington had arrived before Yorktown,
where he took the chief command; and the armies closed in upon
Cornwallis by land as the French fleets had done already by water.
On the 19th of October the British force was compelled to surrender,
seven thousand two hundred and forty-seven troops and eight hundred
and forty seamen laying down their arms. During the siege the latter
had served in the works, the batteries of which were largely composed
of ships' guns.
After Graves's return to New York, Rear-Admiral the Hon. Robert Digby
arrived from England on the 24th of September, to take command of the
station in Arbuthnot's place. He brought with him three ships of the
line; and the two which Sir Peter Parker had been ordered by Rodney to
send on at once had also reached the port. It was decided by the land
and sea officers concerned to attempt the relief of Cornwallis, and
that it was expedient for Graves to remain in command until after this
expedition. He could not start, however, until the 18th of October,
by which time Cornwallis's fate was decided. Graves then departed for
Jamaica to supersede Sir Peter Parker. On the 11th of November Hood
sailed from Sandy Hook with eighteen ships of the line, and on the
5th of December anchored at Barbados. On the 5th of November de Grasse
also quitted the continent with his whole fleet, and returned to the
West Indies.
[Footnote 94: _Ante_, p. 153.]
[Footnote 95: See _ante_, p. 153.]
[Footnote 96: Along the north coast of Cuba, between it and the Bahama
Banks.]
[Footnote 97: The _Ville de Paris_, to which Troude attributes 104
guns. She was considered the biggest and finest ship of her day.]
[Footnote 98: This reproduced the blunder of Byng, between
whose action and the one now under discussion there is a marked
resemblance.]
[Footnote 99: _I.e._ she had stopped.]
[Footnote 100: Hood himself.]
[Footnote 101: Letters of Lord Hood, p. 32. Navy Records Society. My
italics. Concerning the crucial fact of the signal for the line of
battle being kept flying continuously until 5.30 P.M., upon which
there is a direct contradiction between Hood and the log of the
_London_, it is necessary to give the statement of Captain Thomas
White, who was present in the action in one of the rear ships. "If the
_London's_ log, or the log of any other individual ship in the fleet,
confirm this statement," (that Hood was dilatory in obeying the order
for close action), "I shall be induced to fancy that what I that
day saw and heard was a mere chimera of the brain, and that what I
believed to be the signal for the line was not a union jack, but an
_ignis fatuus_ conjured up to mock me." White and Hood also agree
that the signal for the line was rehoisted at 6.30. (White: "Naval
Researches," London, 1830, p. 45.)]
[Footnote 102: "Letters of Lord Hood." Navy Records Society, p. 35.]